National Yemen - Issue 27 by National Yemen Newspaper

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The Facts As They Are

Saudi King’s “Ire” Over Houthi Campaign

H.E. Mr. Mehmet Donmez, Ambassador of Turkey to Yemen

Turkey: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism

SUNDAY , Jan 9 , 2011 I PRICE : YER 30

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Yemen’s Social Fund for Development: a Model for Success

Patrol Boats Affair Points to Strength of Defense Industries

Coastal patrol boats supplied by the US government to Sana’a in order to combat piracy have allegedly been diverted to maritime escort and protection missions, according to the Wall Street Journal. Incoming Republican chief of the Department of Homeland Security was quoted as saying the allegations raised "serious questions, which will

be addressed by the Homeland Security Committee." The newspaper itself framed the revelations in terms of “raising fresh questions about whether the San'a government is effectively using American military aid.” According to a congressional report issued in November of last year, the US governContinued on Page (4)

Artists restore the al-Amriyya Mosque in Rada’, al-Baidha governorate, under the auspices of the Social Fund for Development; see p.

Series of Attacks on Army in Abyan

By Shukri Hussein A brigade commander of 111th Infantry Unit, Colonel Mohsen Juzaylan survived an ambush by an armed group last Friday afternoon. Local authorities claimed that the men belonged to al-Qaeda in the directorate of Lawder in Abyan governorate in Yemen's South. The Yemeni Minister of Defense arrived in Abyan on Saturday along with 50 military officials to follow up on investigations in recent incidents and to assess the security situation in the governorate.

Colonel Juzaylan was on his way back to his base after inspecting the scene of an attack which killed nine other soldiers on the morning of the same day, when a bomb exploded near their vehicle killing one of his bodyguards and wounding two others. The deaths of the nine soldiers was also attributed to al-Qaeda by official sources. According to a statement by the Yemeni Interior Ministry, the attack took place on the road between the regions of Amsarah and Amaen in Lawder directorate, 150 km to

Political Tensions Rise over Constitutional Amendments The prime committee for the national dialogue in the opposition JMP coalition in a meeting yesterday called on Yemeni citizens to "prepare to pay for struggles and to sacrifice all they have for the sake of the country," warning the government and its security apparatus from any negative treatment of citizens and the violation of their rights. Mr. Aidarous al-Nakib said that the current government is stronger than the imamate before the 26 September Revolution, accusing it of

being "the one who is defunct in building the future of Yemen." Yemen's opposition had called for protests, in a statement issued last Sunday, after the parliament, which is overwhelmingly dominated by the ruling party, dismissed its objections to constitutional changes that critics say will enable the Yemeni president to rule for life. The opposition Joint Meetings party coalition called in an official statement for "mobilizing the people's struggle" Continued on Page (3)

the north of Abyan's capital, Zinjibar. Their military transport was struck with a barrage of rocket-propelled grenades, which led to the explosion of the vehicle and the immolation of its passengers. The attackers apparently fled without being arrested or restricted by the army forces, who arrived to the site of the incident long after the deed. the soldiers were killed on their way to provide potable water to the area of Amsarah, which is about 3 km away from their base according to informa-

tion provided by sources. They were surprised by the ambush as they returned to barracks in the in Amaen directorate. The gunmen unleashed a hail of bullets and rocketpropelled grenades, killing nine soldiers on the spot and seriously injuring another, who was promptly hospitalized at the al-Razi public hospital in Abyan governorate. Sources told National Yemen that artillery corps units of the army belonging to the 111th Brigade proceeded to Continued on Page (3)

Two soldiers Killed, Three Injured in Restive South NY Exclusive Al-Habilayn Abdulmalik Alassar Witnesses reported clashes between security forces and armed members of the southern movement members on Friday night in the al-Ruwais area of al-Habilayn district in the Southern Lahj governorate. Tension in the area rose after the attack on the military positions by the separatists, which reportedly resulted in the death of two soldiers and the injury of three others.

Local sources also mentioned to National Yemen that armed southern movement partisans have carried out an attack on a military site on the main roadway between al-Habilayn and neighboring al-Malah directorate.

Turkish President, Business Delegation to Visit Yemen

Special Section pages 5 - 8

Abdullah Gul, President of the Republic of Turkey, is expected to arrive in Sana'a on Monday for a two-day visit and will be accompanied by an entourage of around eighty Turkish businessmen. Members of the delegation are expected to bid for – and likely win – several important and lucrative contracts in the ﬁeld of trade and development, the Turkish Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) announced in a statement last week. Among the most prominent bids already being eyed by Turkish ﬁrms are construction projects for a revamped national airport in Sana'a, as well as the laying of an entirely

new, high-quality road along the 96km stretch between Sana'a and the south central city of Dhamar, which is expected to cost around $400 million. Another project along the southerly route from the capital, between Ta'iz and Aden is also in the works, but will likely not be put up for a bid while government authorities in Yemen strive to gather the requisite funds. An even more ambitious $3 billion, 3000km road connecting Yemen's smaller towns and rural areas along an East-West axis is also on the drawing board, but is a far distant prospect for potential bidders. The Chairman of the Turkish-Yemeni business council Sadik Yildiz also Continued on Page (3)

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Battles Persist Between Shabwa Tribes NY Exclusive - Shabwa Mayfaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;a directorate, 120 km west of the capital, witnessed armed clashes between tribes from the Ba Maâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;abad and Al Suleiman tribes on Friday, in an apparent continuation of a tribal vendetta. The members of the two groups faced each other in the Jawl al-Raiydah area, amd the Ba Awdah tribe reportedly interfered in the battle by shooting gunfire in the air, as part of an attempt to disengage the warring factions. The two tribes had armed clashes two weeks ago, resulting in the deaths of 3 people,

including a local council member, Ahmed Bamoeed in the al-Radum coastal province in Shabwa. In the same area, the Ba-Fayyadh tribe allegedly

established a checkpoint between Habban and al-Maqiyya in a sign meant to compel local authorities to arrest a killer of their fellow tribesman in Ataq directorate.

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The vote, attended by only two independent MPs who called for postponing it, sparked an opposition protest outside parliament on Saturday. The Interior Ministry warned the opposition against holding "unauthorized protests or rallies," on Wednesday, days after calls for mass protests. In a statement posted on its website, the ministry said "unauthorized rallies aim to destabilize the public order and create chaos across the country," adding it would take appropriate legal actions against the organizers of such rallies and would hold them responsible for the consequences. President Saleh had mandated earlier that 44 additional seats be added to the parliament, all of which would be allotted to women, making the total number of seats 345. The committee of the opposition announced today that in the second half of March it would hold a conference in order to prepare for political communications with the other parties along with opposition parties abroad, the Houthis, and NGOs to guarantee a wide participation in the National Dialogue.

Continued From Page (1) bomb the Aged and Maliha mountains surrounding Lawder city on the same day. The town is believed by local authorities in Abyan governorate to be a haven for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. International media had reported earlier in the week that a main leader in the al-Qaeda group in Yemen, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, had been killed in a US drone attack in

Pakistan. Most international observers highly doubt the claim, however, as the militant's death has been falsely reported several times in the past. In related news, it was reported that two children were injured on Friday during clashes between security forces and gunmen belonging to al-Qaeda in the streets of Lawder.

Continued From Page (1) indicated to Turkish media sources that several additional projects will be inked with the Sana'a government which will aid in turning systems of state administration and recordkeeping electronic. Turkey's trade agreements and relaxing of visa policies, especially with its Arab neighbors in the Levant, have led many in the Gulf regions to

National Yemen

hope that Turley's trade aspirations are turning eastward, and that new agreements in terms of industry and free trade are in the ofﬁng. As it stands now, the volume of trade between Yemen and Turkey is $400 million, though Mr. Yildiz hopes the ﬁgure will climb to $1 billion by the end of next year.

Fakhri Hassan Al-Arashi Publisher & Chief Editor

Will Carter Managing Editor

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula claimed it was responsible for a total of 49 attacks during the period between May and October of the last year 2010, On a statement posted to a jihadist web forum. According to a news report issued by Sada al-Malahem, the organization’s magazine – now in its fourteenth instalment – these operations targeted assets of the state and government soldiers during the ﬁve-month period, especially military and security headquarters. Many of the actions acknowledged involved assassinations of ofﬁcers and commanders in the army,

security, and intelligence agencies. Al-Qaeda reported the killing of only five soldiers and the injury of four others, referring to attacks by militants during the AH months: Shaaban, Ramadan, Shawwal, and Zul Qada, corresponding to July, August, September and October. Most of the operations focused in Southern and Eastern governorates, especially Abyan and Shabwa. The report claimed 13 operations targeting officers and leaders in the Yemeni security forces in five governorates and a variety of other processes, and a total of 36 attacks by guerrillas on security headquar-

ters in the governorates of Abyan and Lahj, as well as ambushes and attacks on police patrols, barracks, and checkpoints in Shabwa and Abyan. In addition, the communiqué boasted of the killing and the injury of dozens of ofﬁcers and soldiers in such operations, and the destruction of many military vehicles. But responsibility for the bombing which targeted the al-Wahda Sports stadium in Aden before the Gulf 20 Championship in October was vigorously denied by the group. Furthermore, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for severing the gas export pipeline in the province of Shabwa, saying that its ﬁghters secretly planted

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explosives under the facility stretching from Marib to a port in Lahj, which they say was built “in order to plunder the riches of Muslims.” The capital, Sana’a, witnessed fewer attacks than other provinces, and only two operations were claimed there. One targeted a bus transporting soldiers and ofﬁcers of the PSO, while the other was the much-publicized targeting of a car belonging to the British embassy in Sana’a. A missile was launched at the car carrying the deputy ambassador and group of British diplomats, whom the authors described as involved in a “conspiracy” against Yemen.

80 Refugees drown off Yemeni coast Dozens of African refugees were being smuggled to Yemen in small boats drowned after their boats capsized in the Bab al-Mandab strait between Africa and the Southeastern Arabian Peninsula. A Ministry of Interior spokesman claimed that one of the boats, meant for smuggling goods, was overturned in a coastal area near the Bab, drowning 46 Ethiopians on board. The second boat, carrying about 35 people, including women and children from Ethiopia, capsized off the coast of Ras Ala’ara in the Lahj governorate. None of the African passengers survived except for three Somalis, who were still alive when they were swept ashore. The Yemeni Coastguard found the bodies of two Ethiopian citizens and are checking for survivors among the remaining bodies. Somalis and inhabitants of surrounding countries are forced to flee their homelands to escape conflict and start a new life in stable, securer

states. Migration routes along the Red Sea and Indian ocean are usually journeyed in small boats, not intended for human transportation, thus causing the deaths of hundreds of thousands of refugees, most of them Somalis, in the recent years through drowning. Yemen's coasts are witnessing a daily flow of African refugees, most of them Somalis, with numbers ranging from 80-100 per day, including women and children. According to the Ministry of Interior, refugees assembling on the coasts are either deported to camps in Kharaz or Lahj, or infiltrate local

Yemeni cities. It also pointed out that the number of refugees arriving in Yemen in the last two months reached 3,014 Somali refugees, including 568 women and 276 children. The Ministry of interior has instructed the deportation of 388 Africans, mostly Ethiopian detainees in Yemen's coastal provinces, to their home countries after they entered the country illegally. An unofficial report listed more than 1,750, 000 Somali refugees currently residing in Yemen. A UNHCR Representative in Sana’a claimed in an earlier statement to Saba Yemen news agency that they

had no statistics of the number of refugees entering the country illegally. The only records they keep are of those registering in UNHCR shelters. These number at about 133,000 refugees: 126 Somalis and the rest from other countries. The Yemeni government expressed concern over the continued flow of refugees from the Horn of Africa, especially those filling the ranks of the armed Jihadi Shabab Movement. The government voiced its concerns pending proclamations of Sheikh Fuad Shnaghuli, spiritual leader of the Shabab Movement, that his soldiers are ready to cross the Gulf and join their brothers in Yemen. His announcements, made in December last year, designated Yemen as an arena of “global warfare against apostasy and infidels.” His words roused government fears that refugee camps in Kharaz and Lahj, accommodating approximately 18, 000 Somali Refugees, were on their way to becoming training grounds of the Shabab in Yemen.

Tribal Clash Over Oil Bloc Leaves One Dead One person was killed afternoon and six were injured on Saturday in a clash between two tribes over an oil company in al-Aqla, in the Southern Shabwa governorate, according to official sources. A gun battle occurred between al-Nassi and Aal Esshaq tribes which resulted in the death of a civilian, Turki Mohammed, whose corpse was conveyed to the Mohammed Al-Asaadi Editorial Consultant

central hospital in Shabwa’s capital, Ataaq. Two members of the al Nassi tribe were injured, while four got injured from the Aal Esshaq tribe. It hasn’t been confirmed whether the clash caused was caused by a disagreement over a local oil company, but certain sources confirmed the dispute involved the company’ bloc in the al-Aqla region and the two tribes both

Fuad Al-Qadhi Business Editor

claimed ownership over the tract on which the company was operating. Separately, one person from the al-Twassel tribe was killed and another was wounded in a clash with a military vehicle when the al-Twassil tribesmen stopped officials and demanded a share of the profits from the companies working in al-Aqla, which are now developing new oil and gas produc-

tion projects. Local citizens demanded that the Shabwa governor and the local council force the companies to carry out equitable wealth distribution in the province, in order to avoid the recurrence of disputes and clashes. It was reported that the companies had only done so in Sana’a, ignoring the province, which has irritated the recent problems.

Shukri Hussein Jihan Anwar Amel Al-Ariqi Aden - Abyan Correspondent Staff Journalist Social Editor

The Facts As They Are

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Al-Qaeda Claims Dozens of Attacks in 2010

Continued From Page (1)

and "organizing protests... to mark the new year as the year of peaceful struggle until victory is achieved." The calls came after some 170 members of Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) party voted Saturday in favor of the amendments. The day before, the United States State Department had voiced its objection to the move, rather advocating dialogue and reforms based on consensus among the major parties. Ruling party spokespeople objected strongly to the American statement, calling it foreign interference in Yemeni affairs." Also, official sources dismissed claims about the constitutional measures, which would be further discussed on 1 March, then submitted to popular referendum in the upcoming April elections, which are currently being boycotted by the opposition. The proposed constitutional amendments envision cancelling the limit of two consecutive terms for which the president can be elected and reducing the presidential term from its current seven years to five. President Saleh's current term expires in 2013 term seven years after his election in 2006.

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Mohammed Abdul ghani Shabwah Correspondent e-mail: info@nationalyemen.com website:www.nationalyemen.com address:al-qiada st.

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Hundreds of Refugees Passing Through Shabwah Scores of Somali and Ethiopian refugees were reported to have arrived on the inhospitable coasts between Southern Shabwa and Eastern Hadramawt governorates on their way to Yemeni cities. Several of the migrants interviewed responded that they were fleeing from violence in neighboring Somalia. The number of incoming refugees from the horn of Africa numbered above 50 on

governorate found 13 bodies of unidentified African citizens on the coast near al-Dhabab, the Africans had apparently drowned while attempting to reached Yemeni shores on a smuggling boat. Bodies found on the coast have been buried in the presence of the representative of the UNHCR and the Yemeni Red Crescent Society. The coast guard reported in a press release that they found the bodies of ten Ethiopian

refugees who had drowned, along with other 36 Somalis on 3 January on a smuggling boat in a coastal area called al-Aridha located between the al-Dhabab littoral and the Bab al-Mandab. According to the Ministry of Interior, police found the bodies of ten Ethiopian citizens on Ras al-A’arah, Lahj governorate, and have handed their bodies to the International Red Crescent Society, which supervised the burial.

government position on the conflict, and Smith noted that embarrassing details of military failings were withheld from Saudi newspaper readership. He quoted the Al-Yawm newspaper as an example of such distortions: "[Saudi forces] pounded the stronghold of the infiltrators fortified in Al-Jabri [a Saudi border town overrung by Houthi rebels] inflicting heavy losses including the deaths of

340 infiltrators and the destruction of the deserted houses where the enemies were taking refuge." The message concluded by expressing repeated instances of US assistance to the Saudi

war, in terms of ammunition, surveillance, and intelligence, while lamenting that bureaucratic oversight on the American side presented the quick delivery of many of the Saudi requests.

alleviate their perceived responsibility to do so themselves. Describing the phenomenon as "a great trend," Lt. Nate Christensen, a spokesman

for the Bahrain-based U.S. 5th Fleet told Fox News in 2008, "we would encourage shipping companies to take proactive measures to help ensure their own safety."

Blackwater even hoped to expand into the anti-piracy business in late 2008, according to recently declassified US diplomatic cables, and converted a maritime

Thursday, local sources reported. Security services mentioned that Shabwah authorities transferred 442 Somalis and Ethiopian refugees including 54 women and 64 children to the main camp located in the al-kharaz area in Lahj governorate. At the same time, the al-Kharaz camp also received another110 Somali refugees sent from Taiz governorate. Security services in Taiz

Saudi King Expressed “Ire” Over Houthi Campaign Recently leaked U.S. Diplomatic documents reveal new details on press distortions and official disagreements with regard to Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen against Shi’ite Houthi fighters. The Kingdom’s costly war, which was concluded by a ceasefire last January after several months of inconclusive fighting, led many observers to question the strength of Saudi Arabia’s mostly American-funded armed

forces. A cable attributed to the US’s ambassador to the Arabian oil giant, James Smith, dated 24 December 2009, indicated that Saudi King Abdullah was furious over the length of his army’s involvement in the Yemen campaign, why they had incurred so many casualties, and how inept and unprepared his armed forces had appeared. In the diplomat’s estimation, the conduct of the war

reflected poorly on the Deputy Defense Minister Prince Khaled bin Sultan and boded poorly on his chances of succeeding his father in the office of Defense Minister. The cable questioned the official reports of casualties offered by the Saudi government, and noted that many of those died likely killed each other, in instances of “friendly fire.” Official newspapers were deemed biased to the official

Southern Movement Activists Close Schools An armed group belonging to the Southern Movement reportedly took over and shut down several schools in the Southern governorate of Lahj on Monday last week. The assailants allegedly entered the facilities, forced students out of the halls and classrooms, and closed the surrounding shops by force of arms in order to carry out a “general strike.” The affected schools were the Radfan schools for boys, the al-Zahra school for girls, the Laboza secondary school for boys, the al-Somod school for girls, and the Radfan faculty of education in al-Habilain province of Lahj. They threatened teachers and students, ﬁred their weapons into the schools and reportedly created panic among victims and bystanders. Students were threatened with death if they continued studying, and shopkeepers were forced to keep their stores closed as the strike

continued until 11 o’clock. After the events, the men departed on their motorcycles, brandishing their weapons in front of citizens and students. The strike likely came as evidence of disputes and differences among the movement, where competing leaders and factions each want to prove their right in making decisions. The strike was imposed in al-Habilain, while similar efforts have failed in the other directorates such as Habil Jaber, al-Halimain and al-Malah, in which schools and trading shops remained open from the early morning. The Ministry of Education in the province has demanded the parents of the students to assume the responsibility to stand with schools’ administrations against those who disturbed the peace. The ministry threatened to close the schools in the directorate in protest against the violation of the sanctity of schools and in

order to preserve the safety of teachers and students. In the meantime, parents expressed their sorrow about the security situation, which resulted in disturbing the education process and the intimidation of young students. The parents contacted by the National Yemen also conﬁrmed their denunciation and condemnation of these acts as “heinous” and “a violation of the the law by a few rioters and thugs.” They emphasized their inability to catch and stop them because they control the street and terrorize citizens under the name of the movement. The parents demanded the security agencies to use force against bandits, terrorists and enforce security and to protect schools and public facilities, as well as the lives and property of citizens who are subjected to many such abuses, in their words.

Continued From Page (1) ment has earmarked $29.9 million to the Yemeni coast guard, in the form of patrol boats and radio equipment, in order to face the threat “piracy, terrorism, and refugees” which it claimed would emanate from across the Arabian Sea from Somalia. Two Yemen-based private security firms, Lotus Maritime Security Services and Gulf of Aden Group Transits Ltd., were named as the patrons of the escort operations, by which the Yemeni government

allegedly rented out its boats and personnel in exchange for sums which far surpassed sailors’ usual salaries. The reports come in the context of an extended controversy over the role of private companies in security throughout the world, and especially in combatting piracy in the Arabian Sea by protecting commercial shipping against attacks from mostly Somaliabased pirates. But the official American position on security firms has

been inconsistent over the last years. Private security companies played a major logistical and facilitating role in America’s war on Iraq and Afghanistan, but high-profile massacres of innocent civilians, especially by Blackwater, now Xe LLC., dampened the government's enthusiasm for such programs. US officials originally looked positively on the advent of private escorts for shipping around the troubled Arabian and Red Sea areas, as it would

SPECIAL FEATURE National Yemen H.E. Mr. Mehmet Donmez on Yemen

Sunday, Jan. 9, 2011 Issue 27

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Ambassador of Turkey writes to National Yemen Turkish Yemeni Political Relations: Turkey and Yemen enjoy excellent relations which go back to the earlier centuries with deep historical and cultural ties. We witness a continuous cooperation between our countries in the international arena. We appreciate very much the support extended by Yemen in the international platforms to Turkey. Turkey also gives full support to Yemen in all areas. Mr. Mehmet Donmez

Firstly, I would like to express my thanks to National Yemen Newspaper for providing me such an opportunity.

Presidential visits: H.E. President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s official visit to Turkey in February 2008 was a turning point in our relations. That visit constituted a strong ground for further improving our bilateral relations. We believe that H.E. President Abdullah Gul’s visit to Yemen on 10-11 January 2010 will have very positive impact on the relations of our countries.

Trade/Economic Relations: Our trade volume stood at $ 380 million last year, which could be diversified and enhanced for both sides. We consider this trade volume as inadequate for our countries. One other characteristics of our bilateral trade is that it is very unbalanced. We are happy that there is determination to get more Turkish investors in Yemen. In this framework, Turkish-Yemeni Business Council was established recently. In the framework of the Presidential visit, a Turkish-Yemeni Business Forum will be organized by DEİK (Foreign Economic Relations Board) with the participation of the businessmen from various sectors. I believe that it will be a big push for the increase in the level of trade and investment in both countries.

Turkish Foreign Policy-Principles : The main principle of the Turkish foreign policy towards its neighbours and

the region as a whole is “zero problems towards neighbors/regional countries” which has been successfully implemented for the past years. Turkey's relations with its neighbors and regional countries now follow a more cooperative rather than confrantational track. There is a developing economic interdependence between Turkey and its neighboring countries.

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Turkey's regional policy is based on security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural coexistence.

Turkey's regional policy is based on security for all, high-level political dialogue, economic integration and interdependence, and multicultural coexistence. As we leave behind the first decade of the 21st century, Turkey has been able to formulate a foreign-policy vision based on a better understanding of the realities of the new century, in accordance with its historical role and geographical position. In this sense, Turkey's orientation and strategic alliance with the West remains perfectly compatible with Turkey's involvement in, among others, Iraq, Iran, the Caucasus, the Middle East peace process, and Afghanistan. Turkish foreign policy is based on a "consistent and systematic" framework around the world. Turkey's vision for the Middle East is not in opposition to its approach in Central Asia or in the Balkans; our approach to Africa is no different from our approach to Asia. Turkey remains committed to establishing harmony between its

current strategic alliances and its neighbors. Turkey’s Foreign Policy Towards Arab World Especially during the recent period, very positive steps have been achieved towards developing our relations, both on bilateral and multilateral platforms, with the Arab world that Turkey enjoys deeply rooted historical, cultural, social and religious ties. Establishment of lasting peace and stability in the geography that we share with the Arab world is one of the main priorities in Turkey’s foreign policy. Turkey attaches great importance to close dialogue and co-operation with the Arab states. As one of the strategic components of the Middle East geography, Turkey has therefore taken important steps over the last few years to develop and diversify its relations, both on bilateral and multilateral basis, with the Arab world. Within this framework, our Ministry established consultations mechanisms with a number of Arab countries.

Interview with Suphi Atan, Deputy Turkish Ambassador NY Staff Q. What are Turkey's interests in Yemen? We are here to improve the relations between two brotherly countries whose relations are deeply rooted in history. Q. To what extent does Turkey's history as an Empire, as a major power and an occupying power in Yemen influence the current relationship? We are conscious that we are descendants of an empire ruling for 400 years in a friendly manner and we take power from our history. We are now striving to improve and develop relations in all areas: cultural, education, trade, economic. Q. How do you view cultural ties between the two countries? There are strong ties rooted in religion, culture and language. We also share similar views based on history with linguistic similarities, cultural mannerisms and shared cuisine. Q. Are there any specific plans or programmes to promote Turkish history or language in Yemeni society or schools? There is Turkish Language and Literature Department in Sana’a University which has been teaching the Turkish language since 2006. Turkish Culture and Tourism Ministry together with the General Directorate of Foundations are now involved in a project for the restoration of the Bekiriye Mosque which was the first Ottoman Mosque in Yemen.

Q. What are your thoughts on the popularity of Turkish soap operas in Yemen and the region? We are happy that our society is so popular and hope that these shows continue to promote Turkish culture and tourism in the region. Q. Does turkey have any position on the treatment of women and the role of religion in politics in the region? Turkey hopes the national roles we have allotted women will be emulated in the Arab world: women have been allowed to run for election since 1934 which we hope will have a positive impact on the treatment of women in other Muslim states. In terms of religion, Turkey is Islamic and secular with a separation of religion and state, but we are keen not to impose our identity on other states. Our policies are characterised as neutral, non-sectarian and pursuant of a policy of non-intervention. Q. What are they exactly? Who are the companies? Do you think Turkey has an advantage over multi-national corporations due to YemeniTurkish history? What are the main industries that Turkey hopes to develop with Yemen? The trade volume is viewed as generally weak, reaching only $380 million dollars in 2009. There is also great disparities between Yemeni imports to Turkey and Turkish exports to

Yemen. Last year Yemeni exports to Turkey stood at $310 000, while Yemen receives $379 million in Turkish exports. We are determined to solve this imbalance. We are setting up a Turkish-Yemeni Business Council which aims to strengthen economic relations in various areas. During the visit of H.E. President Abdullah Gül, a Turkish Yemeni Business Forum will be organized with the participation of Turkish and Yemeni businessmen working in various sectors. Q. What are your views on Turkey as a 'resurgent' power or even the ‘new Ottoman Empire'. What accounts for Turkey's prominent new regional/ global role? Turkish foreign policy strives for peaceful relations with all countries and is based on establishing political, economic and cultural relations with the Arab world in particular. We aim to implement this policy with minimal acrimony and confrontation. We aren't trying to be the 'New Ottoman Empire' but to consolidate current inter-Arab relations along the lines of common interests; religion and shared geography and the restructuring of areas of default. There is no secret agenda in our policies. Q. Many Yemeni's and Middle Easterners praised Turkey's role in the Gaza ﬂotilla incident In which prominent Yemeni personalities took

Mr. Suphi Atan part. What are your thoughts on this? The Freedom Flotilla to Gaza was not a governmental initiative, but carried out by Non-Governmental Organisations comprising of around 500 people from 33 countries. Our foreign policy approach is based on establishing peaceful relations with other countries, but if a foreign power carries out a raid against our citizens in international waters it is bound to put a strain on diplomatic ties. Our Government has put two conditions for the strained relations with Israel to be normalized: the ofﬁcial apology and compensation to be paid to the families of victims. Q. Is Turkey's recent rapprochement with Israel a betrayal of this newfound admiration and trust? No it's not a betrayal. The two incidences should be separated, we were providing humanitarian aid to a country in a time of crisis regardless of past diplomatic discrepancies.

Q. How do you think it affects Turkey's potential leadership in mediating the IsraelPalestine conﬂict? I don't think it will pose a problem. Mediation of the dispute should only be approached objectively.

neutral and we want all sectarian groups to come together for the future of the society. The PM did not meet exclusively with Mr. Hariri, but with the leader of all the main political parties in Lebanon without discrimination along sectarian lines.

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Q. What do you think will be the main topics discussed in the visit? The possibility of implementing automatic visas to Yemenis, as we have granted to Syria and Lebanon, the development of economic interdependence between Turkey and Yemen, the establishment of the Turkish/Yemen business Council, balancing bi-lateral trade and diversifying trade industries such as technological cooperation.

We aren't trying to be the 'New Ottoman Empire' but to consolidate current inter-Arab relations along the lines of common interests; religion and shared geography and the restructuring of areas of default. There is no secret agenda in our policies.

Q. In a recent visit to Lebanon, the Turkish PM Erdogan raised eyebrows by appearing prominently with Future Movement leader Saad Hariri and speaking in prominently Sunni areas. Does this mean that Turkey, like say Saudi and Iran is pursuing is pursuing its regional foreign policy along sectarian lines? We are not pursuing a policy along sectarian lines. We are pursuing a policy of peaceful interaction and cooperation between all countries. We are

Q. What are your thoughts on the dispute with the South? We don't have any position concerned with this. We think it is within the means of the Yemeni government to solve this problem, and we can only hope it will be resolved peacefully for the restoration of stability. We will continue to support Yemen in all areas including the challenges their government face from the South. Q. As a diplomat how did you react to Wikileaks? It is a problematic issue because it was not only the United States who were caught exposed. The best we can do is take the necessary precautions to ensure it doesn't happen again.

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SPECIAL FEATURE

National Yemen

Middle Eastern Perceptions of Turkey

Turkish President Abdullah Gul with Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa Public opinion in the Arab world has been broadly appreciative of Turkey’s appearance on the regional stage. A tipping point for interest and trust was the 1 March 2003 vote in the Turkish parliament to refuse passage to U.S. troops on their way to invade Iraq. It was also strengthened, ironically, by Turkey’s push for integration with Europe in the 2000s and the official opening of membership negotiations in 2005. The neighbouring countries began to see Turkey as European. Countries everywhere began moving Turkey from Middle East departments to Europe departments. Intellectuals and middle classes changed their

view of Turkey. That’s why people and investments began coming. They saw a culture close to them, but also close to Europe. The closer we get to Europe, the closer the Middle East wants to get to us. In 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s wave of forthright, biting criticism of Israel caught the imagination of Arab citizens in want of a strong voice that could express their anger at the plight of Palestinian civilians trapped in Gaza at a time that the complaints of most Arab rulers were more commonplace and subdued. The Arab press has excelled itself in praise of Erdoğan, saying in on editorial, “we propose that Mr. Erdoğan should open an

academy in Istanbul to teach Arab leaders some lessons in dignity and how to serve their people”. But, beyond giving voice to frustrations, it is hard to find people in the region who call on Turkey to take extreme positions. More often than not, it is precisely because of Turkey’s overall moderate approach and ties to the West that its firm stance is seen as a model. Many commentators shared this basic analysis: “Turkey seems confident, moving firmly along the new path of its foreign policy, without any noise or foolish posturing of the Iranian sort. It is behaving like a major regional power, relying on its past and present, and aiming to

absorb the smaller players in the region, including Israel”. A Turkish poll taken in seven Arab countries appears to corroborate strong public interest in Turkey as a democratic example. One manager of a Saudi bank said there was anxiety mixed with admiration of Turkey after Erdoğan’s Davos outburst (see below), pointing out that Arab money wants to see a Turkey where EU-style rules and regulations apply, not a country that is turning its back on EU integration. This is especially true because Turkey is viewed as a new channel through which to represent Muslim and Middle Eastern points of view in Western forums, which will not

Turkish PM Erdogan scolds Israeli PresidentPeres at Davos Economic Summit

work if it is distrusted by the West. Alongside politics, Turkish products and construction companies have impressed Middle Eastern consumers. The country’s new quality of life has been showcased by highly popular Turkish sitcoms and soap operas dubbed into Arabic. One series, “Gümüş”, a flop at home, created such a stir in the Middle East that Arab tourists visit the Bosporus-side villa in which it was filmed, and a Kuwaiti couple paid a small fortune to stage their marriage there. It showed a quality of life, of human relations, an ideal modern Muslim family, in which a man who prays also treats his wife with respect, all against the beautiful background of the Bosporus skyline. You can’t imagine the popularity, after decades of seeing Turkey as atheist, anti-Islam, anti-Arab, the friend of Israel that abolished the caliphate. Suddenly we see a new Turkey. The Arab street is not only fascinated by Erdoğan, but by the phenomenon of Turkey. Among Arab officials, sharp divisions of analysis remain. Some Arab states have embraced Turkey’s arrival on the scene. King Abdullah’s visit in 2006 was the first from a Saudi Arabian monarch in many decades. A Syrian official said of his country’s own perception: If Turkey didn’t exist, we’d have to invent it. There’s an Arab vacuum. Turkey is good for us because it draws attention to the absolute lack of Arab initiatives. We in

Syria are sensible enough to realise that the main two powers in the region are Iran and Turkey. So we have a foot in both those camps. Iran protected us a great deal in the past. We have had considerable political benefit from our relationship with Turkey. Other Arab officials voice wariness, partly due to the way Erdoğan’s popularity and legitimacy show up their authoritarian regimes’ unpopularity and legitimacy deficits. His Israel-bashing is a particular cause of concern for those who take a more moderate line. There is some private uneasiness with the prime minister’s populism compared to that of the more measured President Gül. Mixing religion and politics also raises suspicions. According to an Arab diplomat, Turkey only stresses its Islamic identity in the Persian Gulf “when it’s convenient”. Some Middle Eastern partners have expressed discomfort at the “neoOttoman” rhetoric that has entered conversations. Foreign Minister Davutoğlu denies reports that he has privately called AKP “the new Ottomans”, yet in speeches he clearly sees Turkey as being “responsible” for much of the old Ottoman geography, is happy to describe his goal as “Pax Ottomana” and can talk about promoting religious freedom – while reading from an Ottoman imperial decree. Some Arab states object, privately but strongly. Some Turkish officials state explicitly that Turkey’s facilitation is more inspired by centralised

National Yemen Ottoman examples than EU multilateralism, hinting even at a desire to play a leading role: [Turkey’s] current mediation efforts, the peace-building rhetoric in the Middle East and elsewhere, always carries reference to the Ottoman Empire: Many highlevel politicians and bureaucrats [nowadays] say when the Middle East and Balkans were Ottoman, there was peace and stability. The EU model is not really Turkey’s model; in fact, many would see [the EU] to be too weak to deal with these kinds of conflicts. If you take

Davutoğlu’s recent efforts in the Balkans, surpassing and irritating the U.S. and the EU, you will have proof of what I say. Some within Arab governments also suspect that Turkey is active not so much to help the Middle East as in temporary reaction to the recent coldness from Europe, so as to make itself look important in the EU and the U.S. It is also seen as angled at Turkish domestic opinion, and hence insincere. More fundamentally, several Arab states are keenly

SPECIAL FEATURE

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interested in knowing where Turkey stands vis-à-vis Iranian nuclear and other ambitions, which some of them view as a greater concern than Israeli policies. What’s important for Arab leaders is the balance. They can tolerate Turkey appealing to the Arab street and anti-Israel populism as long as Turkey seems to be propping up the regional balance and keeping Iran in its corner. Nevertheless, one influential Turkish policymaker believes a fundamental shift is under way that will reshape the Middle East.

Hit Turkish soap opera “Gumus”

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Arabs still have mixed feelings about the Turks. Varying degrees of intensity, love, respect, admiration, suspicion, mistrust and even dislike are part of the Arab perception of Turks today. … But Turkey is back, not as a matter of ethnicity or religion, but as part of the new debate about geopolitics and world-system analyses. … What we are seeing is not simply emotions or historical nostalgia but a different way of looking at the world system. It is this aspect … that will reshape Arab politics. -International Crisis Group

Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism

In what represents a remarkable departure from its policy of non-involvement, Turkey is once again becoming an important player in the Middle East. In recent years, Ankara has shown a growing willingness to mediate in the Arab–Israeli conflict; attended Arab League conferences; contributed to UN forces in Lebanon and NATO forces in Afghanistan; assumed a leadership position in the Organization of Islamic Conference and established closer ties with Syria, Iran, and Iraq. There are two main factors behind Ankara’s new activism in the Middle East: neo-Ottomanism and the Kurdish challenge. Ironically, these two drivers of Turkish foreign policy are often at odds. The Kurdish challenge is essentially defined by the Kemalist norms of the Turkish Republic which consider Kurdish nationalism to be an existential threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity and regional security. Neo-Ottomanism, on the other hand, is less obsessed with the Kurdish question and more focused on Turkey’s “soft power.” In terms of its geo-strategic vision, neo-Ottomanism is void of imperialist expansionism but determined to promote a high profile diplomatic, political, and economic role for Turkey in the larger Middle East and Europe. At peace with Turkey’s Muslim heritage and multiple identities, neo-Ottomanism is also much more ambitious and idealistic than Kemalism in projecting Turkey as a regional superpower. In dealing with the Middle East and the Kurdish question,

the challenge for Ankara will be to balance its Kemalist and neo-Ottoman instincts carefully. The Kurdish question is likely to remain the central factor in the formulation of Turkey’s regional security policy. The terrorist threat posed by the PKK will continue to play into the hands of hardliners within the Kemalist establishment. However, since military means alone will not solve the problem, it is Turkey’s soft power and neo-Ottoman self-conﬁdence that are more likely to achieve a peaceful and pragmatic solution to the Kurdish conﬂict.

Introduction After many decades of passivity and neglect toward the Middle East, Turkey is once again becoming an active player in that region. For most of its republican history, Ankara did not consider the Middle East a foreign policy priority. The ofﬁcial ideology of the republic, Kemalism, turned its back on the Islamic Turkey’s Middle East Policies world and pursued an exclusively Western path. This one-sided orientation began to change with the end of the Cold War, parallel to new geostrategic horizons, threats, and opportunities in regions surrounding Turkey. As a result, ﬁrst under the late Turgut Özal (prime minister 1983–1989; president 1989–1993) and more recently, since 2002, under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey has become more

involved in the greater Middle East. In recent years, Ankara has taken a more active approach toward the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict; sent troops to the NATO mission in Afghanistan; contributed to UN forces in Lebanon; assumed a leadership position in the Organization of Islamic Conference; attended several Arab League conferences; established closer ties with Iran, Iraq, and Syria; and improved its economic, political, and diplomatic relations with most Arab and Muslim states.

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Turkey has become more involved in the greater Middle East. In recent years, Ankara has taken a more active approach toward the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict;

Not everyone is happy about Turkey’s new engagements. Turkey is deeply polarized over its Muslim, secular, and national identities, and Turkish foreign policy is certainly not immune from such divisions. In one camp, the secularist critics of the AKP government maintain that Turkey’s activism in the Middle East betrays the republic’s Western vocation and orientation. These skeptics usually focus on AKP’s Muslim political pedigree and tend to see a hidden Islamic agenda

behind openings to the Arab world. In the opposing camp are those who argue that such an Islamic agenda simply does not exist, mainly on the grounds that the AKP is the most pro-European Union political party on the Turkish scene. Despite its Islamic roots, the AKP has indeed worked much harder than previous Turkish governments to improve Ankara’s chances of EU membership. Such efforts were eventually rewarded with the opening of accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union in December 2005. Since neither camp is able to convince the other, this polarized debate about the AKP’s intentions and the future orientation of Turkish domestic and foreign policy continues. Moreover, questions raised by Turkey’s new interest in the Middle East are hardly conﬁned to the Turkish domestic debate.

Ankara’s Middle East policy also presents a dilemma for policy makers in Washington, who are often puzzled by Turkey’s rapprochement with countries such as Syria and Iran. What is the reason for Ankara’s new interest in the Middle East? The following study is an attempt to answer this question by looking at two driving forces behind Turkish policy that are in conﬂict, namely neo-Ottomanism and the Kurdish challenge. Turkey’s Middle East policy is increasingly shaped by the tension between these two alternative visions and priorities. Neo-Ottomanism is at odds with the Kurdish-centric focus for a simple reason. Turkey’s Kurdish challenge is deﬁned by the Kemalist norms of the republic, which neo-Ottomanism seeks to transcend. Kemalism considers Kurdish ethnicity and national-

ism as existential threats to the national and territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic. Even Kurdish language and cultural rights are deemed dangerous, on the grounds that they make the assimilation of Kurds Ömer Taspinar into the Turkish nation (the official policy of the Kemalist Republic since 1923) much more difficult. Moreover, Turkey’s concern about Kurds goes beyond its own borders. The nationalist aspirations of Kurds in Iran, Iraq, and Syria poses a similar challenge for Kemalism. As a result, when the Kurdish question dominates Ankara’s agenda, Turkish foreign policy becomes reactive and insecure. Neo-Ottomanism, by contrast, seeks to rise above this Kemalist paradigm. Compared to Kemalism, neo-Ottoman instincts are more self-confident and less focused on the Kurdish threat. Neo-Ottomanism embraces a

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grand, geostrategic vision of Turkey as an effective and engaged regional actor, trying to solve regional and global problems. Since the concept of neo-Ottomanism may evoke an imperial agenda, one important point needs clariﬁcation: Turkey, in this neo-Ottoman paradigm, does not pursue a neo-imperialist policy aimed at resurrecting the Ottoman Empire. Instead of imperial nostalgia, neo-Ottomanism is essentially about projecting Turkey’s “soft power”—a bridge between East and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a democratic political system, and a capitalistic economic force. Like French Gaullism, it seeks Turkish “grandeur” and inﬂuence in foreign policy. Today, Turkey appears torn between these two alternative visions of foreign policy. While the Kurdish challenge makes Ankara reactive, cautious, and sometimes overly insecure, neo-Ottomanism motivates Turkish policy makers to be more audacious, imaginative, and proactive. Needless to say, the secularist Kemalist mindset is very uncomfortable with the neo-Ottoman vision. It perceives it as unrealistic,

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adventurist, and pro-Islamic. But perhaps more importantly, the crucial difference between these two drivers of Turkish foreign policy stems from their diverging visions of Turkey. Neo-Ottomanism wants the Kemalist republic to be at peace with its multicultural, Muslim, and imperial past. It sees such an outcome not as “Islamization” or a denial of achievements of Ataturk, but as a sign of reconciliation, normalization, and correction of excesses associated with radical Kemalism. The last point refers to the militant secularism, or laicism, of the Kemalist regime and its suspicion of all things Islamic. For instance, Kemalists and neo-Ottomanists sharply differ on the question of Islamic headscarves, a polarizing issue in Turkish politics. While the AKP and other conservatives see the issue in the framework of individual religious freedoms, the Kemalists consider the headscarf a symbol of political Islam and the harbinger of a fundamentalist revolution. The domestic roots of the divergence are not conﬁned to religion. The Kurdish question,

National Yemen

SPECIAL FEATURE the second most contentious issue in Turkey after secularism, is another area where Kemalists and neo-Ottomanists sharply differ. While the former emphasize nationalist assimilation and refuse multiculturalism, neo-Ottomanism is open to cultural rights for Kurds. Compared to Kemalists, neo-Ottomanists are much more willing to see Islam as a common denominator between Turks and Kurds. While Kemalist nationalism often rigidly confronts Kurdish ethnic demands, neo-Ottomanism pragmatically seeks to co-opt the Kurds. These differences between Kemalism and neo-Ottomanism have major ramiﬁcations for Turkish foreign policy, mainly because they lead to diverging perceptions of the Middle East and the “West.” For instance, it is not lost on Kemalist hardliners that the European Union and the United States are now in favor of Kurdish cultural rights in Turkey. The Kurds of Iraq have become America’s best friends in the country, and the European Union frequently criticizes Turkey’s human rights record in the predominantly Kurdish southeast of the

country. Some EU countries even advocate ethnic minority rights for the Kurds, something that the Kemalist establishment strongly refutes. Add to these Kemalist concerns the perception that Washington and the EU are too “soft” on the AKP (in their quest to promote Turkey as a model of “moderate Islam” in the Middle East), and the result is a major Kemalist frustration with the West. In the eyes of Turkey’s secularist nationalist establishment, the West is therefore on the wrong side of the Kurdish issue and political Islam—the two redlines of Kemalism. This situation has effectively turned Turkey’s domestic cleavages and foreign policy division upside down. The formerly pro-Western Kemalist circles have increasingly turned anti-American and anti-EU, while former Islamists have, by and large, become supporters of good relations with Brussels and Washington. In that sense, the two camps have traded places. This amounts to an important realignment of Turkish politics and foreign policy.

Sultan Abdul Hamid II, Last Ruler of the Ottoman Empire

- Carnegie Foundation for International Peace

As EU suffers, Turkish trade focuses on East An assessment of Turkey's trade relations has displayed that the Turkish economy is gradually moving its focus toward the east. While the non-EU trade volume trend of Turkey is gradually rising, the trade volume with the European Union is declining, according to a study carried out by the European Parliament Directorate-General for External policies of the Union. The study was published on April. The report, presenting an overview of the current state of the economic and trade relations between the EU and Turkey, evaluated the trade openness of Turkey, asking the question of “Is Turkey more open to the East or West?” The top trading partners of Turkey in the EU are Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Spain while the non-EU top trading partners are Russia, China, the United Arab Emirates, the United States and Iran. The non-EU five has taken over the lead in 2008, according to the study. “Trade between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries is also rising but still at very moderate levels,” the study said. “Historically, trade with these countries was neglected, and Turkey had its face turned to the West, not East. The trade with the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Syria has increased.” A slight downturn in trade with the EU-15 seems to be offset by trade with Near and Middle Eastern countries, namely the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Yemen,

Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. But the trade volume with these countries is no match for EU trade levels. Trade with members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, or OIC, is also rising. “We may predict the trade openness with the OIC is not that great compared to that of the EU-27 trade of Turkey,” the study said. “The figures indicate that while trade with OIC countries is rising, trade with the EU-27 has shown a slight downward trend in the recent years.”

Reintegration with neighbors The study suggested Turkey should continue to reach out to neighboring countries and its region as new export destinations. “Complementarities with the EU should be studied better and target destinations should be evaluated accordingly,” it said. The study welcomed Turkey’s neighborhood policy and its reintegration with its neighbors. “The individualized approach of the EU together with the membership perspective has motivated Turkey recently to pursue

economic reforms, a ‘zeroproblem foreign policy’ and finally, opening up and reintegrating with neighbors,” it said. “However, the EU has to play a difficult political game so as not to discourage the slowest progressing tendencies and so they remain attached to European values and do not revert to periods of instability.” Prof. Dr Hasan Selçuk from the University of Marmara’s Faculty of Economics noted the abundance of new bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the Eastern countries. “As long as you open the borders,

as long as you lift or stretch out visa regimes, trade will naturally increase with these countries,” he told Hürriyet Daily News & Economic Review on Friday.

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“Trade between Turkey and Middle Eastern countries is also rising but still at very moderate levels,”

“I do not think the rise in trade with Eastern countries means a shift in the axis of Turkey,” Selçuk said. “Sure, political preferences of the government have had an influence on the rise of trade with the East. But also, the demands of Turkey’s neighbors have increased and Turkey took the necessary steps to grab the trade opportunity. If there is more demand for trade from the EU countries, Turkey would surely be eager to respond,” he said, referring to lingering economic problems within the European Union. - Hurriyet Daily

BUSINESS National Yemen Yemen to Host Islamic Development Bank Meeting Sunday, Jan. 9, 2011 Issue 27

Yemen will host the thirtysixth meeting of the Islamic Development Bank group at the end of next June, it was announced this week. The event is an annual gathering held each year in an Islamic country internalized within the framework of the Islamic organization, consisting of 56 states. Khalid Abdul-Aziz al-Nazer, Chairman of the Committee on information services for the meeting said commented that the gathering will convene in the capital, Sana’a from 26 to 30 June 2011 at the request of the Republic of Yemen. Nazer pointed out that the meeting is being held for the first time in Yemen, and it is a great opportunity, since more than 100 high-ranking economic decision-makers will present, including minis-

ters and governors of banks. He also reported that the meeting will be accompanied by a number of other meetings including the meeting of the Governors Board of the Foundation. As well, the occasion will witness the meeting of the Board of Governors of the Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development, in addition to the meeting of the General Assembly of the Islamic Foundation for the development of the private sector, and the General Assembly for the International Islamic Trade and Finance . In the meantime, the annual event is an occasion for meetings of the General Assemblies of the institutions’ from the Islamic world, such as the Federation of National Institutions for financing development in the member

states in the Islamic Development Bank, the Federation of Consultants from Islamic countries, the Contract Union of Islamic countries, and the Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and Arbitration. Nazer said that the meeting in Yemen will coincide with the election of the Bank directors, who are nine in total. It is worth mentioning that 35 agreements will be signed, and that Yemen joined the Islamic Development Bank in 1977. The total subsidy from the Islamic Development Bank for the country is 276.300 million Islamic dinars which is distributed in development -facilitated loans, which consist of assistances and grants, in addition to $351.7 million Islamic dinars as commercial loans. The loans offered by the Islamic Bank for Development

reached 261.9 million Islamic dinars by the end of 2008 for a total of 46 development projects. 31 projects have been completed and implemented which developed the electricity sector, water, agriculture, roads, fisheries, as well as the public health sector, education and the syndicated loans sector. The Bank has provided loans to the factories in the amount of one million Islamic dinars. Considering the bank commitments during the donor conference in London, delegates resolved that the bank would provide up to 50% of the $101 million pledged for the implementation of projects under the Third FiveYear Plan. The Islamic Bank for Development has as its stated aim the support of economic development and social progress in

its member states, and of peoples and Muslim communities in non-Member States, collectively and individually, in accordance with the principles of Islamic law. The bank provides various development assistance to finance trade and combat poverty through human development, economic coopera-

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tion, and strengthening the role of Islamic finance in economic and social development. Also, the Bank embarked on a new mission to establish and operate special funds for new purposes, including a fund for assistance the Muslim communities in non-member States.

Government Report Cites Increase in Spending Interest Payments, Oil Derivatives, and Security Drain Government Coffers By Fuad al-Qadi An economic report issued by the government revealed that the year of 2010 witnessed a general increases in utilization the state’s public funds. The report attributed the increase of spending to several causes, including the rise in interest payments oo domestic public debt and increased support costs on oil derivatives, as well as the costs of security operations to counter acts of sabotage and terrorism. The increase in public expenditure comes amid the general scarcity of natural resources, and so exacerbates the budget deficit while the government resorts to funding its operations partially from inflationary sources. It led to many negative effects on the most important indicators of macroeconomic stability, including increased pressure on the balance of payments and the accelerated loss of foreign exchange reserves. As well as the deterioration of the exchange rate on the national currency and the high rates of inflation, low levels of standards of living and the

increase of interest payments on domestic public debt. In light of these developments, the government tried to restore the state of economic and financial stability and worked on controlling public spending, especially unessential expenditure, and its role in the gradual lifting of the support of oil derivatives. The government adopted a program of financial reform and monetary cooperation with the International Monetary Fund from the middle of 2010. The future policies will focus on the restrictions of wages and salaries of the civil service, which contain the current expenditures, while allowing an increase of capital and social expenditure and reforming the price distortions. In light of this, it is expected to contain the total in-use to reduce its share from 28.2% of GDP in 2010 to 25.3% in 2012. The estimate is consistent with ensuring the absolute increase in the total of expenditures with the increase in total general resources, and will not

be detrimental to the public budget deficit. The report expected the return the budget deficit to safe levels, as part of a decrease from -6.9% of GDP in 2010 to less than 3% of GDP in 2012, to reduce the rivalry of private investments and allow more chances for private sectors participation in economic development. This will be the basic orientation in the budget deficit in the reliance on real sources in

financing the budget deficit, through the rationalization of issuing bills and bonds of public debt during the medium and long-term in the open market. There are efforts underway to investigate at the possibility of issuing Islamic bonds geared toward financing the reduction of the deficit and which would serve the public budget for economic growth and the establishment of the

stock market. The report said that the most important general policies and procedures that can be adopted to confront the future challenges that threaten the sustainability of public finances is to maintain the budget deficit at a safe level and to continue financing the deficit of non-inflationary sources. It also recommended reducing dependence on oil and gas

revenues, raising the efficiency of collecting tax revenues, and updating the mechanisms for the application of tax laws. In addition to collecting more loans, foreign aid and raising the efficiency of allocation and utilization, as well as developing public financial management to enhance transparency and accountability and to ensure optimal allocation of resources. The report confirmed that the government, under the current budget, is focusing on measures to expand investment, prioritizing investment spending , increasing the funding for strategic projects with the focus on raising spending on infrastructure, basic services, as well as maintenance and operation of capital assets Raising the efficiency of public expenditure and activating the regulatory tools to ensure periodic evaluations of the various outlays and to identify problems in implementation were also stated goals of the government in the coming months.

Foreign Exchange Reserves Reduced to $5.9 Billion Yemen’s reserves of foreign exchange decreased in October 2010 to YR 1 trillion 281 billion, the equivalent of $5.987 billion, covering a period of imports over the course of 8 months. The net foreign assets of the banking system by the end of last September reached a total of YR trillion 299 billion, equivalent to $6 billion 55 million during the same period. The report issued by the Directorate General of

Research and Statistics at the central bank of Yemen reported that the average price per barrel during the January to October period over the last year was $77.66 at a total of 24.48 million barrels for a sum of $473 million dollars. The government used most of these proceeds to finance imports of oil derivatives for local consumption, which amounted to $1 billion 526 million. The report pointed out that domestic consumption during the period from January

to October reached 20.80 million barrels. The report said that the total consolidated balance sheet of commercial and Islamic banks increased by YR 41.4 billion riyals per 2.2% to reach YR 1 trillion 896 billion. Exchange rates saw an improvement at the end of the month of October, where the exchange rate stabilized at 214.60 after it witnessed a continuous rise during the previous period.

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National Yemen

REPORT

Yemen’s Social Fund for Development: a Model for Success The ‘Social Fund’ is seen as one of the few bright spots among the Yemen government’s development initiatives By Dan Driscoll and Jihan Anwar Al-Salam school sits on the fringe of Sana’a; at first glance, it looks like a typical school in Yemen: 25 classrooms, 80 students per class, and growing with 300-400 new enrollments a year. All the charachteristics of the all too common school found in Yemen. When National Yemen asked a student what she had learned in class recently, the answer was surprising. “In our past lesson, I wrote a story about my favorite place to visit, in English, I then posted it on the internet and students from around the world commented on it,” said the 3rd level student with perfect English as she formatted photos and uploaded them to her online website using a sleek new computer at the internet lab at Al-Salam. An under performing school? Far from it. Al-Salam was not just providing quality education to the students, but an education at the forefront of technology rarely found at even private universities throughout the country. Where did this success come from? Enter the Yemen Social Fund for Development (SFD), a highly successful government organization initiated in 1997 to help contribute to the government’s efforts to reduce poverty. Al-Salam is just one of the 27 schools throughout Yemen receiving strong support from the SFD in an pilot program that is focused on improving learning and teaching methods to provide an education that meets the current demands of the students. While a substantial amount of resources has been earmarked toward education, this area is not the only focus for the Social Fund for Development. Ten other sectors such as health, water and sanitation, agriculture and rural development, rural roads, social protection, cashfor-work programs, cultural heritage, training and capacity building and extensive efforts in small and micro enterprise development have experienced the positive change brought by the activities of the Social Fund. The SFD has received high praise from its partners as it has efficiently and transparently funded over 11,000 projects with $1.22 billion in only 14 years of operation, working in each areas with the same success found at Al-Salam school. One of the most unique interventions achieved under the aegis of SFD is its cultural heritage sector. In an effort to create jobs while preserving Yemen’s rich history, the SFD has brought in international experts that train Yemenis the skills that will enable them to safeguard their national cultural heritage. Projects such as the Great Mosque in Sana’a have seen extensive restoration and excavation projects as well as many other important areas such as the Al-Ashrafiya Madrasa/Mosque project and the Ghail Al-Awar

Tunnel, just to name a few. One of the most highly successful interventions is the labor-intensive work program beneﬁting 16,000 poor households which created over 850,000 days of work in 2009 alone. It seeks to provide cashpaying jobs for unskilled laborers migrating from rural areas, as well as creating work opportunities in rural areas in which living conditions are exacerbated by rising food prices and droughts.

Success in Harsh Conditions It is important to understand the significance the success of the SFD’s projects as they have been implemented in “impossible conditions...[where beneficiaries] live in 140,000 settlements scattered about throughout Yemen, with weak infrastructure and difficult geography” said Abdulelah Taqi, SFD’s Senior Communications Officer. Yet it is the unique structure of the organization and its adaptation to Yemeni society that allows them to overcome these hurdles. “The structure is a very simple form of management: there is the managing director, management committee, heads of units, and then project managers and after that, that's all” explained Dr. Majed Al-Sharjabi, Head of the SFD Health Sector. With its institutional autonomy, the SFD is able to recruit highly-qualified staff and is the only Yemeni government organization that can effectively fire employees. This simple structure of committed individuals allows the organization to be flexible and agile as it addresses the dynamic issues which contribute to poverty in Yemen.

‘‘ It is important to understand the signiﬁcance the success of the SFD’s projects as they have been implemented in impossible conditions

Dr Al-Sharjabi stressed the importance of a straightforward system which enables “easy communication with communities; they can contact us very easily. A person can make a request...meet and discuss [their]

A teacher lead Teachers at the lessons SFD-supported at the SFD-sponsored Al-Salam school al-Salam teaches school the basics of electricity in a science class needs with the SFD...and it can be anyone in the community, not necessarily a sheikh.” By working directly with communities, SFD taps into one of the greatest strengths of Yemeni society. SFD’s Community Local Development Initiative helps the local communities to not only identify their needs but train them and their local governance to develop projects that will address those needs. Thus SFD is a “change agent” for the country as a whole. “[We are trying] to recreate initiatives by the community...for the community. Our country is famous with these initiatives, the most famous dams in the ancient world were done by communities in Yemen,” said Dr. Sharjabi.

Overstretched? With such an extensive list of intervention areas and a rapidly increasing budget, SFD is criticized for doing too much and moving in on the traditional roles of ministry responsibilities. The most pointed disapproval comes from the Yemen government, as many ofﬁcials believe that by working in so many different sectors, they are duplicating the responsibilities of the government ministries. These criticisms are directed

at a program which was only intended to be a short-term response to the structural economic reforms of the 1990’s. Questions remain as to whether the SFD will be a temporary or permanent institution. Ongoing discussions are trying to identify how it can effectively integrate its know-how experience with existing line ministries as the SFD develops or dissolves in the future.

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We are trying to recreate initiatives by the community for the community.

Yet Mr. Taqi, argues that SFD should be seen as an important supporting role to the work of the ministries. “We build [within] the strategies of the

ministries such as planning or education and through this we support them.” SFD has worked hard to create the political space to promote their work by creating understanding between the roles of SFD and the respective ministries. As a result, the SFD and line ministries’ ofﬁces exchange plans and agree on roles. Through this the SFD believes it is effectively supporting the needs of the government and not just duplicating its efforts.

Eye on Future

the

The role of the SFD is not expected to end anytime soon. Donors have increasingly preferred to fund Yemen initiatives through the SFD due to the transparency and effectiveness in their project management, which is rarely matched by any other development organization or agency. With ample support of over 15 donors led by the World Bank, the SFD is planning to implement its fourth phase of development throughout 2011 2015. This phase will build on lessons learned from the previous phases and expand successful projects already implemented such as the Labor Intensive

Workers carry stones to one of the many road projects throughout the rural areas of Yemen

Work Program. Additionally, Mr. Taqi explained that the fourth phase SFD will seek to increase collaboration with government ministries as well as local governorates in an attempt to promote decentralization. “In this phase, we will implement a pilot project which will qualify 80 local councils to receive funding to manage and implement their district’s development plans. We will provide trainings on policies and methodologies from our experiences so they can become the implementers” added Mr. Taqi.

Fulfilling the Needs of Yemen When National Yemen asked Mrs. Mona, a teacher at Al-Salam school, if they could have reached this level of success without the SFD she could only laugh and shake her head in a way that expressed how much they were indebted to their support. “We are so fortunate but many other schools don’t even receive this type of support,” said one teacher. Growing on the success of the program at Al-Salam, the SFD plans to expand this successful program of educational support to over 177 schools. Mrs. Mona went on and stressed that despite their success with SFD’s help, many challenges remained for their school. They have managed admirably but struggle to expand their technology programs as they have only 10 computers for all of the students at the school. Power frequently cuts out disrupting or even canceling the classes for the students. The dropout rate among girls remains high. Yet these adversities reflect the larger needs the country has yet to fulfill. Just as Mrs. Mona looks to continued and growing support to address the issues at Al-Salam and at other schools; Yemen looks to the Social Fund for Development to take the lead in solving many of the problems that afflict the country.

National Yemen