THE MEMPHIS BUFF
VOLUME 36, ISSUE 8
NATIONAL RAILWAY HISTORICAL SOCIETY
AUGUST 2009
Bad Day at Dongola Amtrak Releases “Sunset Limited” Report “Memphis Rails” Website
Memphis Chapter Officers President – David Chase
dchase@memphisredbirds.com
Vice President – Bruce Smedley National Director – Bill Strong
williambstrong@bellsouth.net
Secretary – Oliver Doughtie
doughtio@bellsouth.net
Treasurer – Thomas Doherty
TRDoherty@aol.com
Librarian – Mike Pendergrass Publication Editor – Tom Parker
tscottparker@gmail.com
Last Month’s Meeting No report This Month's Meeting Videos again for August. This time courtesy of Carl Lancaster, a selection from “Workin' on the Santa Fe”, a series of training films produced by the ATSF. Carl is still deciding what to show, but it should be interesting.
New Memphis Rails Website For years I have had a Memphis railroad web site as part of my site, illinoiscentral.net. I have now taken it out of the Illinois Central site and given it its own web address, memphisrails.com. As part of the transition, the online Memphis Buff has been moved to the new site. The old address will work for a while, but it is now a menu option on the Memphis Rails home page. The user name is still “Member” and the password is still “Buff”. (Capital “M” and “B”). I am updating and adding content to the new site all the time, so check it out! Tom Parker Cover Photo:Looking east down Broadway from Kentucky Street. A hot Sunday afternoon in July. Probably a sign of the times, except for a string of cars in the far distance, not a sign of any activity on the rails. Tom Parker Photo
A Bad Night at Dongola By Mary T. McPherson Copyright Mary R. McPherson and used with permission
In today’s Canadian National rulebook, it is rule 518: Movement At Restricted Speed. It reads as follows: When a train is required to move at restricted speed, it must proceed prepared to stop within one-half the range of vision short of: * Train * Engine * Railroad Car * Roadway workers or equipment fouling the track * Stop Signal, or * Derail or switch lined improperly The crew must keep a lookout for broken rail and not exceed 20 MPH. Comply with these requirements until the leading wheels reach a point where movement at restricted speed is no longer required or have reached the end of signaled territory. This rule, or some variation of it, has been in railroad rulebooks since time immemorial. The rule number and exact wording may have changed over the years, but the principal is the same: go slow enough to be able to stop shy of hitting something. In the same rulebook are rules 819 (approach) and 815 (re-
stricted proceed). An approach, or yellow signal, tells a crew to proceed prepared to stop at the next signal. A restricted proceed is a red signal with a number plate on the signal, which allows a train to proceed at restricted speed. On passing a restricted proceed, a train is governed by rule 518. The rules were mostly the same in the Illinois Central rulebook of 1970, though restricted speed at that time allowed a maximum speed of only 10 MPH. Southbound I.C. piggyback train #51 pulled out of IMX piggyback terminal in Chicago at 6:20 the evening of Saturday, September 12, 1970, with GP40 #3013 in the lead. The train made an additional pickup at Markham Yard, where it departed with 42 cars consisting of 38 loads and 4 empties. The train changed crews at Champaign and arrived at Centralia at 1:25am the 13th. At Centralia, there was another crew change. While the new crew took over, car inspectors went to work giving the train its 500 mile brake inspection. When engineer H.W. Dunker kicked off the brakes and notched out the throttle de-
parting B Yard at 1:40am, the train was two hours and 35 minutes behind schedule. Five minutes later, extra 8177 south pulled out of North Yard in Carbondale. The train was a local consisting of two diesels, twenty-six cars and a caboose. Before leaving Carbondale, the local’s crew received a train lineup from the dispatcher showing #51 due by Carbondale at 2:00. The local stopped at Anna to set out a car, and then continued on to Dongola where it had switching work to do. On arrival at Dongola, conductor L.E. Rees called the dispatcher to enquire on #51’s location. The dispatcher told Rees that #51 had passed Carbondale at 2:29, so he figured he should be able to have his switching finished and his train in the siding between the main tracks before the piggyback train arrived. Rees’s 20 year old son was riding along with his father this night, and stayed in the caboose as the crew set about their switching work. In the meantime, #51 was making up time. The crew was taking considerable liberties with the speed limit; not an
uncommon practice at the time. With a 3,240 ton train and three three-thousand horsepower GP40’s doing the work up front, the crew was able to make time in the hill country south of Carbondale. It must have been quite a ride that night, as the train was making considerably better time than Amtrak’s City of New Orleans does today. North of Dongola, #51 passed an approach signal at milepost 335.9. Engineer Dunker started slowing the train, making a fifteen pound brake reduction. He and brakeman Morgan called the signal to each other. “Yellow!” “Does the local work Saturday nights?” Dunker asked. “Yeah, I think so,” Morgan replied. “Maybe he’s clearing up at Dongola.” The local was still switching the Ramp Track at Dongola. The ramp track was a stub ended siding on the west side of the mainline, located between the main tracks and a side street. Conductor Rees was on the ground near his caboose, while the brakeman and flagman were doing the switching work at the south end of the siding. At 2:59am, conductor Rees heard a train to the north and
saw a headlight lighting up the curve. Instantly he realized the train was not going to stop. He shouted a warning to his son, and started running away from his train. #51 was riding the brakes down the .8 percent grade toward Dongola, approaching signal 337.5 at around 25 miles per hour. The signal was located in the middle of a reverse curve; the track coming out of a left hand curve, passing the signal, and curving back to the right into Dongola. “Red!” brakeman Morgan called as the signal came into view, and Dunker put the train into emergency. At the same instant, the men in the cab of #51 saw the red marker light on the local’s caboose,
which was only 600 feet south of the signal. Brakeman Morgan decided to jump. He ran out the back door of the cab behind the engineer, down the walkway to the rear steps and bailed off after the passing the signal. Dunker and a deadheading engineer decided to ride out the collision, hitting the deck seconds before impact. The rest of the men aboard, an off duty engineer in the second locomotive and the conductor and brakeman in the caboose, had no idea anything was wrong until hearing the brakes go into emergency. The impact of the collision shoved the local 150 feet. The caboose was spun around nearly 150 degrees, coming to rest across the northbound
main. It was considered a total loss, as were the four rear cars of the local. #51 traveled 544 feet from the point of the initial impact; the lead unit tearing up the Ramp Track and plowing into Front Street. All three locomotives were derailed, as were the first two cars of the train. Conductor Rees’s son was still in the cupola of the caboose when #51 hit it. Fortunately he suffered only minor injuries; abrasions and a concussion. None of the local’s crew were injured. Engineer Dunker on #51 received a fractured rib and bruises in the back an shoulder in the wreck, while brakeman Morgan sustained strained muscles jumping from the train. None of the rest of the men aboard reported injuries, though the deadheading engineer who was riding in the
second unit died six days later of heart failure. The cause of the Dongola wreck boiled down to one thing: speed. The crew of #51 had a late train, and was in a hurry to get over the road. It was 82.5 miles from B Yard in Centralia to the point of the
collision, and the train averaged 62 miles per hour for that distance. The posted speed limit for last 30 miles was 50 miles per hour, and speed restrictions of 40 through DuQuoin and 10 through Carbondale also came into play. From Centralia to Carbondale was
posted 60 miles per hour. Needless to say, for the train to average 62 miles per hour the train had to have not only been speeding, but speeding by a considerable amount.
Amtrak releases “Sunset Limited” Report Excerpted by Tom Parker
The final piece of the puzzle was the crew of #51 approaching a signal that was likely to indicate proceeding at restricted speed too fast to stop in violation of the rules. Perhaps the crew assumed the next signal would be something other than it turned out to be. Whatever the reason, it turned out to be a bad night at Dongola. Author's note: This article was written using the official accident report as a reference. Dialogue is inferred from statements in the report for dramatic effect.
As mandated by the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008, om July 16, 2009, Amtrak released its report on restoring passenger service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Sanford Florida.
History In 1993, Amtrak’s Sunset Limited, which operated between Los Angeles, California and New Orleans, Louisiana, was extended east from New Orleans to Jacksonville, Orlando, and initially to Miami, Florida. This created a new transcontinental Amtrak route and brought passenger rail service to the Gulf Coast Region between New Orleans and Jacksonville. ln August 2005, Sunset Limited service east of New Orleans was suspended due to Hurricane Katrina, which caused massive damage to rail infrastructure on the portion of the train’s route between New Orleans, Louisiana and Mobile, Alabama. The service remains suspended today because of the cost and challenges associated with restoring service to this route.
About the Author: Mary McPherson is a lifelong railfan, writer and photographer. She is currently a conductor on "Amtrak's City of New Orleans". Visit her Bolg at: http://talesoftherails.blogspot.com/ Map of "Sunset Limited" Route. Thirteen of the seventeen stations shown lost all Amtrak service.
Preferred Options for Service Restoration Amtrak initially evaluated 12 alternatives for restoring service between New Orleans, and Florida. Of the 12 alternatives, three were selected as preferred options for evaluation in the study based upon projected ridership, revenue, operating costs, and operating loss. The preferred options, which are depicted in the route map below, are: • Option 1: Restore tri-weekly Sunset Limited servicebetweenLos Angeles, California and Orlando, Florida. • Option 2: Extend the daily City of New Orleans service, which currently operates between Chicago, Illinois and New Orleans, Louisiana, east from New Orleans to Orlando, Florida. • Option 3: Implement daily stand-alone overnight service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Orlando,Florida.
The Three Options
Projected capital and mobilization costs for restored service are $32.7 million for Option 1 (tri-weekly Sunset Limited) and $57.6 million to $96.6 million for both Option 2 (daily City of New Orleans extension) and Option 3 (daily standalone train). Capital/mobilization expenditures required for all three options are:
Each of the three proposed options would restore service between New Orleans and Orlando. This report assumes that all of the 19 stations between New Orleans and Orlando would be served by the restored service.
• $10.7 million for restoring the 13 Suspended Service Stations to a state of good repair and bringing them into compliance with Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) requirements (including $3.2million for the demolition and reconstruction of the Sanford, Florida station);
Capital Improvements and Mobilization Costs
• $600,000 for improvements at Amtrak’s Sanford mainten-
ance facility where equipment would be maintained; • a preliminary estimate of $20 million for Positive Train Control (PTC) costs as the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008 may require installation of PTC by 2015 on portions of the route solely because of the restoration of passenger service; and • training and engineer/conductor qualification costs of $1.4 million for Option 1 and $2.3 million for Options 2 and 3. For Options 2 and 3, additional equipment would be required to support this service. Each of these options is projected to require the acquisition of between six and 14 new passenger cars, at a cost of $24 million to $63 million.
These capital and mobilization cost estimates do not include expenditures, if any,required to increase rail line capacity. CSX Transportation, Inc., the host freight railroad that owns nearly all of the New Orleans - Orlando route, has indicated that it will seek significant capacity investments as a prerequisite to any service restoration. Contrary to this assertion, Amtrak does not believe that any infrastructure capacity investments on CSX are required to restore the formerly operated tri-weekly service (Option 1), and holds that the need for any track investments to support daily service, Options 2 and 3, should be determined through capacity modeling undertaken in collaboration with CSX. Financial Performance The projected annual direct operating loss associated with restoring service between New Orleans and Orlando is: • $ 4.8 million for Option 1 (restoration of tri-weekly Sunset Limited); • $11.7 million for Option 2 (daily City of New Orleans extension); and • $18.4 million for Option 3 (daily stand-alone train). Projected farebox recovery – the percentage of direct oper-
ating costs covered by passenger revenues generated by restored service (including additional revenues on connecting routes) is 56% for Option 1, 44% for Option 2, and 23% for Option 3. Ridership Forecast Ridership was a primary consideration in selecting the three preferred options. The projected additional Amtrak annual ridership associated with each is: • 53,300 for Option 1 (restoration of tri-weekly Sunset Limited); • 96,100 for Option 2 (daily City of New Orleans extension); and • 79,900 for Option 3 (daily stand-alone train). Projected additional passenger miles on the Amtrak route system (on both the restored service and other routes with which it would connect) for each train mileoperated are: • 228.3 passenger miles for Option 1; • 125.9 passenger miles for Option 2; and • 80.5 passenger miles for Option 3. Option 1 produces the highest passenger miles per train mile because it attractsmore passengers making longer trips (e.g., Los Angeles
to Orlando). Potential ridership between New Orleans and Orlando is adversely impacted by the circuitry of the rail route (769 miles versus 639 miles by highway) and slow speeds that result in a rail trip time of 18.5 hours versus 9.6 hours by automobile. Public Benefits Assuming additional federal or state funding is provided, Amtrak anticipates that restoring passenger service between New Orleans and Orlando will produce modest net economic benefits. Direct benefits include the impact of the approximately $11.3 million in station and facility capital investments along the route and the creation of between 32 and 122 permanent Amtrak jobs, depending upon which option is chosen. Such expenditures would create jobs, primarily in construction, manufacturing and material supply, for the duration of these projects. Operation of the service will also lead to expenditures for food, supplies, lodging for train crews, etc. that will benefit local economies, and can also be expected to produce significant ongoing spillover economic benefits. The daily service options – Options 2 and 3 – would require additional capital expenditures of $24-
$63 million for new equipment. While construction of new equipment is likely to create domestic manufacturing jobs, these jobs are unlikely to be located in the Gulf Coast Region. Restoration of passenger rail service between New Orleans and Orlando would also produce mobility benefits by creating a direct link between Florida, the Gulf Coast Region, and the Central and Western United States. Communities along the Gulf Coast, many of which have limited or no intercity public transportation service and continue to be affected by the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, would regain a passenger rail option. Option 1, which generates the highest number of additional passenger miles per train mile, may produce some energy savings due to diversion of trips that would otherwise be taken by less energy efficient automobiles and airplanes. Options 2 and 3 are not likely to produce measurable environmental, energy or congestion relief benefits because they generate relatively few additional passenger miles per train mile operated and the distance by rail between many city pairs they would serve is considerably longer than the distance by air or highway.
Timeline Implementation of Option 1 (restoration of tri-weekly Sunset Limited) would require a minimum of 20 months lead time from the date on which funding is made available. This is due to the time required to hire, train, and qualify locomotive engineers, and to bring stations into to a state of good repair and make them ADA compliant. Option 2 (daily City of New Orleans extension) and Option 3 (daily stand-alone train) would take approximately four years to implement, since purchase of new equipment would be required. These projections are subject to a number of contingencies.
tion. Once these actions are taken, Amtrak will move quickly to initiate the stepsrequired for service restoration, if such an option is chosen.
Conclusion and Next Steps This plan identifies the most viable options for restoring intercity passenger rail service between New Orleans, Louisiana and Orlando, Florida. Amtrak recommends that federal and state policymakers determine if passenger rail service should be restored between New Orleans and Orlando; and if so: 1. Identify the preferred option for service restoration; and 2. Provide theadditional funding for capital and ongoing operating coststhat will be required to implement that op-
Proposed City of New Orleans Schedule
The complete report is available at : http://www.amtrak.com/pdf/PRIAA/GulfCoastServicePlanReport.pdf
CABOOSE
Autotrain 92 From the collection of Mike Pendergrass Meeting Schedule August 10, 2009 September 14, 2009 October 12, 2009 November 9, 2009 Meetings are the 2nd Monday of each month in the White Station Branch Library from 7-9 pm. 5094 Poplar Avenue Memphis, TN (in front of Clark Tower)
Contact the Editor Tom Parker 3012 Wood Thrush Drive Memphis, TN 38134 tscottparker@gmail.com
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