Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead. 2/2016

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in this issue 4

headlines

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interview with General Petr Pavel

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Will Warsaw Deliver?

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How NATO Must Adapt After Warsaw

Readiness Action Plan: A Reality Check by Jan Jireš & Jan Havránek How NATO Must Adapt After Warsaw by Aylin Matlé

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in depth U.S. Security Partnership with Europe: Obama and Beyond by Mathew Rhodes

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U.S. Security Partnership with Europe: Obama and Beyond

Southern Threats to NATO: Perception and Necessary Strategies by Fabrizio Luciolli

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face2face Should We Relaunch NATO-Russia Council?

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on the map Macedonia-NATO Odyssey by Vesna Poposka

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op-eds

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visegrad news

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leadership

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calendar

22 Should We Relaunch NATO-Russia Council?

in the Era of Information Warfare – 28 Communications the NATO Approach

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editorial

Katarína Schwertnerová Editor-in-Chief In less than three months, Heads of State and Government will gather in Warsaw, Poland, to set out plans for accommodating NATO to the current security challenges and international developments, which are quickly becoming more and more unpredictable. The shape of the Alliance has no doubt changed throughout the years since it was founded in 1949, and it is likewise inevitable that the political and security environment of nowadays will have profound implications for the modus operandi of NATO as it stands now. Therefore, the main question to be answered at the Warsaw Summit is how can the Alliance adjust its functioning in the future, and more importantly, whether there is enough political will to follow through with the intended reforms. Threats surrounding the Alliance to the East and South are impacting different Allies with various degrees of urgency. The Alliance therefore needs to demonstrate, perhaps more than before, its resolution to cater to security needs of its members, no matter the kind of immediate or

potential threats they may face. We are now witnessing NATO returning to its initial roles of protecting its own territory, which includes deterring any possible attack from the outside of the Alliance against any one of the Allies. However, it is frankly not only a question of showing resolve towards the outside world. Right now it is equally as important (if indeed not more important) for every single member nation to be reassured that NATO remains fully committed to ensuring their security. This aspect seems even more crucial in light of the spreading propaganda and the continuously waged information warfare, which aims at mystifying the truth and facts in the eyes of the public in NATO countries. I can hardly imagine a more convincing way to justify NATO’s continued existence than via taking well-explained practical steps towards strengthening its presence in (possibly) affected countries. At the end of the day, security is largely a notion perceived very subjectively, and to wider public it is more about feeling safe than paying attention to political statements. Transparent and visible measures may contribute to the perception of NATO as a not-sodistant organisation, which actually does have profound influence on security that we unconsciously enjoy every day. On the other hand, NATO understands all too well the shared responsibility of the international community for global stability and security. Consequently, the Alliance is well aware that we cannot overlook the disturbing developments in our neighbourhood. Especially when the current threats are no longer tied to concrete locations, and they easily surpass states´ borders. The threats are increasingly interconnected, and none of them too far away. Moreover, challenges are no longer presented only by state actors, but also in the rising number of emerging nonstate threats, which are very often asymmetric and non-conventional. That is where the importance of cooperative security becomes crucial. It is rightly believed that NATO

now needs to be on its guard on two fronts at the same time – both on its own territory and in its neighbourhood. Some might question the Alliance´s ability to juggle both tasks. Furthermore, it is not even clear whether NATO is sufficiently equipped to deal with the kind of needs its neighbourhood has – mitigating extremism, mollifying fundamentalism, rebuilding failed or failing states. Again, the Warsaw Summit will hopefully generate a discussion on the need to devise a currently absent strategy for coping with the Southern threats. As mentioned before, the Summit will also show the political resolve of the Allies to continue working on strengthening the transatlantic partnership. In this regard, Europe has some way to go. Even though the US is re-evaluating its decision to scale back on military presence in Europe as the number of American soldiers on the continent slowly grows again, Europe still needs to show renewed commitment towards its own security. Obviously, this is not to depreciate the US leadership. It is rather a call for more ownership on the European side. And this is not only a matter of money spent to benefit military budgets. The ownership needs to be deeply political. The recent halt in decrease in defence spending of European countries is only the beginning. European leaders should muster enough courage to make difficult and possibly unpopular decisions on the pressing issues of our collective security. Dear readers, allow me to welcome you on the pages of this special edition of Euro-Atlantic! magazine dedicated to NATO in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit. Let me especially welcome the participants of GLOBSEC 2016, who have an exclusive chance to read the magazine in print. We are honoured to present you articles written by some of the most esteemed experts on transatlantic security, and we invite you to keep in touch with us on Facebook and Twitter at @ EuroAtlanticMag.

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headlines Terror Attacks in EU-Turkey Joint Brussels Action Plan

52 Annual Munich

Only days after the arrest of Salah Abdeslam, the alleged mastermind of the Paris terror attacks, the world was hit by the news of attacks in Brussels. The tragedy in the heart of the EU once again stirred up discussions about Europe’s security in the context of the global threat of terrorism. At least 11 people were killed in two explosions inside Zaventem airport in the morning of 22 March. Additionally, an explosion in the Maalbeek metro station led to 20 casualties. According to the latest reports, more than 230 people were injured. The responsibility for the attacks was later claimed by ISIS. After Abdeslam´s arrest, the Belgian Minister of the Interior Jan Jambon warned about the possibility of revenge attacks. The tragic events severely damaged the image of Belgian intelligence agencies and the country’s police force. The police published footage from the airport’s security cameras and is working on identifying the attackers. In the wake of the attacks, European airports are tightening their security and a number of new security measures are imposed. People from all around the world are paying their respects to the victims of these horrible crimes. World leaders have condemned the attacks. Belgium held three days of national mourning. The Brandenburg Gate and the Eiffel Tower were both lit in Belgian colors.

One of the world’s most significant security conferences once again took place in Munich. Over the course of three February days, the conference hosted world leaders focusing on the biggest challenges to global security. On the first day, the speakers reflected on the threat of terrorism. Most notably, German Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen, and French Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian agreed that in light of the Paris attacks, global terrorism still remains a great threat. They were followed by a speech from James Clapper, who also warned about the threats posed namely by ISIS. Among the second day’s highlights was the debate between Prime Ministers of France and Russia – Manuel Valls and Dmitry Medvedev. Their discussion focused on the on-going conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Also taking the floor were two representatives of NATO – Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Chairman of the NATO Military Committee General Petr Pavel. Stoltenberg stressed the importance of strengthening NATO’s military presence in Eastern Europe. He also accused Moscow of wanting to destabilize Europe. The conflict in Syria was on the agenda as well. John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, underlined the role of the United States as the global peace-keeper, while also insisting that Russia’s actions in Syria are against common interests of the international community. The third day of the conference focused on Africa and the Middle East. Various panelists spoke about African development, the constant abuse of human rights and the great number of civilian casualties of conflicts in the regions.

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EU Member States and Turkey agreed on a joint policy, which aims to prevent migrants from entering Europe. As part of the joint action plan, Turkey vows to take back all migrants that cross the Aegean Sea to illegally enter Greece. According to German Chancellor Angela Merkel, all EU countries expressed their desire to back the agreement. Both the EU and Turkey also agreed that every migrant will be protected by international law and every asylum application will be judged individually in cooperation with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Both sides had to make certain compromises. The EU agreed that the €3 billion fund to help Turkey deal with the migrant crisis will be paid as soon as possible. Another part of the agreement is that if proven that Turkey put the money to good use, the EU would agree on another €3 billion fund until the end of 2018. During the summit, both sides talked about the possibility of accelerating the process of Turkey joining the EU. Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that the agreed deal will significantly reduce the number of migrants using the services of human traffickers. The closing stages of the summit were affected by the news of the terror attacks in Brussels, leading to the abrupt departure of the Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel.

Security Conference


by daniel fekete

Big Wins on Super Elections in Iran: A Turning Point? Tuesday

Millions of Brazilians

The US President Barack Obama is nearing the end of his 2nd presidential term, as the successor to the first AfricanAmerican president of the United States will be elected this year. The biggest names running for president are Democrat Hillary Clinton and controversial Republican Donald Trump. Both candidates proved their role as the favorites of the elections, recording big wins on Super Tuesday and are thus one step closer to becoming their respective party’s final presidential candidate. Trump had success in the majority of the southern states, while also recording wins in Massachusetts and Vermont. Clinton recorded wins in Texas and Arkansas, where her husband served as Governor before being elected president. The Republicans are finding themselves in an interesting situation as Trump doesn’t face any real competition from other Republican candidates, which was further proven on Super Tuesday with the businessman-turned-politician’s becoming the party’s clear winner. There are various reasons why there’s a sizeable margin between Trump and other Republican candidates; one of the most notable being the fact that the media are giving Trump so much coverage in comparison to the others. His motto “Make America Great Again” may very well be what the voters want to hear, but Clinton opposed Trump, saying that the USA is, in fact, still great. Everything points to the presidential race being very interesting.

Millions of Brazilians took to the streets on 13 March to protest against current left-wing President Dilma Rousseff. The protesters voiced their anger over country’s stagnating economy, rising prices of necessities, and widespread corruption. Brazil is currently in the midst of a long-term economic crisis which brought the country’s economy to a halt in 2011 the same year Rousseff became president. The protests were peaceful. The highest numbers of protesters were reported in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and the capital Brasilia. Rousseff’s presidential mandate will officially end in 2018. The 68-year-old is being associated with the corruption scandal involving oil conglomerate Petrobras, widely regarded as the biggest corruption scandal in Brazilian history. The right-wing opposition is accusing Rousseff of accepting illegal payments in order to fund her presidential campaign in 2014. Rousseff who, according to the latest polls, is only popular among 10% of the inhabitants of the world’s fifth largest country, is also facing accusations of power abuse. Rousseff also tampered with the country’s budget in 2014 and in the first half-year of 2015. The court ruling in the case ruled the budget to be illegal. Government corruption, protests in the streets, high unemployment rates and the Zika virus scare are putting the planned Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro into serious jeopardy.

Recent parliamentary elections in Iran are being labeled as a turning point for the Middle Eastern country. One of the reasons is the high turnout, as 60% of the voters came to the booths on 26 February. Even president Hassan Rouhani was surprised by the high turnout, saying it led to the polls being closed at midnight instead of 6pm as originally scheduled. Rouhani views elections as an integral part of democracy needed in order for the country to become more open. These elections were the first to allow the participation of prisoners and people from the country’s opposition who are in house arrest. Aside from electing the 290-member parliament, the voters also elected new representatives into the 88-member Assembly of Experts responsible for selecting the country’s next Supreme Leader to replace Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The initial results showcased the success of the Reformists led by president Rouhani, who was successful with young voters, mostly due to the nuclear agreement he had signed last year, limiting Iran´s nuclear potential in exchange for several sanctions against the country being lifted. The reformists have gained 15 seats in the Assembly of Experts out of possible 16 in Teheran, providing reason for optimism that the newly-selected Ayatollah will not be overly conservative. The conservative politicians promoting a more reserved approach towards a rapprochement with the West are thus losing influence in the country. Despite the results, many still think that the elections will not bring any substantial changes.

in the Streets

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interview General Petr Pavel: Strengthening and modernizing our defence and deterrence posture will be at the heart of the Summit Interviewed by Katarína Schwertnerová It is widely discussed that NATO is going back to the roots - meaning its initial role of collective defence and deterrence. How different is or should be NATO´s deterrence in 21st century compared to the Cold War times? The core function of NATO is collective defence - this was the very reason behind the establishment of NATO. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds members together. This principle has not changed in over sixty-five years. Following the end of the Cold War, collective defence was a bit side-lined and crisis management was the main focus. The situation has changed over the past several years as a result of Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea, its activities in Eastern Ukraine, its characterisation of NATO’s activities in its new security strategy as ”dangers“, its snap exercises and so on. Russia has also increased its military capabilities based on a false narrative of NATO and the West’s actions. Moreover, we have been witnessing the rise of violent extremism and terrorism on NATO’s southern flank. Additionally, Russia has become involved in the civil war in Syria, not as part of the US-led Global Coalition but to assist its ally, President Assad. With the ongoing

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ISIL threat to the south of NATO territory and an increase in violent terrorist attacks on European soil, the security situation today is ever more volatile and complex. NATO’s deterrence posture during the Cold War worked for the environment it was created, through stationing thousands of

personnel and military hardware on European soil. However, today’s security environment calls for a different strategy, one that is more flexible and able to respond to any type of threat. A central tenet of NATO’s deterrence strategy rests on credible, capable and responsive

forces, where dialogue also plays a key factor. Defence and Dialogue are complementary. A vital part of our deterrence is to communicate our capability and resolve in any situation to reduce risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation. Another part is transparency and confidence building so that NATO can be clear and strong about its actions so as to prevent incidents from getting out of control. With threats such as ISIL, we need to work with our regional partners to find different forms of deterrence and prevention which better address the root causes of violent extremism. This is where NATO’s Defence Capacity Building comes into play. We are working with countries such as Jordan and Iraq so our partners are better able to defend themselves from threats within and beyond their borders. NATO’s deterrence posture will continue to be adapted and fortified in the run up to the Warsaw Summit. How is it possible for the Alliance to take appropriate precautionary steps when Russia´s statements are often inconsistent with its actions? Following the end of the Cold war, the Alliance and Russia engaged in building a genuine partnership, as demarked by the


establishment of the NATO-Russia to the new security challenges. will be the added value of NFIUs to Council in 2002. NATO and Russia The RAP includes both the armies of respective countries? also worked on several practical assurance measures and projects of mutual interest, adaptation measures. Assurance The VJTF is a brigade that such as counter-terrorism, thus measures comprise a series of will be able to deploy within 48 contributing to global security land, sea and air activities in, on hours and will eventually include together. Then, in early 2014, and around the NATO’s eastern 5,000 troops. It is part of the Russia violated international law flank, which are reinforced by NATO Response Force (NRF), and the borders of a neighbouring exercises focused on collective NATO’s high-readiness force state and undermined the defence and crisis management. which comprises of land, air, sea foundations of European security Adaptation measures focus on and Special Forces units capable by annexing Crimea. NATO reacted long-term changes to NATO’s force of rapid deployment wherever by re-evaluating this partnership. and command structure so that needed. A decision was taken by Foreign the Alliance is better able to react Indeed, the VJTF has taken part Ministers in April 2014 that practical swiftly and decisively to sudden in a number of exercises as this is cooperation was suspended with crises. Adaptation measures also where we want all the deficiencies Russia, while maintaining channels include tripling the strength of to be observed, documented, of dialogue open. the NATO Response Force (NRF), analysed and corrected. From The NATO Secretary General, creating the Very High Readiness there we can move forward to Jens Stoltenberg, has spoken to Joint Task Force (VJTF) that is able ensure that when the time comes, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to deploy at very short notice, the the VJTF is exactly that – ready. Our Sergei Lavrov aim is for the force to on a number be ready to be stood “NATO’s deterrence posture will continue to of occasions, up this year. be adapted and fortified in the run up to the the latest one As for the added being at the value of the NFIUs, Warsaw Summit.” Munich Security their purpose is to Conference in February this establishment of eight NATO Force facilitate the rapid deployment and year. Moreover, direct military- Integration Units (NFIUs) across integration within the respective to-military communication our eastern Allies to help facilitate Host Nation of the VJTF and follow procedures are in place so that actual reinforcements should the on force elements. General Gerasimov (the Russian need arise, and enhancing the Where is the added value for Chief of Defence) and I are able Standing Naval Forces. Host Nations? The NFIUs will to contact each other should a We are constantly adapting enable Allied forces to more situation occur that merits direct and balancing our actions. To rapidly respond to a perceived contact. I have to say that I have illustrate, we are now working on threat and deter an attack because tried to reach out to General a multinational enhanced forward they will help deploying forces on Gerasimov several times with the presence in the Eastern part of the their arrival and further movement aim of enhancing transparency Alliance. It will be rotational and as well as exercise the necessary and avoiding misunderstanding, supported by a programme of coordination in this process. but so far there has not been a exercises. It will be complemented positive response from the Russian by the necessary logistics and Considering the ongoing side. infrastructure to support pre- information war, how does the Russia has not been consistent positioning and facilitate rapid cooperation between Military with its actions and it is correct to reinforcement. Committee and NATO Strategic say its statements do not always I must stress that everything Communication Centre of match its actions. Nevertheless, we do is transparent, defensive Excellence work? What have been the twenty-eight members of the and in line with our international the concrete outcomes of this Alliance share their intelligence commitments. cooperation so far? and their experience, so we are well informed and able to respond NATO aims to strike the right We need to remember that to any threat from any direction. balance between its presence Centres of Excellence (CoEs) are Due to this and in response to on the Eastern border and NATO-accredited but nationally Russia’s actions, not long after rapid deployment of additional sponsored. Ultimately, it is the its illegal annexation of Crimea, forces. NFIU teams in the Eastern Nations involved that direct their Heads of State and Government at countries and Spearhead Forces work and fund their activities. We the NATO Summit in Wales agreed are key parts of this effort. Based in the NATO command structure the RAP to ensure the Alliance is on several exercises of Spearhead reach out to them for expertise ready to respond swiftly and firmly Forces, are they ready yet? What and specialized support.

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The StratCom CoE has already established itself as a solid and reliable source, despite being a relatively new institution accredited only in 2014. Nevertheless,

I said, achieving consensus is not always easy, but once achieved, it clearly demonstrates the strength of 28 democratic Nations speaking in one voice.

“We face a fundamentally changed security environment, and we are adapting our Alliance to the challenges.” in-depth research products are starting to come through. Recently, the CoE has shared with NATO Headquarters some very interesting research results on ISIL’s information campaign and its influence as well as results on Russian propaganda. We see the StratCom CoE as a type of thinktank that pursues quality analytical work in support of NATO. Some of their products on hybrid warfare and information warfare are truly impressive. We co-operate closely with the CoE to make sure that we put their capabilities to best use in order for the Alliance to achieve continuous awareness on the information environment both in the Eastern and Southern flanks of NATO. I personally look forward to seeing the results in coming years. What is the impact of differences in threat perception between Southern and Eastern NATO members on the unity of the Alliance and its decisionmaking process? Can we avoid the situation that the frictions between European countries over migration crisis will spill over to NATO? Our decision making process does not change depending on the threat or the direction of the threat. Whenever we have more sovereign players with their sovereign interests, achieving consensus is not an easy endeavour. But this Alliance is built on culture of unanimous decisions on all major issues and as such, it is used to debating and reaching compromises in favour of bigger and more important objectives. As

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It is logical that threat perception is not exactly the same across the Alliance, due to geography, historical experiences and other factors. Therefore, while eastern Allies are naturally more concerned about threats coming from the Eastern flank, Allies to the South of NATO and those having had direct experience perceive the threat from terrorism and ISIL as rather urgent. It is important that we continue to discuss and share our views as well as build upon and further strengthen our common values. That is also where our strength lies. As for any frictions that could be caused by the migrant crisis, we have to remember that NATO and the EU share 22 members and they are based on the same values. We operate side by side in Afghanistan, in Kosovo and off Somalia as well as in fighting hybrid threats. Most recently, we have started to coordinate our activities in the Aegean in an effort to stem the flow of migrants. NATO has deployed ships to the Aegean Sea to support our Allies Greece and Turkey, as well as the EU border agency FRONTEX, in support of the effort to address the migrant and refugee crisis.

arrangements at the operational and tactical level. NATO and FRONTEX have exchanged liaison officers and are sharing information, to enable FRONTEX, as well as Greece and Turkey, to take action in real time. This is an excellent example of how NATO and the EU can work together to address common challenges. At the same time, there is definitely room for further cooperation between the two institutions. Under current situation, what are NATO´s recommendations to Eastern members in terms of defence planning? How does NATO perceive the efforts in defence and security cooperation of the V4 countries, although they are still limited? Every Ally is involved in the NATO Defence Planning Process individually, as each Nation brings its specific capabilities to the overall NATO defence plan. Regional cooperation is an important factor in defence planning and it is very much encouraged. In the defence field, examples of where regional cooperation can be very beneficial include force integration, host nation support, logistics support, cyber defence, equipment acquisition etc. The V4 group has increased their cooperation in exercises, training and education as well as procurement of defence capabilities. Increasing interoperability on the regional level can only strengthen overall NATO and EU capability. There is currently an EU V4 Battle Group which is on stand-by for any

“A vital part of our deterrence is to communicate our capability and resolve to reduce risk of misunderstanding or miscalculation.” These ships are already collecting information and conducting monitoring in the Aegean Sea. NATO’s Maritime Command has also agreed with FRONTEX on

eventual EU operations. It serves as a linchpin for defence cooperation in the area of training, exercises and capability development.


What are your expectations from the Warsaw Summit? What priorities should the Alliance focus on after the summit in terms of strengthening capabilities and improving strategies? We face a fundamentally changed security environment, and we are adapting our Alliance to the challenges. At the Warsaw Summit we will take the next steps in our collective defence. Strengthening and modernizing our defence and deterrence posture will be at the heart of the Summit. NATO must be strong to keep all our Nations safe. At the same time, we must stay committed to dialogue and transparency. Strong deterrence, defence and dialogue are complementary. I also expect we will take decisions to further modernise our intelligence and early warning, integrate our forces, and enhance cyber defence. This is due to the threats we face from both state and non-state actors, from conventional military forces and from unconventional terrorist or hybrid attacks. We must also look to the future and have fresh ideas and capabilities. In order to achieve

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this, Nations committed nearly two years ago at the Wales Summit to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets; to make the most effective use of our funds; and to share costs and responsibilities in a more balanced way. After many years of substantial reductions in defence spending, many Allies stopped the declining trend and several have already increased

the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM) in Afghanistan. I have no doubt the Allies and their RSM partners will reiterate their continued commitment to the people of Afghanistan and to the reform of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. I also expect the Heads of State and Government will review other NATO missions and operations.

“If we really want to achieve lasting solutions for any crisis, we need to build on local solutions and local forces.” their defence spending in 2015. NATO will also continue to focus on the other two core tasks, i.e. cooperative security and crisis management. Over the years, NATO has seen the benefits of cooperation amongst its Allies and with Partner nations, and so has built a broad cooperative network. Cooperation with an Ally, Partner, or international institution, allows for a more comprehensive answer to a crisis. If we really want to achieve lasting solutions for any crisis, we need to build on local solutions and local forces. As for crisis management, operations will certainly be on the agenda of the Summit, including

eneral Petr Pavel was appointed Chairman of the NATO Military Committee on 26 June 2015. He was elected to this position in September 2014. From July 2012 to May 2015 General Pavel served as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, the highest ranking officer in the Czech Army and the principal military adviser to the Czech Government. General Pavel graduated from the Army College in Vyškov, Czech Republic in 1983 and since then has spent a large part of his military career holding positions in Special Forces, Operations and Intelligence divisions. Throughout his career, General Pavel has held a range of positions from Deputy Military and Air Attaché of the Czech Republic in Belgium to

In sum, I would say that the Summit will ensure NATO’s ability to carry out its tasks of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security by focusing on ensuring sufficient resources, the right military capabilities, the improved decision making procedures, the interoperability as well as increased political dialogue with partners. The Summit will confirm that NATO is a forwardlooking organisation that will continue to fulfil its primary goal – protecting the people, territory and values of our Alliance.

Commander Special Forces to Deputy Director Operations Division at the Ministry of Defence. In addition, General Pavel has also held his share of positions in International and National joint staffs representing the Czech Armed Forces as the National Military Representative to the US Central Command, as well as National Military Representative of the Czech Republic to SHAPE in Mons, Belgium. Furthering his education in the United Kingdom, General Pavel has studied at the Staff College, Camberley, the Royal College of Defence Studies, London and obtained an M.A. in International Relations from King's College, London.

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will warsaw deliver? Readiness Action Plan: A Reality Check Jan Havránek: Defence Counsellor, Delegation of the Czech Republic to NATO Jan Jireš: Defence Policy Director, Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic¹ In September 2014, at the Newport Summit, NATO adopted a robust set of measures in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine as well as heightened instability on the Southern periphery of the Alliance. The Readiness Action Plan (RAP) aimed to reinforce NATO’s collective defence and crisis management in all directions (360° degree approach), to increase the intensity of Allied presence on the territory of the frontline members, and to confirm solidarity in NATO following the “28 for 28” logic. A difficult plan to negotiate, it turned out even more difficult to implement. Now just a few months before the summit in Warsaw, NATO needs a reality check on where it stands in terms of RAP implementation and the way forward.

Before RAP: NATO’s political and military dimensions The post-Cold War enlargement of NATO happened fast. Within one decade its membership grew from 16 to 28 countries. The expansion was implemented in the context of the then ruling maxim that without “going out of area” the Alliance faced the prospect of “going out of business.”

Members of paramilitary National Guard muster near Szczecin, Poland, as they ready themselves to counter threats and contain crisis situations in their area. (AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski, File)

NATO’s traditional collective defence role remained unchallenged but assumed a more political and symbolic character rather than military one. NATO’s core military activities lied, indeed, “out of area.” In exchange for being accepted as a part of the Western political community, the new members in Central and Eastern Europe offered their (often very limited) military capacities to support NATO’s crisis management operations in areas outside of Europe. As a result, the Alliance expanded politically but not mil-

itarily between 1999 and 2009. In military terms, the Cold War dividing line spanning from Szczecin in the North to Trieste in the South stayed in place, the difference being that it no longer ran along the Alliance’s eastern border but right through the middle of its territory. Moreover, military capacities surviving on both sides of this internal dividing line were shrinking with an ever increasing speed. The prospective new members from Central and Eastern Europe dismantled their obsolete Soviet-style militaries,

¹ The views expressed in this article are of both authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of the Czech Ministry of Defence.

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but were unable or unwilling to replace them with modern and sufficiently robust armed forces compatible with their Western allies. The United States concluded that European security was sorted out for good and withdrew the vast majority of its military assets from Europe. Simultaneously, Western European allies implemented a wholesale disarmament, which reached dramatic proportions after the financial and budgetary crisis had started in 2008. Instead of territorially expanding eastwards in line with the political assurances granted to the Central and Eastern European members by the United States and other traditional members, NATO’s military infrastructure kept shrinking. As a result, the possibility of rapid reinforcement of the new frontline allies with military assets based in Western Europe gradually ceased to be a realistic option.

Nailing down the RAP principles was not easy and NATO had to accept a certain amount of risk in the sense of preparing for future security environment that was (and is) by definition unpredictable. Moreover, RAP was unable to define in a sufficiently concrete way the desired balance between responding to “Eastern”

The Readiness Action Plan

and “Southern” threats. Has RAP been able to do justice to security concerns of Central and Eastern European allies? While it is clear that vis-à-vis Russia’s growing military capacities deployed near the Allied territory much more must be done, NATO has achieved surprisingly lot since Newport. If anyone had told even the most seasoned experts in 2013 that in three years NATO would be ready to deploy its spearhead force (VJTF) in 48 hours; that in every frontline ally’s territory there would be a NATO command and control cell (NFIU); that both national and Alliance’s decision-making processes would be significantly streamlined; and that Allied forces would be involved in a sustained training programme conducted on the territory of the most exposed Eastern allies; it would

In this context, a reinvigorated Russia attacked its neighbours, first Georgia in 2008 and then Ukraine in 2014. NATO responded by turning its September 2014 summit in Newport into an emergency meeting aimed at reassuring its exposed Eastern allies. The summit adopted a number of practical measures, both immediate and mid-term, under the label of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). In the run-up to the Warsaw Summit, RAP is considered one of NATO’s key strategic documents, and rightly so. Compared to the pre-2014 situation, it contains an unprecedented set of measures which refocuses NATO on collective defence.

have sounded like a utopia. There were no assurance measures and fewer exercises in the region. The November 2013 Steadfast Jazz exercise, for example, saw merely 3,000 Allied troops participating in the live part of the exercise. It was a disappointment in terms of the overall Allied participation, par-

Polish and British troops take part in a joint military exercise in Swietoszow, Poland, with more than 1,000 British troops participating. (AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski, File)

ticularly given the high number of troops in Russia’s Zapad exercise series conducted at around the same time. Since 2014, due to the Assurance Measures under RAP, NATO has been certainly more visible in Central and Eastern Europe, which means one could take the “so far, so good” approach. On the other hand, NATO’s command and control footprint in Central and Eastern Europe remains minimal and the region’s links to NATO’s force structure are still blurry. Recent developments, such as the massive increase in Russian military capacities deployed in Kaliningrad, illustrate that NATO’s military deterrent on its eastern border is seriously insufficient. The assurance measures that have been implemented by NATO since summer 2014 cannot substitute for proper deterrence: The units

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that train in the Baltics lack the Russia’s growing Anti-Access/ being a nuclear Alliance might necessary equipment, supplies Area Denial (A2/AD) capabili- simply be too high of a threshold and logistics for engagement in ties, we can no longer rely sole- in a hybrid warfare scenario. Also, combat operations. ly on our capacity and freedom a credible deterrent system must This is why, in February 2016, to move heavy equipment and a go beyond forward presence to NATO ministers of defence de- sufficient amount of ammunition affect the whole structure across cided on an Alliance’s entire “NATO has achieved surprisingly lot since Newport. enhanced, perterritory, instisistent, multitutions and caThe implementation of RAP has been by and large a national and pabilities. Here success.” rotational forlooms NATO’s ward military human probpresence along the Alliance’s and other materiel to the theatre lem: insufficient manning and eastern borders, combined with only after a crisis starts. overstretch in tasks and responadditional reinforcement caMoreover, the Warsaw sum- sibilities. Without member counpacity. The decision on the size mit must go well beyond RAP’s tries’ true commitment, supportof this presence will be among mid-term horizon and take deci- ed by growing national defence the top deliverables at Warsaw. sive steps towards a truly long- budgets, this challenge cannot A historical milestone for NATO term adaptation of NATO. How be resolved. in the region, indeed, but will it the Allied collective defence sysFor the next couple of years, be enough to deter Russia from tem will look like over the next the Alliance needs to scale back repeating a hybrid-style scenario twenty years? In this regard, the from the old “global NATO” amin the Baltics, for example? summit should determine how bition and adopt a perspective of NATO should conduct the neces- a county sheriff with badlands in sary strategic review towards the its Northern, Eastern and Southlong-term adaptation. Should ern neighbourhoods as well as in there be a RAP Plus? Should the the cyberspace. The challenges Strategic Concept be updated or that are out there will likely stay even completely revised? with us. The good thing is that Even though the implemenNaturally, deterrence remains thanks to the implementation of tation of RAP has been by and the key challenge. Should the the collective defence package large a success, there are a few conventional and nuclear deter- adopted at Newport, NATO’s initems that have been lagging be- rents be linked better and how? ternal military gap dividing “old” hind conspicuously, in particular What is the proper mix of instru- and “new” allies is today slightly the prepositioning of equipment ments providing for reliable de- narrower than before. and materiel close to the east- terrence in the era of hybrid warern border of the Alliance. Given fare? In this respect, it is clear that

Next steps: beyond RAP

NATO Foreign Ministers stand in front of the logo for the upcoming NATO Warsaw Summit 2016 during a group photo at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. (Jonathan Ernst/Pool via AP)

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will warsaw deliver?

How NATO must adapt after Warsaw Aylin Matlé: Academic Assistant, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg Germany

The European Allies do not possess the necessary airlift capabilities to transport military equipment along with trained personnel quickly to a possible place of action. (AP Photo/Irina Gorbaseva)

Despite diverging threat perceptions, NATO’s 28 member states managed to condemn Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine in a fairly united manner. Consequently, the Alliance reacted to the upended security environment on its Eastern flank by unequivocally refocusing its defence planning and implementation efforts on collective defence, i.e.

alliance solidarity. The Alliance’s credibility to defend one another would have been lost, had the member states not gotten the so-called Readiness Action Plan (RAP) off the ground. The concrete measures that were decided upon are divided between short and longterm endeavours. Short-term measures that were activated very shortly after the annexation

of Crimea include air policing in the Baltics, an increased number of AWACS flights over Poland and Romania, a bolstered navel surveillance as well as additional exercises. All of these activities were aimed at both reassuring NATO’s Eastern partners, most prominently Poland and the Baltic countries, and at deterring Russia – a task that has been all but neglected by NATO as a

13


defence organization in the past two decades. Individual member states have been suspicious of Russia’s intentions long before it displayed expansionist desires. The most vocal among these member states have been Poland,

more precise: if the VJTF is to be deployable within five days after having been put on alert and if the follow-up forces are to be deployable within seven days, the Allies seriously have to consider granting NATO’s

under attack, NATO must increase its capabilities in critical areas including intelligence gathering and surveillance, assessments of a potential conflict theatre, and early warning systems. Tying in with the Alliance’s plans to

“Expanding the authority of the SACEUR could result in the commander being able to put the VJTF on alert provisionally when enough evidence points to an imminent attack.” Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Current demands regarding the bolstering of collective defence on NATO’s Eastern flank exceed plans agreed upon in the RAP. Accordingly, the Baltic states and Poland are assigning the utmost importance to storing military equipment on their soil. The goal of what is better known as prepositioning is to shorten military response times. NATO’s ability to deploy troops quickly on a large scale has become crucial in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. It should be telling and hence worrying enough that Moscow can concentrate several tens of thousands of troops within two to three days, whereas the conventional reaction time of NATO in the framework of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) is reported - according to optimistic estimates - to vary between five to seven days. Adapting NATO’s readiness for action as well as its military reaction time are the two major long-term structural adjustments the Allies agreed the organization should undertake. Steps that need to be taken in this direction chiefly entail the quick deployment of large troop formations up to a division and eventually a corps. Materializing this long-term goal will require not only logistic and material prerequisites but also the political will of the Allies. To be

14

Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) more powers to dispatch troops. After all, it is questionable whether each and every ally would agree to sending NATO troops to aid an Eastern partner under attack from Russia. However, that is not to say that political consultations within NATO and among member states ought to be sidestepped. Ultimately it is the will of the 28 member states that should determine whether or not NATO’s forces are put to use. Rather, expanding the authority of the SACEUR could result in the commander being able to put the VJTF on alert provisionally when enough evidence points

defend itself against so-called hybrid threats or hybrid warfare, the listed capabilities in addition to ensuring cyber security are of critical importance for NATO to defend itself. In addition to political and material considerations, logistic steps have to be taken so as to warrant the quick deployment of the VJTF. The European Allies do not possess the necessary airlift capabilities to transport military equipment along with trained personnel quickly to a possible place of action in Eastern allied territory. Using the land route would clearly be an alternative to the air route. However, the necessary infrastructure,

Commander of US Army Europe Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges speaks to the media during joint NATO military exercise at Rukla military base, west of Vilnius, Lithuania. (AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis)

to an imminent attack. In order to have at command the intelligence that is necessary to determine whether an ally is

planning and legal prerequisites were largely abolished in Western Europe after the end of the Cold War as they were deemed to be


of no further use. Another capability but no less a political issue NATO has to put to the fore in Warsaw and beyond is the nuclear component of its deterrence and defence posture. In particular, against the backdrop of Russia’s nuclear sabre rattling since the cooling of its relations with NATO, the Alliance has to come to terms with the question of what role nuclear weapons ought to play for NATO. Although the latest “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review” (DDPR), published in 2012, clearly states that NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance so long as nuclear weapons exist, the basic assumptions that the DDPR was based upon are no longer valid. Firstly, Russia is not a partner of NATO any longer – and possibly never intended to become a serious one to begin with. Secondly and most importantly, it is highly plausible that Moscow’s nuclear arsenal is once again directed at NATO member states. Russia’s declared intention to station short-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads in Kaliningrad – on the borders of Poland and Lithuania – should be a warning sign in this regard. Taking not only Russia’s (re-) emphasis on nuclear weapons but also its violation of agreed upon principles into account,

resumed at the off-chance of Moscow finding its way back into the European security architecture. However, the spirit of common understandings has been starkly breached by Russia. Thus NATO’s member states should contemplate whether they wish to abide by rules their partner openly ridicules. NATO’s agreement to neither station troops and military equipment nor nuclear weapons on a substantial scale on the soil

NATO troops make a massive amphibious landing during NATO sea exercises BALTOPS 2015. (AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski)

of former Warsaw Pact states was banked on the assumption that the security environment would not change. This assumption was clearly ill-founded. In addition, the NATO-Russia Founding Act is not a legally binding treaty, but

“Adapting NATO’s readiness for action as well as its military reaction time are the two major longterm structural adjustments.” it is clear that the Allies should at least consider nullifying the NATO-Russia Founding Act. That is not to say the agreement should necessarily be formally eviscerated – not least of all because cooperation between NATO and Russia could be

NATO-Russia Founding Act as yet another ploy of propaganda “proving” to the Russian people the alleged aggressive nature of NATO. However, that should not keep the Alliance from showing up Russian allegations for what they are: politically motivated and factually wrong assertions. It would certainly be a difficult task to convince all 28 member states of the utility of at least considering ways to circumvent the agreements laid down in

a declaration of political intent. Thus NATO would not violate international law by deploying troops, military equipment or even nuclear weapons to – for example – the Baltics. It is true that Russia could exploit NATO’s withdrawal from the

the NATO-Russia Founding Act. By the same token, honouring the security interests of its Eastern partners should be of higher importance to the rest of the Allies in light of Russia’s decision to exclude itself from the European security order. In conclusion, it should be apparent that NATO has already come a long way in uniting against and preparing for the spectre of Russian aggression against an ally – yet, it should also be apparent that this process will not end with the summit in Warsaw. If anything, the gathering in July should serve as a reminder that NATO has still daunting political and material tasks and challenges ahead of it.

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in depth U.S. Security Partnership with

Europe: Obama and Beyond

Matthew Rhodes: Director of Central and Southeast Europe Programs,George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany ¹ Security partnership with Europe has been a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy since the Second World War. Its durability and strength have reflected Americans’ understandings of their country’s global role, Europe’s importance to that, and Europe’s own commitment to cooperation. Each of these factors has again been subject to debate during the presidency of Barack Obama. The range of current international challenges make robust, balanced transatlantic partnership as needed as ever. Recognizing and addressing the latest questions about it will thus be critical to the success of NATO’s Warsaw summit and to the longer-term vitality of the alliance.

U.S. Global Engagement America’s relations with Europe are in part a function of its broader approach to the world. Up to the 1940s, the “isolationist” tradition in American foreign policy mainly focused on security interests within the Western hemisphere. The experience of two world wars and the Great Depression brought a shift to a more ambitious strategy of “liberal internationalism.” Together with complementary efforts to

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry shakes hands with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 2 December 2014. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo, Pool) contain Soviet communism, this involved global leadership by the newly preeminent United States to establish and maintain a stable global order as an antidote to

¹ The views expressed here are solely those of the author.

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repetition of the horrors of the first half of the twentieth century. Defining features included new multilateral institutions, formal alliances and forward


On the border crossing between Czech Republic and Slovakia, Slovak supporters welcome American convoy on the way to NATO exercise in Hungary in September 2015. (SITA/Martin Medňanský) troop presence, and economic assistance through programs like the Marshall Plan. More recently, the post-2008 economic crisis, the rise of other powers, and the long military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have re-opened questions about the United States’ continued ability and interest to play this role. President Obama has adhered to the goals of liberal internationalism but argued for more selective deployment of American power on their behalf and correspondingly greater contributions from partners. Among the broader public, a poll by the Pew Center from December 2013 found for the first time in half a century of asking the same question that a majority of Americans agreed with the statement that the country should “mind its own business” in international affairs and let other countries fend for themselves. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the rise of ISIS the following year partly pushed sentiment back in the other direction, but the current presidential election campaign has again featured more circumscribed approaches to national security. For the first time in living memory, most of the leading contenders

from both parties have been outspokenly critical of foreign trade agreements - the historical pillars of liberal internationalism. Candidates including Republican front-runner Donald Trump have also been even more critical than Obama of what they see as expensive, unreciprocated commitments to overseas allies.

U.S. Commitment to Partnership with Europe Despite the developments above, European states remain America’s closest group of allies. The standard list of reasons includes close historical ties, intertwined economies, shared democratic values, and unmatched links through NATO. Few countries elsewhere can provide comparable support for U.S. objectives around the world. Underlining these points, the Obama administration’s National Security Strategy of February 2015 stresses America’s “profound commitment to a Europe that is free, whole, and at peace,” embrace of a “strong Europe” as

an “indispensable partner…for tackling global security challenges,” and “iron-clad” backing for Article 5 collective defence. The continued presence of more than 60,000 U.S. military personnel on the continent, increased tempo of rotational training and exercises since the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and recently quadrupled funding for the Defence Department’s European Reassurance Initiative reflect the same sentiment. However, Europe as such has grown less strategically central to America’s global concerns since the end of the Cold War. In a negative sense, this reflects long-term trends of economic stagnation and demographic decline in Europe compared to surging growth and populations in other regions. More positively, the continent has, at least until recently, appeared less subject to serious threats and more capable (or potentially capable) of providing for its own security. The expanded roles and ambitions of the European Union, a body with an integrated economy bigger than America’s, reinforce that last conclusion. These types of perceptions contributed to the U.S. “pivot” (or rebalance) to Asia from late 2011. Defence-related impacts on Europe included withdrawal of two of four remaining American combat brigades by mid-2013. The extent to which the latest challenges from Russia overturn assumptions here is another issue of debate. Sceptics point out that by standard statistical measures of power, a unified EU would seem well-positioned to deal with its neighbour to the east; as one saying puts it, “why do 500 million Europeans need 300 million Americans to defend them from 150 million Russians?”

17


“cuts have almost stopped.”⁴ Budget numbers are partly symbolic, but they relate to real gaps in capabilities. They help explain why burden-sharing visa-vis other challenges on Europe’s eastern and southern flanks has proven more successful in Questions concerning European cases where Europe could apply capabilities lead back to questions economic and diplomatic power of Europe’s commitment to than in those requiring hard transatlantic partnership. These military assets. issues also are not new. Since In fairness, allies have NATO’s creation in the late 1940s, demonstrated impressive cohesion American policymakers have and endured real sacrifice under sought to balance confidence and difficult circumstances. Still, glasssupport for U.S. leadership with half-empty analyses emphasize greater burden-sharing and selfdisbalances. When Obama sufficiency by its European allies. took office, American forces in Periodic intensified pushes for the Afghanistan tripled from 35,000 latter have usually been carried out to 100,000 by late 2010, while with limited insistence and results. other Allies added only another As noted above, President 7000 and maintained restrictive Obama has nonetheless again caveats on their made this use. Within the goal a priority. “Obama´s National Security Strategy of February coalition against Already as 2015 stresses America’s profound commitment to a ISIS, Europeans a candidate Europe that is free, whole, and at peace.” have joined in in summer efforts to restrict 2008, Obama pledged to “strengthen NATO by to 2014. That year, only three financing and flows of foreign asking more of our allies.”² In an members on the continent met fighters, but the Americans have interview this spring, Obama more the NATO target of two percent carried out two-thirds of airstrikes bluntly described interactions of GDP for defence. Even with against ISIS targets in Iraq and with Europe as an “anti-free rider parallel U.S. cuts after 2010, 90% in Syria. American spending accounts for campaign.”³ In addition to the usual nearly three-quarters of NATO’s challenges that burden-sharing total. In a farewell speech at NATO campaigns have faced in the past, America’s partnership with current efforts have occurred headquarters in June 2011, Europe is deeply rooted and during serial international crises outgoing U.S. Secretary of Defense of “once a generation” proportion. Robert Gates famously warned resilient. It faces some significant These began with the global that such trends were politically challenges that are unlikely to economic downturn at the end unsustainable. Three years later disappear soon. It lies within of 2008. Nearly eight years later, at Wales, allies recommitted the abilities of the United States recoveries remain slow and uneven to raise defence investment by and Europe to address these in 2024. Subsequent progress has ways that preserve and adapt on both sides of the Atlantic. Divergent initial responses been mixed; the most optimistic transatlantic ties far into the signalled that Obama’s popularity note that Secretary General Jens future, but complacence would be with European publics would not Stoltenberg’s Annual Report of misplaced. guarantee backing for his policies January 2016 could strike was that

European Commitment to Partnership with the United States

from European governments. Prior to Obama’s first official trip to Europe in spring 2009, Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek (then holding the EU presidency) condemned U.S. fiscal stimulus as “the road to hell.” The crisis also deepened political polarization. A sense of failure or even betrayal by traditional mainstream parties in many countries has driven support to anti-system populists of the left and right. As a result, policy agreement within and among Euro-Atlantic states has become more difficult. Most directly, the downturn accelerated defence reductions within NATO. On top of the previous declines, European allies’ military spending fell by another $50 billion, or 15%, from 2009

Conclusion

²Speech at the Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, D.C., July 15, 2008. ³Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic Monthly, April 2016. ⁴Jens Stoltenberg, “The Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015,” Jan. 28, 2016.

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in depth

SOUTHERN THREATS TO NATO: PERCEPTION AND NECESSARY STRATEGIES FABRIZIO W. LUCIOLLI: President, Atlantic Treaty Association, Belgium

NATO joined the EU in efforts to halt irregular arrivals of migrants from the Middle East. Alliance´s ships help patrol Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey. (AP Photo/Petros Giannakouris) “The Mediterranean region faces huge security challenges with wide-ranging implications for Euro-Atlantic security”. This statement has been made by the Heads of State and Government on the occasion of 2014 Wales Summit. However, the idea that the Mediterranean security is closely linked to the security of Europe is not particularly new. It was evident to the Romans, as well as during the Cold War, when the Mediterranean

basin became a liquid continuation of the European continental front, where Sixth US Fleet faced off with Fifth Soviet Eskadra. Notwithstanding the security threats and challenges such as terrorism and the refugee crisis, the current strategic relevance of the Mediterranean becomes clear when we consider that even though the Mediterranean Sea represents only 0,67% of all the planet’s waters, it hosts annual

traffic of over 450 million tons of crude oil, which equals one fourth of world’s total oil traffic. Terrorism and the refugee crisis revealed how interconnected the present threats are, and issued challenges affecting both shores of the Mediterranean. Common threats requiring common solutions in the spirit of truly cooperative security approach between international organizations, NATO and its partners, emerged in the

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Mediterranean and the Gulf. In times of global insecurity, instabilities and crises have impact beyond their regional contexts with both actual and potential consequences on other geopolitical areas. Therefore, no country or international organization alone would be able to effectively tackle the complex and interconnected threats and security challenges – terrorism being the most significant among them. Even though terrorism is not a new phenomenon in security sce-

Today, terrorism is spread worldwide, and is ever more interconnected in networks for radicalization, recruitment, and training. The dismay caused by the latest terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels is accompanied by tens of thousands of other innocent victims in Europe, Mediterranean, Middle East, Asia, and across the entire world. Now is the time to act - not only react - with a cooperative security approach and an effective strategic vision, capable of addressing

in this direction, and demands from the EU member states mutual assistance “by all the means in their power”. Yet it remains unused, even though it would be advisable to seek an increased cooperation with NATO in the framework of true NATO-EU strategic partnership. It should be noted though that the international community finally seems to be heading towards cooperative security solutions against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. In order to succeed, the relevant local,

A Kurdish peshmerga fighter carries his weapon as he walks along the front line with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). (AP Photo/Hussein Malla) narios at least since Gavrilo Princip’s actions leading to the World War I, the new terrorist threat we are facing today has unprecedented features that need to be taken into account for developing more effective counter-strategies. Emblematic of the new dimensions of terrorism is the increasing number of “home-grown” and “foreign fighters”. Sometimes confused with “freedom fighters”, they are, quite contrarily, devoted to destroying the fundamental freedoms of our civil societies as well as our cultural heritage in a rather uncivilized manner.

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all the different dimensions of terrorism. An effective counter-terrorism strategy has three layers: International, National, and Individual. At the international level, unprecedented features of new terrorism require international organizations and member states to update and harmonize their counter-terrorism strategies in order to devise more effective counter-measures. The mutual defence clause in Treaty of Lisbon recently invoked by France in its fight against terrorism (article 42, paragraph 7) goes

regional, and international actors are called to establish a true military cooperation, overcoming the political differences that still prevent them from fighting the same battle on the ground. However, stabilization of the Mashrek region will not be enough, as ISIS is spread all across the Maghreb, with major outposts in Libya, Sahel and elsewhere in Africa. ISIS has claimed terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and SouthWest Asia as well, which means cooperative security solutions need to be implemented more broadly, if the international community is


to prevail over ISIS and its ramifications. While NATO and the international organizations have a relevant role in coordinating, supporting, and enhancing the counter-terrorism actions of its member states, national govern-

their capabilities and readiness. Doing so requires adequate military capabilities in order to avoid imbalances within the Alliance in the resources that member states allocate to the defence sector, and the Alliance’s overall ability to guarantee effective collective de-

“We need a new vision and a pro-active, comprehensive strategy capable of effectively addressing the multifaceted threats.” ments hold the primary responsibility in ensuring the security, both internal and external, of their citizens and country. From border control to intelligence and protection of critical infrastructures (such as nuclear facilities, airports and metros), the national governments are requested to update and develop new counter-terrorism strategies and assets. To this end, the terrorist attacks in Brussels showed the importance of effective cooperation between local police forces, municipalities, as well as individual citizens. This entails spreading a new and reinvigorated security culture among the population, development of adequate civilian preparedness, better collection of information, and protection of citizens. In fact, in future counter-terrorism strategies, individual citizens will acquire an essential role, representing the founding tile of a new security mosaic. This calls for conception of educational and training programs able to develop among the citizens a new national security culture. In addition to terrorism, the rise of hybrid forms of warfare as well as the resumption of traditional ones (embodied in the development of the fight against ISIS into a conventional conflict and the violent escalation of the crisis in Ukraine) calls upon NATO countries and their Partners to enhance

fence. Therefore, with regards to the upcoming Warsaw Summit, it is crucial for all the allied countries to make steps forward in addressing the 2% GDP issue. However, NATO countries and their partners are facing gradually more and more security challenges of non-military nature, which cannot be dealt with using military means. Indeed, “security is today far more than just a military matter. Strengthening of political consultation and economic cooperation,

characteristics of the contemporary security scenario. In fact, they are expression of a farsighted vision of the “Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation”, issued by NATO in 1956, enlightening us on the importance of taking up a cooperative approach to security in strategic non-military sectors. Radicalization, unemployment, marginalization, tomorrow’s food and water security, as well as the climate change are all non-military instability factors feeding terrorism and triggering dreadful humanitarian emergencies, such as the refugee crisis. These instability factors are most damaging to the young generation, and produce dangerous fallout in the security domain. Taking all of this into consideration, the European Union and NATO cannot afford to disregard the ongoing developments in its neighbourhood to the south. In Europe, as well as in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, we

Non-military factors underline the multifaceted threats going beyond the Mediterranean region. (AP Photo/Mosa'ab Elshamy) development of resources, as well as progress in education and public understanding - all of these can be as important for protecting a nation’s security, or security of an alliance, as building a battleship or equipping an army”. These words mirror exactly the

need a new vision and a comprehensive, pro-active (rather than simply re-active) strategy capable of effectively addressing the multifaceted threats and challenges to security arising in - and even beyond - the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean-Gulf area.

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FACE2FACE

Y YES

An opening from Moscow “Leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union, who gathered for a meeting in Moscow on December 4, stated that the bringing of troops of their countries into Czechoslovakia was an interference in internal affairs of sovereign Czechoslovakia and should be condemned. Disrupting the process of democratic renewal in Czechoslovakia, those illegal actions had long-term negative consequences and should be condemned. History showed how important it is, even in the most complex international situation, to use political means for the solution of any problems, strictly to observe the principles of sovereignty, independence and non-interference in internal affairs in relations among states, which is in keeping with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty. “(TASS, December 4, 1989).

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Should we

relaunch NATO-Russia Council? Troels Frøling: Board member, Danish Foreign Policy Society, Former Secretary General & Vice President ATA, Denmark This distancing from the “Brezhnev doctrine of socialist internationalism”, which gave Moscow the prerogative to decide on taking action should “socialism be in danger”, was followed by withdrawal of more than 550.000 Russian troops from Poland, GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and the end of the system of bilateral “Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance”, all committing WAPA members to follow Moscow.

The free choice of nations or the best of all worlds The end of the Cold War, the Berlin Wall, the Warsaw Treaty, and of the USSR introduced “A Europe whole and free and at peace” (President G.H.W. Bush 1989). The West began constructing - although not Gorbachev`s common European house - open doors towards an inclusive vision of Russia in the

NATO. Central and East European states finally could choose which family they wanted to belong to.

A return to the past Predictability and security on Moscow`s front door to the West? Not necessarily so. Mr. Putin called farewell to the USSR the worst geopolitical event of the 20th century. To secure its interests, Moscow introduced a doctrine conspicuously similar to that of Brezhnev. In the eyes of Putin-Verstehers, NATO and EU’s being on the borders of Russia shows a lack of understanding and respect for history. The free choice of nations must give way to the rationale of geopolitics. The image of liberal world, freedom and human rights on Russia’s doorstep (Moldova, Georgia [Abkhazia and South Ossetia] Crimea, Ukraine) is a deadly threat to Putin’s regime - hence the deep fear of “colour revolutions”. The EU Association Agreement with Ukraine was the worst


Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov speaks during a media conference after a meeting of the NATO-Russia Council in December 2013. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo) example for Moscow.

ed on a very confrontational line. Should Russia change this attitude, we may yet see a forum for substantial discussions on common security. “Any attempt to Two years ago, Mr. Putin overunite Europe without Russia and turned the strategic environment against it has inevitably led to grim with Crimea and Ukraine, and tragedies”, as Mr. Lavrov elegantly placed Russia far beyond the interwrites in the recent issue of “Russia national law: no progress in Minsk in Global Affairs”, no doubt preII, no compliance with the intersenting a genuine Russian interest. national law and its obligations, At this point, everything simulated strategic bombings on depends on first seeking the arNATO memeas of combers Sweden mon interest “We need to re-establish a cooperative and and Finland, and establishconstructive relationship with Russia, an ongoing threats to the ing cooperaBaltic memtion either on dialogue.” bers, facilitatthe fringes of, ed moves of Syrians to Finland and or not directly involving EuropeAt the same time, we need to Norway, nuclear and conventional re-establish a cooperative and an-Transatlantic security affairs. A military build-up facing Europe, constructive relationship with pragmatic cooperation in the High establishing a cordon sanitaire. Russia, an ongoing dialogue. The North? In Syria? Perhaps beyond? NATO-Russia Council 2002 was Against the Islamic terror? In any not a forum for dialogue between case, the way to the Council will be the Alliance and Russia. When in a long and indirect process of onsession, Russia was called out in going integration. alphabetical order between the NATO is a forum which keeps NATO members. Reality was a bit the US committed to European different though, as Russia insist-

The new “normal”?

security. Europe has a vital interest in securing that the US remain a European power, a balancer from over the sea, a guarantor of security. Delegating European security to Putin-Verstehers is not a viable way for European future. Now, the strategic holiday is over. Liberal values alone cannot protect Europe. Europeans in Warsaw must show commitment to the 2% in defence decision-making and actions.

Back on track - the NATO-Russia Council?

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FACE2FACE

N NO

Should we

relaunch NATO-Russia Council? Flemming Splidsboel Hansen: Research Coordinator, Danish Institute of International Studies, Denmark

On 31 December 2015 Russian anti-NATO catalogue. “The Russian by Danilov, Utkin & Fillipov (2009), president Vladimir Putin signed a is surrounded by enemies” not- tells its young readers that NATO new National Security Doctrine. ed the influential daily Kommer- has blatantly reneged on earlier The doctrine paints a broad picture sant in an earlier article, adding promises about non-enlargement of the contemporary world and it drily that “the state propaganda given to the Soviet leadership and does so with a special view to the is working”. The newspaper cited that it invents pretexts for interfercurrent threats to Russian national late 2013 polls showing that a full ing in the internal affairs of other security as perceived by the Krem- 78 per cent of respondents believe states, essentially with the aim of lin and to the tools necessary to that Russia is faced with enemies containing and even pushing back counter those threats. The doc- – foreign mainly, but supported by opponents of the US-led unipolar trine asserts, for instance, that “the disloyal domestic agents – which world order (an assignment in the USA and its allies strive to preserve represents a marked increase from textbook asks pupils to consider their domwhether Rusinance of sia may “pre“Russia has failed to deliver over Ukraine as requested, and world afvent the enits continued demonization of NATO goes against the spirit fairs” and largement of of the Council.” that in orNATO?”). der to do Add to so, they exert “political, economic, 65 per cent in 1999, 41 per cent in this background of engineered military and information pressure” 1994 and a much less pessimistic pessimism the fact that Russia has on Russia. As part of this, NATO is 13 per cent in 1989. Behind such thrown the European security orsingled out and the doctrine cites figures lies a development by which der into a limbo by violating the the alleged “violation of interna- the West in general and NATO in sovereignty of Ukraine – despite tional law” as well as the “further particular have been demonized having recognized that sovereignenlargement” of the Alliance as by the Russian public, including, of ty on several occasions – by anthreats to Russian national secu- course, the state-controlled me- nexing Crimea and by engaging rity. dia, as the source of most things in an undeclared “hybrid warfare” The new security doctrine is the evil. To illustrate, a widely used against Ukraine in the regions of most recent addition to what is by and Kremlin-endorsed history Luhansk and Donetsk. In an atnow a fairly voluminous Russian textbook for 11th graders, edited tempt to push Russia to return

24


NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Dutch King Willem-Alexander attend a meeting of the North Atlantic Council at NATO headquarters in December 2015. (Olivier Hoslet/Pool Photo via AP) Crimea to Ukraine and to help settle the conflict in Eastern Ukraine as outlined in the February 2015 Minsk II Agreement, a large number of Western states have introduced a combination of targeted social and material sanctions against Russian individuals and companies as well as key sectors in the economy. While the sanctions do have an immediate effect, so far they have not led the Russian regime to fundamentally change its course over neither Crimea nor Eastern Ukraine. The NATO-Russia Council is an important confidence-building institution, and its civilian and military co-operation may hopefully be resumed at a later stage. To do so under the present conditions would be a grave mistake, however. Russia has failed to deliver over Ukraine as requested, and its continued demonization of NATO goes against the spirit of

the Council. A social sanction - the suspension of the civilian and military co-operation - should mirror the sanctions of other Western organizations and it should therefore be lifted only when a broad consensus has emerged that Russia has delivered as it should. An attempt by the Russian leadership to reach out to NATO by publicly recognizing the positive transformative and stabilizing effect of the Alliance in post-Cold War Europe could perhaps have opened the door for a swifter normalization of relations, but it has opted for the exact opposite approach. The new national security doctrine illustrates this all too well. Others may insist that it is in NATO’s best interests to resume full co-operation with Russia; that a crisis such as the current one demonstrates the importance of the Council; and that “if not now, then when?” Such an argument,

however valid it may seem, misses a central feature about the current context of policy-making in Moscow: The suspension by NATO of the civilian and military co-operation will be used – indeed is being used – against the Alliance but so will most likely also a normalization of relations before Russia has delivered something substantial; the Russian public will be told that Russia is much-needed for international conflict resolution, that the West has resigned itself to the new status quo with Crimea as part of Russia, and that the Kremlin has yet again triumphantly navigated the complicated waters of internal NATO politics. The NATO-Russia Council, if it is to be taken seriously as a future tool with which to possibly influence Russia, clearly should be protected from this.

25


on the map

MACEDONIA - NATO ODDYSSEA Vesna Poposka: Independent Expert

A never-ending hurdle: When the door remains open, but impassable. A summary of an absurd dispute reasoning.

Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen speaks to the media during a news conference with former Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski after their meeting in Skopje in May 2014. (AP Photo/Boris Grdanoski) After the fall of The Berlin Wall, the post socialist countries were fascinated by the ideas of freedom, democracy and capitalism, believing them to bring about better living, prosperity and progress. To many of them, NATO was not just a geopolitical or security choice, but also a promise of better life and a new way to transform their identity. The breakup of Yugoslavia was a bloody process, but Macedonia

26

managed to keep away from the fire, although pressured by economic embargo and political and societal challenges in many forms for a long period of time. Macedonia was, no matter what happened, an important stabilization factor in the Balkan region during its though moments. Since the independence, reaching NATO membership has remained among the top priorities of every government and political

elite in the country - that is one of the very few questions upon which every political leader has agreed. NATO has been considered to be a guarantee of the integrity and security in both external and internal sense, due to the turbulent historic paradigms and nationalistic environment. It has been an idea, a possibility, and a matter of pragmatic choice at the same time. In football terminology, the political will towards NATO member-


ship was always as strong as the dedication of Manuel Neuer to keep the goal safe. Most importantly, this willingness was always reflected in concrete action. The pick was, of course, the fact that Macedonia was at one moment among the top contributors of troops in Afghanistan per capita. After the NATO Summit in Bucharest, the disappointment was obvious, for the very sake of the truth, on both sides. The price for this unpleasant situation was paid by Macedonia on many levels, and the effects are still visible, with significant impact on the political power sharing, and - let me say - the current political crisis. NATO accession of Macedonia would mean that the borders and identities are preserved as a whole. Nowadays it seems like the tan(AP Photo/Boris Grdanoski) go partners are a bit tired. The elegant dance has turned into battle cord in the question of Macedo- vided it remains a question that of temper and patience. The only nian accession to NATO in 2008. matters. This was the case when one who suffers, is of course, the However, this did not bring any Turkey and Greece joined the Allifuture of the whole region and actual change, and it looks like the ance together. many young people, who feel stuck ultimate judicial body of the UnitIdentity is not a matter of reclike Tom Hanks in “The Terminal”. ed Nations was not taken seriously. ognition, but a matter of intimacy The seriously absurd “name issue” Shame that the Washington trea- and personal feeling of belongended up being real after all. In a ty itself arises from the same UN ing. No matter how this process situation where the Balkan region Charter - a charter that establishes ends, the people on both sides and NATO members are dealing the system of collective defense will feel the same – they will trade, with the European migrant crisis, and sovereign equality of states cooperate, and drink both Ouzo increasing and Rakia. “Reaching NATO membership has remained among the top radicalizaThe govtion and ernments, priorities of every government and political elite growing no matter in the country.” number of how much foreign fighters from the ISIS re- and recognizes the principles of they try to make political points gion, terrorist attacks all through- non-interference. on identity issues, will be changed out Europe, and a potential huLet’s not get into details of the one day. manitarian catastrophe, we are name issue itself: I personally still That is why this process needs stuck in the middle of nowhere, do not understand how Macedo- to be accelerated, before the amfor no reason. Macedonian border nia’s membership in NATO would biguity of bilateral dispute over is currently under huge pressure negatively influence the ongoing the imagined possession of cul- although surrounded by NATO process of the issue on both sides. ture and history overcomes the member countries, Macedonia is Argumentum a contrario, acces- pragma and the real life problems put into the position of shield of sion would mean that the borders we are all facing, especially the sethe Alliance and Europe, while Eu- and identities are preserved as a curity situation which is about to rope is still arguing solutions, de- whole. More specifically, it would explode and have spillover effects, spite the fact that Macedonia nev- mean respect for good neighbour- after which nothing else will really er contributed to the Middle East ly relations, sovereignty and terri- matter. crisis. torial integrity of the two countries International Court of Justice involved. Negotiation process may found a breach of the interim ac- still continue in the Alliance, pro-

27


op-eds

Communications in the era of information warfare –

the NATO approach

Dr Gerlinde Niehus: Head of Engagements Section, NATO Public Diplomacy Division ¹ NATO today is in a new communications environment. This is largely due to the significant changes in the security environment around us – both to the East and to the South. To the East, Russia has torn up the international rule book. It has returned to a strategy of power politics, especially through the use of military force, by threatening Ukraine, and European and global security more generally. In the South, weak or failing states are creating a zone of dynamic instability. Poor or non-existing governance is providing fertile grounds for terrorism and extreme violence. And we see the consequences in the form of mass migration across the Mediterranean, foreign fighters travelling back and forth, and bloodshed on our streets. The new threats we face have a significant new dimension. Whether we look to the East or the South, they include sophisticated propaganda and disinformation. Rarely have we had to deal with such well-financed, well-orchestrated, slick and unrelenting information and media campaigns.

These campaigns seek to undermine our open societies and our values, to confuse and demoralise us and ultimately to influence our solidarity, cohesion and decision-making. Fed by social media, the internet and the proliferation of new media outlets, propaganda is part and parcel of what we call hybrid warfare. While we have a state actor in the East weaponising information, we are faced with a non-state actor in the South weaponising religion.

What to do? First and foremost: Stay true to our values. NATO’s founding treaty is based on the purposes and principles of the charter of the United Nations and the desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. All members are “determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.” We have to stick to these values and principles – as we have been doing in the case of the Rus-

sia-Ukraine crisis. Our credibility and strength are founded on our political integrity. These are our strongest and most enduring assets in addressing the new challenges. For our communications, this means in particular to be accurate and truthful in what we say and responsive and accountable in what we do. This also means that we are not in a “tit for tat situation”. We cannot and will not wage information war against the information wars around us. Nor will we counter propaganda with more propaganda. This would be grist to the mills of the extremists around us. Second: Stay united and stand up for our vision of society. Russia’s aim is to confuse, divert and divide public opinion in the West, which is portrayed as a society in disarray and moral decline. In the South, ISIL and Al-Qaeda push one radical version of Islam against all other faiths, and seek to undermine trust and confidence in our values and our democracies. To meet these challenges, we must stay united. And we must also continue to tell a compelling story about who we are, what

¹The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policies of NATO or NATO nations.

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we do and why we do it. And we must stand united in our actions, because actions will speak louder than words. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, we have often heard the argument that democratic systems and societies are in a weaker position in comparison to authoritarian regimes: President Putin can decide everything by himself and mobilize the resources he deems necessary - at short notice. Democratic governments however need to negotiate decisions and take public opinion into account. This line of argumentation is as old as it is flawed. Democracies are not perfect – but they have also, by now over centuries, proven themselves as the best form of government mankind has created. Third: Align our words and deeds. All NATO communications are aligned to NATO’s evolving political agenda and the decisions of our members. Our political and communication strategies must continue to be integrated and in sync. To be candid: While Allies are good at designing policies and strategies, they sometimes have difficulty in following through when it comes to resources and strengthening capabilities. One

political debates. This is crucial – as communications should not be an ‘afterthought’ – once political decisions have been made - but an integral part of policy planning. As one Public Diplomacy practitioner once put it: “If you want me to be at the landing, make sure I am on board at take off.” Fifth: Strengthen analytical capacity. We know from surveys

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addresses the media after emergency session of North Atlantic Council to discuss the downing of a Russian fighter jet. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo) that NATO enjoys widespread support throughout the Alliance’s member countries. That does not mean that our policies and activities are always well understood, even among parliamentarians and

“We cannot respond to propaganda with more propaganda, but only with the truth and facts.” of those important capabilities is a strong set of professional communicators throughout NATO nations – the people who explain our policies and actions. This is one of the lessons learnt from our operations in Kosovo and Libya, and it remains essential today. Fourth: Make communications an integral part of policy planning. Over the past year, we have made good progress in better integrating discussions on communications strategy with the Alliance’s

nels as appropriate. We need to be flexible and smart in the way we use our “toolbox” and how we invest our frankly limited resources. For NATO this means in essence to draw on a combination of Public Diplomacy and media relations (or Public Affairs in our terminology), both on the political and the military side of the Organization. We are now much more pres-

opinion makers. A recent Pew report showed limitations in willingness to defend a NATO ally if attacked by Russia. In every Alliance member country, in parliaments, think-tanks and the media, the post-war generation has retired. Many of their successors focus on other aspects of security, such as police, homeland defence or the intelligence services. We need to continue to reach out to this new generation. Sixth: Use all tools and chan-

ent in the media and especially the social media. NATO TV has been instrumental in presenting our activities. We are far more interactive than in the past and we strongly cultivate networks. We engage with broader audiences, particularly policy makers, professionals and young people. Classic techniques, such as speeches and interviews, conferences and seminars, or visits to NATO headquarters, continue to play a key role, but do so alongside Twitter, Facebook, and social media campaigns. And we are rapid, open and transparent and accountable. We cannot respond to propaganda with more propaganda, but only with the truth and facts. By setting the record straight. This includes to debunk Moscow’s false historical narrative, by exposing the reality of Russia’s actions, and by reinstating the international rules it is

29


NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko talk after the meeting with the media in Kiev, Ukraine. (Mykola Lazarenko/Pool Photo via AP) breaking. Seventh: Coordinate and cooperate with members and others. The challenges being huge, we can only address them successfully if we continue to be aligned – not all singing just one single tune, but creating a chorus. This implies first and foremost to ensure complementarity of our actions with those undertaken by NATO nations. And it implies intensified coordination and cooperation with other international organizations, notably the European Union. Here for example, we seek to improve not only timely information sharing but also cooperation in polling or audience analysis, or improved donor coordination. Eighth: Build capacities of our partner countries, particularly our immediate neighbours to the East and to the South. They are even more the targets of propaganda and disinformation campaigns than we are. Russia now has huge media penetration in places like Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. It owns many TV channels and internet sites. This makes its narrative influential not only among Russian-speaking minorities but also among the broader population. Media which are not controlled by Russia can be subject to cyber-attacks or deliberate distortion. Our partners often lack the resources, skills and know-how to organize effective public communications of their own. Effective

30

government communications and a free media are vital if these countries are to keep their cohesion. We have therefore intensified our efforts in communications capacity building, especially in Ukraine. Ninth: Listen and engage. Successful communication is based on listening. Listening to what people think, aspire or fear. Or what they understand (or misunderstand) about peace and security more broadly, or NATO more specifically. This also requires not only a willingness to listen and understand diverging views – it also requires from us the capacity – both intellectually and rhetorically – to have compelling arguments and engaging stories of our own. This means that in our conferences, seminars and outreach

activities we should not “preach only to the converted”. We need to reach out to critical or simply disinterested audiences – be they in NATO nations or elsewhere. In this vein, we have and will keep the channels of communication open with Russia. Last but not least: Keep learning! While good listening is also a way to learn from others, over the past two years we have significantly improved our communications assessment work. This is admittedly challenging, considering the broad range and scope of our activities, and our limited resources. Notwithstanding, we have intensified our media monitoring efforts, including NATO presence on social media. In our outreach activities we have equally mainstreamed assessment tools, either via questionnaires to our visiting groups at NATO Headquarters, or via feedback and assessment efforts in cooperation with our numerous partners and interlocutors. These efforts will continue as they are vital for our own regular learning curve. We cannot and will not rest on the laurels of the past. Effective communication is a moving target – and we have to move with it.

US Secretary of State John Kerry meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, Russia after the terrorist attacks in Brussels underscored the urgency of fighting the Islamic State. (AP Photo/Andrew Harnik, Pool)


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op-eds

NATO Needs to Be

Doubly Wary of Turks and Saudis’ Adventurism in Syria David S. Oualaalou: International Security Lecturer, McLennan Community College, Texas, USA

Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s announcement that they are sending troops and weapons to Syria in support of the USled efforts against ISIS suggests more questions than answers. Conventional wisdom in the United States holds that Saudi Arabia and Turkey are right to enter the chaos defining Syria’s civil war. After all, this is their region of the world, not ours. Yet the fallout could have dangerous implications for NATO, of which the United States is the dominant member. Saudi Arabia has already sent troops and weapons, including fighter jets, to NATO-member Turkey’s Incirlik air base. While the move highlights Saudis’ anxiety over what’s taking place on the ground in Syria, the desert kingdom’s military leaders fail to grasp the perils ahead. Saudi Arabia and Turkey’s move could provoke Russian military resistance given Russia’s own extensive military involvement in war-torn Syria. I’m convinced Russia would escalate tensions if and when its fighter jets come under attack from advanced weapons purchased by Saudis from the United States, including 32

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hand with Syrian President Bashar Assad. (Alexei Druzhinin/RIA-Novosti, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

surface-to-air missiles. Worse, if Turkey is supplying weapons and sanctuary for Saudi fighters, it could spark a full-scale NATO-Russia confrontation, embroiling yet other nations. Such provocation by Saudi Arabia and Turkey — both Sunni-led nations — provides Russia with justification for deploying, if it hasn’t already, far more sophisticated weapons, including its fifth generation fighter jets, advanced S-500 missile-defense systems, and

other high powered weaponry. Result: Syria becomes the battleground of a war pitting NATO powers against Russia. Imagine the toll in such horrifying scenario. Let’s delve deeper in Russia’s geopolitical motives. Russia’s involvement in Syria goes beyond supporting Bashar AlAssad or fighting ISIS terrorists. Rather, it aims at dividing NATO, and destroying the rebels supported not only by the United States, but also by


Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. And don’t discount the role of Iran, a Shiite power, in all of this. It provides fighters and military leaders on the ground in Syria to plan attacks against the rag-tag rebels seeking Assad’s overthrow. Notably, Iran recently purchased advanced Russian fighter jets and missile defense systems; all the reasons why the Saudis and Turks’ military engagement in Syria will only result in more casualties and collateral damage, but no decisive winner. With Turkey and Saudi Arabia expressing their intention of getting involved in this bloodbath, Russia and Iran will seize the opportunity to cement their alliance and further their own objectives, despite having opposite trajectories. Are the Saudis and Turks biting off more than they can chew? Are they foolishly betting that Russia will suffer the same fate it had in Afghanistan in the 1980s? Or are the Saudis and Turks being drawn into a trap with no way out? The answer to these questions depends on who you ask from both sides of the Atlantic. Conversations swirling in Brussels and other Western

A Syrian Kurdish sniper looks at the rubble in the Syrian city of Kobani. (AP Photo)

moving forward with its own plans targeting Syrian rebels. One thing is certain: Despite Russia’s surprising partial withdrawal of military forces, it’ll make sure that any political settlement regarding the future of Syria is achieved to its own satisfaction. One must wonder what truly motivates Saudi Arabia and Turkey to embark on such a risky military venture that could soon turn into a bloody war without an easy end. The Saudis and Turks want to ensure that Sunni rebels prevail (which I do not foresee) while at the same time sending a message to Iran

US troops do the fighting) in support of this objective? The answer to both questions is yes. In any case, this alliance between Turkey and Saudi Arabia will be probably shortlived. If history is any guide, Arab leaders talk more and act less; their sabre-rattling summits and conferences seldom amount to much. But all are mistaken if they think Russia will stand by and watch as Saudi and Turk ground troops march toward Damascus. Washington needs to have a very straightforward talk with its allies, the Saudis and the Turks, about the long-

“Washington needs to have a very straightforward talk with its allies, the Saudis and the Turks, about the long-term consequences.” capitals pivot on whether Turkey is actually pursuing yet another agenda — targeting the neighboring Kurds — rather than bolstering NATO interests such as limiting Russia’s expansion and fighting ISIS terrorism. NATO leadership fears that whatever Turkey’s motives are, it could trigger a major confrontation with Russia. Meanwhile, Russia is

that they will challenge Tehran’s geopolitical aspirations. This leads me to ask one specific question: Does Turkish supposed military adventure in Syria aim at achieving its Sunni sectarian objectives? If so, could this explain why the Saudis are willing to sacrifice their own troops (unusual approach given the desert kingdom’s history of taking the backseat while letting

term consequences to all. This is certainly no time for Sunni adventurism, especially if it is counting on NATO involvement. The complete destabilization resulting could make what happened after the disastrous invasion of Iraq look like a geopolitical picnic by comparison.

33


visegrad news Czech republic Problems with Czech penitentiary system

hungary Hungary reacts to teacher protests

Illustrative picture. (AP Photo/Brennan Linsley)

A march towards the Parliament building during the demonstration against government´s education policy. (Balazs Mohai/MTI via AP)

C

zech prisons are overcrowded, the living conditions in them are bad, the employment rate of the inmates is low, their re-education is often absolutely ineffective and the prison staff has too much work, said Ombudsman Anna Sabatova. Czech prisons need more money, but changes in the whole prison system are even more important, especially in the system of crime punishment. There are 203 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants in the Czech Republic, while in Austria it is 95 prisoners and in Germany it is 76. The probation and mediation service needs more support. Necessary measures should lower the number of prisoners. At present, seven out of ten inmates return to prison after their release, as they commit new crimes. The Ombudsman Office has worked out a detailed report based on checks of seven prisons from 2014-2015. Czech prisons can house 20,500 inmates, but the number of people serving their prison sentence and those in pre-trial detention tops the current official capacity by 1,000. (Prague Monitor, 24.03.2016)

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H

ungary will abolish the state authority overseeing public education, which is a rare political defeat for Prime Minister Viktor Orban after months of protests by teachers. The move would represent the government’s biggest concession yet to appease teachers, who last took to the streets on March 15 and threatened to strike if the cabinet didn’t agree to a meaningful dialogue to reduce centralization. The government responded to swelling street protests by replacing the state secretary for education and calling for dialogue with teachers. It will build a new system to administer schools, which will be discussed in summer before it takes over in September with the new school year. The system will be less centralized and will reduce the number of hours for students. Orban has faced down criticism from the European Union over his centralization push and accusations that he’s undermining democracy after he amassed more power than any of his predecessors since the end of communism. (Bloomberg, 22.03.2016)


poland slovakia Belarus hopes for better Slovakia's president relations with EU swears in contentious coalition government

Polish Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski. (Tibor Illyes/MTI via AP)

Leaders of the political parties during the signing of the new coalition agreement. (SITA/Marek Mrviš)

T

A

he Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs payed the first visit in a bilateral format to Belarus in eight years. Poland wants to resolve all issues relating to neighbourhood with Belarus soon, said Waszczykowski during a meeting with President Alexander Lukashenko. “Indeed, the new Polish government believes that the situation in which two neighbours have not spoken to each other for many years was not normal. Therefore, we have decided, without any preconditions or requests to engage in talks in order to resolve all possible neighbourhood-related matters in the near future,” he announced. Lukashenko in turn expressed his belief that any problem in bilateral relations can be resolved if both sides are willing to do so. Lukashenko also said he was confident that Belarus and Poland can influence together many processes occurring in Europe. Mr. Lukashenko assured that Belarus is ready to engage in close cooperation with Poland with which it used to form one state. (thenews.pl, Polish MFA, 22.03.2016)

coalition government comprising an ethnic minority party and an ultra-nationalist faction has been sworn in by the Slovak president. Fico was sworn in along with the new government composed of three other parties, including the ultra-nationalist Slovak National Party and the center-right party “Sieť” (stands for “network” in Slovak). The party representing country's ethnic Hungarian minority may prove a difficult coalition partner with the nationalist party. The Smer-Social Democracy party claimed 28.4 percent of the vote on March 5, the largest share of any party. However, the poll showed Fico's party lost a significant amount of support compared to the 2012 elections, in which SmerSocial Democracy garnered 44.4 percent of the popular vote. The four-party coalition government holds 81 seats in parliament, and needs to survive a confidence vote within 30 days to continue ruling. The Smer-Social Democracy will hold eight other posts, including the respective ministries of foreign affairs, finance and interior. (Reuters, 23.03.2016) 35


leadership

Training on Hungarian NATO Membership for Young Professionals

Péter Bobák: MA student, Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Hungary

NATO presentation for law enforcement students. (Péter Bobák)

In August 2015 the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy (CEID) organized a summer training camp in Eger, Hungary. The main objective was to convey to its participants comprehensive knowledge about the NATO, with particular attention to its current missions, security challenges, and the Hungarian NATO membership. University and college students who study international relations or security studies all around Hungary were invited to the training. I had two reasons for applying: first of all, I wanted to learn more about NATO and its cur36

rent agenda. Secondly, Eger is a beautiful city. In one week, we could hear presentations by researchers from Hungary and Slovakia, officials from the Hungarian Ministry of Defence, Representatives of NATO, and Slovak experts on radical movements. During the presentations and lectures we were all given ample opportunity to discuss the most relevant questions related to NATO’s current agenda for example the Russia-Ukraine conflict, or the NATO Afghanistan mission. A whole one day was focused on understanding the ever-evolving Russian pro-

paganda in the Central-European region. The last part of the week was dedicated specifically to improving our presentation and debating skills in favour of giving professional presentations about NATO in various high schools and universities. I have chosen high schools because I believe that teenagers are the most important audience for two reasons: Firstly, high school students in Hungary get to hear about the NATO only in the last year of their history class, which means there is little opportunity to attain deep knowledge and understanding. Secondly, teenagers are


very sensitive to radical views and conspiracy theories, which makes them an attractive target to the Russian propaganda. In autumn 2015, I gave three pre-

sideration their field of studies, I explained to students what a “peacekeeping mission” means, and what role NATO plays in peacekeeping, especially in the

The institutions and teachers were very excited and helpful because they found that discussing NATO and the current security challenges is both important and refreshing.” sentations in high schools, all of which yielded interesting experiences. When it came to making arrangements, the institutions and teachers were very excited and helpful because they found that discussing NATO and the current security challenges is both important and refreshing. In general, the presentations emphasized that NATO is cornerstone for security of Hungary and the Central-European region. After a short historical introduction, I focused on talking about the fundamental facts of NATO’s missions, its operations, and decision-making mechanisms. In the end I spoke about the history and the current state of Hungarian NATO membership. In doing so, I always tried to adjust the topics so that they would be more suitable for the each specific subject class. To illustrate: one presentation took place at an English lesson, where I focused on the specific terminology related to NATO’s affairs, explaining definitions and giving examples. The second one was in a history class, which shifted the focus towards spending more time talking about the history of the Alliance, especially about its role in the 1990s Balkan Wars. The third presentation was at a high school specialized in law enforcement studies, which turned out to be the most challenging one. Taking into con-

KFOR and the Afghanistan missions. In order to make the presentation more personal, I used stories and quotes of the ministry officials from my summer camp. Additionally, I frequently asked them for their opinions to trigger a debate. In all three presentations, migration and terrorism came up as the key topics of discussion. To give an example, one teacher asked why the NATO is passive towards the current migration crisis. I had to explain that stopping migration is not a part of its fundamental missions, emphasizing, however, that in this respect, the Alliance is actively occupied by regional nation-building in order to secure the Middle-East. Unfortunately, most of the

students were too passive to ask further questions. Only a few of them wanted to participate in the discussions, and only one student asked several questions after the presentation via an e-mail. I was excited to answer him, but he was obsessed with strange conspiracy theories about migration and terrorism. Unsurprisingly, all of his information was from fake articles and videos from the social media. I could not convince him with hard facts. In summary, there was a friendly atmosphere at the schools and the students were interested in the topic because it was basically new to them. I concluded that personal stories and quotes about the daily life of soldiers, as well as informative presentations concerning current security issues seemed to captivate students the most. I am planning further presentations in 2016 as I was asked to give a talk about the role of NATO during and after the Cold War, and another one with special focus on surgeons working in NATO missions.

NATO presentation during English lesson was focused on explaining key terminology of the Alliance. (Péter Bobák)

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calendar april

6

The Dutch referendum on Ukraine–EU Association Agreement The Dutch will vote in a referendum to approve the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. The agreement became subject of the referendum after more than 427,000 valid requests to hold the vote were received within six weeks. The referendum will be non-binding.

22

Earth day Earth day is annually celebrated in more than 192 countries to demonstrate support for environmental protection, and is coordinated globally by the Earth Day Network.

24

Presidential election in Austria The first round of the election will be held on 24 April. If Austrians fail to elect a new president, the second round will be held on 22 May, according to the Austrian Council of Ministers. Current president Heinz Fischer has served two terms, and is not eligible to be elected for a third successive term.

MAY

9

Europe Day On 9 May every year, the Europe Day celebrates peace and unity in Europe. It marks the anniversary of the day in 1950, when Robert Schuman, one of the founders of the EU, made his 'Schuman Declaration', setting out his idea for a new form of political cooperation in Europe.

9

General Election in the Philippines The citizens of the Philippines will elect new president, vice president, 12 senators, one district representative, one party list representative, and provincial/city/municipal officials. The newly elected president will lead the country for the next six years.

26-27

G7 summit The 42nd summit will be held on 26-27 May at the Shima Kanko Hotel located in the city of Shima, in Japan. The topics will focus on environment, sustainable society and other issues.

june

6

D- Day Anniversary During World War II, the Battle of Normandy which lasted from June 1944 to August 1944, resulted in liberation of Western Europe from Nazi Germany’s control. Codenamed ‘Operation Overlord’ the campaign began on June 6, 1944, also known as the D-Day, when British, American and Canadian forces landed on five beaches on the coast of Normandy region in France.

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UK Votes on EU Membership The referendum will be held on Thursday, 23 June 2016, and British voters will be asked whether Britain should remain a member of the organisation they joined in 1973, at the time named the European Economic Community. The referendum question will be: "Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?"

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS I SECURITY AND DEFENCE

editor-in-chief Project Coordinator language corrections graphic design photography

Katarína Schwertnerová Ivana Slobodníková Tomáš Grenzner Adam Cisár SITA, TASR

Slovak Atlantic Commission Kuzmányho 3, 974 01 Banská Bystrica Mobile: 00421 / 948 120 537 Tel./Fax.: 00421 / 2 544 106 09 E-mail: sac@ata-sac.org

editorial headlines intreview will warsaw deliver? in depth face2face on the map

Katarína Schwertnerová Daniel Fekete Katarína Schwertnerová Ján Čverha soňa trojanová nikola kmecová ján cingel Lea Sekanová andrea lechvárová anna Przybyll ivana slobodníková Lea Sekanová

Issue 2/2016 Publication date: 15 april 2016

op-eds visegrad news leadership calendar

The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies and other contributions rests solely with their authors, and their publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead. The editorial board of the Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead. reserves the right to shorten and revise articles when necessary.

Published with financial support of NATO PDD and National Endowment for Democracy

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Headquarters: Klariskรก 14 811 03 Bratislava Slovak Republic Tel/fax: 00421 / 2 544 106 09 e-mail: sac@ata-sac.org www.ata-sac.org


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