PHST 6: Žarko Paić. The Superfluity of the Human

THE SUPERFLUITY OF THE HUMAN REFLECTIONS

ON THE POSTHUMAN CONDITION

Posthuman Studies

Stefan Lorenz Sorgner (ed.)

The Superfluity of the Human Reflections

on the Posthuman Condition

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“

Honneur au Prince sous son nom!Lacondition de l’homme est obscure Et quelques-uns témoignent d’excellence. (…) Je t’ annonce les temps d’ une grande faveur et la félicité du soir sur nos paupières périssables… mas pour l’instant encore c ’est le jour!”

Saint-John Perse, Anabase

In this book, Iwill speak about the “end,”“obsolescence,” and “superfluity” of humans in light of the outcome of the metaphysical history of Western thinking and about the traces of the idea of homo kybernetes,which cannotbeunderstood in thesense of the Nietzschean “superhuman,” not having the characteristics previously bestowed on “ man. ” It is amatter of importance to criticize all anthropologies, fromphilosophical and structural to cultural and ultimately cybernetic ones. This has been done in the most significant fashioninthe 20th century in Martin Heidegger’ s Being and Time and Gilles Deleuze’ s Différence et répétition. The task that remains for us “contemporary” thinkers to tackle is to preserve in our minds the freedom of events that constitute the creationofthe “ new ” without falling into the technical abyss of the nihilism of “third-order cybernetics.” The rule of autonomous thinking of objects by visualizing concepts in digital simulation is significant. But it seems impossible to contemplate the “ new ” without the physicality of “ man ” and his dignity in the existential decision to choose his path through the endless niches of this life, through his maze and his archipelago of solitude. It is all about wandering around and looking for ahorizon that is drawn in the “empty sky” as awhite line hinting at infinity. This is a book about the superfluity of humans and about their illusions. Without them, we would not arrive at contemplating what follows the upcoming “ new, ” and time carries the openness to the world of the emerging “ new ” in which we are committed to preserve traces of human aspiration for meaning. It is for this reason that the choir sings in Sophocles’ Antigone:

polla ta deina kouden, anthropou deinoteron pelei

Chapter One:Beyond Metaphysics

1. Life

We no longer wonder about the “meaning of life.” This is only an ironic-cynical thought belonging to Monty Python.For, remember,intheir movie The Meaning of Life, which also involves the donation of spermand cosmo-centrism, there is one scene in which aspecial force of paramedics breaks into an apartment in a quiet suburb of London and brutally removes the organs of ahousewife and her husband by aforced-voluntary method. Instead of thepurposefulness of what is called “life,” everything is diverted to the issue of how life is made and what the processes are that sustain it evolutionarily in continuity-discontinuity with qualitative rises and falls. In other words, the issue of “the meaning of life” becomes a question of “the emergence of life.” In the language of late scholasticism, quodditas takes the place of quidditas. “Whatness” gives way to “fact,” that is, the matter exists only by manifesting itself in its factuality, and we can only know this from experience, aposteriori. This reversal becomes crucial for understanding ontology and anthropology. When, therefore, we have biogenetics instead of ontogenesis, it should be obvious that the turn of the Being, beings, and the essence of man takes place. First, it rests on the gift of Being and the organicand the world in terms of life, which has its meaning in the hermeneutical circle of birth and death. Second, it refers to the techno-scientific constructionof “life” from the laboratoryasthe possibility of the emergence of “artificial life.” When distinguishing the meaning of Beingfrom the emergenceoflife as an artificialproduction or the creation of being, what separates the worlds?Ofcourse, without construction, no deconstruction is possible;there are no experiments with inhumanity, except in the potentiality of something belongingtothe so-called area of alien “life.” This notion was argued by early Michel Foucault. Along with economics (work +capital)and linguistics (language), the third decisive concept for the emergence of anew paradigm of modern thought was the emergence of life sciences and biology (Foucault 1994). However,when starting from an understanding of “life” through biology, there is an implicit biologismthat does not consider life in its irreducibility to the scientific settingofthe organicworld. Instead, biologism enters the thinking structure of modern man by offering itself as an anti-metaphysical counterpart to the belief in the beyond, in thedivine. When biological understanding assumes the dogmatic command of faith, everything

becomes “bestial.” That is why even “humanism” can no longer be understood without ahorizontal relationshipbetween humans and animals. It is self-evident that in this respect, man is the result of the biological construction of “life” as the organic structure of the development and constitution of what makes him similar to and at thesame time different from the animal and its instinctive stimuli. Determining what is “human” without arelic of what we share with theanimal world seems impossible without falling into abstract “humanism.” But this is only the other side of the Cartesian machine of rationality. According to René Descartes, animals are nothing but “automatons” or “objects” because they cannot think and use language (Paić 2018).

Nevertheless, if it is obvious that there lies acorrelation between biology and anthropology, is it not symptomatic that the “ essence ” of man is now determined based on his degree in that of the organic, which determines just another way of ruling the paradigm of evolutionary development, that is, Darwin by other means? “Man” cannotbeunderstood just fromhimself, for it would be asubjectcentric attempt to derive an understandingfrom an autonomous act of will. Immanuel Kant, the creatorofanthropology in apragmatic form, sought to rethink it from atranscendental source of antinomian terms that could not be proven other than beyond therule of mentalgenerality (Kant 2003). In other words, when “life” takes over everything that has been set teleologically in the metaphysical history of “ man, ” difficulties arise in determining the law of causality. What then drives the human to transcend biological urges and understand himself as a being whose spiritual essence constitutes the “foundation” of all existence?We know that Martin Heidegger radically abandoned all that biologism and anthropologism at the time of Being and Time,and, even more so, every allusion to “psychologism” as theultimatereason for justifying the meaning of human existence (Heidegger 1994). With that critique of Charles Darwin, Max Scheler, as the most significant philosophical anthropologist,and Sigmund Freud and his psychoanalysis remain akind of will of thought even in situations when we encounter various forms of cybernetic anthropology (Weiss 2009).

How should we think of the “ essence ” of man if, to put it in terms of the vocabulary of information anthropology, man has become “information” and beings in their essence are nothing but the networked and coded systems of the functional activity of “artificialintelligence” that produceand control the exchange of matter and energy between different entities/attractors?Something must be done that cannot be afeature of metaphysical thinking. Namely, we should approach every being based on the truth or meaning of Being, whether in terms of transcendental realism or empiricism. But “ man ” is no longer thinkable as the subject who gives or attributes meaning and purpose to beings. The beings in the cyber paradigm of “life” and “information” are possible and exist only through digital construction. According to this view, that which is becomes virtually actualized by the programming of situations and contexts in which some-

thing as somethingcan only have its place, its position, and its meaning if it interacts with other such constructed states of objects (Gianetti 2005). When the “Human” comes on to the scene as athinking object instead of the subject, then his thinking also appearsintwo modalities:(1) as thinking that is divided into computation and saying,according to thedivision introduced by Heidegger in his book What is Called Thinking?(Was heißt Denken?) and (2)asthinking that is based on the triad of concepts computing-planning-construction relying on the logic of the technosphere (Paić 2019a). The former modelofthought belongs to ontology as metaphysics and the latter to cybernetics as thinking of the computer intelligence of machines that goes beyond the distinction between theliving and the inanimate. Let us add that life itself should be regarded as acybernetic autopoiesis concerninga system of transmission, storage, and exchange of information.

The reason for rejecting the differences that Icall cybernetic differences is that the modelofthinking as an aesthetic construction of theobject appearsin the latest research into “artificialintuition” and is likely to eventually be incorporated into the operation of quantum computers by the new generation. In this gap of worlds, between ontological and cybernetic differences, the “Human” can no longer be merely torn between the gifts of the gods and nature and the performance of avisual event of constructing the virtual existence of the inhuman. His position has becomeeven more questionable than was already evident at the beginning of this discussion in the texts by Günther Anders (Anders 2002). It is no longer amatter of the “obsolescence” of acreaturethat early Heidegger called a “Being-there” (Dasein)and who saw his “ essence ” in existence,which was the first step towards the disappearance of reasons for any “essentialism” of history and its dark shadow ontology as anthropology (Heidegger 2018). The disappearance of the “Human” has been evident in the historical movements of avantgarde art since its inception in futurism, suprematism, and constructivism. When instead of the figure of thehuman outlineeverything becomes marked with a blotch, aline, or theabsence of visibility in theimage,when the human being is replaced by an abstractseries of chaotic forms, or when, as in Kazimir Malevich’ s iconoclasm,man is replaced by theexploration of irrelevance and elemental forms in which the image becomes an idea/form, it is aradical dehumanization of art in general(Ortega yGasset 2018). No, the “Human” is no longer, in modern times, an “obsolete” being due to his biological mortality and inefficiency concerning the “phantom” and “matrix” of programmed thinking in amedially determined “end of history.”

In his existential “irrelevance” as homo kybernetes,man has become superfluous with regard to the existence of adeveloped technological civilization.Since all “human” functions, including his thinking, which require body physicality –feelings, passions, traumas, and pleasures – are already encoded and transmitted into cyber physicality (robots, cyborgs, and androids),whose keyword does not

relate to rallyingdestruction and deconstruction (Heidegger, Derrida), but rather to the establishment of binary code through the processes of emplacement/displacement (embodiment/disembodiment)and incorporation/decomposition (embedding/disembedding). Instead of synapses and brain cortices, it’sall about chips and implants, sensors, and visual dispositions (More/Vita-More2013). What was still invisible in the previous paradigm of “life” becomes the visualization process or the hologram technique that is “visible” as asymbolic trace of information and the genetic code to make an object ready for “artificiallife.” The machine does not teach man to think, but the machine teaches man to see what happens as adigital simulation in the hyper-reality of “life.” This turn, therefore, occurs in its necessity in such away that thinking loses its telling moment of language. Despite this, it turns the image into acalculated projection of what happens to the object. Needless to say, the Anthropocene was the last age that could still have ahuman as its governor and apocalyptic executor of thewill of metaphysics. His “empty” place in the age of cybernetics must be taken over by someone. Who could this be?

2. Superhuman

Friedrich Nietzsche’ sanswer to that question is clear:the superhuman (Übermensch). But what denotes his basic determinant, and how does he differ in his relation to “ man ” in his “superhumanity”?Areliable direction of interpretation seems to be provided by Heidegger. He states that every man treats himself as a Being againstthe beings in terms of the will to power, as it is eternal recurrence that denotes the superhuman. His incarnation includes that abeing in the character of the will to power emerges from the greatest brightness of thought in the eternal recurrence of the equal. (Heidegger 1990, 40)

Once again, together with Heidegger, it is necessary to state that the superhuman in Nietzsche cannot be aname/sign/term for the biological monster that ties bestiality to technical indifference. It is only the self-affirmation of mankind as the last possibility of rule in the era of realizedmetaphysics. Of course, within this process of self-affirmation, nihilism is at workatthe same time because from modern times to the present, everything is happening as an increase in thepower of the inhuman in the face of science and technology. But also, the possibility of overcoming this condition,developed by Western metaphysics from Plato to G. W. F. Hegel, is developing. Therefore, with the advent of the “superhuman,” for the first time, Zarathustra can explicitly say that “superhumanisthe meaning of the Earth” (Nietzsche 1999, 14). If the superhuman denotesa figure of the overcoming of man, then it is entirely unfortunate that with his arrival, “ man, ” within

the complex of Western metaphysics, no longer has his justification. Ontologically speaking, he no longer has a “human nature” or essence that gives him meaning within the understanding of Being and beings. By losing his own “ essence, ” the whole illusion that “Human” in all his transformations is amental being having alanguage (animal rationale)has disappeared. The superhuman, therefore, does not arise from himself. His “ essence ” manifests itself in the will to power as eternal recurrence. If this is so, then in his historical and epochal destiny, “Human ” has already become a “superfluous man, ” though through the apology of all humanity, he must prove himself as the embodiment of “humanism” in light of the being who has been the absolute lord of the Earthsince the NewEra. It would not be possiblefor asuperhuman to be a “ sense of the earth” if the earth had not already opened itself up as the fundamental problem of the relationship between Being, beings, and the essence of humans. The earth does not emerge in this sense only through the planetary nihilism of conquestand transformation into a laboratoryorworking facility, described by Ernst Jünger in Der Arbeiter as a “smelter” and an “arsenal” for total mobilization (Jünger 2014).

When asuperhuman denies what “ man ” was during his (metaphysical)history so far, he must do it in anihilistic way. Why?For the simple reason that it does nothing but reverse the same thing that ruled on behalf of “ man ” before his arrival. All this, of course, is mediated by athought that still causes misunderstanding, but is, in fact, so unambiguous. It is about the death of God. No superhuman can appear without suspendingand neutralizing the highest being within the metaphysical assemblage. The opinion that understands “ man ” in the anthropological sense of Ludwig Feuerbachand in the wake of young Karl Marx as abolishing/overcoming (Aufhebung)the divine “being” within the human being is merely areversalofthe main scheme according to which it was possible to think of “ man ” as an autonomous subject and asignifier of all of Earth’shistory. Indeed, throughouthis thoughtful life, Heidegger constantly kept in mind acritique of biologism, psychologism, and anthropologismtothe very end.Ifrationality belongs to the “ essence ” of man, then in his greatest possiblepseudo-embodiment “ man ” does not necessarily appear as abeing of existential orientation towards the future but as aservant of “animality” (animalitas)(Heidegger 1990, 42). In an essential sense, what is paradoxically pervasive here encompasses the soul and body since animality designates the unity of psycho-ontic manifestations in the world. In this way, “ man ” in addition to being horizontal positionto being understood biologically, and not from the primary spiritual dimensions of existential structure of freedom as groundless and causelessness. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Heidegger, when dealing with Nietzsche, cannot fully agree with his “obsession” concerning life as an exaggeration of creative intensity. The reason is that the problem arises because the physicalityofthe “human” can never be commensurate with the meaning of the body in animals. Indeed, Hegelhas already warnedusthat the mind appears as a “live unity” of reflection and specu-

lation. Therefore, areduction to physicality without athought that transcends metaphysical duality cannot be sustainedwithout, so to speak, phenomenological reduction.So, this means that the superhuman cannot be thought of “horizontally.” By educating the human mind in terms of the modern metaphysics of subjectivity, one falls directly into thenihilism of positivity. Either way, neither positivity nor negativity touches on what the superhuman character assumes in openness for the coming period. But what is it, and how should we think of this “human” as such, which, in philosophical terms, remains problematic?Inone fragment of the Black Notebooks:Reflections XII–XV (Überlegungen XII–XV: Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941),Heidegger states the following:

Human – all metaphysical thinking and Western thinking so far in the whole of his history defines man as aliving being (animal)and in his relation to God as the originator of the world – placing him between the animal and God – as the precursor between that world and equipping him by finding traits and essential constituents (body-soul-spirit), this is again different – according to the conception of animality, mindfulness and their bearers. Everywhere, man remains in his essential foundation – in the abyss of his necessity, both as anecessity of the deepest earthquake and as an earthquake of the external readiness of man to please the Seyns – torn and left to mere realization, sacrificed by directions and plans. (Heidegger 2014, 67)

In describing the metaphysical fateofthe “human” in the technical world of “ actuality,” Heidegger brought out atruly factual state that prevented theascension to the meaning of Being. When everything is exposed to the abyss and torn, the “human” sinks into the living mud. As neither animal nor God, as Aristotle already knew, from whom this “unfortunate” definition of man as “animal rationale” originates, the problem lies in what is between.When something lies between other things, it is necessarily squeezed. Therefore, there is no possibility of escaping from this absurd position. Beingbetween is not only the “destiny” of humans in metaphysical thinking in general but also the necessity or factuality of all anthropology of the 20th century and beyond. And it is based on the unquestioned assumption that even if man, in his “horizontal” position, is not very different from the genome of the mouse, there is something that sets him apart from all beings. This is nothing more than the opinion that, during the history of the West,his leadership was established through two modalities: logos and mythos. Therefore, the myth of Prometheus, as well as that of Epimetheus, his forgotten brother, expresses this necessityfor theexistential determination of the being that stole fire fromthe gods, and his lack of instinctualqualities made him an open being of possibility. The “human” does not have aconstant and unchanging essence. Instead, his fundamental “ontological” feature of the century opens in all directions, precisely because it represents, Nietzscheans say, unfixed animals. Hence, the superhuman must take on the task that, at the end of history, overcomes “ man ” in his animalism and biologism. Extremely paradoxical, it is an

act, and in that way the last justification becomes the aesthetic notion of life, not the scientific role of absolute truth. To be between the animal and God means to take on thetask of thinking as our destiny in the archipelago of the will to power as an eternal recurrence. The task of thinking represents the responsibility of “ man ” for his necessary disappearance in thecoming periodofthe rule of the technosphere. It is no longer just like Nietzsche’sand Heidegger’srealizednihilism. To think of the superhuman means to try to open anew horizonexactly where the period of nihilism in theworld closes,asHeidegger says, in its orientations and plans,thus sacrificing man to what is so banal and trivial but also so unshakable in so-called contemporary life – pragmatic forms of thought.

Are we not returning to the vicious circle of self-determination ?For now what Nietzsche calls “superhuman” is no longer abeing between animal and God, as was self-evident for the metaphysics of the West. The problem arises because the “death of God” denotes acondition for the possibility of the emergence of asuperhumanand the elevation of man to the last stage of his overcoming. This is that vain and ferocious last man (der letzte Mensch)(Nietzsche 1999, 15). His nihilistic devastation hides behindthe guise of an establishedmodern civil society in which virtues become narcissistic and utilitarian in their purpose. Everything is homogenized to theendpoint of consumerism. Moreover, theunderstanding of Beingnow comes from falling into the technical abyss of things. But when there is no God, and when his place becomes ontologically empty, it should be obvious that it is impossible to construct anew replacement for the absolute superiority of sensibility that again, only in the guise of immanence, rules the world beyond good and evil. The superhuman, then, must have genealogy and symptomatology. But his fundamental determination is that in the prevailing state of transcending “ man, ” he can no longer assumehis “present” essence without radically overcoming what constitutes the basic structure of metaphysics in general. This is, of course, the meaning of Being and beings in a changed meaning. For the superhumantobethe “ sense of the Earth,” one must be able to re-establish what was hiddeninthe sources of the West in presence and openness. It is an opinion which, out of awill to poweraseternal recurrence, requires the overcoming of what was necessary between the animal and God. Does this then meanthat the superhumanisthe one who overcomes the “animal” and “God” in himself as the “lowest” and the “highest” that is possiblewithin the horizonofmetaphysical thinking?InHeidegger’s1943 discussion of “Nietzsche’ssaying ‘God is dead’” (“Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’”), there is something enigmatic about that (Heidegger 2003, 209–267). Namely, if the superhuman arrives at the abandoned place of the gods and God after the prevailing condition of the possibility of metaphysical thinking of theessence of humans as “animal rationale,” then what is his essence rooted in?Does the superhumanhave an “ essence, ” or is it all apure illusion that we build on the

rotten foundations of astill-present thought to which we cannot say farewell once and for all?

In Heidegger’sinterpretation of Nietzsche, it is obvious that the superhuman can be nothing more than a “ man ” in the form of thewill to powerasthe eternal recurrence of the Same. If that is so, then what is causing the dispute is essentially the metaphysical ideas known fromthe legacy of Hegel’sspeculative dialectic, in that it means overcoming somethingassomething(Überwindung). There should be no doubt that the correlation between overcoming and abolishing (Aufhebung)denotes anecessary mark of thought that assumes themetaphysical feature of understanding Being as Being. What is becoming (Werden) necessarily becomes different fromthe Same so that theSame changes in the process of its abolition/overcoming. Since Nietzsche does not think dialectically, the superhumancan be neither asynthesis of opposites nor an elevation to the socalled higher degree of what is left of the human.1 That remnant, that indivisible unity and singularity of the “ man ” who in the traditionofmetaphysics cannot be considered “positive” at all, despite all the attempts and failures of the anthropological foundation of his “ essence, ” is nothing but that which comes from the inhuman source of his “humanity.” The “Human” remnant in themetaphysical sense, which is established as the will for power, denotes the technical construction of the human world and hence world history. That is why any predominance of metaphysics as nihilism, from Nietzsche to Heidegger, should also necessarily be calculated with the “ essence ” of technology. For the superhuman was not possible in an age that has long passed and in which it remained amere pursuit of the “childhood of the world” in the tragic thinking of the Greeks. In Heidegger, therefore, it arises as astruggle for the rule of the Earth carried out by the “superhuman” as arealized “subject”– the “substance” of metaphysics in a feature other than the notion of theworker, as in Jünger, but in the form of what is synthetically derivedfrom the will to powerasthe planetary conquest of the world. Since even Heidegger missed aphrase in 1943 that would be philosophically “sealed” away when dealing with Nietzsche and his pronouncement “God is

1 “For the first time in the history of philosophy, the problem of individuation was differently derived from Nietzsche, in whom this diversity,and therefore the principle of individuation itself, tries to think based on deduction from the ‘will for power ’ as the essence of all that is, the ‘eternal recurrence ’ of equality ‘ as the existence of that essence, ’ the definition of ‘superhuman ’ as that of man corresponding to the world of ‘will for power ’ and the definition of Being as ‘quantum of power ’ (which is derived from all the above). Nietzsche, therefore, took the first step in thinking that the principle of individuation was thought alone,outside the metaphysical background, by treating everything as ‘order of value’ (Rang-Ordnung), so that difference,not communion, becomes acentral problem. This is aquestion that Heidegger’sinterpretation of Nietzsche missed, precisely because the moment of difference was not sufficiently observed. Heidegger remained with the problem of essence and existence, while the problem of individuation that is decisive for Nietzsche was set aside” (Sutlić 1994, 54).

dead,” we can only predict that it will soon be revealed when he introduces the understandingof enframing (Gestell)inthe game as an essenceofthe technology (Heidegger 2009, 9–40).

If, for the previous paradigm of theend of metaphysics, theissue of the relationship between humans and technology was aguidingquestion, it is now a fundamentalquestion:can asuperhuman like homo kybernetes still have anything human, too human?First of all, it seems that the relationship can no longer be thought of “vertically” or “horizontally.” If Nietzsche, as is explicitly shown in Vanja Sutlić’slectures on Hegel, and, before him, Deleuze, as he showed in his main work Différence et répétition in 1968, establishedthe principle of individuation starting from differences rather than from communion, then it should be necessary to consider how the difference can be posed as an “ontological” problem at all if, in the “ essence ” of the technosphere as computation, planning and construction, any distinction between the living and the inanimatehas become obsolete. Deleuze talksabout the difference that comes from ourselves,that is, from what is traditionally the field of will. But to make such adifference, Being must be understood in its changed meaning:asbecoming (devenir)(Deleuze 2011). The extremely pressing issue of the superhumanas “the meaning of the Earth” must answer the question of the nihilism of planetarytechnology and the technosphere created by it, which transcends any distinctionbetween nature and the artificial and the fact that something is created by becoming other and different from theprinciple of creative individuation. For this reason, with every “ rehumanization of the world,” as alternatives to techno-scientific nihilism endeavoured to show, thinkers like Derrida and Lyotard were inevitably doomed to failure. Why is that so?Iseven Nietzsche’sfigure of asuperhuman in this sense inappropriate to the present state of affairs with the autopoietic principles of operation of thinking machines that combine the principles of artificial intelligence and artificialintuition?

3. Know-How

The main principle of pragmatic thinking is expressedina variety of know-how. That statement covers the practical knowledge of the subject and how that knowledge translates into the process of realization in things or works. But division does not have to be solely in the materialform of the subject. Today’ssituation of how knowledge of computer systems translates into an information system without which our digital age cannotexist represents agood example. The contemporary German philosopher Hans Blumenberg, in his essay entitled “Technik und Wahrheit,” said that know-how denotesa “set of all knowledge, which becomes away of truth. This is thequestion of the possibility of reality through work” (Blumenberg 2015, 49). Basically, there can be no doubt for Blu-