SDMA Workshop: Monitoring and Assessing Democracies in Asia Gwangju, Republic of Korea 16 May 2012 Concept Note I. Background The proposed Regional Workshop on “Monitoring and Assessing Democracies in Asia”, organized by the Solidarity for Democratization Movements in Asia (SDMA), will be held on 16 May 2012 during the Gwangju Asia Forum in Gwangju, Republic of Korea. SDMA is a regional network of Asian civil society organizations which was established in 2010 to “promote people’s resistance movements in democratization process against states through regional cooperation among democratic advocates, human rights defenders and social movement activists in Asia”. This workshop is set against the backdrop of a continuously growing momentum in the recognition of democracy as a basic human right and the most desired form of government, as well as the simultaneous emergence of present‐day challenges to democracy posed, for example, by unfettered economic liberalism and an increasingly national security‐oriented international relations since 9/11. Indeed, in many countries where progress has been made, including in Asia, the process of democratization has sometimes moved backwards. In response to the current challenges to democracy, people’s movements for democracy in various countries need to take stock of these trends in the region, learn lessons from the past and devise new strategies in defending and consolidating democracy. In this regard, the annual Gwangju Asia Forum has hosted international workshops on human rights and democracy in Asia since 1999, providing civil society actors the opportunity to re‐evaluate the history of democratization and democracy building movements in Asia, in an effort to overcome the challenges to democratization. In 2010 FORUM‐ASIA, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), SDMA, the Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternative (ARENA), and the Korean Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS) jointly organised a workshop titled “Democracy in Asia: Progress or Crisis?”. Subsequently, in 2011, workshops were held by SDMA on the themes of “Judiciary Watch by Asian Civil Society”, and “War on Terror and Asian Democracy”. At the same time, there have also been initiatives by governments to discuss the issue of democracy and democratization in the region. Most notably, the Indonesian government initiated the first Bali Democracy Forum (BDF) on 10‐11 December 2008. Since then, this has become an annual inter‐ governmental event to discuss issues related to democracy and democratization in Asia. Civil society groups have also taken the opportunity to engage in this initiative by organizing annual parallel meetings during the BDF since 2010. On 6‐7 December 2011, FORUM‐ASIA and Imparsial organized the “Regional Consultation on Democratization and People’s Participation in Asia” in Bali, Indonesia, which, among other things, considered the democracy assessment framework developed by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) for usage in the Asian context.
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Drawing from previous discussions in various fora, as well as the existing frameworks on democracy assessment, it is clear that there remains a need to develop a framework for assessment of democracies that emphasizes perspectives on the ground, and that is suitable and feasible for the work of democracy advocacy groups in Asia. In this context, this workshop aims specifically to produce a suitable and feasible framework and set of indicators that will serve as a useful tool for civil society actors to assess the progress and quality of democracies in the region. Such an assessment in turn should be aimed at supporting civil society’s advocacy for democratic reforms.
II. Objectives a) To provide a platform for the strengthening of cooperation and mutual support between human rights and democracy advocacy groups at the regional and national levels; b) To develop indicators and framework to better and more systematically assess the progress of democracies (both substantive and procedural) in Asia that will be suitable and feasible for civil society actors in their work of advocating democracy in the region; c) To decide on a publication of a democracy assessment report in Asia, with a focus on the aspect of civil society and popular participation in democratic processes; and d) To prioritize key areas in advocacy and develop strategies on how civil society groups in Asia can use such assessments in developing democracy and promoting human rights in the region.
III. Expected Outcomes a) Framework and indicators for assessment report on the progress and quality of democracies in Asia, with a focus on the aspect of civil society and popular participation in democratic processes; b) Work plan for assessment report on democracies in Asia; and c) Strategies on how to utilize the framework for assessment of democracies, as well as the subsequent report, as an advocacy tool for civil society in Asia.
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IV. Programme Agenda SDMA Regional Workshop: Monitoring and Assessing Democracies in Asia Gwangju, Republic of Korea 16 May 2012 09:00‐09:15
Welcome remarks: Suntae Song (Executive Director, The May 18 Foundation)
09:15‐10:00
Session 1 Overview of existing democracy assessments Two speakers will make presentations of 15 minutes each to provide a brief overview on the existing democracy assessments, including their frameworks, indicators and methodologies; as well as civil society’s experience/potential role in monitoring and assessing democracy. This is followed by a 15‐minute Q&A session. • Speakers: 9 Yap Swee Seng (FORUM‐ASIA) on previous discussions on the International IDEA framework at the “Regional Consultation on Democratisation and People’s Participation in Asia”, held on 6‐7 December 2011, in Bali, Indonesia 9 Seungwon Lee (Sungkonghoe University) on the Asian Democracy Index • Moderator: Poengky Indarti (Imparsial)
10:00‐10:45
Session 2 Proposal of framework in assessing democracies in Asia A proposed framework of general principles and areas of focus will be presented to participants, followed by an open discussion. • Presenter: John Liu (FORUM‐ASIA)
10:45‐11:00
Tea/Coffee Break
11:00‐12:30
Session 3 Discussion on specific indicators and methodology in assessing democracies in Asia Based on the broad framework presented in the previous session, participants will discuss and decide on the specific indicators and methodology to be employed in the assessment and report writing. Participants will be divided into three discussion groups. • Group discussions
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12:30‐13:30
Lunch
13:30‐14:30
Reporting back from group discussions and Q&A • Moderator: Wong Chin‐Huat (Monash University Malaysia)
14:30‐15:30
Session 4 Strategizing and plan of action (Part 1) This session will deliberate and decide on the work plan for the publication of the assessment report, and strategies on how to utilize the assessment report as an advocacy tool for civil society in Asia. • Moderator: Adilur Rahman Khan (Odhikar)
15:30‐15:45
Tea/Coffee Break
15:45‐16:45
Strategizing and plan of action (Part 2) • Moderator: Adilur Rahman Khan (Odhikar)
16:45‐17:00
Closing remarks: Taeho Lee (PSPD)
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아시아민주화운동연대 워크숍: 아시아 민주주의 평가와 감시 대한민국, 광주 2012. 5. 16
1. 배경 아시아민주화운동연대(SDMA)가 조직한 ‘아시아 민주주의 평가와 감시’ 지역 워크숍이 광주아시아포럼(Gwangju Asia Forum) 기간인 2012년 5월 16일, 대한민국 광주에서 개최된다. SDMA는 2010년 출범한 아시아 시민사회 지역 네트워크로 아시아의 민주주의 옹호자, 인권 수호자, 사회 운동가들의 지역 협력을 통해 정부에 대항하는 사람들의 저항 운동과 민주화 과정을 촉진한다. 인권을 민주주의의 기본으로 인식하는 추세가 증가하면서 그러한 정부 형태 역시 요구되고 있다. 또한 9/11 테러 이후 나타나고 있는 국가 안보에 기반한 국제 관계와 무한 경제 자유주의는 민주주의가 안고 있는 현 도전과제의 핵심이기도 하다. 이번 워크숍은 위와 같은 상황을 배경으로 하고 있다. 실제로 아시아를 포함하여 민주주의 발전을 이룬 많은 국가들 내에서 민주화 과정이 다소 퇴보하고 있다. 많은 국가의 민주주의 운동은 민주주의가 직면한 현 도전과제에 대응하기 위해서 지역 내 흐름을 파악하고 과거로부터 교훈을 얻으며 민주주의를 옹호하고 공고히 할 수 있는 새로운 전략을 고안할 필요가 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 광주아시아포럼은 1999 년 이후부터 매년 아시아 지역에서 인권과 민주주의에 관한 국제 워크숍을 개최하였다. 이를 통해 시민 사회 활동가들은 민주화가 직면한 도전과제를 해결하고자 아시아 내 민주화와 민주주의 역사를 재평가하고 민주화 운동을 마련할 기회를 얻었다. 2010 년 포럼아시아(FORUM-ASIA), 참여연대, 아시아민주화운동연대(SDMA), 아시아대안교류회(ARENA), 한국동남아학회(KISEAS)는 ‘아시아 민주주의 : 공고화인가 혹은 위기인가’라는 주제로 워크숍을 공동 주최하였다. 그 후 2011 년 SDMA 는 ‘아시아 지역 사법감시운동’과 ‘테러와의 전쟁과 아시아 민주주의’에 대한 주제로 워크숍을 주최했다. 이와 동시에 아시아 내 민주주의와 민주화에 관한 논의를 위한 정부 주도의 이니셔티브가 마련되었다. 특히 인도네시아 정부가 2008 년 12 월 10-11 일에 개최한 제 1 차 발리 민주주의 포럼 (Bali Democracy Forum)이 주목을 끌었다. 그 이후로 이 포럼은 아시아 내 민주주의와 민주화와 관련된 사안을 논의하기 위한 연례 국제행사로 자리잡았다. 시민 사회 단체들도 2010 년 이후 발리 민주주의 포럼 개최기간 동안 시민사회 회의를 조직하는 등 이니셔티브에 참여해오고 있다. FORUM-ASIA 와 Imparsial 은 2011 년 12 월 6-7 일 인도네시아 발리에서 ‘아시아 민주주의와 시민참여에 대한 지역협의’를 조직하고 민주주의선거지원국제연구소(International IDEA)가 개발한 민주주의 평가 시스템을 어떻게 아시아 상황에 맞게 사용할지에 대하여 논의한 바 있다. 이처럼 다양한 포럼에서 논의된 내용과 민주주의 평가에 관한 기존 시스템을 바탕으로 아시아 내 민주주의 옹호 활동을 위해 적합하고 실행 가능하며 현실적인 내용에 초점을 맞춘 민주주의 평가 시스템이 개발되어야 할 필요가 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 이번 워크숍은 특히 시민 사회 활동가들이 아시아 내 민주주의 발전과 수준을 평가하기 위해 유용하게 사용할 수 있는 알맞은 지표와 시스템의 개발을 목표로 삼고 있다. 이와 함께 새로운 평가는 민주주의 개혁을 위한 시민사회 활동을 지원하는 것을 목표로 해야 한다.
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II. 목적 1) 지역과 국가 수준에서 인권과 민주주의 옹호 단체간의 상호 지원과 협력을 강화하기 위한 플랫폼 제공; 2) 아시아 내 민주주의 수준과 발전을 체계적으로 평가하기 위해 시민 사회 활동가들의 민주주의 옹호 활동을 평가할 알맞은 지표와 시스템 개발; 3) 아시아 내 민주주의 평가 보고서 발간에 대한 결정; 4) 아시아 내 민주주의 발전과 인권 향상을 위한 시민 사회 단체의 새로운 평가 사용 방법에 대한 전략 수립과 민주주의 옹호에 관한 주요 분야 설정. III. 기대되는 결과 1) 높은 참여와 시민 사회 관점을 초점으로 한 아시아 내 민주주의 발전과 수준에 관한 평가 보고서 지표와 시스템 구축; 2) 아시아 내 민주주의 평가 보고서를 위한 행동 계획 마련; 3) 민주주의 평가 시스템과 차후 보고서를 아시아 내 시민 사회의 민주주의 활동에 이용할 방법에 대한 전략 수립. IV. 프로그램 일정
지역 워크숍: 아시아 민주주의 감시와 평가 대한민국, 광주 2012. 5. 16 09:00-09:15
개회사 (송선태, 5·18 기념재단)
09:15-10:00
세션 1 현존하는 민주주의 평가 툴 검토 두 명의 발표자가 현 민주주의 평가 시스템, 지표, 방법들에 관한 검토와 시민사회의 민주주의 감시하고 평가하는 역할에 관하여 각 15 분씩 발표한다. 발표 후에 20 분의 질의응답 시간이 주어진다.
•
발표: 9
Yap Swee Seng (FORUM-ASIA) 2011 년 12 월 6-7 일 인도네시아 발리에서 열린 ‘아시아 민주주의와 시민참여에 대한 지역협의’에서 논의된 민주주의선거지원국제연구소 (International IDEA)가 개발한 민주주의 평가 시스템에 관해 토론한다.
9
이승원 (성공회대학교 민주주의와사회운동연구소)
아시아 민주주의 지표
• 10:00-10:45
사회: Poengky Indarti (Imparsial)
세션 2 아시아 민주주의 평가 툴 제안 제안된 일반원리 체제와 논의사항이 발표 된 후 공개토론이 이어진다.
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•
발표: John Liu (FORUM-ASIA)
10:45– 11:00
휴식시간
11:00-12:30
세션 3 구체적인 아시아 민주주의 평가 방향과 방법 토론 이전 회의에서 발표된 포괄적인 평가방식을 기초로 참가자들이 평가와 보고서 작성에 필요한 구체적인 지표와 방법들을 결정하고 토의 한다. 참가자들은 3 개의 그룹으로 나뉘어 토론한다.
•
그룹 토의
12:30-13:30
점심
13:30-14:30
그룹 토의 보고 및 질의 응답 •
14:30-15:30
사회: Wong Chin-Huat (Monash University Malaysia)
세션 4 전략과 행동계획(Part 1) 이 회의에서 평가 보고서 발간과 평가 보고서가 아시아 내에 시민 사회 지원 도구로서 이용될 방법에 대한 전략에 관한 계획을 검토하고 결정 한다.
•
진행: Adilur Fahman Khan (Odhikar)
15:30-15:45
휴식시간
15:45-16:45
전략과 행동계획(Part 2) •
16:45-17:00
진행: Adilur Fahman Khan (Odhikar)
폐회사 (이태호, 참여연대)
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The Asian Democracy Index Democratization as De-monopolization of Monopoly-Complex
Spring 2012
Dr. Seoungwon Lee by DaSMI, SKHU South Korea
Democratization and Neoliberalism • In the third wave of democratization, democracy tended to mean freedom in the market : Humanity of Capital (human capital, social capital)
• People lost their trust in democratic procedure and institution What kind of democracy do people want?
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Asian Context • Transition from authoritarianism does not guarantee transition to democracy
• Transition to democracy (electoral democracy) does not necessarily involve realization of representative democracy • Transition to substantive democracy (socialization of democracy) does not directly follow transition to democracy.
Authoritarian Regime as Monopoly-Complex • Dictatorship or authoritarian regime = A politically monopolized system coupled with socio-economic monopolies
• The monopoly complex composed of political, economic and social monopolies • The monopolized political, economic and social power - 11 12 -
Democratization as De-Monopolization • Democratization 1) a process where multi-layered demonopolization proceeds in the level of political, economic and social monopolies 2) the conflicts and struggles over transformation and reorganization of social and economic monopolies under authoritarian regimes
Key Conceptions • Democracy 1) a continuing process and struggles towards a new version of democracy 2) not only in political system but also in social and economic fields à A relational formation 3) a historically produced formation
à A historical formation (no divine version) - 12 13 -
Three Components of De-monopolization • Liberalization : Diverse sectors get some independence and autonomy from the authoritarian political control • Equalization : minorities or subalterns can get access to resources in differentiated sectors • Empowerment : Capabilities of the people to mobilize and control the resources
Theoretical Contributions • A broad perspective to see what the traditional theories of democratization failed to recognize • We can analyzed many Asian countries that experienced a transitory period to post-authoritarianism and democratization are facing some phenomena of antidemocratic backsliding
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Asian Democracy : Two Models of Political De-Monopolization • Asia? : Particularities and Complexities (plural)
1) Neo-Oligarchy : Political monopoly/vested rights which didn’t break up widely and monopolized power which didn’t weaken 2) Post-Oligarchy : The breakup of the former political monopoly and the institutionalization of pluralistic competition
Diverse Paths to Democracy A) Impacts of globalization : Neoliberal subjectivity and internalization of market logic B) Democratization : an endless story, and a beginning of new social, economic and political struggles C) Neoliberal globalization + Democratization = uncertainty and crisis in the democratic consolidation process - 14 15 -
The Asian Democracy Index ⇨ Relational and historical approaches ⇨ Restoring a role of agent through the concept of empowerment and capabilities ⇨ Going beyond political regime into social and economic dimensions : the deepening of inequality in the fields of economy and civil society are threatening democracy
Field
Politics
Autonomy Liberalization Fair Competition Principle Pluralization Equalization Solidarity
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Economy
Civil Society
아시아 민주주의 지표 총체적 독재의 탈 독재를 위한 민주화
2012 년 봄 이승원(성공회대학교 민주주의와사회운동연구소) 한국
민주화와 신자유주의
z 제 3 의 민주화 물결에서 민주주의는 시장의 자유를 의미했음: 자본의 인간화 (인적 자본, 사회 자본)
z 민주주의 절차와 기관에 대한 사람들의 신뢰 상실 : 사람들이 원하는 민주주의는 무엇인가?
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아시아의 상황
z 독재주의의 탈피가 민주주의로의 이행을 보장하지 않음
z 민주주의로의 이행 (선거 민주주의)이 필연적으로 대의 민주주의를 현실화 하지 않음
z 실질적 민주주의로의 이행 (민주주의의 사회화)이 직접적으로 민주주의로 연결되지 않음
탈 독재로써의 민주화 • 민주화
1)
다층의 탈 민주화가 정치적, 경제적, 사회적 독재 하에서 일어나는 과정
2)
독재 정권하에서 사회적, 경제적 독재의 변화와 재편에 대한 충돌과 투쟁
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주요 개념 • 민주주의 1) 새로운 민주주의를 향한 끊임없는 과정과 투쟁 2) 정치적 시스템뿐 아니라 사회· 경제 분야에서 발생 a’ 관계 형성 3) 역사를 통해 형성됨 a’ 역사적인 형성 (신에 의한 형성 아님)
탈 독재의 3 요소
•자유화 : 다양한 부분에서 독재정치 통제로부터의 독립과 자율성이 일어남
•평등화 : 소수 또는 하위계층이 다른 분야에서 자원을 얻을 수 있음
•권한 신장 : 사람들의 자원을 동원하고 통제할 능력
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이론적 기여
• 전통적인 민주주의 이론으로 보지 못한 것을 알기 위한 폭넓은 관점
• 탈 독재주의와 민주화의 과도기를 경험하였으나 오히려 반민주주의 현상을 직면하고 있는 많은 아시아 국가를 분석할 수 있음
아시아의 민주주의 : 두 개의 정치적 탈 독재 모델
• 아시아? 특이성과 복잡성(다원적임)
1) 신 과두정부: 사라지지 않은 정치독점/기득권과 약화되지 않은 권력 독점
2)
탈 과두정부: 이전 정치 독점 붕괴와 다원적 경쟁의 제도화
- 19 20 -
민주주의로 가는 다양한 길
1)세계화의 영향: 주관적인 신자유주의와 시장논리의 국제화
2) 민주화 : 사회, 경제, 정치적 투쟁을 위한 출발과 그에 대한 끊임없는 이야기
3) 신자유주의 국제화 + 민주화 = 민주주의 강화 과정에서의 위기와 불확실성
아시아 민주주의 지표 → 지역적, 역사적 접근
→ 권한신장과 능력 향상의 개념을 통한 매개체 역할 복원
→ 정치 체제에서 사회, 경제적 차원까지 나아감 : 경제와 시민사회 분야의 불평등 심화는 민주주의를 위협함
- 20 21 -
분야 정치
경제
시민 사회
자율성
공정 경쟁
다원화
결속
자유화
원칙
평등화
- 21 22 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 39
I. POLITICS Item
Question
▷ The level of the 1. How well do you think the citizens performance of state are protected from the violence violence wielded by government agencies in your country?
Autonomy
Liberalization
▷ Civil Rights
2. How well do you think the citizens' freedom is protected in your country?
▷ Freedom to organize and act in political groups
3 How much do you think the freedom of assembly and activities of political groups (parties and quasipolitical organizations) are protected in your country?
▷ Permission for political opposition
4. How much do you think the opposition movements to the government or governing groups and the governing ideology are allowed in your country?
▷ The Expansion of 5. How well do you think suffrage of the universal the citizens is protected in your suffrage country?
Principle Competition
▷ Efficiency of the state
6. How well do you think all government agencies implement government policies in your country?
▷ The presence of the non-elected hereditary power
7. How much do you think nonelected groups account for the political power in your country?
▷The rule under the 8. How well do you think the rule of laws law is established in your country? ▷ Electoral Fairness 9. How fairly do you think elections are conducted in your country? ▷ Transparency
10. How transparent do you think the operations of government agencies are in your country?
Pluralization
Equalization
▷ Independence and 11. How well do you think checks and balances government agencies maintain checks between state power and balance? apparatuses ▷ Dispersion of 12. How well do you think the power political power in the within the legislature is distributed in parliament your country? - 22 23 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 40
▷ Political representation
13. How well do you think the Parliament or the legislature represent various social groups in your country?
▷ Democratization of state institutions
14. How fairly and rationally do you think government agencies are being implemented in your country?
▷ Participation 15. How actively do you think system and degree of citizens are participating in elections participation and other political decision making processes in your country?
Solidarity
▷ Affirmative action
16. How well do you think affirmative actions are established and implemented in your country?
▷ The public credibility of the current democratic institution
17. How much do you think the public trust the government? 18. How much do you think the public trust the Parliament / Legislature?
▷ The public credibility of a democratic institution and the public attitude of democratic participation
19. How much do you think the public trust Democracy?
- 23 24 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 41
II. ECONOMY Item
Question
▷ Freedom/Autonomy 1. How much influence do you think the political of Economic Activities power / elite have on the operation of private without political companies in your country? intervention Autonomy
Liberalization Competition
▷ Protection of basic labor rights
2. How well do you think labor rights are established in your country? 3. How well do you think the prohibition of forced labor and child labor is observed in your country?
▷ Autonomy of the decision making in the policy of the international political economy ▷ Economic Transparency ▷ Economic Fairness
4. How independent do you think decision making processes of the central government is from foreign countries and/or foreign capital in your country?
Principle Pluralization
Equalization Solidarity
5. How transparent do you think the corporate operations are in your country? 6. How fair do you think the competition between companies is in your country? ▷ Government’s 7. How much effort do you think the government Accountability is exerting to protect and guarantee labor rights in your country? ▷ Corporate's 8. How well do you think private companies Accountability protect / guarantee labor rights in your country? ▷ Economic monopoly 9. How much do you think the economy is dominated by certain groups in your country? ▷ Regional Inequality 10. How serious do you think the economic disparities / inequality are between regions in your country? ▷ Inequality of Income 11. How serious do you think the income disparity is in your country? ▷ Inequality of Asset 12. How serious do you think the asset disparity is in your country? ▷ Inequality of 13. How serious do you think discrimination is in employment the labor market in your country? ▷ The Social Security14. How well do you think support systems for the System poor are working in your country? 15. How well do you think the social insurance programs are operated in your country? ▷ The Activity of 16. How well organized do you think labor Trade Unions unions are in your country? 17. How much influence do you think labor unions have on the policies of the central government in your country? 18. How much do you think labor unions participate in the management process in your country? - 24 25 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 42
▷ Corporate Watch ▷ Awareness of reducing inequality
19. How well do you think public monitoring is carried out on the corporate activities in your country? 20. How enthusiastic do you think the general public is about improving the economic inequality in your country?
- 25 26 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 43
III. CIVIL SOCIETY Item
Question
Autonomy
Liberalization
▷ Autonomy of society 1. How free do you think citizens' social activities from state intervention are from the government interference in your country? 2. How much influence do you think government organizations have on society in your country? ▷ Autonomy of society 3. How much do you think private companies from the market have influence on society in your country? ▷ Autonomy of social 4. How much do you think citizens' basic needs member (basic needs are met in your country? and basic human 5. Aside from the basic needs stated in question development level) no. 4, how much do you think special care is provided for vulnerable people or minorities, such as children, women, people with disabilities, and immigrants in your country? 6. How much do you think citizens are provided with education opportunities in your country? ▷ Tolerance
Competition
Principle
Pluralization
Equalization
▷ Capability of voluntary association
7. How much do you think citizens respect different cultures, religions, languages, races, nations and ideas in your country? 8. How much influence do you think NGOs have on society in your country?
▷ Public good of voluntary association
9. How well do you think NGOs represent public interest in your country?
▷ Transparency of voluntary association ▷ Diversity of voluntary associations ▷ Inequality of public spheres ▷ Inequality of culture and information ▷ Inequality of interest relations ▷ Inequality of Power
10. Do you think NGOs are democratically operating in your country? 11. Do you think NGOs well represent different values and demands of society in your country? 12. Do you think the media is fair and just in your country? 13. How wide do you think the information gap between citizens is in your country? 14. Do you think citizens have equal access to cultural facilities and activities in your country? 15. How equally do you think power is distributed among people in your country? 16. Do you think affirmative actions are well established and operated in your country?
Solidarity
▷ Institutional guarantee of diversity and affirmative actions ▷ Participation and 17. How actively do you think citizens are support of social groups participating in NGO activities in your country? ▷ Governance of the 18. How much influence do you think NGOs have State and Civil Society on government's policy making processes in your country? - 26 27 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 44
Appendix 1. Questionnaires
- 27 28 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 45
I. Political Area * The questions stated below are about the political situation in your country. Please score each question out of the total 10. If you are fully satisfied with a situation (or if you think that the situation can be regarded as an advanced level in terms of democracy), please give 10. Contrary to this, if you are fully opposite to or dissatisfied with a situation, please give 0. Each item consists of a question, description and comments. The description will guide you to understand the purpose of the question more clearly. You can add your own comments which cannot be reflected by scoring. Your comments are not compulsory, but they will make our survey more meaningful. Comments on questions themselves are also welcome.
1. How well do you think the citizens are protected from the violence wielded by government agencies in your country? * If citizens are entirely free from undue violence from government agencies, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the degree of government violence. When you answer this question, please consider whether political terrorism is conducted by the government: to be specific, judicial agencies (public prosecutors, police, and military and intelligence agencies) inspect, surveil / monitor and control citizens; or illegally detain, imprison and torture citizens. You may as well refer to the number of the prisoners of conscience, the number of people detained due to protests, and the number of political terrorism cases conducted by the government’s state apparatuses. 0 ↓ Full control
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
COMMENTS
2. How well do you think the citizens' freedom is protected in your country? * If freedom is institutionally protected and actually guaranteed, please encircle 10.
- 28 29 -
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full freedom
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 46
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the status of citizens' freedoms and civil rights. When you answer this question, please consider whether freedom of assembly, protest, religion, conscience, travel, housing and job selection is protected. When such freedom is institutionally protected and actually guaranteed, that may be an ideal condition. 0 ↓ Full control
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full freedom
COMMENTS
3. How much do you think the freedom of assembly and activities of political groups (parties and quasi-political organizations) are protected in your country? * If freedom of assembly is institutionally protected and actually guaranteed, please 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the status of freedom of assembly, which is a key condition to the political rights. When you answer this question, please consider whether citizens are free to organize political parties or quasi-political groups; whether such organizations are autonomous and independent enough to participate in the political decision making processes. When such freedom is institutionally protected and actually guaranteed, that may be an ideal condition. Quasi-political groups or organizations in this question refer to political organizations generally acknowledged by the citizens under a democratic society, not defined by a current law. 0 ↓ Full control
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full freedom
COMMENTS
4. How much do you think the opposition movements to the government or governing groups and the governing ideology are allowed in your country? * If the rights to political opposition is institutionally protected and actually guaranteed, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION
- 29 30 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 47
This question is designed to measure if political opposition movements are guaranteed in your country. Such political opposition may be antigovernment, anti-regime, and/or antireligion. When you answer this question, please examine whether there is any censorship system or legislation that restricts citizens' freedom of ideology. You are also advised to consider not only the existence of a system, but also the execution. The governing groups or ideology refer to those in the political power, constitutional ideology, and the economic power in your country. 0 ↓ Full repression
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full freedom
COMMENTS
5. How well do you think suffrage of the citizens is protected in your country? * If the right to suffrage is institutionally protected and actually guaranteed, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure whether suffrage or political franchise is actually guaranteed. When you answer this question, please examine whether voters can elect their representatives (heads of state and legislators) based on their free will; and whether there is any formal or actual limitations to the rights. You are advised to consider any limitation to suffrage based on the voters' age, religion, gender, ideology, race, and/or class; and any virtual restrictions that go against the law in your country. 0 ↓ Full repression
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full freedom
COMMENTS
6. How well do you think all government agencies implement government policies in your country? * If government policies are properly implemented based on the public trust, please 10..
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the degree of government efficiency, that is its ability of political implementation and policy execution. When you answer this question, please examine whether government agencies are running efficiently and stably, and - 30 31 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 48
government policies are effectively operated. You are also advised to consider how much the public trust government agencies and policies. 0 ↓ Fully ineffective
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully effective
COMMENTS
7. How much do you think non-elected groups account for the political power in your country? * If elected officials have no influence on politics, please encircle 10. Unlike other questions, higher scores on this question represent a more political monopolization. DESCRIPTION This question is designed to examine whether there are non-elected hereditary power groups, such as social class, wealth, religious or military groups; and how much control they exercise over the government. When you answer this question, please examine whether your government system and the Parliament/legislature are subjected to the monarchy, hereditary system and/or junta. Even if non-elected political groups are not institutionally recognized, you are advised to carefully examine whether there is any supreme political body based on family heritage or military power. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully occupied
COMMENTS
8. How well do you think the rule of law is established in your country? * If you think the rule of law is fully established in your country, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to examine whether your government rules by law and the law is fairly executed. When you answer this question, please examine whether the country is governed by law, and all citizens are equal before the law. In addition, you are also advised to consider whether the Judicial branch is independent; and whether there is any independent evaluating body that examines constitutionality of juridical judgment. 0
1
2
3
4
5
6 - 31 32 -
7
8
9
10
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 49
↓ None
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓ Middle
↓
↓
↓
↓
↓ Fully established
COMMENTS
9. How fairly do you think elections are conducted in your country? * If elections are institutionally and actually fair, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the fairness of elections. When you answer this question, please examine whether there is a fair law governing elections; whether citizens are equally granted voting opportunities; whether election and ballot count procedures are fairly performed; whether there is an independent body governing elections (e.g., The National Election Commission of Korea); and whether a fair election system exists and supports fair elections. In addition, you are also advised to consider that fair competition between political parties is actually guaranteed, not only stated by law. 0 ↓ Fully unfair
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully fair
COMMENTS
10. How transparent do you think the operations of government agencies are in your country? * If transparent operations are institutionally guaranteed and actually carried out, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure whether operations of government agencies are transparent without corruption. When you answer this question, please examine whether government bodies operate open and transparent hiring processes; whether there is any hiring practice based on beneficiary-sponsorship relationship; and whether their budget execution is transparent. In addition, you are also advised to examine whether sufficient information on legislative, administrative and judicial bodies are disclosed; whether there are laws and regulations that dictate reasonable and transparent administrative procedures; and whether there are systems like an Anti-corruption Commission. - 32 33 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 50
0 ↓ Fully untransparent
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully transparent
COMMENTS
11. How well do you think government agencies maintain checks and balance? * If government agencies are independently operating both institutionally and actually, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure horizontal responsibilities and/or checks and balance among government agencies. When you answer this question, please examine whether legislative-administrative-judiciary branches are independent from each other and maintain check and balance; whether local governments are autonomous and independent from the central government, and vice versa; whether there are supervisory bodies that monitor major government agencies and their activities and their independence is well secured; and whether citizens' activities are monitored and controlled by any government bodies. 0 ↓ Very subjugated
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very independent
COMMENTS
12. How well do you think the power within the legislature is distributed in your country? * If power distribution is both institutionally and actually guaranteed in the Parliament, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to examine whether the Parliament or the legislature is democratically operating. When you answer this question, please consider whether Parliamentary schedules and other operations are carried out based on the consensus of all parties; whether minority parties' opinions are well embraced in the course of Parliamentary operation (assembly schedule, legislation voting and Filibuster system); and whether minority parties are supported by the government, such as in the form of subsidies. 0 ↓
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ - 33 34 -
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 51
Very monopolized
Middle
Fully distributed
COMMENTS
13. How well do you think the Parliament or the legislature represent various social groups in your country? * If the Parliament well represents different political groups, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to examine if various social groups are well represented in the legislature. When you answer this question, you must examine if certain political groups are overrepresented in the legislature despite fair and free elections; and then examine if political, cultural, social (class), and racial minorities including women are fully guaranteed participation in the politics. You may as well refer to the ratio of Parliamentary seats of each political party. If political parties are not solid bases of identity in your country, then please describe your particular representative relations in ‘comments’. 0 ↓ Very closed
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully representative
COMMENTS
14. How fairly and rationally do you think government agencies are being implemented in your country? * If government agencies are operated very democratically, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to examine how democratically government agencies implement. When you evaluate the degree of democratization, please consider two different aspects simultaneously. First, you must examine if decision making processes of these agencies are fairly and rationally. Then, you must examine if they have good governance, such as listening to public opinion through committee and public hearings, and sharing information and power in the course of the process. 0 ↓ Very authoritarian
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
COMMENTS
- 34 35 -
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very democratic
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 52
15. How actively do you think citizens are participating in elections and other political decision making processes in your country? * If public participation is institutionally guaranteed and actually active, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure public awareness of political participation. When you answer this question, you must first examine various indices that involve election turnouts. You must consider supplementary systems to help the citizens’ political participation in the decision making processes, such as public hearings and petitions; and other democratic systems like recall and initiative by the public and the referendum. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very participated
COMMENTS
16. How well do you think affirmative actions are established and implemented in your country? * If you think the affirmative actions are well-implemented and guaranteed, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to examine if there are systems that represent political rights of minorities; and, if there is any, how well do these systems operate. When you answer this question, please examine if quotas for women and people with disabilities in the political system are available; and if any, how well such quotas are observed. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
COMMENTS
- 35 36 -
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully implemented
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 53
17. How much do you think the public trust the government? * If citizens fully trust the incumbent government policies and announcements, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure public confidence or trust towards the government. When you assess the confidence level, please examine how much citizens trust the incumbent (both local and central) government pronouncements or policies. In authoritarian countries, distrust in the government may be regarded as a potential for democratization, while in democratic countries, such distrust may result in the political apathy and skepticism on democracy itself. 0 ↓ Full distrust
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full trust
COMMENTS
18. How much do you think the public trust the Parliament / Legislature? * If citizens fully trust the Parliament and politicians, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure public confidence or trust in the Parliament / Legislature. When you answer this question, please consider how the citizens view the political circle in the parliament and politicians; to be specific if citizens regard the politics as efficient and fair and if citizens think of politicians as public servants or persons of a privileged group. You may as well examine if citizens think the Parliament / Legislature is an efficient organization or a privileged body. 0 ↓ Full distrust
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full trust
COMMENTS
19. How much do you think the public trust Democracy? * If citizens fully trust the value and practice of democracy and believe that democracy is superior to any other political system, please encircle 10. - 36 37 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 54
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to examine public trust in democracy. In order words, this question asks about public awareness of democracy, not of the democratic status of the country. You are advised to consider whether citizens regard democracy as the most desirable and efficient political value and decision-making system; and whether they trust the democratic value and system. 0 ↓ Full distrust
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
COMMENTS
- 37 38 -
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full trust
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 55
II. Economic Area * The questions stated below are about the economic situation in your country. Please score each question out of the total 10. If you are fully satisfied with a situation (or if you think that the situation can be regarded as an advanced level in terms of democracy), please give 10. Contrary to this, if you are fully opposite to or dissatisfied with a situation, please give 0. Each item consists of a question, description and comments. The description will guide you to understand the purpose of the question more clearly. You can add your own comments which cannot be reflected by scoring. Your comments are not compulsory, but they will make our survey more meaningful. Comments on questions themselves are also welcome.
1. How much influence do you think the political power / elite have on the operation of private companies in your country? * If the government or the political power / elite has complete control over the economy, please encircle 10. In this question, the higher score means the less democratic.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how independent economic activities are from political power / elite. When you answer this question, please consider how much the government influence, directly or indirectly, the operations of private companies (a condition of state-controlled economy), and how close the ties are between politicians and/or bureaucrats and members of private companies (the cozy / united / sole relations between politics and business). 0 ↓ Fully independent
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully control
COMMENTS
2. How well do you think labor rights are established in your country? * If labor rights are well-established and protected by institutions, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION
- 38 39 -
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This question is designed to measure how well labor rights are institutionalized and protected by law and are actually guaranteed. When you answer this question, please consider if three primary labor rights (freedoms of union organizing, collective bargaining, and collective action) are legally protected, and in particular, if the labor rights of certain groups (public officials, teachers, soldiers, etc.) are limited or restricted by law. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully guaranteed
COMMENTS
3. How well do you think the prohibition of forced labor and child labor is observed in your country? * If forced labor and child labor are legally prohibited and the prohibition is actually guaranteed, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how well forced labor and child labor are legally prohibited and the prohibition is actually guaranteed. When you answer this question, please consider if there is any law that prohibits forced labor and child labor, if the government signed any international convention/treaty of the International Labor Organization, the United Nations, and other significant organizations, and if, despite the legal prohibition, there is any case that involves forced labor and child labor. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully guaranteed
COMMENTS
4. How independent do you think decision making processes of the central government is from foreign countries and/or foreign capital in your country? * If you regard the decision making process as entirely independent, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how independent the government's policy making processes are from foreign capital and states. When you answer this question, please - 39 40 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 57
consider if the government's policy making processes are independent, and if the key industries, including backbone industries, are mainly dominated by domestic capital. You must consider the ratio of foreign aid and debts to the government budget, and the ratio of foreign capital to the total capital of key industries/cultural industries. You may as well examine if important government economic decisions have ever been altered or discouraged by foreign capital. 0 ↓ Fully subordinated
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully independent
COMMENTS
5. How transparent do you think the corporate operations are in your country? * If transparent corporate management is forced by law and regulation and is actually guaranteed, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure transparency of the economic system. When you answer this question, please consider if the corporate management and financial information of the private sector is transparently disclosed. In addition, you must consider if there are securities exchange markets, the real-name financial and real-estate transaction system, and the minority shareholder protection system. 0 ↓ Fully untransparent
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully transparent
COMMENTS
6. How fair do you think the competition between companies is in your country? * If fair competition is institutionally and actually guaranteed, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure fairness of economic activities. When you answer this question, please consider if there are laws and regulations that prevent monopoly and oligopoly, and encourage fair competition between companies; and if such laws and regulations are actually effective. For example, you must consider if there are monitoring and supervisory bodies, such as the Fair Trade Commission of Korea; if so, whether such bodies are effectively operating; and if the relations between large companies and SMEs - 40 41 -
The Guidebook for the Asian Democracy Index – 2011 | 58
are not lopsided. 0 ↓ Fully unfair
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully fair
COMMENTS
7. How much effort do you think the government is exerting to protect and guarantee labor rights in your country? * If the government protects labor rights by law and in practice, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure if the government is doing its best to protect the relatively vulnerable party, i.e., labourers. When you answer this question, please consider if government agencies that represent labor rights and mediating bodies, systems, and procedures are present. You must also assess how effectively such bodies, systems, and procedures protect labor rights. 0 ↓ Full restriction
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
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5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full protection
COMMENTS
8. How well do you think private companies protect / guarantee labor rights in your country? * If private companies fully comply with laws and regulation and thus protect labor rights, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how well private companies protect labor rights. When you answer this question, please consider if private companies are doing their best to abide by relevant laws and regulations. In addition, you must consider if they try to protect workers' health and rights. To this end, you may as well examine the rate of industrial accidents/disasters and the number of labor disputes. 0 ↓ Full restriction
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
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6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full protection
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COMMENTS
9. How much do you think the economy is dominated by certain groups in your country? * If the economy is dominated by certain groups, please encircle 10. Unlike other questions, higher scores on this question represent a more monopolistic economy.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure monopoly of the economy by certain groups. When you answer this question, please consider if certain families, races, or groups monopolize the economic wealth of the country or dominate economic activities. For example, under a dictatorship, powerful men and their families occupy key economic interests. Even in democratic societies, economic wealth and activities may be largely influenced by a few conglomerates. 0 ↓ Very distributive
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very dominated /monopolized
COMMENTS
10. How serious do you think the economic disparities / inequality are between regions in your country? * If certain regions account for an overwhelmingly high portion of the national economy, please encircle 10. Unlike other questions, higher scores on this question represent a more monopolistic economy.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure regional disparities in the economy. The regional economic disparity refers to disparities in the economic development between regions. When you answer this question, please consider GRDP, population concentration, Gini’s coefficient of each region, average incomes, and employment rates. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
COMMENTS
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6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very serious
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11. How serious do you think the income disparity is in your country? * If income gaps are very wide, please encircle 10. Unlike other questions, higher scores on this question represent a more monopolistic economy.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure income disparities. When you answer this question, please consider Gini coefficient, income quintiles, poverty rates, income gaps according to education levels, and gender income gap. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very serious
COMMENTS
12. How serious do you think the asset disparity is in your country? * If asset gaps are very wide, please encircle 10. Unlike other questions, higher scores on this question represent a more monopolistic economy.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure asset disparities. Asset disparities include disparities in both financial and nonfinancial assets. In Asia, asset disparities appear as disparities in real estate, housing, and land ownership. When you answer this question, please consider home ownership rates, land ownership concentration, and real-estate price disparities by region. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very serious
COMMENTS
13. How serious do you think discrimination is in the labor market in your country? * If discrimination is very serious, please encircle 10. Unlike other questions, higher scores on this question represent a more monopolistic economy.
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DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure inequality and/or discrimination in the labor market. In Asia, there are still regional ties, and sponsorship and patriarchal practices, which lead to various forms of employment discrimination. When you answer this question, please consider inequality between or discrimination against social classes, educational backgrounds, religions, regions, and genders. You must examine unemployment rates, youth unemployment rates, unemployment rates by gender/educational background, and the ratio of regular to irregular workers. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very serious
COMMENTS
14. How well do you think support systems for the poor are working in your country? * If institutions/systems are well established to protect the basic lives of the citizens, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure if public assistance programs within the social welfare system are well established and operating. When you answer this question, please consider the existence and operation of the minimum wage and basic life support laws, and government support out of social insurance programs for low-income families. Public assistance programs largely differ from country to country. Some countries have dedicated laws and regulations that define basic life support and assistance, while others include such support in social insurance programs. This question should be evaluated in accordance with the situation of your country. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully guaranteed
COMMENTS
15. How well do you think the social insurance programs are operated in your country? * If the system is well established and operated, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how well social insurance programs within the social welfare system are operated. Although social insurance programs may differ from - 44 45 -
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country to country, they refer to unemployment benefits, national pension programs, national health insurance, and unemployment insurance in this question. This question asks whether such insurance programs are well established and operated. When you answer this question, please consider the ratio of social welfare expenditure to GDP (or the government budget), income redistribution rates, and the operation of national pension system/national health insurance/unemployment insurance. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully guaranteed
COMMENTS
16. How well organized do you think labor unions are in your country? * If the rate of labor union organization is high and the members rely on the unions, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure if labor unions are commonly organized, and if such unions are respected and trusted by their members. When you answer this question, please consider the rate of labor union organization, the type of labor unions (by industry or company), the implementation of collective agreement, and members' confidence in the unions. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully organized
COMMENTS
17. How much influence do you think labor unions have on the policies of the central government in your country? * If labor unions have strong influence, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure political influence of labor unions. When you answer this question, please consider if labor unions are respected and trusted by the public; if there is a political party that represents the interests of labor unions; if there is an organization that coordinates interests of labor-management-government; if there is an umbrella organization that supports labor unions; and if such umbrella organization has influence on the central government policies.
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0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very much
COMMENTS
18. How much do you think labor unions participate in the management process in your country? * If such participation is very active, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the degree of labor unions' participation in the corporate management. When you answer this question, please examine labor unions' monitoring of and participation in corporate management. In order words, you may as well consider if there are labor-management co-decision making systems; and if labor unions participate in the board of directors' meeting. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full participation
COMMENTS
19. How well do you think public monitoring is carried out on the corporate activities in your country? * If such monitoring is very active, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how much the general public is involved in monitoring corporate activities, and its consequences, including consumer rights violation and environment problems. When you answer this question, please examine if there are consumer and environment groups. Assess how effective their activities are, how well consumer protection laws are operating, and how proactively the general public are involved in the monitoring process. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
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6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Full participation
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COMMENTS
20. How enthusiastic do you think the general public is about improving the economic inequality in your country? * If the general public is very enthusiastic about addressing economic disparities, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure public awareness of addressing economic disparities. In some cases, such awareness can be represented by active efforts, such as trying to change social systems, and by individual efforts, such as donations or voluntary activities. This question asks public opinions and actions about economic inequality. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
COMMENTS
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6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully active
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III. Civil Society Economic Area * The questions stated below are about the situation of the civil society in your country. Please score each question out of the total 10. If you are fully satisfied with a situation (or if you think that the situation can be regarded as an advanced level in terms of democracy), please give 10. Contrary to this, if you are fully opposite to or dissatisfied with a situation, please give 0. Each item consists of a question, description and comments. The description will guide you to understand the purpose of the question more clearly. You can add your own comments which cannot be reflected by scoring. Your comments are not compulsory, but they will make our survey more meaningful. Comments on questions themselves are also welcome.
1. How free do you think citizens' social activities are from the government interference in your country? * If you regard the activities as completely free, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how free and autonomous civil society is from government interference. When you answer this question, please consider media freedom (e.g., the existence of regulation bodies, direct/indirect pressures and/or punishment on the media, etc.), cultural freedom (e.g. the degree of censorship on art and creative works, etc.), and other factors. 0 ↓ Fully controlled
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully free
COMMENTS
2. How much influence do you think government organizations have on society in your country? * If you regard the influence as very high, please encircle 10. Unlike other questions, higher scores in this question represent a more monopolistic or authoritarian society. - 48 49 -
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DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the degree of government control on society. The government organizations in this question refer to pro-government organizations that are supported by the government. When you answer this question, please consider the number of government organizations, their influence, their privilege (financial support by the government and ties with government/government agencies), and other factors. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very high
COMMENTS
3. How much do you think private companies have influence on society in your country? * If you regard the influence as very high, please encircle 10. Unlike other questions, higher scores in this question represent a more monopolistic or authoritarian society.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how free society is from the market. When you answer this question, please consider how free the media is from private companies. In addition, you must consider if NGOs’ free activities independent from private companies are socially and institutionally guaranteed. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very high
COMMENTS
4. How much do you think citizens' basic needs are met in your country? * If you think the basic needs are fully met, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how much citizens' basic needs (such as food, clothing, shelter, hygiene, and sanitation) are satisfied. When you answer this question, please consider poverty rates, death rates (infant death rates and life expectancy), housing ownership rates, homelessness rates, disease rates, water treatment and supply - 49 50 -
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facilities (for clean water and sanitation), malnutrition/undernourishment indexes, and other factors. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully satisfied
COMMENTS
5. Aside from the basic needs stated in question no. 4, how much do you think special care is provided for vulnerable people or minorities, such as children, women, people with disabilities, and immigrants in your country? * If you think special care is good enough, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the quality of care provided to vulnerable people and/or social minorities. When you answer this question, please consider the conditions stipulated by the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the International Plan of Action on Ageing, and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully satisfied
COMMENTS
6. How much do you think citizens are provided with education opportunities in your country? * If you regard the opportunities as sufficient, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the degree of human development. When you answer this question, please consider the Human Development Index released by the UNDP. 0 ↓
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓
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6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓
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None
Middle
Fully satisfied
COMMENTS
7. How much do you think citizens respect different cultures, religions, languages, races, nations and ideas in your country? * If you regard citizens as highly inclusive, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure tolerance of society. When you answer this question, please consider the degree of tolerance toward different values, citizens' awareness of human rights, tolerance between different groups, nature of competition (violent vs. tolerant), and political activities of interest groups. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully respecting
COMMENTS
8. How much influence do you think NGOs have on society in your country? *If there are an enough number of NGOs and they are competent, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the capabilities of NGOs. When you answer this question, please consider the number of NGOs and their members, human resources, public support and trust, financial self-sufficiency, existence of laws that support NGOs, existence of umbrella organizations and, if applicable, their effectiveness. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
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6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very high
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COMMENTS
9. How well do you think NGOs represent public interest in your country? * If you think NGOs well represent public interest, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the public nature of NGOs. Although NGOs pursue the public interest, they may also have the nature of interest groups. In Asia, some NGOs are virtually serving as a sponsor for a certain interest group or privileged organization, due largely to old-fashioned relationship and archaic practices. When you answer this question, please consider the ratio of public interest groups to interest groups. 0 ↓ Fully private
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully public
COMMENTS
10. Do you think NGOs are democratically operating in your country? * If you regard the operations as democratic, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the degree of democratic operation and transparency of NGOs. When you answer this question, please consider the transparency of organizational operation, mutual respect, and gender equality. In addition, you are advised to consider if NGOs present outdated practices, such as organizational hierarchy or regional ties. 0 ↓ Non-democratic
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
COMMENTS
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6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully democratic
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11. Do you think NGOs well represent different values and demands of society in your country? * If you think various NGOs are operating, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the diversity of NGOs. When you answer this question, please consider the following factors: if NGOs are concentrated in only a handful of fields (e.g., human rights and environmental issues) and only a handful of regions (e.g., large cities, or the capital cities and its vicinity). You must consider the diversity of NGO’s values, representativeness of NGO leaders and members, and country-wide distribution of NGOs. 0 ↓ Very biased and narrow
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very various
COMMENTS
12. Do you think the media is fair and just in your country? * If you regard the media as very fair, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the inequality in the public discourse. When you answer this question, please consider the ownership and governance of media companies and the degree of monopoly in the public discourse. In order words, you must consider if the media is occupied by or dependent on a certain (religious, interest, or ideological) group of people. 0 ↓ Very unfair
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
COMMENTS
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6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very fair
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13. How wide do you think the information gap between citizens is in your country? * If you regard the gap as very wide, please encircle 10. Unlike other questions, higher scores in this question represent a more monopolistic or authoritarian society.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how equal the opportunities to access information are. When you answer this question, please consider the degree of access to conventional media, such as newspapers and television. More importantly, you must consider the degree of personal computer and information technology device ownership and internet penetration rates. 0 ↓ Very narrow / equal
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very wide /negative
COMMENTS
14. Do you think citizens have equal access to cultural facilities and activities in your country? * If you regard such access as equal, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how equal the opportunities to access cultural facilities and activities are. When you answer this question, please consider the opportunities to access theaters, sports, and other cultural facilities. You are also advised to consider if there is a cultural education system, such as a voucher program for various cultural experiences. 0 ↓ Very unequal
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very equal
COMMENTS
15. How equally do you think power is distributed among people in your country? * If you think the elite in society are socially supplemented by different groups, please encircle 10. - 54 55 -
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DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the degree of inequality between groups in the society. In other words, this question asks whether different circles, such as media, academe, cultural and religious societies, are influenced to a great extent by certain groups. When you answer this question, please consider if a few elites monopolize a wide range of fields in society and pass such power to their inner circles. 0 ↓ Very monopolized
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Very distributed
COMMENTS
16. Do you think affirmative actions are well established and operated in your country? * If you think the actions are well implemented and guaranteed, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure how well affirmative actions are implemented and operated. When you answer this question, please consider human rights protection conditions for women, people with disabilities, LGBT, immigrants, and conscientious objection to military service. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully active
COMMENTS
17. How actively do you think citizens are participating in NGO activities in your country? * If you regard the awareness and participation as high, please encircle 10.
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DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure citizens' awareness of and participation in NGO activities. When you answer this question, please consider citizens' membership rates, volunteer activities, and donations. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully active
COMMENTS
18. How much influence do you think NGOs have on government's policy making processes in your country? * If you regard the influence as high, please encircle 10.
DESCRIPTION This question is designed to measure the governance of the government and civil society. When you answer this question, please consider if good governance systems, such as commissions and public hearing sessions, are present and, if present, how effective are these systems operating. 0 ↓ None
1 ↓
2 ↓
3 ↓
4 ↓
5 ↓ Middle
COMMENTS
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6 ↓
7 ↓
8 ↓
9 ↓
10 ↓ Fully influential
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
Editor
Todd Landman Contributors
David Beetham Edzia Carvalho Stuart Weir
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© International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 2008 International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA, its Board or its Council Members.
Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or any part of this publication should be made to: International IDEA SE -103 34 Stockholm Sweden
Graphic design by: Santángelo Diseño Printed by: Bulls Graphics Cover illustration © Alberto Ruggieri/Illustration Works/Corbis/Scanpix ISBN 978-91-85724-44-4
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Contents
Setting the scene Assessing democracy The approach The framework Experiences of applying the framework The steps involved in carrying out an assessment Democracy assessment outputs Assessing for reform Summary Notes
7 9 9 10 13 16 17 18 22 23
Appendix. The search questions
25
Annex. About International IDEA
31
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5
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework Setting the scene Democracy is the predominant form of government in the world today. While for the greater part of world history democracy has been a recent phenomenon,1 successive ‘waves’ of democracy throughout the 20th century have meant that by the new millennium more countries are now governed through democratic than through non-democratic forms of rule. Various attempts to enumerate democracies in the world agree that more than 60 per cent of all countries today have in place at least some minimal form of democratic institutions and procedures.2 The Community of Democracies lists more than 100 countries and the United Nations International Conference on New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD) has grown in depth, breadth and importance since its inauguration in 1988 as a forum for global democratic development. Increasingly, governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations emphasize that democracy is an end in itself, as well as an important means to other ends such as economic development, poverty reduction and greater protection of internationally recognized human rights.3 There have been many explanations for the remarkable growth, spread and pace of democratization. Internal explanations focus on major socio-economic transformations; mobilization by social movements and civil society organizations; class alliances, challenges and revolutions (‘coloured’ or otherwise); and elite agreements and concessions. External explanations focus on defeat of the incumbent regime in war; the role of ‘contagion’ from democratization processes in neighbouring states; the diffusion of democratic values through processes of globalization; and various forms of international intervention, including support for civil society groups and nascent political party organizations; state building; institutionalization; and the specification of criteria for appropriate and acceptable forms of democratic rule. - 63 65 -
7
Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
A crucial element in mapping, explaining and encouraging this growth in democracy has been the need for valid, meaningful and reliable ways to measure and assess democratic progress and the quality of democracy itself. Scholars and practitioners have adopted a number of strategies to measure democracy, including categorical measures (democracy vs non-democracy), scale measures (e.g. a rating on a 1 to 10 scale), objective measures (e.g. voter turnout and party share of the vote), hybrid measures of democratic practices, and perceptions of democracy based on mass public opinion surveys. In certain instances, measures have been developed for particular needs and then used for other purposes, while in others general measures of democracy have been developed for a wide range of application by the academic and policy community (e.g. the ‘Polity’ data set developed by the University of Maryland). The quest for comparability and broad temporal and spatial coverage, however, has meant a certain sacrifice of these measures’ ability to capture the context-specific features of democracy, while the turn to good governance, accountability and aid conditionality among leading international donors has created additional demand for measures of democracy that can be used for country-, sector- and programme-level assessments. In response to these many developments and the proliferation of democracy measures, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) has developed an alternative framework for democracy assessment that moves away from country ranking and external judgement towards an approach of comprehensive assessment based on national assessment teams led by governments or civil society and academic institutions. The framework combines a commitment to the fundamental principles of democracy, mediating values related to these principles, and a comprehensive range of questions about democratic performance. There is scope in the framework for using existing measures while at the same time incorporating much more context-specific information on the quality of democracy that can then be linked to domestic processes of democratic reform. Its use across new and old democracies around the world as diverse as Mongolia and Italy, Bangladesh and Kenya, and Peru and Australia has shown that it works, and demand continues for the framework to be applied in new and challenging contexts. After numerous applications of the assessment framework in no fewer than 20 countries, International IDEA, along with Democratic Audit in the United Kingdom (UK), the Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex in the UK, and the larger ‘State of Democracy’ network, has thoroughly revised the framework into a new hand8
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International IDEA
book, entitled Assessing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide. The Guide includes all the normative principles and practical elements of the framework, experiences from those countries that have used it, and the ways in which democracy assessment can be linked to the process of democratic reform. This much shorter Overview provides an introduction to the framework, including its fundamental democratic principles, its mediating values, the assessment search questions, examples of its application around the world, the typical steps involved in carrying out an assessment, and its value as a tool for promoting democratic reform. The assessment framework outlined here (and more fully in the Guide) upholds International IDEA’s fundamental principles in supporting democracy worldwide. • • • • •
Democratization is a process that requires time and patience. Democracy is not achieved through elections alone. Democratic practices can be compared but not prescribed. Democracy is built from within societies. Democracy cannot be imported or exported, but can be supported.4 Taken together, the Overview and the Guide provide a robust package of materials that are grounded in many years of experience and practical application in old and new democracies across the world. Both volumes should prove highly attractive to grass-roots democracy activists, civil society organizations, reform-minded actors in political society and in government, and those international donor agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that are committed to building democracy for the future.
Assessing democracy The approach The fundamental and underlying question in democracy assessment is: ‘How democratic are our country and its government?’ There are many ways to answer this question. The International IDEA framework takes a particular approach that marks it out from other approaches to democracy assessment and measurement.5 The main features of the International IDEA approach are as follows.
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9
Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
•
• • • •
• • • •
Only citizens and others who live in the country being assessed should carry out a democracy assessment, since only they can know from experience how their country’s history and culture shape its approach to democratic principles. A democracy assessment by citizens and residents of a country may be initiated by government or external agencies only under strict safeguards of the independence of the assessment. The prime purpose of democracy assessment is to contribute to public debate and consciousness raising, and the exercise ought to allow for the expression of popular understanding as well as any elite consensus. The assessment should assist in identifying priorities for reform and monitoring their progress. The criteria for assessment should be derived from clearly defined democratic principles and should embrace the widest range of democracy issues, while allowing assessors to choose priorities for examination according to local needs. The assessments should be qualitative judgements of strengths and weaknesses in each area, strengthened by quantitative measures where appropriate. The assessors should choose benchmarks or standards for assessment, based on the country’s history, regional practice and international norms, as they think appropriate. The assessment process should involve wide public consultation, including a national workshop to validate the findings. Old as well as new democracies can and should be subject to a similar framework of assessment. The primacy of internal actors and citizens of a country is an essential feature of the International IDEA approach, while it also allows for international expertise, support and resources to complement the assessment process. The experience of assessments thus far has shown various degrees of learning, sharing and support through local assessment teams, the State of Democracy network, international donor agencies, international academic experts, representatives of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and other key actors. In this way, the International IDEA approach avoids many of the pitfalls of existing approaches,6 while at the same time developing local ownership and empowering citizens to improve the quality of their own democracy in ways that reflect their own history, culture and national priorities.
The framework The key democratic principles that form the basis for the assessment framework are popular control over decision makers and political 10
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International IDEA
equality of those who exercise that control. These principles define what democrats at all times and in all places have struggled for: • • •
making popular control over public decision making more effective and more inclusive; removing elite monopoly over decision making and its benefits; and overcoming obstacles to the equal exercise of citizenship rights, such as those of gender, ethnicity, religion, language, class and wealth, among many others. The framework derives seven mediating values from the two democratic principles.
• •
• •
• •
•
Participation. Without citizen participation, and the rights, the freedoms and the means to participate, the principle of popular control over government cannot begin to be realized. Authorization. The starting point of participation is to authorize public representatives or officials through free and fair electoral choice, and in a manner which produces a legislature that is representative of the different tendencies of public opinion. Representation. If different groups of citizens are treated on an equal footing, according to their numbers, then the main public institutions will be socially representative of the citizen body as a whole. Accountability. The accountability of all officials, both to the public directly and through the mediating institutions of parliament, the courts, the ombudsman and other watchdog agencies, is crucial if officials are to act as agents or servants of the people rather than as their masters. Transparency. Without openness or transparency in government, no effective accountability is possible. Responsiveness. Responsiveness to public needs, through a variety of institutions through which those needs can be articulated, is a key indication of the level of controlling influence which people have over government. Solidarity. While equality runs as a principle through all the mediating values, it finds particular expression in the solidarity which citizens of democracies show to those who differ from themselves at home, and towards popular struggles for democracy abroad. The mediating values have certain requirements and institutional means for their realization. The overall structure of the assessment framework is derived from the democratic principles and mediating values to include four main pillars, each of which has further divisions used to organize 90 search ques- 67 69 -
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
tions (15 overarching questions and 75 specific questions) that form the core of democracy assessment. These main pillars are as follows. 1. Citizenship, law and rights Democracy starts with the citizen, and the subject of the first pillar of the framework is the rights of the citizen and the ability of the state to guarantee equal rights of citizenship to all through its constitutional and legal processes. The assessment includes civil, political, economic and social rights. 2. Representative and accountable government The second pillar comprises the institutions of representative and accountable government, including the electoral process, the political party system, the role of parliament or the legislature and other institutions in securing the integrity and accountability of government officials, and civilian control over the military and police forces. 3. Civil society and popular participation The third pillar is devoted to what is conventionally called ‘civil society’. Democratic institutions depend for their effective functioning both on guaranteed rights upheld by the legal process and on an alert and active citizen body. 4. Democracy beyond the state The fourth pillar concerns the international dimensions of democracy. Its rationale is that countries do not form isolated units, but are mutually interdependent, especially in their degree of democratic progress. The assessment takes into account the external influences on a country’s democracy and the country’s democratic impact abroad. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the democratic principles, the mediating values, the structure of the framework, and the search questions. The appendix to this Overview includes a full list of the 90 search questions, while part 2 of the Guide provides comprehensive guidance on ‘what to look for’ in answering each search question, generalized sources of information, data and indicators, and standards of good practice. These elements of the framework provide the core substantive content of an assessment, and when taken together reflect a larger set of values and principles associated with a general normative commitment to democracy and democratic values. Those who want a quick view of what the method involves can turn straight to the search questions in the appendix.
12
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Figure 1: The International IDEA democracy assessment framework %FNPDSBUJD QSJODJQMFT 1PQVMBS DPOUSPM 1PMJUJDBM FRVBMJUZ
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Experiences of applying the framework There have been a total of 17 assessment projects so far, comprising not fewer than 20 countries (since the South Asia democracy assessment was carried out in five countries). A team of academics is currently carrying out an assessment in Mexico, while more assessments are planned for countries in Latin America, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe and Africa. In addition, certain features of the framework have been adopted by the Open Society Institute’s AfriMap project and in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Oslo Governance Centre’s work on poverty reduction and gender mainstreaming. International IDEA has held a series of expert meetings for the State of Democracy Network – in June 2004, in London; in 2005, at the University of Essex; in 2006, at the meeting of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) in Fukuoka; and in March 2007, in Stockholm, to reflect on the experiences of applying the framework across a range of different country contexts. International IDEA also made numerous presentations at two national workshops for the Fifth International Conference on New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD-5) in Ulaanbaatar in 2003 and 2006, and the inaugural - 69 71 -
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
meeting of the Sixth International Conference on New or Restored Democracies (ICNRD-6) in Doha in November 2006. The reports and experiences from the different assessments reveal a remarkably diverse range of democratic situations as between countries, approaches and techniques. All the assessments that have taken place have remained committed to the standard methodology and the central principle of local ownership of the assessment process that encompasses the research, analysis and consultation processes, and the identification of priorities for future reform. But, as Krishna Hachhethu, a Nepalese member of the South Asia regional assessment team, says, ‘Democracy has many stories’. This straightforward and insightful observation captures the essence of the approach: a standard method derived from democratic principles and values elicits democracy’s many stories from around the world. The assessment methodology was invented and first applied by Democratic Audit in the UK. It was developed for universal use under the direct aegis of International IDEA and then pioneered over a six-month period in eight countries – Bangladesh, El Salvador, Italy, Kenya, Malawi, Peru, New Zealand and South Korea. The pilot assessments covered different regions of the world and a mix of developed and developing countries in an effort to test the process. Nearly all involved a national conference of leading experts and interested parties within each country. The pilot assessments showed that it has been relatively easy to: • • • • •
obtain a broadly agreed constitution with a bill of rights; establish some sort of office of ombudsmen and/or a public defender; hold free elections and establish universal suffrage; revive local government; and ensure respect for and the protection of basic freedoms such as party association, press, speech and assembly. But they also revealed that has been more difficult to establish:
• • • • • •
14
the effective inclusion of minorities and women’s participation; equal access to justice and protection of the right to life; meaningful intra-party democracy; control of executives; a reduction in private influence and private interests in the public sphere; and a significant role for opposition parties.
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Since 2000, the assessment framework has travelled widely across regions and countries at different stages of democratization. The pilot assessments have been followed by assessment exercises in (in alphabetical order) Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union (EU), Ireland, Latvia, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, the Philippines, the South Asia region (covering Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) and the UK (the latest audit). These ‘second-generation’ assessments were largely conducted independently of International IDEA, and in many cases resulted from a deliberate selection of the methodology as the most appropriate from among the many assessment methods currently used internationally. The origins, funding and form of the assessments differ greatly. The pilot assessments funded by International IDEA were all universitybased and most of the non-International IDEA assessments so far – nine of the individual country assessments and the South Asian regional assessment – have their roots in universities, but there have been wide variations in the funding and in the process of assessment, ranging from nationally and internationally well-funded assessments (e.g. those undertaken in Australia, Latvia and Mongolia) to those that have been under-resourced and have been carried out in piecemeal fashion (e.g. the assessments in New Zealand and the Philippines). Three assessments (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ireland and the UK) sprang from civil society, while two (the Netherlands and Mongolia) were government-led, although the Dutch assessment was funded wholly by the government and the Mongolian assessment received technical assistance from the UNDP’s Oslo Governance Centre and funding from various international donors. The governmentled assessments in Mongolia, the Netherlands and Latvia (where the assessment was in a sense state-sponsored) were carried out without inappropriate intervention by the government and in many ways have tied the government to the larger agenda of democratic reform, although such a model may not be appropriate in all contexts. There have been as many differing arrangements for carrying out assessments as there have been projects. It is clear across the experiences that the breadth of the investigations necessary to conduct full assessments has generally obliged the projects to involve a wide range of contributors. Assessment teams have variously comprised national and international academics, researchers and analysts from intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, members of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, and representatives from civil society and the media. The norm seems to be that projects generally have a small core of people who coordinate the - 71 73 -
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
research and draft reports together with a wider set of experts, who have often been recruited from outside the bounds of the institution carrying out the assessment and who usually seem to work independently of each other.
The steps involved in carrying out an assessment Assessing the quality of democracy is a large and complex task that involves many stakeholders and is affected by a variety of national and context-specific factors, including the size of the country (population and geography), its level of economic development, its type of societal cleavages and level of fragmentation, and its history of democracy and democratic stability, among many others. Despite this complexity and variety, the history of the democracy assessment framework has shown that it can apply equally across very different countries. The assessments have been carried out in new and old democracies, large and small countries, post-authoritarian and post-conflict countries, and rich and poor countries. With this universal applicability comes a series of standard steps that all assessments undergo in order to make the best of the assessment experience. These include: (a) the initial decisions and agenda setting for the process of assessment; (b) the data collection, analysis and organization that form the core of the assessment; and (c) a national workshop and stakeholder event in which the final report is launched, discussed and evaluated and in which the future of democracy is discussed. Figure 2 summarizes the main elements of these three steps, while part 1 of the Guide contains two flowcharts that map in greater detail the components of each stage. Step 1 includes all those decisions concerning the purpose of the assessment, the context in which it will be conducted, the range of benchmarks and comparators that will be used, the personnel that will carry out the assessment and many other crucial decisions. Step 2 forms the core of the assessment and takes the largest proportion of the time, since it involves collecting and analysing data in order to provide valid, meaningful and reliable answers to all the search questions (every assessment thus far has provided answers to all the questions). The time it takes to complete an assessment is necessarily a function of the complexity of the context in which it is being carried out, the available capacity and resources, and the initial parameters that have been established in step 1. 16
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Step 3 is a significant launch event that involves all relevant stakeholders, the media, key actors from civil, political and economic society, and in many cases the international community. It is a time to build consensus around the main findings of the report and to reflect on the kinds of reform that can be designed and implemented, as well as the ways in which the entire experience can be evaluated and assessed.
Figure 2: The steps involved in carrying out a democracy assessment 4UFQ
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Democracy assessment outputs There is considerable variety in the balance of the outputs between full assessments, special reports, partial audits and monitoring or follow-up reports, and in the way in which they are published and disseminated. Most of the projects have published a single volume reporting on a full assessment, while some have published additional supplementary materials (e.g. the South Asian team published separate Country Reports and is considering publishing its Case Studies and dialogues separately; and the Mongolians published a Country Information Note, Democratic Governance Indicators, and a National Plan of Action), while still others, such as the Philippines project, published books devoted to each pillar of the framework separately. Different methods have been used to make the results of the comprehensive assessments more digestible for those who find a large book unmanageable. For the Mongolian assessment, five national experts - 73 75 -
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
were selected to ‘score’ the assessment findings on a five-point scale from 5 (most democratic) to 1 (least democratic), and the results were published together in tabular form. The Latvian assessment constructed a similar table for each search question, the results being marked on a scale from ‘very good’ to ‘good’, ‘satisfactory’, ‘poor’ and ‘very poor’. There then followed a brief item on the ‘best feature’ for that section, then the ‘most serious problem’, and finally a ‘suggested improvement’, all of which provided a quick ‘snapshot’ of the democratic condition in the country. In the latest UK audit, the findings from each section were summarized together at the end of the book in bullet-point form, and these were then edited for publication as a separate pamphlet.
Assessing for reform The International IDEA framework stresses that the process of assessment is an effective means to communicate a particular story about democracy that has been forged through national consensus. The story itself ought to be communicated to as diverse and broad an audience as possible and it ought to lead to the formulation of concrete proposals for democratic reform that draw on the findings of the assessment in ways that are based on local ownership of the reform agenda. It is clear from the experiences of applying the assessment framework that assessment teams have moved beyond the set of search questions and have used the framework as a useful tool for critical reflection within the country that is being assessed. A domestic team of assessors and stakeholders based in the country of the assessment provides the empirical basis for answering the questions while reflecting on the democratic achievements and deficits for the period being assessed, as well as identifying the obstacles for democratic reform that may exist. In this way, the assessment is crucial for celebrating democratic achievements while revealing critical gaps in the lived democratic experience of the country and obstacles in need of attention through proposals for reform to move the democratic agenda forward. The main gaps between early constitutional and institutional achievements, on the one hand, and longer-term problems that erode the democratic quality of life, on the other hand, are consonant with popular commentaries on and critical analyses of democratic underachievement beyond the countries that have undergone the kind of assessments carried out using the International IDEA framework. Such commentaries are critical about two key things: (a) an overemphasis on elections (known as the ‘electoral fallacy’) at the cost of examining 18
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other key dimensions of democracy; and (b) the false logic of democratic ‘sequencing’.7 While elections are important and feature prominently in the assessment framework, the many other dimensions of the framework show that elections are but one facet of the democratic experience, where questions of rights, inclusion, the media, political parties and parliaments, among other things, must sit alongside the holding of regular elections. Democratic sequencing sees the development of democracy as a set of necessary steps in which the state and the rule of law are stabilized before democracy is introduced fully. A recent critique of this sequential approach cautions against this and argues that democracies and the democrats who inhabit them are best placed to bring about democratic reform, that their efforts to do so often precede rather than follow any interventions from the international community and that even in those instances where this is not the case the power of outside intervention in democracy promotion is overrated. This view is largely compatible with the types of lessons that have been learned by applying the assessment framework across such a diverse set of countries, which – unlike the various debates on democratic sequencing – has included established democracies as well as new and restored democracies. The new democrats of Mongolia forged a competitive electoral system in which real alternation of power has taken place, and where all major stakeholders have become engaged in state reform and strengthening the rule of law. In the Netherlands, popular rejection of the EU constitution and two prominent political assassinations initiated an assessment that revealed the need to revisit issues of Dutch citizenship and the complexity of government itself in representing the needs and democratic aspirations of the population. In South Asia, the State of Democracy project sought to locate democracy in the context of that region of the world in order to discover what South Asians think about democracy and how they have adapted its very idea. The project showed that across the region democratic ‘preconditions’ are not necessary for the installation of democracy and that democracy has not yet been able to address questions of poverty. These different examples suggest that the framework, in addition to being equally applicable to such a diverse range of country contexts, is equally useful in generating concrete proposals for democratic reform, the success of which relies heavily on the agents of the assessment and their ability to provide the broad conditions of ownership for key stakeholders that have the capacity and opportunity to drive the reform process. In terms of the assessment framework and within International IDEA’s general orientation towards democracy as an ongoing and an evolving process, it is entirely to be expected that de- 75 77 -
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
mocracy is not an ‘all or nothing affair’, so that certain features may be better developed than others, and that the assessment of the quality of democracy necessarily requires a multidimensional approach that can provide a more nuanced and context-specific ‘performance profile’. Moreover, the assessment framework lends itself well to the identification of possible explanations for the gaps between achievements and remaining challenges, which in turn can lead to the formulation of a democratic reform agenda. The potential for initiating, implementing and sustaining significant democratic reforms, however, must be seen as a function of four larger factors that need to be taken into consideration. These factors are: • • • •
the context under which the assessment was carried out; the types of influence that the assessment made possible; the audience to which the assessment was directed; and the type of outputs produced. These factors can act alone or in combination to affect the type of democratic reform possible, both in the short term and in the longer term. Across the experiences, the context of the assessment varied greatly across the main agent of the assessment (government, civil society or an academic institution), the relative openness of the political process to reform, and the relative voice the assessment had in the public domain and popular political discourse. Assessments can have direct influence on policy makers and other political elites, as in the cases of the Netherlands, Mongolia and Latvia, and to a lesser extent in Ireland and the UK. Assessments can also strengthen constituencies, non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations that can mobilize and add pressure for democratic reform. It is also possible for assessments to have longer-term cultural impact through raising awareness and being mainstreamed through educational curricula at secondary school level, as well as within the university system. Finally, different audiences for an assessment include national stakeholders within government and in political, civil and economic society, as well as audiences outside the country, including other countries wishing to carry out their own assessments and the international donor community. These different dimensions of the assessment process (agent, context, openness of the political process, audiences, outputs and impact) create different opportunities and areas for democratic reform, which include:
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• • •
institutional reforms; resource-based reforms; and long-term cultural shifts. Institutional reforms are based on enhancing accountability mechanisms in ways that prohibit the centralization of power or prevent power and decision making being exercised without real oversight. Across different institutional arrangements (e.g. unitary and federal systems, presidential and parliamentary systems, and proportional and majoritarian systems), the assessment experiences have shown that it is important that institutional mechanisms are in place for maintaining independent forms of representation and accountability. Institutional oversight requires real power backed with constitutional or statutory authority to oversee and control actions of government that can have a deleterious impact on human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Popular institutional solutions include the establishment of national human rights institutions, electoral commissions, anti-corruption bodies and ombudsman offices, as well as more traditional legislative and judicial powers of oversight that have evolved over long periods of time in the more established democracies. For transitional societies there is an additional demand for institutional solutions that confront authoritarian legacies (at a formal and legal level and at a cultural and practical level), the so-called military ‘reserve domains’ of power (e.g. in Bangladesh and Pakistan), and the use of emergency powers within national constitutions. Moreover, there ought to be institutional solutions to enhance participation and the inclusion of all groups, including minority groups and women. The need for resource-based reforms stems from the fact that the framework is based on the idea that political and legal equality must be complemented by the means for realising social equality. The persistence of social and economic inequality constrains the ability of large numbers of people to take part in the public affairs of the country. Concentration on the fulfilment of economic and social rights is often criticized for placing a heavy burden on the fiscal capacity of governments, but programmes that enhance the protection of civil and political rights also entail such a burden. All rights depend to some degree on tax revenues and government spending. Thus, the improvement of the quality of democracy involves enhancing the fiscal capacity of states, while more democratic procedures and institutions can contribute to a better allocation of national revenue in ways that raise living standards and overall well-being.
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
Finally, there is a longer-term need for the kind of reforms that promote and develop a broader political culture that is supportive of democracy. The Bosnian and Latvian assessment experiences showed that new and restored democracies face harder challenges in this regard. Bangladesh has experienced ongoing military interventions in the political sphere which the general public in general has backed, which suggests a weak attachment to democracy and democratic principles. Indeed, the South Asian assessment found that ‘an affirmation of democracy does not lead to the negation of authoritarian alternatives, so support for democracy is thin’. The Netherlands has sought to formulate an interconnected package of measures to guarantee, reinforce and – where necessary – renew democracy, together with the results of the Citizens’ Forum (Burgerforum) and the National Convention (Nationale Conventie), among other initiatives. In Australia, assessment outputs form part of the curricula for university students, where ‘students cut their teeth on our assessments of Australian political practices when learning about Australian politics…’. Such institutional, resource-based and cultural reforms demand varying degrees of attention, time, and a wide range of different actors in order to build a broader, deeper and better democratic future. The assessment framework makes it clear that democracy assessment must be comprehensive, inclusive and forward-looking in ways that draw on the democratic achievements, are grounded in the many different contexts in which democracy flourishes, and require the support of all citizens within the country that is to be assessed. Democracy assessment engages all levels of society as well as key international actors in an effort to build and strengthen democratic institutions, democratic society and democratic culture in ways that reflect the needs of the population governed within the democracy itself.
Summary This Overview has provided a short outline of the purpose, conceptual underpinning, methodology and main features of the International IDEA framework for democracy assessment. It has also provided a brief reflection on the experiences of applying the framework across a diverse set of country contexts. The framework makes a clear link between fundamental principles of democracy, mediating values, and specific questions that probe the overall quality of democracy and identify key areas for democratic reform. The method is grounded in the use of country-based assessment teams and the promotion of broad forms of participation in ways that develop ownership over 22
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the assessment process and the larger democratic reform agenda. The fuller Guide lays out in much greater detail the framework; the sources of data, standards and good practice; the process of carrying out an assessment; the experiences of teams that have carried out the assessments in several countries; and how the lessons of an assessment can be used to pursue long-term democratic reform.
Notes 1
In The History of Government (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), Samuel Finer compares all forms of government from antiquity to the present and shows that his notion of the ‘forum-polity’ is the rarest and most recent of all forms of government.
2
See, for example, Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A. and Limongi, F., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Boix, C., Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Doorenspleet, R., Democratic Transitions: Exploring the Structural Sources of the Fourth Wave (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
3
See, for example, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) 2006 White Paper Eliminating Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor, Cm 6876 (London: The Stationery Office, 2006).
4
International IDEA, Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2005), p. 12.
5
Annex A to Assessing the Quality of Democracy: Practical Guide reviews the other main ways of measuring democracy.
6
These pitfalls include: (a) conceptual problems of oversimplification and a narrow focus on the institutional dimensions of democracy; (b) methodological problems of lack of transparency in coding, selective use of material, country-level aggregation, and the validity and reliability of measures; and (c) the political problems of giving primacy to outside judgement, the lack of local ownership in the measurement process and the tendency to engage in comparative ranking.
7
Two issues of the Journal of Democracy cover the many sides of this debate about democratic sequencing (see volume 18, issues 1 and 3, 2007).
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Appendix: The search questions
1.
Citizenship, law and rights
1.1.
Nationhood and citizenship Overarching question: Is there public agreement on a common citizenship without discrimination?
1.1.1.
How inclusive is the political nation and state citizenship of all who live within the territory? How far are cultural differences acknowledged, and how well are minorities and vulnerable social groups protected? How much consensus is there on state boundaries and constitutional arrangements? How far do constitutional and political arrangements enable major societal divisions to be moderated or reconciled? How impartial and inclusive are the procedures for amending the constitution? How far does the government respect its international obligations in its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, and how free from arbitrary discrimination is its immigration policy?
1.1.2. 1.1.3. 1.1.4. 1.1.5. 1.1.6.
1.2.
Rule of law and access to justice Overarching question: Are state and society consistently subject to the law?
1.2.1. 1.2.2.
How far is the rule of law operative throughout the territory? To what extent are all public officials subject to the rule of law and to transparent rules in the performance of their functions? How independent are the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference? How equal and secure is the access of citizens to justice, to due process and to redress in the event of maladministration? How far do the criminal justice and penal systems observe due rules of impartial and equitable treatment in their operations?
1.2.3. 1.2.4. 1.2.5.
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1.2.6.
How much confidence do people have in the legal system to deliver fair and effective justice?
1.3.
Civil and political rights Overarching question: Are civil and political rights equally guaranteed for all?
1.3.1.
How free are all people from physical violation of their person, and from fear of it? How effective and equal is the protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly? How secure is the freedom for all to practise their own religion, language or culture? How free from harassment and intimidation are individuals and groups working to improve human rights?
1.3.2. 1.3.3. 1.3.4. 1.4.
Economic and social rights Overarching question: Are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all?
1.4.1.
How far is access to work or social security available to all, without discrimination? How effectively are the basic necessities of life guaranteed, including adequate food, shelter and clean water? To what extent is the health of the population protected, in all spheres and stages of life? How extensive and inclusive is the right to education, including education in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship? How free are trade unions and other work-related associations to organize and represent their members’ interests? How rigorous and transparent are the rules on corporate governance, and how effectively are corporations regulated in the public interest?
1.4.2. 1.4.3. 1.4.4. 1.4.5. 1.4.6.
2.
Representative and accountable government
2.1.
Free and fair elections Overarching question: Do elections give the people control over governments and their policies?
2.1.1.
How far is appointment to governmental and legislative office determined by popular competitive election, and how frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel?
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2.1.2. 2.1.3. 2.1.4.
2.1.5. 2.1.6.
How inclusive and accessible for all citizens are the registration and voting procedures, how independent are they of government and party control, and how free from intimidation and abuse? How fair are the procedures for the registration of candidates and parties, and how far is there fair access for them to the media and other means of communication with the voters? How effective a range of choice does the electoral and party system allow the voters, how equally do their votes count, and how closely do the composition of the legislature and the selection of the executive reflect the choices they make? How far does the legislature reflect the social composition of the electorate? What proportion of the electorate votes, and how far are the election results accepted by all political forces in the country and outside?
2.2.
The democratic role of political parties Overarching question: Does the party system assist the working of democracy?
2.2.1.
How freely are parties able to form and recruit members, engage with the public and campaign for office? How effective is the party system in forming and sustaining governments in office? How far are parties effective membership organizations, and how far are members able to influence party policy and candidate selection? How far does the system of party financing prevent the subordination of parties to special interests? To what extent do parties cross ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions?
2.2.2. 2.2.3. 2.2.4. 2.2.5. 2.3.
Effective and responsive government Overarching question: Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its concerns?
2.3.1.
How far is the elected government able to influence or control those matters that are important to the lives of its people, and how well is it informed, organized and resourced to do so? How effective and open to scrutiny is the control exercised by elected leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and other executive agencies? How open and systematic are the procedures for public consultation on government policy and legislation, and how equal is the access for relevant interests to government? How accessible and reliable are public services for those who need them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service delivery?
2.3.2. 2.3.3. 2.3.4.
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
2.3.5. 2.3.6.
How comprehensive and effective is the right of access for citizens to government information under the constitution or other laws? How much confidence do people have in the ability of government to solve the main problems confronting society, and in their own ability to influence it?
2.4.
The democratic effectiveness of parliament Overarching question: Does the parliament or legislature contribute effectively to the democratic process?
2.4.1.
How independent is the parliament or legislature of the executive, and how freely are its members able to express their opinions? How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or legislature to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation? How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account? How rigorous are the procedures for approval and supervision of taxation and public expenditure? How freely are all parties and groups able to organize within the parliament or legislature and contribute to its work? How extensive are the procedures of the parliament or legislature for consulting the public and relevant interests across the range of its work? How accessible are elected representatives to their constituents? How well does the parliament or legislature provide a forum for deliberation and debate on issues of public concern?
2.4.2. 2.4.3. 2.4.4. 2.4.5. 2.4.6. 2.4.7. 2.4.8. 2.5.
Civilian control of the military and police Overarching question: Are the military and police forces under civilian control?
2.5.1.
How effective is civilian control over the armed forces, and how free is political life from military involvement? How publicly accountable are the police and security services for their activities? How far does the composition of the army, police and security services reflect the social composition of society at large? How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary units, private armies, warlordism and criminal mafias?
2.5.2. 2.5.3. 2.5.4. 2.6. 2.6.1.
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Integrity in public life Overarching question: Is the integrity of conduct in public life assured? How effective is the separation of public office from the personal business and family interests of office holders? - 84 86 -
International IDEA
2.6.2. 2.6.3. 2.6.4. 2.6.5.
3.
How effective are the arrangements for protecting office holders and the public from involvement in bribery? How far do the rules and procedures for financing elections, candidates and elected representatives prevent their subordination to sectional interests? How far is the influence of powerful corporations and business interests over public policy kept in check, and how free are they from involvement in corruption, including overseas? How much confidence do people have that public officials and public services are free from corruption? Civil society and popular participation
3.1.
The media in a democratic society Overarching question: Do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values?
3.1.1.
How independent are the media from government, how pluralistic is their ownership, and how free are they from subordination to foreign governments or multinational companies? How representative are the media of different opinions and how accessible are they to different sections of society? How effective are the media and other independent bodies in investigating government and powerful corporations? How free are journalists from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation? How free are private citizens from intrusion and harassment by the media?
3.1.2. 3.1.3. 3.1.4. 3.1.5. 3.2.
Political participation Overarching question: Is there full citizen participation in public life?
3.2.1.
How extensive is the range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc., and how independent are they from government? How extensive is citizen participation in voluntary associations and self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity? How far do women participate in political life and public office at all levels? How equal is access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they represented within it?
3.2.2. 3.2.3. 3.2.4.
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
3.3.
Decentralization Overarching question: Are decisions taken at the level of government that is most appropriate for the people affected?
3.3.1.
How independent are the sub-central tiers of government from the centre, and how far do they have the powers and resources to carry out their responsibilities? How far are these levels of government subject to free and fair electoral authorization, and to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation? How extensive is the cooperation of government at the most local level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision?
3.3.2. 3.3.3.
4.
Democracy beyond the state
4.1.
External influences on the country’s democracy Overarching question: Is the impact of external influences broadly supportive of the country’s democracy?
4.1.1.
How free is the country from external influences which undermine or compromise its democratic process or national interests? How equitable is the degree of influence exercised by the government within the bilateral, regional and international organizations to whose decisions it may be subject? How far are the government’s negotiating positions and subsequent commitments within these organizations subject to effective legislative oversight and public debate?
4.1.2. 4.1.3.
4.2.
The country’s democratic impact abroad Overarching question: Do the country’s international policies contribute to strengthening global democracy?
4.2.1.
How consistent is the government in its support for, and protection of, human rights and democracy abroad? How far does the government support the UN and agencies of international cooperation, and respect the rule of law internationally? How extensive and consistent is the government’s contribution to international development? How far is the government’s international policy subject to effective parliamentary oversight and public influence?
4.2.2. 4.2.3. 4.2.4.
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Annex: About International IDEA
What is International IDEA? The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy worldwide. Its objective is to strengthen democratic institutions and processes. International IDEA acts as a catalyst for democracy building by providing knowledge resources, expertise and a platform for debate on democracy issues. It works together with policy makers, donor governments, UN organizations and agencies, regional organizations and others engaged on the field of democracy building.
What does International IDEA do? Democracy building is complex and touches on many areas including constitutions, electoral systems, political parties, legislative arrangements, the judiciary, central and local government, formal and traditional government structures. International IDEA is engaged with all of these issues and offers to those in the process of democratization: • • •
knowledge resources, in the form of handbooks, databases, websites and expert networks; policy proposals to provoke debate and action on democracy issues; and assistance to democratic reforms in response to specific national requests.
Areas of work International IDEA’s notable areas of expertise are: •
Constitution-building processes. A constitutional process can lay the foundations for peace and development, or plant seeds of conflict. International IDEA is able to provide knowledge and make poli- 87 89 -
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy: An Overview of the International IDEA Framework
•
•
•
•
cy proposals for constitution building that is genuinely nationally owned, is sensitive to gender and conflict-prevention dimensions, and responds effectively to national priorities. Electoral processes. The design and management of elections has a strong impact on the wider political system. International IDEA seeks to ensure the professional management and independence of elections, adapt electoral systems, and build public confidence in the electoral process. Political parties. Political parties form the essential link between voters and the government, yet polls taken across the world show that political parties enjoy a low level of confidence. International IDEA analyses the functioning of political parties, the public funding of political parties, their management and relations with the public. Democracy and gender. International IDEA recognizes that if democracies are to be truly democratic, then women—who make up over half of the world’s population—must be represented on equal terms with men. International IDEA develops comparative resources and tools designed to advance the participation and representation of women in political life. Democracy assessments. Democratization is a national process. International IDEA’s State of Democracy methodology allows people to assess their own democracy instead of relying on externally produced indicators or rankings of democracies.
Where does International IDEA work? International IDEA works worldwide. It is based in Stockholm, Sweden, and has offices in Latin America, Africa and Asia.
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Assessing the Quality of Democracy An Overview of the International IDEA Framework Assessing the Quality of Democracy: an Overview of the International IDEA Framework introduces International IDEA’s State of Democracy (SoD) assessment framework, developed for use by local actors in assessing the quality of their democracies and mounting reform agendas. The Overview highlights the elements that constitute the assessment framework: the democratic principles upon which it is based, the mediating values, the structure and the range of search questions. Examples of application of the framework in various parts of the world, critical steps for conducting SoD assessments, and examples of concrete proposals for democratic reform emerging from assessments are highlighted. The Overview, together with Assessing the Quality of Democracy: the Practical Guide, forms a comprehensive package of knowledge resources for the implementation of the SoD framework.
INTERNATIONAL IDEA SE -103 34 Stockholm Sweden Phone: +46 8 698 37 00 Fax: +46 8 20 24 22 E-mail: info@idea.int Website: http://www.idea.int
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ISBN 978-91-85724-44-4
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Southeast Asia
thailand’s uneasy passage Thitinan Pongsudhirak
Thitinan Pongsudhirak teaches international political economy and directs the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. His essay “Thailand Since the Coup” appeared in the October 2008 issue of the Journal of Democracy.
Few countries struggling to emerge as democracies have undergone
bouts of “democratic rollback”1 as dramatic as those that Thailand has endured over the last several years. Since a September 2006 military coup deposed deeply flawed but popularly elected premier Thaksin Shinawatra and forced him into exile, the Thai body politic has been battered and torn as never before in its already tumultuous history. Street protests and violent faceoffs between red-shirted Thaksin backers and yellow-shirted Thaksin foes have continued year after year and show no sign of stopping. Although Thaksin himself was banned from actually appearing on the ballot in the 3 July 2011 parliamentary elections, he emerged as the big winner when a new electoral vehicle known as the Pheu Thai Party (PTP, or “For Thais”) gained a decisive victory with his younger sister Yingluck at its head. As twilight settles over the 65-year reign of King Bhumibol Adulyadej (b. 1927), Thais find themselves caught in a national stalemate. Those who favor maintaining the monarchy-centered hierarchy as the ultimate source of political power are arrayed against others who want to reform the monarchy and reconcile it with a fuller and more mature form of democracy. With Cold War imperatives now obsolete, with international norms increasingly favoring democracy and human rights, and with new media technologies and demographic realities making themselves felt, Thailand’s monarchy-based establishment finds itself hard-pressed to maintain the status quo. Yet it has too much at stake to simply give way to the challenges that Thaksin (in his faulty and not-always-democratic way) spearheaded during a premiership that began with his election in 2001 and was cut off by the coup five years later. Journal of Democracy Volume 23, Number 2 April 2012 © 2012 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press - 90 93 -
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The two imperative or pressing questions are: Can and will an entrenched monarchy reconcile itself with an irreversible trend toward democracy? And can that democracy be kept safe from the usurpations, manipulations, and abuses of power that marred the Thaksin years and put all Thais on notice that getting democracy is one thing, but getting it right is another?
The Rise of Thaksin The last decade of Thai politics has featured volatility and contention in abundance. In the wake of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, Thaksin rode his Thai Rak Thai (TRT, or “Thais Love Thais”) party into office in the January 2001 election. He enacted unprecedented policy innovations and a broadly populist platform designed to appeal to the rural voters left behind by the long economic boom that ended in 1997. He suspended rural debts while offering microcredit schemes and cheap healthcare. He launched development projects and niche industries to promote food, fashion, tourism, healthcare, and automobiles. 2 He revamped policy making to give elected politicians more sway than bureaucrats. He also tinkered with military promotions in order to elevate trusted associates (including a cousin) to the high command, and undermined the 1997 Constitution by politicizing and coopting its intended checks and balances. In August 2001, he was narrowly found not guilty of hiding assets in a trial marred by charges that Constitutional Court judges had been pressured or paid off. Thaksin continued to enact policies that won majority support among voters, but accompanied these successes with corruption, conflicts of interest, human-rights violations, abuses of power, and displays of an authoritarian bent. When he was reelected by an overwhelming margin in February 2005, he came to feel virtually invincible. 3 His problems with the palace date from this time. Already an outsider, with a vast fortune springing from a stock-market boom rather than from the traditional realm of protected state concessions, Thaksin further alienated himself from the establishment by deciding that he no longer needed to consult with General Prem Tinsulanond, the former premier and army chief who runs the Privy Council, the king’s nineteen-member advisory body. As a former officer in the police service, moreover, Thaksin favored it over the military and used the police to wage a war on drugs that claimed close to 2,300 lives, many by extrajudicial killings. While Thaksin’s populism was winning at the polls, his abuses were rousing his foes. By mid-2005, they had formed a coalition that included the Democrat Party (DP), the military, senior bureaucrats, some private business elements, the urban middle class, and palace insiders as well
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as royalists in society at large (yellow-shirts wear that color because of its association with the Thai monarchy). When Thaksin’s Shinawatra Corporation (Shin Corp) conglomerate was sold, tax-free, for US$1.9 billion to Singapore’s Temasek Holdings in January 2006, cries went up for his resignation. His response was to call a snap election (later nullified by the courts) for April 2006. The DP and two smaller allies boycotted the vote, setting up a constitutional crisis. The widening coalition against Thaksin kept up the pressure, eroding his legitimacy and filling the streets with protesters in the weeks leading up to the 19 September 2006 putsch. Thaksin, out of the country on official business, decided to remain abroad. The coupmakers, who later styled themselves the Council for National Security, were meanwhile careful to publicize a photo that they had taken with the king and queen on the night of the putsch. But if the plotters thought that they had turned back once and for all the challenge to the established order represented by Thaksin and his redistributionist platform, they were mistaken. The military installed a caretaker government under a retired general, saw to the judicial dissolution of Thaksin’s TRT, and arranged for the drafting of a new constitution that would elevate bureaucrats and judges at the expense of elected politicians, political parties, and parliament. Yet in the ensuing election, held in December 2007, the TRT’s successor, now called the People’s Power Party or PPP, thrashed the DP by 233 to 165 seats in the revised 480-member assembly. By January 2008, Thaksin was back on top through a proxy prime minister. Thaksin’s adversaries, led by the yellow-shirted People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), replied with sit-ins, taking over Government House (which holds the prime minister’s office) in May 2008 and then Bangkok’s main international airport for a week in late November and early December. Thus a crisis of governability erupted even as the Constitutional Court was disbanding the PPP and two smaller allied parties after a vote-fraud conviction.4 With the weight and influence of the military behind it, the DP took power in early 2009 under the premiership of the Eton- and Oxford-educated Abhisit Vejjajiva. Then it became the pro-Thaksin red-shirts’ turn to hit the streets in protest. In April 2009, and then from March to May 2010, they staged demonstrations that the army dispersed. In 2010, the death toll from these confrontations reached 91. The strife partly set the stage for the early dissolution of parliament and the July 2011 elections, with the PTP as Thaksin’s third-time-around vehicle after the banning of his previous two. Yingluck—whom her brother has called his “clone”— and the PTP brought the pro-Thaksin forces even more success at the polls than they had experienced in December 2007, winning 265 of 500 seats and dwarfing the DP with its 159 seats. Once again, a clear majority of Thailand’s electorate has made its pro-Thaksin preferences clear.
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The 44-year-old Yingluck allows her much-older brother (Thaksin is 62) to present as his proxy a youthful and attractive new figure with no baggage—she had previously worked in the family real-estate business and has no background in politics. Thaksin picked nearly her entire cabinet.5 As she began her mandate, she was greeted by a crisis not of human making: The worst flooding in decades swept large parts of Thailand starting with the monsoon season in July 2011. Her government emerged from the flood crisis in a much weaker position due to interagency conflicts and lack of policy coordination among cabinet members. But for Yingluck herself, the floods constituted a political baptism. Her day-to-day devotion to flood management and disaster relief earned her public sympathy and allowed her to emerge from the crisis with heightened stature and confidence. In the wake of the disastrous floods, 2012 began in an atmosphere of stalemate. Yingluck’s government has been upholding the monarchy’s sanctity by strictly enforcing Article 112 of the Criminal Code, otherwise known as the l`ese-majesté (LM) law, and its related Computer Crimes Act. In return, debilitating street protests, party dissolutions, and politician disqualifications have abated. Neither side seems capable of a decisive move. The government lacks the will to amend the repressive laws that stifle freedom of expression. Establishment forces, for their part, cannot muster the strength for more rounds of party dissolutions, street demonstrations, and changes of government, let alone a military coup. When the ban on former TRT politicians that accompanied the party’s dissolution expires in May 2012, Thaksin (acting through Yingluck) will have more political talent to pick from. As long as the monarchy remains sacrosanct and the symbiotic relationship between it and the military remains untouched, Yingluck may be able to muddle along with a reheated populist agenda of higher wages and subsidies for the urban poor and upcountry farmers. Should the palace begin to perceive a clear and present danger, however, the Yingluck government and anyone who actively aspires to a basic reform of the monarchy will likely face stepped-up pressure and perhaps even the specter of violence from royalist and conservative quarters.
Contemporary Electoral Patterns This brief narrative of Thailand’s political dynamics and Thaksin’s durable impact over the past decade is supported by a review of election results. Despite the 2006 coup and protracted political turmoil, elections have proceeded with substantial regularity since November 1996. Over that time, the party system has gravitated toward bigger parties. The introduction of party lists to fill a portion of seats in the legislature dates from the 1997 Constitution and has had the effect of weeding out smaller parties. The party-list system also provided the basis for a ger-
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Table—Thai Election Results by Region, 2001–11 Party
Total Constituency Bangkok Central Northeast North South Seats Seats1
July 2011 Pheu Thai*
265
204
10
41
104
49
0
Democrat
159
115
23
25
4
13
50
Others
76
56
0
30
18
5
3
Total
500
375
33
96
126
67
53
December 2007 People’s Power*
233
199
9
39
102
47
2
Democrat
165
132
27
35
5
16
49
Others
82
69
0
24
28
12
5
Total
480
400
36
98
135
75
56
February 2005 Thai Rak Thai*
377
310
32
80
126
71
1
Democrat
96
70
4
7
2
5
52
Others
27
20
1
10
8
0
1
Total
500
400
37
97
136
76
54
January 2001 Thai Rak Thai*
248
200
29
47
68
55
1
Democrat
128
97
8
19
6
16
48
Others
124
103
0
29
63
6
5
Total
500
400
37
95
137
77
54
Source: Election Commission of Thailand. “Total Seats” includes party-list as well as constituency seats. “Constituency Seats” equal the sum of all regional seats. * Thaksin’s party. 1
rymandering scheme—enacted as part of the military-backed postcoup constitution of 2007—that is meant to dilute the power of Thaksin’s movement. In the December 2007 balloting, the gerrymandering did help the DP to nearly match the PPP in party-list seats (with a final tally of 33 to 34), but otherwise it has not been the game-changer that its backers in the establishment had hoped that it would be. Since 2001, Thaksin’s party (under whatever label) has won each of the four national elections by a large margin. During that time, the DP and the forces behind it have succeeded in engineering various systemic
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changes—including party-list gerrymandering and a switch from singleto multi-member constituencies—to improve DP chances, but none have stripped Thaksin or his populist platform of their ability to win elections. His biggest margin of victory came in February 2005, which makes it puzzling that before the year was out he would face major street protests in Bangkok that swelled into a broad-based movement by early 2006. Part of the explanation lies in the capital’s status as a bastion of anticorruption sentiment and its disproportionately prominent voice in national politics. In February 2005, TRT nabbed 32 of Bangkok’s 37 lower-house seats. But the shady Shin Corp sale and the rising tide of anti-Thaksin protests in the capital throughout the period from 2005 to 2007 (years punctuated by the coup and the new constitution) reversed this situation. In December 2007, the DP won 27 Bangkok seats, leaving the PPP with a mere 9 seats from the capital. In July 2011, the score was 23 seats for the DP versus just 10 for the PTP. Northern and Northeast Thailand, which together are home to slightly more than half the electorate, show a very different pattern. Thaksin (or his stand-in) swept those regions in 2005, 2007, and 2011. He saw some shrinkage of support in 2007, after the protests and coup against him and the passage of a new constitution, but his wide margin of victory returned in 2011. The DP has fared consistently poorly in these two populous regions while Thaksin’s electoral appeal there has proven highly resilient. The South, however, has gone for the DP time and again. None of Thaksin’s electoral vehicles has been able to penetrate the DP bastion there, where Thailand’s territory extends down the northern neck of the long Malay Peninsula. Yet this region, which has its own distinct dialect and customs and has been the scene of a deadly Malay-Muslim insurgency in the provinces bordering Malaysia, accounts for just 11 percent of the seats in parliament. Central Thailand has been more like the North: It voted for TRT in 2005, saw the DP make up some ground in 2007, and then witnessed the PTP reopen a lead on Thaksin’s behalf in 2011. As about a quarter of parliament comes from the central region, it is traditionally an area of fairly intense competition between the two main parties, with smaller parties joining in as well. Although the DP still ran well behind there in 2011, it has palpably expanded its presence in the Central region. These regional trends mirror the larger conflict. Rural folk from the North and Northeast are the mainstays of the pro-Thaksin red-shirts. They ran amok in the capital after the PPP was dissolved, rioting in April 2009 and then staging a sustained sit-in at a major street intersection in Bangkok’s central business district. Thaksin has won all Thai elections in the early twenty-first century by comfortable margins, yet his parties have lost substantial support in Bangkok since the coup and have never been able to penetrate the South. The DP has gained consid-
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erable ground in Bangkok and the Central region since 2005, and has held its southern base over the entire past decade. But even after being hoisted into office with help from the military in December 2008 and holding power for thirty months, the DP could not solve the electoral challenge posed by Thaksin’s populism. Over this same period, parts of the country’s court system became politicized and, at times, willing to ban entire parties and large numbers of politicians. This added to the Thai party system’s already considerable institutional shortcomings and constitutes a thread of the story that warrants attention.
The Failure of “Judicialization” Until recently, Thailand’s judiciary was rarely in the political spotlight. That began to change when the framers of the 1997 Constitution, seeking improved governmental stability, effectiveness, transparency, and accountability, mandated a clutch of agencies to oversee the Thai body politic. The new constitutional entities included the Election Commission, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), the Administrative Court, and the Constitutional Court. Given this last court’s jurisdiction over all matters related to constitutional interpretation, it did not take long for it to become politicized. For the first few years after it opened its doors in 1998, the Court invariably endorsed corruption indictments brought to it by the NACC. In December 2000, the NACC handed down, by a vote of 8 to 1, an indictment of Thaksin for having hidden assets under the names of his housekeeper, maid, driver, security guard, and business colleague.6 Shortly thereafter, Thaksin emerged triumphant in the January 2001 election, nearly securing an outright majority in the lower house for his Thai Rak Thai party. The pressure on the Court was immense, and intensified as the verdict drew near. Should Thaksin be convicted, his supporters swore, they would wreak havoc in the streets. On 3 August 2001, a divided Court narrowly acquitted him on a technicality by an 8-to-7 vote. Four judges ruled that the Court had no jurisdiction, while four more accepted jurisdiction but held Thaksin to have been “honestly negligent” regarding financial records that his wife had been handling. The seven minority judges, by contrast, were united in holding that Thaksin had deliberately hidden and falsely declared his assets in knowing contravention of constitutional stipulations. One dissenting jurist has said that senior figures including a four-star general and a former Supreme Court chief justice had lobbied the Constitutional Court on Thaksin’s behalf.7 Other heavy hitters such as Privy Council chairman Prem Tinsulanond had dropped public hints while the case was pending about the need for “giving [Thaksin] a chance.” Plainly, Thaksin was no ordinary defendant. His party had just won eleven million votes plus the right to form a government, and his plat-
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form of economic nationalism and new growth strategies seemed as if it might be suited to pulling the Thai economy out of the doldrums in which it had been languishing since the 1997–98 crisis. Indeed, many of those who would oppose Thaksin after the coup, including media tycoon and yellow-shirt leader Sondhi Limthongkul, lined up firmly behind him during his early legal troubles. Yet whatever might have been the merits of influencing the course of justice for the sake of democracy and prosperity, this episode hopelessly compromised the new Constitutional Court’s ability to build a reputation for independence and impartiality. Before and after Thaksin’s overthrow in the 2006 coup, the Court’s politicization went from passive to active. Letting him off in 2001 had been a passive politicized decision because it maintained rather than changed the course of electoral politics: The winner of the election was allowed to take power, make policy, and build political momentum. In 2006, however, the Court turned activist and tried to set new political directions. The boycotted snap election of 2 April 2006 led to an impasse that the king exhorted the judiciary to resolve. As the monarch told the Administrative Court judges in a televised address on 26 April 2006: You must find ways to solve the problem. . . . Should the election be nullified? You have the right to say what is appropriate or not. If it is not appropriate, it is not to say the government is not good. But as far as I am concerned, a one-party election is not normal. The one-candidate situation is undemocratic.8
In the ensuing weeks, the chiefs of the Supreme Court, the Administrative Court, and the Constitutional Court met and agreed to adjudicate “in the same direction.” The key ruling came from the Constitutional Court, which annulled the April balloting. Later, the chiefs of the three courts would demand that the Election Commission’s three remaining members (two members had already stepped down) resign to make way for the naming of a new commission. When the three commissioners refused, they were ignominiously jailed for a night before bail was granted. A public intellectual described this at the time as the “judicialization” of Thai politics, implying that the judiciary was Thailand’s way out of crisis.9 Judicial decisions, in other words, aspired to actively set political directions in view of the prevailing impasse. Among the lessons of 2011 is judicialization’s failure. Put in motion by the king’s 26 April 2006 speech, it was seen by some analysts as royal interference in politics.10 After the coup, the Constitutional Court was disbanded and replaced by a smaller, nine-judge Constitutional Tribunal. The DP and TRT charged each other before this body with having resorted to illegal electoral practices. On 30 May 2007, the Constitutional Tribunal absolved the DP and found TRT guilty. The penalties included dissolution and a five-year ban on officeholding by any of its 111 executive-board members, including Thaksin and many of those
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who had served in his cabinets. But by election time in December 2007, the TRT remnant had managed to regroup under the PPP label, and came out on top in the voting. In September 2008, the Constitutional Tribunal ousted PPP prime minister Samak Sundaravej on a technicality—his acceptance of an honorarium for hosting a televised cooking show, the Tribunal ruled, made him a private-sector “employee” and hence disqualified him from holding the premiership. Samak, aged 73 at the time, left politics for good and died of cancer a year later. Thaksin’s brotherin-law, Somchai Wongsawat, stepped in as premier and came under immediate pressure from yellow-shirt protests. On 7 October 2008, police were ordered to disperse demonstrators who had surrounded Parliament House, where Somchai was slated to announce his policy agenda. (The army chief had earlier refused to obey government instructions and had gone on television to urge Somchai’s resignation.) In the clashes that ensued between police officers and yellow-shirts, several hundred were injured and two protesters died. In an unusual step, the queen presided over the funeral of one of those killed.11 As December began, yellow-shirts were in the midst of their weeklong occupation of Bangkok’s largest airport while the Constitutional Tribunal was convicting the PPP and two smaller allied parties of vote fraud and banning their leading figures from running for or holding office. These bans are set to expire later in 2012, an event that will probably give a broad boost to the Yingluck government and may be a boon to Thai politics in general. (Whatever talent Thai politicians have to offer, much of it has been systematically kept off the playing field for the past half-decade.) Looking back over the last few years, it is obvious that judicialization has come to nought. The TRT party was shuttered but reorganized itself as first the PPP and then the PTP, which secured a thumping majority in the July 2011 election. Thaksin remains in charge from abroad. His sister rules in his name, and his TRT lieutenants are to be reinstated on 30 May 2012, with his banned PPP supporters to follow in December 2013. The failure of judicialization carries far-reaching implications.
Challenge and Pushback The monarchy is associated with the launch of the judicialization strategy, and that strategy’s failure appears to have compromised the monarchy up to a point. If the bans and dissolutions, the postcoup seizure or freezing of Thaksin’s assets, and his 2010 Supreme Court conviction in absentia on “policy corruption” charges had succeeded in ending the challenge that he represented, then perhaps Thai politics might have stabilized and returned to something like its pre-Thaksin form, led by a weak party system and a strong military-monarchy-bureaucracy triumvirate. But Thaksin with all his strengths and weaknesses—the innova-
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tive efforts to increase economic competitiveness, the offer of greater upward mobility to those on society’s bottom rungs, and also the corruption, the conflicts of interest, and the human-rights violations of the war on drugs—became “indestructible.”12 The failure of judicialization marked the monarchy’s failure to extinguish the political awakening and the runaway expectations that Thaksin’s TRT years had ignited. Moreover, when a senior general left the Privy Council to head the coupappointed government, then rejoined the king’s advisory body after the December 2007 poll, it reinforced the popular perception that the putsch had been carried out to protect and promote the crown (and the militarybureaucratic establishment long associated with it) at the expense of a democratically elected government. That perception gained force when Chanchai Likitjitta, justice minister for the coup government, was named to the Privy Council on 8 April 2008. Similarly, Air Chief Marshal Chalit Pookpasuk, a core coupmaker who had headed the Council for National Security after September 2007, was appointed to the Privy Council on 18 May 2011. Many also noted the queen’s conspicuous attendance at the October 2008 funeral of the yellow-shirt protester. The l`ese-majesté law may deter public discussion, but it cannot prevent people from taking private notice.13 Then there were the televised comments in which top army general Prayuth Chan-ocha effectively endorsed the DP just weeks before the 2011 election, urging viewers not to vote for the same politicians but to elect “good people” who would defend the monarchy. This could not help but tarnish the revered institution when Pheu Thai won handily. 14 Unsurprisingly, challenges to the established order have grown since the military coup. According to a letter that eight royal descendants sent to Prime Minister Yingluck urging amendment of the l`ese-majesté law, cases involving Article 112 went from zero in 2002 to 165 in 2009.15 They have ranged from the convictions of an Australian writer and a Thai-American who translated an unauthorized biography of the king16 to the twenty-year sentence handed to a 61-year-old man who was charged with sending four SMS messages deemed in violation of Article 112.17 Many studies of Thailand’s state and society published since the coup have reflected this challenge to established centers of power. Although it was greeted with mixed reactions when it came out, journalist Paul M. Handley’s controversial royal biography The King Never Smiles eventually reverberated far and wide, and is now a staple for anyone intent on understanding contemporary Thailand.18 Prior to Handley’s work, scholarly scrutiny of the Thai establishment was scant and not widely available,19 especially during the Cold War. But since the military coup, what used to be droplets have swelled into a steady flow of critical expositions. Less than a year before Handley’s account of the
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king was published, Duncan McCargo’s analysis of the Malay-Muslim insurgency taking place in southernmost Thailand identified a “network monarchy” that revolved around Privy Council chairman and army general Prem Tinsulanond.20 In early 2008, the Journal of Contemporary Asia offered a special issue on Thai politics that challenged much of what had been the conventional wisdom regarding the putsch and its backers.21 An influential international weekly followed suit the same year.22 Other critiques focused on the king’s deification through propaganda and popular culture.23 In 2010, two major edited volumes further challenged the establishment’s political role, economic interests, and popular image.24 In terms of the scholarly literature on Thai politics, the genie was irreversibly out of the bottle. As intimidation, coercion, and suppression through the l` e se-majesté and Computer Crimes laws began to draw increasing attention at home and abroad, the establishment pushed back with the publication of a new and more positive scholarly biography of the king, King Bhumibol Adulyadej: A Life’s Work,25 which comes across as an implicit antidote and indirect rebuttal to Handley’s The King Never Smiles. Other manifestations of the royalist pushback have been available online and all across the state-owned airwaves, including some vigilante threats against dissenters. When a set of Thammasat University law professors known as the Nitirat Group tried to suggest amendments to the l`ese-majesté law, a broad array of royalist groups castigated them.
Reconciling Monarchy and Democracy As of early 2012, no other reformist groups or individuals had appeared on the scene possessing anything like what it will take to reconcile monarchy and democracy in Thailand. All the same, however, it appears that Thailand cannot escape the challenge of reaching a new consensus that will root the monarchy more squarely within the constitution of an emerging democracy, but in a way that reconciles conservative royalists. The desire of the rural lower classes to have their voices heard and their numbers felt is legitimate, but so is the desire for a government that does not simply replace the lack of accountability that characterized the old military-bureaucratic power centers with a similarly unaccountable populist strongman. Yingluck Shinawatra may head the new government, but her brother continues to bestride Thailand’s political landscape like a colossus. Currently, his adversaries’ shortcomings loom larger in the public eye than do his own glaring defects and wrongdoings. The intellectual hegemony of a hierarchical social and political order centered on the monarchy is no longer tenable and offers no path to a viable future. The superstructure of this old order can sense the ground shifting beneath it and is maneuvering hard to maintain the status quo. Its maneuvers will not al-
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ways be pretty to watch, and they must all take place in the long shadow cast by Thaksin, who even after being deposed by a coup, convicted of corruption, and banned from office keeps winning at the polls, with no serious challenger in sight. Thaksin’s name is synonymous with divisiveness. In deeply polarized Thailand, mentioning him seems to rouse either love or hate; few are lukewarm. His supporters may outnumber his detractors in the voting booth, but in the public square the voices crying out against him are louder and more potent than those that speak in his defense. In bygone eras, elections and coups came and went. Voters sold their votes like commodities, and legislators went to Bangkok seeking pork and patronage via graft and corruption, hardly bothering even to acknowledge (much less consult) their constituents. Elected officials, not surprisingly, enjoyed scant legitimacy, thereby making coups more thinkable and more feasible. Coups sometimes issued in new constitutions, but these were just more turns of the wheel, not true departures pointing the way to sounder models of governance. While the Cold War imposed its exigencies, the pillars of the Thai state—the nation, its Buddhist religion, and its hereditary monarchy—kept communism at bay, brought unity, and underwrote stability. Challenges to the order represented by the army, the monarchy, and the bureaucracy were invariably put down, as left-wing students discovered in the 1970s. Thai schoolchildren sang martial songs and the national anthem each morning. Thais knew what to expect and where their places lay in their country’s sociopolitical hierarchy, thanks to socialization via the classroom and the living room, where the state-run media were ever-present to drive home the lesson. Dissenting views of what it meant to be Thai gained little traction. All this undergirded rapid development. Yet this economic growth and the benefits that it brought became distributed in increasingly uneven ways, and thus set the stage for Thaksin’s rise as a tribune of populism and the less well-off. The rise of TRT put an end to the old clubby-yet-distant world of Thai politics. The party pursued a scientific approach to electioneering complete with expensive polling carried out by foreign experts, clear and deliverable platforms, and strong leadership. Judicial bans notwithstanding, TRT and its successors became household names. Thaksin’s was the first post–Cold War party to capture the collective imagination. The voices of once-marginalized voters began to count. Vote-buying, long a staple of Thai politics, remained necessary but was no longer sufficient. Whatever else can be said about it, TRT did introduce to Thailand the idea of close ties between a party, its policies, and its voter base. By 2001, the Cold War was long over. Political leaders dissenting from the status quo could not so easily be jailed on communismrelated charges. The Internet and new media were making it harder for
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official sources to mold minds uncontested. Information became more widely diffused and media outlets multiplied even as state propaganda continued to make its influence felt. New international norms came to the fore. Foreign powers that had once turned a blind eye to coups and repression now put more emphasis on democracy and human rights. The passage of time, meanwhile, has ensured that most university students today cannot even recall the Cold War, for it ended before they were born. Thaksin was well positioned by circumstance and insight to take advantage of this new and more open political environment. Given an opportunity, he overhauled the bureaucracy, delivered on his populist pledges to do more for poorer Thais, mapped out plans to upgrade the country’s industrial base, and even pursued an ambitious foreign-policy agenda in pursuit of Thai regional leadership. Yet there was to all this an underside of corruption, conflicts of interest, cronyism, human-rights violations, abuses of power, and other sins of misrule. Such is Thaksin’s mixed legacy. The wider opportunities that he opened for the downtrodden and his ambitious plans for Thailand’s future were inextricably entangled with his self-dealing, his penchant for corruption, and his habit of abusing the powers of his office. Thaksin Incorporated went hand-inhand with Thailand Incorporated. Yet Thaksin’s enemies have shown their own limits in refusing to admit that there is more to him and what he stands for than graft and corruption. They should have weighed his policy innovations and put forward their own ideas for assisting the impoverished and marginalized. In the end, they came up with the Abhisit government and its programs for “welfare” and fostering a “sufficiency economy” that most voters find insufficient. For Thaksin’s establishment foes, conceding to his spectacularly successful populism would have been tantamount to admitting that most people in the hospitable, smiling, conspicuously tourist-friendly Kingdom of Thailand have been—and have been kept— poor. Wittingly or not, Thaksin has been the catalyst for propelling Thailand into the twenty-first century while his adversaries have stayed stuck in Cold War times. Although he committed many infractions, Thaksin’s most egregious crime and gravest sin were that he changed the way Thais see themselves and their country. Some see this change as usurpation and manipulation by Thaksin and his cronies. Others see it as Thailand’s overdue deliverance from the Cold War era. Those who have ruled in the past must accept this new reality, just as those who are atop the polls now must accept the legacy of the past. NOTES 1. Larry Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State,” Foreign Affairs 87 (March–April 2008): 36–48.
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2. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thailand Since the Coup,” Journal of Democracy 19 (October 2008): 140–53; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thaksin: Competitive Authoritarian and Flawed Dissident,” in John Kane, Haig Patapan, and Benjamin Wong, eds., Dissident Democrats: The Challenge of Democratic Leadership in Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2003 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), 277–90. 3. In the February 2005 general election, Thaksin’s TRT party won 75 percent of the national assembly, or 377 of 500 contested MP seats. The literature on Thaksin’s abuse of power is voluminous. See, for example, William Case, “Democracy’s Quality and Breakdown: New Lessons from Thailand,” Democratization 14 (August 2007): 622–42; and Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Thaksin’s Political Zenith and Nadir,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2006 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), 285–302. 4. See James Ockey, “Thailand in 2008: Democracy and Street Politics,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2009 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009): 315–33. For Thaksin’s latent policy impact and the larger challenge that he posed, see Kevin Hewison, “Thaksin Shinawatra and the Reshaping of Thai Politics,” Contemporary Politics 16 (June 2010): 119–33. 5. Author’s interview with a Pheu Thai adviser on condition of anonymity, 11 August 2011. 6. For an excellent analysis of the judiciary’s role in politics, see Björn Dressel, “Judicialization of Politics or Politicization of the Judiciary? Considerations from Recent Events in Thailand,” Pacific Review 23 (December 2010): 671–91. 7. Author’s interview with former Constitutional Court judge Suchit Bunbongkarn, 23 January 2012. 8. “H.M. the King’s April 26 speeches (unofficial translation),” Nation (Bangkok), 27 April 2006. 9. Theerayuth Boonmee, Tulakarn Piwat [Judicialization] (Bangkok: Winyuchon, 2006). 10. See, for example, Michael Montesano, “Thailand: A Reckoning with History Begins,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2007 (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007), 311–40. 11. Ockey, “Thailand in 2008.” 12. “The Indestructible Mr. Thaksin,” Economist, 1 November 2007. 13. Part of the law states: “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen years.” 14. “The Army Chief Issues Veiled Election Endorsement,” VOA News, 15 June 2011. 15. “Royal Kin Call for L`ese-Majesté Law Overhaul,” Bangkok Post, 12 January 2012. Other accounts suggest a much higher number of cases. See, for example, David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason, and L`ese-Majesté (London: Routledge, 2010). 16. Paul M. Handley, The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 17. Ampon Tangnoppakul, an unemployed grandfather whose only occupation was tending to his grandchildren after school hours, sent the four SMS messages to an assistant of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva during the May 2010 army crackdown on red-shirt protesters. Ampon’s case became a cause cél`ebre as an instance of authority running wild and lashing out at an obviously harmless citizen. See “Ampon Gets 20 Years for L`eseMajesté Text Messages,” Bangkok Post, 24 November 2011.
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18. Handley, The King Never Smiles. 19. There were notable exceptions, including Kevin Hewison’s chapter titled “The Monarchy and Democratisation” in Kevin Hewison, ed., Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation (London: Routledge, 1997); and Roger Kershaw, Monarchy in South-East Asia: The Faces of Tradition in Transition (London: Routledge, 2001), 136–54. 20. Duncan McCargo, “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand,” Pacific Review 18 (December 2005): 499–519. 21. See the essays by Thongchai Winichakul, Michael K. Connors, Kevin Hewison, and others that appeared in the special issue on Thailand which was the first of Volume 38 of the Journal of Contemporary Asia in 2008. 22. “Thailand’s King and Its Crisis: A Right Royal Mess,” Economist, 4 December 2008, 29. The magazine’s critical coverage of the coup and its aftermath drew threats, and as of 2010, the Economist began basing its Southeast Asia correspondent in Singapore rather than Bangkok. 23. See, for example, Peter A. Jackson, “Markets, Media, and Magic: Thailand’s Monarch as a ‘Virtual Deity,’” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 10 (September 2009): 361–80. 24. Marc Askew, ed., Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand (Chiang Mai: Silkworm, 2010); Søren Ivarsson and Lotte Isager, eds., Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2010). 25. Nicholas Grossman and Dominic Faulder, eds., King Bhumibol Adulyadej: A Life’s Work (Bangkok: Editions Didier Millet, 2011).
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동남 아시아
태국의 불안한 정세 티티난 퐁수티락
티티난 퐁수티락(Thitinan Pongsudhirak)은 방콕의 출라롱콘 대학(Chulalongkorn University)에서 국제정치경제학 교수를 역임하고 있으며 안보국제문제연구소장을 맡고 있다. 티티난 교수의 에세이 “쿠데타 이후의 태국”은 민주주의 저널(Journal of Democracy)의 2008 년 10 월호에 실렸다.
민주국가가 되기 위해 투쟁하는 국가 중 지난 몇 년 동안 태국이 겪은 것만큼이나 심각한 ‘민주주의 후퇴’ 과정을 겪은 나라는 없다. 2006 년 9 월, 군부는 심각하게 부패했지만 국민의 지지를 얻어 선출된 탁신 친나왓(Thaksin Shinawatra) 총리를 쿠데타를 일으켜 퇴위시키고 축출하여 망명을 보냈다. 그 후 이미 혼란스러웠던 태국 정계는 엄청난 타격을 받았고 분열되었다. 탁신 지지세력(레드셔츠)과 반대세력(옐로셔츠)간의 잔혹한 대립과 거리 시위는 지속되었고 멈출 기미를 보이지 않았다. 사실상 탁신은 2011 년 7 월 3 일에 열린 총선에 출마하는 것을 금지 당했다. 하지만 탁신의 여동생 잉락 치나왓(Yingluck Shinawatra)을 내세운 신당인 프어타이당(PTP)이 압도적으로 승리하자 탁신이 총선의 승리자가 되었다. 국왕 푸미폰 아둔야뎃(Bhumibol Adulyadej)의 65 년 집권이 점차 스러지자 태국 국민들은 나라가 교착상태에 빠졌음을 발견했다. 궁극적인 정치권력의 원동력으로써 군주제 중심의 지배체제를 유지하려는 사람들은 군주제를 개혁해서 더 완전하고 성숙한 민주주의로 나아가려는 사람들과 대립하게 되었다. 냉전시대가 종식되고 국제 규범은 점차 민주주의와 인권을 옹호하며 새로운 미디어 기술의 발달과 인구 이동이 일어나고 있는 상황에서, 태국은 군주제 중심 체제를 그대로 유지하기 어렵게 되었다. 그러나 2001 년 선출되어 쿠데타로 쫓겨난 2006 년까지의 총리 재임 기간 동안 탁신이 부정적이고 때로는 비민주적인 방법으로 주도했던 변화들을 단순히 허용하기엔 너무 위태로운 상황이다. 여기에서 두 개의 중요하고 의문사항이 생겨난다. 첫째는 곤경에 빠진 군주제가 거역할 수 없는 민주주의에 대한 열망과 조화를 이룰 수 있는가와 그것을 이룰 것인가 이다. 둘째는 탁신 시대를 문제에 빠뜨린 탈취, 조작, 권력 남용이 없는 민주주의를 이루는 것과 올바른 민주주의를 이루는 것이 별개임을 탁신 국민들에게 알게 할 것인지에 대한 것이다.
탁신의 부상
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지난 10 년 동안 태국 정치는 변동과 논쟁으로 가득 찼다. 1997~1998 년 아시아 외환위기가 시작되었을 때 탁신은 타이락타이(TRT)당을 창당해 2001 년 1 월 선거에서 승리하여 총리가 되었다. 탁신은 혁신적인 정책을 제정했고 1997 년에 끝난 장기 경제 호황시기를 누리지 못한 농촌 유권자들을 위한 포괄적인 대중영합정책을 펼쳤다. 탁신은 농민들의 부채를 탕감해주고 소액대출계획과 저가 의료보험을 제공했다. 식품, 패션, 관광, 의료, 자동차 산업을 육성하고자 개발 프로젝트와 틈새 산업을 장려했다. 정책 결정 과정을 개혁해서 정부 관료보다 선출 정치인들이 더 많은 영향력을 행사할 수 있게 하였다. 또한 믿을 만한 사람(사촌 포함)을 고위 사령부에 앉히기 위해 군대 승진 체제를 수정했다. 헌법이 지정한 삼권분립을 정치적 논쟁거리로 만들어 1997 년 헌법을 약화시키기도 했다. 2001 년 8 월 탁신은 자산 은닉의 혐의로 열린 재판에서 가까스로 무죄 판결을 받았으나 헌법 재판소 판사는 무죄 판결을 내리라는 압력과 뇌물을 받았다는 비난을 받았다. 탁신은 계속해서 유권자의 전폭적인 지지를 얻어 정책을 제정하는 성공을 보였다. 그러나 이와 더불어 부패, 이해관계 충돌, 인권 유린, 권력 남용, 독재적인 모습도 보여주었다. 2005 년 2 월 압도적인 지지로 재선에 승리했을 때 탁신은 사실상 거칠 것이 없다고 느끼게 되었다. 탁신과 왕정과의 갈등은 이때부터 시작되었다. 탁신은 순수 정치인이 아닌 이단자였다. 정부가 혜택을 주는 전통적인 방법이 아닌 주식 시장의 호황으로 막대한 부를 쌓은 탁신은 쁘렘 띤쑤라논(Prem Thnsulanond) 장군과 더 이상 상의할 필요가 없다고 결정함으로써 왕정과 멀어지게 되었다. 쁘렘 띤쑤라논은 전 총리이자 육군 사령관으로 19 명으로 구성된 국왕 자문단인 프라이비 위원회(Privy Council)을 이끌고 있다. 게다가 스스로가 경찰 출신인 탁신은 군대보다 경찰을 더 선호했으며 마약과의 전쟁에 경찰을 동원했다. 이 전쟁으로 2,300 명이 사망하였고 많은 사람들이 사법절차를 따르지 않는 방식으로 처형되었다. 탁신의 대중영합주의는 선거에서 승리를 안겨주었지만 반대세력을 키우기도 했다. 2005 년 중반까지 민주당(DP), 군부, 고위 정부 관료, 일부 민간 기업가, 도시 중산층, 왕실 내부자와 지지자로 구성된 반대세력은 연합을 이루었다(이들은 태국 왕정을 의미하는 색인 옐로셔츠를 입는다). 2006 년 1 월 탁신의 친나왓 그룹(Shin Corp)이 세금 없이 싱가포르의 테마섹 홀딩스(Temasek Holdings)에 19 억 달러로 팔리자 탁신의 사임을 요구하는 목소리가 커졌다. 이에 대해 탁신은 2006 년 4 월 조기 총선(후에 법원에 의해 무효가 됨)을 발표했다. 민주당과 두 개의 소규모 동맹단체는 투표 참여를 거부했고 헌법적 위기로 이어졌다. 탁신에 대항하는 대규모 연합단체는 압력의 수위를 높이고 탁신의 정당성을 비난하며 시위로 거리를 가득 메웠다. 이는 2006 년 9 월 19 일에 발생한 쿠데타로 이어졌다. 공식 업무로 외국을 방문 중이던 탁신은 외국에 머무르기로 결정했다. 쿠데타 주동자들은 후에 스스로를 국가안보위원회(Council for National Security)라고 칭했다. 이들은 쿠데타를 일으킨 날 밤에 국왕과 왕비와 찍은 사진을 공개하는데 매우 조심스러워 했다. 그러나 만약 이들이 한 번의 쿠데타로 탁신이 기존의 군주 질서에 제기한 도전과 부의 재분배 정책을 한 번에 무마시켰다고 생각한다면 큰 실수였을 것이다. 군부는 퇴역장군을 내세워 임시 정부를 설립했고 타이락타이(TRT)당의 법적 해산을 처리했다. 또한 선출 정치인, 정당, 의회가 아닌 정부 관료와 판사들이 승진∙혜택을 보는 새로운 헌법 초안을 작성했다. 그러나 2007 년 12 월에 열린 총선에서 타이락타이당 이후 생긴 친(親)탁신 정당인 국민의 힘(PPP)이 새로 개정된 480 개의 의석수 중 233 석을 확보함으로써 165 석을 확보한 민주당을 눌렀다. 2008 년 1 월까지 탁신은 대리 총리를 통해 다시 최고 자리에 올랐다. 옐로셔츠를 입은 국민민주주의연대(PDA)가 이끄는 탁신 반대세력은 연좌시위를 벌이고 2008 년 5 월 태국 총리실을 점거했으며 11 월 말부터 12 월 초까지 일주일 동안 주요 국제 공항에서 점거시위를 벌였다. 그 후 헌법 재판소가 투표 부정을 확인한 후
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국민의 힘(PPP)과 두 개의 소수 친(親)탁신 정당을 해체 했음에도 정부의 통치 능력에 대한 위기가 발생했다. 군부 세력을 배경으로 민주당은 2009 년 초 이튼과 옥스포드에서 교육받은 아피싯 웻차치와(Abhisit Vejjajiva)를 총리로 내세워 권력을 잡았다. 그 후 레드셔츠의 친탁신 세력이 거리시위를 벌였다. 2009 년 4 월과 2010 년 3 월부터 5 월까지 친(親)탁신 세력은 시위를 벌였고 군대에 의해 해산되었다. 2010 년 친(親)탁신 세력과 군부의 대립으로 91 명의 사람이 목숨을 잃었다. 갈등으로 인해 의회가 조기 해산되었고 2011 년 7 월 선거가 열렸다. 탁신은 이 총선에서 세 번째 정당인 프어타이당(PTP)를 창당하여 그의 여동생을 총리로 내세웠다. 잉락(탁신은 잉락을 자신의 분신이라 부른다)과 프어타이당(PTP)은 2007 년 12 월 선거에서 총 500 개 의석수 중 265 석을 확보함으로써 159 석을 확보한 민주당을 크게 이겼다. 태국 선거인단은 다시 한 번 친(親)탁신 임을 여실히 보여주었다. 44 세의 잉락은 오빠 탁신(62 세)을 대신하여 젊고 매력적인 새로운 총리가 되었다. 잉락은 탁신 일가의 부동산기업에서 일했고 정치적 배경이 없다. 탁신은 거의 잉락의 내각 전체를 선택했다. 잉락이 총리가 되자 태국 정부는 인재가 아닌 위기를 맞이했다. 2011 년 7 월 장마가 시작되는 시기에 수 십 년만의 최악인 홍수가 태국을 덮쳤다. 잉락 정부는 훨씬 불안정한 상황에서 홍수 위기를 직면했다. 당시 부처 갈등과 내각 의원들간의 정책 조율은 원만히 이루어 지지 않고 있었다. 하지만 잉락에게 홍수는 정치적 세례를 받은 것이었다. 홍수 관리와 재난 구호를 위해 헌신하는 잉락의 모습에 태국 국민들은 감동을 받았다. 홍수 위기가 끝났을 때 잉락은 자신감을 얻었고 잉락의 지지도는 높아졌다. 잔혹했던 홍수가 난 이후 2012 년은 교착상태에서 시작되었다. 잉락 정부는 왕실모독금지법(lesemajeste law)이라고 알려진 형법 112 조와 이와 관련된 컴퓨터 범죄 법안을 엄격히 집행함으로써 군주의 신성함을 지지했다. 그에 따라 거리 시위, 정당 해체, 정치인 자격 박탈이 점차 사라졌다. 탁신 친세력과 반대세력 모두 결정적인 행동을 하기 어려운 것으로 보인다. 정부는 표현의 자유를 빼앗는 억압적인 법을 수정할 의지가 없는 것으로 보인다. 반대세력은 그들대로 군사 쿠데타는 물론 친(親)탁신 정당을 해산하고 거리시위를 벌이며 정권을 바꿀 힘을 모을 수 있을 것 같지 않다. 타이락타이당(TRT)이 해체 되면서 생긴 당원들의 활동 금지가 2012 년 5 월 끝나게 되면 탁신은(잉락을 통해서) 더 많은 유능한 정치인을 선택할 수 있을 것이다. 왕정의 신성함이 유지되고 왕정과 군부의 공생관계가 지속된다면 잉락 정부는 도시 빈민층과 농민을 위한 고임금과 보조금이라는 논란이 될 대중영합주의 정책을 써야 할 지도 모른다. 그러나 만약 왕정이 현재의 분명한 위험을 인지하게 된다면 군주제의 개혁을 바라는 모든 사람들과 잉락 정부는 군주 체제 지지자와 보수세력으로부터 거센 압력을 받고 심지어는 폭력 사태를 직면할 지도 모른다. 태국의 선거 패턴 지난 10 동안 태국 정치의 역동성과 탁신의 지속적인 영향은 선거 결과를 보면 잘 알 수 있다. 2006 년 쿠데타와 지속된 정치적 혼돈에도 불구하고 선거는 1996 년 11 월 이후부터 꾸준히 치러졌다. 이 기간 동안 정당 시스템은 큰 정당으로 바뀌어 갔다. 의회의 의석수를 채우기 위한 정당 명부의 도입은 1997 년 헌법에서 제정된 이후 시작되었으며 이로 인해 작은 정당들이 사라지게 되었다. 정당 명부 시스템의 도입으로 게리멘더링(선거구를 당에 유리하게 변경하는 것)이 생겨나게 되었다. 이는 2007 년 군부가 주도한 쿠데타 이후 헌법에서 제정되었으며 탁신의 권력을 약화시키려는 목적이었다. 2007 년 12 월 선거에서 민주당은 게리멘더링으로 국민의힘(PPP)과 비슷한 정당 명부 의석수를 획득했다(마지막
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기록으로는 민주당이 33 석 PPP 가 34 석). 하지만 게리멘더링 시스템은 민주당 지지세력이 원했던 만큼 큰 판도를 바꿀만한 것은 아니었다. 2 001 년 이후 친(親)탁신 정당은(정당 이름이 무엇이든지) 4 번의 총선에서 큰 지지를 얻어 승리 했다. 이 기간 동안 민주당과 지지 세력은 성공적으로 많은 제도적 변화를 꾀했다. 민주당의 선거 승리를 높이고자 정당 명부에 의한 게리멘더링 제도를 도입하고 단일 선거구에서 중선거구제로 바꿨다. 하지만 그 어느 것도 탁신과 탁신 친세력의 대중영합주의가 선거에서 이기는 것을 막을 수 없었다. 탁신은 2005 년 2 월 선거에서 압도적인 승리를 했다. 이는 탁신을 반대하는 거리 시위가 방콕에서 열리고 2006 년 초에 반대 움직임으로 커졌다는 것을 보았을 때 이해하기 어려운 부분이다. 이는 부분적으로 방콕에 반부패주의 정서가 팽배하고 다른 지역에 비해 유난히 정치에 대한 목소리가 높다는 것으로 설명된다. 2005 년 2 월 타이락타이당(TRT)은 방콕의 하원 의석수 중 32 석을 획득했다. 그러나 친나왓 그룹(Shin Corp)의 부정 매각과 2005 년부터 2007 년까지 방콕에서 일어난 반(反)탁신 시위는 탁신이 우세했던 상황을 뒤집었다(당시 쿠데타가 일어나고 새로운 헌법이 제정되었다). 2007 년 12 월 민주당은 방콕에서 27 석을 확보하고 타이락타이당은 9 석만을 획득했다. 2011 년 7 월 선거에서 민주당은 23 석을, 타이락타이당은 10 석만을 확보했다. 태국 북부와 동북지역은 총 유권자 중 절반이 약간 넘는 유권자가 살고 있는 지역으로 방콕과는 매우 다른 양상을 보여준다. 탁신(또는 그의 대리인)은 2005 년, 2007 년, 2011 년 선거에서 투표수를 압도적으로 휩쓸었다. 탁신 저항 시위과 쿠데타가 일어나고 새로운 헌법이 통과된 이후 2007 년 선거에서 지지가 떨어지긴 했지만 탁신의 압도적인 승리는 2011 년 선거에서 다시 보여졌다. 유권자가 많은 이 두 지역에서 민주당은 계속해서 저조한 성적을 보이는 반면 탁신을 지지하는 선거구는 견고한 것으로 확인되었다. 이와 반대로 남부 지역에서는 민주당이 우세하다. 세 개의 친(親)탁신 정당 모두 민주당이 우세한 남부 지역을 뚫을 수 없었다. 이 지역은 태국 밑에 있는 긴 말레이 반도의 북쪽으로 이어지는 곳이다. 이 지역은 특유의 사투리와 관습을 갖고 있고 말레이시아와 국경이 닿은 주에서는 말레이 이슬람반란이 일어났다. 남부 지역은 의회 의석수의 11 퍼센트만을 차지한다. 중부 지역은 북부와 비슷해지고 있다. 중부 지역에서 2005 년 선거에서는 타이락타이당(TRT)이 우세했고 2007 년 선거에서는 민주당이 상당한 지지를 얻었다. 2011 년 선거에서는 다시 프어타이당(PTP)이 우세했다. 의석수의 약 1/4 는 중부 지역이 차지하고 있기 때문에 친(親)탁신 정당과 민주당 사이의 경쟁이 치열하고 소수 정당도 선거에 참여한다. 민주당이 2011 년 선거에서 뒤쳐지긴 했지만 중부 지역에서 그 영향력이 커지고 있음을 알 수 있다. 이러한 지역별 추세는 깊은 갈등을 반영한다. 북부와 동북 지역의 농민들은 레드셔츠의 친탁신 세력의 주류이다. 이들은 국민의힘(PPP)이 해체되었을 때 방콕에서 격렬한 시위를 벌였고 2009 년 4 월 폭동을 일으켰으며 방콕의 도심 사업 지역의 주요 거리에서 연좌시위를 벌였다. 탁신은 2001 년부터 2011 년 선거까지 안정적인 투표수를 획득하면서 모두 승리했다. 그러나 2006 년 쿠데타 이후 방콕에서는 상당한 지지를 잃었으며 남부 지역에서는 민주당을 무너뜨리지 못했다. 민주당은 2005 년 이후 방콕과 중부 지역에서 두터운 기반을 마련했고 지난 10 년 동안 남부 지역에서 지지를 얻었다. 하지만 민주당은 2008 년 12 월 군부의 도움으로 30 개월 간 권력을 잡았음에도 탁신의 대중영합주의로 인한 친(親)탁신 세력을 해결할 수 없었다. 동기간 동안 태국의 일부 사법 체제는 정치적 논란거리가 되었고 전체 정당과 많은 정치인들을 금지하려 했다. 이는 이미 제도적으로 심각한 문제를 가진 태국 정당 시스템에 또 하나의 문제가 되었으며 사람들의 입에 오르내릴 이야깃거리가 되었다.
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표ㅡ지역별 선거 결과 2001-2011 당
총 의석수†
선거구 의석수
방콕
중부지역
동북지역
북부지역
남부지역
2011 년 7 월 프어타이당(PTP)*
265
204
10
41
104
49
0
민주당(DP)
195
115
23
25
4
13
50
기타당
76
56
0
30
18
5
3
합계
500
375
33
96
126
67
53
국민의힘 (PPP)*
233
199
9
39
102
47
2
민주당(DP)
165
132
27
35
5
16
49
기타당
82
69
0
24
28
12
5
합계
480
400
36
98
135
75
56
타이락타이당(TRT)*
377
310
32
80
126
71
1
민주당(DP)
96
70
4
7
2
5
52
기타당
27
20
1
10
8
0
1
합계
500
400
37
97
136
76
54
타이락타이당(TRT)*
248
200
29
47
68
55
1
민주당(DP)
128
97
8
19
6
16
48
기타당
124
103
0
29
63
6
5
합계
500
400
37
95
137
77
54
2007 년 12 월
2005 년 2 월
2001 년 1 월
출처: 태국선거위원회(Election Commission of Thailand)
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† 총 의석수는 정당 명부수와 선거인단 의석수를 포함한다. “선거인단 의석수”는 모든 지역의 의석수의 총합이다. *친(親)탁신 당 ‘사법화’의 실패 최근까지 태국 사법부는 정치적으로 거의 주목을 받지 않았다. 이는 1997 년 헌법 제정자들이 정부 안정성과 효율성을 향상시키고 투명성과 책임감을 높이고자 일련의 기관들에게 태국 정계를 감시하라는 권한을 주면서 바뀌게 되었다. 새로운 헌법 기구에는 선거위원회, 국가반부패위원회(NACC), 행정 법원, 헌법 재판소가 포함된다. 모든 분야에서 헌법 재판소의 사법권은 헌법의 해석과 관련이 있기 때문에 얼마 되지 않아 정치적 논란에 휩싸이게 되었다. 1998 년 처음 문을 연 이후 몇 년 동안 헌법 재판소는 국가반부패위원회가 제기한 부패 혐의 기소를 판결했다. 2000 년 12 월 국가반부패위원회는 탁신이 자신의 가정부, 운전사, 보안 경비원, 사업 동료의 이름으로 자산을 은닉했다는 기소를 8 대 1 로 판결을 내렸다. 얼마 되지 않아 탁신은 2001 년 1 월 선거에서 승리했고 타이락타이당(TRT)은 하원에서 과반수를 차지했다. 법원에 대한 압력은 거세졌고 판결이 다가오자 더욱 격화되었다. 탁신이 기소가 되었다면 탁신 지지자들이 거리에서 들고 일어났을 것이다. 2001 년 8 월 3 일 헌법 재판소는 법 조항 하나에 의거하여 8 대 7 의 판결로 탁신에게 무죄판결을 내렸다. 4 명의 판사는 헌법 재판소가 사법권이 없다고 판결했고 또 다른 4 명의 판사는 재판소가 사법권을 가지고 있지만 탁신의 아내가 관리한 자금 기록에 대해 탁신은 ‘정말로 몰랐다’고 판결했다. 이와 반대로 7 명의 유죄판결을 내린 판사들은 탁신이 의도적으로 자산을 숨기고 헌법에 위반된다는 것을 알면서도 자산을 거짓 신고했다고 판결했다. 그 중 한 판사는 사성 장군과 전 대법관을 포함한 고위 인사들이 탁신을 대신하여 헌법 재판소에 청탁했다고 말했다. 탁신에게 다시 기회를 줄 것인지에 대한 사건이 계류 중일 당시 프라이비 위원회장인 쁘렘 띤쑤아논과 같은 주요 인사는 이에 대해 공개적으로 비난 발언을 흘렸다. 분명히 탁신은 평범한 피의자가 아니다. 탁신 정당은 1,100 만 명의 유권자 표를 얻었고 정부를 구성할 권리가 있다. 또 탁신의 경제 민족주의와 새로운 성장 전략은 1997-98 년 아시아 외환 위기 이후 침체된 태국 경제를 끌어올릴 것 같았다. 실제로 쿠데타 이후 탁신에게 등을 돌렸던 미디어 재벌이자 반(反)탁신 세력(옐로 셔츠)을 주도한 쏨티 림텅꾼(Sondhi Lmthongkul)은 탁신이 법적 문제에 빠지자 다시 탁신의 편에 섰다. 그러나 민주주의와 번영을 위해 사법 절차의 영향력을 높임으로써 얻는 것이 무엇이든지 간에 이러한 상황은 독립성과 공평함을 추구한다는 명성을 쌓으려는 새 헌법 재판소의 능력을 약화시켰다. 탁신이 2006 년 쿠데타로 축출되기 전과 후에 헌법 재판소는 소극적이었던 정치화에서 적극적으로 바뀌었다. 2001 년 탁신에게 무죄판결을 한 것은 선거 정치 과정을 바꾸기 보다 유지하려고 했기 때문에 정치적으로 소극적인 결정이었다. 그러나 2006 년 헌법 재판소는 적극적으로 바뀌어 새로운 정치적 결정을 내리려 했다. 2006 년 4 월 2 일 조기 선거 불참 시위는 정치적 교착상태로 이어졌고 국왕은 사법부에게 해결하라고 촉구했다. 2006 년 4 월 26 일 국왕은 TV 연설을 통해 행정 법원에게 다음과 같이 말했다.
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행정 법원은 문제를 해결하기 위한 방법을 찾아야만 한다. 선거가 무효화되어야 하는가? 행정 법원은 무엇인 옳고 그른지 말할 권리가 있다. 만약 옳지 않다면 정부가 옳지 않다는 것이 아니다. 나의 생각으로는 일당 선거는 정상적이지 않다. 일인 후보자는 비민주적이다. 바로 직후에 대법원, 행정 법원, 헌법 재판소의 최고 재판관들은 모여 ‘일관된’ 판결을 내리기로 동의했다. 주요 판결은 4 월 선거를 무효화 시킨 헌법 재판소에서 나왔다. 후에 세 법원의 최고 재판관들은 새로운 선거위원회를 구성하기 위해 남아있는 세 명의 선거위원회 멤버에게(두 명은 이미 사임했다) 사임할 것을 요구했다. 이들은 사임을 거부하자 보석으로 나오기 전까지 하루 동안 감금되었다. 지식인들은 이를 두고 태국 정치의 ‘사법화’라고 일컬으며 사법부가 태국이 위기에서 빠져나올 길임을 암시했다. 즉, 사법 결정을 통해 팽배했던 교착상태를 고려한 정치적 방향을 마련하고자 함이었다. 2011 년으로부터의 교훈 중 하나는 사법화의 실패이다. 일부 전문가들은 2006 년 4 월 26 일 국왕이 한 연설을 태국 정치에 대한 왕정의 개입이라고 보았다. 쿠데타 이후 헌법 재판소는 해체되었으나 이전보다 적은 9 명의 재판관으로 이루어진 헌법 재판소(Constitutinal Tribunal)로 바뀌었다. 민주당(DP)와 타이락타이당(TRT)은 불법 선거 관행을 저질렀다는 혐의로 서로를 고발했다. 2007 년 5 월 30 일 헌법 재판소는 민주당의 손을 들어주어 타이락타이당(TRT)에게 유죄를 선고했다. 이에 대한 처벌로 타이락타이당은 해체되었고 탁신과 탁신 내각에 있었던 많은 의원들을 포함한 타이락타이당(TRT)의 111 행정위원회 멤버들은 5 년 동안 정당활동을 금지 당했다. 하지만 2007 년 12 월 선거까지 타이락타이당 의원들은 새로운 민주권력당(PPP)라는 이름으로 선거에서 승리했다. 2008 년 9 월 헌법 재판소는 법 조항 하나에 의거해서 사막 순다라벳(Samak Sundaravej) 국민의힘(PPP) 총리를 축출했다. 사막 총리는 TV 요리 프로그램을 제작해준 대가로 사례비를 받았는데 헌법 재판소는 이 사건으로 사막 총리가 민간 부분에서 ‘일한 피고용인’이 되었기 때문에 총리직을 맡을 자격이 없다고 판결했다. 당시 73 세였던 사막 총리는 정계를 완전히 떠났고 1 년 뒤에 암으로 사망했다. 그 후 탁신의 매제인 솜차이 웡사왓(Somchai Wongsawat)이 총리가 되었고 즉시 옐로셔츠 시위의 압력을 받게 되었다. 2008 년 10 월 7 일 경찰은 총리실을 에워싸고 있던 시위대들을 해산시키라는 명령을 받았다. 솜차이 총리는 총리실에서 그의 정책 아젠다를 발표할 준비를 하고 있었다. (군 사령관은 이미 정부 지시사항을 따르지 않겠다고 발표했고 TV 를 통해 솜차이 총리의 사임을 촉구했다.) 경찰과 옐로셔츠 시위대와의 충돌에서 수 백 명이 부상당했고 두 명의 시위자가 사망했다. 이례적으로 여왕이 사망한 한 시위자의 장례식을 주재했다. 12 월이 시작되자 옐로 셔츠의 반(反)탁신 세력은 몇 주 동안 방콕의 가장 큰 공항을 점거했다. 헌법 재판소는 국민의힘(PPP)과 두 개의 소수 친탁신 정당을 부정 선거 혐의로 기소하고 주요 인사들의 정당활동을 금지했다. 이 금지는 2012 년에 만료된다. 만료가 되면 잉락 정권에 큰 힘을 실어줄 것이며 전반적으로 태국 정계에 이득이 될 것이다. (지난 5 년 동안 유능한 태국 정치인들이 무엇을 제안했는지와 상관없이 제도적으로 공정함이 없는 활동을 했다.) 지난 몇 년을 돌아보면 태국의 사법화가 거의 실패했음이 분명하다. 타이락타이당(TRT)은 해체되었지만 이후 국민의힘(PPP)으로 다시 생겼다. 그 후에는 프어타이당(PTP)로 다시 창당되었다. 프어타이당은 2011 년 7 월 선거에서 압도적인 승리를 했다. 탁신은 해외에서도 태국에 영향을 끼치고 있다. 탁신 여동생이 총리직을 맡고 있으며 타이락타이당 의원들은 2012 년 5 월 복귀할 것이다. 국민의힘 지지자들은 2013 년 13 월 복귀한다. 사법화의 실패는 크나큰 영향을 가져올 것이다. 도전과 반격
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군주는 사법화 전략의 시작에 관련되어 있다. 사법화 전략의 실패는 군주를 상당히 위태롭게 한 것으로 보인다. 만약 친(親)탁신 정당의 해체와 지지세력의 정당 금지, 쿠데타 후의 권력 장악 또는 탁신의 자산 동결과 재판 불참 중 일어난 2010 년 대법원의 정책 부패에 대한 기소가 모두 성공적으로 탁신이 야기한 도전문제들을 끝냈다면 태국 정치는 아마도 탁신이 정계에 입문하기 전인 안정화되고 약한 정당 시스템과 강력한 군부-군주-관료의 우세 체제로 돌아갔을 것이다. 하지만 강력함과 취약함을 동시에 가진 탁신은 저지할 수 없는 인사가 되었다. 탁신은 경제 경쟁력을 높이기 위한 혁신적인 노력을 보였고 사회 하위 계층이 상류층으로 올라갈 수 있도록 해주었다. 반면 부패, 이해관계의 상충과 마약과의 전쟁 시 발생한 인권유린 등 문제점도 안고 있다. 사법화의 실패는 탁신의 타이락타이당(TRT)이 촉발한 정치적 각성과 이탈 문제를 해결하는 데 있어 군주의 실패로 비춰졌다. 게다가 고위 장관이 프라이비 위원회를 떠나 쿠데타 이후의 임시정부를 이끌고 2007 년 12 월 선거 후 다시 국왕의 프라이비 위원회로 복귀했을 때 쿠데타가 민주적으로 선출된 정부의 희생으로 군주를 보호하기 위해 일어났다는 국민들의 생각이 더욱 확고해졌다. (군부와 관료는 군주와 오랜 관계를 맺어왔다.) 이러한 인식은 쿠데타 임시 정부의 법무장관인 찬차이 리킷찟타(Chanchai Likitjitta)가 2008 년 4 월 8 일 프라이비 위원회에 임명되고, 공군 사령관인 마샬 챨릿 푸크파석(Marshal Chalit Pookpasuk)이 2011 년 5 월 18 일 프라이비 위원회에 임명되었을 때 힘을 얻었다. 마샬 사령관은 2007 년 9 월 이후 국가안보위원회를 이끌어온 쿠데타 주동자이다. 많은 사람들은 2008 년 옐로 셔츠 시위자의 장례식에 여왕이 참석했음을 알아차렸다. 왕실모독금지법은 공공 토론을 저지할지 모르나 사람들이 개인적으로 알아차리는 것은 막을 수 없다. 그리고 나서 프라야뜨 챤 오챠(Prayuth Chan-ocha) 육군참모장은 2011 년 선거가 열리는 몇 주 전 TV 에서 민주당 지지 발언을 했다. 그는 유권자들에게 과거에 뽑았던 정치인을 뽑지 말고 군주를 지킬 ‘올바른 사람’을 뽑으라고 촉구했다. 하지만 프어타이당(PTP)이 가볍게 선거에서 승리했을 때 왕실의 명예는 떨어질 수 밖에 없었다. 군주제에 대한 저항은 군사 쿠데타 이후 더욱 증가했다. 8 명의 왕족 후예들이 잉락 총리에게 보낸 편지를 보면 왕실모독금지법의 개정을 요구하고 있고 헌법 112 조와 관련된 사건은 2002 년 0 건에서 2009 년 165 건으로 증가했다. 여기에는 호주 작가와 태국계 미국인이 허가 나지 않은 국왕의 전기를 번역했다는 혐의로 20 년 징역형을 선고 받은 것과 61 세 남자가 4 개의 단문 메시지를 보낸 것이 헌법 112 조를 위반한 것으로 간주되어 기소 당했다. 쿠데타가 발생한 이후 공고해진 세력에 대한 대항으로 태국과 태국 사회에 대한 많은 연구가 발표되었다. 저널리스트 폴 핸들리(Paul M. Handley)의 논란을 일으킨 왕정 일가에 대한 전기인 ‘국왕은 절대 웃지 않는다(The King Never Smiles)’가 발간되었을 때 상반되는 반응이 있었다. 하지만 태국을 비롯한 많은 국가에서 발간되어 이제는 근대의 태국을 이해하려는 사람들에게 교과서와 같은 책이 되었다. 핸들리의 책이 나오기 전에 태국 군주제에 대한 학문적 조사는 거의 없었고 특히 냉전 기간 동안 널리 이용될 수 없었다. 하지만 쿠데타 이후 물방울처럼 존재했던 비판적 발언이 긴 물줄기가 되었다. 핸들리의 국왕에 대한 저서가 나온 지 1 년도 안 되어 태국 남쪽 지역에서 일어난 말레이 무슬림 반란에 대한 던칸 맥카르고(Duncan McCargo)의 분석이 나왔다. 이 분석은 프라이비 위원회 의장이자 육군 장관인 쁘렘 띤쑤라논을 위주로 이루어진 ‘군주 네트워크’를 규명했다. 2008 년 초 근대아시아의 저널(Journal of Contemporary Asia)은 태국 정치에 대한 특별호를 실었다. 이는 쿠데타와 그 지지세력에 대해 알려졌던 통념에 대해 이의를 제기하는 내용이었다. 같은 해에 영향력 있는 국제 주간지도 태국 쿠데타에 대한 통념을 깨는 글을 실었다. 다른 비판들은 선전문구와 대중 문화를 통한 국왕의 신격화에 초점을 맞췄다. 2010 년 편집된 두 권의 책이 기존 군주제의 정치적 역할, 경제적
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이해관계, 대중 이미지에 대해 이의를 제기했다. 태국 정치에 대한 글이 발간되고 게시되는 것을 더 이상 저지할 수 없는 상황이 되었다. 왕실모독금지법과 컴퓨터 범죄 법을 통한 위협과 협박이 국내외적으로 주목을 받게 되자 군주 체제는 국왕을 긍정적으로 다룬 새로운 전기를 발간함으로써 대응했다. 국왕 ‘푸미폰 아둔야뎃: 생애의 업적’은 핸들리의 책 ‘국왕은 절대 웃지 않는다’에 대한 암시적 반박과 해결책으로 쓰여졌다. 군주의 또 다른 분명한 맞대응은 군주 반대자들에 대한 자경단의 위협과 온라인 및 국영 TV 방송에서 볼 수 있다. 탐마삿 대학(Thammasat University)의 법학교수 단체인 니티랏 단체(Nitirat Group)가 왕실모독금지법 수정을 제안했을 때 많은 왕실 인사들이 그들을 맹비난 하였다. 군주제와 민주주의의 조화 2012 년 초부터 군주제와 민주주의를 조화하려는 다른 개혁가나 개혁단체를 보기 힘들다. 그러나 이와 동시에 태국은 새로운 합의를 이뤄야 하는 도전 상황을 피할 수 없을 것이다. 새로운 합의는 부상하는 민주주의 속에서 군주제를 더욱 올바르게 뿌리내리게 할 것이지만 보수적인 왕실 지지자들과 타협하는 방식으로 이뤄져야 한다. 농촌 하층민들이 자신들의 목소리와 존재가 반영되길 바라는 것은 정당하다. 이와 마찬가지로 정부가 낡은 군부와 관료 중심의 권력층에서 자주 나타나는 책임감의 부재를 비슷하게 무책임하지만 강력한 대중영합주의자와 바꾸지 않으려고 하는 것도 타당하다. 잉락 친나왓은 새로운 정부를 이끌 것이지만 오빠 탁신은 마치 거대한 조각상처럼 태국 정계를 계속 주시할 것이다. 최근 국민들의 눈에는 탁신의 결점이나 부정부패보다 잉락 반대세력들의 문제점이 더 크게 보이고 있다. 군주제를 이루는 사회∙정치적 계층 질서에 의한 지식 패권은 더 이상 보호되기 어렵고 성공적인 미래로 가는 길이 아니다. 태국 왕실은 이 오래된 질서의 기반이 흔들리고 있다는 것을 감지하고 있으며 현 상태를 유지하기 위해 온갖 방법을 동원하고 있다. 왕실의 술책을 보는 것은 가히 즐겁지 않을 것이다. 왕실은 쿠데타에 의해 축출되고 부패혐의로 기소되고 정당 활동을 금지되었음에도 뚜렷한 경쟁자 없이 선거에서 계속 승리하는 탁신의 긴 그늘 밑에서 일을 꾸며야 할 것이다. 탁신의 이름은 갈등을 야기하는 이름이 되었다. 깊게 양극화된 태국에서 탁신의 이름을 말하는 것은 탁신에 대한 지지와 분노 모두를 자아낸다 중립적인 사람이 없다. 선거에서는 탁신 지지자들이 반대자들보다 더 많다. 하지만 일상 공공 장소에서 탁신에 반대하는 목소리가 탁신을 옹호하는 사람들의 목소리보다 더욱 거세다. 지나간 시간 동안 선거와 쿠데타는 일어나고 사라졌다. 유권자들은 자신들의 한 표를 마치 상품처럼 팔았다. 의원들은 방콕에서 뇌물과 부패를 통해 선심 정치만 펼쳤을 뿐 대화는커녕 유권자들을 알아보려 하지도 않았다. 별만 다를 바 없이 선출 정치인들도 정당성이 없는 상황을 즐겼다. 그럼으로써 쿠데타가 일어날 수 있고 실행 가능하다고 생각했다. 쿠데타로 인해 새로운 헌법이 발표되기도 했으나 이는 태국 정세가 바뀌는 계기를 만들어줬을 뿐 더 나은 거버넌스 모델을 위한 진실된 출발점은 아니었다. 냉전은 해결하기 어려운 위급한 시기였다. 이와 반면에 태국의 주요 축인 국민, 불교, 세습된 군주제는 공산주의를 멀리했고 단결을 가져왔으며 안정화를 겪었다. 군대, 군주제, 관료주의로 이루어진 구 질서에 대한 저항은 언제나 진압되었다. 1970 년대 좌파 학생들은 이를 알아차렸다. 태국 학생들은 매일 아침 학교에서 군가와 국가를 불렀다. 태국 국민들은 학교와 가정을 통한 사회화 교육 덕택에 사회정치적 계층에서 자신들의 위치와 기대 정도를 알았다. 당시 집에서는 국영 TV 프로그램에서 사회화에 대한
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내용이 항상 나왔다. 태국 국민으로서 정부가 행동하길 기대하는 것과 반대되는 의견은 거의 관심을 받지 못 했다. 이 모든 것이 급격한 발전을 가능하게 해주었다. 그러나 발전으로부터 온 경제 성장과 혜택은 점점 균등하게 분배되지 않았다. 그래서 대중과 부유하지 못한 이들의 지도자로서 탁신이 부상하게 되었다. 탁신의 타이락타이당(TRT)은 배타적이고 친서민적이지 않은 낡은 태국 정치에 종지부를 찍었다. TRT 는 외부 전문가가 수행하는 비싼 여론조사가 포함된 과학적인 선거 방식과 강력한 리더십을 추구했다. 법적 금지에도 불구하고 타이락타이당(TRT)과 그 뒤를 이은 친탁신 정당은 널리 알려졌다. 타이락타이당은 냉전 이후 집단의 상상력을 야기한 첫 번째 정당이었다. 태국 정치에서 만연하게 일어났던 투표권 매수는 여전히 필요했지만 더 이상 충분하지 않게 되었다. 이 외에도 타이락타이당은 정당과 정당의 정책, 지지 유권자 기반간의 밀접한 관계가 형성된다는 생각을 태국 국민들에게 알려주었다. 2001 년을 기준으로 냉전은 한참 전에 끝났다. 현 상황에서 탈피하려는 정치 지도자들은 더 이상 공산주의와 관련된 혐의로 수감되지 않는다. 인터넷과 새로운 미디어로 인해 정부관리들은 더 이상 사람들의 마음을 조작할 수 없게 되었다. 심지어 정부의 선전 문구가 여전히 힘을 발휘 할 때도 언론 매체는 더욱 다양해지고 정보는 더욱 확산되었으며 새로운 국제 규범이 효력을 발휘 했다. 한 때 쿠데타와 압제를 모른척했던 강대국들은 이제 민주주의와 인권을 더욱 강조하고 있다. 그러는 사이 시간은 흘러 이제 대학생들은 자신들이 태어나기도 전에 일어났던 냉전을 거의 기억하지 못하게 되었다. 탁신은 상황과 통찰력을 잘 이용해 새롭고 더욱 개방적인 정치 환경의 혜택을 보았다. 탁신은 총리로서 관료주의를 개혁했고 가난한 태국 국민들을 위하겠다는 그의 공약을 지켰으며 태국의 산업 기반을 향상시키려는 계획을 마련했고 심지어는 태국의 역내 리더십을 키우기 위해 대담한 외교정책도 펼쳤다. 하지만 이러한 활동 밑에는 부패와 이해관계의 상충, 족벌주의, 인권 유린, 권력 남용과 악정이 함께 일어났다. 탁신의 업적이 혼재되어 있는 것이다. 탁신은 태국의 미래를 위한 야심찬 계획과 짓밟힌 사람들을 위해 많은 기회를 만들었다. 하지만 이와 함께 탁신의 내부 금융 거래, 부패, 권력 남용이 일어났다. 탁신 주식회사는 태국 주식회사와 운명을 같이 했던 것이다. 그러나 탁신 반대 세력들도 뇌물과 부패 혐의 이상으로 탁신이 뛰어나고 그가 추구하려 한 것에 대해 반대하기는 어려울 것이다. 탁신 반대파들은 탁신의 정책 개혁을 깊게 생각해보고 가난하고 소외된 사람들을 위한 그들의 생각을 추진했어야 했다. 결국 아피싯 총리가 이끄는 정권이 출범했고 ‘복지’와 ‘자립 경제’ 프로그램을 마련했지만 대부분의 유권자들은 충분치 않다고 느꼈다. 이들에게 탁신의 눈부시게 성공적인 대중영합주의를 인정하는 것은 쾌적하고 웃음을 건네주며 관광객에게 친절한 태국 왕국의 대부분의 국민들이 가난하다는 것을 인정하는 것이다. 알았든 몰랐든 탁신은 태국을 21 세기 국가로 만들어준 촉매제였고 탁신의 반대파들은 여전히 냉전 시기에 머물러 있었다. 비록 탁신이 많은 위법을 저질렀지만 탁신의 가장 큰 죄는 태국 국민들이 스스로와 태국을 보는 방식을 바꿨다는 것이다. 일부는 이러한 변화를 탁신과 그의 일가가 저지른 탈취와 조작으로 보고 있다. 다른 이들은 이를 태국이 뒤늦게 냉전 시기로부터 구조된 것이라고 본다. 선거에서 가장 많은 지지를 얻은 이들이 과거의 유산을 받아들여야 하듯이 과거에 통치했던 이들은 이제 새로운 현실을 받아들여야만 한다.
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List of Participants 참가자 명단 *organized in alphabetical order Organization
#
Country
Full Name
1
Bangladesh
Mr. Adilur Rahman Khan
Odhikar
2
Bangladesh
Mr. Ahmed Swapan Mahmud
VOICE
3
Burma
Ms. Khin Ohmar
Burma Partnership
4
Cambodia
Mr. Panhavuth Long
Cambodia Justice Initiative
5
India
Mr. Lenin Raghuvanshi
People's Vigilance Committee on Human Rights
6
India
Ms. Indira Unninayar
Campaign for Judicial Accountability & Judicial Reform
7
India
Mr. Prashant Kumar
Campaign for Judicial Accountability & Judicial Reform
8
Indonesia
Mr.FebiYonesta
LBH Jakarta
9
Indonesia
Ms. Poengky Indarti
Imparsial
10
Korea Republic
Mr. Chanho Kim
The May 18 Memorial Foundation
11
Korea Republic
Mr. Deepak Prasad Bashyal
The May 18 Memorial Foundation
12
Korea Republic
Ms. Heejeong Kim
The May 18 Memorial Foundation
13
Korea Republic
Ms. Mihoko Yamamoto
The May 18 Memorial Foundation
14
Korea Republic
Mr. Youngjeong Kim
The May 18 Memorial Foundation
15
Korea Republic
Ms. Gayoon Baek
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
16
Korea Republic
Ms. Huisun Kim
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
17
Korea Republic
Mr. Jaegun Lee
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
18
Korea Republic
Ms. Jinyoung Lee
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
19
Korea Republic
Ms. Mihyeon Lee
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
20
Korea Republic
Mr. Sang hie Han
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
21
Korea Republic
Ms. Sangmi Lee
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
22
Korea Republic
Ms. Sunmi Lee
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
23
Korea Republic
Mr. Taeho Lee
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
24
Korea Republic
Mr. Yang Chihchiang
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
25
Korea Republic
Ms. Youngmi Yang
People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD)
26
Korea Republic
Mr. Seungwon Lee
Soengkonghoe Univ., Democracy and Social Movements Institute
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 27
Malaysia
Mr. Wong Chin-Huat
Monash University Malaysia
28
Nepal
Mr. Krishna Gautam
Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC)
29
Pakistan
Mr. Rashid Rehman Khan
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
30
Singapore
Mr. James Gomez
Thammasat University
31
Sri Lanka
Mr. Niran Joshua Anketell
Inform Human Rights Documentation Centre
32
Taiwan
Mr. Chuan-yueh Chen
Judicial Reform Foundation
33
Taiwan
Mr. Wen-Lung Cheng
Judicial Reform Foundation
34
Timor- Leste
Mr. LuisdeOliveiraSampaio
Judicial System Monitoring Programme
35
Regional
Mr. Sayeed Ahmad
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
36
Regional
Mr. John Liu Yn Tynn
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
37
Regional
Mr. Yap Swee Seng
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
38
Regional
Ms. Giyoun Kim
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
39
Regional
Ms. Sejin Kim
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
40
Regional
Mr. Isagani V. Abunda II
Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID)
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