Legal Watch: Property Risks & Coverage September 2015 Issue 008
Introduction As we took a short break over the summer, this is a slightly
In this issue:
newly appointed sub-editor Andrew Wallen, to whom I am
• Property Risks and Coverage seminar programme 2015/2016
Brit UW case below.
• Future Litigation? “The Cheesegrater”
With the failure of bolts during the construction of the US
• Avoidance of public liability policy valid where insurer induced by the insured’s material nondisclosure and misrepresentation
larger than usual edition on which I have been assisted by my
very grateful. Thanks also go to Andrew for his article on the
Embassy building in Vauxhall recently hitting the press,
Christopher MacQueen considers the possible consequences and implications of similar post-construction bolt failures at the Leadenhall Building.
We consider the case of Barking & Dagenham London Borough
• Intermediate supplier had no duty of care • The Consumer Rights Act 2015
Council v GLS Electrical Supplies Ltd & Ors which looks at
duties of care where there is a chain of intermediate suppliers. We also look briefly at the Consumer Rights Act 2015, which is
due to come into force on 1 October 2015. We will look at the Act in more detail next month.
Finally, we have included details of our 2015/2016 Seminar Programme, which we hope you will find interesting and useful. The seminars are free to attend and will be followed by drinks.
Confirmation of the dates and venue for the Leeds seminars
Contact us
If you would like any further information on the cases or articles featured in this issue, please contact: Christopher MacQueen T: 020 7469 6267 E: christopher.macqueen@greenwoods-solicitors.com
will follow shortly.
Andrew Wallen
In the meantime, please do circulate the programme to any of
T: 020 7469 6286
your colleagues who may be interested in attending. Here are the links you can use to book your place:
• For Leeds seminars email kirandeep.kaur@plexuslaw. co.uk
• For London seminars email: alison.heard@greenwoodssolicitors.com
• For Manchester seminars email: chris.heitzman@ greenwoods-solicitors.com
If there are any topics not currently covered which you would find useful please let me know so that we can add them to our next seminar programme.
E: andrew.wallen@greenwoods-solicitors.com Marise Gellert T: 020 7469 6249 E: marise.gellert@greenwoods-solicitors.com
Property Risks and Coverage seminar programme 2015/2016 Date Thursday
Location Manchester
Seminar Claims handling:
24 Sept 2015
Parabis Law LLP
Obtaining and preserving evidence
5.30pm
21st Floor City Tower Piccadilly Plaza Manchester M1 4BT
Followed by drinks
TBC
Leeds
Insurance Act 2015:
Oct 2015
TBC
The practical effect on claims handling
Thursday
London
Followed by drinks Insurance Act 2015:
15 Oct 2015
Parabis Law LLP
The practical effect on claims handling
5.30pm
Peninsular House
5.30pm
30-36 Monument Street London EC3R 8NB
Followed by drinks
12 Nov 2015
Parabis Law LLP
How to identify different terms in insurance contracts, their
5.30pm
Peninsular House
Thursday
London
30-36 Monument Street London EC3R 8NB
Insurance contract terms and conditions: legal effect, warranties – pre and post Insurance Act 2015
Followed by drinks
Thursday
Manchester
Fire and flood claims:
19 Nov 2015
Parabis Law LLP
Update
5.30pm
21st Floor City Tower Piccadilly Plaza Manchester M1 4BT
01
Followed by drinks
TBC
Leeds
Claims handling:
Jan 2016
TBC
Obtaining and preserving evidence
5.30pm Followed by drinks Thursday
London
Claims handling:
4 Feb 2016
Parabis Law LLP
Obtaining and preserving evidence
5.30pm
Peninsular House 30-36 Monument Street
Differences in property claims north and south of the border:
London EC3R 8NB
Key differences between Scottish and English property
claims across the major perils of floods, fires and defective products; limitation and costs.
Wednesday
Manchester
Followed by drinks Insurance contract terms and conditions:
24 Feb 2016
Parabis Law LLP
How to identify different terms in insurance contracts, their
5.30pm
21st Floor City Tower Piccadilly Plaza Manchester M1 4BT
legal effect, warranties – pre and post Insurance Act 2015
Followed by drinks
TBC
Leeds
Fire claims:
March 2016
TBC
Ignis suus
5.30pm
S86 Fires Prevention Metropolis Act 1774 – accidental fires? Rylands v Fletcher Causation Tactical considerations
Followed by drinks
02
Future Litigation? “The Cheesegrater” The Leadenhall Building, more affectionately known as the
construction industry. From a safety point of view having
tallest building in the City of London. Attracting companies
a massive advantage as it gives you time to support, fix
‘Cheesegrater’, stands at 737 feet (48 stories) and is the
from all over the world it is 90% pre-let and contains the
most expensive office space in the City of London. However,
its construction has not been incident free with two bolts, each around the size of a human arm, having broken in
late 2014 and a third caught by protective tethering put in place earlier this year. With a precautionary programme well underway to replace 3,000 similar bolts and an estimated
repair bill of £6m this is likely to be one of the legal stories of the 2015/16 calendar.
The circumstances which give rise to the remedial work
provide a good demonstration of the difficulties which are inherent in proving causation in construction cases and
of the potential financial risks which face manufacturers, product distributors and their insurers.
So what is the cause of the bolt failures? It has been
a visible sign of deterioration before breakage occurs is or, in a worst case scenario, evacuate a building before a catastrophic failure.
The post failure tests for detecting hydrogen embrittlement
are not wholly reliable and require a certain amount of ‘interpretation’. Usually these tests involve reviewing the
fractured edges under a microscope with the general
wisdom being that if the edge is rough, then it is more likely to suggest hydrogen embrittlement and if it is smooth, a
mechanical failure. However, the very process used to harden steel makes it more brittle, which means that as
the tensile strength of the steel increases it becomes more likely that a mechanical failure will also lead to a rough edge.
Therefore, with high tensile steel, which was used to make the supporting bolts, it is often difficult to differentiate between hydrogen embrittlement and a standard mechanical failure.
publicised following tests by Laing O’Rourke (the main
The interested parties in this case are likely to fall into three
team) that the bolts appear to have failed due to hydrogen
for any error in the calculation of weights, forces etc.); (ii) the
contractor) and Arup Structural Engineers (part of the design embrittlement. But what is hydrogen embrittlement? And is it really so straightforward to detect?
To understand hydrogen embrittlement requires a basic
broad categories: (i) the design team (who will be responsible build team (who will be responsible for installation defects);
and (iii) the supply chain (who will be responsible for any latent defects in the materials).
understanding of the microscopic structure of steel. Under a
This uncertainty in forensic ‘diagnosis’ will be an appealing
sections with numerous microscopic cracks running
particularly steelwork firm Severfield, the current liability
microscope, steel is made up of a latticework of overlapping through it. Hydrogen embrittlement occurs when hydrogen
migrates into these cracks causing them to widen and eventually fracture the physical structure. Unchecked this
process eventually leads to sudden catastrophic failures,
which are precisely what makes hydrogen embrittlement so dangerous.
Ironically the danger which hydrogen embrittlement creates
is that it makes steel act like any other metal (e.g. aluminium) and by so doing negates the property, its ability to bend
before breaking, which has made it the mainstay of the 03
argument for those companies in the supply chain and
‘front runner’, as if mechanical failure is the true cause then
this opens up the possibility that the bolts failed due to poor installation, specification or design failure (rather than any
inherent defect in the bolts) and so may leave the design and build team with questions to answer. Given the repair
cost it would be surprising if Severfield did not challenge the
suggestion of hydrogen embrittlement, especially when the report giving rise to that suggestion was prepared by two of the contractors from the design and build team.
Even if the suggestion as to cause in the initial investigation
is vindicated, identifying who is at fault is not straightforward. Further questions arise: when was the hydrogen introduced? Was this an impurity in the steel? Was it during the hardening process? Was acid used at any stage for cleaning? Was the
steel baked long enough? Was it during the electrochemical binding of the coating? Was a scratch introduced in transit?
Did a contractor damage the bolts during installation?
Or is it simply that the coating was inappropriate for the ‘toxic smog laden air’ of central London? These questions
and many more will no doubt be asked and sought to be
answered as the legal and expert teams seek to expose the hidden depths of the figurative iceberg.
Whatever answers are found, it would be tempting to think that the final chapter would be straightforward with member(s) of the insurance industry agreeing to pick up the
costs of the fallout in accordance with the insurance which each of the contractors likely have in place.
However, at least one outcome could have a final twist.
Product liability insurance does not often cover contractual losses where the only damage is to the products themselves,
as demonstrated in the claim of Pilkington v CGU Insurance
PLC [2004] EWCA Civ 23. This means that with potential damages at ÂŁ6m and legal and expert costs expected to
be several million on top, there could be severe financial consequences for the loser(s?).
Therefore, in all the uncertainty, the only thing that seems for certain is that the legal repercussions of the broken bolts
are going to reverberate around the City for the foreseeable future.
04
Avoidance of public liability policy valid where insurer induced by the insured’s material nondisclosure and misrepresentation In the matter of Brit UW Ltd v F & B Trenchless Solutions
the carriages remained upright they were damaged along
Ltd [2015] EWHC 2237 (Comm) the court considered the
with the track.
validly avoided a contractor’s combined liability policy into
The insurance position
claimant insurer’s (C) application for a declaration that it had which it had entered with its insured, the defendant (D).
Background
Upon notification of the derailment D sought to notify its
insurers, Novae (N). However, N responded by indicating
its policy had expired on 14 August 2013, prior to the
C was engaged as a subcontractor to construct a concrete
derailment, such that it was not on cover. It was then
Nottinghamshire. Network Rail required, as per guidelines
had not come on cover until 19 August 2013 meaning that
crossings showed no more than 5mm of track settlement (i.e.
breach of its subcontract. More pertinently, however, it was
there would be no more than 2-4mm of track settlement.
the track and void in the road at the time it entered into a
a requirement to carry out the work with due diligence and
information.
micro-tunnel beneath a railway line and level crossing in
established that C were on cover at the time, although they
that it had issued, that all estimates for under-track
there was no insurance cover for five days rendering D in
deformation of the railway). D’s tender proposal estimated
clear that D knew of the existence of both the settlement of
This estimation was included in the subcontract along with
contract of insurance with C and that it did not disclose this
in a workmanlike manner.
C’s initial response was that since the derailment occurred
D’s subcontract also required it to indemnify the contractor
within its period of insurance it would likely fall under cover,
a result of any breach of the main contract as a result of any
to establish whether or not D in fact knew of the void and risk
works were carried out between 11 June and 9 July 2013.
C’s solicitors and D also gave rise to a conflict of evidence
for any liability or loss sustained by the main contractor as
but that it was to carry out the necessary investigations first
act, neglect or default on the part of D. The subcontract
of collapse prior to the policy inception. A meeting between
At a site meeting on 17 July 2013 it was established the settlement of the tracks had increased to 15-18mm. A void
as to what was said during that meeting and, specifically, whether a reservation of rights was made on behalf of C.
also then appeared in the adjacent road. Both the rail and
Following the initial reservation of rights, C wrote to D’s
this point. On 13 August 2015 a representative of D visited
material non-disclosure. In addition, D had indicated in its
D’s works but rather as a result of earlier exploratory works
which C relied upon as a misrepresentation by D such that
road settlement varied day by day but became worse after
broker on 21 January 2014 purporting to avoid the policy for
the site and concluded the settlement was not as a result of
proposal to C that it did not carry out work on active lines,
carried out by a third party.
it was also entitled to avoid cover.
At approximately 4.27am on 27 August 2013 a freight train
Accordingly, C sought a declaration from the court that it
derailed when passing over the level crossing. Whilst all of 05
was entitled to avoid the policy for material non-disclosure
and/or misrepresentation. D denied C was entitled to do
so and counterclaimed for both damages and various declarations that C should indemnify it for numerous claims arising out of the derailment.
Specifically, D sought to rely on the guidance issued by Network Rail that an intervention was only required once the settlement was 25mm or greater, such that it was
reasonable not to disclose this fact to C at the time the policy was incepted since the settlement was below this level. Further, D’s case was that it had not seen the proposal sent to C as this had been prepared by its broker.
Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501 (Pan Atlantic) confirmed
that the same principles apply at common law for non-
marine insurance cases, that an insurer may avoid the policy for a material non-disclosure.
Information that is material must be disclosed to an insurer
prior to the conclusion of a policy, where materiality is determined by whether it ‘would influence the judgement
of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining
whether he will take the risk’. It is worth remembering that
this does not mean that a fact needs to be determinative
in whether the underwriter would write the risk or alter the premium, but merely that it would have had ‘an effect on the
The issues before the court The court summarised the issues to be considered as follows:
1. would the disclosure of the earth settlement and/or
mind of the insurer when weighing up the risk’. The reasons
for failing to disclose the risk are irrelevant and materiality is
judged objectively from the perspective of a prudent insurer. ii) Misrepresentation
road void and/or the fact the railway was active have
Section 20(1) of the Act sets out the general common law
cover to D and, if so, have influenced the terms of
making material misrepresentations and that an insurer may
influenced the prudent underwriter in deciding to offer
rule that the parties to an insurance contract must avoid
cover?
avoid as a consequence. Materiality has the same meaning
2. on an objective reading of the risk details provided prior to inception of the policy, did D tell C it did not work under railway lines whilst they were active?
3. did D’s failure to disclose those facts, or the
misrepresentation allegedly made by D, induce C’s underwriter to offer cover to D on the terms of the policy?
as for non-disclosure. Again, a representation is judged objectively and is true ‘if substantially correct’. Where a representation is ambiguous, it is for the person relying on that representation to establish how he understood it. iii) Inducement However,
where
a
material
non-disclosure
and/or
misrepresentation has been made it was held in Pan Atlantic
4. did C affirm the policy with the result that it lost its right
that an insurer is only entitled to avoid where either of those
The court then set out the law relevant to considering those
write the policy or on the terms agreed.
to avoid?
issues, which it is useful to summarise briefly below:
The law i) Non-disclosure The Marine Insurance Act 1906 (the Act) (specifically section
18(1)) sets out the principles governing non-disclosure and
duties of utmost good faith in insurance contract. The
was a substantial cause in the underwriter’s decision to iv) Affirmation
It is a well established principle that an insurer may lose its right to avoid as a result of an affirmation or waiver by election. It is for the insured to prove that at the time of
affirmation the insurer knew of its entitlement to avoid
but that its words or actions amounted to an unequivocal election to keep the policy in force.
authority of Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd & Anr v Pine Top
06
Findings
iv) Inducement
The court heard evidence from various witnesses including
Even though the non-disclosure was found to be material,
persons at D. There was also expert underwriting evidence
written the risk on the same terms or at all in order to be
make findings without reference to that evidence.
that had the settlement and/or void been notified to C then
C’s underwriter and solicitors, as well as from the relevant
as noted above the insurer must show it would not have
before the court, although the court indicated it was able to
entitled to avoid cover. The evidence before the court was
i) Expectations of settlement levels The court found that there was no justification to D’s initial estimate that there would only be 2-4mm settlement as a
result of the tunnelling works. Had that been the case then when D was advised of the ever increasing settlement
during July and August 2013, its actions would have been different. The court did not accept D’s position that it was
unconcerned by the deviation from the settlement levels because of the Network Rail’s intervention levels.
ii) Material non-disclosure (on settlement and the void) The court found that if it was truly D’s expectation that settlement levels were between 2-4mm and that by the
time the policy was concluded the settlement was well
beyond this, then that was something of which a prudent underwriter would want to be aware. A claim for liability and
future remedial costs was plain as soon as the expected settlement levels were exceeded. Further, as soon as the
void appeared in the road there was a clear claim for liability as a result. Looking objectively, it is not for the insured to
determine what is material, otherwise it becomes ‘judge and jury on the risk that the underwriter is contemplating’. Accordingly, there was material non-disclosure on the part of D.
iii) Material misrepresentation and non-disclosure (work on active railway lines)
There is no doubt that the proposal misrepresented the
fact that D undertook work on active railway lines. It did not matter that the proposal was completed by the broker, since the broker was clearly acting as D’s agent. Both the lay and
expert evidence was that had it been disclosed a prudent underwriter would likely have considered that such works
would attract a higher excess or premium. Accordingly this was also a material fact that should have been notified to C. 07
its underwriter would have excluded the site from the policy.
The non-disclosure did therefore induce C into writing the policy on the terms it did.
Likewise, in respect of the work on active railway lines, the consistent evidence before the court was that had C
been notified of the fact there was work being undertaken
on active railway lines then there would have likely been
a higher premium due to the increased risk. Whether by reference to misrepresentation or non-disclosure, this was again a material fact.
The non-disclosure did therefore induce C into writing the policy on the terms it did. v) Affirmation of the policy D relied on the sequence of events from the meeting with
C’s nominated solicitors on 3 October 2013. The court held
it was unlikely that the phrase ‘reservation of rights’ was expressly used in that meeting, since it did not appear in
the solicitors’ manuscript or typed notes of the meeting. However, the notes did indicate that D had been told that
C might not provide cover. Against this backdrop and other evidence before the court, it was satisfied that C had not
affirmed the policy at any stage prior to formally reserving rights, by letter, on 3 December 2013.
Comment This is likely to be one of the last cases to be governed by
the Marine Insurance Act 1906, since contracts of insurance entered into after 16 August 2016 will be subject to the less stringent provisions of the Insurance Act 2015.
Would the result have been any different here? That question would fill an article all of its own and we shall no doubt see
similar cases in the next few years. Yet in summary, it is unlikely that the result would have been any different. C’s evidence was unequivocally that it would have excluded the
site from the policy had it been made aware of the settlement and/or void. There would be no other appropriate remedy as
set out in the 2015 Act other than allowing the insurer to avoid cover.
For solicitors, this case demonstrates the importance of taking good notes during a meeting, retaining these
afterwards as well as typing them up. In such matters where solicitors are called to give evidence, contemporaneous documents are likely to be the most persuasive evidence that can be put before a court.
08
Intermediate supplier had no duty of care The recent TCC case of Barking & Dagenham London
S, in turn, defended the claim and brought a claim against
Stearn Electrical Co Ltd (3) RKW Ltd [2015] EWHC 2050
G but denied that the terms were congruent with those in
contribution claims are properly and fully pleaded. This was
contract and under the Act. G responded to S’s defence
Protection Act 1987 did not apply.
knowledge of the use of those goods, owed a duty of care
Background
There were procedural issues with the Additional Claim
Borough Council v (1) GLS Educational Supplies Ltd (2)
R. S accepted the existence of a contract between it and
(TCC) demonstrates how important it is to ensure that
the contract between G and B and denied liability both in
not a consumer case and so the provisions of the Consumer
by averring that S, as a provider of goods and having to B, as the end user of those goods.
This was a contribution claim arising out of a fire in a
against R. R was actually called RK Wholesale Ltd and it
claimant local authority (B) to be used in a school. The
this but R was sued as RKW Ltd in the claim form and in
who was told that it was to be used in a school. G had, in
to be RKW Ltd care of R’s solicitors but they had agreed to
who purchased it from RKW Ltd (R).
and had not waived the requirement in the CPR that the
defective Micromark oil-filled radiator, ordered by the
appears that from an early stage S and its solicitors knew
radiator was ordered from GLS Educational Supplies Ltd (G)
the statement of case. The address for service was stated
turn, ordered the radiator from Stearn Electrical Co Ltd (S),
accept service of proceedings for ‘RK Wholesale Limited’
R did not manufacture or import the radiator and purchased it from others, merely being one link in a chain of contractual
transactions starting with the foreign manufacturer and
defendant’s last known address should be included in the claim form.
ending with B. There was no evidence or reason to
The application(s)
intermediate inspection of the radiator.
the basis that it was statute- barred and on the basis that
believe that R, S or G would or should have carried out an
The radiator caught fire within 10 minutes of first being used.
It appeared from the information before the court that the
nature of the defect that was being alleged in the radiator was identified at an early stage and was known to all.
B commenced proceedings against G in contract, alleging that the radiator was defective, also relying on a contractual
indemnity. G admitted the contract with B but denied the radiator caused the fire. G, in turn, brought an Additional
Claim (as Part 20 claims are now known) against S, on a contingent basis, in contract and under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (the Act) – in other words, if B
succeeded in its claim against G, then G sought damages
from S for breach of contract amounting to an indemnity and/or an indemnity/contribution under section 1 of the Act.
09
R applied to strike out S’s claim against it in contract on
it disclosed no reasonable cause of action under the Act. R also sought summary judgment against S.
S responded by applying to substitute RK Wholesale for RKW Limited and to amend the claim form to include R’s place of business.
S also applied to strike out G’s claim against it on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.
S’s witness evidence acknowledged that the claim in
contract against R was statute-barred. It also acknowledged
the defects in failing to correctly name R and failing to supply its address.
Judgment
S’s claim against R The judge took the view that S’s pleading was fundamentally defective. To succeed in its contribution claim against R, S
had to prove that R was or would at some stage be liable
to G for the same damage. It was common ground that R did not enter into a contract with G, so S had to prove the
existence of a duty of care owed by R to G, breach of which
could entitle G to recover the same damage from R as it
may recover from S. However, G’s damage was the purely financial loss that it may incur to B (the claimant) and S
realistically conceded at the hearing that it could not pursue a claim against R on the basis of such a duty. There was
no special relationship or relationship akin to contract in existence between R and G. R was merely one intermediate
supplier in a chain of contracts relating to a product in respect of which R assumed no responsibility other than any responsibilities arising out of its contract with S. That claim in contract was statute-barred.
The claim against R under the Act therefore disclosed no reasonable cause of action and no reasonable grounds
for bringing the claim and had no prospect of success. On
that basis, it was to be struck out and judgment entered summarily for R. The defects in this claim were not simply defects that could be remedied by changing the name on
the pleading against R or inserting their address and S’s application to do so was also dismissed.
S’s application to strike out the claim against it by G The court levelled the same criticisms against G’s pleading
of its claim under the Act against S. There was no sound basis for the existence of a duty of care owed by S to B (the claimant). Again, there was no relationship in contract between S and B and the amended Additional Claim did not
assert the existence of a duty of care in tort or that such a
the mere fact that an intermediate supplier of radiators
knew they were going to be used for heating did not of itself give rise to a duty to inspect and that was not affected by
the type of use of the building to which the radiator was ultimately delivered, in other words, the fact that they knew it was going to be used in a school made no difference.
Once again, S was no more than an intermediate link in the chain of suppliers. There was no allegation anywhere
that it was negligent to supply that type of radiator and the only complaint related to that particular radiator being
defective, which carried no implication of fault on the part of an intermediate supplier.
On that basis, G’s claim against S was also struck out.
“an intermediate supplier did not owe a duty in respect of internal defects unless it could be shown that he should have inspected and detected them.” Comment As can be seen from this case, care must be taken when
considering a contribution claim to ensure that the target
defendant would be liable for the same damage as the party seeking the contribution under the Act. Here, it was pure financial loss and that was not recoverable in the absence of a contractual or special relationship.
duty was breached and did no more than refer to breaches
The judge commented on the need for competence and
of themselves, either demonstrate or evidence negligence
and the inadequacy of relying on current websites. There is
of the contract between G and S. Those breaches did not,
care in determining the names of potential corporate parties
on the part of S.
clearly no substitute for full enquiries being made to ensure
The court held that an intermediate supplier did not owe a
parties.
duty in respect of internal defects unless it could be shown that he should have inspected and detected them. Likewise,
that the proceedings are issued against the correctly named
010
The Consumer Rights Act 2015 The Act is a major part of the government’s reform of UK
consumer law, streamlining and consolidating complicated law from numerous pieces of national and EU legislation,
which has developed over many years. The Act even
goes so far as to contain amendments to the weights and measures legislation in relation to unwrapped bread!
having to put up with repeated attempts to get a repair done
5. consumers being able to challenge terms and
conditions which are not fair or are hidden in the small print
The Act also provides guidance in relation to unfair contract
There are numerous innovations and the Act includes
terms. An indicative and non-exhaustive list of terms in
measures to specifically reduce the burden of understanding
consumer contracts that may be regarded as unfair is
and applying consumer law.
provided in Part 1 of Schedule 2.
When it comes into force on 1 October 2015 the Act will
The Act and its practical implications will be considered in
introduce a range of new rights for consumers, including a
30-day time period to return faulty goods and, for the first
time, replacement rights for faulty digital content. Currently the law in that regard is unclear and has failed to keep up with the huge demand for digital products.
The definition of ‘consumer’ has been widened by the Act
(section 2) so that it now means ‘an individual acting for purposes that are wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession’. A trader who claims
that someone is not a consumer (in other words, was not so acting) has the burden of proof.
Under the Act, consumers and businesses will have clearer rights and responsibilities. These include:
1. new rights for consumers to get a repair or a
replacement of faulty digital content such as online film, games, music downloads and e-books
2. consumers having a clear right to demand that
substandard services are redone or failing that receive a price reduction
3. a 30-day time period to return faulty goods and get a full refund. The law is currently unclear on how long
this period should last and the Act therefore provides certainty
4. consumers being entitled to some money back after one failed repair of faulty goods (or one faulty replacement) even if more than 30 days have passed, rather than 011
more detail next month.
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Contact us For information on articles and cases featured in
other editions of Property Risks and Coverage Newsletters, please contact: Marise Gellert Partner T: 020 7469 6249 E: marise.gellert@greenwoods-solicitors.com
www.greenwoods-solicitors.com
www.plexuslaw.co.uk
The information and opinions contained in this document are not intended to be a comprehensive study, nor to provide legal advice, and should not be relied on or treated as a substitute for specific advice concerning individual situations. This document speaks as of its date and does not reflect any changes in law or practice after that date. Plexus Law and Greenwoods Solicitors are trading names of Parabis Law LLP, a Limited Liability Partnership incorporated in England & Wales. Reg No: OC315763. Registered office: 12 Dingwall Road, Croydon, Surrey CR0 2NA. Parabis Law LLP is authorised and regulated by the SRA.