Chinese Reactions to Taiwan Arms Sales
With the September 2011 arms sale announcement – in response to which no apparent sanctions have taken place – as an outlier, it is clear that Chinese responses to the last few notifications of Taiwan arms sales by the U.S. have been consistent with PRC reactions to Taiwan arms sales dating back to 1979. While perhaps slightly more shrill than normal since the 2001 package announced by President Bush, China’s responses have been “well within the channels within which arms sales to Taiwan have been dealt in the past.” 50 If the U.S. were to announce the sale of additional F-16C/Ds to Taiwan, it is true that China is likely to react stronger than it has done to date in response to the September 2011 retrofit notification. Nevertheless, that potential response should still be comparatively reasonable and moderate, because the U.S. releasing additional F-16s to Taiwan is inherently both moderate and reasonable. The U.S. would not be introducing a significant new capability into the region, particularly since they have already agreed to include AESA as part of the retrofitting of Taiwan’s existing F-16s. In addition, the release of additional F-16s is a reasonable response to Beijing’s refusal to initiate a drawdown of its forces opposite Taiwan. If China truly sought to reduce U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing would begin a drawdown of its missile forces facing the island.
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Paal, Douglas H., “China: Reaction to Taiwan Arms Sales” Carnegie Endowment Web Commentary, January 31, 2010, at www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24827.
2012 US-Taiwan Business Council | Project 2049 Institute www.us-taiwan.org | www.project2049.net
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