Estonian Defence Forces Annual Report 2022

Estonian Defence Forces Annual Report 2022

To the reader

MARTIN HEREM General, Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces

For the Estonian Defence Forces, 2022 began with the escalation of the Ukraine war, and it cannot be called unexpected. The signs had been in the air for a long time, and the EDF and Estonian government state, responded accordingly.

The decision to support Ukraine with weaponry and ammunition had already made at the end of 2021. At the same time, the EDF made proposals to the Minister of Defence for strengthening its defensive capability. Ever since, for the whole rest of the year, we sought out opportunities for supporting Ukraine.

Because of our proactive approach, we now have nothing to second-guess or be ashamed of. We put our values into action and did nothing that would significantly weaken our own national defence capabilities. 2022 was quite a fast-paced year for the EDF, and featured major forward strides and events that constituted a stress test for the organization.

The substantive beginning of the year can be traced to the Cabinet’s decision to allocate additional funding to the EDF for procuring ammunition. More than 300 million euros is a very large sum of money for the government, but in terms of the EDF’s ammunition in a potential wartime situation, it can also be measured in days, as developments in Ukraine have proved. Decisions to allocate additional funding were made in March and September, too, giving the EDF an opportunity to improve its existing capabilities and create completely new ones.

Here are just a few of the most significant steps:

1) Increasing territorial defence by 10,000 fighters. This decision will culminate in autumn 2023 with 10,000 men being called up for reservist training. The move will increase the EDF’s wartime contingent to 36,000.

2) Development of short-range and medium-range air defences. In 2023, the first Piorun man-portable air defence missiles will be delivered. By 2025, the first medium-range air defence battery will arrive in Estonia and enter use. At Exercise Kevadtorm 2023, a nationwide air alert system will be tested, which will give information about targets to air defence personnel and send air raid alerts to the EDF and the civilian population.

3) Increasing indirect fire capability, in the course of which we will procure additional self-propelled K9 howitzers and specific K9 ammunition and loitering munitions (drones). A large part of this will reach the EDF’s stores in 2024 and 2025, with the last deliveries scheduled for 2026.

4) Increasing anti-tank resources will arm the brigades with Spike-LR guided missiles. Territorial defence personnel will be armed with Spike-SRs and Instalaza grenade launchers. The bulk of these systems will also reach Estonia in 2024–2025 and the last deliveries will be made in 2026.

Besides this, the EDF will invest additional funds into situational awareness. At the same time, other, previously-decided developments will continue, e.g. HIMARS, fleet, anti-ship defences, and naval mines. All of this poses a major undertaking for EDF personnel.

It is no exaggeration to say that the decisions made in 2022 will usher in the most intense decade ever in the history of the EDF.

It has made many EDF members reflect on whether we have enough manpower for it all. To be honest, by current standards, we definitely don’t have enough. In fact, there will not be enough people even years down the road. But the events in Ukraine show that we have no other possibility, nor do we have all that much time.

Russia’s behaviour gives no reason to expect a more peaceful course of events or ones that are convenient for us. What can be done now has to be done. Doing it now will prevent us from being in the position Ukraine was in, where preparations had to be made in the middle of a shooting war or are rendered impossible.

At the same time, we have to come to grips with other developments. If necessary, we have to be able to host a increased numbers of NATO allies stationed in Estonia and plan and organize their training in a smarter manner.

To do this part, we established an Estonian Division whose function is coordinate the activity of the units arriving as reinforcements on land, planning, training and if necessary, be responsible for command of the activity. When we established the division, it seemed it was the only way of getting all forces involved in the defence of Estonia coordinated and on the same page. This is no longer just a gut feeling but a conviction.

I know that carrying out all of the above seems nigh-well impossible to many. Maybe it is, but undoubtedly we have much better options than Estonians did in 1918. In any case, Ukrainians would much prefer to be in our shoes, grappling with ambitious preventative goals, not as they were in February 2022. Let us learn what we can from them and make use of what we have: funding, time, peace, so that we can be better prepared to deny the aggressor that Ukraine had to face. ||

EDF

photo by Ardi Hallismaa

Estonia’s Independence Day dawned in 2022 differently than in the past. Before sunrise, columns of Russian Federation tanks rolled across the Ukrainian border, as Ukrainian cities were hit by Russian missile attacks. In Estonia, the flags raised as a symbol of freedom and independence took on an even more poignant meaning. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine meant the horrors of war had returned to Europe.

Toward a free Ukraine and stronger NATO

TUULI DUNETON Undersecretary for Defence Policy at the Estonian Ministry of Defence

The course of the events that stunned the international community could partly be anticipated a few months before, when satellite photos and intelligence betrayed the Kremlin’s hand. The West’s efforts to deter the invasion with unprecedented release of intelligence information, threats of extensive sanctions and 11th hour diplomacy were fruitless. And so we find ourselves in the most fraught security environment in decades, both in Europe and elsewhere.

Naturally, the brave Ukrainians are the ones bearing the brunt of the war –both the soldiers on the battlefield and the civilians enduring the onslaught of missile and drone attacks. Ukraine’s extraordinary resistance has lasted over 100 times longer than what was supposed to be its defeat in a “three-day military operation”.

An impressive counteroffensive in the second half of 2022 liberated one-third of the territory Russia had captured, but 18% of Ukrainian territory is still controlled by Russia at the time of this writing. The war

has taken a massive toll: the footage from Bucha, Izyum and the liberated territory sear the brutal nature of Russia’s unjust war into memory. During late autumn, Russia had destroyed or damaged onehalf of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in an effort to demoralize the population by leaving them in the cold and dark.

Even though optimistic voices have been declaring the Russian war a failure for many long months, we must be prepared for a long war ahead. Despite the heavy casualties, the Russian reserves are well stocked with equipment and ammunition, and there are plenty of people who can still be mobilized, and thereby continue the war at the same intensity up to late 2023.

The priority nature of use of military force and the ostensibly unlimited resources pledged by Putin himself also push the timeline forward and the shortcomings in quality are compensated for by quantity. The high level of support for the war from Russian society has not been dented by Western sanctions or the partial mobiliza-

tion announced in September 2022. It is too early to hail victory.

For NATO and the West, too, the past year has been a challenge-filled litmus test of allied unity, resolve and adaptability. The first deliveries of weapons from the West – Javelins sent from Estonia among them – reached Ukraine already before the invasion.

Yet the fear of escalation meant that actual military aid to Ukraine was slow to match declarations of political will among the allies. The exact makeup of the military aid and the sustainable channelling of the aid are everyday discussion topics. The boundaries to sending more powerful weaponry and equipment to Ukraine have shifted over time, allowing the Ukrainian armed forces to access modern Western anti-aircraft systems, multiple rocket systems and finally tanks, but the barriers have not disappeared completely. A new glass ceiling has now been established – at the time of this writing, it stands in the way of fighter jets.

A Ukrainian soldier in defensive positions in Khorlivka on the Donetsk front.

SIPA photo by Vadim Kudinov / Scanpix

Establishing impactful sanctions, breaking energy dependence and maintaining political unity have required significant effort from Western politicians and diplomats as well as from Western societies. In the form of energy prices and inflation, the war has intruded into everyone’s living room.

Estonia has been a vocal advocate for supporting Ukraine and for isolating Russia and holding it accountable. Estonia is the first country whose total aid to Ukraine has exceeded 1% of its GDP. These efforts are directly based on the most important principles and goals of Estonian security. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not just a military conflict; it is an assault on the whole system of democratic values and rule of law.

The trenches of eastern Ukraine are not only the key to what flag will fly over the cities in that region, but the future of transatlantic security and the Western value space is at stake: not just Ukraine’s own territorial integrity, but everyone’s freedom and the democratic principle that political ambitions forced through at gunpoint cannot pay off.

Russia’s ultimatum of December 2021 illustrates its hostile and aggressive international ambitions. Ukraine was mentioned twice in the three-page document – the rest amounted to a call for NATO return de facto to its 1997 limits.

Among other things, the Russian Federation said it was against the deployment of forces and armaments and any sort of military activity (including exercises) in the eastern NATO members. The Russian Federation does not conceal the fact that it is seeking to overturn the rules-based world order and restore a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and, as every day in Ukraine demonstrates, the Kremlin does not shy away from absorbing high costs and use of military force and nuclear threats to achieve its aims. Russia’s centuries-old imperialistic ambitions have not gone away.

Western leaders have now admitted that the warnings sounded by the Baltics and Poland should have been taken seriously a long time ago: the Russian Federation has not changed and poses a threat. In the light of the Ukraine war, NATO also acknowledged that it cannot rule out coming under a military attack from Russia. The time when

�� The Russian Federation does not conceal the fact that it is seeking to overturn the rules-based world order.

peace could be taken for granted has passed: we are now in an overt and lasting standoff.

The dramatic degradation in the overall security environment led Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, and the entire alliance reappraised the basic tenets of national security. At the NATO summit in Madrid in June 2022, a new strategy was adopted, defining the Russian Federation explicitly as the most significant and direct threat to allied security. Among the key decisions of the summit, it was declared that it is time to replace the tripwire model of deterrence with deterrence by denial.

To be able to truly defend every inch of territory, NATO will have to transition to a reinforced defensive footing. This means battle-ready presence of allies integrated with the host forces on the eastern flank, and dedicated reinforcement units, prepositioned stockpiles, and high-quality defensive plans that regularly train at exercises. Besides that, what is required is allied commitment and capability to quickly direct additional forces in case of a crisis.

To enable all of this, Estonia is creating an Estonian division in the NATO chain

of command. The core of these essential decisions was articulated in Tallinn, based on the military advice of General Martin Herem, and allies were persuaded of the necessity as a joint effort of the Baltic States. For a strong NATO, historic decisions must be made by every separate ally. The war has led to changes in mindset, such as the “Zeitenwende” or end of an era in Germany, and a redoubling of the volume and speed of efforts in Poland and Estonia to develop defensive capability. The Allies, led by the UK, US, Germany and France have significantly increased their commitment to security on the eastern flank.

Yet this is only the beginning. NATO’s collective adaptation to the new reality will require consistent efforts, investments and solidarity. The first waypoint along the way will be the NATO summit in Vilnius this summer.

All allies face the task of ensuring that aggression against NATO cannot happen. The existence of a free, independent and territorially intact Ukraine and bringing to justice the architects of the war and perpetrators of war crimes will reduce the risks to Estonia’s security. ||

Ukrainian defenders resting after the victorious battles near Izyum in September 2022.

AP photo by Evgeniy Maloletka / Scanpix

How the war in Ukraine affected defence resolve among people in Estonia

H. MARTIN REISNER Director of Defence Resolve at the Estonian Ministry of Defence

Since the invasion of Ukraine, all of Estonian society has seen a dramatic rise in the number of people who say they stand ready to defend Estonia, a concept most often translated as “defence willingness” or “defence resolve”. It can be seen in the visibility of the Ukrainian national colours in Estonian cities and towns, the more than 4000 newly minted members of the Defence League and their Women’s Voluntary Defence Organization, and the millions of donations to Ukraine. All this is complemented by the weapons and humanitarian aid given by the public sector.

Opinion polls also make the uptick in sentiment very visible in figures. In public opinion polls, defence willingness is measured according to the share of people who support armed resistance (passive defence resolve) and whether they are personally prepared to enlist and fight (active defence resolve). Passive willingness grew from 72% to 81% last year; active defence resolve is up from 56% to 66%. That gives ample ground to conclude that the events of 2022 added close to 10 percentage points to society’s defence resolve. Looking at only speakers of Estonian as a first language, support for armed resistance rose to 90% and personal readiness to enlist reached 76%.

Based on these figures, it might be concluded that we are in satisfactory if not downright good shape. Looking in depth, however, we see there is a lot of room for improvement.

When we look at where this sort of growth has come from, it turns out that the

oldest age groups are driving the change. Active defence resolve among men over 65 years of age shot up from >76% to 88% - 12 percentage points – but the defence resolve of men age 14-34 only grew 5 percentage points, from 61 to 66%. That is a 22 percentage point difference in defence resolve between the youngest and oldest groups. Indisputably, it is also important that older people want to participate in defence activity, but younger males are even more important when it comes to military defence.

It should also be considered that not all rises in defence resolve are permanent. Defence willingness also rose after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, by seven percentage points, but 18 months later, it had dropped to the pre-annexation level. A drop in defence resolve in subsequent surveys is therefore to be expected. This is due to war fatigue, a cooling economy and other factors that influence people’s willingness to participate in defence. Therefore, the current strong level of willingness can not be taken for granted.

What could be done to increase defence readiness? Above all, to increase defence resolve, the concept must be defined and its influences understood. In the newly updated National Security Concept, it is defined as a “values-based attitude and readiness on the part of the individual and all of society to contribute to broad-based national defence”. If we look at what influences defence resolve, besides societal factors (such

as the form of government) and social and demographic characteristics (age, ethnicity, language etc.), it is also influenced by individual attitudes (pride, perceived threat, training, knowledgeability/awareness, etc.).

The Ministry of Defence’s position is that defence resolve must be developed in

the Defence Forces and among reservists, as the possibilities of the rest of society to act on their own willingness depend on the former.

Conscription and the pre-conscription period have the greatest impact on the state of reservists’ defence resolve, at a time when young people are still determining their value space and attitudes. The national defence curriculum plays a very important role and is the first introduction to the field for many children and teens. The youth organizations of the Defence League (Young Eagles and Home Daughters) are also important. The more substantially and earlier children learn about national defence, the stronger their defence resolve is later in life. For this reason, it is exceedingly important to expand national defence studies and the activity levels of the Defence League youth organizations. The current limitation is finding teachers and youth leaders. So, for our Estonian readers, this is an important point of reflection on possibly participating in national defence studies or the Defence League youth organization.

Conscript training has experienced constant change and, as a result, conscripts’ defence resolve and readiness have also improved. At the same time, various studies have shown that there is plenty of room for improvement in areas such as the belief that Estonia can be defended, or the awareness of why conscription and reserve service is necessary and what their own role as reservists is. This is worth considering for all commanding officers who deal with conscripts and reservists in regard to explaining the topic better to them and resolving the problem areas.

These are two examples that influence the defence resolve of current and future reservists. In 2023, a new unit at the Ministry of Defence was established to attend to precisely the activities in the above examples and beyond. The main goal is to ensure that the Estonian reserve army is prepared to unflinchingly take part in the military defence of the country, that all others in Estonia are ready to contribute to the broad-based defence, and that society as a whole (including the private sector) supports national defence and defenders. ||

Lieutenant Riho Pihelpuu arrived at exercise Siil with the support of his family.

EDF photo by Ardi Hallismaa

What did the first year of the war in Ukraine show about the Russian's strategic thinking?

Russian's strategic thinking

ESTONIAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CENTRE ERIK

MÄNNIK

Research Professor, Estonian Military Academy, Department of Applied Research

In February 2022, the Russian Federation escalated the eight-year-long standoff with Ukraine into a full-scale war, the likes of which had not been seen in Europe for over 70 years. In this war, two very different countries confronted each other: on the one hand, the authoritarian Russia, whose Chief of the General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, thought he had "the world's second army" under his command, and on the other, democratic Ukraine, which aspired to join the EU and NATO.

During the first year of the war, the hostilities have gone through several phases, the analysis of which makes it possible to assess how the Russian Federation has tried to balance the general political and military aims, the ways of achieving military objectives, and the means necessary to achieve them. In other words, it is possible to assess Russia's strategy in the war with Ukraine.

RUSSIA’S POLITICAL AIMS IN THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

Despite President Putin’s claims that Russia aspired to “de-Nazify” and “demilitarize” Ukraine (read: to overthrow the regime in Kyiv and eliminate Ukrainian military power), the deeper roots of the war lie in geopolitics.

The backdrop to the words of the Russian President is formed by the categorical proposals conveyed by the Russian Foreign Ministry to the US and NATO in mid-December 2021. The Russian Federation called for the removal of NATO forces from countries who were not the Alliance members before 27 May 1997, and written guarantees that Ukraine and other countries would not join NATO. Russia wanted the US to commit to halting

any further eastward enlargement of NATO and not station American troops (even in the context of military alliances) in areas where Russia “feels threatened by them”.

To put it another way, the Russian Federation tried, by applying military pressure against Ukraine and threatening to start a war against it, to force NATO to withdraw its armed forces from the soil of the Eastern European countries that joined the Alliance after 1997 and to provide guarantees that Ukraine would not become a NATO member. Had NATO given in to Russia's demands, it would have effectively ceased to be a military alliance whose purpose is to protect the security of its members. As expected, Russia's demands were rejected.

Unfortunately, it is currently impossible to examine documents that might provide a clearer idea of what the Russian leaders were actually thinking or come to a deeper understanding of how realistic they thought it would be that NATO and the US would actually do Russia’s bidding. But it is completely certain that Russia sought to prevent the increase of the EU’s and Western countries’ influence in Ukraine and prevent Ukraine from joining NATO. To this end, Russia wanted to carry out a regime change in Ukraine and deprive the country of military power.

THE CENTRES OF GRAVITY OF RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

In Clausewitz’s view, a war is planned based on the adversary’s main characteristics, from which their centre of gravity – the basis for its power and freedom of movement – can be inferred. In war, all the energy ought to be directed against the centre of gravity.

According to the Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations (AJP-5), at the political-strategic level, moral-strength as well as physical-strength centres of gravity exist. The former may be a particularly strong element of the country’s military forces, while the latter can be a powerful political or religious leader, the ruling elite or a population with a strong defence will.

According to open-source information, Russia outmatched Ukraine significantly in terms of physical power. The Russian Federation's pre-war naval infantry, airborne, and ground forces’ manpower was 2.4 times that of Ukraine. The Russian forces had similar superiority in terms of artillery, with a calibre of 100mm and above, and multiple-launch rocket systems.

The Russian military’s superiority in tanks constituted 3.5:1, in armoured combat vehicles 5.7:1. And tactical aircraft and combat helicopters 7:1 and 12:1, respectively.

The Black Sea Fleet was superior to the Ukrainian Navy in every ship class and had seven surface vessels and six submarines armed with Kalibr cruise missiles. Prior to the war, Russia formed a group of amphibious landing ships, which was capable of transporting 4,500-5,000 naval infantry troops with equipment and weapons. The Russian

Federation had 7,000 short-range and medium-range missiles of various types.

The numerical relationships are bound to be estimates, but they do outline the superiority of Russia in military personnel and equipment. There was also a major difference between the quantities of ammunition available to each side: Ukraine had ammunition sufficient for only six weeks of fighting.

Russia’s moral centre of gravity was President Putin, who had at his disposal the highly centralized power structure of the Russian Federation. In February 2022, Putin’s approval rating was 71%, whereas in the absence of independent media and substantial political opposition, 51–71% of Russians supported a military operation against Ukraine.

It was the opposite in Ukraine, where the Ukrainian people constituted the moral centre of gravity. Immediately before the war, President Zelensky had the trust of 41% of Ukrainians (57% did not have confidence in him).

14% of Ukrainians trusted the Ukrainian government, and only 11% said they trusted the Verkhovna Rada. A total of 64% of Ukrainians felt certain that Ukraine would be able to fend off a Russian invasion and 48% of the

A woman dressed in a Soviet era Red Army uniform directs pedestrian traffic in front of the Lenin Mausoleum.

EPA photo by Sergei Ilnitsky / Scanpix

population was prepared to defend their homeland, bear arms, or to support the Ukrainian armed forces.

Seemingly, the Russian Federation had a number of advantages: it had a larger, better armed military, and its numerical superiority in equipment and air power appeared a decisive advantage. Russia was ruled by an autocrat with sweeping powers, unchallenged by opposition, and who, with the help of the mass media, had mobilised the majority of the Russian population to support the war. Ukraine's armed forces were smaller and in many respects armed with older equipment than Russian forces. Ukraine was a divided state, where the people did not trust political institutions but were willing to defend the country. It was a nation that had staged two victorious revolutions, and broadly speaking, one in every hundred Ukrainians had fought against Russia in the eight-year-long conflict in eastern Ukraine.

PHASES OF WAR: RUSSIA’S COUP ATTACK, OFFENSIVE IN EASTERN UKRAINE

The Russian Federation entered the war with a plan to break the resistance of Ukraine (a country with a population of 40 million people) in 10-14 days. Such an assessment is supported by the size, equipment, and

doctrine of the Russian contingent involved. The capital Kyiv, home to close to three million people, was supposed to be captured in the first three days of the war, with the government overthrown, a pro-Russian faction given the leading role in Verkhovna Rada, and Ukraine’s resistance brought to an end. The plan was founded on the assumptions that Ukraine was a divided country, wherein the people were more concerned with the economy and predominantly indifferent to the fate of their own country's leadership.

The attack was to proceed so quickly that the Western response would be belated and Ukraine's ability to mobilise its forces constrained. Russia’s planners expected to destroy around 50% of the Ukrainian forces in Donbas, and estimated that Ukraine would be able to call up 40,000 reservists. Apparently, Russia did not have a contingency plan in case the invasion failed to achieve its goals.

The coup attack was launched at high speed. Air assault at Hostomel and rapid movement of troops from Belarus toward Kyiv allowed Russian advance units to enter Kyiv’s suburb Obolon on the second day of the war. Moreover, in the first week of the war, three assassination attempts on President Zelensky took place.

Banksy's street art even made it to the wall of a house in Borodyanka house, which was destroyed in the war.

However, by the fourth day of the war, the Russian attack was already stalling, and the partial fulfilment of the operational objectives did not bring Russia any closer to achieving its strategic aims. On the contrary, Russia’s initial success on the Kyiv operational direction rallied the Ukrainian population for military defence against the Russian Federation.

Additional units arrived to defend Kyiv, the Ukrainian leadership did not flee, and its popularity grew. The number of those looking to participate in the defence of Kyiv and Ukraine outstripped the capacity of Ukrainian units to take them in. By the fourth day of the war, Ukraine had mobilized 100,000 fighters. Kyiv’s inhabitants were issued with 25,000 assault rifles, 10 million rounds of ammunition, and other weapons.

The Russian Federation continued its onslaught on Kyiv until 20 March, at which point, buckling under the growing pressure from Ukrainian forces, heavy losses and deepening supply problems, the Russian commanders decided to withdraw from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts.

Thus, only about a month and a half after the start of the war, the Russian Federation’s original plan had failed and it was forced to quickly find some other way to defeat

Ukraine. Russia chose an offensive in eastern Ukraine in the hopes of destroying a large part of the Ukrainian armed forces (the physical centre of gravity), expanding the occupied territory in eastern and southern Ukraine, cutting Ukraine off from Black Sea ports, and forcing a regime change in Kyiv. Russia was probably aware of the Ukrainian military’s dwindling ammunition stocks and hoped to leverage its superiority in equipment and firepower.

The Russian offensive started on 18-19 April. At first, Russia tried to achieve breakthroughs with armoured units, but due to the shortage of infantry and heavy equipment losses, such attempts were abandoned. Subsequently, the Russian forces attacked with the support of an extremely intensive artillery barrage to force the Ukrainian units to abandon their positions. In May and June 2022, the Russian Federation had a 12:1 superiority in artillery and fired 20,000-30,000 shells a day. In August, Russian artillery fired up to 40,000-60,000 shells a day.

At the same time, personnel problems in the Russian units worsened. Some Russian Federation battalion tactical groups lacked sufficient numbers of infantry from the beginning of war and as the offensive continued, it became increasingly harder to compensate for losses and

Zumapress photo by Sergei Chuzavkov / Scanpix

to restore the units’ combat power. Russia tried to solve the problem by mobilizing inhabitants in occupied areas and other measures, but to no avail. By the end of June, the Russian offensive was losing momentum and an operational pause to restore units’ combat power was needed. In August, the personnel shortages were becoming severe and motor rifle units fighting in Ukraine were even reinforced with personnel drawn from the Navy and Strategic Missile Forces; but by the second half of the month, it was clear that the Russian offensive had culminated.

The critical period for Ukraine was from April to June 2022. During this period, the ammunition stocks of Ukrainian artillery were depleted, and the transition to using Western equipment and ammunition began. As of April 2022, Ukraine started to receive tanks, artillery, armoured vehicles, attack helicopters, air defence, anti-tank, and anti-ship missiles. The US M777 howitzers arrived in Ukraine in April, and the HIMARS multiple launch rocket systems in June. By August, the Ukrainian Air Force had received AGM-88 anti-radiation missiles.

By the end of the summer, Russia’s five-month-long offensive had managed to push Ukrainian forces back, but not destroy them. Russian units had sustained heavy losses and a very large amount of ammunition had been expended, all without attaining the set objectives.

A Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv and Kherson oblast then forced Russia to announce a partial mobilization and switch to defence. The Russian Federation now faced a different Ukraine. Ukraine's ability to wage war with its own resources was largely exhausted and the Western-supplied arms, ammunition, and other military support became Ukraine’s strategic physical centre of gravity. Simultaneously, Ukraine's moral centre of gravity had become stronger, as its people still had a strong will to defend themselves and, in addition, now had confidence in their president and government.

Ukraine, however, had suffered heavily in the war: in September 2022, unemployment reached 34%, inflation 24%, the grain harvest was down 45% from 2021, 13.3 million people (32% of the population) had left their homes, and GDP had fallen by 30%. Almost 50% of Ukraine's energy facilities had suffered minor or major damage.

While requiring time to rebuild its conventional forces, the Russian Federation aimed its main effort against the Ukrainian population (moral centre of gravity), probably seeking (1) to break the Ukrainian people's defensive will and their resistance, (2) to throw the Ukrainian economy into freefall, (3) to unleash a Ukraine-wide humanitarian catastrophe.

Russia began a concerted assault on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure on 11 September 2022 and by 20 February 2023, it had launched about 20 attacks in which energy facilities were struck by 255 missiles and loitering munitions.

Ukrainian air defences managed to destroy 33–87% of the incoming missiles and loitering munitions. Despite continuous repairs, the Ukrainian energy system kept

accumulating damage and the attack of 23 November 2022, where 19 cruise missiles penetrated air defences, resulted in a total blackout in 11 Ukrainian oblasts. At the end of November, the electricity deficit in Ukraine's energy grid stood at 30% and nearly 50% of the country's energy facilities remained damaged. At the end of 2022, the situation was considered critical in Kyiv and by early February 2023, Ukraine had lost 44% of its nuclear energy generating capacity, 75% of its thermal power plant capacity, and 33% of its co-generation capacity.

Yet still Ukraine did not fall. This was the result of a relatively warm winter, a significant amount of provi-

ded anti-aircraft weaponry, and 1,700 generators, 1,000 transformers, and a large amount of other equipment received from 30 countries, which enabled the restoration of damaged power grids and the generation of electricity where it was needed. Imports of electricity from the EU also started at the turn of the year.

On 11 January 2023, Army General Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff, was appointed the commander of the Russian forces in Ukraine. The beginning of a new Russian offensive in Eastern Ukraine has been associated with this appointment. In January and February 2023, the average daily losses of the Russian forces

Colorful ceremony of Putin's youth to see off the fallen in Luhansk.

Reuters photo by Alexander Ermochenko / Scanpix

increased by 23% and 53%, respectively, as compared to December 2022, and units made up of mobilised personnel were sent to the frontlines from various training grounds. At the cost of heavy losses, Russian forces managed to increase the occupied territory by 85–230 km2 (0.01–0.04%) in February.

MEANS AND RESOURCES USED BY RUSSIA IN PURSUIT OF ITS OBJECTIVES

The use of resources by the Russian military in the Ukraine war was initially characterized by the desire to achieve the war aims primarily with peacetime forces. Such an approach was abandoned only when it was utterly clear that the existing means were insufficient for prosecuting the war.

Before the war, Russia had amassed at least 75% of its conventional forces on Ukraine’s borders (120- 136 battalion tactical groups) and Ukraine was within striking distance for 500 Russian tactical aircraft and 50 bombers.

In May, the Russian command had 146 battalion tactical groups in eastern Ukraine, of which 91-93 took active part in hostilities, 13 tactical groups were restoring their combat power, and 40 were held in reserve. These units also included 136 battalion tactical groups, which were used by the Russian Federation for invasion, and units composed of mobilised personnel from Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts.

Despite the measures taken, by the end of summer 2022, the number of troops at the disposal of the Russian command had fallen to 150,000 (the employment of battalion tactical groups was already abandoned in June).

The partial mobilization announced on 21 September 2022 resulted in 300,000 reservists being called up, of whom 150,000 were sent to the combat zone by early December and 150,000 draftees were sent to various training grounds for combat training.

CONCLUSION

None of the strategies employed by the Russian Federation have been successful. The attempt to keep Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence and prevent its accession into NATO and the EU – which was to be achieved through the coup attack, conventional warfare, and destruction of Ukrainian energy infrastructure – has produced the opposite result. NATO has enlarged again, Ukrainian military cooperation with the US, NATO members and third countries is more robust than ever, and, during the war, Ukraine was granted EU candidate status.

The following key features can be identified in the strategic thinking of the Russian Federation:

• Russia did not comprehend the distinctive features of the country it invaded and failed to correctly assess its centres of gravity. The Russian Federation failed to

This is how the Russians' attempt to cross the Siverskyi Donets River in May 2022 ended.

understand that people comprise Ukraine’s moral centre of gravity, nor the extent to which the Ukrainian people are willing to defend their country. Nor was Russia able to correctly assess the readiness of the West to arm Ukraine once Ukraine’s own resources were exhausted, and to keep Ukrainian energy systems in operation to offset the impact of the Russian attacks.

• The Russian Federation failed to understand/factor in the nature of the war it was unleashing. Russia's military action was aimed at overthrowing the Ukrainian government, eliminating the armed forces, and changing the political orientation of the country, essentially meaning its destruction. Russia’s expectation that the Ukrainians would remain passive onlookers was either based on false information or is an indication of Russia’s inability to correctly evaluate the information it had gathered.

• Russia has so far been unwilling to maximise the military effort. Russia’s misjudgements about the nature of the war to be fought and Ukraine's sources of power led to a situation where a partial mobilisation was only organised when the Russian front in Ukraine began to crumble. Despite the fact that Russia has waged an intensive war for a whole year, Moscow has still not defined the conflict as a war, imposed a state of martial law in Russia, or mobilized all its resources. It is likely that the Russian regime is not prepared to deal with the possible public reaction to the declaration of martial law.

• Russia has been adamant and inflexible with regard to the political objectives of the war. Despite the lack of success during the first year of the war, Russia has not given up its goal of preventing Ukraine from joining NATO and the EU, and establishing full control over Ukraine’s policies.

• The Russian Federation has tried to implement the approved plans to the point where it has become untenable. Both the attack on Kiev and the course of the spring offensive of 2022 show that Russia does not react quickly when the assumptions on which its strategy is based are proved invalid and the situation changes.

• Russia’s military thinking can be considered to be rational and adhering to the principles of total war. Leaving aside the coup attack, in the planning of which special services played a major role, Russia was able in both May-June and November-December last year to put the Ukrainian armed forces and the country in a very difficult situation which, without Western support, could have forced Kiev to make concessions. Russia has shown that, when waging a war, it attacks a country at several levels, targeting armed forces, population, and civilian and military infrastructure.

• Russia’s strategy and implementation of the strategy do not balance flexibly set goals, the ways selected to achieve them, and the allocated resources. Russia’s unwillingness to change the political aims behind the war, its inability to understand Ukraine and its allies, its rigidity in following the approved plans, and its slowness in mobilising the necessary resources characterise Russia as a country that has fought in Ukraine clumsily and in a somewhat misguided, but thoroughly unrelenting manner.

With regard to Estonia's military security, it can be concluded that Russia may resort to military force on the basis of fundamental miscalculations, and that once it has entered a conflict, it will not easily withdraw from it. Russia's persistence in pursuing its objectives and its deep disregard for losses could place the war in Ukraine on a par with the Winter War, World War II, and the Chechen war of December 1994. The USSR and its successor, Russia, started these wars with strategies based on misjudgements, but paid for their mistakes in soldiers' blood, subsequently changing their approach and beginning to impose their will on their opponents in an increasingly methodical way. This means that the message conveyed to Russia in the deterrence process about the likely cost of aggression must really mean severe consequences for Russia, and that Moscow must have no doubt that this will indeed be the case. ||

This text is based on a longer article on the Russian Federation's strategy in the war in Ukraine, which will be published this year in the Estonian Journal of Military Studies (No. 22).

AP photo by Ukrainian Defence Forces / Scanpix

Supporting Ukraine –meeting wartime needs in peacetime conditions

Estonia was able to deliver part of the artillery to the defenders of Ukraine.

Although the war was in the air already in late 2021 and the question of supporting Ukraine was topical by that time, for reasons beyond our control, the only weapons delivered in the first package were Javelin anti-tank missiles in mid-February 2022. That shipment was transported in peacetime conditions, where all transport routes were still open.

But on 24 February, international rhetoric and the security situation changed, necessitating much larger transport volumes with fewer avenues for getting the aid to the destination.

On 24 February 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced the Estonian Defence Forces to adjust to new rules of play, and logisticians were no exception. Both the amount of work and the urgency had to be stepped up while adhering to the current domestic and international legal framework.

TOOMAS PÄRNPUU

Major, Commander of the Support Command’s Movement and Transportation Service

EDF photo by Martin Hiir

Speed was critical not only when it came to transporting the equipment, but the whole chain of the donation process had to be efficient, starting from the executive decisions to assembling the deliveries at the Estonian Defence Forces stockpiles. As such, the timeframe for analysing, planning and preparing consignments was much shorter, and transport had to be arranged the very next day following a decision from the high command.

Our decisions regarding the equipment to be sent were based on Ukraine’s needs and our own possibilities. That means we had to give what Ukraine actually needed in that timeframe, not that we were giving our own surplus or cast-off items. It was also necessary to analyse how the military aid we gave would impact the Estonian Defence Forces’ own combat capabilities, and if need be, find compensatory measures for filling any gaps in capabilities. For that reason, the decisions on donation were not made by autocratically; rather, representatives from various areas and experts from different branches of the military were involved as well.

In the beginning of the war, small arms and light weapons, SALW ammunition and personal protective gear made up the bulk of the shipments, but as the war continued, heavy weaponry and equipment gained in share. Unlike SALW, support in the form of weapons and equipment does not end with the delivery, as technical know-how and training are also necessary. It may seem easy to wax sarcastic about the donated aid, such as asking how much rifles will change the course of a battle, but it should be remembered that in battle, a draftee with a rifle and a Molotov cocktail is superior to a volunteer clutching only a Molotov.

Transporting the military aid to Ukraine was very different from conventional freight forwarding. Due to the combat activity and the closed airspace, there was no possibility of quickly using air transport to deliver the aid directly.

Alternative channels had to be found. One was to set up logistical intermediate bases on the Ukrainian border. The Ukrainians handled the last leg, transporting to the battlefield the equipment that we delivered to the abovementioned bases. After all, they knew best where they would need a given piece of equipment.

After the first shipment of Javelins, which was delivered before the invasion began, the next consignment consisted four trucks laden with military equipment departing 26 February, just two days after the war started.

Almost 2,500 tons of military aid on almost 5,000 pallets were delivered to

Estonia was so fast in dispatching the first shipments that when the shipment was sent, we did not yet know its destination, nor were the intermediate bases ready for transit. To alleviate the situation, an Estonian Defence Forces liaison officer was sent to the intermediate base to start organizing transfer of control of the equipment on site.

Since the dispatching of the shipments took place much faster than in peacetime – often just a day after the decision – there was a heavy load on the Estonian embassies in the destination countries to secure aviation and border crossing permits under expedited procedure.

Assembling and releasing the aid shipments from the Estonian Defence Forces stockpiles was also a challenge. Since speed was of the essence in the early phase of the war, and the most time-critical materiel had to be sent to the front, personnel preparing the transport had take time away from their everyday work. Just like throughout the transport chain, wartime-type time constraints had to be observed in the stockpiles, even though it was peacetime. That means that peacetime legal formalities had to be fulfilled, from releasing the goods to writing them off the books.

Although arranging transport for military aid in the early phase of the war progressed in rather chaotic fashion, after a few weeks, internationally standard procedures were in place. Transport channels were agreed collectively, and so were the procedures for using logistical intermediate bases in Ukraine’s immediate neighbouring countries. The International Donor Coordination Centre (IDCC) helped stabilize the confusing situation, coordinating movements of the aid shipments between the countries and helping to resolve any problems that came up.

In total, close to 2500 tonnes of military aid on nearly 5000 pallets of goods were delivered to Ukraine from Estonia in 2022. Air transport relied on eight military and seven private sector planes and 22 Estonian Defence Forces and 171 private-sector trucks were used for the road transport.

Did the Estonian Defence Forces learn any lessons from the Ukraine support operations? Certainly. For example, we became wiser about how Estonia could accept military aid in a similar situation, and how to release or send out Estonian Defence Forces equipment in an expedited manner without getting bogged down in red tape. ||

to Ukraine by plane.

EDF photo by Martin Hiir

Training Ukrainians in Estonia

Your country may be pretty small compared to ours. But the aid that your people and government give us is huge. I don’t know when we will win and Ukraine will return to peace. But I do know this is our country, it’s where our parents, homes, our roots are, and we don’t have another option but to fight the aggressor until they are destroyed.”

Those were words from one Ukrainian officer who was recently in Estonia for training. Due to security rules (governing personnel, training and the operation), the Estonian Defence Forces and Ukraine do not talk publicly about the Ukrainian Defence Forces personnel receiving training in Estonia. Here as well, in a yearbook meant for the public, we cannot go into much detail, either, but in taking stock of the milestones of last year, we will shed some light (just a little) on a topic that was up to now kept completely silent. As of this writing, five artillery units and hundreds of infantrymen have received training.

Years ago, Ukraine decided to change over from compulsory military service to a professional army. This decision was surely a carefully considered and rational move for peacetime, given the size of the country, but deprived Ukraine’s national defence of one of the most valuable assets – trained reserve units. Those who were drafted and volunteered certainly had the will and motivation to defend Ukraine, but that is not enough on the battlefield: soldiers need all sorts of specialized skills to survive and cause as much damage as possible to the enemy.

Ukraine lacked resources for training new units and at the 15 November meeting of European Union defence ministers in Brussels, there was a call for member states to provide training to the Ukrainian Defence Forces everywhere on the territory of the EU. Estonia began preparations for training Ukrainian soldiers even before that meeting: in April, artillery personnel made their plans and the Scouts Battalion began preparing their programme in the summer.

MARINA LOŠTŠINA

Lieutenant, Public Affairs Officer, 1st Infantry Brigade

�� That is not enough on the battlefield: soldiers need all sorts of specialized skills to survive and cause as much damage as possible to the enemy.

“Teaching Ukrainian soldiers is an honour and entails a great amount of responsibility. It can’t be denied that it’s also a challenging task. That is mainly due to the time factor. There is little time for rehearsing the skills being taught,“ said Lt. Colonel Ranno Raudsik, the commander of the Scouts Battalion.

“We teach our future reservists in increments and all the main skills that they receive during soldier basic training and the following specialized courses can be refined and committed to muscle memory depending on the length of the service for at least six months. Ukrainian soldiers don’t have that luxury,” he cited as an example and added that the programme was designed accordingly to reflect needs and possibilities of units.

“We try to get the maximum from the amount of time given us. We’ve omitted everything that soldiers don’t need on the battlefield, and have focused on the crucial top priority parts. The training is intense, the work days are 12 hours long and there is only day off from training each week.”

The artillery battalion which organized artillery personnel training also faced a challenging task: how to train effective howitzer teams in as short a space of time as possible. In other words, allow the Ukrainians to master troubleshooting, weapons handling, safety protocols and other skills needed to be successful in completing their task.

The training programme designers worked closely with Ukrainian defence forces members in the process. The outline of the training and the main topics were decided based on their experiences and desires, textbooks were translated into Russian, and educational resources needed for the training were procured.

“We knew the soldiers had an artillery background and they were not strangers to use of howitzers. They were familiar with transitioning from movement to shooting position and other procedures. For that reason, the FH70 training was shorter. We mapped the necessary topics that were different from the systems they knew well, we laid the emphasis there and crammed the topics into the time allotted to us,” said Lt. Col. Allan Raidma, the commander of the artillery battalion.

Ukrainian unit during training in Estonia.

Regardless of their speciality, Ukrainian soldiers receive basic training and performance is verified at live-fire exercises. “A soldier’s motivation and clear understanding of why they have to learn these skill sets contribute to making the training a success,” says Raudsik and adds that it is complicated to train Ukrainian soldiers but the motivation is very high in spite of the difficulties. “They understand why it’s all necessary: mastering beneficial material increases their survival ability and are keen to learn. At the end of the training programme, they will be able to serve effectively as a cohesive unit in defence and offensives.”

“We provide support to them around the clock. They know that if they have a question or a problem that needs to be solved, they can call us at 3am at night and we’ll help,” said Lt. Col. Raidma, and added that the Ukrainians have said the training in Estonia has been effective and valuable. “The main message is that speed and experience on the battlefield come faster to them thanks to the training in Estonia.” The commanders of both battalions also note that they have remained in contact with the soldiers of the units who completed training here. ||

EDF photo by Ardi Hallismaa

The Estonian Division

The first and most important function of the Estonian Defence Forces has always been to defend Estonia in Estonia. Considering our geographical position, our tumultuous history and the fact that fate has dealt us an extremely aggressive and bad neighbour, this has never been an easy task. But since Estonia joined NATO, we fortunately do not have to carry the entire load by ourselves. Estonia has gained additional defenders. True, not all allies have had an identical appraisal of the military threat posed by Russia and although security of the eastern flank has always been considered important, in the past direct military defence has not been the top priority.

Our allies’ views, however, are changing. The wanton, brazen and completely unjust and unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine has now served as an alarm bell for many. As a result, the 2022 Madrid summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) decided to significantly reinforce the alliance’s deterrent and defensive footing and reinforce protection of NATO’s eastern flank. Among other things, it was decided to establish a division operating within the NATO framework and meant for the defence of Estonia, the units and staff of which consist of personnel from both Estonia and our allies. In addition, the Estonian and UK prime ministers agreed that the UK would increase its presence

VEIKO-VELLO PALM Major General, Commander of the Estonian Division

The newly established Estonian Division helps integrate national and allied capabilities into a unified striking force.

in Estonia and work with Estonia so that the division can achieve combat capability, supporting it with additional units.

By its decision of 8 December 2022, the cabinet amended the statute of the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF), establishing a division as a structural unit of the EDF. The establishment of the division stems directly from military Estonian defence needs: we need a command level that helps shape Estonian units – our brigades and territorial defence districts and the allied units who contribute – into a united striking force. The division is also the top military tier that helps link and combine operations in different domains, such as land, sea, air, cyber and information operations. The

division was also a necessity because of the military logic of the NATO command chain. Military activities in Estonia’s region are under the command of a multinational corps that requires a command element – a division – below it.

That corps is NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast, whose area of responsibility is Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. Multinational Corps Northeast incorporates both the Estonian Division and the Multinational Division North and Multinational Division Northeast to the south of us. If necessary, the divisions’ staffs are prepared to control additional brigade-size units that are sent to NATO’s north-eastern flank as support.

Allied tanks in exercise Bold Hussar 2022.

EDF photo by Martin Liiskmaa

The Multinational Corps Northeast staff, which is subordinate to the NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum, is based in Szczecin, Poland, and is in standing readiness to lead land operations on NATO’s north-eastern flank. Also subordinate to Brunssum are the NATO multinational battlegroups and staff elements, and the high-readiness NATO Response Forces.

The establishment of the Estonian Division has gone rapidly. In just a few months, we have sprinted ahead from theoretical tabletop exercises to a concrete unit. The changes that still lie ahead for us are certainly among the greatest that our Defence Forces have experienced during its post-re-independence history.

It is important to do things the right way, but even more crucial to do the right things. The creation of Estonia’s own division is the best way of ensuring that our country is even better militarily defended. The Division allows us to consolidate Estonian and NATO long-range fire power into a united whole to wage a better targeted deep operation to prevent the adversary from invading outright or sensing that it can operate unchallenged, no matter how far from our borders. The Estonian Division will help make the entire country more secure so that our government and structures can continue to function during a crisis. It will also allow us to improve security in our greater region and in NATO as a whole.

It is also important to note that we are not the only ones facing major changes – a similar picture can be seen in neighbouring countries and in NATO as a whole. Many have to face even more trying challenges. Who could have imagined in early 2022 that our good friends Finland and Sweden would also become our staunch allies in NATO?

The division will lay even better opportunities to plan and rehearse the military defence in Estonia and the Baltic region as a whole within the framework of NATO. This will create possibilities for rapidly utilizing

the forces and capabilities based in Estonia and ones being added for reinforcement. What is very important for us is that the process of bringing the entire allied power here will get better and Estonia will become, so to speak, a plug-and-play environment for allied units – in other words, allied forces and or capabilities can quickly be combined under the command of the division and its staff. It must be possible to plug these units into the division like a plug into a socket, so the units to get their orders for actions that Estonia needs at a given point in time.

The establishment of the Estonian Division proceeds from the principle that It is not meant only for combining existing capabilities. In other words, if the allies should station weapons like HIMARS or medium-range air defences in Estonia before we procure our own systems, they could be integrated with the division’s units in a streamlined manner.

The division’s battles will have to span weeks so we must be capable of having a longer and more effective look-ahead at the course of battles and shape the battlefield so that we can enjoy success during that timeframe. Using the division’s existing capabilities and additional ones to be provided, we will start influencing the battle and war from much greater distances, deep in the adversary’s rear area and on our own territory as a whole.

The creation of the division staff and the entire division is a major test. To do it, we will have to reorganize the current General Staff of the Defence Forces and a few other Defence Forces sub-units. Besides brigades, the Headquarters and Signals Battalion, Logistics Battalion and Artillery Battalion were brought under the division's command; and so will the HIMARS systems and other capabilities to be procured. We must help our brigades fight battles, making them “lighter”. We will take away capabilities that are not directly related to warfare, and thus make them more mobile, able to be repositioned as quickly as possible.

For the purpose of creating the Estonian Division, the British

government decided that it would allocate one UK brigade alongside two Estonian infantry brigades. The UK brigade will be based in the UK during peacetime but by agreement if a wartime footing should develop, it would move to Estonia and begin serving in the Estonian Division’s chain of command, which, in turn, is in the NATO chain of command.

To understand the British decision, it should be considered that the allocation of the brigade was not only pledged to Estonia but to NATO as well, and NATO military planners will take this into account.

The units in the UK brigade will begin attending regular exercises here to get used to operating In conjunction with the EDF, division and brigades, just as has been done for years in NATO’s eFP framework. In recent years, nearly all of the British artillery, tank and infantry units have rotated through the multinational battlegroup in Estonia. During that time, over 10,000 British army personnel have been stationed in Estonia, which is a noteworthy number considering that the entire army is 70,000 strong.

The changes will also mean the need for training, and the US and UK have already extended a helping hand in terms of documentation and know-how. We will continue cooperation in this field and join training programmes to get the division up and running.

We will also invite allies with the suitable training and the experiences we need to join the division’s staff. All this will require great effort but is also an fascinating, necessary experience. A fast-paced but extremely exciting time lies ahead.

The Estonian Division will not be formed from zero – it has an historical legacy. A division was first established in Estonia in 1917, when the 1st Infantry Division was established to command national forces. It existed until 1940. The current division will re-adopt the historical shield-shaped emblem depicting the Roman numeral I. ||

Estonia's defensive capabilities have been systematically improved over the long term, with significant strides made in recent years. This progress has recently accelerated, increasingly positioning Estonia to defend itself effectively should the need arise. The nation has successfully maintained defence spending at over 2% of GDP for the last decade, ensuring the efficient utilization of funds allocated for national defence and contributing to the continued enhancement of its defence capabilities and infrastructure.

A year that determined defence and capability planning principles for the next decade

IVO PEETS

Major, Estonian Military Academy, Chief of Estonian Defence Forces Force Development Project

The ongoing geopolitical changes brought about by Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine have compelled Estonia to make threat-level-based adjustments to its existing plans. As a result, Estonia has accelerated the implementation of its programs, with defence spending now exceeding 3% of GDP. This highlights the nation's commitment to adapting and responding to the evolving security landscape.

This year, we have had to refine our defence and capability planning, focusing our development efforts exclusively on countering existential threats. The reasons for this adjustment include:

• Russia has overtly declared a large part of Ukraine to be its own territory. It has no intention of relinquishing these annexed provinces and these could spark new future conflicts.

• The persistent potential for Russia to invade other neighbouring countries necessitates our preparedness to defend against any aggression.

• The need to avoid underestimating Russia's military capability, as the nation has shown that its quantitative advantage can compensate for any shortcomings in

quality. Throughout history and under various regimes, Russia has consistently prioritized its military. No sacrifice is considered too great to maintain its power.

• Russia extensively uses various non-conventional means to impose its will on others. However, its military engages in conventional warfare on the battlefield, primarily emphasizing ground combat.

In the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine, establishing credible deterrence requires focusing on developing additional capabilities that render the cost of aggression unacceptably high for potential aggressors. Consequently, maximizing combat capability becomes the prevailing concern for defence and capability planning in the near to medium term, taking precedence over potential long-term risks to force sustainability.

For defence planners, this means that the following factors have to be considered:

LOCATION

Estonia's strategic position in the Baltic Sea region highlights the importance of its actual defence capabilities. Although the country's defence spending surpasses

FOR THE FUTURE

▶ As a result of the plans devised and decisions made this year, the Estonian Defence Forces' conventional capabilities are set to significantly increase. Key developments include:

▶ Expansion of the operational structure: The target level outlined in the development plan will encompass nearly 40,000 fully equipped and armed soldiers, along with necessary equipment.

▶ Army structure reorganization: Establishment of a permanent territorial division that will coordinate combat operations between Territorial Defence districts, brigades, and other armed services, serving as a connecting link between our allies and their military capabilities

▶ Deep operations support: Capabilities necessary for conducting and supporting deep operations will be developed, creating more expansive conditions for shaping the battlefield and mitigating losses.

▶ Enhanced reconnaissance capability: Additional units will be formed or reinforced at the division and structural unit level to improve situational awareness and battlefield manoeuvrability.

▶ Enhancing army fire and manoeuvre: The division's infantry brigades will transition to armoured vehicles and related platforms, increasing firepower, mobility, and anti-tank capabilities.

▶ Unmanned system procurement: Unmanned systems, sensors, and surveillance equipment will be acquired to support manoeuvre and combat, improving situational awareness and overall capabilities against adversaries in various conditions.

▶ Improved sustainability: Measures will be implemented to enhance the Estonian Defence Forces' resilience in the event of a long-term conventional conflict.

▶ Medium-range anti-aircraft system acquisition: This will support and enhance mobilization efficiency and ensure the necessary security for hosting additional allies.

▶ Air surveillance and anti-aircraft system upgrades: Both systems will be modernized.

▶ Naval domain enhancements: Anti-ship capability will be developed.

▶ Improved command, control, and communication capabilities: The Estonian Defence Forces' command and control and communication capabilities will be enhanced.

▶ Increased ammunition stocks: Ammunition stocks will be increased to correspond with NATO regional plans.

Soldier carrying a Spike LR anti-tank gun at the Central Training Area during the Siil (Hedgehog) 2022 exercise. EDF photo by Allar Vaha

that of many NATO allies in percentage terms, it is proportionally smaller. Consequently, increasing defence spending in the short and medium term is crucial to aligning defence capabilities with the evolving situation.

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

Maintaining the pace of growth in defensive capabilities requires boosting defence spending in the short and medium term. While Estonia values its independent defence capability, it cooperates and conducts operations with allies. This cooperation necessitates prompt investments in developing and modernising essential military resources for seamless interoperability. The Estonian Defence Forces stand ready to protect the country at any moment, leveraging their deep understanding of the operational area as a key advantage.

ADAPTING TO CHANGE

Technological advancements necessitate preparedness for continuous shifts in military capabilities and exploring innovative ways to develop them. Optimising and

adjusting solutions to minimise spending is crucial while ensuring military deterrence and the ability to respond effectively to potential adversarial aggression. Aligning capability development with doctrinal innovations, such as implementing MDO - multi-domain operations, is also essential.

CONTINUOUS EVALUATION OF CAPABILITIES

Periodic assessments of military capabilities are essential to identify surpluses and deficits and manage risks through elimination, mitigation, or acceptance. Additionally, comparing capability requirements with existing solutions is vital, as is developing new approaches that align with these requirements while using fewer resources to maintain an effective and efficient defence strategy.

CAPABILITY INTEGRATION

Streamlining military capabilities enhances cost savings and bolsters the Estonian Defence Forces' effectiveness. It also facilitates the combination of specialised capabilities, improving the planning and execution of

Firing of the HIMARS missile system in Saaremaa during joint exercises Siil (Hedgehog) and Defender Europe.

military operations. Integrating capabilities lead to better situational awareness and quicker, more efficient responses to unforeseen circumstances. Emphasising multi-domain operations, capability integration is critical for maintaining cohesive defensive capabilities and adapting to rapidly evolving situations.

RESULTS

This year, Estonia has made substantial progress in accelerating its defensive capabilities development. In a noteworthy decision, the Estonian government allocated 1.2 billion euros to modernize weaponry and ammunition and expand Territorial Defence to 20,000 soldiers. Additionally, Estonia has hosted allied forces to strengthen its integration with its national defence, ensuring their presence and eliminating the need to seek out and wait for assistance.

The evolving geopolitical landscape prompted revising of the current national long-term defence development plan. Alongside executing already planned and funded capabilities, the Estonian Defence Forces persist in re-evalu-

ating military capabilities, seeking opportunities to further improve the effectiveness of its forces in the future.

Estonia's military strength will continue to grow through enhancing military capabilities and the comprehensive utilization of the country's resources. Furthermore, the groundwork for further expansion of the armed forces has been laid by deliberately and extensively deploying reservists. While the hope is to never employ these capabilities, Estonia remains prepared to defend its homeland and protect the interests of its allies if the need arises.

In preparing for any future scenario, it is essential to recognize the increased demand for military defence and the higher workload faced by our active-duty personnel and personnel in the broader defence sector. Despite these challenges, the dedication and expertise of all those involved in the defence sector enable them to manage this increased workload in the short term. To ensure long-term sustainability, it is crucial to better distribute the workload and compensate everyone involved in defending Estonia at a respectable level, as their contributions are invaluable to the nation's security. ||

EDF photo by Valmar Voolaid

A new shipment of K9 self-propelled howitzers arrived in Paldiski in December 2022

EDF photo by Martin Liiskmaa

Defence investments in 2022

MAGNUS-VALDEMAR SAAR Director General, Estonian Centre for Defence Investments

For some time, it has been evident that not all is well in the world’s economy: worldwide, inflation is slightly less than 9%, it is a little higher than that in Europe, and in Estonia, It is a whopping 20%. In current prices, the economy is growing, but adjusted for inflation, shrinking or stagnant. Central banks are raising interest rates to get inflation under control, to limited success thus far.

As for the commodities market, producers and suppliers have lamented the instability all year though in practice most commodities prices are now down: copper is down 13%, aluminium 15%, steel 2% - all measured in current prices. Energy prices are particularly volatile, which means major fluctuations. Year on year, the rise is not all that fearsome but for a while, the price of electricity reached a point where it was cheaper to use a generator than rely on mains. How does all of this affect prices of equipment for defence use, their availability and delivery terms?

For one thing, the defence industry seems to have more inertia than the general economy. The market turbulence is felt at the day-to-day level at the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments – this is the case with real estate services and foodstuffs and a few, labour-intensive sectors in which local Estonian industry is heavily represented. It has not had much of an effect on weapons systems – no doubt this is due to the lengthy delivery and production turnaround, due to which pricing is not as rigidly expense-based.

Besides inputs, the demand side is also seeing a steep increase and as we know, price is a function of demand and supply. Although the steep growth in demand has also been covered in the mass media, focusing on a number of examples, the actual situation is a bit more complex than it seems at first glance. For example, the 100-million-euro defence investment package unveiled by Germany with great fanfare will in reality largely be spent on air defence – Patriot missile systems and F35 fighters, namely. In 2023, the German defence budget is 0.6 per cent smaller than in 2022 at face value. Even Poland’s major investments into national defence will largely bypass our suppliers. The most immediate impact here will be that we will receive 12 additional self-propelled howitzers in 2026.

SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION

Thanks to relatively short command chains and a very task-based command model, Estonia managed to make a number of important decisions before the madness of the war began – it ordered two times more ammunition in 2022 than it had in the entire period of re-independence that preceded it. But in the sense of deliveries as well, it was an extremely busy year: over 100 million euros worth of various ammunition was delivered – more than ever before.

As to more important articles, large quantities of ammunition for small arms and light weapons (SALW) was delivered, a great amount of ammunition

Last year was a watershed year in terms of security, since large-scale war returned to Europe and investments into defensive capability are at record levels. But what is taking place on the defensive industry markets and what is state of play in the macroeconomic sense?

�� Estonia ordered two times more ammunition in 2022 than it had in the entire period of reindependence that preceded it.

for various anti-tank weapons, including for Carl-Gustaf and Spike SR and C90 grenade launchers. Stocks of ammunition for SALW has also seen record increases; as of this writing much of it was still in the process of being transported to Estonia. There have also been significant improvements to the on-board weapons of a number of armoured vehicles and 23mm ZSU23-2 anti-aircraft guns. In the years ahead, even more will be delivered.

Deliveries worth 100 million euros have been agreed for 2023 and a number of large orders are being formalized. Besides the categories above, anti-aircraft missiles will also be delivered next year: for both the short-range Mistral air defence systems currently in use, and for the new Piorun shoulder-fired short-range anti-air missile systems. Also expected to arrive are new-technology-based artillery shells, which will substantially increase the range of our artillery, and –a completely new capability – Blue Spear anti-ship missiles.

Based on the orders made, we can say that to some extent, delivery times have become protracted in the case of various ammunition products, while for several weapons and military equipment market, delivery times have become shorter. Will the trend of longer delivery periods become longer-term phenomenon is hard to say – currently a number of producers are making investments to increase production volumes. Certainly the increase in capacity in the European defence industry is a positive development.

NEW CAPABILITIES FROM SHIPS TO LOITERING MUNITIONS

If some of the decisions made as a result of the war, such as purchases of ammunition, shoulder-fired short-range antiairgraft, anti-tank weapons, additional indirect fire systems etc. are now already formalized in contracts, some decisions are still being implemented. The most important ones are loitering munitions and medium-range anti-air defences. The latter is quickly taking the lead over HIMARS as Estonia’s largest defence investment.

Although at the time of writing decisions are still distant, news is expected quite soon after the decision is announced. Medium-range anti-aircraft defences in the Estonian context are defined as a missile

system that can repel air threats from at least 30 km from the firing device and up to 12 km atmospheric altitude. As one alternative, a medium-range air defence system coupled with ballistic missile shield can be acquired, which would mean a ceiling up to 20 km atmospheric altitude. Competition in this sector is pretty intense and we are negotiating with six suppliers: Diehl Defence, Eurosam, IAI, Kongsberg, MBDA and Rafael Advances Defense Systems.

Another new capability that should be mentioned is long-range precision strike capability, which is naturally achieved through multiple systems, HIMARS being the most important one. We concluded the contract with the US in autumn 2022 and all of the necessary equipment for the unit to function integrally in 2025 will be supplied. A noteworthy quantity of ammunition has also been ordered, starting from practice ammunition all the way up to an ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System. We also hope to be among the buyers

Live fire exercises of HIMARS and MLRS at the Central Training Area.

EDF photo by Robert Markus Liiv

in the initial production phase for the Extended Range Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System – ER GMLRS – as well as for a Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) which in testing has demonstrated a 500 km range. HIMARS will be supplemented and supported by loitering munitions as well as the longer firing range of our artillery with new types of ammunition such as Nexter Bonus and precision munitions with extended range.

EVERY SOLDIER WILL SOON BENEFIT FROM NEW EQUIPMENT

Important developments are also taking place closer to soldiers. The new Defence Forces field uniform is being developed –simple in its essence and similar to the current uniform, it serves two purposes: first, it should be lighter in weight and more durable and equivalent in production price to the current one. The first prototypes are now ready and we can expect the new design to enter use around 2024.

Advances are also being made on the SALW front. the first to be switched over are the machine guns used by the EDF. The EDF’s new fire support weapon at the squad level will be the Israeli-made IWI Negev NG7 machine gun. The procurement of machine guns also shows the inertia of the arms market, since the price of the weapons ended up matching the results of market research conducted in 2021 and the delivery terns are very good in spite of our relatively large order.

It is also planned to outfit sharpshooters with new sniper rifles - but It is too early to know who the contract will be awarded to, testing is yet to be completed. There are four manufacturers in the running: Desert Tech, Sako, CG Haenel and Unique Alpine. Weapons testing taking place in Estonia provides a nice change of pace from routine – the abovementioned arms manufacturers come demonstrate capabilities in set conditions with their own sharpshooters. Quite a legendary bunch of top marksmen will be in Estonia for a few weeks and some of it will get media coverage.

To this point, we have purchased R20 Rahe automatic rifles produced by Lewis Machine and Tool Company, this being a modernized version of the AR-15 customized for our needs. The volume of the contact has now been fulfilled and it is planned to start a new procurement of automatic weapons to arm additional personnel with the new weapons: the territorial defence reserve and new-capabilities personnel.

Preparations for the new weapons procurement are now being made based on lessons learnt from the first procurement: the new weapons will continue to be on the same AR-15 platform but the main improvements are aimed at technical support and better organization of lifecycle support. Possibilities to hold joint procurements with nearby neighbours are also being considered.

CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN 2022

Our summary of the year in construction is somewhat different. After the war started the construction price spiralled out of control: besides some difficulties in the supply chain that affected several important materials, the construction market was also

Blue Spear anti-ship missile.

Photo by Proteus Advanced Systems

plagued by an extensive change in availability of workforce. In spring 2022, we went through a period where it was hard to find suppliers who could offer a fixed price for procurement contracts.

Compared to the previous development plan for the Ministry of Defence’s area of administration, the Centre’s infrastructure development portfolio ended up costing 40% more in 2021. As a result, several important sites were postponed and the whole infrastructure plan ran beyond the budgetary period.

Besides the launch of new construction projects, a new experience in 2022 was that we had to negotiate on hikes of the value of existing contracts. In nearly all projects, there was a push for charging higher prices due to force majeure (the war). Only two yielded real results. In most cases, there was not enough support for a higher price tag.

The main engines driving infrastructure development in the coming years are buildings and infrastructure established for hosting allies, improving training conditions, additional storage infrastructure and buildings needed for making use of new capabilities. The largest investments in the near future will be developed in southern Estonia, where we are enlarging our presence significantly. training conditions will improve and additional allied personnel will be deployed.

In addition, we are opening a new location point near Tartu in Nõo Rural Municipality where we will mainly establish infrastructure connected to brigade logistics and staging. We are also starting the design process for a new base near the Nursipalu training area, which is being expanded.

Training conditions are one of the biggest limitations of the current infrastructure. Conditions were already tight before the war broke out, when territorial defence was smaller, fewer training curricula were planned and weaponry did not include systems with major demands. To this point, we are compensating allies’ shortcomings, but in the new and changed security situation, these possibilities have also dried up. Development plans for the near future include a number of expansions of training grounds and in a few years the total capability should grow by close to 10;000 hectares. But the growth amounts to more than just acreage –new training features will be developed in all training areas.

Many readers may not know that the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments is also responsible for managing all of the training areas. The portfolio consists of 32,000 hectares of training areas, of which 27,000 hectares is taken up by the training areas themselves – the difference between training areas (harjutusväli in Estonian) and other training facilities is mainly the possibility of organizing shooting range training.

A big challenge is to quickly bring the level of training possibilities up to where they do not hinder the Defence Forces units from attaining the level of training and readiness or contributions from our essential allies to Estonia’s defence plans.

In northern Estonia, Ämari base will account for the greatest share of the construction volume in the coming years. Before 2023 is done, we plan to establish additional facilities for hosting allies and gradually start establishing conditions for new capabilities such as medium-range air defence systems. One of the most complicated projects in the coming years is the renovation of Ämari

�� The largest investments in the near future will be developed in southern Estonia, where we are enlarging our presence significantly – training conditions will improve and additional allied personnel will be deployed.

airfield, which will have to accomplished in a single construction season – from spring to autumn 2024.

Besides construction prices, the expenses on maintaining all of the infrastructure has also grown rapidly. In 2020, the goal set was to reach, by 2026, a maintenance cost per square meter of 26 euros measured in 2020 constant prices. Although a euro here and a euro here may seem like a trivial matter, considering that the whole Ministry of Defence’s area of government totals around 700,000 square metres of enclosed net area and over 35,000 hectares of land, the impacts are huge.

Each year, we spend around 27 million euros on building maintenance, and on top of that maintaining infrastructure (roads, training areas, runways, communication towers and other such structures) costs approximately 3 million. As such, smart utility system management, climate solutions and skilful administration are key areas for saving.

Thus, we are continuing the approach of transitioning more and more utility

systems to analysis-based automated control. The saving campaign launched in 2022 managed to save slightly over 1 million euros – mainly on heating costs. if we extrapolate the same percentage to a whole year, that would mean savings of over 2.5 million euros – the price of one K9.

More will have to be done to reach the goal. When developing the infrastructure, we have an eye to use of energy efficient solutions both in choosing utility systems and other building structures. To achieve the set goals, we will establish solar plants – the first two are planned for Ämari and Tapa.

SOLDIERS MUST BE WELL-FED

Starting in 2022, the Centre also offers food service. As a result, 200 new employees were added to the already 200-strong staff in nine food service facilities. As with other infrastructure services, the foodstuff market was also hit by a noteworthy price rise in 2022.

Year-over-year, food prices rose close to 30% for retail consumers. The daily price of food for the EDF was kept under control, though: the direct cost of a man-day of food was €6.48, which is more than 7% lower than the year before.

The saving was made possible by changing over the food service facilities to a more goal-driven management system, and among other things, calorie content was reduced. While it may seem stingy – as if soldiers were being shortchanged – that is not really the case; it should be borne in mind that in the past the energy allowance was a minimum of 3500 calories, which meant over 2 tonnes of food gone to waste per day.

In 2022, the new calorie allowance limit was set at 3500 and an expense management programme was started at the same time – one of the central solutions here was reduction of use of semi-products. Besides saving money, this will also improve food quality.

In the near future, it is planned to reduce calorie content even more and thereby cut down on the amount of food waste, while maintaining the same quality through varied and balanced menus. Compared to 2021, satisfaction with food service system also improved. the recommendation index score rose from 53 to 61 points. ||

155 mm self-propelled howitzer K9 live fire exercises in the Central Training Area.

EDF photo by Antero Noor

The year of the fleet merger

The biggest change in 2022 for the Navy was the fact that our usual contribution to the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1) became a military operation. The change also prompted changes in our personnel movements and how ships are manned.

At home, the biggest change was the merger of fleets, something that was long in discussion and preparation. This structural change has been talked about for 20 or more years. This time, too, the decision was balanced at a tipping point but ultimately one of the large structural changes in the military sector went ahead.

The decision resulted in the four largest vessels of the Police and Border Guard becoming part of the Navy. Along with the ships, 72 new personnel joined the Navy with new assignments, such as cleaning up spills at sea and to a limited extent, law enforcement functions. The merged ships now make up a patrol ship division.

As a result of the decisions, shore radar stations also became part of the Defence Forces, and the EDF became the institution in charge of situational awareness at sea. One of the less-discussed but in my opinion the most important change was that the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre and Navy’s maritime operations centre are now headquartered in one location.

JÜRI SASKA Commodore, Commander of the Estonian Navy

That change means that maritime security and rescue at sea are based in one facility, which will shorten the response time to events. The merger has also resulted in a few smaller setbacks but in general the process has been streamlined and painless.

The feared unravelling did not take place, nor was there a flight of personnel. The process was made significantly easier by the careful preparations and the complete dedication of the working groups. The deadlines were short and the pace was fast but in the end, I can tell everyone: BZ! (well done – Ed.).

The fleet merger was discussed but there were never hard plans to accomplish

it. At the same time, activity continued according to plans, including projects already familiar to us as well as different kinds of endeavours that were nevertheless still in the pipeline.

Anti-surface ship capability was improved. Personnel from our newly formed coastal defence division visited Poland for training and took part in Exercise Rekin.

Exercise Siil, the largest on the Estonian calendar, had a new tinge for us: while a Polish missile unit had taken part in years past, too, but Siil 2022 proved completely different. Last year, we felt it would be great if we could realize our own missile unit some day, but this time it was clear that this day would be here soon, since the agreements are in place and the deliveries are planned for 2023.

The Navy has long supported the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group and 2022 was no different in this regard. Lt. Capt. Ott Laanemets was in command of the unit the entire year and managed the job well. At the same time, the EML Sakala was also in the unit’s structure in the first half of the year.

There is nothing extraordinary in all this, had it not been taking place during Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Due to that fact, NATO’s rapid response units were in activated, SNMCMG1 among them. That fact meant changes in how the teams were manned, as by law, conscripts are not currently allowed to serve on international military operations.

In spite of the fact that 2022 was a dark year for the world, there have been positive milestones in the Navy’s development: many changes long in preparation became a reality. The fleet merger and the decisions that sprang from that structural change resulted in a number of state functions being placed in the remit of designated actors.

For the first time in a long while, the numbers of Navy personnel is growing. The number of active-duty members and conscripts is both up. Any sort of growth is much more time-consuming and arduous in its own way, yet still positive. It is always more interesting to build up than to dismantle. We are now building a growing, better Estonian Navy that is in the process of renewing itself. ||

From the joint exercises Siil (Hedgehog) and Defender Europe 2022: patrol boat Risto countermeasures the Lindormen-class command and support ship EML Wambola.

EDF photo by Valmar Voolaid

Territorial defence, the Defence League and reservists

Photo from the snap exercise of the Southern Land Protection District.

EDL photo by Karri Kaas

RENE TOOMSE Major, Commander of the Defence League School

Many reservists have already been notified that they have been assigned a position in the wartime territorial defence structure. Events in Ukraine have shown that the reserve would have a very important role to play during a possible conflict.

To this point, territorial defence has been manned by Defence League members – 9500 of them have been assigned to the aforementioned positions. In the summer of 2022, it was decided to expand territorial defence to 20,000 fighters. This can no longer be done solely using Estonian Defence Forces members, and thus reservists from earlier years have to be brought in as well.

The idea behind territorial defence is defence of one’s own communities –protection and defence that is as locally centred as possible, and certainly not an approach based on conquest of territory. Historically, territorial defence has been either spontaneous or engineered by the government, and its roots go back millennia.

The Estonian Defence League itself started as a spontaneous community defence organization in the closing days of the First World War, at a time when the Estonian people were weary of thefts and violence perpetrated by Russian soldiers who had deserted the crumbling front.

Simply put, villagers took up arms in defence of their village against brigands. In essence, it was the same thing we now think of when we talk about “territorial defence”: defending your community and your land. On 11 November 1918, the Defence League was established: At that time, all male citizens were required to be members due to the War of Independence, which had begun.

TODAY’S DEFENCE LEAGUE

Today the organization is a voluntary national defence institution organized along military lines; it possesses arms and is engaged in military exercises. An important distinction is that Defence League is not a part of the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF)

but rather an independent legal entity in public law.

Its main functions are to bolster Estonian citizens’ motivation, morale and patriotic values, prepare the country’s military defence capability and increase and preserve security and safety for the population. If there is war, the sub-units fighting in the Defence League will take their positions in the Estonian Defence Forces structure to ensure consistent command.

The Defence League is more complex than the EDF because support and logistical networks play a major role. The function of the networks is to supply troops with information, logistics, including medicine and evacuations, to organize non-violent resistance against the adversary and be responsible for reservist staging.

In a war, when the Defence Leaguers in territorial defence go over to the EDF’s

�� The Defence League is more complex than the EDF because support and logistical networks play a major role.

area of control, this part of the networks will continue to support them even while under the EDF’s command. Besides territorial defence and if necessary, supporting the EDF, the Defence League must always stand prepared to support local governments, rescue services and police, giving local inhabitants every advantage they need for their survival.

Thus, the Defence League cannot be equated completely with Territorial Defence: the Defence League is much larger and more diverse than just that.

RESERVISTS IN TERRITORIAL DEFENCE

Territorial Defence personnel are divided into separate specialist sub-units, which will most often fight as company-sized units. An exception is the unit established for Tallinn’s defence, which is a battalion.

The main effort of Territorial Defence units will have to be made in dispersed combat and protection of rear areas. In war, sometimes (although seldom and necessitated in emergencies), territorial defence units must fight classical defence and assault battles.

The EDF’s main effort is to enter battle with the adversary’s main forces in a conventional manner. Territorial Defence fighters, which are more lightly armed and protected, the aim is to wear the adversary down wherever possible. The goal is to prevent the adversary from breaking through the defence forces unit and exact heavy punishment on its rear and flanks. This would include constantly peppering the adversary’s support arms and rear area with attacks. Territorial defence units remain in their prepared fighting areas regardless of the adversary’s movements.

Territorial Defence units whose areas are not encumbered by the adversary’s manoeuvre units carry out protection tasks, which include guarding the EDF and allies’ movement and supply points. If necessary, Territorial Defence supports the police in law enforcement, and also serve as an auxiliary to rescue authorities in corresponding operations and help local government by providing protection for evacuating inhabitants.

Countermeasures and apprehension of the adversary’s agents and saboteurs in the rear area is also important. These operations require securing key buildings and

facilities and setting up traffic checkpoints.

Over the years, Defence League members involved in territorial defence learn master all of the abovementioned procedures. Dispersed combat activity taking place around and behind the adversary’s lines is unquestionably the most complicated, risk-filled and energy-intensive areas. This is the principal effort of Defence League’s territorial defenders, since the adversary’s plans must be foiled as early as possible.

Territorial Defence personnel from the assigned from the reserve get their initial training and tasks while performing security and protection tasks, so that they can play this key role behind our own lines. This frees up the Territorial Defence units drawn from the Defence League to focus more on dispersed combat.

This system takes place the same way in Ukraine – and quite successfully at that. The better-trained territorial defenders operate around the enemy and the ones with less training are in charge of protection and security in towns and villages in our own rear area. Everyone has their own roles, which give an opportunity to use the entire force in the most judicious manner.

UPCOMING RESERVIST TRAINING

It is highly likely that close to 10,000 freshly assigned reservists will be called up for a reservist training in late 2023. They will form platoons to Defence League districts as close to their respective homes as possible.

The training is expected to have three modules: a five-day leadership refresher training for platoon and squad commanders; a two-day training in weapons and new equipment (for everyone) – and finally, a five-day interoperation training (also for everyone). The last of these will focus on securing facilities, actions at checkpoints and defence of strongpoints. It is considered important to achieve cohesiveness and a common understanding throughout the Territorial Defence system.

The reservist trainings will be very intensive this time around and all calledup reservists are urged to carefully read the instructional materials the Defence League uses in training and which are publicly available, e.g. the Territorial Defence Manual (in Estonian) on opiq.ee. ||

Fighters from Estonian Defense League Jõgeva unit at the training meeting in Okas (Quill) 2022.

EDL photo by Merlin Naudre

How Estonia’s largest exercise, Siil, unfolded

GEIDI LOVISE LEE 2nd Lieutenant, Public Affairs Officer, 2nd Infantry Brigade

‘‘Siil is just Kevadtorm on steroids,” said Major General Veiko-Vello Palm last April in Postimees daily. The main emphasis of the three-week-long exercise lay on testing the capabilities of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and interoperability with 4000 soldiers from other NATO countries.

For the brigade, it was one of the biggest challenges in recent years and Siil’s (Hedgehog) well-known tagline “every quill counts” was particularly apt, because every brigade member’s role was important in making the exercise a success.

SMALLER EXERCISES TO BUILD UP TO THE BIG EVENT

Although Siil officially started for the 2nd Infantry on 17 May, when the first reservists arrived, September 2021 can be considered the beginning of Siil. That is when a five-day reservist exercise called Sentry Rise took place, with more than 200 of the brigade’s key reserve Cos participating. The reason they were involved so early was to determine what sorts of attitudes were expected of them and to dust off their abil-

ities for Siil 2022. Reservists were expected to provide professional instruction to their team, including training on how to use the new R20 Rahe rifle.

An exercise from March 2022 that included all of the brigade’s sub-units, Severe Storm, is also worth mentioning as a lead-up to Siil. Over five days, planning and command and control of the brigade’s combat on terrain were rehearsed. A counterattack was also simulated and cooperation between different arms was tested.

According to reserve Colonel Tarmo Metsa, who served as commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade during Siil and now is head of the Strategy and Innovation Department at the Estonian Military Academy, preparations for Siil required additional effort from the head of every sub-unit.

“Whether an active-duty Defence Forces member was commander of a company or battalion, they had to do significant additional work in preparation for the exercise, even if the active-duty member belonged to some other unit," said Metsa. He said preparing for Siil made it possible

�� Reservists were expected to provide professional instruction to their team, including training on how to use the new R20 Rahe rifle.

Delivery of equipment at a mobilization station in Luunja during Exercise Siil (Hedgehog).

EDF photo by Geidi Lovise Lee

to develop the brigade’s own combat capability. Equipment levels also rose thanks to procurements being fulfilled. . Interoperability with allied units increased.

UNIFORMS DONNED AND EQUIPMENT DELIVERED

Siil presented a possibility for staging the 2nd Infantry Brigade in its entirety for the first time at three bases simultaneously. Usually reservists only suit up and gear up in one specific base, but this time, in cooperation with the Defence League, the staging took place at Taara, Raadi and Luunja. “The regional staging was extensive and it can be confidently called a separate undertaking, and a successful one,“ recalled Metsa.

Although the staging points were full of action and in some cases queuing was necessary, the mood was upbeat and crackled with excitement. A number of Estonian Defence Forces members saw friends they hadn’t seen in a while and as such it was a good chance to catch up and reminisce about the last exercise or conscription. One of them was an ensign from the 22nd Infantry Battalion, Mattias Popp, who arrived at the exercise from Sweden. “My fellow platoon members were eagerly looking forward to the exercise. They said a few months ago that they simply can’t wait to be done with school and get to Siil,” said Popp on staging day. Once they had taken possession of equipment and machinery, the reservists headed out onto the terrain, where many of them learned to use a Rahe rifle for the first time and brushed up on their basic skills they learned as conscripts.

The second week of the exercise meant the start of active combat training. The battles mainly took place along the Väike-Emajõgi River around Sangaste, Jõgeveste, Puka, Tõrva and Pikasilla. For the first time, the UK’s Royal Tank Regiment was integrated with the 2nd Infantry Brigade as well – it included more than a dozen tanks, combat engineers, a self-propelled artillery unit and a support unit. The brigade’s mobility and protection gained significantly thanks to the cooperation. Tarmo Metsa said the joint exercise with NATO was a valuable experience. Many of the sub-units were able to engage in real-world cooperation with the allies. “Figuratively speaking, reservists got an overview of what putting together a plan side by side

and fighting according to the plan means.” Metsa added that the brigade’s personnel had not previously experienced this level of international concerted activity. The brigade was under the command of Multinational Division North as the highest unit. The brigade’s neighbours were the Latvian National Guard Brigade, the UK’s 20th Brigade and Defence League units. The UK tank regiment played an organic role.

FROM BATTLE TO A LIVE FIRE EXERCISE

Most of the reservists returned home after the combat part of the exercise. Only conscripts and the 23rd Infantry Battalion’s reservists remained in place, and they continued to the central firing range for live-fire exercises. Lt. Col. Rainek Kuura, former

�� Figuratively speaking, reservists got an overview of what putting together a plan side by side and fighting according to the plan means.

commander of the 23rd Infantry Battalion, said it was the first live-fire exercise for the infantry battalion mostly made up of reservists. “Although the reservists received their new R-20 at the start of the exercise, there was the sense that it did not influence tactical skills and our reservists were totally top-calibre,“ said Lt. Col. Kuura.

All of the sub-units of the 23rd Infantry Battalion attended the live-fire exercise. Besides the new R-20 semi-automatic rifle, higher-calibre 81 mm and 120 mm rifles were also fired, as were Javelin and Carl Gustav anti-tank weapons and higher-calibre machine guns. To make the combat environment as realistic as possible, the infantry was supported by indirect 122 mm artillery fire by the 25th artillery battalion and the 27th combat engineer battalion

helped to prepare positions. To practice cooperation between different weapons, different categories of weapons were fired simultaneously.

LESSONS LEARNT FROM SIIL

Looking back on the exercise now, more than six months later, Metsa said Siil came off as a success. The main task was fulfilled, cooperation with allies was instructive and smooth and sub-units managed to fulfil their goals. The combat service support battalion should be singled out – their medical company worked with allies from the US Landstuhl base, Germany. The aim was to familiarize themselves with field hospital functions and carry out an integration exercise, in the course of which their specialists were utilized on the brigade’s team.

The field hospital also served as part of the logistics battalion at Siil for the first time. “Although some limitations did emerge during the exercise, which will require more attention and coordination in future, overall the exercise was a success: the reservists’ motivation was high, the problems with equipment and standing operations were identified,” said Lt. Hele-Reet Lille, senior nurse of the 2nd Infantry Brigade’s medical company, who in peacetime works for the Estonian Military Academy’s war and disaster medicine centre as head of the support and development department. Lille added that the reservists who attended withstood all the challenges well.

But as to lessons in general, there were quite a few. For example, the main battlefield command system was deactivated for a couple hours on one day of the exercise, which meant the brigade had to transition to analogue command and control. “In the context of the exercise, wriggling out of that jam was quite a challenge and we got our fingers burned on a number of things. But we’re smarter in hindsight,“ said Tarmo Metsa. Another concern was the percentage of reservists who attended, which ranged between 60 and 80% among sub-units. Although the percentage wasn’t lower than past exercises, it did leave holes in sub-units. “The concern wasn’t about those who had given advance notice that they could not attend but the ones who didn’t give any word,” said Tarmo Metsa. At the same time, the rate of the ones who did attend allowed the brigade to operate as an integral unit. ||

Combat contact during the exercise Siil (Hedgehog) on the banks of the Purtsi river.

EDF photo by Oskar Kivilaan

Akson fired strong

One of the two primary training audiences at Exercise Siil in 2022 whose combat-readiness was evaluated was the Cyber Command’s Strategic Communication Centre. The peacetime role of the Strategic Communication Centre is to train reservists to serve in the public affairs and direct notification subunits and to carryout Estonian Defence Forces media operations. In wartime, StratCom Centre must be prepared to keep the civilian population and international media informed, counter misinformation and hit the adversary in the public information environment.

All this was rehearsed at Akson 2022, sub-exercise of Siil 2022. For this purpose,

entire reserve structure was alarmed and formed, equipped and weaponized according to plans. Participants brushed up on their knowledge and skills and moved to different assembly areas Estonia-wide to carry out their combat tasks.

In the exercise’s scenario, information aggression against Estonia started a while earlier than the physical invasion. The goal of the hostile information operations were to produce results in the real-world environment: to interfere with mobilization, and disrupt state governance and defence forces command, etc.

Just as in the case of military conflicts, escalating tension between countries is also

UKU AROLD, Lieutenant Colonel, CE Commander of the Strategic Communications Centre

The axon is the part of the nerve cell that "fires" to trigger the activity of the connected network.

reflected in the public media sphere. Potential conflict areas draw many reporters from international outlets, and an even greater number of journalists cover events from a distance. It is not unprecedented for enemy intelligence services to try to use journalistic cover.

Today’s hybrid conflicts use social media and influence networks to sway ordinary people to act in subversive interests is commonplace. All this is also reflected in the media. Cyber attacks are a part of the war in the information environment. If the armed forces are silent or prevent genuine journalists from covering developments, then rumours,

The snake king is a mythological entity that can now be seen on the flag of StratCom Centre, where it symbolizes force from unity.

The heads show the communication and interaction taking place with Estonians, allies and the adversary. The crowns symbolize strategic communication as a command function: The tongues extending out of the mouth express interaction in different languages and communication in different kinds of media categories: images, text and audio. The blood-red background is the blood spilled in the 1918–1920 War of Independence in defence of the newly proclaimed Republic of Estonia.

noise and hostile propaganda would fill in the vacuum.

Although operational security and safety considerations prevent giving journalists access everywhere, the war must be televised – meaning it is necessary to shoot and generate a video feed. The messaging has to be clear but aligned with government communications, instructions to civilians from other institutionsand in nested to allied communication framework. After all, the enemy's information oprartions will try to make us pay for the slightest inconsistency in our messaging.

A key principle is that any systems that pose a threat to Estonia's indepen-

Flag donation ceremony for the Strategic Communication Center at the end of the Akson exercise.

EDF photo by Ardi Hallismaa

dence and territorial integrity must not be allowed to operate unchecked. We have to maintain the initiative and go on an information counteroffensive ourselves. The issues described above are among those the Strategic Communication Centre contended with in Akson 2022. Naturally, the precondition was that general military training must precede rigorous specialized skills – involving taking the information from the grass-roots level to the international arena: providing sufficient protection for units on patrol and elsewhere in the field, signal discipline, familiarity with the Estonian Defence Forces' decision-making process and safety procedures.

To evaluate the combat readiness of the Strategic Communication Centre, a task structure was established at the Siil 2022 exercise control element. This structure developed a vibrant multilingual information environment, conducted evaluation of the centre and its subunits and offered feedback and additional information from different levels of NATO force structure, our closest allies and domestic partner institutions in order to guarantee achievement of exercise objectives.

Wartime cooperation between the Government’s Communication Centre and the Prime Minister was rehearsed in depth. Other national leaders and Estonian Defence Forces commanders also stood up in their roles in the simulation. For the Estonian Defence Forces members, role players and evaluation personnel, the events unfolded in three places at once: deployment areas, in the operations area of other Estonian Defence Forces units who were public affairs and direct communication support, and in a closed virtual information environment where TV news, podcasts, press releases and infographics, hostile propaganda and friendly commenters all intermingled.

Experienced Estonian Defence Forces officers took part in the evaluation team along with international experts from the NATO Strategic Communications Centre

Communication soldiers in a row, photographer Rauno Volmar in the foreground.

of Excellence. The evaluation given to the unit was unequivocal – they were deemed combat-capable. We identified many places for improving training, organization of work and supply, but these did not hamper overall combat readiness of the unit substantively.

It proved possible to achieve combat capability thanks to the exceptional dedication showed by the centre’s reservists and active-duty personnel alike and their selfless efforts to carry out the exercise battle tasks. A motivated reserve force functions effectively. The Cyber Command in general and the Estonian Defence Forces as a whole posted a major accomplishment in making the exam for StratCom Centre Akson 2022 a success. Volunteers from Estonia and abroad who played the role of the adversary in the exercise did not go easy on the centre – after all, it was important to make sure that it was capable of meeting challenges of an actual combat situation.

Akson 2022 closed with a ceremonial lineup on 27 May 2022, where state secretary Taimar Peterkop donated a flag on behalf of the Government Office to the StratCom Centre. The flag depicts the centre’s symbol – a three-headed snake king. Peterkop said the combat potential of the Strategic Communications Centre posed an “terrifying” force for an adversary.

As such, the Centre is truly prepared to engage in information warfare for Estonia in all relevant fighting functions. That does not mean that the centre can rest on its laurels. Akson pointed up a number of areas to improve in. Russia’s war in Ukraine is instructive for various branches of the military and cooperation between them. Information and communication technology continues to make advances. Potential adversaries are also improving. Akson 2022 is not the end of a road, but means that brothers of arms in the StratCom Centre will continue developing the centre while maintaining combat capability and readiness at an ever higher level. ||

EDF photo by Ardi Hallismaa

Cyber lessons learnt in 2022

MIHKEL TIKK

Deputy Commander of EDF Cyber Command

As in most walks of life, the events in Ukraine have had a significant impact on cyber space. In 2022, over 2000 cyber attacks targeted Ukraine, one of which also temporarily took down the VIASAT communication system used by the Ukrainian army. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February also coincided with simultaneous cyber attacks on the country. A number of Ukraine’s supporters also faced cyber attacks. Indeed, there is much to learn from the Ukraine war in the cyber domain. For the first time, we are seeing a conflict on this scale is being combined with cyber attacks. Some of the lessons are more rudimentary, but others will require thorough analysis and cooperation between allies.

In early 2022, many countries believed a Russian invasion was very likely and one hypothesis was that it would begin with cyber attacks. This theory panned out. Although the extensive cyber campaign against Ukraine started in January with an aim of destabilizing government and demoralizing the public, the largest attacks occurred in the first hours of the war.

The January campaign was mainly aimed at intimidating and demoralizing Ukraine through hijacked websites and destruction of data on movement sites. In the hours leading up to the invasion and the weeks that followed, the Ukrainian chain of command’s communication systems were targeted. The most successful attack was against the US company VIASAT, whose

KA-SAT stations were rendered unusable – this communication system used by the Ukrainian army.

Although the cyber attack may have succeeded, it did not have much effect on Ukrainians overall, since they were able to take countermeasures almost immediately. The biggest impact was in Germany, where 5000 wind turbines went offline due to the attack.

At the same time, Ukrainian communication service providers were also targeted in an attempt to limit internet access in Ukraine. In general, the attacks were successfully denied, while specific areas –particularly ones facing conventional attack as well – did experience downtime.

Although it did not necessarily have a major impact on the Ukrainian army’s activities, the attacks certainly impacted notification of the public and situation awareness. Today the information space is practically inseparable from the internet, and whoever controls information holds advantages that are hard to distinguish in the big picture and in the context of a war.

In early 2014, the Russian side was the one with the information space advantage in narratives, since it took a while for the West to reach consensus. This time, however, the Ukrainians managed to seize the initiative right away. To achieve success, they needed manoeuvre room in their cyber space to deliver the right information to the right place at the right time.

Today the information space is practically inseparable from the internet, and whoever controls information holds advantages that are hard to distinguish in the big picture and in the context of a war.

Cyberattacks were used to disrupt the use of the Internet in Ukraine.

Shutterstock photo by Gennadi Danilkin

The Ukrainians managed to quickly develop ad hoc apps to warn the population of air raids and to report on the adversary’s location. Russia’s cyber attacks continue, but to this point it does not seem that they are the main focus for the Russian state. Instead, they are for gathering information, information warfare and psychological operations.

The last known major attempt was in the spring against Ukrainian energy infrastructure – if it had succeeded, it would have left about 2 million people in the Kyiv area without power and saved the Russians a number of Iranian drones and other munitions. There have not been any significant cyber attacks since spring 2022. Instead, Russia has concentrated on spreading disinformation via hacked Facebook accounts belonging to senior Ukrainian officials and spoof text messages.

During the war, Ukraine has learned a number of lessons in the use of cyberspace and electronic means of warfare. Both sides have fallen victim to use of mobile communications on the front lines. When the war started, Ukraine was probably not as technologically sophisticated as it is now, since the a number of IT solutions have been adopted using Western assistance and local talent, predominantly for reconnaissance and observation and indirect fire control. The broader use of technology allows faster decisions and more surgical strikes to be made, saving resources. On the other hand, it also increases the potential breadth of cyber attacks.

Although the VIASAT attack can be considered successful from the cyber point of view, sufficient bombproofing and backup processes help to reduce dependence on cyberspace. As an alternative to VIASAT, Ukraine started using Starlink equipment, which allows information to be exchanged quickly. The broad use of Starlink and the VIASAT attacks illustrate well how deeply civilian infrastructure is now embedded in modern warfare. Many countries are facing a situation where they have to put their trust in other countries and their contractors in order to guarantee their own national security.

In October, the Cyber Command forum held in Tallinn, which drew cyber commanders from over 30 countries, centred on the kinds of dependencies be-

tween warfare and civilian infrastructure, the attendant risks and ways of mitigating them. It was obviously not possible to find answers to all of the questions, but cooperation between allies in this matter was very important. Since NATO consists of member states, we must be prepared for the possibility that an attack against any one of us originates in cyberspace and seeks to cripple some military capability. In cyberspace, it is nearly inconceivable that an attack will end up being limited only to military targets; in general, the civilian infrastructure is generally involved as well.

Good defence starts from each individual member state. The key is to find a coordination mechanism that helps stave off risk to broad-based and military national defence. From there on, it is important to coordinate with allies to ensure that information on attacks and attempts reaches allies quickly and that malware used for that purpose cannot be used again in the same fashion.

This forces the adversary to rethink its operating mechanisms, tactics and procedure. While the predominant part of attacks against western countries has been denial of service attacks by pro-Russia groupings targeting government institutions and companies, quite a few have targeted officials of various countries in order to access information systems of interest . One factor that encourages failure of such attacks is cyber awareness among the professional and official cadre and the ability to recognize weak passwords, phishing messages and flawed processes.

The EDF Cyber Command and the Estonian State Information Authority have actively supported Ukraine since January 2022. Estonia has supported Ukraine in the field of both cyber security and cyber defence by providing various equipment, actions and training. This allows us to better understand the means and technological capabilities of various cyber groupings so that we can provide more effective defence and make it as complicated and costly for the enemy to attack us and our allies.

�� The broader use of technology allows faster decisions and more surgical strikes to be made, saving resources. On the other hand, it also increases the potential breadth of cyber attacks.

Although cyber attacks in Ukraine have been eclipsed by the horrors of the kinetic warfare, battles do go on every day in cyber space. What is or was their actual influence, time will tell, once there is time and opportunity to investigate and study them in more detail

What is clear that our own infrastructure must be defended constantly since preparations for the attacks described above (not including denial of service attacks) is very time-consuming and requires that the targets to have been compromised beforehand. To prevent this from happening in our cyberspace, we must be constantly vigilant and think about how to bombproof systems and what other procedures and measures to compensate for them; also, which systems could cost human lives should they go down.

Nor should the importance of cyber attacks be downplayed just because there are not enough reported facts, because after all, attacks that do not cross the news threshold

with a hot war raging might be sufficient lead to a crisis or state of emergency in some countries in peacetime.

To sum up, it should be acknowledged that cyber is a part of kinetic warfare and skilful use of cyber means can support kinetic military operations in various stages. When integrating cyber, it must be ensured that systems are well planned and developed and are guaranteed to be sufficiently bombproof on a needs basis.

It also means mitigating risks related to the use of the private sector and solutions from other countries and being prepared to shift to solutions that do not include use of those systems. Collective cyber defence is just as important because advances and updates that move via NATO territory also make use of critical infrastructure that is in the hands of other countries’ private sectors.

The most important thing is to be always prepared. Since it is time- and resource-intensive to prepare cyber attacks, it is much more complicated to attack systems with good cyber defence and expert users. ||

Cyber attacks are intended for information warfare and psychological influence.

Photo by Shutterstock

A pivotal year: the International Centre for Defence and Security

Interesting from a professional point of view but tragic from a human point of view – such was the pivotal year 2022 for the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS). Russia’s horrific war of aggression meant more work and more interest in our activities than before, but also concerns about Ukraine and the future. It was a year of fallen masks and shattered illusions.

Throughout the year, we organised five major conferences, as well as dozens of seminars and hundreds of meetings. A large part of the year was spent providing comments to the media and explaining our views to foreign experts both in Estonia and abroad. Alongside the analysis aimed at the public, it is equally important that our allies are on the same page with us.

The Lennart Meri Conference on 13–15 May was the first major international conference on foreign and security policy to be held after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The keynote for last year’s conference, “Time Flees”, illustrated the moment when Western values had to take a decisive stand against Russia’s imperialist war. The Annual Baltic Conference on Defence (ABCD), held in September

with the Ministry of Defence, discussed the impacts of the war and lessons for the Baltic Sea region.

Among the Centre’s publications last year, the most influential were research papers on different aspects of the war and the resulting policy recommendations. By far the most-read was the series of briefs “Russia’s War in Ukraine”, with the specific topics listed below.

In May 2022, a team from the ICDS went to Ukraine on the first research trip of its kind to study the lessons of the first months of the war in Ukraine: How were people managing to survive and even resume their regular lives in the new normal? How was the war impacting civilian infrastructures? And finally, what can other countries learn from Ukraine to prepare for a potential outbreak of war?

During the course of the year, researchers at the ICDS also looked at foreign policy and security issues from a broader perspective: energy security, arms developments and the information space, as well as China’s ever-expanding reach and what is happening in the Indian and Pacific ocean region.

THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY (ICDS)

�� Russia’s horrific war of aggression meant more work and more interest in our activities than before.

THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY’S MOST-READ PUBLICATIONS IN 2022

1. Ten briefs on Russia’s war in Ukraine

▶ “The Kremlin’s Aims and Assumptions”, Kalev Stoicescu

▶ “The War in Cyberspace”, Dmytro Dubov

▶ “Russian Military Logistics”, Ronald Ti

▶ “Large-Scale War and NATO”, Martin Hurt

▶ “The Early Air War”, Tony Lawrence

▶ “The War at Sea”, Bill Combes

▶ “When Russia Went to War”, Konrad Muzyka

▶ “WMD Issues”, Richard Weitz

▶ “Russia’s Propaganda War”, Igor Gretskiy

▶ “Western Military Assistance”, Tony Lawrence

2. “NATO’s Hypersonic Challenge” Richard Weitz

3. “A War of the Final Soviet Generation: Russia’s Demography, Society, and Aggression against Ukraine” Igor Gretskiy

4. ”The Contours of a New Western Russia Strategy” Kristi Raik

5. “Putin’s Counterintelligence State” Sanshiro Hosaka

Our national defence courses, the foundation of broad national defence, also continued. In 2022, a total of 161 people enrolled in Higher National Defence Courses (HNDC) and Higher Digital and Cyber Defence Courses. Over 500 graduates of the courses gathered for a conference for the second time on 27 September.

The almost 2,300 HNDC graduates

include heads of municipalities, businesses and public organisations, doctors, journalists, civil servants, politicians and senior military officers, as well as three prime ministers, two commanders of the defence forces and about a hundred members of the Riigikogu.

Amajor change has occurred for the magazine Diplomaatia, the ICDS foreign policy journal celebrating its 20th anniversary this year. Previously published in print, the magazine will continue to be published online in 2023 to provide readers with up-to-date articles on international events, background information and future forecasts.

In 2023, ICDS will continue its analysis of the long-term and immediate effects of the war. One constant is unlikely to change: “In the foreseeable future, Russia is likely to remain a major threat to European security for two main reasons: it will not give up its imperial ambitions to (re-)establish a sphere of influence, using force if necessary, and it will not become a stable democracy.” (Kristi Raik and Martin Hurt, “Building European Security Against Russia – A View From Estonia”) ||

Discussion group of generals at the Annual Baltic Conference on Defence.

ICDS photo by Marko Mumm

Excavations at the Viljandi Uueveski cemetery brought out the remains of over half a hundred people.

Sakala photo by Marko Saarm / Scanpix

The War Museum’s year: proper reburials of WWII-era troops and tanks on display

Last year began for the War Museum in anticipation of a return to the good pre-pandemic routine and former visitor numbers. There was also hope that the details of the system for the military band’s new position in the museum’s jurisdiction would be solidified. However, by the time Estonian Independence Day (24 February) rolled around, the year had already confounded expectations.

Russia’s war of conquest in Ukraine, which began on that day, did bring the museum more visitors, and many people came with their families and friends. War had come closer both physically and psychologically than ever before for today’s generations, so this understandably raised various questions – what sorts of wars have been waged in history, how they were fought, what wars have meant for society, and what weapons look like. People also had questions about specific weapons. Javelins had become a household word and people naturally wanted to see these missiles for themselves. In cooperation with the Estonian Defence Forces, we gained access to one set of Javelins that we could show to museum visitors.

In spring, the removal of Soviet-occupation-era monuments and reburial of war graves in places now considered inappropriate as last resting places came on to the agenda. Some of our readers may be unaware that the remains of thousands of soldiers on both the Red Army and Nazi side have been reinterred in the last few decades. The bodies were generally unearthed on construction sites and in some cases, war

graves in poorly sited places were relocated along with removals of the corresponding grave markers and monuments.

In the post-war Estonian SSR, fallen soldiers began to be buried outside cemeteries. Local authorities would take a number of individual graves and create new “fraternal graves” in the centres of towns and villages. From the battlefields or places they were killed, the remains were, over a period of about 10 years, reburied in central squares, parks – areas of public assembly were preferred.

Establishing such “shrines” was part of Soviet-era ideological indoctrination and aimed to reshape people’s historical consciousness. It amounted to exploitation of the dead for the purpose of lending permanence to ideologically motivated monuments. After Estonia restored independence, the only occupation-era ideologically-tinged monuments that were accorded continuing protection were the ones that marked people’s burial sites. Most of these are the last resting places of Red Army personnel killed on Estonian soil in the Second World War.

However, a cemetery is a much more appropriate place for a last resting place than a public park. The reburials have proceeded in a respectful manner, considering religious confession and cultural affiliation of the deceased. No matter what the circumstances of the deaths, or which military they were serving in or which uniform they wore, the policy is to treat the remains of all fallen soldiers with dignity. What is im-

�� The remains of thousands of soldiers on both the Red Army and Nazi side have been reinterred in the last few decades.

HELLAR LILL Director, Estonian War Museum/General Laidoner Museum

portant here is that reburial frees the dead from having to serve a bogus ideological narrative; now they can truly rest in peace.

The reburials started in mid-June with a war grave in Otepää, which held a surprise: although the monument’s plaques listed the names of about 25 soldiers, a thorough excavation revealed that in fact no one was buried there.

Among the first major reburials and monument removals to garner public coverage were a war grave in front of the future site of the Rakvere state gymnasium and the complex in the Raadi area of Tartu. During the year we reburied the remains of 830 people.

The reinterred mainly comprised four groups: Red Army killed in the War of Independence (for example, Viljandi), those killed in the battles of summer 1941 (Pärnu, Võsu, Emmaste, Suure-Jaani, Võhma, Pilistvere), German soldiers executed in the early Nazi occupation (Rakvere, Pärnu, Raadi, Elva) and soldiers killed in the battles of 1944 (Rakvere, Nõo, Raadi, Kärstna, Elva, Rõngu, Aakre, Vallapalu).

Finding the Red Army personnel in Viljandi was an exceptional event. The men in question were the subjects of propaganda burials in 1940. The “civil war fraternal graves” created in the 1960s in Palupera and Oonametsa proved to be a sham.

A mass grave in Viiratsi, containing the remains of 244 Red Army POWs, was an exception. This was also the only original burial site. The others were reburial sites established at different points in time after the Second World War. Often badly decomposed remains from the original grave were reburied, dividing them up in arbitrary manner between caskets.

In Vallapalu, the burial crews had also tossed five pairs of rubber boots assigned to them for the work into the grave atop the Red Army caskets. In individual cases, the Soviet-era documentation does match what was unearthed – but these are the exception that proves the rule that the records in the registry of cultural antiquities cannot be trusted. The magnitude and systematic nature of the misrepresentation is discussed in an article by War Museum archaeologist Arnold Unt, which was published in the June 2017 issue of Akadeemia journal (in Estonian). ||

The bodies excavated from the Uueveski cemetery were reburied in the Viljandi Metsakalmistu. Sakala photo by Elmo Riig / Scanpix

The Narva tank

The museum also made the news due to the arrival of the notorious Narva tank. The tank also drew streams of visitors: at the first weekend, close to 3000 visitors came to the museum, most of them native Russian speakers.

But the majority also visited the rest of the exhibition –among other things, the part devoted to WWII. Hopefully those still under the influence of Russian Federation’s narrative of the “Great Patriotic War” got a new perspective on the history of that period. Actually, tank T-34/85 – which is the same model as so-called Narva tank, and in somewhat better shape – has been in front of the War Museum for years, completely accessible to the public. It is a good example of how the “story” makes the exhibit. Largely thanks to the publicity around the War Museum, a new annual visitor record was set – 33,000.

Besides the war graves and tanks, the War Museum has also dealt with traditional fields of activities for museums:

As a part of the permanent exhibition, “Oma vägi” (Our Own Force), which introduces Estonian national defence and its principles during the interwar period and starting again from re-independence was completed. At the opening ceremony held on the anniversary of the Estonian Defence Forces, the commander-in-chief of the Estonian Defence Forces and an old hand, Ivan Orav, were in attendance.

The Johan Laidoner personal exhibition was also updated. We have reconditioned, digitized and supplemented the museum collection – the largest-scale part involved taking possession of the existing Defence League history collection. An international military history conference held in cooperation with the Baltic Defence College, “The Resistance in the Baltic States during and after the Second World War” drew good feedback from presenters and attendees. The 10th military history yearbook was published.

And of course, we also continue on our mission to promote high-quality military music! ||

The infamous Narva tank started its journey to Estonian War Museum in Tallinn. ERR photo by Sergei Stepanov/ Scanpix

Published by Strategic Communication Department, General Staff, Estonian Defense Forces

Produced by Strategic Communication Center, Cyber Command, Estonian Defense Forces

Edited by Heiki Suurkask

Design and layout by Ivo Sokka

Translated by Kristopher Rikken

ISSN 2613-4934