no1 December 2011
The beginning of a new journey Editorial
Intercultural Dialogue
Geopolitics
Insights
www.agi.it Papers of Dialogue: no 1 – December 2011
Editor in chief: Roberto Iadicicco
Editorial team coordinator: Daniele Atzori
Marketing & Communication: Laura Brunetti (Coordinator), Patrizia Arizza
Photography: AFP (pages 08, 28) www.123rf.com (pages 16, 23, 34, 35) Carlos Latuff - twitter.com/carloslatuff (page 12) Global Services Incorporation archives (pages 19, 26,30)
Editing and production: AGI, Via Ostiense, 72 – 00154 Rome – Italy patrizia.arizza@agi.it
Layout Concept & Consultancy: Global Services Incorporation
Printing: Raidy | www.raidy.com
Translated by: Roma Congressi
Publisher AGI SPA: Chairman and CEO: Daniela Viglione General Director: Alessandro Pica AGI, Via Ostiense, 72 – 00154 Rome – Italy
TABLE OF CONTENT no 1 December 2011
Editorial 06 The beginning of a new journey Roberto Iadicicco
Intercultural Dialogue 08 Reading the Papers of Dialogue together Amer Al Sabaileh The beginning of a new journey Editorial
Intercultural Dialogue
Geopolitics
Insights
12 Egypt: a journey through pluralism Rassmea Salah 14 European policies towards the Mediterranean: an overall assessment Suhair El Qarra
Geopolitics 18 The army’s role and potential alternatives Giulio Sapelli 22 Syria and Lebanon: is a new scenario possible? Hadi El Amine 25 Egypt and Israel: army and energy security Ahmed S. Fahmy
Insights 28 The Turkish model Alice Marziali 32 Realism in Arab cinema Majdi Korbai 34 The scent of jasmine Marta Bellingreri 36 Cultural dialogue in the kitchen Lilia Zaouali
The beginning of a new journey
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Roberto Iadicicco Editor in chief
06 | Papers of Dialogue
his is the beginning of a journey. A journey whose aim is to embark on and explore old and new paths alike, a journey toward mutual awareness. The title, “Awraq Al Hiwar. Papers of Dialogue”, was deliberately chosen to highlight our wish to spark an interest in an open, polyphonic and pluralist dialogue. As the Holy Quran says, “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female and made you into nations and tribes that ye may know each other” (49:13). The sacred scripture invites us to ponder the fact that humankind is divided into different peoples and tribes so that diversity might constantly act as a trigger for us to get to know one another in a mutually enriching process. This magazine aims to overcome the notion of a clash of civilizations, that prejudice which suggests there is an “us” which stands in contrast to a “them”, for example a conflict between the West and the Arab or Muslim world. Indeed, many of the magazine's authors cannot even be classified as Westerners or Arabs. Our authors include young people of Arab descent who have grown up in or gone to school or university in Europe and feel both like European and Arab citizens. We also have European authors who, after having spent time living in Arab countries, fell in love with their people, landscapes and cultures to the point where they, too, feel part-Arab. This publication also strives to tell their stories, to listen to their voices, accepting the fact that a person's identity is a complex and mercurial phenomenon which cannot be reduced to an “us” and “them” binary rationale. Identities and cultures are not fixed entities, but rather living and breathing social constructs which constantly intermingle and blend. “Awraq Al Hiwar. Papers
of Dialogue” therefore has the potential to be a valuable platform, a place for policy makers, academics and intellectuals the world over to deliberate and compare notes, with a particular focus on issues pertaining to countries in the Middle East, North Africa and the Mediterranean. It should come as no surprise that this magazine came to be in Italy, a country which built bridges between Europe and the Mediterranean at the height of its glory, and flourished owing to the contributions of other peoples and cultures. The Mediterranean, open seas for thousands of years, a place where trade prospers and cultures meet, has always been a shared space in which the peoples of Europe, North Africa and the Middle East have come together and come to know one another. The Mediterranean’s open waters can be seen as a metaphor for tomorrow’s world. This project came about, in fact, within the context of a decision on the part of the Agenzia Giornalistica Italia (Italian news agency) to tackle the challenges of globalization, launching portals such as AGI Afro, AGI China and AGI Arab. Within the framework of these initiatives, this magazine endeavours, on the one hand, to provide prime geopolitical analysis, comparing the work of Arab and European academics. On the other hand, its goal is to explore dialogue’s roots, travelling through the Mediterranean, North Africa and Europe’s history, culture and traditions. To this end, we aim to place particular importance on the voices of women and youth, hoping they will play a bigger role in building a better future, a peaceful one, for our nations. This first edition lays the groundwork for what we hope will turn into a fascinating adventure. Our journey is about to begin.
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Intercultural dialogue
Reading the Papers of Dialogue together Amer Al Sabaileh
A magazine that prompts intercultural communication, focusing on the different identities that form the Mediterranean and Arab world. A bridge that helps mutual knowledge and understanding.
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any miles distant from the dreams and memories of a particular life and time, there persists a recollection of the history of civilisation and the milestones of culture with their personalities and symbols, their deeds and words. Perhaps the most important thing which distinguishes the period in which we are currently living is the dramatic speed of change, which has broken down all barriers, carried people across frontiers and left no room for restraints. The Papers of Dialogue exist to build bridges of dialogue, to cross the abyss which all the pompous slogans, all the initiatives incapable of moving from theory to practice failed to cross, despite numerous attempts made by so many of us in the hope of a brighter future for the Mediterranean. The bridge between cultures remains the greatest challenge. Our hope today, therefore, is that the Papers of Dialogue initiative will play an important role in intercultural communication at this historical time; at the same time avoiding errors of the past, such as the Mediterranean Initiative which stressed the importance of fusing all the identities of the Papers of Dialogue | 09
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southern and eastern Mediterranean into one single identity, and completely overlooked the many different forms of heritage and history, of societal concepts, of local and religious identity. Accepting others in their historical truth and their local identity is the foundation upon which to build pluralism and will be the basis for intellectual and cultural communication. The Mediterranean Sea, which separates such exalted historical civilisations, nonetheless reconciles differences, because the sea which divides also unites. The Papers of Dialogue will play a pivotal role in creating the cultural mosaic of the Mediterranean, throwing light on the cultural and creative essence of Mediterranean people. It seeks to present itself as a pulpit for civilisation, a cultural forum set up by men and women of culture as a vehicle for their concerns and problems, and as a way to share with one another their joys and successes, their hopes and dreams of a better life for everyone. Readers will be able to leaf through the various Papers of Dialogue, the aim of which is to establish knowledge and understanding among the peoples of the Mediterranean. Intellectual communication is the basis for achieving such understanding, and this is the main goal which we who dwell in the Mediterranean basin are seeking. Thus we hope that each Paper of Dialogue will have an important role in creating a better tomorrow, a tomorrow where peace and dignity triumph, where cooperation, harmony and understanding prevail. The Papers of Dialogue will be the place in which differences are administered, in which ideological and intellectual contrasts come together, and different voices find a receptive and understanding ear. Perhaps the bridging role played by the Papers of Dialogue will not be limited to a fleeting contact but will help us return to the 10 | Papers of Dialogue
historical roots of cultural relations, and become an important factor in identifying the positive aspects of historical relationships among civilisations. Indeed, rereading the past in terms of today’s civilisation is the building block with which to reinforce the concept of cultural cooperation and exchange, in order to build a better present and a brighter future. A wise reading of the past is the foundation for building culture today and the brush with which to paint the canvas of a radiant tomorrow. However, cultural exchange faces various problems including the thorny inheritance and the controversies of the past. These have not been dealt with thoughtfully and transparently, because many people prefer to paint a rosier picture and to overlook disputes of former times, seeking to hide them and failing to understand that a bygone disagreement is not necessarily a present obstacle, so long as we face up to these questions with complete transparency and all of us recognise our mistakes; for it is human nature to be in error and all of us are at fault. What then remains are the deep-rooted disputes which surface from time to time and represent the biggest challenge facing any attempt to bring civilisations together. Thus, the Papers of Dialogue must work to overcome the disputes of the past, to eradicate their divisive influence and put an end to cultural crises. Yesterday’s dispute can be reread in a completely different way today, and can become a vehicle for convergence and understanding. Dialogue remains the best mean for approaching and communicating with others. It is the only attribute we possess on this earth and, making good use of it, there is no doubt that we will change our differences from weapons of conflict to elements of attraction and convergence. At this historical moment in which the people of the earth share the same destiny, the time has come
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bridges of dialo g n i d l i u g ue B
for all of us to contemplate others as if looking into a mirror, a mirror of objective truth which admits no distortion or diminution, so as to put ourselves in the place of others before seeking to describe or judge them. None of us can deny the important role culture has in fomenting knowledge and awareness in societies. It is here that the Papers of Dialogue come in to complete the picture, creating new cultural circumstances capable of overcoming objective worldly limitations and geographical obstacles, and demonstrating that constraints to our physical movements cannot apply to our ideas, which cross borders and break all shackles. We must work together to promote humanitarian values, especially among the oppressed peoples on earth whom the politics of repression and tyranny have caused to lose their humanity. Any cultural initiative which hopes to meet with success must understand the importance of finding a new framework for the sentiments of victims of oppression. Feelings of
humanity and security are a basic humanitarian necessity, similar to the need for food and clothing. We all hope that the Papers of Dialogue will fill this gap and come to represent the model we are still hoping to find, a broad cultural model which has faith in intellectual pluralism, differing schools of thought and opposing opinions, but which also believes in the sacredness of human existence and strives to find suitable ground for a better life for all human beings without exception, within a context of justice, equality, brotherhood, compassion, friendship and peace.
http://amersabaileh.blogspot.com Papers of Dialogue | 11
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Egypt: a journey through pluralism Rassmea Salah
A young woman’s return to her country of origin and the discovery of a new world bubbling with turmoil. A complex, diverse and surprising place.
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bout a year and a half ago I decided to embark on a new adventure and come here to Cairo to see what my country of origin might still have to offer. I set off with the aim to enhance my knowledge of Egypt’s culture, to loosen my tongue and practice the dialect, to turn my gaze inwards and engage in a little self-analysis, of myself as a person, as a woman and as a Muslim. Amid the tons of luggage I brought with me lay also a lot of preconceived notions and prejudices regarding the world I was about to re-enter. The so-called Arab-Islamic world, a post-colonial, static world, accustomed to letting itself be led, or to being stuck with absolutist, hereditary and oppressive governments. A motionless world, forever true to itself and chained to its traditions. I was sure this was bound to be a journey into the past, yet I found myself facing the dawn of the future. Dazed and astounded, I witnessed the beginning of the Arab Spring, the awakening of consciousness, the mass
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protests. I watched the history of Egypt unfold before me at one of its most delicate and crucial moments. The year had begun with the tragic terrorist attack on a church in Alexandria, right when worshipers had gathered to
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celebrate mass and bring in the new year. The bombing was a deliberate attempt to worsen relations between Muslims and Copts and to draw the public’s eye away from the first signs of unrest in Tunisia. It failed on both fronts. Just a week after that devastating attack, I happened to attend the funeral of a Muslim colleague’s father. I went to the funeral with a Catholic Egyptian friend (a minority within a minority) who was wearing a necklace with a gold, cross-shaped pendant, offset by her black clothes. The prayer room slowly filled with women, all of whom were wearing a veil, and some of whom were wearing a niqab (full veil which covers the face). Out of respect, my friend took out a small scarf she had in her bag and used it to cover her head. A few minutes later, my colleague came in, took her aside and gave her some prayer booklets to hand out to the mourners. It was beautiful to see how he had instinctively chosen her for the task among many Muslim relatives and friends, without giving any thought to any differences or to what the family members might think or say about his choice. It was a small, simple gesture, yet it completely nullified the misintentioned attempts of those who had tried to create walls, barriers and gaps between Egypt’s Muslims and Christians. That day I watched my friend, with her cross pendant sitting on her chest and her makeshift, lopsided veil, handing out the prayer books to women who were wearing a veil or a niqab. The pain erased all the differences; we were all just human beings mourning the loss of a man, gathered in prayer for him. The most touching thing of all was the way several women approached my friend after the funeral to give her their condolences for the victims of the Alexandria bombing. I’ll never forget that image: looks of deep empathy, handshakes, hugs, kisses and eyes full of tears. Then and there I truly came to understand the feeling of unity which connects Egyptians, who feel they are the offspring of one Mother, citizens of a single country, notwithstanding their religious differences.
Then came the Revolution, Hosni Mubarak stepped down and this country held its first real elections, which many people predict will be won by the Muslim Brotherhood’s “El Horreya Wel Adala” (Freedom and Justice) Party. What many people fail to see, however, is the diversity in Egyptians’ choices when casting their ballots. And the spontaneity and openness with which they proclaim their preference for one political party or another, out loud. Forget the notion that “votes are secret” which we’re used to back home. Over here, every day at work I see my colleagues nonchalantly asking others for whom they’ve voted. And the answer is always given out loud, in public, and backed up by more than one line of reasoning. I can feel the stirring, the interest and the involvement sparked by public matters. I sense an active and heartfelt participation in the country’s politics, a great yearning for change and for freedom of choice. I see colleagues who support the Muslim Brotherhood telling Coptic colleagues why they should be voting for the Horreya Party; I see Muslims with a zebiba (prayer bump) on their forehead announcing they have voted for the Coptic “El Kotla El-Masreya” Party; I see people clad in jeans and a T-shirt voting for the Salafi “Hizb en-Nur” Party. And after the political debate, everyone goes off to lunch together. It’s a great mosaic where the different pieces coexist and combine to compose that splendid heterogeneous Egyptian landscape, multi-ethnic and multi-faith, brimming with contradictions, but also with original and surprising combinations.
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European policies towards the Mediterranean:
an overall assessment Suhair El Qarra
A brief analysis of the main initiatives adopted by the European states to its Southern periphery during the last thirty years. Some final suggestions for new strategies of cooperation in order to promote an effective construction of a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity1.
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he history of the EU-Mediterranean relations has been shaped by many frameworks of cooperation which differ for nature and rationale. The next section will describe the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the Euro-Neighbourhood (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM): cooperation agreements stipulated in order to improve cooperative economic relations between Europe and its Southern Mediterranean shore.
Frameworks of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: From GMC to EMP Since the beginning of the 1970s, some European states have shown a renewed political and economic interest in the Mediterranean area2. Ac-
cordingly, by the mid-70s the European Economic Community (EEC) elaborated the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMC), a series of bilateral cooperation agreements stipulated with South Mediterranean countries aimed at regulating and guarantying preferential trade relations in exchange for European grants and loans3. Although a vein of European interest towards the Mediterranean region has always been manifested during the past centuries, it must be noticed that the European involvement in the cooperation with Mediterranean countries gained more salience only in the post Cold War era4. In the early 1990s, in effect, the European Commission began to consider how it could improve the Euro-Mediterranean relationship as an attempt to tackle regional instability. Therefore, the
1. Peace, security and shared prosperity, The Barcelona Process, http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm 2. In 1978, entered into force both “The Barcelona Convention on Protection of the Mediterranean” (signed in February 1976) and “The Cooperation agreements with Maghreb countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), the Mashreq countries (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon) and additional financial protocols with Israel, Portugal and Malta”- http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1970-1979/1978/index_it.htm 3. Ayadi, R. and Gadi, S., The future of Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation: The role of the Union for the Mediterranean, European Institute of the Mediterranean, EuroMeSCo papers No. 7 2011 4. Ibid. 14 | Papers of Dialogue
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European Union made it clear from the outset that it would pursue political and strategic aims in the region by using economic tools5. For the sake of this purpose in 1995, with the adoption of the Barcelona Declaration, the Barcelona Process come into begin creating the basis for the launch of the so called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)6. During the Barcelona conference held in November of the same year, European member states and some South Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) gathered together with an attempt to renew the frameworks of cooperation agreements7 in a logic of a wider multilateral regional partnership8. The EMP framework of cooperation focuses on the stipulation of Association Agreement aimed at establishing a Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) and donation of founds to support restructuring of Mediterranean Partner Countries9. Focused on regionalism, the EMP covers many aspects of multilateral cooperation aimed at increasing the economic growth of both EU members and South Mediterranean partners.
Frameworks of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: From EMP to ENP For almost a decade the EMP has regulated the European relations with its Southern shore but, with the EU enlargement and extension of its Eastern borders in 2004, the EU urged a revision of its external relations policy10. Thus, the
2003 was the ripe year for the European Commission to elaborate a new set of bilateral agreements based on a single standard approach valid for both Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries11: The European Neighbourhood Partnership (ENP)12. If the main objective of the EMP strategy was to strengthen political and socio-economic ties between the EU and the twelve Southern Mediterranean partner states, the main ENP’s focus, instead, has been shifted on a wider external approach aimed at establishing a buffer zone of EU’s friends alongside the EU Eastern borders (only later the ENP was extended to the EU’s Southern Mediterranean neighbours)13. Although the new framework for relations with EU’s neighbours came into existence within the framework of EU’s external cooperation, it widely differs from the EMP multilateral approach. The ENP operates on individual bases through bilateral Association Agreements and Action Plans. Therefore, within the ENP policy, the regional dimension is put aside in favour of limited and specific bilateral cooperation goals14. Although they differ for nature and rationale, the ENP and EMP coexist when it comes to regulate the EU cooperation policies with Mediterranean partners. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) will be conceptualized with an attempt to revitalize Euro-Mediterranean relations already regulated by EMP and ENP approaches in order to overcome criticisms over the incompatibility of the previous agreements.
5. Schmid D. (2003) Interlinkages within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: linking economic, institutional and political reform – conditionality within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, EuroMeSCo Paper No. 27, p.7 6. The Barcelona Process, http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm 7. Preamble, Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 27-28/11/95 8. Comelli, M., Approach of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): Distinctive Features and Differences with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), Institute of International Affairs, 2005, p. 7 9. Kuiper, M., Euro-Mediterranean Partnership State of affairs and key policy and research issues, LEI, 2004, p.9 10. Attinà F. and Rossi, R., European Neighbourhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues, The Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-Med” Department of Political Studies, 2004, p. 8 11. Russia, plus ten Southern Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia) and three Western Newly Independent States (WNIS) (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) Papers of Dialogue | 15
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Frameworks of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: From ENP to UfM The 13th July 2008 signed a new stage in the context of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation: the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was launched to re-frame EU’s relation towards the Mediterranean for the first time conceived in trans-Mediterranean terms15. This new approach recovered some principles of regionalism also present in the EMP multilateral framework. By focusing on issues such as environmental substitutability, de-pollution, regional trans-
portation and illegal migration, the UfM should guarantee and increase the security and stability of the Mediterranean region16. This new framework of relations has been criticised by some scholars who accused the UfM promoters for having recycled obsolete ideas already embodied in previous cooperation agreements. As Kristina Kausck and Richard Youngs point out: the Union for the Mediterranean is not a new lease of life but another nail in the coffin of the vision that infused the inception of the EMP in 199517. The UfM has been the last initiative promoted with an attempt to create a
12. See Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 11 March 2003, COM(2003) 104 final; Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, 12 May 2004 13. Del Sarto, R. and Schumacher, T., From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?, European Foreign Affairs Review 10: 17-38, 2005, p. 19 14. Attinà F. and Rossi, R., European Neighborhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues, The Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-Med”Department of Political Studies, 2004, p. 12 16 | Papers of Dialogue
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stabile and prosper Mediterranean area, yet. Unfortunately, current cooperation policies do not constitute a sustainable and effective forward-looking strategy able to reach that ambitious goals18.
Conclusions The rationale behind the EMP, ENP and UfM frameworks laid on Neoliberal assumptions. Neoliberals generally assert that the promotion of economic cooperation and free trade among communities would help economic growth spreading, therefore, economic prosperity, stability and peace19. This article has shown that the Neoliberal paradigm did not prove to be exhaustive when it came to regulate the EuroMediterranean relations. An effective forwardlooking strategy of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation should be able to integrate Neoliberal claims with social-Constructivist assertions. For what concerns the EU’s strategies adopted vis-à-vis the Southern Mediterranean partners, it could be noted how, neither EMP nor ENP have put particular attention to the social interaction between people which generally construct common values and principles of cooperation just by interacting with their changeable social environment20. Put differently, Social interaction would normalize relationship among different communities creating the values the basis for every successful socio-economic cooperation plan. To this purpose, the European states members and the South Mediterranean partner countries should invest in youth education. Moreover, EU’s institutions should extend student mobilisation
programs (such as Erasmus and Leonardo da Vinci) to the students of the Mediterranean partners. They should also promote a youth EuroMed platform for critical dialogue and informational purposes. In other words, as M. Sarup points out, only by comprehending that not only Identity is a construction but it is also a consequence of interaction between people, institutions and practices21 that an effective forward-looking Euro-Mediterranean strategy of cooperation would come into existence.
References: - Ayadi, R. and Gadi, S., The future of Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation: The role of the Union for the Mediterranean, European Institute of the Mediterranean, EuroMeSCo papers No. 7 2011 - Attinà F. and Rossi, R., European Neighborhood Policy: Political, Economic and Social Issues, The Jean Monnet Centre “Euro-Med”Department of Political Studies, 2004 - Del Sarto, Raffaella and Schumacher, T., From EMP to ENP: What’s at Stake with the European - Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?, European Foreign Affairs Review 10: 17-38, 2005 - Schmid D. (2003) Interlinkages within the EuroMediterranean Partnership: linking economic, institutional and political reform – conditionality within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, EuroMeSCo Paper No. 27: December 2003 (Lisbon) - Kuiper, M., Euro-Mediterranean Partnership State of affairs and key policy and research issues, LEI, 2004 - Joffé, G., The Status of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Lisboan Institute of strategic and international studies (IEEI), 2008 - Comelli, M., Approach of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): Distinctive Features and Differences with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), Institute of International Affairs, 2005
15. George Joffé, ‘European policy and the southern Mediterranean’, in Y. Zoubir and H. Amirah-Fernández, eds. North Africa: politics, region, and the limits of transformation (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 323. 16. Roberto Aliboni, George Joffé, Erwan Lennon, Azzam Mahjoub, Abdallah Saaf and Alvaro Vasconcelos Union for the Mediterranean: building on the Barcelona acquis, ISS report 1, 13 May 2008, p. 24. 17. Kausch,K. And Youngs, R., The End of the Euro-Mediterranean vision, International Affairs, 85: 5, 2009 18. Ibid. 19. For further readings on Neoliberalism see R. Keohane and J. Nye 20. Solingen, E., Mare Nostrum? The Sources, Logic and Dilemmad of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Institute of European Studies, 2004 21. Sarup, M., Identity, Culture and the Postmodern World, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburg, 1996, p. 98 Papers of Dialogue | 17
Geopolitics
The army’s role and potential alternatives Giulio Sapelli
The modernization process in North African and Middle Eastern countries has often seen military forces play a key role. The military’s power can only be curtailed once qualified domestic powers stabilize the political and economic situation.
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here’s no doubt that we have come to a turning point in the transformation process underway in North Africa and in the Middle East. Indeed, we are witnessing the end of the transformation process in the political and military – and therefore international – weight and relevance of this region that started as early as in 1979. This is an area that is multi-faceted, inhomogeneous and multifarious. The new course did not start with the “Arab springs” but when Egypt put an end to its global alignment with the United States in the aftermath of its serious military defeats. It was thus viewed as the bulwark of the USSR and as the most powerful factor (together with Turkey, but this will not be addressed here) in fostering the irreversible stability of Israel. This process made a breach not only in the taboo of Nasser’s pan-Arabism but also in the ideological postulates of Baathism, which had its founders in Iraq and Syria. These quickly turned into the builders of national powers that were extremely important in maintaining the Metternich-designed balance of power in the Middle East and North Africa, which had recently arisen from the English dominion only a few decades earlier (it’s enough to consider the history of the United Arab Emirates to get a clear picture of the
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region’s persisting instability). On the one hand, almost with a view to remotely counterbalancing the power of Iran, right after WW II Saudi Arabia immediately configured itself as a tribal State although it was woven together through the most refined techniques of North American intelligence, which destined it to be the operating headquarters of all dissuasive operations – whether relatively to energy or not – which might have turned out to be necessary anywhere from Morocco to Jordan and from Egypt to the border with Iran, during the dramatic and albeit inevitable irreversible downgrading of the historical role of France and the UK; a degradation that the Libya war should remind us of. The so-called “Arab springs” led us to think that this concert of Nations with extremely diverse ideological origins and economic interconnections with the rest of the world could be configured into a meshwork of territorial representations of interests that, for the sake of brevity, we commonly call “democracy”. A meshwork however in which extreme Islamic fundamentalisms have no hearsay. But the reality is in fact quite different. This is easy to understand if we take the perspective of political scientists and of modernization. Although they failed to achieve the goal of merging, both in theory and in practice, modernization and democracy, they were nonetheless right in claiming, already several years ago, that all modernization and abrupt transformation processes need a societal backbone, issuing from rebellion or collapse, in order for them to solidify. Now, if societies feature very low levels of institutional integration and nation-building – according to classical Anglo-Saxon canons – the backbone cannot be put in place according to political
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representation models but rather according to a power model centred on the army, and not only from a military point of view. Indeed, it is the army that victoriously comes out as the crux of the albeit limited but inevitable statutality that will have to be implemented in the aforesaid meshwork of nations. Dismantling the army
would lead these countries on the brink of chaos: suffice it to take the example of the terrible bloodshed triggered in Iraq when improvident American envoys dismantled the police and the army, inspired by the typical stupidity of ideological fanaticism. Society fell into an abyss from which it has not yet arisen
Egyptian army
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Geopolitics
and that delayed the withdrawal of foreign ground troops by many years. To confirm my statements, it is enough to look at the other extreme of the reasoning and of reality. Suffice it to shift our glance to Algeria, which has remained immobile with imperceptible waves of unrest that could be defined by an oxymoron that well represents the force of technocracy and of bureaucracy in a rentier State governed through a military dictatorship whose backbone is an army that, once its former Premier Ben Bella was eliminated, never stopped presenting and representing itself as the winner of the revolution for independence. Furthermore functionally speaking, the army becomes increasingly central when Nations do not coincide with States, as in the case at hand. These, before becoming States, were secularly grounded on personal and corporative powers, but beware, not only tribal, but mainly on those of an Islam that is traditionally more varied and divided than any other religion in the world. These powers were fought until those States tried to establish a new internal equilibrium between different Nations after the collapse of the colonial and post-colonial dominion in the years immediately following the Suez conflict (1956). This new equilibrium had to distinguish itself from the colonial divide et impera strategy, although they did not always prove to be successful. International public opinion found this out during the unexpected, and still widely unexplained, fall of the regime in Libya, whose regions were still so divided that one of them, Fezzan, never rebelled against the Rais while Cyrenaica started its uprising following in the ideological footsteps of King Idris, relying on the strongest unifying force in the region, after and together with the army: religion, in this case promoted by the Senussi sect. It was not by chance that Gaddafi mortified the army, acknowledging its importance and centrality only after engaging in a conflict with some of its historical leaders (Jallud, for example). He was extremely careful not to confer to the military the power that he instead obtained from the area’s other multi-State nations. Egypt, which is the region’s Germany in how well it expresses this multi-national and multi-State 20 | Papers of Dialogue
consensus, represents the irreversibility of military dominion. Moreover, the role of the army is very strong also in the “sacred” monarchies acknowledged throughout Islam because of their direct line of descendents from the Prophet: I’m primarily thinking of the historical role played by Jordan in a multi-religious, multi-tribal context. The army surrounds the Hashemite monarchy with its army of Bedouins and Circassian loyalists, who are ready to fight off all internal and external adversaries (remember the extermination of Palestinians). Groups of Western leaders wonder what can be done although, in my opinion, they continue to not understand the region’s historical specificities that can in no way be eliminated. The Western world or, better said, what remains of it, namely only its economic interests, both oil-related and not, thinks that it is necessary to limit the power of the army in these States. I think that the West’s primary duty is to stabilize the area by re-launching its production and mining activities, by supporting the local forces that are best-suited to do this. This is the first goal to be achieved in a context in which Iran is increasingly losing weight, both diplomatic and economic, although it is still capable of playing a prevailing ideological role. The priority is thus to stabilize Syria, with or without Assad, by negotiating a peace process primarily aimed at the security of Israel, already threatened by the vacuum of power produced in the Sinai, which is no longer controlled against terrorist infiltrations as in the past. This shows that the Egyptian military is engaged on too many fronts. This is why the Egyptian elections, just as those in Tunisia, can only but help strike a balance with the new relevance acquired by the Muslim Brotherhood, which is far more willing to dialogue on the current need for modernizing policies than it is made out to be. But, in order to achieve this, it is necessary to realistically recognize the role of the armed forces, whether they be post-Baathist or post-Pan-Arabian. The time of old ideologies is over and done with: new ones will arise.
Geopolitics
Syria and Lebanon: is a new scenario possible? Hadi El Amine
The relationships between Syria and Lebanon have always been complex. Syria has often had a strong influence on its neighbor. Now Syrian political situation is going to change rapidly. Will the new era allow Lebanon to build a strong sovereign State? Lebanon before the revolution in Syria
E
ver since I was a boy I, like many others, heard and read about, and had direct experience of the great seismic fracture between Lebanon and Syria, and the question of how Lebanon, supposedly a State and sovereign nation, became a kind of portfolio which Syria would constantly be studying, and carry about under its arm to turn profitable account whenever it found itself in need. I am not exaggerating if, like others, I say that this portfolio - in other words, Damascus' need to turn Lebanon to profitable account - caused a great deal of blood to be spilt and inflicted much degradation and shame over decades of bitter and chronic conflict. In saying this I do not, of course, mean to impute the reasons for that catastrophe, for that terrible seismic fissure, to Damascus alone, thus overlooking the fact that certain Lebanese - Lebanese militias, that is - also helped to create it and bring it to maturity. How did this happen? The catastrophic relationship (or call it rather the malfunctioning relationship) between the two States depends, to a large extent, on the various forms of dependency which certain militias calling themselves the "Islamic Resistance" in Lebanon 22 | Papers of Dialogue
have experienced and continue to experience. Their dependency, their subservience or subjection, certainly cannot be justified by claiming that such "resistance" organisations need support centres to carry out their role as combatants, especially because the blind obedience they have shown has led (if it has led to anything) to them paying a heavy price in terms of image and credibility, in Lebanon and in the whole world. This brief overview does not perhaps give a complete picture of the reasons for the catastrophe, or of the many facets of the crisis with the Syrian regime, however it does lead us to a point from which we can understand the methods that regime used in its dealings with Lebanon over the very years in which Syria was experiencing the apex of its strength and influence. For many years, in fact, Syria worked to undermine the project of a sovereign State in Lebanon, doing everything in its power to ensure that such a project would remain weak and fragmented. Indeed, the regime was not content with merely supervising that fragmentation, but even sought to justify it by giving legitimacy to various political and military projects which could only exist at the expense of the project of a Lebanese State. In past years, it was widely believed that the Syrian regime has worked to support
Geopolitics
various armed organizations, both Lebanese and non Lebanese, organizations about which the least that can be said is that they were oblivious to the concept of the State and its obligations, and that they overturned legitimate Lebanese authority as and when they wished. It can be argued that these organisations drew their legitimacy from the Syrian regime, then used that legitimacy (with the regime's blessing) as a cover, sometimes for armed operations which trampled on the prestige of the Lebanese State and, at other times, for smuggling weapons and rockets with the excuse of supporting the resistance; weapons and rockets which were then used to destroy the pillars upon which the State rested. The Syrian regime did not of course have any right, even before the revolution, to supply the needs of these organisations, which effectively
meant supplying them the possibility to continue to renew and rebuild their power in and from Lebanon. What the Syrian regime should have done - not as a gesture of good will but out of a desire to respect and reinforce Lebanese sovereignty - is to have undertaken a full review of its mental approach and working methods with Lebanon, defining the nature of its links with the country, as a State, a territory and a people. In other words, for the sake of law, the constitution, logic, tradition, ethics and religion, Syria should have stopped giving, as suspected, military and political support to such organisations, it should have stopped supporting any activities which breached security, and it should have called upon those organizations (both the Lebanese and the Palestinian) to surrender the arms in their Papers of Dialogue | 23
Geopolitics
possession and behave according to new parameters which sanctioned Lebanon's right to a sovereign homeland free from the illicit weaponry of the militias.
Lebanon after the revolution in Syria It would of course be extremely ingenuous to have expected Syria to take a clear step such as the one we have just mentioned. The Syrian regime was never going to renounce all it had achieved - the power and authority it wielded through the division and partition "treaties" it had concluded with Lebanese leaders, political parties and armed militias - in the interests of building a strong and sovereign State. But the year 2011 brought surprises for both Lebanon and Syria, when the completely unexpected happened: the Syrian people rose against their regime in an attempt to regain what had been taken from them by force. How did this happen? Clearly the revolution, which began just a few months ago, is not an uprising of the hungry but a struggle for dignity. The people would not have risen against the regime had it not been for the historical accumulation of injustice, violence and persecution which the regime practised against its own citizens. Yet the revolution underway in Syria in not just for dignity but also for existence, because the people there had come to feel that they did not exist, that they had no voice and no opinion, that they were treated as if they were an entirely submissive entity with no other role than that of raising their fists and voices to cry long life to their inspired leader. For these reasons, and many others, we can affirm that this revolution for dignity and existence will not stop until it has achieved its fundamental objective: bringing down the Syrian regime. Any attempt to impose conciliation by force between government and people has become impossible, because the regime has entered an acute structural crisis which means that any attempts to introduce political participation to restore the status quo will be useless. The solution lies only in one of 24 | Papers of Dialogue
two options: either the regime will step down voluntarily, or the revolution will continue until it has been brought down. The fundamental question that now arises is this: How will Lebanon benefit from the fall of the regime in Syria? As we said earlier, the current Syrian regime made use of Lebanon and the Lebanese State for many decades in a way about which the least that can be said is that it was devoid of pity or ethics, and that it always had grievous results for the feasibility and stability of a Lebanese State. Therefore, irrespective of who will come to power in Syria afterwards, the fall of this regime tells us that the moment has come to build a Lebanese State on solid and healthy foundations. This is not because of the dramatic past which Lebanon went through on account of the Syrian regime, but because of the present that is being constructed by the free men and women of Syria, and the future they are preparing; and because of Lebanese determination to survive and construct a free, sovereign and independent State with a single army, no armed militias and effective institutions. The fall of the regime in Syria will inevitably reinforce Lebanon's right to the governance of all its territory, the State's right to exercise sovereignty by extending its complete, definitive and absolute authority to every corner of its territory. Moreover, the fall of the regime in Syria will inevitably give Lebanon's political forces, parties, government and institutions the courage not to recognise any illegal weapons, even if that weaponry is recognised as legitimate by Iran. This rejection, which must inevitably come, entails a strong and well-rooted faith in the inevitability and imminence of the creation of a State in Lebanon, a State which, instinctively but also deliberately, will stand against the hegemony of that militia mentality founded in the sacredness of resistance, confrontation and struggle, and which will introduce a new strategy, a new mentality, new concepts which block the futile outcome of the militia's activities: impeding the creation of a nation State.
Geopolitics
Egypt and Israel: army and energy security Ahmed S. Fahmy
In order to trace the course of these relations, it is necessary to understand two fundamental aspects: the regional setup of the Middle East, and the nature of the political changes currently underway in Egypt.
I
n order to trace the course of these relations, it is necessary to understand two fundamental aspects: the regional setup of the Middle East, and the nature of the political changes currently underway in Egypt. Over recent years, and particularly following the events of 11 September 2001 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the regional setup of the Middle East has undergone major changes which have brought about significant transformations to its structure. The U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq was the first direct military intervention of its kind by one of the great powers in the Middle East since the end of the age of imperialism in the midtwentieth century. The result of that invasion, with the fall of Saddam Hussein and the break-up of the Iraqi army, was the emergence of Iran and its attempt to become the dominant regional power. The Islamic Republic is striving, on the one hand, to protect itself from the dangers of having the United States as a next door neighbour and, on the other, is continuing its efforts to export its Revolution, that being one of the regime’s sources of legitimacy. Iranian activity has led to the formation of a broad front extending from Iran itself in the east to Hamas in the west, passing by way of Syria and Hezbollah. In contrast, Israel has entered into two wars
(against Hezbollah and against Hamas) with the fundamental aim of dissuading such alliances and enhancing its own power, while the United States has been increasing diplomatic pressure against Iran, using the pretext of the latter's nuclear programme which may be being developed to produce atomic weapons. As the region is experiencing such strong polarisation – what we could call a kind of Cold War – what position is Egypt taking, and how does it coincide with the position of Israel? The Egyptian stance in the course of this Cold War has rested on two main pillars: opposing Iran’s ascent to the level of dominant power in the region and in the Gulf, while at the same time rejecting the use of military force against the country. In this, Egyptian policy has coincided with Israeli policy on some matters, and differed with it on others: the similarity being that both States oppose the rise of a politicised Islam, especially in Gaza. Egypt has always dealt with Hamas from the viewpoint that it is an extension of the Muslim Brotherhood, the most powerful of the opposition groups in Egypt. Therefore, despite Egypt’s diplomatic condemnation of Israel’s “Operation Cast Lead” against Gaza from December 2008 to January 2009, the country persistently refused to open the Rafah Border Crossing, notwithstanding the Papers of Dialogue | 25
Geopolitics
Mount Sinai overview
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huge pressure brought to bear both by its own people and by the Arab world against what was considered as a siege of Gaza and Egyptian support for Israel in war. Egypt’s position against a strengthening of Hamas in
the Gaza Strip has always been clear yet, at the same time, Egypt has clearly opposed any plans for military strikes against Iran or Syria. In this it has enjoyed the backing (in public at least) of Saudi Arabia. It appeared that the
Geopolitics
two biggest Arab States – Egypt and Saudi Arabia – had made a strategic agreement to abort the plans of the Iran-Syria axis politically while avoiding any military escalation. Thus, in our analysis of the first of our two aspects (that of the regional setup in the Middle East, the limitations it imposes and the opportunities it brings) we may conclude that the relationship between Egypt and Israel during Mubarak's rule was, in the first place, governed by a fear the two States shared of politicised Islam, and this meant that there was an objective convergence of their interests. But at this point the question that arises naturally is: will the changes that have taken place in the political system in Egypt lead to a change in Egypt’s definition of threats to its national security, and thus to a change in its relations with Israel? Despite international optimism at the events of what has been called the Arab Spring, the few months that have passed since Mubarak left power have clearly established a number of facts which were already known to experts on Egypt. Firstly, that the authoritarian system was divided into two parts, the political and the military; the political part fell, the military part did not. Therefore, any idea that authoritarianism died with the end of the Mubarak era is perhaps unfounded optimism, in no way borne out by Egyptian history or contemporary events. The ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is currently involved in numerous disputes with the political and revolutionary forces in Egypt about the future status of the military, and about the rules governing the Egyptian Constitution, which will be rewritten after the parliamentary elections. What emerges from an analysis of these political disputes is that the military enjoy wide respect among the majority of the Egyptian people, who have always revered and esteemed the army and protected it from criticism. If we also consider the fact that strategic relations with the United States and Israel were always administered by the Egyptian security agencies (the Intelligence
Services and the Ministry of Defence) and that they were in no way a civilian function, there is nothing to suggest that the armed forces will abandon their role as overseers of matters regarding national security (including relations with Israel) under any future civilian government in Egypt. And whether the Muslim Brotherhood or a government with a more Pan-Arab outlook come to power, they will not easily be able to take decisive decisions without the agreement of the Egyptian army. Another matter worthy of consideration and in which change is expected is that of energy security. It is well known that Egypt has been exporting natural gas to Israel since 2005, and this has always aroused the anger of ordinary Egyptians who see it as Egyptian support to the economy of a State that occupies Arab lands. Nine times in a row since the fall of Mubarak unidentified armed men operating in the Sinai Peninsula have used explosives to sabotage pipelines carrying gas to Israel. However after each explosion the ruling Military Council has ordered the immediate repair of the damage and the resumption of exportation. In view of the serious security situation in the Sinai Peninsula and what appears to be the emergence of a number of terrorist organisations there, in addition to the fact that Egyptian public opinion is not in favour of exporting gas to Israel, it is likely that this will be a polemical issue in postMubarak Egypt and may lead to the amendment or even cancellation of the gas exportation agreements between Egypt and Israel.
Conclusion It is likely that the danger threatening relations between Egypt and Israel will not extend beyond the issue of supplying gas, at least for the foreseeable future, and will not threaten the course of peaceful relations between the two States, as long as nothing happens to arouse Egyptian public opinion against Israel, such as a wide-scale war between Israel and Palestine or with any other Arab nation. Papers of Dialogue | 27
Insights
The Turkish model Alice Marziali
Turkey is becoming a key player in the Arab world, thanks to its growing political influence. Can the Turkish model set an example for the Arab countries?
T
he crucial geo-political role played by a non-Arab country during the uprisings was, without a doubt, a big surprise among the events of the so-called Arab Spring. Turkey has in fact only recently become a relevant neighbour for Arab Middle Eastern countries. Ankara is undoubtedly increasing its influence in the region, mainly through the Arab street, by openly supporting the uprisings and advancing the Turkish model for political Islam as being of value for political transitions in these countries. The historical “zero problems” policy characterizing the country’s relations with its neighbours, based on equal standing and noninterference, had already been questioned before 2011. An important step in this shift was the 2010 Israeli assault on the Turkish vessel Mavi Marmara carrying Freedom Flotilla activists. This episode was followed by a harsh diplomatic row and a freeze in the once prosperous and cooperative relations between the two countries. With respect to its role as the new champion of the Palestinian cause, Turkey strongly backed the PNA’s (Palestinian National Authority) United Nations bid last September. However, the most unexpected Papers of Dialogue | 29
Insights
Recep Tayyip Erdogan Prime Minister of Turkey
30 | Papers of Dialogue
change concerns Syria, with open criticism of President Bashar al Assad following the intensification of protests and the regime’s massive crackdown. Turkey vigorously supported opposition forces calling for the regime to stand down and hosted the Syrian National Council last May. Moreover, Turkish concern over possible chaos at its borders has increased with the deterioration of the uprising, resulting in Ankara threatening to set up a neutral buffer zone between the two countries. This shift from neutrality and good relations with everyone, to an assertive role in the region, is full of tricky implications for example in addressing the Kurdish issue and energy, should relations with Iran and Israel take a turn for the worse. However, prompt Turkish support for popular causes in Arab countries (before any official reaction from an Arab forum, such as the Arab League) without directly interfering, has enhanced the country’s popularity throughout the region. Cultural, moral and political influence rather than power games are the key components of Turkish influence. This hegemonic combination also plays on the rising role of Islamic movements and political parties in Arab countries. Ennahda’s victory in the Tunisian
elections, and that of other national Islamic parties in Morocco and in Egypt, raise the issue of their place in transitions toward democracy. Turkey seems to be a model of integration between Islamic parties and democracy, having an Islamic party in power leading a secular and democratic state. This oft-mentioned “Turkish model” was evoked mainly after Ennahda’s victory, underlining the party’s moderate inspiration and its willingness to cooperate with other political forces, respecting freedom and democratic values. There has always been a dialogic dialectic between the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing and the AKP, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, resulting in mutual influence. Ennahda’s founder Rashid Ghannouchi has also been an inspirational figure among some reformist branches within the Islamic movement. Certainly, the differences between Arab and Turkish political and social contexts cannot be ignored. It is hard to imagine an identical political outcome, imposing a positivist model of evolution, without acknowledging the differences in every country. In addition, even the Turkish experience is not free from problems concerning its regime’s reputation as far as human rights are concerned, with increasing allegations of restrictions on freedom and censorship. Regardless, by taking on a key-role in the Arab world, based mainly on political influence, Turkey is also redefining its own until now Western-oriented political identity, starting with a new and not always entirely clear prioritization of its foreign policy goals. Turkey’s relations with its neighbours and eventual regional hegemony are thus “works in progress” and intimately linked to the evolution of the entire region.
Insights
Realism in Arab cinema Majdi Korbai
Neorealism is used to describe a movement of renewal in Italian cinema which emerged following World War II and abandoned all forms of romanticism for artistic and literary realism. Let us discover the meaning of Realism in present Arab filmmaking.
W The Night of Counting the Years by the director Shadi Abdel Salam (1969)
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hen we speak of Neorealism we may imagine that we are talking about a new form of filmmaking today, however the term Neorealism is used to describe a movement of renewal in Italian cinema which emerged following World War II and abandoned all forms of romanticism for artistic and literary realism. Realism in films is an artistic trend which has
its foundations in the link between the private and the public. Italian Neorealism was influenced and characterised by the poetry of working class neighbourhoods, location filming and the use of non professional actors. It adopted some of the features of the Verismo school which appeared in Italy towards the end of the nineteenth century, after the manner of French Naturalism, and which had its roots in the realism of the Renaissance. Italian cinema, then, was influenced by the literature of that time and its polemical concern with the problems of the rural world, as expressed by such authors as Giovanni Verga, Luigi Capuana, Matilde Serao and Edmondo De Amicis, just as it was influenced by such figures as Alberto Moravia and Pier Paolo Pasolini. Realism in Italian cinema came about as a result of the close union between the power of art and the common people, in which context we may recall a number of films which have come to be seen as beacons for cinema all over the world,
Insights
Roma città aperta by Roberto Rossellini (1945)
Ossessione by Luchino Visconti (1943)
such as Ossessione by Luchino Visconti from 1943, or Roma città aperta made in 1945 by the director Roberto Rossellini. Nor must we forget the film which has exercised an effect on all cinema clubs in the Arab world: Ladri di biciclette made in 1948 by Vittorio De Sica. Following this brief historical glimpse at realism in Italian cinema, let us now turn to define the concept as it pertains to Arab filmmaking. A number of names have emerged in the field of realism in Arab cinema, chief among them Salah Abu Seif, Henry Barakat, Youssef Chahine and Tawfik Saleh, all of whom are considered by critics as emblematic figures of Arab realism. Thanks to these directors, cinema came to be associated with Arab intellectual concerns such as the class struggle, the ills of society and other questions similar to those raised by Italian cinema. Among the most important of these realist films were The Night of Counting the Years (also called The Mummy) by the director Shadi Abdel Salam, The Land by Youssef Chahine, and El Bari’ (The Innocent Man) by Atef El Tayeb.
Following the war of 1967, realism started to become associated with a form of cinema which reflected an awareness of defeat. Films became a social necessity and there was a vital need for young cinematographers. The Palestinian filmmaker Michel Khleifi said that “among the many questions troubling my mind is how to film Arab-Palestinian reality in order to change it”, and the Egyptian Youssef Chahine has stated: “Confrontation ... what we need is confrontation ... confrontation with the reality from which we came, how we got into this state, how we were duped and where we went wrong”. Over recent years, realism in Arab cinema has acquired two aspects: the dominant and the marginal. While it remains realism, it has become more diffident and blended with other elements, because the reality of Arab cinema today does not enable it to cross certain limits of change imposed by the production and distribution structures. However, the question that now arises is: are we going to see a different realism in coming years, after the revolutions of the Arab Spring?
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Insights
The scent of Jasmine Marta Bellingreri
A Tunisian citizen in Palermo; her peaceful existence thanks to a chance encounter with a multi-ethnic polyphonic choir. All year round, she detects the scent of jasmine, the symbol for her home country and for Tunisia’s revolution.
Palermo city - Italy
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S
he seems to smell Jasmine everywhere, every day of the year. Jasmine. The symbol of her country of origin, Tunisia, and of the ongoing revolution: the Jasmine Revolution.
Yet to Safa, despite the link she has come to draw between jasmine and images of her home country, of her hometown and of the recent events which are reshaping the history of her country, above all else jasmine is the scent
Insights
which wafts through the air as she makes her way to university in the morning. Not because there are that many jasmine plants in Palermo, in Sicily, but rather because she is gripped by that beautiful feeling as she goes to university-positivity and energy as she becomes immersed in her daily life in Italy. Safa moved to Italy so she could attend university here, which she hopes will enable her to teach in Tunisia someday. In the meantime, she has tried to find work teaching private lessons. We met in September of 2009. When I came back from Palestine, I wanted to keep speaking Arabic by practicing with a native speaker, and she would make her schedule available to the university, also for lessons in the Palestinian dialect which she spoke almost as fluently as Tunisian, thanks to songs from the East which filter through to northern Africa. She still has me down as “Marta Palestine” on her mobile phone, because that’s where I’d just been and it’s her I latched on to in an attempt to breathe the air I yearned for and the language I was learning to speak. She thought she spoke Italian well, but she still had a lot to learn: the Italian language isn’t just a summary of the grammar rules she had already been taught. She relearned the new language that awaited her through song. The polyphonic choir at Palermo University. A Moroccan classmate and her Italian boyfriend asked her along after class. Off she went, without the slightest hesitation. What a great opportunity to practice her Italian! Surprise surprise, only half the participants were Italian, and the rest were all foreigners! What’s more, the choirmaster asked her to bring the lyrics and chords from traditional Tunisian songs. In
University of Palermo - Italy
the morning, Safa hums the Tunisian tunes which have etched themselves into her brain, her senses suffused with the scent of jasmine. She manages to convey the beauty of her peoples’ oral culture to the choir – in Italian, of course, the language which these three dozen “Arab Palermitans” share. And the choirmaster finds what he was looking for. I attended several concerts to which I was invited by Safa, concerts she advertised enthusiastically at our university with her sister. To me, as to others, this was a taste of the Arab world and its music, and it took me back to my time in the Middle East. Safa discovered the sounds of her first melodies in Palermo. Notes which sang of morning joy. Safa discovered those notes and invented others, which turned into the chorus of her new identity. Aside from regularly promoting classical and world music concerts, Safa is writing her thesis in order to finish her degree, in Italian, of course, a language foreigners describe as “a melody” one Safa learned through song and through her studies.
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Insights
Cultural dialogue in the kitchen Lilia Zaouali
Certain similarities between Italian and Arab dishes bear witness to there being contact and a profound impact dating back to the period which ran from the 9th century to the 13th century.
I
Medieval Cuisine of the Islamic World: A Concise History with 174 Recipes (California Studies in Food and Culture). M. B. DeBevoise (Translator), Charles Perry (Foreword)
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t was the beginning of 1981 when I came to Italy for the first time. I got on the train at Italy’s North-Eastern border. At the time, Tunisian nationals were free to enter Italy without an entry visa. The train stopped for a few minutes, without the police making controls. It was night time, and the light in the coach was off, all the passengers were soundly sleeping but I wanted to know the name of the station. The only name that I was able to catch looking out of the window was the first part of the notice “Forbidden to cross the tracks”, and I thought that Forbidden was the name of an Italian city. Then the train resumed its journey towards the Station of Venice-Santa Lucia. That’s where I bought my first Italian sandwich: a mozzarella sandwich. I was expecting to taste something extraordinary and instead I was rather disappointed, and for many years I never had another. Generally speaking, I was banned from eating any other sandwich sold at train stations as they contained prosciutto crudo, cured or York ham, or salami. But I had to survive in some way! I had a taste of authentic buffalo-milk mozzarella, soft, tender and light, only many years later, at a gourmet shop in Turin. Indeed, Turin is renowned for being a city of gourmets and this is where I
developed a passion for cooking, to the point of writing a book on the history of Medieval Arab cuisine. My research was mainly based on Arab sources ranging from the 9th to the 12th Centuries although I also used earlier sources to trace culinary traditions at the time of the Prophet Mohammed. And this is how I discovered that the Prophet’s favourite dish was the “tharida”, which was made of pieces of bread in a meat or vegetable broth, which very much resembled Tuscany’s “ribollita”, only without black leaf kale. In cooking this dish 7th Century Arabs used – and still do in Qatar, which I visited this year – a very thin bread called “ruqâq”, which is identical to the Sardinian bread “carasau”! Similarities, blends, things both borrowed and shared can be picked out of the cuisine of different Mediterranean Countries, in the past as in the present, albeit with one fundamental persisting and divisive element represented by an animal: pork, both an object of repulsion and of desire. In Tunisia, the “sandwich jambon”, a sandwich whose name is half-English and halfFrench, is stuffed with turkey ham, made from a bird that does not like to fly which was imported from Mexico approximately five centuries ago. I wonder what fate would have been reserved to pigs, in Jewish and Muslim culinary traditions, if they had only reached us five centuries ago, along with turkeys.
BIOGRAPHIES Amer Al Sabaileh is a University Professor and journalist. He was born in Amman, where he currently lives and where he obtained a degree in Modern Languages and Literature, with a specialization in English and Italian. In 2003 he obtained a Master’s Degree from the University of Rome in “Educating for Peace, International Cooperation, Human Rights and European Union Policies”, with a dissertation on women’s rights in Jordan. From 2004 to 2007 he lived in Pisa to take part in a University project on cross-cultural and inter-religious dialogue. Since 2007 he is Professor at the Department of European Languages of the University of Jordan in Amman, holding courses on literature, the media, contemporary thinkers and human rights. Among his works are “Contemplations (Taámulat)”; “When Cultures Talk (The Figure of Ali in the West)”, “Limitations of America’s Public Diplomacy in the Middle East”, “Managing Dialogue (The Figure of the Prophet Mohammed in the West)”, while 5 more books are currently being printed. Rassmea Salah was born in 1983 in Casorate Primo (in the province of Pavia), in Italy. She spent her childhood going back and forth between Milan, Cairo and Mecca, then decided to settle down in Milan with her family. Daughter to an Italian-Egyptian couple, Rassmea belongs to that so-called second generation category, what we could call “new Italians”. She describes herself as “a tree whose roots are sunk in the southern Mediterranean, but whose branches stretch not only toward Europe, but also to the world at large”. To put it simply, she is glocal: a citizen of the world, but also Milanese inside. She has a degree in Linguistic and Cultural
Mediation and another in Arab-Islamic Studies. Her travels have mostly been dedicated to discovering the Middle East: Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine, Jordan, Yemen... and she can’t seem to get enough of it! Her interests range from Arabic language and literature to multiculturalism, interreligious dialogue, integration, second generation networks, journalism, poetry and novels. Suhair El Qarra is an Italian-Jordanian political analyst with Palestinian origins and European nationality. El Qarra earned her BA in International Sciences and European Institutions at the University of Milan in 2008 and a MA in International Relation and Diplomacy at the University of Jordan in 2011. Giulio Sapelli is full professor of Economic History at the University of Milan. He has taught at some of the world’s most prestigious universities. He has also served as board member at several major Italian companies and worked as a managerial, formative and research consultant. In 1994 he was awarded the title of researcher emeritus by ENI’s Enrico Mattei Foundation. He has been a member of the World Oil Council since 2002 and of the OECD International Board for non-profit organizations since 2003. He is currently focusing his work on the changes the Theory of the State has undergone in the realm of economics, politics and geostrategy. His experience spans many fields at the international level. Many of his works have been published and translated into English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Russian and Japanese. Hadi El Amine is a Lebanese PhD researcher in politics with focus on Lebanon, the Hezbollah
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Biographies
of Lebanon, Syria, Iran and the greater Middle East. Hadi has appeared on some television news bulletins and has also been a guest on a number of prime time current affairs shows on Lebanese and Arab televisions. He has been interviewed by some leading Arabic newspapers and his editorials appeared, among others, in the newspapers “L’Orient-Le Jour”, “An-nahar” and “Al-mustaqbal”. Ahmed Shahin Fahmy is currently a PhD Candidate at the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, UK. He received his Masters degree in International Relations of the Middle East in 2010 from Durham University, UK. Ahmed is specialized in the Middle East’s international politics, security affairs and democratization issues. He is the author of “The Rise of Iran and the New Cold War in the Middle East: Security Structure Post-Iraq War”, published in 2010. Lilia Zaouali is a scholar in 16th century Mediterranean history. She was awarded a Ph.D. at Sorbonne University, and has taught in the Ethnology, Anthropology and Religious Studies department at Jussieu University in Paris. She also collaborated with a number of Italian universities. She is the author of “Medieval Cuisine of the Islamic World”, University of California Press “La grande cuisine arabe du Moyen Age”, Officina Libraria as well as of several short stories published in collection publications such as “La pupa di zucchero” “The sugar girl” in “Il sogno e l’approdo. Racconti di stranieri in Sicilia” “The Dream and the Landing: Tales of Foreigners in Sicily”, Sellerio. Alice Marziali holds a M.A. Degree with honors in International Relations and Diplomacy from Bologna University, with a 38 | Papers of Dialogue
focus on Middle East Politics and Islamic movements. She has lived in Jordan for one year and half, attending at first a semester at the University of Jordan and later carrying a field research for her final dissertation on Jordanian Islamic movements- in particular on the Islamic Action Front- for which she obtained an honorable mention of publication. She writes for the Italian review of geopolitics Limes and for the on-line review of the Italian Insitute of International Affairs (IAI). She is currently attending a Master on diplomacy at the SIOI, based in Rome. Majdi Korbai was born in January 1984. He obtained a degree in Languages and International Commerce from the University of Tunis where he was active in the Cinema Club. He is currently a student of cinema and performing arts at the University of Roma 3 in Rome. He has been a member of the jury at the Giffoni International Festival of Children's Films in Italy, and of the jury for the Amnesty International Prize at the Amateur Film Festival of Kélibia in Tunisia. Marta Bellingreri is a keen Arabist from Palermo and an aspiring journalist; her degree in Eastern Languages and Civilizations and specialization in the History of Islamic Countries was an excellent excuse to travel across the Middle East, where she lived, studied and worked, sharing her tales and experiences from Palestine and Jordan. In Sicily and in Rome she teaches Italian as a second language courses and works as cultural mediator for unaccompanied foreign minors, aside from writing about and denouncing human rights violations. She is fervently awaiting her next trip to “her” Arab world.