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Risk taking requires the extra resources that may be by the tactics of bringing in fee paying international needed to recover from an error. It is poor manageand domestic students, and selling higher education ment to risk an enterprise’s survival on a new and services more broadly. These tactics certainly have innovative form of activity when models that are increased revenue and follow a competitive model. demonstrably survivable are available in the environIt is unlikely that this will be the only outcome of ment. An organisation can afford innovative risk taking competition. Competition comes at a cost. As noted, with its surplus, not with its foundation. Competition quality and efficiency are neither the only nor necesin an established endeavour like higher education prosary outcomes of competition. Competition among motes isomorphism as the organisations seek to emudesperate organisations produces a number of outlate and compete on the standards set by the leading comes, including collusion, corruption, debasing of successful organisations (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). In products, and the abuse of trust of workers, suppliers an established area where the standards for the comand customers. These negative effects of competition petition have already been set, as in the case of the have had significant impacts on the university. Among university, for more than a thousand years, the primary these negative effects is an increased discontent and question is whether one wishes to participate in that declining morale among members of the academic competition or be outside it all together. Competition profession, (Anderson, Johnson & Saha 2002; Davis & in this market does not create diversity (Meek & Wood Ferreira 2006) reduced quality, and even as the case of 1997 and Meek 2000). the University of Newcastle The third policy objecdemonstrated, corruption ...quality and efficiency are neither tive for introducing mar(Cripps 2005). the only nor necessary outcomes of kets into higher education With respect to the competition. Competition among desperate is quality. In order to second policy objective organisations produces a number of have a market based on of competition, increasing outcomes, including collusion, corruption, quality, information on choice and diversity comquality must be carefully debasing of products, and the abuse of petition the more likely collected, complete, coris just the opposite. The trust of workers, suppliers and customers. rect and timely. Further choices offered to students it requires consumer to will be those that are most make decision on the basis of the qualities promoted profitable to the university – as the federal governby the policy makers. Information in markets is a seriment learned when nursing and teacher training proous problem and one of the four basic types of market grammes were closed (Game, 2004) despite chronic failure. Nonetheless, it is hoped that markets will presshortages. Further, choices will be further constrained sure universities to improve quality by the publicato those courses which are currently popular, often a tion of rankings. The impact of markets on quality in reflection of pop culture – whether ‘LA Law’ or video higher education has been studied by Zemsky (2005). game design. Diversity decreases further as only those Zemsky observes that competitive markets as found courses that promise immediate entry into lucrative in university ranking, which students and their parcareers which are economically viable with a student ents use for decision making, fails to stimulate quality base of 15 to 20 are maintained. Law professor Cass improvements for a number of reasons. Perhaps most Sunstein argues that public interest requires govsignificantly, students and their parents are not particuernments to take into consideration non-economic larly interested in making decisions based on quality interests, and among other things the importance of indicators (Zemsky 2005). While a small cohort of parpreference formation where commercial markets ticularly keen students will make their decision based dominate society and threaten public space. In such on that information, so-called ‘zoomers’, who use presinstances, Sunstein observes, there is a prima facie tigious universities to fast track prestigious careers, case for not relying on markets but re-organising systhe rest of the students are ‘amblers’ and ‘bloomers’ tems to advance the more widely conceived notions of who develop as a result of their university experience public good and social welfare (Sunstein 1990, cited in and decide which university to attend on other bases. Morgan & Yeung 2007). These include proximity to home, security of person Diversity will further decline as organisations under for international students (Nyland & Smith 2009), pressure cannot afford to take entrepreneurial risks.

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Regulation by markets and the Bradley Review of Australian higher education, Benedict Sheehy

vol. 52, no. 1, 2010


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