Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales
CONCLUSION The potential for PRC coercive use of force to resolve political differences with Taiwan has been the primary flash point in the region and likely will remain so for the foreseeable future. A relative erosion of Taiwan’s military capabilities could create opportunities and incentives for Beijing’s political and military leadership to assume greater risk in imposing their own agenda on cross-Strait relations, including resorting to force to resolve their difference with Taiwan. This is also the contingency that is most likely to bring the U.S. and China into armed conflict. Beijing has long viewed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in a predominately political context. Yet the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Taiwan have both approached arms sales issues from a primarily military perspective. China presumes that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are encouraging Taiwan independence sentiments on the island. However, such assertions are no less difficult to prove than the previously mentioned cause-effect linkage between arms sales and breakthroughs in cross-Strait relations. The single most important factor in alienating the people of Taiwan, and thereby a large factor in encouraging independence sentiments, is the PRC’s coercive military posture opposite Taiwan. 51 If it truly desired a reduction in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the PRC would begin substantive reductions in its own military posture. This would have to include redeployment or closure of conventional SRBM and MRBM brigades opposite Taiwan, along with the dismantling of static infrastructure supporting missile operations – such as rail transfer points and brigade/base-level underground missile assembly/checkout centers. Removal of the missiles has been an important issue both under Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou and his predecessor, President Chen Shui-bian. The Ma administration has explicitly established the removal of the
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“Opposite” Taiwan would mean the 52 Base area of operations. 52 Base, headquartered in Huangshan, Anhui Province, is the Army-level command that most likely is responsible for operational planning for a Taiwan contingency, and includes subordinate brigades and regiments deployed in Fujian, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Anhui, and Jiangxi provinces. SRBM/MRBM brigades directed against Taiwan include the 815 Brigade in Leping, 817 Brigade in Yong’an, 818 Brigade in Meizhou, 819 Brigade in Ganzhou, and 820 Brigade in Jinhua. An additional SRBM/MRBM brigade under 52 Base appears to be forming at Shaoguan. A specialized regimental-level depot headquartered in Shangrao may serve as a centralized missile-storage facility supporting the brigades within 52 Base’s purview. Fixed support facilities could include rail transfer points and brigade-level underground missile assembly and checkout centers located near presurveyed launch sites. Administrative resubordination of the six SRBM/MRBM brigades out of 52 Base and to other bases, such as 51, 53, 54, 55, or 56, would likely complicate redeployment back to Southeast China and would inhibit smooth transition to a wartime command footing. Resubordination of the missile storage depot and missiles from 52 Base to elsewhere would also complicate rapid and smooth operations from areas opposite Taiwan, if done together with closure of other fixed support facilities, such as rail transfer points and missile assembly/checkout centers. In other words, “removing missiles” by itself would be of only symbolic value since the missiles themselves can be transported back to 52 Base with relative ease, possibly undetected. In contrast, the loading and unloading on rail cars of a sizable fleet of vehicles and other equipment assigned to a brigade would be time-consuming and relatively difficult to conceal. While other assets – such as longer range DF-21C or DH-10 land attack cruise missiles – could be used to strike targets on Taiwan, closing or redeployment of SRBM/MRBM infrastructure would significantly impede the PLA’s ability to launch a rapid, large-scale offensive operation against Taiwan. The military equation, or “balance,” in the Taiwan Strait would change dramatically with the withdrawal of 52 Base SRBM/MRBM infrastructure assets from Southeast China.
2012 US-Taiwan Business Council | Project 2049 Institute www.us-taiwan.org | www.project2049.net
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