[BOOK] 2015 PEACE TOUR

Peace Tour 2015: The 70th Anniversary of the Liberation/Division of Korea

Date l 8th August – 11th August 2015 Places to Visit l Seoul, Ansan, Cheolwon, Hwacheon, Dongducheon, Yangjoo Host ㅣ The Institute for Korean Historical Studies, Human Rights Foundation “Saram”, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), The Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea (ASCK) Organizer ㅣ The Korean People Artist Federation, The April 9 Unification & Peace Foundation, Geumjunggul Humanrights & Peace Foundation, Civil Peace Forum, Asia Peace & History Education Network,Catholic Human Right Committee The 2015 Peace Tour is sponsored by the 2015 Scenario for Change of

Table of Contents

Welcoming Remarks Program

p.2

p.7

Host / Organizer

p.9

List of Participants p.17 Symposium Program

p.20

2015 Peace Tour - Welcoming Remarks

Kim Seong Bo The Institute for Korean Historical Studies The liberation that the Korean society faced 70 years ago gave way to the many possibilities of what kind of society to construct. The moment it was acknowledged that the war and violence was finally over, the desire to create a new society became stronger than ever. And because that desire was strong, various actions for its realization also outpoured in diverse ways. Amid delirious joy, the hopeful notion that anything could be possible stemmed from “peace”.

However, the division and occupation of the U.S. and Russian military as well as the Korean War solidified the division of the peninsula and subsequent violence invaded the peace. As the violence became structuralized political and social conflicts were created, which are continuing explicitly to this day. The numerous types of military action that encircles the Korean peninsula, the hatred of “pro-North Korea” that has a stranglehold on our everyday lives, the complete indifference toward the universal nature of human rights

It can be said that feeling

sensitive to these phenomenon and fervently contemplating over how to put that sensitivity into real life action is a one way to contribute to the “Peace Movement”. Peace movements have always been difficult chapters in history but we know well that it had never once been stopped.

It is meaningful that we are simultaneously welcoming the 70th anniversary of two historical watersheds: liberation and division. This tells us how important it is to candidly face the origin of the violence that is 2

plaguing the Korean society today. It also lets us know that the seemingly failed liberation has always existed around us. It is through detailed diagnosis of violence and pondering over the many kinds of action to overcome the violence that we can continue on the course of liberation.

More than ever before, the present times call for the rethinking of the value of peace.

It is at this time that civic groups and research institutions from home and abroad have come together to jointly arrange the <Peace Tour 2015: 70th Year since Liberation/Partition>. We have already experimented in this new form of solidarity through the 2013 <Peace Tour: Marking the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War Armistice>. Through the title â&#x20AC;&#x153;Peace Tourâ&#x20AC;?, we are striving to realize the notion of putting peace into action by encompassing both theory and reality.

The variety of programs scheduled from August 8 to 11 tells us that we are all key actors of the peace movement and we also have collective resolve that this movement will never cease. It is without a doubt in our minds that mere participation itself is being part of the peace movement.

I sincerely welcome you for participating in the undertaking to solidify peace.

3

2015 Peace Tour Welcome Address on behalf of the ASCK Owen Miller, Lecturer in Korean Studies, SOAS, University of London

여러분 반갑습니다. 저는 런던 대학교 SOAS에서 코리아('한국') 역사를 가르치는 Owen Miller입니다.

I'd like to welcome everyone to the 2015 Peace Study Tour on behalf of the Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea. Formed in 2003 in New York, the Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea (ASCK) is dedicated to the promotion of mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of Korea, both North and South. As you might be able to tell I am not from North America so I think I must be here representing the rather small European branch of the organisation! One of the goals of ASCK is to help scholars, students, and the general public learn about North and South through accurate, historically informed an analyses, and thus we are happy to be a co-organizer of this Peace in Korea Study Tour along with Human Rights Foundation “Saram”, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), and The Institute for Korean Historical Studies.

I'd like to say a few words to highlight the very international nature of this important tour. This year, ASCK participants come from: Thailand, Italy, the UK, Japan, the US, Switzerland and a few who are based in the Republic of Korea. I wish we could also have participants from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But that will have to be a 4

worthy goal for the future.

Our backgrounds and interests also vary: many of us are academics, some of us are students and some are activists. Perhaps some of us are all three. All of us have a deep general interest in Korean history, while some of us have a very focused interest - e.g. in South Korea's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in North Korean social history or in the history of Sino-Korean relations.

Some of us speak Korean, some of us do not. Some of us are of Korean descent, some are not. What we have in common is a deep interest in issues of justice and peace, not just in Korea but all around the world. We know that international solidarity is important, and that getting to know people on a personal level makes this more easy and long-lasting.

I am a first timer on this tour and I'm personally very excited about what I will learn and what I can take away to pass on to my students back in the UK and enrich their encounter with Korean history. This tour offers a unique type of direct learning experience that is difficult to achieve in other ways. This is an opportunity to learn about events in the places where they happened, to learn about movements from the people who have built and participated in them and to see the physical remnants of modern Korean history at close quarters. And of course it is also a unique opportunity to meet a wide range of interesting and stimulating people and hopefully make some new friends or meet some new collaborators.

Finally I would like to wish everyone here a very safe, enjoyable and fruitful tour.

5

6

2015 Peace Tour Program Time

Program

Venue

Facilitator / Lodging

st

1 day:Saturday,August8 Conference

PSPD 2ndfloor conference hall (Seoul)

09:30 ~ 10:00

Welcome

10:00 ~ 12:00

Session I: East Asia before and after World War II; Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s division system Lunch Session II: 70 Years since partition; Korean peninsula present and future Break Session III: Overcoming war and partition; Korea and beyond Dinner

12:00 ~ 13:00 13:00 ~ 15:00 15:00 ~ 15:30 15:30 ~ 17:30 18:00 ~ 20:00

Moderators: Lee Tae-Ho, Clara Hong Welcome: Kim Seong Bo, Owen Miller

Lodging: Seowon Guest House

2ndday:Sunday,August9 07:30 ~ 09:00 9:00 ~ 10:50 Interlocutor: Kim Ikhwan 11:00 ~ 13:20 13:00 ~ 14:30 14:30 ~ 15:40

Travel to Ansan, Gyeonggi Province Visit Memorial

Danwon

High

School

from PSPD &

meet families of Sewol Ferry victims / Lunch Return to Seoul former KCIA facilities in Imun-dong, Seodaemun Prison / Museum

Facilitator: Lee Tae-Ho

Gyeonggi Province

Seoul

Guide: Institute for Korean Historical Studies (Yeoksa munje yeonguso) Lodging: Seowon Guest House

Travel to Hwachon

from PSPD

Vietnam War training camp & memorial Lunch Kkeomeok Bridge (Korean War Site) Cheorwon / 3rd Infantry Division Seungil Bridge / railway to Geumgang Mts Civilian control line Dinner with Yugongni villagers / meeting with landmine victims

Gangwon Province

Breakfast will be provided on the bus Guide: Institute for Korean Historical Studies (IKHS)

16:10 ~ 17:40

Dinner Walking Tour, Tongin-dong

3rdday,MondayAugust10 07:30 ~ 10:30 10:30 11:30 12:40 15:00 16:00

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

11:30 12:20 13:20 15:40 16:40

17:00 ~ 17:50 18:00 ~ 20:00

Gangwon Province

Hakmaru pensyeon.

Cheorwon, Gangwon Province

4thday,TuesdayAugust11

7

08:00 ~ 08:40 08:50 ~ 9:40 9:40 ~ 10:30 10:30 ~ 11:40 12:00 ~ 13:00 13:00 ~ 13:50 14:10 ~ 15:00 15:30 ~ 16:20 16:20 ~ 18:00 18:00 ~

8

Hakmaru pensyeon

Breakfast ruins of North Korean Workersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Party Headquarters Leave for Dongducheon Camptown STD Inspection Office / Meet with Durumi-bang activists Lunch Yun Kuem Yi murder site

Gyeonggi Province

Sangpae-dong Cemetery for camptown women Yangju Highway (Hyosun and Miseon Incident) Return to Seoul Closing Ceremony @ PSPD

Seoul

Gangwon Province

Guide: Institute for Korean Historical Studies

Lodging not provided

HOST The Institute for Korean Historical Studies Human Rights Foundation “Saram” People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) The Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea (ASCK)

9

The Institute for Korean Historical Studies The Institute for Korean Historical Studies was established on February 21, 1986, as a private research institute, with these aims: first, facilitating collaborative researches on issues of Korean history, second, sharing the fruits of our research with the public, third, suggesting a desirable direction Korea should take in the future through reflections on its history, and fourth, contributing to making Korea a more democratic nation and bringing about peaceful reunification of the peninsula.

The institute has relied on the participation of citizens interested in historical studies in its management, as well as historical researchers.

Critical Review of History, a quarterly journal established in 1987, has made a great contribution to sharing modern studies of Korean history with the public. Also, Critical Studies on Modern Korean History was first published in 1996, as an academic journal on modern history of Korea, and has spearheaded fresh and in-depth studies on this controversial area of Korean history.

The Institute for Korean Historical Studies hosts an annual symposium, where lively and fruitful discussions on recent issues of Korean history are had by top researchers. Also, the institute hold places for debate and conferences, leading critical historical research. Furthermore, with an aim of sharing the recent historical studies with more citizens, it hosts lectures and history trips, open to the public.

The Institute for Korean Historical Studies has regular academic exchanges with

various overseas research institutes in Japan, China,

Taiwan, Germany, etc., as well as cooperates with domestic institutes and non-governmental organizations. The institute is an active member of an international solidarity for promoting peace and human rights in East 10

Asia.

The Institute for Korean Historical Studies firmly believe a right historical awareness is a key to solving many thorny issues in Korea.

Join us! Your participation will make a difference for human rights, peace and justice for all.

Human Rights Foundation “Saram” Human Rights Foundation “Saram” was founded in 2004 in order to support organizations or individuals who defend human rights. The foundation have been dedicating its work on various aspects of human rights movement: Financial Support Center for financially challenged human rights organizations; promotion of human rights dialogue though the publication of human rights magazine <Saram> and <Saram Saeng-gak>, the publication company specializing the publication of human rights books; various events and activities including human rights tour programs and etc.

In 2013, the foundation established Human Rights Center “Saram” with the support from the people. The organization expects that people will learn, think and try to fulfil human rights in “Saram”. We dream of a society where everyone is treated equaly without any discrimination. We also dream of a state that fulfills its duty rather than to act as an oppressor. We will continue our work until our dreams come true; a world where the dignity of human beings are protected in harmony with nature.

11

Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) Until the 1980s, achievement of democracy was driven by studentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; movements resisting government violence and oppression. Eventually the military dictatorship, which lasted over three decades, was terminated by the power of the people. Nevertheless, democratization of the society was not fully realized immediately.

The true realization of democracy could only be achieved by the people who ordinarily participate in politics and closely watch the abuse of power of the state and the corporate. The PSPD was founded in 1994 by activists, scholars and lawyers who had engaged in various democratic movements during military dictatorship decades. Hoping to open a new era of participatory democracy and human rights, the PSPD has been working on institutionalization of civil participation in democracy, state power and socioeconomic reform.

Missions of the PSPD Alternatives We research and propose alternative policies, bills and measures for enhancing livelihood and rights of ordinary people.

Watch We watch closely whether the power is abused.

Participation We operate with membership fee of more than 10,000 members, irregular donations, and involvement of members and volunteers.

Solidarity We would like to hold up solidarity as forming a society that honest, hard- working persons enjoy a decent life and anyone participates in democracy.

Center for Peace and Disarmament of the PSPD The PSPD noticed the visible transformational processes of dismantling 12

separation in the Korean Peninsula after the South-North Korea Summit in 2000. We began to discuss the expected influences of a nuclear issue of North Korea, a new obstacle in the ice-melting environment in the Korean Peninsula in half-century, and the war on terror led by the U.S. Facing the changes of times, the PSPD reached the conclusion that we should deal with overcoming the separated situation and preventing the international military conflict with more clear visions and responsibilities: the civil movements in Korea had aimed at the democracy and social justice in South Korea.

Even before the establishment of the center, the PSPD had carried out some campaigns to improve the transparency and accountability of the area of defense such as the protection of informants in the military industry.

The start of the Center for Peace and Disarmament meant the expansion of the PSPD’s experience towards defense and security beyond authority monitoring through civil power. Members of the center felt the need of ‘democratization of field of security’, which meant challenge to the exclusive interpreting power about security by the state and security experts. They also paid their attentions to the importance of solidarity with the subjects of new visions and philosophy to prepare a new social and world paradigm.

Missions of Center for Peace and Disarmament - Peace Initiatives in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia - Monitoring the military spending and Disarmament - Promoting civil participation

13

The Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea (ASCK) We are scholars working in the United States and other countries who join together out of concern about current US policies toward the Korean peninsula.

We believe that current problems on the Korean peninsula and between the US and the two Koreas, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, can only be solved through dialogue, cooperation, and the active pursuit of peace. We feel the responsibility to speak out against policies that increase tensions in Northeast Asia and may lead to another catastrophic war in Korea. We wish to add our voices to a constructive discussion on how to achieve a peaceful, unified Korea existing in harmony with its neighbors, including the United States.

The Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea (ASCK) is dedicated to the promotion of mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of Korea, both North and South. The goals and activities of ASCK include: 1. Helping scholars, students, policy-makers and the general public learn about Korea, both North (DPRK) and South (ROK), through accurate, historically informed analyses; 2. Contributing to the constructive and peaceful development of US-ROK and US-DPRK relations; 3. Facilitating the exchange of scholars and students between the US and the DPRK. We realize that this is a critical moment in US-Korean relations. Our organization is committed to promoting a US policy toward Korea that is informed, humane, and in everyone's mutual interest.

14

ASCK History The Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea (ASCK) was founded at a meeting at Columbia University on March 29, 2003.

15

Organizers The Korean People Artist Federation The April 9 Unification & Peace Foundation Geumjunggul Humanrights & Peace Foundation Civil Peace Forum Asia Peace & History Education Network Catholic Human Right Committee

16

List of Participants

17

강건한 강혜빈 권영태 권유경 김국환 김난 김대용 김덕자 김도민 김미원 김민화 김상균 김선영 김손자 김수지 김승환 김영미 김원식 김은경 김정아 김종백 김태경 김현숙 난새 데이비스 찰스 로빈슨 태미 고 마츠사카 히로 매리김 문선영 박강성주 박미경 박수홍 박주연 박현숙 배건욱 배경식 배지우 벨로스 조슈아 사토 유코 서재정 세토 토모코 쉐논 츄 스탁 제프리 신수정 신지현 심기호 애퍼제시 존 양수빈 엘빈웡 여재희 오웬 밀러 유다정 유왕선

18

Kang, Geon Han Kang, Hye-bin kwon Young tae Kim, Kook-Hwan Kim, Nan Kim, Dae Yong Kim Duk ja Kim domin Kim Mi won Kim Sang gyoon Kim Seon young Kim, Sonja Kim, Suzy KIM Seung Hwan Kim Young mi Jason Wonsihick Kim Kim, Jung Ah Kim Jong back Kim Tae kyung Kim hyun sook Nanse Davis, Charles Tammy Ko, Robinson Matsusaka, Hiro Kim, Mary Moon sun young Park-Kang, Sungju Park Mi kyung Park Su hong Park, Joo Yeun Park, Hyun Suk Bae, Kun Wook

Bellos, Joshua Sato Yuko Suh, Jae-Jung Tomoko, Seto Chew, Shannon Stark, Jeffery Shin Su jeong Shin, Jihyun Sim, Ki-Ho, Eperjesi, John Yang Su bin Wong, Alvin Yeo, Jae Hui Miller, Owen Yoo da jeong Yu , Wang-Seon

이진 이경숙 이경주 이경희 이광희 이규정 이미현 이상희 이숙현 이영아 이용덕 이지원 이지혜 이태호 이현옥 이혜정 이효성 임광순 임지현 임헨리 장완익 전영욱 정욜 정근식 정다혜 정민주 정병욱 정혜민 제인진 카이슨 조진석 줄리아니 조르지아 찬로카나키트 판디트 최덕효 최명운 최현모 케빈그레이 킴벌리정 프리데릭 바르타사트 한준구 홍승혜 홍천희 황수영

Lee, Jean H Lee Kyeong suk LEE Kyeong Ju Lee, Kyunghee Lee Kwang hee Kyujeong LEE LEE Mihyeon Lee, Sang Hee Lee, Sookhyun LEE Youngah Lee Yong-Duk Lee Ji Won Lee Ji hye LEE Taeho Lee, Hyeon-Ok LEE Hea Jeong Lee Hyo sung Lim gwang soon Lim, Jeehyun Em, Henry Chang Wan Ick Jeong, Yol Jung, Keun-sik Chung Hye min Jung Byung Wook Chung Min ju Kaisen, Jane Jin Cho jin seok Giuliani, Giorgia Chanrochanakit, Pandit Choi, Deokhyo Choi Myung Woon Choi, Hyun Mo Gray, Kevin Chung, Kimberley Barthassat, Frederic Hong,

Seunghei Clara

Hwang Soo young

19

Symposium Program

20

Session 1: East Asia Before and After World War II, Korea’s Division System, and Continuing Conflicts Over History Chair: Yang Mi-gang (Co-Chair, Asia Peace & Education Network) Presentation 1. The Korean Peninsula and the Post-World War II Division System in East Asia Lee Sam-Sung (Professor, Hallym University, Department of Politics and Administration) Presentation 2. Controversy over South Korea’s History Text books and the New Right’s Historical Perspective Kim Jeong-in (Professor, Chuncheon National University of Education, Department of Social Studies) Presentation 3. The Onset of Cold War Divisions in North Korea and the Korean War Suzy Kim (Professor, Rutgers University, Department of Asian Languages & Cultures) Session 2: Seventy Years since Liberation-Partition, The Korean Peninsula Present and Future Chair: Clara Hong (Professor, Yonsei University, Underwood International College) Presentation 1. Finding a New Path for the Korean Peninsula: Beyond THAAD to Collective Security JJ Suh (Professor, International Christian University, Politics and International Studies) Presentation 2. The Emergence of Mass Right-Wing Organizations and the Rightward Shift in South Korean Politics KimDong-Choon (Professor, SungKongHoe University, Sociology) Presentation 3. The National Security Stateand the Peace Movement in South Korea Park,Jung-eun (Co-Secretary General, PSPD) Session 3: Overcoming War and Partition – Korea and Beyond Chair: Lee Tae-Ho (Secretary General, PSPD) Jane Jin Kaisen, “Some Artistic Reflections on War and Division” Lee, Jung-ae, “The Division System and Zainichi Koreans” Im Jae-seong, “Conscientious Objectors’ Movement for anti-militarism

21

[Session1: East Asia Before and After World War II, Korea’s Division System,

and Continuing Conflicts Over History] Presentation 1

The East Asian System of Grand Division and the Korean Peninsula

Lee, Sam-Sung (Professor, Hallym University)

The postwar Europe was an era of “long peace,” borrowing J. L. Gaddis’ words, despite the Cold War, while the same period in East Asia witnessed a hodgepodge of cold and hot wars, including the civil conflict in China as well as the destructive wars in Korea and Indochina.

The barbarism and violence associated with fascism and war were rather more intense and grotesque in scale in Europe than in East Asia. The legacy of the historical scars, however, has been deeper and more enduring in Asia to this day. The postwar history of Europe is largely a record of movement toward a more integrated community both in economic life and security, while the ideal of “one community” remains a mirage in East Asia even long after the end of the Cold War. This tells something very significant about the nature of the historical evolution of the East Asian international order for the last century. That means a striking historical continuity more than discontinuity in this regional system in double senses: continuities between prewar and postwar eras, one the one hand, and between the Cold War and Post-Cold War periods, on the other hand. It is a plain truth that the integration of China into the capitalist world economy since the 1980s brought about great changes in the terrain of international conflict and cooperation in 22

the region. East Asian international scene for the last twenty plus years, however, increasingly testified that geopolitical and military tension can intensify despite the development of economic interdependence among nations.

These observations necessitate a (re)conceptualization of the unique nature of the East Asian international system of the postwar era. The discourse of Cold War/Post-Cold War, which has been the dominant conceptual framework in international studies around the world, is not properly qualified to capture the nature of East Asian regional system.

The concept of the East Asian System of Grand Division, which was minted by myself in early 2000s, was intended to better understand the uniqueness of the past and present East Asian international system.

The conceptual limitations of the Cold War/Post-Cold War dichotomy, in explaining the East Asian international system, derives from its reductionist tendencies. The Cold War concept places the U.S.-Soviet bipolar relations at the center of all historical causations, in the first place. Moreover, the concept tends to reduce the ultimate sources of the postwar international conflicts to the dimension of politico-ideological tension, thereby downplaying the other dimensions of geopolitical or historico-psychological tensions. In addition, the Cold War/Post-Cold War dichotomy, in its conceptual consequences, stresses qualitative discontinuity between the eras of the Cold War and the Post-Cold War. It can nicely explain what happened in Europe, while it hinders more than help a proper understanding of the nature of what happened in East Asia.

As an alternative way to reconstruct the postwar East Asia, the concept of the East Asian Grand Division focuses, first, on the historical continuities between the empire system of the first half of the last century and the postwar era, and between the Cold War and Post-Cold War systems within the postwar East Asia. Second, the concept highlights the element of geopolitics and the historical-psychological dimension as well as the political-ideological tension as the determinants of the regional 23

international system. Based on these considerations, my theory attempts to conceptualize the nature of the historical continuities (more than discontinuities) between different eras in East Asia.

In this presentation, the following themes will be discussed: 1. The Uniqueness of the Postwar International Order in East Asia and the Conceptual Limitation of the Cold War/Post-Cold War Dichotomy 2. Theoretical Premises of the Theory of the East Asian Grand Division (1) The Role of Second-Tier Great Powers in Regional International Order (2) Historical Memories Matter (3) The Duality and Limitation of the Historical Effects of Economic Integration and Interdependence 3. The Duality of Division and the Multi-dimensionality of Tension, and the Patterns of Interaction 4. The Historical Formation of the East Asian Grand Division 5. The Evolution of the Grand Division during the Cold War: the Two Phases 6. Change and Continuity in the East Asian Grand Division after the End of the Cold War 7. Exploring Exits from the Systemic Trap of the Grand Division (1) Imagining a Peace Belt along the Grand Division Line (2) Reflections on the Tension of Political Systemic and Ideological Differences (3) Designing Alternative Ways of Transnational Dialogues on History 24

Issues 8. Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula (1) A Three-Step Concept of Peace Building on the Korean Peninsula (2) Peace Treaty on the Korean Peninsula and the Idea of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia (3) Three Implications of a Korean Peace Treaty

25

[Session1: East Asia Before and After World War II, Korea’s Division System, and Continuing Conflicts Over History] Presentation 2

Controversy over South Korea’s History Textbooks and the New Right’s Historical Perspective

Kim, Jeong-In (Chuncheon National University of Education)

Brief Abstract / Summary (by the translators) In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crises South Korean society fully entered the era of neoliberalism. At the same time, the conservative bloc in South Korea had to endure “10 lost years” under the [progressive] governments of Kim Dae Jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008).

Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine Policy, the Inter-Korea summit between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong-il in 2000, and the Roh Moo-hyun government’s reform program in 2004 that included a proposal to dismantle South Korea’s National Security Law provided the impetus for the formation of New Right political organizations like Jayujuui yeondae (Association for Liberalism).

The New Right differentiated itself from the Old Right by privileging (neo)liberalism and rejecting statism. This novel formulation of a conservative political agenda was able to rally the conservative forces

26

through Anti-North [Korea] / Anti-Communist projects, giving the New Right a formidable political voice.

The New Right chose history junior and senior high schools

specifically, history textbooks used in as the terrain to engage in an

ideological war with progressives. They referred to progressives and Leftists in contemporary South Korea as servants of North Korea (Jong-Buk). Historians like Kwon Hee-Young (Academy of Korean Studies), describe current history textbooks as having a socialist historical interpretive structure. The conservative daily Chosun ilbo carried editorials with headings like “South Korean Workers’ Party-like Historical Perspective Still Drilled into Junior High Students’ Heads.”

In terms of both economy and politics, the historical perspective of the New Right is grounded on the belief that the market will regulate itself, and a fundamental and visceral anti-North Korea sentiment. It is a perspective that emphasizes South Korea’s historical and political legitimacy, advancement (seonjinhwa), and civilization (munmyeong), in contrast to North Korea that is semi-civilized, ruled by a government that is the world’s worst violator of human rights.

In explaining South Korea’s economic development, New Right history textbooks (e.g. published by Gyohaksa) would point out that South Korea’s economic planners left corporate management to the entrepreneurs and (for the most part) did not tell them where to export their goods.

One of the reasons why other countries have not been able to emulate South Korea’s success is that they do not have entrepreneurs like Lee Byung-chul (founder of Samsung Group), Chung Ju-yong (founder of Hyundai Group), et al.

With this kind of attack on current history textbooks and their authors, 27

the so-called history war between conservatives and progressives have been growing sharper and harsher. It is time to pull the history debates away from the arena of political media and back into the academic arena.

Continuation of the history war only aggravates conflict throughout South Korean society.

28

[Session1: East Asia Before and After World War II, Korea’s Division System, and Continuing Conflicts Over History] Presentation 3

Onset of Cold War Divisions in North Korea and the Korean War

Suzy Kim (Rutgers University)

We may be heading not for general breakdown but for an epoch as horribly stable as the slave empires of antiquity

that is, the kind of world-view, the

kind of beliefs, and the social structure that would probably prevail in a state which was at once unconquerable and in a permanent state of ‘cold war’ with its neighbours

. [I]t is likelier to put an end to large-scale wars at the cost

of prolonging indefinitely a ‘peace that is no peace’.

George Orwell, “You and the Atom Bomb,” Tribune (19 October 1945)

The division system in Korea is undeniably situated in the 20th century history of the Cold War, but with the continued division of the Korean peninsula

marking its 70th year this year

a quarter of a century

after the so-called end of the Cold War, there have been persistent efforts to understand the precise relationship between the Cold War and the evolution of the division system in Korea, as well as the significance of the Korean War in the development of the Cold War. That is, how do we explain the continued division of Korea long after the end of the Cold War? Conventional historiography of the Cold War has focused on the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union that 29

created a bipolar world without outright fighting due to the possibility of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) in a nuclear holocaust. Such simplistic rendering has already been challenged by scholarship that have tried to overcome the Eurocentric perspective by examining the effects of the Cold War in the Third World where there was much bloodshed, as well as by expanding the historical timeline of the Cold War as far back as the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution that gave birth to the Soviet Union1).

While cognizant of the productive efforts to define the particularities of the Korean division system within the East Asian Grand Division, my paper attempts to situate the Korean division historically within the global Cold War and its competing ideologies about what would become of postcolonial societies2). Rather than a focus on nation-states as actors that would necessarily highlight conflicts that emanate from their interests to gain hegemony, I focus on the transnational flows and linkages across national borders that clearly show a world aligning into opposing camps over the substance and form of modern life. In other words, the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution unleashed a radical alternative to capitalist modernity, and many living under the yoke of colonial rule took this option seriously as an antidote to both colonialism and capitalism. The clash over such competing visions already erupted in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) in the 1930s, even before World War II. The latter global conflict only managed to put on hold the differences between the capitalist and socialist camps in order to counter the common fascist threat. This is not to say that the Cold War was inevitable; only that it was possible given the right conditions as predicted by George Orwell in 1945.

One of those necessary conditions was the introduction of atomic weapons. The timing of Orwell’s first known use of the term “cold war” 1) Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006); David C. Engerman, “Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917-1962,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Origins, Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

2) 이삼성, “동아시아 대분단체제: 전후 동아시아 질서의 개념적 재구성과 ‘냉전’,” 냉전과 동아시아 분단체제 한국냉전학회 창립 기념 학술대회 자료집 (June 25, 2015)

30

in October 1945 cannot be ignored. As indicated in the epigraph, he uses the term in a piece titled “You and the Atom Bomb,” published just over two months after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August 1945. Ominously, he concludes that “in a state which was at once unconquerable and in a permanent state of ‘cold war’ with its neighbours it is likelier to put an end to large-scale wars at the cost of prolonging indefinitely a ‘peace that is no peace’.” Orwell’s prediction turned out to be all too accurate, and while “large-scale wars” that involved the detonation of nuclear weapons were avoided, the lack of such “deterrence” plunged the rest of the world into “proxy” wars. If the history of capitalism (and socialism) explains the great ideological divide across the 20th century over the course that modernity would take, then the history of science explains why this division turned into a “cold” war.

While the geopolitics of international relations sheds light on the macro-structural history of the Cold War and Korea’s place in it, this birds-eye view relegates Korea to mere “proxy” status as a chess piece in great power politics whether the great powers are constituted by the US and USSR during the global Cold War or the US, Japan, and China in the regional East Asian divide. Rather, a micro-social history of the Cold War reveals the ways in which the onset of the Cold War was experienced by those living through it in places like North Korea as one significant (ongoing) site of Cold War’s unfolding between 1945 and 19503).

North-South Divide Changes in North Korea between 1945 and 1950 were dramatically depicted as a major point of difference between the North and South, ideologically solidifying the rather arbitrary geographic division that had 3) While North Korea was not officially formed as a separate state until September 1948 with the formation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), I use the term North Korea as shorthand to refer to the area north of the 38th parallel, occupied by the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1948 in agreement with the US proposal for a temporary division of the Korean peninsula in August 1945. The following two sections of the paper are based on examples from Chapter 1 of Suzy Kim, Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

31

been instituted by the two separate occupation powers, with the US in the South and the USSR in the North after Japan’s defeat in August 1945.

For example, a North Korean poster exclaims: “Look! At the Brilliant Democratic Construction in the North.” It is a deliberate attempt to differentiate the North from the South in terms of its aspirations to create a working class utopia as indicated by the tools that identify the two men in the poster as a peasant and a worker, iconic subjects of socialist revolution. The worker points dramatically to what their utopian vision entails: in the distant background are tractors on vast stretches of land to represent mechanized agricultural production for an abundant and self-sufficient food supply; this would be complemented by the rapid industrialization represented in the form of factories, belching out thick black smoke. This particular image is undoubtedly masculine with two male figures in the foreground, but there were plenty of representations of heroic women as well.

A cover of Chosŏn Yŏsŏng (Korean Woman) journal published in North Korea at the time

the primary women’s celebrated the one year

anniversary of the passing of the Gender Equality Law in July 1946 that gave women and men equal political, social, and economic rights.

Through the legislation, women gained the right to vote and hold public offices, rights to free marriage and divorce, property and inheritance rights, rights to education and an equal wage. Polygamy and prostitution were also banned. The cover shows a heroic Korean woman, leading the revolution toward gender equality wearing the traditional Korean dress.

She is a married woman, denoted by the way her hair is tied up in a bun, and she holds a flag of the Democratic Women’s Union, the mass organization of women responsible for the publication of the journal. She is clearly leading the charge for the liberation of women, but not just in North Korea. She is standing on top of the globe, on the northern side of the Korean peninsula, with chains stretching into the southern zone, symbolizing the fact that women continue to be shackled in the South in 32

need of liberation by northern women.

By the time division was formalized through the founding of separate states in the South in August 1948 and in the North in September 1948, once illiterate peasants had learned basic reading and writing, composing short autobiographies that described exactly how their lives had changed in the North. A poor peasant by the name of Sŏ Yŏng-jun from North Pyŏng’an Province Sŏnch’ŏn County submitted the following autobiography attached to his resume in order to join the Democratic Youth League4). He wrote: As a poor peasant by birth since before my grandparents, we lived as tenant farmers to Mr. Kim Un-pu in Sŏkhwadong for 13 years and in 1925 lived as Mr. Pak Pyŏng-ŭp’s [farmhand] in Sŏkhodong, not only oppressed and exploited but also bitterly suffering a wretched life (pich’amhan saenghwal), not able to go to school, caring for my younger siblings until I was 12, and then in order to support my siblings, I started farming at 13 until liberation when we were allotted land, and I was able to farm freely and live a life of freedom (chayusŭrŏn saenghwal).

Before liberation, I couldn’t even read, but after liberation in 1946, I started attending Korean School until 1947, learning to read and participate in organizational life (chojik saenghwal) and beginning a collective life (tanch’ae saenghwal), joining the Youth League on May 26, 1946 and the Peasant League on February 10, 1946, and then I took charge of physical education for the Youth League in our village, training the league members every morning and having fun with this work, and then I wanted to have an organizational life (chojik saenghwal) and joined the Workers Party in January 1947, beginning my organizational life (chojik saenghwal) and taking charge of the party cell on January 6, 1948 and carrying on the cell life (saep’o saenghwal) to this day.

Born in 1926, Sŏ Yŏng-jun had not learned to read or write until he was 20 years old, after liberation in 1946, which can be surmised in the very pages of the handwritten autobiography. Difficult to fully appreciate 4) National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 242, Shipping Advice 2006, Box 16, Item 23 Youth League North Pyŏng’an Province Sŏnch’ŏn County Nam Township Committee (1948).

33

in the translation but visible in the original are the rough block letters, spelling errors, and the lack of punctuation and structure to the sentences.

But, also visible are the differences in his work life and educational life before and after liberation, which is marked throughout the short paragraph with the use of the word saenghwal no less than nine times.

His “wretched life” of tenancy and suffering had turned into a “life of freedom” supported by the 7000 p’yŏng (just over 2 hectares or almost 6 acres) of land he had received in the 1946 land reform. Moreover, his decision to join one organization after another in quick succession suggests that he was eager to embrace a collective lifestyle that changed his daily routine as signaled by the morning exercises he notes in his autobiography. Such changes made a stark contrast to the ways in which the South was depicted as another colony of the US, where peasants and workers continued to be exploited.

Socialist Modernity Aligning with the socialism camp already during the colonial period, Paek Nam-un (1894-1979), the North Korean Minister of Education, viewed the socialist experiment in the Soviet Union as providing a “profound lesson” and “roadmap” for North Korea. He left an illuminating travelogue after his visit to the Soviet Union between February 22 and April 7, 1949 as part of the North Korean delegation to sign the Treaty on Economic and Cultural Cooperation with the Soviet Union5). During a visit to a chocolate factory, Paek noted the packaging of consumer products in Soviet society that focused on preserving the use value of the product

that is the function and form of the product

rather than as a ploy to increase the exchange price. In other words, the materiality of the product determined the way the product was designed and made rather than its exchange value as something to be bought and 5) RG 242, SA 2008 Box 9 Item 89, Paek Nam-un, Ssoryŏn Insang [Impressions of the Soviet Union] (Pyongyang, 1950) reproduced in Paek Nam-un, Ssoryŏn Insang [Impressions of the Soviet Union], ed. Pang Ki-jung (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2005), 80, 10. For a succinct biography of Paek, see Pang’s introduction.

34

sold for profit. Moreover, Paek saw the mechanization of the production line in the Soviet Union, not as enslaving the worker as in capitalist societies, but as freeing workers from tedious work to be placed in control as masters over the machines, monitoring and directing the production process, with time left in the day to live a cultural life.

Touring various sites from factories and educational facilities to museums and art galleries, Paek was struck by the collective forms of entertainment in the various “circles” (ssŏk’ŭl) and the extent to which everyday life was connected to the arts through music, dance, sculpture, and architecture. He wrote: All the recreation and pastime is directed toward collective circles, developing the cultural standard of socialist life to a new level

everyday life is connected to the

arts, and it is the highest civilizational life and the happiest in the world in terms of making life artistic6).

His travelogue was filled with precise and meticulous descriptions, including lists of memorable museum pieces and detailed features of building interiors and public spaces. He explained his reasons for doing so in the “timeliness that must be grasped historically for a scientific worldview, which is a necessary condition to recognize Soviet society that has created a new history of humanity.”7) Appropriate to his position as the Minister of Commerce, another delegation member Chang Si-u (1891-1953) also noted the details in the various stores from the uniforms that the sales clerks wore to the manner in which the merchandise was displayed. He particularly noticed the practical construction of the sales counter8). In contrast to the glass cases back home that were deemed to be more expensive and fragile, Chang praised the wooden counters that were sturdy and easy to make while 6) Ibid, 223, 264.

7) Ibid, 20.

8) RG 242, SA 2008 Box 9 Item 52, Chang Si-u, Ssoryŏn ch’amkwangi [Visit to the Soviet Union] (Pyongyang: Sangŏpsŏng minju sangŏpsa, 1950), 50

35

also providing more room to attend to customers. He concluded that the Soviet counter was practical as opposed to showy, serving its purpose in assisting customers rather than focusing on displaying commodities.

Moreover, he observed how the development of machines had transformed the artistic form in the Soviet Union to make art more accessible to people through mass production, pointing to the way architecture, craftwork and other works of art were no longer produced by hand but mechanized, reminiscent of Walter Benjamin’s point in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1936)9). He concluded that art had not only become part of everyday life, but life itself had become artistic, noting how “The Soviets have absolutely made art part of one’s everyday life. As a smoker who cannot withstand not being able to smoke, they become restless when they go to a dance hall. Even in the making of a door lock or frame, they must have some kind of engraving.”10) Finishing his travelogue, Chang lamented the fact that Korea could not be like the Soviet Union fast enough, urging the workers in his department to learn from the Soviet Union as a model. Eventually, many of the sites that the delegation visited, including the subway, the kolhotz, the Kremlin, the National Pediatrics Hospital, Lenin’s mausoleum, and the Leningrad Palace of Young Pioneers became prototypes for similar sites in North Korea. However, such modeling of the Soviet Union as the vanguard of socialism was not viewed to contradict the principle of autonomy and independence that the North Korean leadership advanced as the primary condition for a modern Korean state. In fact, Paek saw mutual aid and cooperation with the Soviet Union as the basis for a strong independent Korea with chuch’esŏng (subjectivity), referencing a derivative of the term Juche already in 1950 before Kim Il Sung’s famous 1955 speech to which the birth of the ideology is traced.11)

9) Ibid, 85-86.

10) Ibid, 84, 87.

11) Paek, 205.

36

Imminent War12) Revolutions must end as the radical changes are institutionalized, but for North Korea, the end came early with the Cold War. Militarization and centralization of power went hand in hand as the peninsula headed for civil war. By October 1948 the founding of separate states in the North and South heightened tensions along the 38th parallel as North Korea moved to build up its “38 guard units” (38 kyŏngbidae) and the “self-defense forces” (chawidae) in order to thwart southern attacks13).

Beginning in June 1949, the organization of border security and self-defense units became an agenda item at almost every party meeting in Inje County in Kangwŏn Province located right at the 38th parallel14).

Supplementing the military and the police, these units were responsible for protecting factories, government offices, granaries, and the transportation and communication facilities, and for taking villagers to safety should there be a southern attack. They were also given the right to inspect people’s identification cards, take suspicious persons to the closest police station, and carry simple self-defense tools such as sickles, knives, and batons. Local commanders included leaders from the youth, women’s, and peasant unions.

Military training, particularly of youth league members and students, began in August 1949 with instructions in military strategy, weapons training, and aeronautics15). Such preparations were hardly an overreaction as the border threats were real. In July 1949, there was a large-scale attack by the so-called Tiger Unit (horim pudae) from the South that caused extensive damage to local villages, and on August 6, 1949, there was yet another skirmish in Nam Township16). As a result 12) This section is an excerpt from the concluding chapter of Suzy Kim, Everyday Life in the North Korean Revolution, 1945-1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

13) North Korean Workers’ Party Kangwŏn Province Inje County Executive Committee Meeting Minutes No. 25 (1948.10.21), NHCC, vol. 2, 632. Also in RG 242, SA 2007, box 6, item 1.55.

14) North Korean Workers’ Party Kangwŏn Province Inje County Executive Committee Meeting Minutes No. 48 (1949.6.8), NHCC, vol. 3, 348. Also in RG 242, SA 2007, box 6, item 1.65.

15) North Korean Workers’ Party Kangwŏn Province Inje County Executive Committee Meeting Minutes No. 54 (1949.7.21), NHCC, vol. 3, 527, 845 50. Also in RG 242, SA 2007, box 6, item 1.19.

16) North Korean Workers’ Party Kangwŏn Province Inje Executive Committee Minutes No. 58 (1949.8.25), NHCC, vol. 3, 528; North Korean Workers’ Party Kangwŏn Province Inje County Executive Committee Minutes No. 71 (1949.12.10), NHCC, vol. 3, 879.

37

of these clashes in Inje County, 40 people were killed, 18 were kidnapped, 22 were injured, 38 households with 156 people fled to the South, 92 farm animals were lost, 136 houses were burnt down, and 1,127 sacks of grain were destroyed17). In a counterattack, the Inje County self-defense forces occupied the southern half of Nam Township south of the 38th parallel for 12 days between August 6 and 20, 1949, mobilizing some 6,552 people until heavy rains disrupted the supply route and they had to retreat18). As a result, 63 people were killed and 97 houses destroyed in the South while the North sustained 25 casualties with 31 houses burned or destroyed.

Immediately after the fighting in Nam Township, the recruitment of self-defense corps members in Inje County was expanded. Before the fighting, it had been limited to the ages of 18 to 40; now, it was open to those between the ages of 16 and 45, thereby organizing almost all able-bodied residents into defense units19). The number of defense unit members increased to 8,295 5,130 men and 3,165 women out of a county population of 33,722, mobilizing almost a quarter of the residents and over 70 percent of those eligible to join. Consequently, by 1950 an extensive security and surveillance network had been established. Every five households formed one surveillance unit, keeping an eye out for illegal lodgers and strangers from out of town, protecting local facilities and infrastructure, maintaining public health, and preventing fires20). The units were organized and directed by the people’s committees, not by the local police force, since their duties were broadly defined to include not only security but also monitoring sanitary conditions and the spread of infectious diseases. There were outbreaks of cholera in the first half of 1950, already a major problem in the South since 194621). Being so 17) North Korean Workers’ Party Kangwŏn Province Inje County Executive Committee Meeting Minutes No. 73 (1949.12.27), NHCC, vol. 3, 936 40. Also in RG 242, SA 2007, box 6, item 1.62.

18) North Korean Workers’ Party Kangwŏn Province Inje Executive Committee Minutes No. 58 (1949.8.25), NHCC, vol. 3, 528 36.

19) North Korean Workers’ Party Kangwŏn Province Inje County Executive Committee Meeting Minutes No. 54 (1949.7.21), NHCC, vol. 3, 421, 534 35. Also in RG 242, SA 2007, box 6, item 1.19.

20) “Inje County Internal Affairs Bureau Document No. 1 4: Summary of Police Station Work (Secret)” (1950.6), NHCC, vol. 18, 310.

38

close to the border, Inje County was exposed to the spread of epidemics from the South while being repeatedly subjected to instances of sabotage; the most serious cases involved looting and arson of important facilities such as factories and granaries. Indeed, many villages along the 38th parallel had to come up with strategies for defense even before directives from the central government, organizing firefighters and security guards for public facilities such as telephone lines, railways, and granaries. They were especially vigilant against unauthorized travelers. People with criminal records and those with family members who had fled to the South were most suspect; they were specifically placed under watch “in order to prevent beforehand any possible incidents.”22) According to public opinion gathered by North Korean secret surveillance in 1950 before the start of the Korean War, peasants reacted to rising tensions with worries about daily survival. They were concerned about the bad harvest the previous year and wondered who would be left to till the land if people continued to leave for the factories and mines.

Others in charge of defense wondered how long they had to continue guarding the area, with one complaining that he was “sick of it” (kol i ap’ŭda). After cattle were stolen and a guard kidnapped by infiltrators from the South on February 6, 1950, residents were disillusioned by the lack of response from the defense units, expressing skepticism about their competence and effectiveness. One peasant woman in her late forties complained that the guard units had no countermeasure despite the kidnapping, claiming she would join them “if they would be willing to go kill ’em.”23) Physical confrontations were augmented by strategies to win the hearts and minds of the people. In 1949, there were repeated reports of South Korean planes dropping propaganda leaflets, trying to convince North 21) “On the Implementation of the Summer Cleaning,” Puk Township Police Chief (1950.6.9), NHCC, vol. 18, 327 28.

22) RG 242, SA 2012, box 8, item 28, Kangwŏn Province Ch’ŏrwŏn County Department of Interior (1950).

23) RG 242, SA 2012, box 8, item 28, Kangwŏn Province Ch’ŏrwŏn County Department of Interior (1950).

랍취되여도 대책도 없이 그 놈들을 하로에다 잡아죽겨쓰면 같이 나가서 해보겟다.

39

Korean soldiers and defense units to join the South24). The leaflets offered free medical care for injured soldiers, arguing that they were not the enemy but that Kim Il Sung and his “cronies” were. “Why fight to the end just to have the Soviet Union as your homeland?” implored a leaflet as it promised safe passage to anyone who “returns to the bosom of the homeland” with the leaflet in hand. Many were not easily swayed, expressing disdain for and hostility toward the planes, wondering why the People’s Army did not shoot them down. Others, however, were impressed with the planes and the kinds of resources that the South was able to mobilize, with one woman expressing concern that subsequent planes might drop bombs rather than leaflets and that it was “time to prepare to move into the mountains.”

The woman’s statement was ominous to say the least, but no one could have predicted the catastrophic war that was to take over three million lives, or 10 percent of the Korean population, over the course of just three years, making it one of the deadliest conflicts in modern history outside of the two world wars. By 1952, there were “no more targets” left standing in the North, where, by war’s end, American planes had dropped 635,000 tons of bombs and 32,557 tons of napalm, compared to 503,000 tons of bombs used in all of Asia and the Pacific during World War II25). While South Korea sustained 1,312,836 casualties, including 415,004 dead, North Korean casualties are estimated at two million, including a million civilians, which meant that the war had claimed, on average, at least one member from every family in the North26).

The war left long-term physical and psychological damage that continues to shape North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy down to the present day. Not only is it exceptionally guarded against the 24) RG 242, SA 2010, box 2, item 76, North Korean Workers’ Party Hwanghae Province (Top Secret) (1949).

다시 생각해보라 쏘련을 조국으로 하기위하여 결사적으로 싸울필요가 있을까? 쏘련=스탈린=김일성=공산당=인민군패전=중엄=멸망! (넘어올때는 반듯이 이종이를 갖이고 오면 친절히 안내하겠다) 빨리 뉘우치고 조국의 품안으로 어서 돌아오라. 국군은 따뜻이 맞이 해주마!

25) Head of Bomber Command in the Far East, General O’Donnell, quoted in Foster-Carter, “North Korea: Development and Self-Reliance,” 47; Charles Armstrong, “The Destruction and Reconstruction of North Korea, 1950 1960,” Asia-Pacific Journal 8, Issue 51.2 (December 20, 2010).

26) Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: Modern Library, 2010), 35, 63.

40

infiltration of foreign influence, whether in the form of tourists or the Internet, but it has one of the longest conscription stints in the world at ten years of mandatory military service for almost all males who meet physical and background requirements27). This may explain why men have increasingly come to dominate all levels of the social and political hierarchy in the postwar period despite the importance accorded to women before the war. With the war ending in an armistice rather than a peace treaty, North Koreans have been mobilized to continue preparing for a war that might resume at a moment’s notice against a far superior power, the United States. The Korean War has become the single most defining national experience, leaving North Koreans with a fiercely autarkic mentality as a form of internal cohesion against outside threats.

It should be apparent by this point that I am questioning the declared end of the Cold War, situating the unended Korean War within the history of ongoing Cold War and the divisions it has spawned. The stockpiling and proliferation of nuclear weapons continue to be problems today, and while state socialism proved inadequate as an alternative modernity in the 20th century, problems associated with capitalist modernity continue unabated. What the history of division in Korea shows is that the Cold War divide was as much about alternatives to liberalism in the social and cultural realm as it was to capitalism in the economic realm. Confronted with the realpolitik of the Cold War, the utopian vision of overcoming class and gender inequality and ethnic and national divisions in the name of proletarian internationalism was forsaken. Across the political spectrum, the primary method by which to overcome divisions today resorts to forms of ethnic nationalism and/or cultural relativism that champion essentialist arguments against the threat of Western universalism. The same could be said of North (and South) Korean appeals for minjok t’ongil (national reunification). It is yet another 27) Although conscription terms were codified at three to four years in 1958, actual service terms reportedly extended up to eight years. The ten-year service requirement became law in 1993. See 2009 Pukhan kaeyo [2009 overview of North Korea] (Seoul: T’ongil yŏn’guwŏn, 2009), 97.

41

fallout of the Cold War itself.

42

[Session2: 70 Years since partition; Korean peninsula

present

and future] Presentation 1

THAAD in Northeast Asia

J.J. Suh (International Christian University)

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

[Session 2: 70 Years since partition; Korean peninsula present and future] Presentation 2

The Conservative Swing of South Korean Politics and the Emergence of Popular Far-Right Organizations

Kim Dong-choon (SungKongHoe University)

(Summary Translation) 1.

Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hyeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Pro-North Korean Branding

The continued seizure of power by the conservatives, with the Park Geun-hye administration following Lee Myung-bak, is the result of the post-Korean War rightwing and the breakaway middle class disappointed with the economic policies of the previous ten years of democratic government under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. After the 1997 financial crisis, the two democratic administrations took the lead in adopting a neo-liberalist economy, which aggravated economic polarization.

The seizure of power by Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye cannot simply be attributed to nostalgia for regionalism or authoritarianism. The masses desired strong leadership that could address their anxieties about the economy.

Since the inauguration of the Park Geun-hye administration, the ruling party, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the Ministry of National Defense that illegally intervened in the presidential election have defined those who have criticized such intervention as national enemies

61

who are “pro-North” and “leftist.” Elections have become wars, the opposition party an enemy, and the supporting masses an object of “pacification.” As Schmitt says, “politics is what distinguishes me from the enemies” (Schmitt, 2007: 19-79).

How can we explain this condition in which elections, party politics, and the independence of the judiciary are guaranteed by law, and yet the president and the intelligence agencies are intervening in politics in the name of national security? Is this indeed anything new? Are we to doubt the common knowledge that South Korea has been “democratized” since 1987? Or did certain conditions such as the division of the Korean peninsula or US hegemony in Korea work as factors that thwarted “democratic consolidation” in South Korea? Theories such as “democratic consolidation theory” or “post-democracy theory” that attempt to explain the political transition from authoritarianism to democracy can offer only limited insight into current Korean politics. Despite attempts to achieve “high quality democracy” for a while now, such procedural democracy can always be reversed, and accordingly so-called democratic institutions and apparatuses can be rendered powerless.

This did not just happen over the past year, but rather needs to be explained within the timeframe since the 1987 democratization, especially during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations when neo-liberal political and economic changes were instituted. As the far-right political forces seized power, aspects of authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and fascism that remained in South Korean state and civil society have appeared in new forms today.

2. Emergence of Far-Right Activism in South Korea Far-right activism emerged in South Korea when the Kim Dae-jung administration came into power. In the case of Europe, when leftist or 62

liberal forces such as the Labor Party and the Social Democratic Party took power, rightists were motivated to come out into the streets, advocating racist nationalism. In South Korea, the seizure of power by liberalist progressive forces left conservative rightists with a sense of crisis, which led them to conclude they no longer held exclusive support of the state, triggering their activism.

As Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun held power throughout much of the 2000s, those who had participated in the student movement or social activism began to gather and organize rightwing organizations. Even before the emergence of such rightwing organizations, there were frequent rallies and protests led by mega-churches or veterans’ associations.

Although such activism by veterans’ associations and elderly groups (reminiscent of white terror immediately after liberation and during the Korean War) may not be entirely equivalent to the blatant terrorism of the past, their violence tactics indeed reject law and order, and any possibility for reasonable conversation and discussion.

Since 2000, mass rallies by Protestants have become quite severe in their distinctly pro-American and anti-North Korean stance. The main participants who have rallied against the abolishment of the National Security Law or for democratization through regime collapse in North Korea have been Protestants mobilized by conservative mega-churches such as the Full Gospel Church. Some churches even held prayer meetings for North Korean “collapse” publicly.

Meanwhile, as the media took on a pro-government stance under the Lee Myung-bak administration, anti-government and progressive political satire became radically popular on the Internet. Concurrently, far-rightist political satire, jokes, and cyber games started to attract the younger generation; especially noteworthy is the emergence of far-rightist organizations online. Ilbe (short for Ilgan Best) is the most representative example. Ilbe emerged through a combination of the political stance in the “Politics and Society Gallery” and anti-honam (southwest) regionalism 63

of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Baseball Galleryâ&#x20AC;? on the DC Inside website. Ilbe has thus become an exclusive rightwing humor community by Internet users saving certain kinds of posts from DC Inside. The far-rightist characteristics of Ilbe can be summarized as anti-democratic and anti-progressive (anti-Communist and anti-North Korean rightist), anti-women (sexist), anti-foreign (racist, xenophobic), anti-honam (regional discrimination).

Subsequently, rightist organizations in South Korea since 2000 have become politicized and some have even resorted to violence. Although the autonomous emergence of the younger generation of rightists is most noteworthy, they have not come out on the streets or used violence, opposed to rightist middle-aged former military personnel or the elderly.

3. Support for Rightist Organizations under Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye When Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun came to power, so-called interest groups that had previously received support from the state and local governments lost their status. Support for non-governmental organizations by the Ministry of Public Administration and Security and other government organizations was institutionalized, as newly formed interest groups since the 1990s have become the new beneficiaries of state support. Accordingly, the conservative Grand National Party and conservative media such as the Chosun Ilbo attacked the state, claiming that the state was colluding with civil society to strengthen state power.

Aware of such popular opinion, the state gradually decreased its support of interest groups.

However, even during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, various local governments and institutions were still illegally controlled by conservative interest groups, and the government budget for interest groups was still distributed in favor of those 64

conservative groups.

As Lee Myung-bak came into power, those interest groups which had felt disadvantaged during the previous ten years of democratic administrations started to raise their voice and publicly approach the government. Furthermore, as the candle light protests occurred at the beginning of the Lee administration, the ruling party and the conservative media blamed certain interest groups for participating in the protests. The state cut support to those interest groups which had received support after the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations came into power.

Thus, conservative organizations again came to monopolize support from the state as they had in the past.

4. Are the Old Right and the New Right Different in South Korea?

Far-right organizations and radicalism have often emerged in times of crisis under modern capitalism. Radical rightists tend to emerge violently when institutionalized parties or labor unions do not represent the economic needs and interests of the unemployed or under-employed workers, and when the institutions and laws of liberal democracy do not represent their demands. Similar to socialist movements in the early to mid-20th century, rightist radicalism has its roots in mass discontent and feelings of isolation and deprivation, resorting to physical violence under the leadership of far-rightist organizations.

The period when rightist terrorism and activism reached its peak in South Korea was between liberation in 1945 and the 1950s. The period of military dictatorship between the 1960s and 1980s was when the ideology and position of rightists were absorbed and represented by state power, the military, and the police; while the period since is when rightists became active because they felt a sense of crisis from being 65

alienated by “progressive or leftist” activists in the political arena.

Rightists started to come out on the streets since 2000 because democratization threatened their political standing.

Old rightist organizations were mainly composed of North Korean refugees from the 1940s-50s such as members of the Northwest Youth Association, the unemployed, families who had suffered damage from leftists, and some Christians. Active rightists since 2000 are mainly former military personnel such as members of the Veterans’ Association, Korean Disabled Veteran’s Association by Agent-Orange in the Vietnam War, and Special Duty Veterans’ Association, along with newly emerged Christians from mega-churches. The biggest difference between “old” rightist activism and the “new” one is the emergence of Christians. South Korea, where Christians of conservative church organizations such as the Christian Council of Korea are mobilized by their ministers for rightist activism, is most similar to the United States in the 1970s. Meanwhile, except the fact that members of Ilbe are only active online, they are similar to neo-Nazi rightists of Europe in the 1990s. In other words, young people who are not socially recognized, unemployed, or steeped in patriarchal culture or male chauvinism tend to become the main forces of new rightist activism. However, these young rightists are not using physical violence or being mobilized for political purposes as is the case of young far-rightists in Europe or terrorist forces in the Arab world today. Although feelings of deprivation, failure, or anger prompted these young men to gravitate toward discourses of radical regionalism, anti-North Koreanism, and female hatred, they lack the ideology that can firmly motivate them to act.

Indeed, the motivation for former military personnel to participate in rightist organizations such as the Veterans’ Association or the Korean Disabled Veteran’s Association by Agent-Orange in the Vietnam War is closely related to “benefits” like financial support from the state rather than desire for social recognition. North Korean refugees 66

who had joined the Northwest Youth Association, taking the lead in the anticommunist fight, had also been related to such â&#x20AC;&#x153;benefits.â&#x20AC;?

Anti-communism masked the past of the rich pro-Japanese, who were able to use it to secure their property against confiscation of collaborator properties, which matched the interests of North Korean refugees needing money. The rich used the refugees who secured their means of livelihood through their support. That rightists

whether old or new

unite and

dissolve according to interests instead of ideology means that they have almost entirely depended on the financial support of the state in South Korea.

With the active support and collusion of the government, various rightist organizations composed of former military personnel commit acts of violence, such as use of abusive language, interference in other interest groupsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; events and counter-rallies, threatening progressive leaders, breaking into the Unified Progressive Party building and assaulting related personnel, and breaking into a newspaper company and damaging its property. Members of these organizations think that no one can disturb them because they are patriots who have sacrificed themselves for the nation and have made clear their anti-North Korean and anti-Communist stance. They believe that they are justified in their use violence in order to eliminate pro-North Korean and leftist politicians who in their view are national enemies. They consider procedural democracy or discussion meaningless. However, it is doubtful whether they could continue their activism without the financial support and collusion of the state.

5. Concluding Remarks The emergence of far-right activism can be interpreted as a sign or tendency for fascism. Fascism in the past, particularly after World War II, 67

can be seen as a failure of democracy. They were mostly a reflection of a sense of crisis felt by the rich upon the emergence of leftists or progressive social movements. Fascism tends to emerge when institutional politics cannot represent the grievances and needs of the masses.

Far-rightist activism in South Korea since 2000 emerged out of a sense of crisis from, and a resistance to the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations that had rejected anti-Communist or anti-North ideologies, as well as against the progressive parties seeking to engage with North Korea and socialist thoughts.

Various civil society movements since the 1990s, the emergence of progressive discourse on the Internet, and resistance to criticism of liberalism on Social Network Services also gave motivation for far-right activism. Moral superiority and self-justification claimed by civil society movements and progressive intellectuals faced stiff negative reactions from the rightists. And rightist activism was further fueled by the Kim and Roh administrations themselves that had staked a progressive stance but in reality made the lives of workers and the poor more difficult. For these reasons, the old equation that fascism reflects the emergence and failure of the left can be applied to the case of South Korea.

Although the discourse claimed by these rightists do champion the supremacy of the state as in other countries, it does not espouse the kind of racism or social conservatism as in advanced capitalist countries.

Instead, an extreme anti-Communist, anti-North Korean, and pro-American stance comprise the major proportion of its discourse. It may be a distorted vision of Korean rightists who cannot realize imperialism.

Meanwhile, core members of the Park Geun-hye administration also possess the same stance or ideology as the far-rightists. Thus, they are tempted to use the far-rightists to secure their own hold on power, willing to defend and support their activism. Far-rightist activism is a poisoned apple. If one swallows it, one is destined to become like the US where 9/11 became the retaliation for having used Osama bin Laden.

68

[Session 2: 70 Years since partition; Korean peninsula present and future] Presentation 3

The Security State and Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Peace Movement

Jeong Eun Park(Peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy)

The South Korean government, which continues to equate national security with peace, has aimed to become a security state by latching onto the dominant power and expanding military spending. It has monopolized information and expanded its domain of making exceptions and maintaining secret information. At the foundation of the national security state are consumptive spending on peninsular division, which sacrifices the safety of citizens, and an apparatus of repression. However, due to extreme economic inequality, the majority of citizens are already in a state of anti-peace. Thus it is necessary to keep asking the question, what kind of peace do we wish to achieve? Furthermore, we must include the question of why peace is necessary for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Peace calls for the respect of human life and dignity and a world without discrimination. Achieving peace is possible in a society in which anyone can live a safe and sustainable life, conflict is prevented, and democracy mediates. Ultimately it is a question of what kind of nation and community we are striving to become.

69

The division systems of both North and South Korea, which are structured through abnormal systems, are strong and firm. The overwhelming superiority of security authorities the military, National Intelligence Service, Defense Security Command, prosecution, etc. and conservative media under the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun Administrations and the administrations that followed still reign. Each time an administration faces crisis, furthermore, the tactic of positioning North Korea a scapegoat is still being used. With the harsh reality of the international community as a pretext, the ROK-US Alliance was not a means but rather an ideology that was propagated, and neither the intellectual community and its discourse nor the political party landscape of the dominant conservative power has changed. After the financial crisis in 1997, South Korean society has experienced extreme polarization and a shift to materialism, severely damaging the democratic values that had once been achieved. It became even more difficult to expect a fair market and to have confidence in the rule of law. In this enormous system of peninsular division the priority for the peace and security of citizens gets pushed out, and the individuals that get tossed into the market must survive on their own. Such economic inequality does not help to improve inter-Korean relations or to overcome the system of division.

In such a reality, the pressure of having to choose between autonomy and alliance now carries over to having to choose between China and the U.S. For South Korea the necessity to align with the strongest country permeates naturally. Such choices, however, do not present a way for us, those who live on the Korean Peninsula, to acquire universal and sustainable peace. The fact that both North and South Korea reinforce military spending and continue the discourse on security makes clear that military conflict cannot be resolved. North Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s abandoning its nuclear weapons program is also unlikely.

70

It is necessary to go beyond the established security state and its discourse. Reconciliation will otherwise be impossible, and consequently we would have to continue to submit to having a symbiotic relationship with the â&#x20AC;&#x153;enemyâ&#x20AC;? and the system of division would become permanent.

Achieving genuine peace while living with unsustainable economic inequality and under the neoliberal system of accumulation would be difficult, and resolving the issue of division would be unlikely. The peace movement, therefore, cannot simply work to dismantle the maintained structure of division and the mechanisms of war. Simultaneously, the movement must resist the mechanisms of violence which destroy human dignity and are spread across society.

There must be a discussion on whether the peace movement is effective by changing through access or promoting access through change. For example, concerning the prospects of creating a peace state and achieving reunification, discussions are needed at great lengths regarding the shift from the current security state to a peace security state (or a security state that aims for peace), as well as the national vision and the foundation of social construction that the peace movement must pursue.

The discussions must also include the possibility of actually carrying out a peace movement in spite of a severely regressive democracy and intensified economic inequality; whether solidarity and growth can be possible among diverse progressive groups, such as peace and human rights groups; whether Korea can demonstrate leadership and gain trust in North East Asia; and whether South Korea, in its current state, can actually shape the state of North Korea in the future.

South Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s peace movement, like many civil society movements, is losing its vitality. There are external factors that hinder the movement,

71

such as the increased degree of fatigue regarding issues of the peninsula and North Korea and the dominance of ideological camp logic; the deterioration in financial capability and the quality of living; the absence of a political power that embraces or represents the values of peace; etc.

There is also difficulty in recruiting and training activists and forming long-lasting connections with policy experts. Extraordinary effort is needed to strengthen the infrastructure of the peace movement. The peace movement must be expanded beyond issues of everyday life. Activism that reveals the direct ties between decreased spending on division and the peace and safety of citizens needs to be strengthened.

Japan’s Abe Administration’s recent push for a security bill exercising the nation’s right to collective self-defense goes beyond a mere change in security policies. Rather, creates a shift in Japan’s national identity to that of a dangerous nation. Throughout this process Japan is facing extreme danger to its own constitutionality and democracy. The US-ROK-Japan security triangle is taking concrete form. Korea signed the ROK-US-Japan military intelligence pact, and discussions on the deployment of THAAD are in full swing. The legislation that will allow the overseas deployment of Korean soldiers is its last stage before being enacted by the National Assembly. It is the job of the civil society to resist the actions of South Korea and Japan. Powerful solidarity for peace is urgently needed in East Asian civil society.

72

[Session 3: Overcoming War and Partition â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Korea and Beyond]

Some artistic reflections on war and division

Kaisen, Jane Jin (Ph.D. Candidate, University of Copenhagen / The Royal Danish Academy of Fine Arts, Denmark)

In response to the topic of this panel, Overcoming War and Partition Korea and Beyond, I will share somepersonal reflections on whatprompted me as an artist and filmmaker to work with issues that emanate from the Korean War and division of Korea by talking around a few art projects.

I was adopted to Denmark in 1980 during the peak of overseas adoptions from South Korea. As an adoptee growing up in a white suburban working class family in Northern Europe, I was not taughtKorean history at all. Rather, I grew up within humanitarian savior narratives of transnational adoption in which adoptees are constructed as objects without a history, or as persons without a past.However, in 2001, just before entering art school, I went to Korea for the first time since I was adopted and on this journey I managed to find and reunite with my Korean birth family in Jeju Island. This was a formative event for me not only on a personal level in that I saw the discrepancies between official narratives of adoption and my own story, but also artistically in that it prompted an interest in histories that have been marginalized.

Themes I have dealt extensivelywith in my artworks and filmsinclude

73

transnational adoption, gendered effects of war and militarism, legacies of colonialism, and the political history of Jeju Island. These are all topics that I see intrinsicallyconnected to the division of Korea. At the same time, they cannot be isolated to Korea but must be seen within broader transnational geopolitical and historical contexts.

The Woman, The Orphan, and The Tiger The Woman, The Orphan, and The Tigeris a narrative experimental film from 2010 that I made in collaboration with visual artist and filmmaker Guston Sondin-Kung. The film traces ways in which trauma is passed on from previous generations to the present through a sense of being haunted. It follows a number of Korean diasporic women in their 20s and 30s who return to Korea and explores how the physical return of the diaspora confronts and destabilizes narratives that have been constructed to silence histories ofbiopolitical mobilization andviolence committed onto certain parts of the population.

The film creates a strategic genealogy by relating the stories of three generations of women: the former â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;comfortâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; women who were conscripted into military sexual slavery by the Japanese military between World War I and II

women working assex workers around US military bases in

South Korea since the division of Korea

and children who were

adopted from South Korea to the West since the Korean War. Since my first journey back to Korea, I have been part of a growing contingency of transnational adoptee artists, activists and academicswho have generated critical discourse around transnational adoption in South Korea and in the west. 2004was a significant year in terms of transnational adoptee organizing as the first Gathering of Overseas Korean Adoptees took place in South Korea that year. The event was attended by more than 400 adoptees from 15 countries and provided a forum for adoptees to meet and share experiences. Around the same time, groups

74

such as ASK: Adoptee Solidarity Korea

and Track: Truth and

Reconciliation for the Adoptee Community of Korea were formed as alternatives to largely apolitical adoptee associations. These groups have been committed to put attention to social issues related to transnational adoption, among others by aligning with single mothers and birth families.

Women artists played a significant role in forming these organizations and artists also organized among themselves, examples of which arethe artist collective UFOlab (Unidentified Foreign Object LABoratory) andthe Korean diaspora artist group and networkOrientity Exhibition .

An incentive for making The Woman, The Orphan, and The Tiger was to inscribe transnational adoption within the history of Korea and to record aspects of adopteesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; collective process of political becoming, focusing especially on how women adoptee artists have played a significant role in shaping the growing critical discourse on adoption within the Korean transnational adoptee community and beyond.Several of the artists who have played an important role in this endeavor function asmain protagonists in The Woman, The Orphan, and The Tiger. Among those are visual artist Nathalie MiheeLemoine,writer Maja Lee Langvad, poet Jennifer Kwon Dobbs, writer Jane JeongTrenka, filmmaker Tammy Chu. The film speaks from a collective set of voices in an endeavor to create an alternative to dominant representations of adoptee search and return that tend to focus on individual adopteesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; search for biological rootsrather than the broader social, historical and political frameworks in which transnational adoptions from South Korea emerged and which is intimately linked to the Korean War and its aftermath.

Another motivation for the film was to trace connections between the history of transnational adoption and other histories of migration from Koreastemming fromgendered effects of war and militarism. The Woman,

75

The Orphan, and The Tiger was conceptualized while I was studying in New York and Los Angeles and interfaced with Korean diaspora communities in the United States.I became interested in the U.S.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; role in the Korean War and how militarism, particularly in the form ofsexual intimacies between Korean women and US servicemen,has played a role in shapingKorean migration patterns to the U.S. Grace M. Cho, one of the protagonists in the Woman, The Orphan, and The Tiger, eloquently details in her book Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and The Forgotten War, how this tabooed and often times painful history enveloped in family secrets, appears only in fragments and is passed on through a sense of haunting from one generation to the next. In addition, the film, through the voice of visual artist SoniKum, traces legacies Japan´s colonization of Korea and experiences of the Korean diaspora in Japan. The voices of these young diasporic women are accompanied in the film by testimonies from Korean and Philippina women involved in the U.S. military prostitution industry in South Korea and women who were forced into military sexual slavery by the Japanese army to contour the transgenerational effects of militarism on the lives of women.

With my artworks I attempt to point to relationships between power, representation, and productions of meaning by on the one hand exposing and destabilizing dominant narratives and representational logics that serve to suppress, exclude, or demonize certain subjects or perspectives while pointing to sites of emergence by proposing alternative readings or translations that can also give aesthetic shape to the traumas and fractures that accompanies modes of erasure and silencing.

The Woman, The Orphan, and The Tigershows how the Korean War is officially represented among others through panoramas of the Korean War Memorial in Seoul and in archive footage fromU.S. newsreels from the 1950s. However in the film,these official images are contested by the voiceovers of the women protagonists who give alternative accounts and

76

testimonies. The official Korean War representations are also contrasted byfilmed footage fromthespaces of the military camptowns that remain largely invisible and isolated.

Thestrategic genealogy established between the ‘former comfort’ women, women working around US military bases, and transnational adoptees, is not meant to insinuate that these issues can be conflated or that they are directly related, but rather to point tohow these histories emerged out of a similar nexus of colonialism, militarism and war, as well as how they were tabooedand silenced for decadesbecause of patriarchy, nationalism, and class-inflicted marginalization.

Reiterations of Dissent Following The Woman, The Orphan, and The Tiger, I began an ongoing art project titledDissident Translationsconsisting of threevideos installations and a multi-media archive installationabouthow thesuppressed history and fragmented memories of the Jeju April Third Uprising continue to reverberate in the present moment.

Working on The Woman, The Orphan, and The Tiger, I was compelled to understand some of the details of what occurred in the short interim period between the decolonization of Korea from Japanin 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Working on the Jeju project also provided me a deeper context for understandinghow my birth family has been impacted by the ideological tensions of Korea´s division that was felt intensely on Jeju Island up until the late 1990s when truth and reconciliation efforts around the Jeju April Third Incident finally began to take shape in public.

A main workin the Dissident Translations project is a multi-channel video installation and film titled Reiterations of Dissent. Told mainly through the voices of individuals (Hyun Ki Young, Huh YeongSeon,Kim Kyung Hoon, Kim SeongNae, Jong Gong Chul, Kim Dong Man, Song

77

Seung Moon, Koh Nan Hyang, Kim Jong Min, and Kim Dong Chun) who have been active in efforts to investigate and narrate the events surrounding the Jeju April Third, Reiterations of Dissent conveys perspectives that have been largely suppressed and remain disputed to the present daybecause of ideological arguments over the history.

Rather than providing a linear chronological account of the Jeju April Third Uprising and Massacre,Reiterations of Dissent presents a multi-layered archive of experiences, events, and perspectives.The work is composed of six different video narratives that uncovers various underlying political motivations and portrays how the un-reconciled trauma of Jeju April Third continues to resonate through multiple forms: the island's present landscape, evocative literary representations, recurring memories of survivors and relatives, shamanic rituals that mediate between the living and the dead, and in protests against re-militarization of Jeju Island with the construction of the Jeju Naval Base.

Similar for The Woman, The Orphan, and The Tiger and Reiterations of Dissent is an attempt to give aesthetic form to the ramifications of division through a diasporic lens. The division of Korea represents to me a political primal scene and trauma that continues to permeate the present because of the un-ended status of the Korean Warwith the effect that certain histories remain unresolved and a real process of healing and recognition is suspended.Because of this suspension, past and present cannot be separated but is constantly conflated and there is no neat resolution. This manifests in my works in the form of multiple and layered montage sequences and fragmented narrativeswhere temporal and spatial dimensions overlap.

For me as an artist it has been a gradual process of going back in time to the sources of the Korean War. Going back in time has also been a process of approaching the present and the root cause of what, as a

78

transnational adoptee of Korean descent, Iregard as the traumatic stalemate that conditions my subjectivity - and this might be shared with many diaspora subjects - a sense of separation and disjuncture - that cannot be undone but that I can try nuance and approximate.

79

[Session 3: Overcoming War and Partition

Korea and

Beyond]

The Division System and Zainichi Koreans

Lee, Jung-ae (Zainichi Koreans)

Hello!

My name is Lee, Jung-ae. I am a third-generation Jaeil

Joseonin[1]. I am sure the last name Lee must be unfamiliar to you already, but the term, ‘Jaeil Joseonin,’ would be even more unfamiliar.

When I visited Korea in 2005, I didn’t see so many Koreans who knew what Jaeil Joseonin was. Also, when Koreans heard me introducing myself as ‘Lee’ and that I am a Jaeil Joseonin, the South Koreans looked at me with wary eyes.[2] I later heard that some Koreans thought the Jaeil Joseonin in Japan betrayed Korea and chose Japan out of their administration for richer country. Buy both my dad’s and mom’s parents who used to live in Jeju Island went to Japan after being deprived of everything, like pretty much everyone was at the time, to survive. The Koreans who moved to Japan during the colonization period were the 1st generation Jaeil Koreans[3].

My parents who were born in Osaka were

the 2nd generation, thus it makes me the 3rd generation. Now, the Korean expatriate community has 4th and 5th generation Jaeil Joseonins.

Because of the frightening Japanese colonial period and such a painful history of division into North and South, we, the Korean expatriates in Japan, have been suffering for more than a century. From the historical

80

perspective, it would be proper to refer Korea as Chosun, thus it would be also appropriate to refer the Korean expatriates in Japan as Jaeil Joseonin, but the word, ‘Chosun,’ is a very uncomfortable one to use here in Korea, but especially far too onerous in Japan[4].

I do not

enjoy speaking Japanese (in Korea), but if I dare to say it, ‘Chosen’ or ‘Chosenjin’[5] are objects of all sorts of discrimination and contempt in Japan. So, the Korean expatriates with dual citizenship in Korea call themselves ‘Jaeil Hankukin’ or some from both sides of Korean expatriate communities just call themselves as ‘Jainich[6]’ leaving ‘Korean’ out.

This is only one of many examples that show how deeply the Korean expatriate communities are divided and how deep-rooted the discrimination is in Japan. There is one more thing with the titles. In Korea, we are often referred to as ‘Gyopo,’ but I think we should be referred to as ‘Dongpo’. Frankly, I don’t feel comfortable being called as a Gyopo, because the term feels alienating. How Gyopo is different from Dongpo?

Gyopo refers to a compatriot who lives permanently in other countries as the citizens thereof, and Dongpo is a term for a person from same country or race with a positive connotation. I wish the South Koreans would call us, the Jaeil Chosunin, and be kind to their Dongpo.

If I were just any Jaeil Dongpo or Jaeil Chosunin, I wouldn’t have come here today. I am here because I wanted to talk about my nationality. One may assume that I am a Japanese, because I was born and raised in Japan, or that I am a Korean, because I am living in Korea. Unfortunately, none of the above. I am a national of Chosun.

People often ask if it means that I am a North Korean, but no. Again, I am a national of Chosun. Then, South Koreans ask if I am a Chosunjok[7].

Here goes a very complicated story about my nationality. To be exact, I am a ‘Chosenseki[8]’ holder. Under the international law, I am a stateless person. I have never met anyone who understood my situation

81

at once. I had to explain my status over and over to make others understand - to Ms. Lim, the cartoonist who draw the story of my life in ‘Story of Lee Jung-ae, the Jaeil Dongpo, in Seoul’ and even to my husband, Mr. Kim, Ick. Even the Japanese people who came up with this idea don’t know what it is - considering how ‘flexible’ they are about their history, I wouldn’t be surprised if they did.

So, when I

have a business at the Immigration Bureau of Japan, I have to spend hours to explain and persuade the ignorant officials.

The Japanese

government has been saying that ‘a person can choose to hold the Chosenseki,’ but I have lived all my life believing that it was my nationality. Chosun has been my nationality since my grandfather was born and I was born. Chosun is my identity. And I do not want to recognize my homeland having been separated into two. If I acquired the Korean citizenship, I would be accepting that my homeland is divided. Over my dead body! No!

On the very day when the two

Koreas are unified, I will apply for the citizenship of ‘United Korea.’

Lee, Jung-ae, the 3rd generation Jaeil Chosunin, the dreamer of unification of homeland, the ardent lover of land, language and race of Korea, the only Chosenseki holder living in Korea, the writer of Story of Lee Jung-ae, the Jaeil Dongpo, in Seoul (Lee, Jung-ae, Lim, So-hee (cartoonist), Bori Publisher, 2015) and a member of Prisoner of Conscience Supporters.

[1] Translator’s note: As North and South Koreas prefer ‘Chosun’and‘Hankuk,’respectively,astheirnationaltitle,‘JaeilJoseonin’ meansKoreanexpatriatesinJapanwhoarepro-NorthKorea. Those who are pro-South Korea are called‘JaeilHankukin.’

[2] Translator’s note: the Korean last name, ‘Lee,’ is pronounced ‘Yi’in South Korea and‘Lee’in North Korea

82

[3] Translator’s note: as the Korean expatriate community was divided into pro-South and pro-North later, the references to Korean expatriates were also divided.

[4] Translator’s note: it is so, because: Koreans have inferiority complex from Chosun Dynasty being lethargically colonized by Japan; North Koreans chose to refer their nation as ‘Buk(North)Chosun’;andJapanesesentimentofbelittlingKoreansasthese condclasscitizens.

[5] Translator’s note: ‘Chosun’ and ‘Chosun person’ pronounced in Japanese.

[6] Translator’s note: ‘Jaeil (in Japan)’ pronounced in Japanses.

[7] Translator’s note: ‘Chosunjok’ is a general term for Chinese-Koreans.

[8] Translator’s note: A nationality granted by Japanese government, for immigration administration convenience’s sake, to the Koreans who lived in Japan as of 1945 and thereafter and held no citizenship of Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or Japan.

83

[Session 3: Overcoming War and Partition

Korea and

Beyond]

Conscientious Objectors’ Movement for anti-militarism

Im Jae-seong (Conscientious Objector)

The conscientious objection movement in Korea began to surface to public attention when Oh Tae-yang, a Buddhist and a peace activist, publicly raised his conscientious objection to military duty in December in 2001. Oh’s public statement prompted three dozens or so nongovernmental organizations in Korea to gather together and form solidarity in support of conscientious objectors. The main demand of these activists was that the Korean government provide alternative channels, other than military service, for fulfilling one’s duty to the nation and stop putting conscientious objectors away in prison. Thanks to their campaigns, the Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) finally announced its decision in September 2007 to allow conscientious objectors to serve in alternative social services. The decision finally put an end to the five-decade history of punishing and condemning conscientious objectors.

The MND’s decision, however, was soon overturned by the Lee Myung-bak administration that came to power afterward, which cited the “inadequacy of the public consensus on the issue” as the reason for cancelling the decision. As a result, numerous young people who could have served their duty in social and non-military positions since March

84

2009 are now forced to risk going to prison. There are over 700 such young persons in Korea today who are incarcerated solely for their conviction that they ought not to aim their weapons at others for murder.

This essay examines the history of conscientious objection in Korea with a focus on social movements. The participants in those movements may have failed to stop conscientious objectors from going to prison, but that does not mean that all their efforts have ended in vain. The social movements in support of conscientious objection not only raised the public awareness of the importance of alternatives to military service, but also created and spread practices and language of resistance against the military authoritarianism that has long characterized the Korean society.

The majority of studies on conscientious objection focus on the institutional history and implications of alternatives to military service, and have thus failed to capture the significant progresses made on the social front. This essay, by contrast, approaches conscientious objection as a series of anti-military movements and voices.

I have a personal stake in this research. It was in 2002, while I was still an undergraduate student, that I first began to participate in a movement for conscientious objection. Fighting for the human rights of others, I have come to discover the new meaning of picking up a gun and aiming it at others as a soldier. This discovery led me to increasingly question whether I, myself, was ready to become a soldier.

While campaigning against Koreaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s participation in the Iraq War in 2003, I finally decided to become a conscientious objector, and joined A World without Wars, a nonprofit organization for conscientious objection. I was scheduled to enter the army on December 13, 2004, but decided not to go, and was sentenced to one year and a half in prison as a result. After I finished my term in prison, I entered a graduate school to do in-depth research on conscientious objection and pacifist movements, and have been writing on these and related topics since then.

85

Given this personal background, I cannot help but include my own experiences and thoughts as a conscientious objector, activist and researcher in this essay. The main focus of this essay is on the history and trend of the conscientious objection movements in Korea, but I will not shy away from expressing the emotions and ideas I have had as a conscientious objector myself. For I believe that speaking honestly of my personal experiences is itself a method for assessing both the past and the future of the movements for conscientious objection in Korea.

86

87

Memo

88

Memo

89

Memo

90

Memo

91

Memo

92