PART IV
The Unraveling
12 EARLY 2007: SPREADING SUBPRIME WORRIES
CONTENTS Goldman: “Let’s be aggressive distributing things”.............................................. Bear Stearns’s hedge funds: “Looks pretty damn ugly”........................................ Rating agencies: “It can’t be . . . all of a sudden”.................................................. AIG: “Well bigger than we ever planned for” .....................................................
Over the course of , the collapse of the housing bubble and the abrupt shutdown of subprime lending led to losses for many financial institutions, runs on money market funds, tighter credit, and higher interest rates. Unemployment remained relatively steady, hovering just below . until the end of the year, and oil prices rose dramatically. By the middle of , home prices had declined almost from their peak in . Early evidence of the coming storm was the . drop in November of the ABX Index—a Dow Jones–like index for credit default swaps on BBBtranches of mortgage-backed securities issued in the first half of . That drop came after Moody’s and S&P put on negative watch selected tranches in one deal backed by mortgages from one originator: Fremont Investment & Loan. In December, the same index fell another after the mortgage companies Ownit Mortgage Solutions and Sebring Capital ceased operations. Senior risk officers of the five largest investment banks told the Securities and Exchange Commission that they expected to see further subprime lender failures in . “There is a broad recognition that, with the refinancing and real estate booms over, the business model of many of the smaller subprime originators is no longer viable,” SEC analysts told Director Erik Sirri in a January , , memorandum. That became more and more evident. In January, Mortgage Lenders Network announced it had stopped funding mortgages and accepting applications. In February, New Century reported bigger-than-expected mortgage credit losses and HSBC, the largest subprime lender in the United States, announced a . billion increase in its quarterly provision for losses. In March, Fremont stopped originating subprime loans after receiving a cease and desist order from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In April, New Century filed for bankruptcy.
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These institutions had relied for their operating cash on short-term funding through commercial paper and the repo market. But commercial paper buyers and banks became unwilling to continue funding them, and repo lenders became less and less willing to accept subprime and Alt-A mortgages or mortgage-backed securities as collateral. They also insisted on ever-shorter maturities, eventually of just one day—an inherently destabilizing demand, because it gave them the option of withholding funding on short notice if they lost confidence in the borrower. Another sign of problems in the market came when financial companies began to report more detail about their assets under the new mark-to-market accounting rule, particularly about mortgage-related securities that were becoming illiquid and hard to value. The sum of more illiquid Level and assets at these firms was “eyepopping in terms of the amount of leverage the banks and investment banks had,” according to Jim Chanos, a New York hedge fund manager. Chanos said that the new disclosures also revealed for the first time that many firms retained large exposures from securitizations. “You clearly didn’t get the magnitude, and the market didn’t grasp the magnitude until spring of ’, when the figures began to be published, and then it was as if someone rang a bell, because almost immediately upon the publication of these numbers, journalists began writing about it, and hedge funds began talking about it, and people began speaking about it in the marketplace.” In late and early , some banks moved to reduce their subprime exposures by selling assets and buying protection through credit default swaps. Some, such as Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, reduced mortgage exposure in some areas of the firm but increased it in others. Banks that had been busy for nearly four years creating and selling subprime-backed collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) scrambled in about that many months to sell or hedge whatever they could. They now dumped these products into some of the most ill-fated CDOs ever engineered. Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and UBS, particularly, were forced to retain larger and larger quantities of the “super-senior” tranches of these CDOs. The bankers could always hope— and many apparently even believed—that all would turn out well with these super seniors, which were, in theory, the safest of all. With such uncertainty about the market value of mortgage assets, trades became scarce and setting prices for these instruments became difficult. Although government officials knew about the deterioration in the subprime markets, they misjudged the risks posed to the financial system. In January , SEC officials noted that investment banks had credit exposure to struggling subprime lenders but argued that “none of these exposures are material.” The Treasury and Fed insisted throughout the spring and early summer that the damage would be limited. “The impact on the broader economy and financial markets of the problems in the subprime market seems likely to be contained,” Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke testified before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress on March . That same day, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson told a House Appropriations subcommittee: “From the standpoint of the overall economy, my bottom line is we’re watching it closely but it appears to be contained.”
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GOLDMAN: “LET’S BE AGGRESSIVE DISTRIBUTING THINGS” In December , following the initial decline in ABX BBB indices and after consecutive days of trading losses on its mortgage desk, executives at Goldman Sachs decided to reduce the firm’s subprime exposure. Goldman marked down the value of its mortgage-related products to reflect the lower ABX prices, and began posting daily losses for this inventory. Responding to the volatility in the subprime market, Goldman analysts delivered an internal report on December , , regarding “the major risk in the Mortgage business” to Chief Financial Officer David Viniar and Chief Risk Officer Craig Broderick. The next day, executives determined that they would get “closer to home,” meaning that they wanted to reduce their mortgage exposure: sell what could be sold as is, repackage and sell everything else. Kevin Gasvoda, the managing director for Goldman’s Fixed Income, Currency, and Commodities business line, instructed the sales team to sell asset-backed security and CDO positions, even at a loss: “Pls refocus on retained new issue bond positions and move them out. There will be big opportunities the next several months and we don’t want to be hamstrung based on old inventory. Refocus efforts and move stuff out even if you have to take a small loss.” In a December email, Viniar described the strategy to Tom Montag, the co-head of global securities: “On ABX, the position is reasonably sensible but is just too big. Might have to spend a little to size it appropriately. On everything else my basic message was let’s be aggressive distributing things because there will be very good opportunities as the market goes into what is likely to be even greater distress and we want to be in position to take advantage of them.” Subsequent emails suggest that the “everything else” meant mortgage-related assets. On December , in an internal email with broad distribution, Goldman’s Stacy Bash-Polley, a partner and the co-head of fixed income sales, noted that the firm, unlike others, had been able to find buyers for the super-senior and equity tranches of CDOs, but the mezzanine tranches remained a challenge. The “best target,” she said, would be to put them in other CDOs: “We have been thinking collectively as a group about how to help move some of the risk. While we have made great progress moving the tail risks—[super-senior] and equity—we think it is critical to focus on the mezz risk that has been built up over the past few months. . . . Given some of the feedback we have received so far [from investors,] it seems that cdo’s maybe the best target for moving some of this risk but clearly in limited size (and timing right now not ideal).” It was becoming harder to find buyers for these securities. Back in October, Goldman Sachs traders had complained that they were being asked to “distribute junk that nobody was dumb enough to take first time around.” Despite the first of Goldman’s business principles—that “our clients’ interests always come first”—documents indicate that the firm targeted less-sophisticated customers in its efforts to reduce subprime exposure. In a December email discussing a list of customers to target for the year, Goldman’s Fabrice Tourre, then a vice president on the structured product correlation trading desk, said to “focus efforts” on “buy and hold rating-based buyers”
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rather than “sophisticated hedge funds” that “will be on the same side of the trade as we will.” The “same of side of the trade” as Goldman was the selling or shorting side—those who expected the mortgage market to continue to decline. In January, Daniel Sparks, the head of Goldman’s mortgage department, extolled Goldman’s success in reducing its subprime inventory, writing that the team had “structured like mad and traveled the world, and worked their tails off to make some lemonade from some big old lemons.” Tourre acknowledged that there was “more and more leverage in the system,” and—writing of himself in the third person—said he was “standing in middle of all these complex, highly levered, exotic trades he created without necessarily understanding all the implications of those monstrosities.” On February , Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein questioned Montag about the million in losses on residual positions from old deals, asking, “Could/should we have cleaned up these books before and are we doing enough right now to sell off cats and dogs in other books throughout the division?” The numbers suggest that the answer was yes, they had cleaned up pretty well, even given a million write-off and billions of dollars of subprime exposure still retained. In the first quarter of , its mortgage business earned a record million, driven primarily by short positions, including a billion short position on the bellwether ABX BBB index, whose drop the previous November had been the red flag that got Goldman’s attention. In the following months, Goldman reduced its own mortgage risk while continuing to create and sell mortgage-related products to its clients. From December through August , it created and sold approximately . billion of CDOs— including . billion of synthetic CDOs. The firm used the cash CDOs to unload much of its own remaining inventory of other CDO securities and mortgage-backed securities. Goldman has been criticized—and sued—for selling its subprime mortgage securities to clients while simultaneously betting against those securities. Sylvain Raynes, a structured finance expert at R&R Consulting in New York, reportedly called Goldman’s practice “the most cynical use of credit information that I have ever seen,” and compared it to “buying fire insurance on someone else’s house and then committing arson.” During a FCIC hearing, Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein was asked if he believed it was a proper, legal, or ethical practice for Goldman to sell clients mortgage securities that Goldman believed would default, while simultaneously shorting them. Blankfein responded, “I do think that the behavior is improper and we regret the result—the consequence [is] that people have lost money” The next day, Goldman issued a press release declaring Blankfein did not state that Goldman’s “practices with respect to the sale of mortgage-related securities were improper. . . . Blankfein was responding to a lengthy series of statements followed by a question that was predicated on the assumption that a firm was selling a product that it thought was going to default. Mr. Blankfein agreed that, if such an assumption was true, the practice would be improper. Mr. Blankfein does not believe, nor did he say, that Goldman Sachs had behaved improperly in any way.”
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In addition, Goldman President and Chief Operating Officer Gary Cohn testified: “During the two years of the financial crisis, Goldman Sachs lost . billion in its residential mortgage–related business. . . . We did not bet against our clients, and these numbers underscore that fact.” Indeed, Goldman’s short position was not the whole story. The daily mortgage “Value at Risk” measure, or VaR, which tracked potential losses if the market moved unexpectedly, increased in the three months through February. By February, Goldman’s company-wide VaR reached an all-time high, according to SEC reports. The dominant driver of the increase was the one-sided bet on the mortgage market’s continuing to decline. Preferring to be relatively neutral, between March and May, the mortgage securities desk reduced its short position on the ABX Index; between June and August, it again reversed course, increasing its short position by purchasing protection on mortgage-related assets. The Basis Yield Alpha Fund, a hedge fund and Goldman client that claims to have invested . million in Goldman’s Timberwolf CDO, sued Goldman for fraud in . The Timberwolf deal was heavily criticized by Senator Carl Levin and other members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations during an April hearing. The Basis Yield Alpha Fund alleged that Goldman designed Timberwolf to quickly fail so that Goldman could offload low-quality assets and profit from betting against the CDO. Within two weeks of the fund’s investment, Goldman began making margin calls on the deal. By the end of July , it had demanded more than million. According to the hedge fund, Goldman’s demands forced it into bankruptcy in August —Goldman received about million from the liquidation. Goldman denies Basis Yield Alpha Fund’s claims, and CEO Blankfein dismissed the notion that Goldman misled investors. “I will tell you, we only dealt with people who knew what they were buying. And of course when you look after the fact, someone’s going to come along and say they really didn’t know,” he told the FCIC. In addition to selling its subprime securities to customers, the firm took short positions using credit default swaps; it also took short positions on the ABX indices and on some of the financial firms with which it did business. Like every market participant, Goldman “marked,” or valued, its securities after considering both actual market trades and surveys of how other institutions valued the assets. As the crisis unfolded, Goldman marked mortgage-related securities at prices that were significantly lower than those of other companies. Goldman knew that those lower marks might hurt those other companies—including some clients—because they could require marking down those assets and similar assets. In addition, Goldman’s marks would get picked up by competitors in dealer surveys. As a result, Goldman’s marks could contribute to other companies recording “mark-to-market” losses: that is, the reported value of their assets could fall and their earnings would decline. The markdowns of these assets could also require that companies reduce their repo borrowings or post additional collateral to counterparties to whom they had sold credit default swap protection. In a May email, Craig Broderick, who as Goldman’s chief risk officer was responsible for tracking how much of the company’s money was at risk, noted to colleagues that the mortgage group was “in the process
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of considering making significant downward adjustments to the marks on their mortgage portfolio [especially] CDOs and CDO squared. This will potentially have a big [profit and loss] impact on us, but also to our clients due to the marks and associated margin calls on repos, derivatives, and other products. We need to survey our clients and take a shot at determining the most vulnerable clients, knock on implications, etc. This is getting lots of th floor attention right now.” Broderick was right about the impact of Goldman’s marks on clients and counterparties. The first significant dispute about these marks began in May : it concerned the two high-flying, mortgage-focused hedge funds run by Bear Stearns Asset Management (BSAM).
BEAR STEARNS’S HEDGE FUNDS: “LOOKS PRETTY DAMN UGLY” In , Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, who had structured CDOs at Bear Stearns, were busy managing BSAM’s High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund. When they added the higher-leveraged, higher-risk Enhanced Fund in they became even busier. By April , internal BSAM risk exposure reports showed about of the High-Grade fund’s collateral to be subprime mortgage–backed CDOs, assets that were beginning to lose market value. In a diary kept in his personal email account because he “didn’t want to use [his] work email anymore,” Tannin recounted that in “a wave of fear set over [him]” when he realized that the Enhanced Fund “was going to subject investors to ‘blow up risk’” and “we could not run the leverage as high as I had thought we could.” This “blow up risk,” coupled with bad timing, proved fatal for the Enhanced Fund. Shortly after the fund opened, the ABX BBB- index started to falter, falling in the last three months of ; then another in January and in February. The market’s confidence fell with the ABX. Investors began to bail out of both Enhanced and High-Grade. Cioffi and Tannin stepped up their marketing. On March , , Tannin said in an email to investors, “we see an opportunity here—not crazy opportunity—but prudent opportunity—I am putting in additional capital—I think you should as well.” On a March conference call, Tannin and Cioffi assured investors that both funds “have plenty of liquidity,” and they continued to use the investment of their own money as evidence of their confidence. Tannin even said he was increasing his personal investment, although, according to the SEC, he never did. Despite their avowals of confidence, Cioffi and Tannin were in full red-alert mode. In April, Cioffi redeemed million of his own . million investment in Enhanced Leverage and transferred the funds to a third hedge fund he managed. They tried to sell the toxic CDO securities held by the hedge funds. They had little success selling them directly on the market, but there was another way. In late May, BSAM put together a CDO-squared deal that would take billion of CDO assets off the hedge funds’ books. The senior-most tranches, worth . billion,
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were sold as commercial paper to short-term investors such as money market mutual funds. Critically, Bank of America guaranteed those deals with a liquidity put—for a fee. Later, commercial paper investors would refuse to roll over this particular paper; Bank of America ultimately lost more than billion on this arrangement.
“ is doomsday” Nearly all hedge funds provide their investors with market value reports, at least monthly, based on computed mark-to-market prices for the fund’s various investments. Industry standards generally called for valuing readily traded assets, such as stocks, at the current trading price, while assets in very slow markets were marked by surveying price quotes from other dealers, factoring in other pricing information, and then arriving at a final net asset value. For mortgage-backed investments, marking assets was an extremely important exercise, because the market values were used to inform investors and to calculate the hedge fund’s total fund value for internal risk management purposes, and because these assets were held as collateral for repo and other lenders. Crucially, if the value of a hedge fund’s portfolio declined, repo and other lenders might require more collateral. In April, JP Morgan told Alan Schwartz, Bear Stearns’s co-president, that the bank would be asking the BSAM hedge funds to post additional collateral to support its repo borrowing. Dealer marks were slow to keep up with movements in the ABX indices. Even as the ABX BBB- index recovered some in March, rebounding , marks by brokerdealers finally started to reflect the lower values. On April , , Goldman sent BSAM marks ranging from cents to cents on the dollar—meaning that some securities were worth as little as of their initial value. On Thursday, April , in preparation for an investor call the following week, BSAM analysts informed Cioffi and Tannin that in their view, the value of the funds’ portfolios had declined sharply. On Sunday, Tannin sent an email from his personal account to Cioffi’s personal account arguing that both hedge funds should be closed and liquidated: “Looks pretty damn ugly. . . . If we believe the runs [the analyst] has been doing are ANYWHERE CLOSE to accurate, I think we should close the Funds now. . . . If [the runs] are correct then the entire sub-prime market is toast.” But by the following Wednesday, Cioffi and Tannin were back on the same upbeat page. At the beginning of the conference call, Tannin told investors, “The key sort of big picture point for us at this point is our confidence that the structured credit market and the sub-prime market in particular, has not systemically broken down; . . . we’re very comfortable with exactly where we are.” Cioffi also assured investors that the funds would likely finish the year with positive returns. On May , , the two hedge funds had attracted more than million in new funds, but more than million was redeemed by investors. That same day, Goldman sent BSAM marks ranging from cents to cents on the dollar. Cioffi disputed Goldman’s marks as well as marks from Lehman, Citigroup,
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and JP Morgan. On May , in a preliminary estimate, Cioffi told investors that the net asset value of the Enhanced Leverage Fund was down . in April. In computing the final numbers later that month, he requested that BSAM’s Pricing Committee instead use fair value marks based on his team’s modeling, which implied losses that were to million less than losses using Goldman’s marks. On June , although Goldman’s marks were considered low, the Pricing Committee decided to continue to average dealer marks rather than to use fair value. The committee also noted that the decline in net asset value would be greater than the . estimate, because “many of the positions that were marked down received dealer marks after release of the estimate.” The decline was revised from . to . According to Cioffi, a number of factors contributed to the April revision, and Goldman’s marks were one factor. After these meetings, Cioffi emailed one committee member: “There is no market . . . its [sic] all academic anyway— [value] is doomsday.” On June , BSAM announced the drop and froze redemptions.
“Canary in the mine shaft” When JP Morgan contacted Bear’s co-president Alan Schwartz in April about its upcoming margin call, Schwartz convened an executive committee meeting to discuss how repo lenders were marking down positions and making margin calls on the basis of those new marks. In early June, Bear met with BSAM’s repo lenders to explain that BSAM lacked cash to meet margin calls and to negotiate a -day reprieve. Some of these very same firms had sold Enhanced and High-Grade some of the same CDOs and other securities that were turning out to be such bad assets. Now all refused Schwartz’s appeal; instead, they made margin calls. As a direct result, the two funds had to sell collateral at distressed prices to raise cash. Selling the bonds led to a complete loss of confidence by the investors, whose requests for redemptions accelerated. Shortly after BSAM froze redemptions, Merrill Lynch seized more than million of its collateral posted by Bear for its outstanding repo loans. Merrill was able to sell just million of the seized collateral at auction by July —and at discounts to its face value. Other repo lenders were increasing their collateral requirements or refusing to roll over their loans. This run on both hedge funds left both BSAM and Bear Stearns with limited options. Although it owned the asset management business, Bear’s equity positions in the two BSAM hedge funds were relatively small. On April , Bear’s co-president Warren Spector approved a million investment into the Enhanced Leverage Fund. Bear Stearns had no legal obligation to rescue either the funds or their repo lenders. However, those lenders were the same large investment banks that Bear Stearns dealt with every day. Moreover, any failure of entities related to Bear Stearns could raise investors’ concerns about the firm itself. Thomas Marano, the head of the mortgage trading desk, told FCIC staff that the constant barrage of margin calls had created chaos at Bear. In late June, Bear Stearns dispatched him to engineer a solution with Richard Marin, BSAM’s CEO. Marano now worked to understand the portfolio, including what it might be worth in a worst-
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case scenario in which significant amounts of assets had to be sold. Bear Stearns’s conclusion: High-Grade still had positive value, but Enhanced Leverage did not. On the basis of that analysis, Bear Stearns committed up to . billion—and ultimately loaned . billion—to take out the High-Grade Fund repo lenders and become the sole repo lender to the fund; Enhanced Leverage was on its own. During a June Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, members were informed about the subprime market and the BSAM hedge funds. The staff reported that the subprime market was “very unsettled and reflected deteriorating fundamentals in the housing market.” The liquidation of subprime securities at the two BSAM hedge funds was compared to the troubles faced by Long-Term Capital Management in . Chairman Bernanke noted that the problems the hedge funds experienced were a good example of how leverage can increase liquidity risk, especially in situations in which counterparties were not willing to give them time to liquidate and possibly realize whatever value might be in the positions. But it was also noted that the BSAM hedge funds appeared to be “relatively unique” among sponsored funds in their concentration in subprime mortgages. Some members were concerned about the lack of transparency around hedge funds, the consequent lack of market discipline on valuations of hedge fund holdings, and the fact that the Federal Reserve could not systematically collect information from hedge funds because they were outside its jurisdiction. These facts caused members to be concerned about whether they understood the scope of the problem. During the same meeting, FOMC members noted that the size of the credit derivatives market, its lack of transparency and activities related to subprime debt could be a gathering cloud in the background of policy. Meanwhile, Bear Stearns executives who supported the High-Grade bailout did not expect to lose money. However, that support was not universal—CEO James Cayne and Earl Hedin, the former senior managing director of Bear Stearns and BSAM, were opposed, because they did not want to increase shareholders’ potential losses. Their fears proved accurate. By July, the two hedge funds had shrunk to almost nothing: High-Grade Fund was down ; Enhanced Leverage Fund, . On July , both filed for bankruptcy. Cioffi and Tannin would be criminally charged with fraud in their communications with investors, but they were acquitted of all charges in November . Civil charges brought by the SEC were still pending as of the date of this report. Looking back, Marano told the FCIC, “We caught a lot of flak for allowing the funds to fail, but we had no option.” In an internal email in June, Bill Jamison of Federated Investors, one of the largest of all mutual fund companies, referred to the Bear Stearns hedge funds as the “canary in the mine shaft” and predicted more market turmoil. As the two funds were collapsing, repo lending tightened across the board. Many repo lenders sharpened their focus on the valuation of any collateral with potential subprime exposure, and on the relative exposures of different financial institutions. They required increased margins on loans to institutions that appeared to be exposed to the mortgage market; they often required Treasury securities as collateral; in many cases, they demanded shorter lending terms. Clearly, the triple-A-rated
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mortgage-backed securities and CDOs were not considered the “super-safe” investments in which investors—and some dealers—had only recently believed. Cayne called Spector into the office and asked him to resign. On Sunday, August , Spector submitted his resignation to the board.
RATING AGENCIES: “IT CAN’T BE . . . ALL OF A SUDDEN” While BSAM was wrestling with its two ailing flagship hedge funds, the major credit rating agencies finally admitted that subprime mortgage–backed securities would not perform as advertised. On July , , they issued comprehensive rating downgrades and credit watch warnings on an array of residential mortgage–backed securities. These announcements foreshadowed the actual losses to come. S&P announced that it had placed tranches backed by U.S. subprime collateral, or some . billion in securities, on negative watch. S&P promised to review every deal in its ratings database for adverse effects. In the afternoon, Moody’s downgraded mortgage-backed securities issued in backed by U.S. subprime collateral and put an additional tranches on watch. These Moody’s downgrades affected about . billion in securities. The following day, Moody’s placed tranches of CDOs, with original face value of about billion, on watch for possible downgrade. Two days after its original announcement, S&P downgraded of the tranches it had placed on negative watch. Fitch Ratings, the smallest of the three major credit rating agencies, announced similar downgrades. These actions were meaningful for all who understood their implications. While the specific securities downgraded were only a small fraction of the universe (less than of mortgage-backed securities issued in ), investors knew that more downgrades might come. Many investors were critical of the rating agencies, lambasting them for their belated reactions. By July , by one measure, housing prices had already fallen about nationally from their peak at the spring of . On a July conference call with S&P, the hedge fund manager Steve Eisman questioned Tom Warrack, the managing director of S&P’s residential mortgage–backed securities group. Eisman asked, “I’d like to know why now. I mean, the news has been out on subprime now for many, many months. The delinquencies have been a disaster now for many, many months. (Your) ratings have been called into question now for many, many months. I’d like to understand why you’re making this move today when you—and why didn’t you do this many, many months ago. . . . I mean, it can’t be that all of a sudden, the performance has reached a level where you’ve woken up.” Warrack responded that S&P “took action as soon as possible given the information at hand.” The ratings agencies’ downgrades, in tandem with the problems at Bear Stearns’s hedge funds, had a further chilling effect on the markets. The ABX BBB- index fell another in July, confirming and guaranteeing even more problems for holders of mortgage securities. Enacting the same inexorable dynamic that had taken down the Bear Stearns funds, repo lenders increasingly required other borrowers that had put up mortgage-backed securities as collateral to put up more, because their value was unclear or depressed. Many of these borrowers sold assets to meet these margin calls,
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and each sale had the potential to further depress prices. If at all possible, the borrowers sold other assets in more liquid markets, for which prices were readily available, pushing prices downward in those markets, too.
AIG: “WELL BIGGER THAN WE EVER PLANNED FOR” Of all the possible losers in the looming rout, AIG should have been among the most concerned. After several years of aggressive growth, AIG’s Financial Products subsidiary had written billion in over-the-counter credit default swap (CDS) protection on super-senior tranches of multisector CDOs backed mostly by subprime mortgages. In a phone call made July , the day after the downgrades, Andrew Forster, the head of credit trading at AIG Financial Products, told Alan Frost, the executive vice president of Financial Product’s Marketing Group, that he had to analyze exposures because “every f***ing . . . rating agency we’ve spoken to . . . [came] out with more downgrades” and that he was increasingly concerned: “About a month ago I was like, you know, suicidal. . . . The problem that we’re going to face is that we’re going to have just enormous downgrades on the stuff that we’ve got. . . . Everyone tells me that it’s trading and it’s two points lower and all the rest of it and how come you can’t mark your book. So it’s definitely going to give it renewed focus. I mean we can’t . . . we have to mark it. It’s, it’s, uh, we’re [unintelligible] f***ed basically.” Forster was likely worried that most of AIG’s credit default swap contracts required that collateral be posted to the purchasers, should the market value of the referenced securities decline by a certain amount, or should rating agencies downgrade AIG’s long-term debt. That is, collateral calls could be triggered even if there were no actual cash losses in, for example, the super-senior tranches of CDOs upon which the protection had been written. Remarkably, top AIG executives—including CEO Martin Sullivan, CFO Steven Bensinger, Chief Risk Officer Robert Lewis, Chief Credit Officer Kevin McGinn, and Financial Services Division CFO Elias Habayeb—told FCIC investigators that they did not even know about these terms of the swaps until the collateral calls started rolling in during July. Office of Thrift Supervision regulators who supervised AIG on a consolidated basis didn’t know either. Frost, who was the chief credit default swap salesman at AIG Financial Products, did know about the terms, and he said he believed they were standard for the industry. Joseph Cassano, the division’s CEO, also knew about the terms. And the counterparties knew, of course. On the evening of July , Goldman Sachs, which held billion of AIG’s super-senior credit default swaps, sent news of the first collateral call in the form of an email from Goldman’s salesman Andrew Davilman to Frost: DAVILMAN: Sorry to bother you on vacation. Margin call coming your way. Want to give you a heads up. FROST, minutes later: On what? DAVILMAN, one minute later: bb [ billion] of supersenior.
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The next day, Goldman made the collateral call official by forwarding an invoice requesting . billion. On the same day, Goldman purchased million of fiveyear protection—in the form of credit default swaps—against the possibility that AIG might default on its obligations. Frost never responded to Davilman’s email. And when he returned from vacation, he was instructed to not have any involvement in the issue, because Cassano wanted Forster to take the lead on resolving the dispute. AIG’s models showed there would be no defaults on any of the bond payments that AIG’s swaps insured. The Goldman executives considered those models irrelevant, because the contracts required collateral to be posted if market value declined, irrespective of any longterm cash losses. Goldman estimated that the average decline in the market value of the bonds was . So, first Bear Stearns’s hedge funds and now AIG was getting hit by Goldman’s marks on mortgage-backed securities. Like Cioffi and his colleagues at Bear Stearns, Frost and his colleagues at AIG disputed Goldman’s marks. On July , Forster was told by another AIG trader that “[AIG] would be in fine shape if Goldman wasn’t hanging its head out there.” The margin call was “something that hit out of the blue and it’s a f***ing number that’s well bigger than we ever planned for.” He acknowledged that dealers might say the marks “could be anything from to sort of, you know, ” because of the lack of trading but said Goldman’s marks were “ridiculous.” In testimony to the FCIC, Viniar said Goldman had stood ready to sell mortgagebacked securities to AIG at Goldman’s own marks. AIG’s Forster stated that he would not buy the bonds at even cents on the dollar, because values might drop further. Additionally, AIG would be required to value its own portfolio of similar assets at the same price. Forster said, “In the current environment I still wouldn’t buy them . . . because they could probably go low . . . we can’t mark any of our positions, and obviously that’s what saves us having this enormous mark to market. If we start buying the physical bonds back then any accountant is going to turn around and say, well, John, you know you traded at , you must be able to mark your bonds then.” Tough, lengthy negotiations followed. Goldman “was not budging” on its collateral demands, according to Tom Athan, a managing director at AIG Financial Products, describing a conference call with Goldman executives on August . “I played almost every card I had, legal wording, market practice, intent of the language, meaning of the [contract], and also stressed the potential damage to the relationship and GS said that this has gone to the ‘highest levels’ at GS and they feel that . . . this is a ‘test case.’” Goldman Sachs and AIG would continue to argue about Goldman’s marks, even as AIG would continue to post collateral that would fall short of Goldman’s demands and Goldman would continue to purchase CDS contracts against the possibility of AIG’s default. Over the next months, more such disputes would cost AIG tens of billions of dollars and help lead to one of the biggest government bailouts in American history.
E A R LY : S P R E A D I N G S U B P R I M E W O R R I E S
COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 12 The Commission concludes that entities such as Bear Stearns’s hedge funds and AIG Financial Products that had significant subprime exposure were affected by the collapse of the housing bubble first, creating financial pressures on their parent companies. The commercial paper and repo markets—two key components of the shadow banking lending markets—quickly reflected the impact of the housing bubble collapse because of the decline in collateral asset values and concern about financial firms’ subprime exposure.
13 SUMMER 2007: DISRUPTIONS IN FUNDING
CONTENTS IKB of Germany: “Real money investors” .......................................................... Countrywide: “That’s our /” ......................................................................... BNP Paribas: “The ringing of the bell”............................................................... SIVs: “An oasis of calm”...................................................................................... Money funds and other investors: “Drink[ing] from a fire hose.........................
In the summer of , as the prices of some highly rated mortgage securities crashed and Bear’s hedge funds imploded, broader repercussions from the declining housing market were still not clear. “I don’t think [the subprime mess] poses any threat to the overall economy,” Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson told Bloomberg on July . Meanwhile, nervous market participants were looking under every rock for any sign of hidden or latent subprime exposure. In late July, they found it in the market for asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), a crucial, usually boring backwater of the financial sector. This kind of financing allowed companies to raise money by borrowing against high-quality, short-term assets. By mid-, hundreds of billions out of the . trillion U.S. ABCP market were backed by mortgage-related assets, including some with subprime exposure. As noted, the rating agencies had given all of these ABCP programs their top investment-grade ratings, often because of liquidity puts from commercial banks. When the mortgage securities market dried up and money market mutual funds became skittish about broad categories of ABCP, the banks would be required under these liquidity puts to stand behind the paper and bring the assets onto their balance sheets, transferring losses back into the commercial banking system. In some cases, to protect relationships with investors, banks would support programs they had sponsored even when they had made no prior commitment to do so.
IKB OF GERMANY: “REAL MONEY INVESTORS” The first big casualty of the run on asset-backed commercial paper was a German
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bank, IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG. Since its foundation in , IKB had focused on lending to midsize German businesses, but in the past decade, management diversified. In , IKB created an off-balance-sheet commercial paper program, called Rhineland, to purchase a portfolio of structured finance securities backed by credit card receivables, business loans, auto loans, and mortgages. It made money by using less expensive short-term commercial paper to purchase higher-yielding longterm securities, a strategy known as “securities arbitrage.” By the end of June, Rhineland owned billion (. billion) of assets, of which were CDOs and CLOs (collateralized loan obligations—that is, securitized leveraged loans). And at least billion (. billion) of that was protected by IKB through liquidity puts. Importantly, German regulators at the time did not require IKB to hold any capital to offset potential Rhineland losses. As late as June , when so many were bailing out of the structured products market, IKB was still planning to expand its off-balance-sheet holdings and was willing to take long positions in mortgage-related derivatives such as synthetic CDOs. This attitude made IKB a favorite of the investment banks and hedge funds that were desperate to take the short side of the deal. In early , when Goldman was looking for buyers for Abacus -AC, the synthetic CDO mentioned in part III, it looked to IKB. An employee of Paulson & Co., the hedge fund that was taking the short side of the deal, bluntly said that “real money” investors such as IKB were outgunned. “The market is not pricing the subprime [residential mortgage–backed securities] wipeout scenario,” the Paulson employee wrote in an email. “In my opinion this situation is due to the fact that rating agencies, CDO managers and underwriters have all the incentives to keep the game going, while ‘real money’ investors have neither the analytical tools nor the institutional framework to take action before the losses that one could anticipate based [on] the ‘news’ available everywhere are actually realized.” IKB subsequently purchased million of the A and A tranches of the Abacus CDO and placed them in Rhineland. It would lose of that investment. In mid-, Rhineland’s asset-backed commercial paper was held by a number of American investors, including the Montana Board of Investments, the city of Oakland, California, and the Robbinsdale Area School District in suburban Minneapolis. On July , IKB reassured its investors that ratings downgrades of mortgage-backed securities would have only a limited impact on its business. However, within days, Goldman Sachs, which regularly helped Rhineland raise money in the commercial paper market, told IKB that it would not sell any more Rhineland paper to its clients. On Friday, July , Deutsche Bank, recognizing that the ABCP markets would soon abandon Rhineland and that IKB would have to provide substantial support to the program, decided that doing business with IKB was too risky and cut off its credit lines. These were necessary for IKB to continue running its business. Deutsche Bank also alerted the German bank regulator to IKB’s critical state. With the regulator’s encouragement, IKB’s largest shareholder, KfW Bankengruppe, announced on July that it would bail out IKB. On August , Rhineland exercised its liquidity puts with
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IKB. Rhineland’s commercial paper investors were able to get rid of the paper, and KfW took the hit instead—with its losses expected to eventually reach . The IKB episode served notice that exposures to toxic mortgage assets were lurking in the portfolios of even risk-averse investors. Soon, panic seized the short-term funding markets—even those that were not exposed to risky mortgages. “There was a recognition, I’d say an acute recognition, that potentially some of the asset-backed commercial paper conduits could have exposure to those areas. As a result, investors in general—without even looking into the underlying assets—decided ‘I don’t want to be in any asset-backed commercial paper, I don’t want to invest in a fund that may have those positions,’” Steven Meier, global cash investment officer at State Street Global Advisors, testified to the FCIC. From its peak of . billion on August , the asset-backed commercial paper market would decline by almost billion by the end of .
COUNTRYWIDE: “THAT’S OUR 9/11” On August , three days after the IKB rescue, Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo realized that his company was unable to roll its commercial paper or borrow on the repo market. “When we talk about [August ] at Countrywide, that’s our /,” he said. “We worked seven days a week trying to figure this thing out and trying to work with the banks. . . . Our repurchase lines were coming due billions and billions of dollars.” Mozilo emailed Lyle Gramley, a former Fed governor and a former Countrywide director, “Fear in the credit markets is now tending towards panic. There is little to no liquidity in the mortgage market with the exception of Fannie and Freddie. . . . Any mortgage product that is not deemed to be conforming either cannot be sold into the secondary markets or are subject to egregious discounts.” On August , despite the internal turmoil at Countrywide, CFO Eric Sieracki told investors that Countrywide had “significant short-term funding liquidity cushions” and “ample liquidity sources of our bank. . . . It is important to note that the company has experienced no disruption in financing its ongoing daily operations, including placement of commercial paper.” Moody’s reaffirmed its A ratings and stable outlook on the company. The ratings agencies and the company itself would quickly reverse their positions. On August , Mozilo reported to the board during a specially convened meeting that, as the meeting minutes recorded, “the secondary market for virtually all classes of mortgage securities (both prime and non-prime) had unexpectedly and with almost no warning seized up and . . . the Company was unable to sell high-quality mortgage[-]backed securities.” President and COO David Sambol told the board, “Management can only plan on a week by week basis due to the tenuous nature of the situation.” Mozilo reported that although he continued to negotiate with banks for alternative sources of liquidity, the “unprecedented and unanticipated” absence of a secondary market could force the company to draw down on its backup credit lines. Shortly after the Countrywide board meeting, the Fed’s Federal Open Market
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Committee members discussed the “considerable financial turbulence” in the subprime mortgage market and that some firms, including Countrywide, were showing some strain. They noted that the data did not indicate a collapse of the housing market was imminent and that, if the more optimistic scenarios proved to be accurate, they might look back and be surprised that the financial events did not have a stronger impact on the real economy. But the FOMC members also expressed concern that the effects of subprime developments could spread to other sectors and noted that they had been repeatedly surprised by the depth and duration of the deterioration of these markets. One participant, in a paraphrase of a quote he attributed to Winston Churchill, said that no amount of rewriting of history would exonerate those present if they did not prepare for the more dire scenarios discussed in the staff presentations. Several days later, on August , Countrywide released its July operational results, reporting that foreclosures and delinquencies were up and that loan production had fallen by during the preceding month. A company spokesman said layoffs would be considered. On the same day, Fed staff, who had supervised Countrywide’s holding company until the bank switched to a thrift charter in March , sent a confidential memo to the Fed’s Board of Governors warning about the company’s condition: The company is heavily reliant on an originate-to-distribute model, and, given current market conditions, the firm is unable to securitize or sell any of its non-conforming mortgages. . . . Countrywide’s short-term funding strategy relied heavily on commercial paper (CP) and, especially, on ABCP. In current market conditions, the viability of that strategy is questionable. . . . The ability of the company to use [mortgage] securities as collateral in [repo transactions] is consequently uncertain in the current market environment. . . . As a result, it could face severe liquidity pressures. Those liquidity pressures conceivably could lead eventually to possible insolvency. Countrywide asked its regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision, if the Fed could provide assistance, perhaps by waiving a Fed rule and allowing Countrywide’s thrift subsidiary to support its holding company by raising money from insured depositors, or perhaps through discount-window lending, which would require the Fed to accept risky mortgage-backed securities as collateral, something it never had done and would not do—until the following spring. The Fed did not intervene: “Substantial statutory requirements would have to be met before the Board could authorize lending to the holding company or mortgage subsidiary,” staff wrote. “The Federal Reserve had not lent to a nonbank in many decades; and . . . such lending in the current circumstances seemed highly improbable.” The following day, lacking any other funding, Mozilo recommended to his board that the company notify lenders of its intention to draw down . billion on backup lines of credit. Mozilo and his team knew that the decision could lead to ratings
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downgrades. “The only option we had was to pull down those lines,” he told the FCIC. “We had a pipeline of loans and we either had to say to the borrowers, the customers, ‘we’re out of business, we’re not going to fund’—and there’s great risk to that, litigation risk, we had committed to fund. . . . When it’s between your ass and your image, you hold on to your ass.” On the same day that Countrywide’s board approved the . billion drawdown—but before the company announced it publicly, the Merrill Lynch analyst Kenneth Bruce, who had reissued his “buy” rating on the company’s stock two days earlier, switched to “sell” with a “negative” outlook because of Countrywide’s funding pressures, adding, “if the market loses confidence in its ability to function properly, then the model can break. . . . If liquidations occur in a weak market, then it is possible for [Countrywide] to go bankrupt.” The next day, as news of Bruce’s call spread, Countrywide informed markets about the drawdown. Moody’s downgraded its senior unsecured debt rating to the lowest tier of investment grade. Countrywide shares fell , closing at .; for the year, the company’s stock was down . The bad news led to an old-fashioned bank run. Mozilo singled out an August Los Angeles Times article covering Bruce’s report, which, he said, “caused a run on our bank of billion on Monday.” The article spurred customers to withdraw their funds by noting specific addresses of Countrywide branches in southern California, Mozilo told the FCIC. A reporter “came out with a photographer and, you know, interviewed the people in line, and he created— it was just horrible. Horrible for the people, horrible for us. Totally unnecessary,” Mozilo said. Six days later, on August , Bank of America announced it would invest billion for a stake in Countrywide. Both companies denied rumors that the nation’s biggest bank would soon acquire the mortgage lender. Mozilo told the press, “There was never a question about our survival”; he said the investment reinforced Countrywide’s position as one of the “strongest and best-run companies in the country.” In October, Countrywide reported a net loss of . billion, its first quarterly loss in years. As charge-offs on its mortgage portfolio grew, Countrywide raised provisions for loan losses to million from only million one year earlier. On January , , Bank of America issued a press release announcing a “definitive agreement” to purchase Countrywide for approximately billion. It said the combined entity would stop originating subprime loans and would expand programs to help distressed borrowers.
BNP PARIBAS: “THE RINGING OF THE BELL” Meanwhile, problems in U.S. financial markets hit the largest French bank. On August , BNP Paribas SA suspended redemptions from three investment funds that had plunged in less than two weeks. Total assets in those funds were . billion, with a third of that amount in subprime securities rated AA or higher. The bank said it would also stop calculating a fair market value for the funds because “the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market segments of the US securitization
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Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Outstanding At the onset of the crisis in summer 2007, asset-backed commercial paper outstanding dropped as concerns about asset quality quickly spread. By the end of 2007, the amount outstanding had dropped nearly $400 billion. IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS $1,250 1,000 750 500 250 0 2001
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NOTE: Seasonally adjusted SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Figure . market has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their quality or credit rating.” In retrospect, many investors regarded the suspension of the French funds as the beginning of the liquidity crisis. August “was the ringing of the bell” for shortterm funding markets, Paul McCulley, a managing director at PIMCO, told the FCIC. “The buyers went on a buyer strike and simply weren’t rolling.” That is, they stopped rolling over their commercial paper and instead demanded payment on their loans. On August , the interest rates for overnight lending of A- rated assetbacked commercial paper rose from . to .—the highest level since January . It would continue rising unevenly, hitting . in August , . Figure . shows how, in response, lending declined. In August alone, the asset-backed commercial paper market shrank by billion, or . On August , subprime lender American Home Mortgage’s assetbacked commercial paper program invoked its privilege of postponing repayment, trapping lenders’ money for several months. Lenders quickly withdrew from programs with similar provisions, which shrank that market from billion to billion between May and August. The paper that did sell had significantly shorter maturities, reflecting creditors’ desire to reassess their counterparties’ creditworthiness as frequently as possible. The average maturity of all asset-backed commercial paper in the United States fell from
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about days in late July to about days by mid-September, though the overwhelming majority was issued for just to days. Disruptions quickly spread to other parts of the money market. In a flight to quality, investors dumped their repo and commercial paper holdings and increased their holdings in seemingly safer money market funds and Treasury bonds. Market participants, unsure of each other’s potential subprime exposures, scrambled to amass funds for their own liquidity. Banks became less willing to lend to each other. A closely watched indicator of interbank lending rates, called the one-month LIBOR-OIS spread, increased, signifying that banks were concerned about the credit risk involved in lending to each other. On August , it rose sharply, increasing three-to fourfold over historical values, and by September , it climbed by another . In , it would peak much higher. The panic in the repo, commercial paper, and interbank markets was met by immediate government action. On August , the day after BNP Paribas suspended redemptions, the Fed announced that it would “provid[e] liquidity as necessary to facilitate the orderly functioning of financial markets,” and the European Central Bank infused billions of Euros into overnight lending markets. On August , the Fed cut the discount rate by basis points—from . to .. This would be the first of many such cuts aimed at increasing liquidity. The Fed also extended the term of discountwindow lending to days (from the usual overnight or very short-term period) to offer banks a more stable source of funds. On the same day, the Fed’s FOMC released a statement acknowledging the continued market deterioration and promising that it was “prepared to act as needed to mitigate the adverse effects on the economy.”
SIV S : “AN OASIS OF CALM” In August, the turmoil in asset-backed commercial paper markets hit the market for structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, even though most of these programs had little subprime mortgage exposure. SIVs had a stable history since their introduction in . These investments had weathered a number of credit crises—even through early summer of , as noted in a Moody’s report issued on July , , titled “SIVs: An Oasis of Calm in the Sub-prime Maelstrom.” Unlike typical asset-backed commercial paper programs, SIVs were funded primarily through medium-term notes—bonds maturing in one to five years. SIVs held significant amounts of highly liquid assets and marked those assets to market prices daily or weekly, which allowed them to operate without explicit liquidity support from their sponsors. The SIV sector tripled in assets between and . On the eve of the crisis, there were SIVs with almost billion in assets. About one-quarter of that money was invested in mortgage-backed securities or in CDOs, but only was invested in subprime mortgage–backed securities and CDOs holding mortgage-backed securities. Not surprisingly, the first SIVs to fail were concentrated in subprime mortgage–
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backed securities, mortgage-related CDOs, or both. These included Cheyne Finance (managed by London-based Cheyne Capital Management), Rhinebridge (another IKB program), Golden Key, and Mainsail II (both structured by Barclays Capital). Between August and October, each of these four was forced to restructure or liquidate. Investors soon ran from even the safer SIVs. “The media was quite happy to sensationalize the collapse of the next ‘leaking SIV’ or the next ‘SIV-positive’ institution,” then-Moody’s managing director Henry Tabe told the FCIC. The situation was complicated by the SIVs’ lack of transparency. “In a context of opacity about where risk resides, . . . a general distrust has contaminated many asset classes. What had once been liquid is now illiquid. Good collateral cannot be sold or financed at anything approaching its true value,” Moody’s wrote on September . Even high-quality assets that had nothing to do with the mortgage market were declining in value. One SIV marked down a CDO to seven cents on the dollar while it was still rated triple-A. To raise cash, managers sold assets. But selling high-quality assets into a declining market depressed the prices of these unimpaired securities and pushed down the market values of other SIV portfolios. By the end of November, SIVs still in operation had liquidated of their portfolios, on average. Sponsors rescued some SIVs. Other SIVs restructured or liquidated; some investors had to wait a year or more to receive payments and, even then, recouped only some of their money. In the case of Rhinebridge, investors lost and only gradually received their payments over the next year. Investors in one SIV, Sigma, lost more than . As of fall , not a single SIV remained in its original form. The subprime crisis had brought to its knees a historically resilient market in which losses due to subprime mortgage defaults had been, if anything, modest and localized.
MONEY FUNDS AND OTHER INVESTORS: “DRINKING FROM A FIRE HOSE” The next dominoes were the money market funds and other funds. Most were sponsored by investment banks, bank holding companies, or “mutual fund complexes” such as Fidelity, Vanguard, and Federated. Under SEC regulations, money market funds that serve retail investors must keep two sets of accounting books, one reflecting the price they paid for securities and the other the fund’s mark-to-market value (the “shadow price,” in market parlance). However, funds do not have to disclose the shadow price unless the fund’s net asset value (NAV) has fallen by . below (to .) per share. Such a decline in market value is known as “breaking the buck” and generally leads to a fund’s collapse. It can happen, for example, if just of a fund’s portfolio is in an investment that loses just of its value. So a fund manager cannot afford big risks. But SIVs were considered very safe investments—they always had been—and were widely held by money market funds. In fall , dozens of money market funds faced losses on SIVs and other asset-backed commercial paper. To prevent their funds from breaking the buck, at least sponsors, including large banks such
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as Bank of America, US Bancorp, and SunTrust, purchased SIV assets from their money market funds. Similar dramas played out in the less-regulated realm of the money market sector known as enhanced cash funds. These funds serve not retail investors but rather “qualified purchasers,” which may include wealthy investors who invest million or more. Enhanced cash funds fall outside most SEC regulations and disclosure requirements. Because they have much higher investment thresholds than retail funds, and because they face less regulation, investors expect somewhat riskier investing and higher returns. Nonetheless, these funds also aim to maintain a net asset value. As the market turned, some of these funds did break the buck, while the sponsors of others stepped in to support their value. The billion GE Asset Management Trust Enhanced Cash Trust, a GE-sponsored fund that managed GE’s own pension and employee benefit assets, ran aground in the summer; it had of its assets in mortgage-backed securities. When the fund reportedly lost million and closed in November , investors redeemed their interests at .. Bank of America supported its Strategic Cash Portfolio—the nation’s largest enhanced cash fund, with billion in assets at its peak—after one of that fund’s largest investors withdrew billion in November . An interesting case study is provided by the meteoric rise and decline of the Credit Suisse Institutional Money Market Prime Fund. The fund sought to attract investors through Internet-based trading platforms called “portals,” which supplied an estimated billion to money market funds and other funds. Investors used these portals to quickly move their cash to the highest-yielding fund. Posting a higher return could attract significant funds: one money market fund manager later compared the use of portal money to “drink[ing] from a fire hose.” But the money could vanish just as quickly. The Credit Suisse fund posted the highest returns in the industry during the months before the liquidity crisis, and increased its assets from about billion in the summer of to more than billion in the summer of . To deliver those high returns and attract investors, though, it focused on structured finance products, including CDOs and SIVs such as Cheyne. When investors became concerned about such assets, they yanked about billion out of the fund in August alone. Credit Suisse, the Swiss bank that sponsored the fund, was forced to bail it out, purchasing . billion of assets in August. The episode highlights the risks of money market funds’ relying on “hot money”—that is, institutional investors who move quickly in and out of funds in search of the highest returns. The losses on SIVs and other mortgage-tainted investments also battered local government investment pools across the country, some of which held billions of dollars in these securities. Pooling provides municipalities, school districts, and other government agencies with economies of scale, investment diversification, and liquidity. In some cases, participation is mandatory. With billion in assets, Florida’s local government investment pool was the largest in the country, and “intended to operate like a highly liquid, low-risk money market fund, with securities like cash, certificates of deposit, . . . U.S. Treasury bills,
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and bonds issued by other U.S. government agencies,” as an investigation by the state legislature noted. But by November , because of ratings downgrades, the fund held at least . billion in securities that no longer met the state’s requirements. It had more than billion in SIVs and other distressed securities, of which about million had already defaulted. And it held million in Countrywide certificates of deposit with maturities that stretched out as far as June . In early November, following a series of news reports, the fund suffered a run. Local governments withdrew billion in just two weeks. Orange and Pinellas counties pulled out their entire investments. On November , the fund’s managers stopped all withdrawals. Florida’s was the hardest hit, but other state investment pools also took significant losses on SIVs and other mortgage-related holdings.
COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 13 The Commission concludes that the shadow banking system was permitted to grow to rival the commercial banking system with inadequate supervision and regulation. That system was very fragile due to high leverage, short-term funding, risky assets, inadequate liquidity, and the lack of a federal backstop. When the mortgage market collapsed and financial firms began to abandon the commercial paper and repo lending markets, some institutions depending on them for funding their operations failed or, later in the crisis, had to be rescued. These markets and other interconnections created contagion, as the crisis spread even to markets and firms that had little or no direct exposure to the mortgage market. In addition, regulation and supervision of traditional banking had been weakened significantly, allowing commercial banks and thrifts to operate with fewer constraints and to engage in a wider range of financial activities, including activities in the shadow banking system. The financial sector, which grew enormously in the years leading up to the financial crisis, wielded great political power to weaken institutional supervision and market regulation of both the shadow banking system and the traditional banking system. This deregulation made the financial system especially vulnerable to the financial crisis and exacerbated its effects.
14 LATE 2007 TO EARLY 2008: BILLIONS IN SUBPRIME LOSSES
CONTENTS Merrill Lynch: “Dawning awareness over the course of the summer”................. Citigroup: “That would not in any way have excited my attention”................... AIG’s dispute with Goldman: “There could never be losses”............................... Federal Reserve: “The discount window wasn’t working”................................... Monoline insurers: “We never expected losses”...................................................
While a handful of banks were bailing out their money market funds and commercial paper programs in the fall of , the financial sector faced a larger problem: billions of dollars in mortgage-related losses on loans, securities, and derivatives, with no end in sight. Among U.S. firms, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch reported the most spectacular losses, largely because of their extensive collateralized debt obligation (CDO) businesses, writing down a total of . billion and . billion, respectively, by the end of the year. Billions more in losses were reported by large financial institutions such as Bank of America (. billion), Morgan Stanley (. billion), JP Morgan (. billion), and Bear Stearns (. billion). Insurance companies, hedge funds, and other financial institutions collectively had taken additional mortgage-related losses of about billion. The large write-downs strained these firms’ capital and cash reserves. Further, market participants began discriminating between firms perceived to be relatively healthy and others about which they were not so sure. Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were at the top of the “suspect” list; by year-end the cost of five-year protection against default on their obligations in the credit default swap market stood at, respectively, , and , annually for every million, while the cost for the relatively stronger Goldman Sachs stood at ,. Meanwhile, the economy was beginning to show signs of stress. Facing turmoil in financial markets, declining home prices, and oil prices above a barrel, consumer spending was slowing. The Federal Reserve lowered the overnight bank borrowing rate from . earlier in the year to . in September, . in October, and then . in December.
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MERRILL LYNCH: “DAWNING AWARENESS OVER THE COURSE OF THE SUMMER” On October , Merrill Lynch stunned investors when it announced that thirdquarter earnings would include a . billion loss on CDOs and billion on subprime mortgages—. billion in total, the largest Wall Street write-down to that point, and nearly twice the . billion loss that the company had warned investors to expect just three weeks earlier. Six days later, the embattled CEO Stanley O’Neal, a -year Merrill veteran, resigned. Much of this write-down came from the firm’s holdings of the super-senior tranches of mortgage-related CDOs that Merrill had previously thought to be extremely safe. As late as fall , its management had been “bullish on growth” and “bullish on [the subprime] asset class.” But later that year, the signs of trouble were becoming difficult even for Merrill to ignore. Two mortgage originators to which the firm had extended credit lines failed: Ownit, in which Merrill also had a small equity stake, and Mortgage Lenders Network. Merrill seized the collateral backing those loans: . billion from Mortgage Lenders, . billion from Ownit. Merrill, like many of its competitors, started to ramp up its sales efforts, packaging its inventory of mortgage loans and securities into CDOs with new vigor. Its goal was to reduce the firm’s risk by getting those loans and securities off its balance sheet. Yet it found that it could not sell the super-senior tranches of those CDOs at acceptable prices; it therefore had to “take down senior tranches into inventory in order to execute deals”—leading to the accumulation of tens of billions of dollars of those tranches on Merrill’s books. Dow Kim, then the co-president of Merrill’s investment banking segment, told FCIC staff that the buildup of the retained super-senior tranches in the CDO positions was actually part of a strategy begun in late to reduce the firm’s inventory of subprime and Alt-A mortgages. Sell the lower-rated CDO tranches, retain the super-senior tranches: those had been his instructions to his managers at the end of , Kim recalled. He believed that this strategy would reduce overall credit risk. After all, the super-senior tranches were theoretically the safest pieces of those investments. To some degree, however, the strategy was involuntary: his people were having trouble selling these investments, and some were even sold at a loss. Initially, the strategy seemed to work. By May, the amount of mortgage loans and securities to be packaged into CDOs had declined to . billion from . billion in March. According to a September internal Merrill presentation, the net amount in retained super-senior CDO tranches had increased from . billion in September to . billion by March and . billion by May. But as the mortgage market came under increasing pressure and as the market value of even super-senior tranches crumbled, the strategy would come back to haunt the firm. Merrill’s first-quarter earnings for —net revenues of . billion—were its second-highest quarterly results ever, including a record for the Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities business, which housed the retained CDO positions. These
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results were announced during a conference call with analysts—an event that investors and analysts rely on to obtain important information about the company and that, like other public statements, is subject to federal securities laws. Merrill’s then-CFO Jeffrey Edwards indicated that the company’s results would not be hurt by the dislocation in the subprime market, because “revenues from subprime mortgage-related activities comprise[d] less than of our net revenues” over the past five quarters, and because Merrill’s “risk management capabilities are better than ever, and crucial to our success in navigating turbulent markets.” Providing further assurances, he stated, “We believe the issues in this narrow slice of the market remain contained and have not negatively impacted other sectors.” However, Edwards did not disclose the large increase in retained super-senior CDO tranches or the difficulty of selling those tranches, even at a loss—though specific questions on the subject were raised. In July, Merrill followed its strong first-quarter report with another for the second quarter that “enabled the company to achieve record net revenues, net earnings and net earnings per diluted share for the first half of .” During the conference call announcing the results, the analyst Glenn Schorr of UBS, a large Swiss bank, asked the CFO to provide some “color around myth versus reality” on Merrill’s exposure to retained CDO positions. As he had three months earlier, Edwards stressed Merrill’s risk management and the fact that the CDO business was a small part of Merrill’s overall business. He said that there had been significant reductions in Merrill’s retained exposures to lower-rated segments of the market, although he did not disclose that the total amount of Merrill’s retained CDOs had reached . billion by June. Edwards declined to provide details about the company’s exposure to subprime mortgage CDOs and any inventory of mortgage-backed securities to be packaged into CDOs. “We don’t disclose our capital allocations against any specific or even broader group,” Edwards said. On July , after the super-senior tranches had been accumulating for many months, Merrill executives first officially informed its board about the buildup. At a presentation to the board’s Finance Committee, Dale Lattanzio, co-head of the American branch of the Fixed Income, Currencies and Commodities business, reported a “net” exposure of billion in CDO-related assets, essentially all of them rated tripleA, with exposure to the lower-rated asset class significantly reduced. This net exposure was the amount of CDO positions left after the subtraction of the hedges— guarantees in one form or another—that Merrill had purchased to pass along its ultimate risk to third parties willing to provide that protection and take that risk for a fee. AIG and the small club of monoline insurers were significant suppliers of these guarantees, commonly done as credit default swaps. In July , Merrill had begun to increase the amount of CDS protection to offset the retained CDO positions. Lattanzio told the committee, “[Management] decided in the beginning of this year to significantly reduce exposure to lower-rated assets in the sub-prime asset class and instead migrate exposure to senior and super senior tranches.” Edwards did not see any problems. As Kim insisted, “Everyone at the firm and most people in the industry felt that super-senior was super safe.”
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Former CEO O’Neal told FCIC investigators he had not known that the company was retaining the super-senior tranches of the CDOs until Lattanzio’s presentation to the Finance Committee. He was startled, if only because he had been under the impression that Merrill’s mortgage-backed-assets business had been driven by demand: he had assumed that if there were no new customers, there would be no new offerings. If customers demanded the CDOs, why would Merrill have to retain CDO tranches on the balance sheet? O’Neal said he was surprised about the retained positions but stated that the presentation, analysis, and estimation of potential losses were not sufficient to sound “alarm bells.” Lattanzio’s report in July indicated that the retained positions had experienced only million in losses. Over the next three months, the market value of the super-senior tranches plummeted and losses ballooned; O’Neal told the FCIC: “It was a dawning awareness over the course of the summer and through September as the size of the losses were being estimated.” On October , Merrill executives gave its board a detailed account of how the firm found itself with what was by that time . billion in net exposure to the super-senior tranches—down from a peak in July of . billion because the firm had increasingly hedged, written off, and sold its exposure. On October , Merrill announced its third-quarter earnings: a stunning . billion mortgage-related writedown contributing to a net loss of . billion. Merrill also reported—for the first time—its . billion net exposure to retained CDO positions. Still, in their conference call with analysts, O’Neal and Edwards refused to disclose the gross exposures, excluding the hedges from the monolines and AIG. “I just don’t want to get into the details behind that,” Edwards said. “Let me just say that what we have provided again we think is an extraordinarily high level of disclosure and it should be sufficient.” According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, by September , Merrill had accumulated billion of “gross” retained CDO positions, almost four times the . billion of “net” CDO positions reported during the October conference call. On October , when O’Neal resigned, he left with a severance package worth . million—on top of the . million in total compensation he earned in , when his company was still expanding its mortgage banking operations. Kim, who oversaw the strategy that left Merrill with billions in losses, had left in May after being paid million for his work in , which was a profitable year for Merrill as a firm. By late , the viability of the monoline insurers from which Merrill had purchased almost billion in hedges had come into question, and the rating agencies were downgrading them, as we will see in more detail shortly. The SEC had told Merrill that it would impose a punitive capital charge on the firm if it purchased additional credit default protection from the financially troubled monolines. Recognizing that the monolines might not be good for all the protection purchased, Merrill began to put aside loss allowances, starting with . billion on January , . By the end of , Merrill would put aside a total of billion related to monolines and had recorded total write-downs on nearly billion of other mortgage-related exposures.
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CITIGROUP: “THAT WOULD NOT IN ANY WAY HAVE EXCITED MY ATTENTION” Five days after O’Neal’s October departure from Merrill Lynch, Citigroup announced that its total subprime exposure was billion, which was billion more than it had told investors just three weeks earlier. Citigroup also announced it would be taking an to billion loss on its subprime mortgage–related holdings and that Chuck Prince was resigning as its CEO. Like O’Neal, Prince had learned late of his company’s subprime-related CDO exposures. Prince and Robert Rubin, chairman of the Executive Committee of the board, told the FCIC that before September , they had not known that Citigroup’s investment banking division had sold some CDOs with liquidity puts and retained the super-senior tranches of others. Prince told the FCIC that even in hindsight it was difficult for him to criticize any of his team’s decisions. “If someone had elevated to my level that we were putting on a trillion balance sheet, billion of triple-A-rated, zero-risk paper, that would not in any way have excited my attention,” Prince said. “It wouldn’t have been useful for someone to come to me and say, ‘Now, we have got trillion on the balance sheet of assets. I want to point out to you there is a one in a billion chance that this billion could go south.’ That would not have been useful information. There is nothing I can do with that, because there is that level of chance on everything.” In fact, the odds were much higher than that. Even before the mass downgrades of CDOs in late , a triple-A tranche of a CDO had a in chance of being downgraded within years of its original rating. Certainly, Citigroup was a large and complex organization. That trillion balance sheet—and . trillion off-balance sheet—was spread among more than , operating subsidiaries in . Prince insisted that Citigroup was not “too big to manage.” But it was an organization in which one unit would decide to reduce mortgage risk while another unit increased it. And it was an organization in which senior management would not be notified of billion in concentrated exposure— of the company’s balance sheet and more than a third of its capital—because it was perceived to be “zero-risk paper.” Significantly, Citigroup’s Financial Control Group had argued in that the liquidity puts that Citigroup had written on its CDOs had been priced for investors too cheaply in light of the risks. Also, in early , Susan Mills, a managing director in the securitization unit—which bought mortgages from other companies and bundled them for sale to investors—took note of rising delinquencies in the subprime market and created a surveillance group to track loans that her unit purchased. By mid-, her group saw a deterioration in loan quality and an increase in early payment defaults—that is, more borrowers were defaulting within a few months of getting a loan. From to , Mills recalled before the FCIC, the early payment default rates nearly tripled from to or . In response, the securitization unit slowed down its purchase of loans, demanded higher-quality mortgages, and conducted more extensive due diligence on what it bought. However, neither Mills nor other members of the unit shared any of this information with other divisions in Citi-
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group, including the CDO desk. Around March or April , in contrast with the securitization desk, Citigroup’s CDO desk increased its purchases of mortgagebacked securities because it saw the distressed market as a buying opportunity. “Effective communication across businesses was lacking,” the company’s regulators later observed. “Management acknowledged that, in looking back, it should have made the mortgage deterioration known earlier throughout the firm. The Global Consumer Group saw signs of sub-prime issues and avoided losses, as did mortgage backed securities traders, but CDO structures business did so belatedly—[there was] no dialogue across businesses.” Co-head of the CDO desk Janice Warne told the FCIC that she first saw weaknesses in the underlying market in early . In February, when the ABX.HE.BBB- - fell to below par, the CDO desk decided to slow down on the financing of mortgage securities for inventory to produce CDOs. Shortly thereafter, however, the same ABX index started to rally, rising to below par in March and holding around that level through May. So, the CDO desk reversed course and accelerated its purchases of inventory in April, according to Nestor Dominguez, Warne’s co-head on the CDO desk. Dominguez said he didn’t see the market weakening until the summer, when the index fell to less than below par. Murray Barnes, the Citigroup risk officer assigned to the CDO business, approved the CDO desk’s request to temporarily increase its limits on purchasing collateral. Barnes observed, in hindsight, that rather than looking at the widening spreads as an opportunity, Citigroup should have reassessed its assumptions and examined whether the decline in the ABX was a sign of strain in the mortgage market. He admitted “complacency” about the desk’s ability to manage its risk. The risk management division also increased the CDO desk’s limits for retaining the most senior tranches from billion to billion in the first half of . As at Merrill, traders and risk managers at Citigroup believed that the super-senior tranches carried little risk. Citigroup’s regulators later wrote, “An acknowledgement of the risk in its Super Senior AAA CDO exposure was perhaps Citigroup’s ‘biggest miss.’ . . . As management felt comfortable with the credit risk of these tranches, it began to retain large positions on the balance sheet. . . . As the sub-prime market began to deteriorate, the risk perceived in these tranches increased, causing large writedowns.” Ultimately, losses at Citigroup from mortgages, Alt-A mortgage–backed securities, and mortgage-related CDOs would total about billion, nearly half of Citigroup’s capital at the end of . About billion of that loss related to protection purchased from the monoline insurers. Barnes’s decision to increase the CDO risk limits was approved by his superior, Ellen Duke. Barnes and Duke reported to David Bushnell, the chief risk officer. Bushnell—whom Prince called “the best risk manager on Wall Street”—told the FCIC that he did not remember specifically approving the increase but that, in general, the risk management function did approve higher risk limits when a business line was growing. He described a “firm-wide initiative” to increase Citigroup’s structured products business. Perhaps what is most remarkable about the conflicting strategies employed by the
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securitization and CDO desks is that their respective risk officers attended the same weekly independent risk meetings. Duke reflected that she was not overly concerned when the issue came up, saying she and her risk team were “seduced by structuring and failed to look at the underlying collateral.” According to Barnes, the CDO desk didn’t look at the CDOs’ underlying collateral because it lacked the “ability” to see loan performance data, such as delinquencies and early payment defaults. Yet the surveillance unit in Citigroup’s securitization desk might have been able to provide some insights based on its own data. Barnes told the FCIC that Citigroup’s risk management tended to be managed along business lines, noting that he was only two offices away from his colleague who covered the securitization business and yet didn’t understand the nuances of what was happening to the underlying loans. He regretted not reaching out to the consumer bank to “get the pulse” of mortgage origination.
“That has never happened since the Depression” Prince and Rubin appeared to believe up until the fall of that any downside risk in the CDO business was minuscule. “I don’t think anybody focused on the CDOs. This was one business in a vast enterprise, and until the trouble developed, it wasn’t one that had any particular profile,” Rubin—in Prince’s words, a “very important member of [the] board”—told the FCIC. “You know, Tom Maheras was in charge of trading. Tom was an extremely well regarded trading figure on the street. . . . And this is what traders do, they handle these kinds of problems.” Maheras, the co-head of Citigroup’s investment bank, told the FCIC that he spent “a small fraction of ” of his time thinking about or dealing with the CDO business. Citigroup’s risk management function was simply not very concerned about housing market risks. According to Prince, Bushnell and others told him, in effect, “‘Gosh, housing prices would have to go down nationwide for us to have, not a problem with [mortgage-backed securities] CDOs, but for us to have problems,’ and that has never happened since the Depression.” Housing prices would be down much less than when Citigroup began having problems because of write-downs and the liquidity puts it had written. By June , national house prices had fallen ., and about of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages were delinquent. Yet Citigroup still did not expect that the liquidity puts could be triggered, and it remained unconcerned about the value of its retained super-senior tranches of CDOs. On June , , Citigroup made a presentation to the SEC about subprime exposure in its CDO business. The presentation noted that Citigroup did not factor two positions into this exposure: . billion in supersenior tranches and . billion in liquidity puts. The presentation explained that the liquidity puts were not a concern: “The risk of default is extremely unlikely . . . [and] certain market events must also occur for us to be required to fund. Therefore, we view these positions to be even less risky than the Super Senior Book.” Just a few weeks later, the July failure of the two Bear Stearns hedge funds spelled trouble. Commercial paper written against three Citigroup-underwritten CDOs for which Bear Stearns Asset Management was the asset manager and on
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which Citigroup had issued liquidity puts began losing value, and their interest rates began rising. The liquidity puts would be triggered if interest rates on the assetbacked commercial paper rose above a certain level. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the regulator of Citigroup’s national bank subsidiary, had expressed no apprehensions about the liquidity puts in . But by the summer of , OCC Examiner-in-Charge John Lyons told the FCIC, the OCC became concerned. Buying the commercial paper would drain billion of the company’s cash and expose it to possible balance-sheet losses at a time when markets were increasingly in distress. But given the rising rates, Lyons also said Citigroup did not have the option to wait. Over the next six months, Citigroup purchased all billion of the paper that had been subject to its liquidity puts. On a July conference call, CFO Gary Crittenden told analysts and investors that the company’s subprime exposures had fallen from billion at the end of to billion on June . But he made no mention of the super-senior exposures and liquidity puts. “I think our risk team did a nice job of anticipating that this was going to be a difficult environment, and so set about in a pretty concentrated effort to reduce our exposure over the last six months,” he said. A week later, on a July call, Crittenden reiterated that subprime exposure had been cut: “So I think we’ve had good risk management that has been anticipating some market dislocation here.” By August, as market conditions worsened, Citigroup’s CDO desk was revaluing its super-senior tranches, though it had no effective model for assigning value. However, as the market congealed, then froze, the paucity of actual market prices for these tranches demanded a model. The New York Fed later noted that “the model for Super Senior CDOs, based on fundamental economic factors, could not be fully validated by Citigroup’s current validation methodologies yet it was relied upon for reporting exposures.” Barnes, the CDO risk officer, told the FCIC that sometime that summer he met with the co-heads of the CDO desk to express his concerns about possible losses on both the unsold CDO inventory and the retained super-senior tranches. The message got through. Nestor Dominguez told the FCIC, “We began extensive discussions about the implications of the . . . dramatic decline of the underlying subprime markets, and how that would feed into the super-senior positions.” Also at this time— for the first time—such concerns reached Maheras. He justified his lack of prior knowledge of the billions of dollars in inventory and super-senior tranches by pointing out “that the business was appropriately supervised by experienced and highly competent managers and by an independent risk group and that I was properly apprised of the general nature of our work in this area and its attendant risks.” The exact dates are not certain, but according to Bushnell, he remembers a discussion at a “Business Heads” meeting about the growing mark-to-market volatility on those super-senior tranches in late August or early September, well after Citigroup started to buy the commercial paper backing the super-senior tranches of the CDOs that BSAM managed. This was also when Chairman and CEO Prince first heard about the possible amount of “open positions” on the super-senior CDO tranches that Citigroup held: “It wasn’t presented at the time in a startling fashion . . . [but]
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then it got bigger and bigger and bigger, obviously, over the next days.” In late August, Citigroup’s valuation models suggested that losses on the super-senior tranches might range from million to billion. This number was recalculated as to million in mid-September, as the valuation methodology was refined. In the weeks ahead, those numbers would skyrocket.
“DEFCON calls” To get a handle on potential losses from the CDOs and liquidity puts, starting on September Prince convened a series of meetings—and later, nightly “DEFCON calls”—with members of his senior management team; they included Rubin, Maheras, Crittenden, and Bushnell, as well as Lou Kaden, the chief administrative officer. Rubin was in Korea during the first meeting but Kaden kept him informed. Rubin later emailed Prince: “According to Lou, Tom [Maheras] never did provide a clear and direct answer on the super seniors. If that is so, and the meeting did not bring that to a head, isn’t that deeply troubling not as to what happened—that is a different question that is also troubling—but as to providing full and clear information and analysis now.” Prince disagreed, writing, “I thought, for first mtg, it was good. We weren’t trying to get to final answers.” A second meeting was held September , after Rubin was back in the country. This meeting marked the first time Rubin recalled hearing of the super-senior and liquidity put exposure. He later commented, “As far as I was concerned they were all one thing, because if there was a put back to Citi under any circumstance, however remote that circumstance might be, you hadn’t fully disposed of the risk.” And, of course, the circumstance was not remote, since billions of dollars in subprime mortgage assets had already come back onto Citigroup’s books. Prince told the FCIC that Maheras had assured him throughout the meetings and the DEFCON calls that the super seniors posed no risk to Citigroup, even as the market deteriorated; he added that he became increasingly uneasy with Maheras’s assessment. “Tom had said and said till his last day at work [October ]: ‘We are never going to lose a penny on these super seniors. We are never going to lose a penny on these super seniors. . . . ’ And as we went along and I was more and more uncomfortable with this and more and more uncomfortable with Tom’s conclusions on ultimate valuations, that is when I really began to have some very serious concerns about what was going to happen.” Despite Prince’s concerns, Citigroup remained publicly silent about the additional subprime exposure from the super-senior positions and liquidity puts, even as it preannounced some details of its third-quarter earnings on October , . On October , the rating agencies announced the first in a series of downgrades on thousands of securities. In Prince’s view, these downgrades were “the precipitating event in the financial crisis.” On the same day, Prince restructured the investment bank, a move that led to the resignation of Maheras. Four days later, the question of the super-senior CDOs and liquidity puts was specifically raised at the board of directors’ Corporate Audit and Risk Management
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Committee meeting and brought up to the full board. A presentation concluded that “total sub-prime exposure in [the investment bank] was bn with an additional bn in Direct Super Senior and bn in Liquidity and Par Puts.” Citigroup’s total subprime exposure was billion, nearly half of its capital. The calculation was straightforward, but during an analysts’ conference call that day Crittenden omitted any mention of the super-senior- and liquidity-put-related exposure as he told participants that Citigroup had under billion in subprime exposure. A week later, on Saturday, October , Prince learned from Crittenden that the company would have to report subprime-related losses of to billion; on Monday he tendered his resignation to the board. He later reflected, “When I drove home and Gary called me and told me it wasn’t going to be two or million but it was going to be eight billion—I will never forget that call. I continued driving, and I got home, I walked in the door, I told my wife, I said here’s what I just heard and if this turns out to be true, I am resigning.” On November , Citigroup revealed the accurate subprime exposure—now estimated at billion—and it disclosed the subprime-related losses. Though Prince had resigned, he remained on Citigroup’s payroll until the end of the year, and the board of directors gave him a generous parting compensation package: . million in cash and million in stock, bringing his total compensation to million from to . The SEC later sued Citigroup for its delayed disclosures. To resolve the charges, the bank paid million. The New York Fed would later conclude, “There was little communications on the extensive level of subprime exposure posed by Super Senior CDO. . . . Senior management, as well as the independent Risk Management function charged with monitoring responsibilities, did not properly identify and analyze these risks in a timely fashion.” Prince’s replacements as chairman and CEO—Richard Parsons and Vikram Pandit—were announced in December. Rubin would stay until January , having been paid more than million from to during his tenure at the company, including his role as chairman of the Executive Committee, a position that carried “no operational responsibilities,” Rubin told the FCIC. “My agreement with Citi provided that I’d have no management of personnel or operations.” John Reed, former co-CEO of Citigroup, attributed the firm’s failures in part to a culture change that occurred when the bank took on Salomon Brothers as part of the Travelers merger. He said that Salomon executives “were used to taking big risks” and “had a history . . . [of] making a lot of money . . . but then getting into trouble.”
AIG’S DISPUTE WITH GOLDMAN: “THERE COULD NEVER BE LOSSES” Beginning on July , , when Goldman’s Davilman sent the email that disrupted the vacation of AIG’s Alan Frost, the dispute between Goldman and AIG over the need for collateral to back credit default swaps captured the attention of the senior management of both companies. For months, Goldman pressed its case and sent AIG a formal demand letter every single business day. It would pursue AIG relentlessly with
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demands for collateral based on marks that were initially well below those of other firms—while AIG and its management struggled to come to grips with the burgeoning crisis. The initial collateral call was a shock to AIG’s senior executives, most of whom had not even known that the credit default swaps with Goldman contained collateral call provisions. They had known there were enormous exposures— billion, backed in large part by subprime and Alt-A loans, in , compared with the parent company’s total reported capital of . billion—but executives said they had never been concerned. “The mantra at [AIG Financial Products] had always been (in my experience) that there could never be losses,” Vice President of Accounting Policy Joseph St. Denis said. Then came that first collateral call. St. Denis told FCIC staff that he was so “stunned” when he got the news that he “had to sit down.” The collateral provisions surprised even Gene Park, the executive who had insisted months earlier that AIG stop writing the swaps. He told the FCIC that “rule Number at AIG FP” was to never post collateral. This was particularly important in the credit default swap business, he said, because it was the only unhedged business that AIG ran. But Jake Sun, the general counsel of the Financial Products subsidiary, who reviewed the swap contracts before they were executed, told the FCIC that the provisions were standard both at AIG and in the industry. Frost, who was the first to learn of the collateral call, agreed and said that other financial institutions also commonly did deals with collateral posting provisions. Pierre Micottis, the Paris-based head of the AIG Financial Products’ Enterprise Risk Management department, told the FCIC that collateral provisions were indeed common in derivatives contracts— but surprising in the super-senior CDS contracts, which were considered safe. Insurance supervisors did not permit regulated insurance companies like MBIA and Ambac to pay out except when the insured entity suffered an actual loss, and therefore those companies were forbidden to post collateral for a decline in market value or unrealized losses. Because AIG Financial Products was not regulated as an insurance company, it was not subject to this prohibition. As disturbing as the senior AIG executives’ surprise at the collateral provisions was their firm’s inability to assess the validity of Goldman’s numbers. AIG Financial Products did not have its own model or otherwise try to value the CDO portfolio that it guaranteed through credit default swaps, nor did it hedge its exposure. Gene Park explained that hedging was seen as unnecessary in part because of the mistaken belief that AIG would have to pay counterparties only if holders of the super-senior tranches incurred actual losses. He also said that purchasing a hedge from UBS, the Swiss bank, was considered, but that Andrew Forster, the head of credit trading at AIG Financial Products, rejected the idea because it would cost more than the fees that AIG Financial Products was receiving to write the CDS protection. “We’re not going to pay a dime for this,” Forster told Park. Therefore, AIG Financial Products relied on an actuarial model that did not provide a tool for monitoring the CDOs’ market value. The model was developed by
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Gary Gorton, then a finance professor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School, who began working as a consultant to AIG Financial Products in and was close to its CEO, Joe Cassano. The Gorton model had determined with . confidence that the owners of the super-senior tranches of the CDOs insured by AIG Financial Products would never suffer real economic losses, even in an economy as troubled as the worst post–World War II recession. The company’s auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), who were apparently also not aware of the collateral requirements, concluded that “the risk of default on [AIG’s] portfolio has been effectively removed and as a result from a risk management perspective, there are no substantive economic risks in the portfolio and as a result the fair value of the liability stream on these positions from a risk management perspective could reasonably be considered to be zero.” In speaking with the FCIC, Cassano was adamant that the “CDS book” was effectively hedged. He said that AIG could never suffer losses on the swaps, because the CDS contracts were written only on the super-senior tranches of top-rated securities with high “attachment points”—that is, many securities in the CDOs would have to default in order for losses to reach the super-senior tranches—and because the bulk of the exposure came from loans made before , when he thought underwriting standards had begun to deteriorate. Indeed, according to Gene Park, Cassano put a halt to a million hedge, in which AIG had taken a short position in the ABX index. As Park explained, “Joe stopped that because after we put on the first . . . the market moved against us . . . we were losing money on the million. . . . Joe said, ‘You know, I don’t think the world is going to blow up . . . I don’t want to spend that money. Stop it.’” Despite the limited market transparency in the summer of , Goldman used what information there was, including information from ABX and other indices, to estimate what it considered to be realistic prices. Goldman also spoke with other companies to see what values they assigned to the securities. Finally, Goldman looked to its own experience: in most cases, when the bank bought credit protection on an investment, it turned around and sold credit protection on the same investment to other counterparties. These deals yielded more price information. Until the dispute with Goldman, AIG relied on the Gorton model, which did not estimate the market value of underlying securities. So Goldman’s marks caught AIG by surprise. When AIG pushed back, Goldman almost immediately reduced its July collateral demand from . billion to . billion, a move that underscored the difficulty of finding reliable market prices. The new demand was still too high, in AIG’s view, which was corroborated by third-party marks. Goldman valued the CDOs between and cents on the dollar, while Merrill Lynch, for example, valued the same securities between and cents. On August , Cassano told PwC that there was “little or no price transparency” and that it was “difficult to determine whether [collateral calls] were indicative of true market levels moving.” AIG managers did call other dealers holding similar bonds to check their marks in order to help its case with Goldman, but those marks were not “actionable”—that is, the dealers would not actually execute transactions at the
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quoted prices. “The above estimated values . . . do not represent actual bids or offers by Merrill Lynch” was the disclaimer in a listing of estimated market values provided by Merrill to AIG. Goldman Sachs disputed the reliability of such estimates.
“Without being flippant” On August , for the first time, AIG executives publicly disclosed the billion in credit default swaps on the super-senior tranches of CDOs during the company’s second-quarter earnings call. They acknowledged that the great majority of the underlying bonds thus insured— billion—were backed by subprime mortgages. Of this amount, billion was written on CDOs predominantly backed by risky BBB-rated collateral. On the call, Cassano maintained that the exposures were no problem: “It is hard for us, without being flippant, to even see a scenario within any kind of realm or reason that would see us losing in any of those transactions.” He concluded: “We see no issues at all emerging. We see no dollar of loss associated with any of [the CDO] business. Any reasonable scenario that anyone can draw, and when I say reasonable, I mean a severe recession scenario that you can draw out for the life of the securities.” Senior Vice President and Chief Risk Officer Robert Lewis seconded that reassurance: “We believe that it would take declines in housing values to reach depression proportions, along with default frequencies never experienced, before our AAA and AA investments would be impaired.” These assurances focused on the risk that actual mortgage defaults would create real economic losses on the company’s credit default swap positions. But more important at the time were the other tremendous risks that AIG executives had already discussed internally. No one on the conference call mentioned Goldman’s demand for . billion in collateral; the clear possibility that future, much-larger collateral calls could jeopardize AIG’s liquidity; or the risk that AIG would be forced to take an “enormous mark” on its existing book, the concern Forster had noted. The day after the conference call, AIG posted million in cash to Goldman, its first collateral posting since Goldman had requested the . billion. As Frost wrote to Forster in an August , , email, the idea was “to get everyone to chill out.” For one thing, some AIG executives, including Cassano, had late-summer vacations planned. Cassano signed off on the million “good faith deposit” before leaving for a cycling trip through Germany and Austria. The parties executed a side letter making clear that both disputed the amount. For the time being, two companies that had been doing business together for decades agreed to disagree. On August , Frost went to Goldman’s offices to “start the dialog,” which had stalled while Cassano and other key executives were on vacation. Two days later, Frost wrote to Forster: “Trust me. This is not the last margin call we are going to debate.” He was right. By September , Société Générale—known more commonly as SocGen—had demanded million in collateral on CDS it had purchased from AIG Financial Products, UBS had demanded million, and Goldman had upped its demand by million. The SocGen demand was based on an . bid price provided by Goldman, which AIG disputed. Tom Athan, managing director at AIG Fi-
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nancial Products, told Forster that SocGen “received marks from GS on positions that would result in big collateral calls but SG disputed them with GS.” Several weeks later, Cassano told AIG Financial Services CFO Elias Habayeb that he believed the SocGen margin call had been “spurred by Goldman,” and that AIG “disputed the call and [had] not heard from SocGen again on that specific call.” In the second week of October, the rating agencies announced hundreds of additional downgrades affecting tens of billions of dollars of subprime mortgage–backed securities and CDOs. By November , Goldman’s demand had almost doubled, to . billion. On November , Bensinger, the CFO, informed AIG’s Audit Committee that Financial Products had received margin calls from five counterparties and was disputing every single one. This stance was rooted in the company’s continuing belief that Goldman had set values too low. AIG’s position was corroborated, at least in part, by the wide disparity in marks from other counterparties. At one point, Merrill Lynch and Goldman made collateral demands on the very same CDS positions, but Goldman’s marks were almost lower than Merrill’s. Goldman insisted that its marks represented the “constantly evolving additional information from our market making activities, including trades that we had executed, market activity we observed, price changes in comparable securities and derivatives and the current prices of relevant liquid . . . indices.” Trading in the ABX would fall from over trades per week through the end of September to less than per week in the fourth quarter of ; trading in the TABX, which focuses on lower-rated tranches, dropped from roughly trades per week through mid-July to almost zero by mid-August. But Cassano believed that the quick reduction in Goldman’s first collateral demand (from . billion on July to . billion on August ) and the interim agreement on the million deposit confirmed that Goldman was not as certain of its marks as it later insisted. According to Cassano, Michael Sherwood, co-CEO of Goldman Sachs International, told him that Goldman “didn’t cover ourselves in glory during this period” but that “the market’s starting to come our [Goldman’s] way”; Cassano took those comments as an implicit admission that Goldman’s initial marks had been aggressive.
“More love notes” In mid-August, Forster told Frost in an email that Goldman was pursuing a strategy of aggressively marking down assets to “cause maximum pain to their competitors.” PricewaterhouseCoopers, which served as auditor for both AIG and Goldman during this period, knew full well that AIG had never before marked these positions to market. In the third quarter of , with the collateral demands piling up, PwC prompted AIG to begin developing a model of its own. Prior to the Goldman margin call, PwC had concluded that “compensating controls” made up for AIG’s not having a model. Among those was notice from counterparties that collateral was due. In other words, one of AIG’s risk management tools was to learn of its own problems from counterparties who did have the ability to mark their own positions to market prices and then demand collateral from AIG.
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The decision to develop a valuation model was not unanimous. In mid-September, Cassano and Forster met with Habayeb and others to discuss marking the positions down and actually recording valuation losses in AIG’s financial statements. Cassano still thought the valuation process unnecessary because the possibility of defaults was “remote.” He sent Forster and others emails describing requests from Habayeb as “more love notes . . . [asking us to go through] the same drill of drafting answers.” Nevertheless, by October, and in consultation with PwC, AIG started to evaluate the pricing model for subprime instruments developed and used by Moody’s. Cassano considered the Moody’s model only a “gut check” until it was fully validated internally. AIG coupled this model with generic CDO tranche data sold by JP Morgan that were considered to be relatively representative of the market. Of course, by this time—and for several preceding months—there was no active market for many of these tranches. Everyone understood that this was not a perfect solution, but AIG and its auditors thought it could serve as an interim step. The makeshift model was up and running in the third quarter.
“Confident in our marks” On November , when AIG reported its third-quarter earnings, it disclosed that it was taking a million charge “related to its super senior credit default swap portfolio” and “a further unrealized market valuation loss through October of approximately million before tax [on that] portfolio.” On a conference call, CEO Sullivan assured investors that the insurance company had “active and strong risk management.” He said, “AIG continues to believe that it is highly unlikely that AIGFP will be required to make payments with respect to these derivatives.” Cassano added that AIG had “more than enough resources to meet any of the collateral calls that might come in.” While the company remained adamant that there would be no realized economic losses from the credit default swaps, it used the newly adopted—and adapted—Moody’s model to estimate the million charge. In fact, PwC had questioned the relevance of the model: it hadn’t been validated in advance of the earnings release, it didn’t take into account important structural information about the swap contracts, and there were questions about the quality of the data. AIG didn’t mention those caveats on the call. Two weeks later, on November , Goldman demanded an additional billion in cash. AIG protested, but paid . billion, bringing the total posted to billion. Four days later, Cassano circulated a memo from Forster listing the pertinent marks for the securities from Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Calyon, Bank of Montreal, and SocGen. The marks varied widely, from as little as of the bonds’ original value to virtually full value. Goldman’s estimated values were much lower than those of other dealers. For example, Goldman valued one CDO, the Dunhill CDO, at of par, whereas Merrill valued it at of par; the Orient Point CDO was valued at of par by Goldman but at of par by Merrill. Forster suggested that the marks validated AIG’s long-standing contention that “there is no one dealer with more knowledge than the others or with a better deal flow of trades and all admit to
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‘guesstimating’ pricing.” Cassano agreed. “No one seems to know how to discern a market valuation price from the current opaque market environment,” Cassano wrote to a colleague. “This information is limited due to the lack of participants [willing] to even give indications on these obligations.” One week later, Cassano called Sherwood in Goldman’s London office and demanded reimbursement of . billion. He told both AIG and Goldman executives that independent third-party pricing for of the , securities underlying the CDOs on which AIG FP had written CDS and AIG’s own valuation for the other indicated that Goldman’s demand was unsupported—therefore Goldman should return the money. Goldman refused, and instead demanded more. By late November, there was relative agreement within AIG and with its auditor that the Moody’s model incorporated into AIG’s valuation system was inadequate for valuing the super-senior book. But there was no consensus on how that book should be valued. Inputting generic CDO collateral data into the Moody’s model would result in a . billion valuation loss; using Goldman’s marks would result in a billion valuation loss, which would wipe out the quarter’s profits. On November , PwC auditors met with senior executives from AIG and the Financial Products subsidiary to discuss the whole situation. According to PwC meeting notes, AIG reported that disagreements with Goldman continued, and AIG did not have data to dispute Goldman’s marks. Forster recalled that Sullivan said that he was going to have a heart attack when he learned that using Goldman’s marks would eliminate the quarter’s profits. Sullivan told FCIC staff that he did not remember this part of the meeting. AIG adjusted the number, and in doing so it chose not to rely on dealer quotes. James Bridgewater, the Financial Products executive vice president in charge of models, came up with a solution. Convinced that there was a calculable difference between the value of the underlying bonds and the value of the swap protection AIG had written on those bonds, Bridgewater suggested using a “negative basis adjustment,” which would reduce the unrealized loss estimate from . billion (Goldman’s figure) to about . billion. With their auditor’s knowledge, Cassano and others agreed that the negative basis adjustment was the way to go. Several documents given to the FCIC by PwC, AIG, and Cassano reflect discussions during and after the November meeting. During a second meeting at which only the auditor and parent company executives were present (Financial Products executives, including Cassano and Forster, did not attend), PwC expressed significant concerns about risk management, specifically related to the valuation of the credit default swap portfolio, as well as to the company’s procedures in posting collateral. AIG Financial Products had paid out billion without active involvement from the parent company’s Enterprise Risk Management group. Another issue was “the way in which AIGFP [had] been ‘managing’ the SS [super senior] valuation process—saying PwC will not get any more information until after the investor day presentation.” The auditors laid out their concerns about conflicting strategies pursued by AIG subsidiaries. Notably, the securities-lending subsidiary had been purchasing mortgage-backed securities, using cash raised by lending securities that AIG held on
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behalf of its insurance subsidiaries. From the end of through September , its holdings rose from billion to billion. Meanwhile, Financial Products, acting on its own analysis, had decided in to begin pulling back on writing credit default swaps on CDOs. In PwC’s view, in allowing one subsidiary to increase exposure to subprime while another subsidiary worked to exit the market entirely, the parent company’s risk management failed. PwC also said that the company’s second quarter of financial disclosures would have been changed if the exposure of the securities-lending business had been known. The auditors concluded that “these items together raised control concerns around risk management which could be a material weakness.” Kevin McGinn, AIG’s chief credit officer, shared these concerns about the conflicting strategies. In a November , , email, McGinn wrote: “All units were apprised regularly of our concerns about the housing market. Some listened and responded; others simply chose not to listen and then, to add insult to injury, not to spot the manifest signs.” He concluded that this was akin to “Nero playing the fiddle while Rome burns.” On the opposite side, Sullivan insisted to the FCIC that the conflicting strategies in the securities-lending business and at AIG Financial Products simply revealed that the two subsidiaries adopted different business models, and did not constitute a risk management failure. On December , six days after receiving PwC’s warnings, Sullivan boasted on another conference call about AIG’s risk management systems and the company’s oversight of the subprime exposure: “The risk we have taken in the U.S. residential housing sector is supported by sound analysis and a risk management structure. . . . we believe the probability that it will sustain an economic loss is close to zero. . . . We are confident in our marks and the reasonableness of our valuation methods.” Charlie Gates, an analyst at Credit Suisse, a Swiss bank, asked directly about valuation and collateral disputes with counterparties to which AIG had alluded in its third-quarter financial results. Cassano replied, “We have from time to time gotten collateral calls from people and then we say to them, well we don’t agree with your numbers. And they go, oh, and they go away. And you say well what was that? It’s like a drive-by in a way. And the other times they sat down with us, and none of this is hostile or anything, it’s all very cordial, and we sit down and we try and find the middle ground and compare where we are.” Cassano did not reveal the billion collateral posted to Goldman, the several hundred million dollars posted to other counterparties, and the daily demands from Goldman and the others for additional cash. The analysts and investors on the call were not informed about the “negative basis adjustment” used to derive the announced . billion maximum potential exposure. Investors therefore did not know that AIG’s earnings were overstated by . billion—and they would not learn that information until February , .
“Material weakness” By January , AIG still did not have a reliable way to determine the market price of the securities on which it had written credit protection. Nevertheless, on January
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, Cassano sent an email to Michael Sherwood and CFO David Viniar at Goldman demanding that they return . billion of the billion posted. He attached a spreadsheet showing that AIG valued many securities at par, as if there had been no decline in their value. That was simply not credible, Goldman executives told the FCIC. Meanwhile, Goldman had by then built up . billion in protection by purchasing credit default swaps on AIG to cover the difference between the amount of collateral they had demanded and the amount that AIG had paid. On February , , PwC auditors met with Robert Willumstad, the chairman of AIG’s board of directors. They informed him that the “negative basis adjustment” used to reach the . billion estimate disclosed on the December investor call had been improper and unsupported, and was a sign that “controls over the AIG Financial Products super senior credit default swap portfolio valuation process and oversight thereof were not effective.” PwC concluded that “this deficiency was a material weakness as of December , .” In other words, PwC would have to announce that the numbers AIG had already publicly reported were wrong. Why the auditors waited so long to make this pronouncement is unclear, particularly given that PwC had known about the adjustment in November. In the meeting with Willumstad, the auditors were broadly critical of Sullivan; Bensinger, whom they deemed unable to compensate for Sullivan’s weaknesses; and Lewis, who might not have “the skill sets” to run an enterprise-wide risk management department. The auditors concluded that “a lack of leadership, unwillingness to make difficult decisions regarding [Financial Products] in the past and inexperience in dealing with these complex matters” had contributed to the problems. Despite PwC’s findings, Sullivan received million over four years in compensation from AIG, including a severance package of million. When asked about these figures at a FCIC hearing, he said, “I have no knowledge or recollection of those numbers whatsoever, sir. . . . I certainly don’t recall earning that amount of money, sir.” The following day, PwC met with the entire AIG Audit Committee and repeated the analysis presented to Willumstad. The auditors said they could complete AIG’s audit, but only if Cassano “did not interfere in the process.” Retaining Cassano was a “management judgment, but the culture needed to change at FP.” On February , AIG disclosed in an SEC filing that its auditor had identified the material weakness, acknowledging that it had reduced its December valuation loss estimates by . billion—that is, the difference between the estimates of . billion and . billion— because of the unsupportable negative basis adjustment. The rating agencies responded immediately. Moody’s and S&P announced downgrades, and Fitch placed AIG on “Ratings Watch Negative,” suggesting that a future downgrade was possible. AIG’s stock declined for the day, closing at .. At the end of February, Goldman held billion in cash collateral, was demanding an additional . billion, and had upped to . billion its CDS protection against an AIG failure. On February , AIG disappointed Wall Street again—this time with dismal fourth-quarter and fiscal year earnings. The company reported a net loss of . billion, largely due to . billion in valuation losses related to the super-senior CDO credit default swap exposure and more than .
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billion in losses relating to the securities-lending business’s mortgage-backed purchases. Along with the losses, Sullivan announced Cassano’s retirement, but the news wasn’t all bad for the former Financial Products chief: He made more than million from the time he joined AIG Financial Products in January of until his retirement in , including a million-a-month consulting agreement after his retirement. In March, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the federal regulator in charge of regulating AIG and its subsidiaries, downgraded the company’s composite rating from a , signifying that AIG was “fundamentally sound,” to a , indicating moderate to severe supervisory concern. The OTS still judged the threat to overall viability as remote. It did not schedule a follow-up review of the company’s financial condition for another six months. By then, it would be too late.
FEDERAL RESERVE: “THE DISCOUNT WINDOW WASN’ T WORKING” Over the course of the fall, the announcements by Citigroup, Merrill, and others made it clear that financial institutions were going to take serious losses from their exposures to the mortgage market. Stocks of financial firms fell sharply; by the end of November, the S&P Financials Index had lost more than for the year. Between July and November, asset-backed commercial paper declined about , which meant that those assets had to be sold or funded by other means. Investment banks and other financial institutions faced tighter funding markets and increasing cash pressures. As a result, the Federal Reserve decided that its interest rate cuts and other measures since August had not been sufficient to provide liquidity and stability to financial markets. The Fed’s discount window hadn’t attracted much bank borrowing because of the stigma attached to it. “The problem with the discount window is that people don’t like to use it because they view it as a risk that they will be viewed as weak,” William Dudley, then head of the capital markets group at the New York Fed and currently its president, told the FCIC. Banks and thrifts preferred to draw on other sources of liquidity; in particular, during the second half of , the Federal Home Loan Banks—which are government-sponsored entities that lend to banks and thrifts, accepting mortgages as collateral—boosted their lending by billion to billion (a increase) when the securitization market froze. Between the end of March and the end of December , Washington Mutual, the largest thrift, increased its borrowing from the Federal Home Loan Banks from billion to billion; Countrywide increased its borrowing from billion to billion; Bank of America increased its borrowing from billion to billion. The Federal Home Loan Banks could thus be seen as the lender of next to last resort for commercial banks and thrifts—the Fed being the last resort. In addition, the loss of liquidity in the financial sector was making it more diffi-
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cult for businesses and consumers to get credit, raising the Fed’s concerns. From July to October, the percentage of loan officers reporting tightening standards on prime mortgages increased from to about . Over that time, the percentage of loan officers reporting tightening standards on loans to large and midsize companies increased from to , its highest level since . “The Federal Reserve pursued a whole slew of nonconventional policies . . . very creative measures when the discount window wasn’t working as hoped,” Frederic Mishkin, a Fed governor from to , told the FCIC. “These actions were very aggressive, [and] they were extremely controversial.” The first of these measures, announced on December , was the creation of the Term Auction Facility (TAF). The idea was to reduce the discount window stigma by making the money available to all banks at once through a regular auction. The program had some success, with banks borrowing billion by the end of the year. Over time, the Fed would continue to tweak the TAF auctions, offering more credit and longer maturities. Another Fed concern was that banks and others who did have cash would hoard it. Hoarding meant foreign banks had difficulty borrowing in dollars and were therefore under pressure to sell dollar-denominated assets such as mortgage-backed securities. Those sales and fears of more sales to come weighed on the market prices of U.S. securities. In response, the Fed and other central banks around the world announced (also on December ) new “currency swap lines” to help foreign banks borrow dollars. Under this mechanism, foreign central banks swapped currencies with the Federal Reserve—local currency for U.S. dollars—and lent these dollars to foreign banks. “During the crisis, the U.S. banks were very reluctant to extend liquidity to European banks,” Dudley said. Central banks had used similar arrangements in the aftermath of the / attacks to bolster the global financial markets. In late , the swap lines totaled billion. During the financial crisis seven years later, they would reach billion. The Fed hoped the TAF and the swap lines would reduce strains in short-term money markets, easing some of the funding pressure on other struggling participants such as investment banks. Importantly, it wasn’t just the commercial banks and thrifts but the “broader financial system” that concerned the Fed, Dudley said. “Historically, the Federal Reserve has always tended to supply liquidity to the banks with the idea that liquidity provided to the banking system can be [lent on] to solvent institutions in the nonbank sector. What we saw in this crisis was that didn’t always take place to the extent that it had in the past. . . . I don’t think people going in really had a full understanding of the complexity of the shadow banking system, the role of [structured investment vehicles] and conduits, the backstops that banks were providing SIV conduits either explicitly or implicitly.” Burdened with capital losses and desperate to cover their own funding commitments, the banks were not stable enough to fill the void, even after the Fed lowered interest rates and began the TAF auctions. In January , the Fed cut rates again— and then again, twice within two weeks, a highly unusual move that brought the federal funds rate from . to ..
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The Fed also started plans for a new program that would use its emergency authority, the Term Securities Lending Facility, though it wasn’t launched until March. “The TLSF was more a view that the liquidity that we were providing to the banks through the TAF was not leading to a significant diminishment of financing pressures elsewhere,” Dudley told the FCIC. “So maybe we should think about bypassing the banking system and [try] to come up with a vehicle to provide liquidity support to the primary dealer community more directly.” On March , the Fed increased the total available in each of the biweekly TAF auctions from billion to billion, and guaranteed at least that amount for six months. The Fed also liberalized its standard for collateral. Primary dealers—mainly the investment banks and the broker-dealer affiliates of large commercial banks— could post debt of government-sponsored enterprises, including GSE mortgage– backed securities, as collateral. The Fed expected to have billion in such loans outstanding at any given time. Also at this time, the U.S. central bank began contemplating a step that was revolutionary: a program that would allow investment banks—institutions over which the Fed had no supervisory or regulatory responsibility—to borrow from the discount window on terms similar to those available to commercial banks.
MONOLINE INSURERS: “WE NEVER EXPECTED LOSSES” Meanwhile, the rating agencies continued to downgrade mortgage-backed securities and CDOs through . By January , as a result of the stress in the mortgage market, S&P had downgraded , tranches of residential mortgage–backed securities and , tranches from CDOs. MBIA and Ambac, the two largest monoline insurers, had taken on a combined billion of guarantees on mortgage securities and other structured products. Downgrades on the products that they insured brought the financial strength of these companies into question. After conducting stress analysis, S&P estimated in February that Ambac would need up to million in capital to cover potential losses on structured products. Such charges would affect the monolines’ own credit ratings, which in turn could lead to more downgrades of the products they had guaranteed. Like many of the monolines, ACA, the smallest of them, kept razor-thin capital— less than million—against its obligations that included billion in credit default swaps on CDOs. In late , ACA reported a net loss of . billion, almost entirely due to credit default swaps. This was news. The notion of “zero-loss tolerance” was central to the viability of the monoline business model, and they and various stakeholders—the rating agencies, investors, and monoline creditors—had traditionally assumed that the monolines never would have to take a loss. As Alan Roseman, CEO of ACA, told FCIC staff: “We never expected losses. . . . We were providing hedges on market volatility to institutional counterparties. . . . We were positioned, we believed, to take the volatility because we didn’t have to post collateral against the changes in market value to our counterparty, number one. Number two, we were told by the rating agencies that
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rated us that that mark-to-market variation was not important to our rating, from a financial strength point of view at the insurance company.” In early November, the SEC called the growing concern about Merrill’s use of the monolines for hedging “a concern that we also share.” The large Wall Street firms attempted to minimize their exposure to the monolines, particularly ACA. On December , S&P downgraded ACA to junk status, rating the company CCC, which was fatal for a company whose CEO said that its “rating is the franchise.” Firms like Merrill Lynch would get virtually nothing for the guarantees they had purchased from ACA. Despite the stresses in the market, the SEC saw the monoline problems as largely confined to ACA. A January internal SEC document said, “While there is a clear sentiment that capital raising will need to continue, the fact that the guarantors (with the exception of ACA) are relatively insulated from liquidity driven failures provides hope that event[s] in this sector will unfold in a manageable manner.” Still, the rating agencies told the monolines that if they wanted to retain their stellar ratings, they would have to raise capital. MBIA and Ambac ultimately did raise . billion and . billion, respectively. Nonetheless, S&P downgraded both to AA in June . As the crisis unfolded, most of the monolines stopped writing new coverage. The subprime contagion spread through the monolines and into a previously unimpaired market: municipal bonds. The path of these falling dominoes is easy to follow: in anticipation of the monoline downgrades, investors devalued the protection the monolines provided for other securities—even those that had nothing to do with the mortgage-backed markets, including a set of investments known as auction rate securities, or ARS. An ARS is a long-term bond whose interest rate is reset at regularly scheduled auctions held every one to seven weeks. Existing investors can choose to rebid for the bonds and new investors can come in. The debt is frequently municipal bonds. As of December , , state and local governments had issued billion in ARS, accounting for half of the billion market. The other half were primarily bundles of student loans and debt of nonprofits such as museums and hospitals. The key point: these entities wanted to borrow long-term but get the benefit of lower short-term rates, and investors wanted to get the safety of investing in these securities without tying up their money for a long time. Unlike commercial paper, this market had no explicit liquidity backstop from a bank, but there was an implicit backstop: often, if there were not enough new buyers to replace the previous investors, the dealers running these auctions, including firms like UBS, Citigroup, and Merrill Lynch, would step in and pick up the shortfall. Because of these interventions, there were only failures between and early in more than , auctions. Dealers highlighted those minuscule failure rates to convince clients that ARS were very liquid, short-term instruments, even in times of stress. However, if an auction did fail, the previous ARS investors would be obligated to retain their investments. In compensation, the interest rates on the debt would reset, often much higher, but investors’ funds would be trapped until new investors or the
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dealer stepped up or the borrower paid off the loan. ARS investors were typically very risk averse and valued liquidity, and so they were willing to pay a premium for guarantees on the ARS investments from monolines. It necessarily followed that the monolines’ growing problems in the latter half of affected the ARS market. Fearing that the monolines would not be able to perform on their guarantees, investors fled. The dealers’ interventions were all that kept the market going, but the stress became too great. With their own problems to contend with, the dealers were unable to step in and ensure successful auctions. In February, en masse, they pulled up stakes. The market collapsed almost instantaneously. On February , in one of the starkest market dislocations of the financial crisis, of the ARS auctions failed; the following week, failed. Hundreds of billions of dollars were trapped by ARS instruments as investors were obligated to retain their investments. And retail investors—individuals investing less than million, small businesses, and charities—constituted more than billion of this billion market. Moreover, investors who chose to remain in the market demanded a premium to take on the risk. Between investor demands and interest rate resets, countless governments, infrastructure projects, and nonprofits on tight budgets were slammed with interest rates of or higher. Problems in the ARS market cost Georgetown University, a borrower, million. New York State was stuck with interest rates that soared from about . to more than on billion of its debt. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey saw the interest rate on its debt jump from . to in a single week in February. In alone, the SEC received more than , investor complaints regarding the failed ARS auctions. Investors argued that brokers had led them to believe that ARS were safe and liquid, essentially the equivalent of money market accounts but with the potential for a slightly higher interest rate. Investors also reported that the frozen market blocked their access to money for short-term needs such as medical expenses, college tuition, and, for some small businesses and charities, payroll. By , the SEC had settled with financial institutions including Bank of America, RBC Capital Markets, and Deutsche Bank to resolve charges that the firms misled investors. As a result, these and other banks made more than billion available to pay off tens of thousands of ARS investors.
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COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 14 The Commission concludes that some large investment banks, bank holding companies, and insurance companies, including Merrill Lynch, Citigroup, and AIG, experienced massive losses related to the subprime mortgage market because of significant failures of corporate governance, including risk management. Executive and employee compensation systems at these institutions disproportionally rewarded short-term risk taking. The regulators—the Securities and Exchange Commission for the large investment banks and the banking supervisors for the bank holding companies and AIG—failed to adequately supervise their safety and soundness, allowing them to take inordinate risk in activities such as nonprime mortgage securitization and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives dealing and to hold inadequate capital and liquidity.
15 MARCH 2008: THE FALL OF BEAR STEARNS
CONTENTS “I requested some forbearance” .......................................................................... “We were suitably skeptical”............................................................................... “Turn into a death spiral” .................................................................................. “Duty to protect their investors” ......................................................................... “The government would not permit a higher number” ...................................... “It was heading to a black hole”..........................................................................
After its hedge funds failed in July , Bear Stearns faced more challenges in the second half of the year. Taking out the repo lenders to the High-Grade Fund brought nearly . billion in subprime assets onto Bear’s books, contributing to a . billion write-down on mortgage-related assets in November. That prompted investors to scrutinize Bear Stearns’s finances. Over the fall, Bear’s repo lenders—mostly money market mutual funds—increasingly required Bear to post more collateral and pay higher interest rates. Then, in just one week in March , a run by these lenders, hedge fund customers, and derivatives counterparties led to Bear’s having to be taken over in a government-backed rescue. Mortgage securitization was the biggest piece of Bear Stearns’s most-profitable division, its fixed-income business, which generated of the firm’s total revenues. Growing fast was the Global Client Services division, which included Bear’s prime brokerage operation. Bear Stearns was the second-biggest prime broker in the country, with a market share in , trailing Morgan Stanley’s . This business would figure prominently in the crisis. In mortgage securitization, Bear followed a vertically integrated model that made money at every step, from loan origination through securitization and sale. It both acquired and created its own captive originators to generate mortgages that Bear bundled, turned into securities, and sold to investors. The smallest of the five large investment banks, it was still a top-three underwriter of private-label mortgage– backed securities from to . In , it underwrote billion in collateralized debt obligations of all kinds, more than double its figure of . billion.
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The total included . billion in CDOs that included mortgage-backed securities, putting it in the top in that business. As was typical on Wall Street, the company’s view was that Bear was in the moving business, not the storage business—that is, it sought to provide services to clients rather than take on long-term exposures of its own. Bear expanded its mortgage business despite evidence that the market was beginning to falter, as did other firms such as Citigroup and Merrill. As early as May , Bear had lost million relating to defaults on mortgages which occurred within days of origination, which had been rare in the decade. But Bear persisted, assuming the setback would be temporary. In February , Bear even acquired Encore Credit, its third captive mortgage originator in the United States, doubling its capacity. The purchase was consistent with Bear’s contrarian business model—buying into distressed markets and waiting for them to turn around. Only a month after the purchase of Encore, the Securities and Exchange Commission wrote in an internal report, “Bear’s mortgage business incurred significant market risk losses” on its Alt-A mortgage assets. The losses were small, but the SEC reported that “risk managers note[d] that these events reflect a more rapid and severe deterioration in collateral performance than anticipated in ex ante models of stress events.”
“I REQUESTED SOME FORBEARANCE” Vacationing on Nantucket Island when the two Bear-sponsored hedge funds declared bankruptcy on July , , former Bear treasurer Robert Upton anticipated that the rating agencies would downgrade the company, raising borrowing costs. Bear funded much of its operations borrowing short-term in the repo market; it borrowed between and billion overnight. Even a threat of a downgrade by a rating agency would make financing more expensive, starting the next morning. Investors, analysts, and the credit rating agencies closely scrutinized leverage ratios, available at the end of each quarter. By November , Bear’s leverage ratio had reached nearly to . By the end of , Bear’s Level assets—illiquid assets difficult to value and to sell—were of its tangible common equity; thus, writing down these illiquid assets by would wipe out tangible common equity. At the end of each quarter, Bear would lower its leverage ratio by selling assets, only to buy them back at the beginning of the next quarter. Bear and other firms booked these transactions as sales—even though the assets didn’t stay off the balance sheet for long—in order to reduce the amount of the company’s assets and lower its leverage ratio. Bear’s former treasurer Upton called the move “window dressing” and said it ensured that creditors and rating agencies were happy. Bear’s public filings reflected this, to some degree: for example, its annual report said the balance sheet was approximately lower than the average month-end balance over the previous twelve months. To forestall a downgrade, Upton spoke with the three main rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch, in early August. Several times in —
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including April and June —S&P had confirmed Bear’s strong ratings, noting in April that “Bear’s risk profile is relatively conservative” and “strong senior management oversight and a strong culture throughout the firm are the foundation of Bear’s risk management process.” On June , Moody’s had also confirmed its A rating, and Fitch had confirmed its “stable” outlook. Now, in early August, Upton provided them information about Bear and argued that management had learned its lesson about governance and risk management from the failure of the two hedge funds and was going to rely less on short-term unsecured funding and more on the repo market. Bear and other market participants did not foresee that Bear’s own repo lenders might refuse to lend against risky mortgage assets and eventually not even against Treasuries. “I requested some forbearance” from S&P, Upton told the FCIC. He did not get it. On August , just three days after the two Bear Stearns hedge funds declared bankruptcy, S&P highlighted the funds, Bear’s mortgage-related investments, and its relatively small capital base as it placed Bear on a “negative outlook.” Asked how he felt about the rating agency’s actions, Jimmy Cayne, Bear’s CEO until , said, “A negative outlook can touch a number of parts of your businesses. . . . It was like having a beautiful child and they have a disease of some sort that you never expect to happen and it did. How did I feel? Lousy.” To reassure investors that no more shoes would drop, Bear invited them on a conference call that same day. The call did not go well. By the end of the day, Bear’s stock slid , to ., below its all-time high of ., reached earlier in .
“WE WERE SUITABLY SKEPTICAL” On Sunday, August , two days after the conference call, Bear had another opportunity to make its case: this time, with the SEC. The two SEC supervisors who visited the company that Sunday were Michael Macchiaroli and Matthew Eichner, respectively, associate director and assistant director of the division of market regulation. The regulators reviewed Bear’s exposures to the mortgage market, including the billion in adjustable-rate mortgages on the firm’s books that were waiting to be securitized. Bear executives gave assurances that inventory would shrink once investors returned in September from their retreats in the Hamptons. “Obviously, regulators are not supposed to listen to happy talk and go away smiling,” Eichner told the FCIC. “Thirteen billion in ARMs is no joke.” Still, Eichner did not believe the Bear executives were being disingenuous. He thought they were just emphasizing the upside. Alan Schwartz, the co-president who later succeeded Jimmy Cayne as CEO, and Thomas Marano, head of Global Mortgages and Asset Backed Securities, seemed unconcerned. But other executives were leery. Wendy de Monchaux, the head of proprietary trading, urged Marano to trim the mortgage portfolio, as did Steven Meyer, the co-head of stock sales and trading. According to Chief Risk Officer Michael Alix, former chairman Alan Greenberg would say, “the best hedge is a sale.” Bear finally reduced the portfolio from billion in the third quarter of to . billion in the fourth quarter, but it was too little too late.
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That summer, the SEC felt Bear’s liquidity was adequate for the immediate future, but supervisors “were suitably skeptical,” Eichner insisted. After the August meeting, the SEC required that Bear Stearns report daily on Bear’s liquidity. However, Eichner admitted that he and his agency had grossly underestimated the possibility of a liquidity crisis down the road. Every weeknight Upton updated the SEC on Bear’s billion balance sheet, with specifics on repo and commercial paper. On September , Bear Stearns raised approximately . billion in unsecured -year bonds. The reports slowed to once a week. The SEC’s inspector general later criticized the regulators, writing that they did not push Bear to reduce leverage or “make any efforts to limit Bear Stearns’ mortgage securities concentration,” despite “aware[ness] that risk management of mortgages at Bear Stearns had numerous shortcomings, including lack of expertise by risk managers in mortgage backed securities” and “persistent understaffing; a proximity of risk managers to traders suggesting a lack of independence; turnover of key personnel during times of crisis; and the inability or unwillingness to update models to reflect changing circumstances.” Michael Halloran, a senior adviser to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, told the FCIC the SEC had ample information and authority to require Bear Stearns to decrease leverage and sell mortgage-backed securities, as other financial institutions were doing. Halloran said that as early as the first quarter of , he had asked Erik Sirri, in charge of the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entities program, about Bear Stearns (and Lehman Brothers), “Why can’t we make them reduce risk?” According to Halloran, Sirri said the SEC’s job was not to tell the banks how to run their companies but to protect their customers’ assets.
“TURN INTO A DEATH SPIRAL” In August, after the rating agencies revised their outlook on Bear, Cayne tried to obtain lines of credit from Citigroup and JP Morgan. Both banks acknowledged Bear had always been a very good customer and maintained they were interested in helping. “We wanted to try to be belts-and-suspenders,” said CFO Samuel Molinaro, as Bear attempted both to obtain lines of credit with banks and to reinforce traditional sources of short-term liquidity such as money market funds. But, Cayne told the FCIC, nothing happened. “Why the [large] banks were not more willing to participate and provide lines during that period of time, I can’t tell you,” Molinaro said. A major money market fund manager, Federated Investors, had decided on October to drop Bear Stearns from its list of approved counterparties for unsecured commercial paper, illustrating why unsecured commercial paper was traditionally seen as a riskier lifeline than repo. Throughout , Bear Stearns reduced its unsecured commercial paper (from . billion at the end of to only . billion at the end of ) and replaced it with secured repo borrowing (which rose from billion to billion). But Bear Stearns’s growing dependence on overnight repo would create a different set of problems. The tri-party repo market used two clearing banks, JP Morgan and BNY Mellon.
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During every business day, these clearing banks return cash to lenders; take possession of borrowers’ collateral, essentially keeping it in escrow; and then lend their own cash to borrowers during the day. This is referred to as “unwinding” the repo transaction; it allows borrowers to change the assets posted as collateral every day. The transaction is then “rewound” at the end of the day, when the lenders post cash to the clearing banks in return for the new collateral. The little-regulated tri-party repo market had grown from billion in average daily volume in to . trillion in , . trillion in , and . trillion by early . It had become a very deep and liquid market. Even though most borrowers rolled repo overnight, it was also considered a very safe market, because transactions were overcollateralized (loans were made for less than the collateral was worth). That was the general view before the onset of the financial crisis. As Bear increased its tri-party repo borrowing, it became more dependent on JP Morgan, the clearing bank. A risk that was little appreciated before was that JP Morgan and BNY Mellon could face large losses if a counterparty such as Bear defaulted during the day. Essentially, JP Morgan served as Bear’s daytime repo lender. Even long-term repo loans have to be unwound every day by the clearing bank, if not by the lender. Seth Carpenter, an officer at the Federal Reserve Board, compared it to a mortgage that has to be refinanced every week: “Imagine that your mortgage is only a week. Instead of a -year mortgage, you’ve got a one-week mortgage. If everything’s going fine, you get to the end of the week, you go out and you refinance that mortgage because you don’t have enough cash on hand to pay off the whole mortgage. And then you get to the end of another week and you refinance that mortgage. And that’s, for all intents and purposes, what repos are like for many institutions.” During the fall, Federated Investors, which had taken Bear Stearns off its list of approved commercial paper counterparties, continued to provide secured repo loans. Fidelity Investments, another major lender, limited its overall exposure to Bear, and shortened the maturities. In October, State Street Global Advisors refused any repo lending to Bear other than overnight. Often, backing Bear’s borrowing were mortgage-related securities and of these, . billion—more than Bear’s equity—were Level assets. In the fourth quarter of , Bear Stearns reported its first quarterly loss, million. Still, the SEC saw “no evidence of any deterioration in the firm’s liquidity position following the release and related negative press coverage.” The SEC concluded, “Bear Stearns’ liquidity pool remains stable.” In the fall of , Bear’s board had commissioned the consultant Oliver Wyman to review the firm’s risk management. The report, “Risk Governance Diagnostic: Recommendations and Case for Economic Capital Development,” was presented on February , , to the management committee. Among its conclusions: risk assessment was “infrequent and ad hoc” and “hampered by insufficient and poorly aligned resources,” “risk managers [were] not effectively positioned to challenge front office decisions,” and risk management was “understaffed” and considered a “low priority.” Schwartz told the FCIC the findings did not indicate substantial deficiencies. He wasn’t looking for positive feedback from the consultants, because the Wyman re-
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port was meant to provide a road map of what “the gold standard” in risk management would be. In January , before the report was completed, Cayne resigned as CEO, after receiving . million in compensation from through . He remained as non-executive chairman of the board. Some senior executives sharply criticized him and the board. Thomas Marano told the FCIC that Cayne played a lot of golf and bridge. Speaking of the board, Paul Friedman, a former senior managing director at Bear Stearns, said, “I guess because I’d never worked at a firm with a real board, it never dawned on me that at some point somebody would have or should have gotten the board involved in all of this,” although he told the FCIC that he made these comments in anger and frustration in the wake of Bear’s failure. In its final report on Bear, the Corporate Library, which researches and rates firms for corporate governance, gave the company a “D,” reflecting “a high degree of governance risk” resulting from “high levels of concern related to the board and compensation.” When asked if he had made mistakes while at Bear Stearns, Cayne told the FCIC, “I take responsibility for what happened. I’m not going to walk away from the responsibility.” At Bear, compensation was based largely on the return on equity in a given year. For senior executives, about half of each bonus was paid in cash, and about half in restricted stock that vested over three years and had to be held for five. The formula for the size of each year’s compensation pool was determined by a subcommittee of the board. Stockholders approved the performance compensation plan and capital accumulation plan for senior managing directors. Cayne told the FCIC he set his own compensation and the compensation for all five members of the Executive Committee. According to Cayne, no one, including the board, questioned his decisions. For , even with its losses, Bear Stearns paid out of revenues in compensation. Alix, who sat on the Compensation Committee, told FCIC staff the firm typically paid but that the percentage increased in because revenues fell—if management had lowered compensation proportionately, he said, many employees might have quit. Base salaries for senior managers were capped at ,, with the remainder of compensation a discretionary mix of cash, restricted stock, and options. From through , the top five executives at Bear Stearns took home over . million in cash and over . billion from stock sales, for more than a total of . billion. This exceeded the annual budget for the SEC. Alan Schwartz, who took over as CEO after Cayne and had been a leading proponent of investing in the mortgage sector, earned more than million from to . Warren Spector, the co-president responsible for overseeing the two hedge funds that had failed, received more than million during the same period. Although Spector was asked to resign, Bear never asked him to return any money. In , Cayne, Schwartz, and Spector each earned more than times as much as Alix, the chief risk officer. Cayne was out, Schwartz was in, and Bear Stearns continued hanging on in early . Bear was still able to fund its balance sheet through repo loans, though the interest rates the firm had to pay had increased. Marano said he worried this increased cost would signal to the market that Bear was distressed, which could “make our problems turn into a death spiral.”
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“DUTY TO PROTECT THEIR INVESTORS” On Wednesday, January , , Treasurer Upton reported an internal accounting error that showed Bear Stearns to have less than billion in liquidity—triggering a report to the SEC. While the company identified the error, the SEC reinstituted daily reporting by the company of its liquidity. Lenders and customers were more and more reluctant to do business with the company. On February , Bear Stearns had . billion in mortgages, mortgagebacked securities, and asset-backed securities on its balance sheet, down almost billion from November. Nearly billion were subprime or Alt-A mortgage–backed securities and CDOs. The hedge funds that were clients of Bear’s prime brokerage services were particularly concerned that Bear would be unable to return their cash and securities. Lou Lebedin, the head of Bear’s prime brokerage, told the FCIC that hedge fund clients occasionally inquired about the bank’s financial condition in the latter half of , but that such inquiries picked up at the beginning of , particularly as the cost increased of purchasing credit default swap protection on Bear. The inquiries became withdrawals—hedge funds started taking their business elsewhere. “They felt there were too many concerns about us and felt that this was a short-term move,” Lebedin said. “Often they would tell us they’d be happy to bring the business back, but that they had the duty to protect their investors.” Renaissance Technologies, one of Bear’s biggest prime brokerage clients, pulled out all of its business. By April, Lebedin’s prime brokerage operation would be holding billion in assets under management, down more than from billion in January. Nonetheless, during the week of March , when SEC staff inspected Bear’s liquidity pool, they identified “no significant issues.” The SEC found Bear’s liquidity pool ranged from billion to billion. Bear opened for business on Monday, March , with approximately billion in cash reserves. The same day, Moody’s downgraded mortgage-backed securities issued by Bear Stearns Alt-A Trust, a special purpose entity. News reports on the downgrades carried abbreviated headlines stating, “Moody’s Downgrades Bear Stearns,” Upton said. Rumors flew and counterparties panicked. Bear’s liquidity pool began to dry up, and the SEC was now concerned that Bear was being squeezed from all directions. While “everything rolled” during the day—that is, Bear’s repo lenders renewed their commitments—SEC officials worried that this would “probably not continue.” On Tuesday, the Fed announced it would lend to investment banks and other “primary dealers.” The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) would make available up to billion in Treasury securities, accepting as collateral GSE mortgage– backed securities and non-GSE mortgage–backed securities rated triple-A. The hope was that lenders would lend to investment banks if the collateral was Treasuries rather than other highly rated but now suspect assets such as mortgage-backed securities. The Fed also announced it would extend loans from overnight to days, giv-
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ing investment banks an added breather from the relentless need to unwind repos every morning. With the TSLF, the Fed would be setting a new precedent by extending emergency credit to institutions other than commercial banks. To do so, the Federal Reserve Board was required under section () of the Federal Reserve Act to determine that there were “unusual and exigent circumstances.” The Fed had not invoked its section () authority since the Great Depression; it was the Fed’s first use of the authority since Congress had expanded the language of the act in to allow the Fed to lend to investment banks. The Fed was taking the unusual step of declaring its willingness to soon open its checkbook to institutions it did not regulate and whose financial condition it had never examined. But the Fed would not launch the TSLF until March , more than two weeks later—and it was not clear that Bear could last that long. The following day, Jim Embersit of the Federal Reserve Board checked on Bear’s liquidity with the SEC. The SEC said Bear had . billion in cash—down from about billion at the start of the week—and was able to finance all its bank loans and most of its equity securities through the repo market. He summarized, “The SEC indicates that no notable losses have been sustained and that the capital position of the firm is ‘fine.’” Derivatives counterparties were increasingly reluctant to be exposed to Bear. In some cases they unwound trades in which they faced Bear, and in others they made margin or collateral calls. In Bear’s last few years as an independent company, it had substantially increased its exposure to derivatives. At the end of fiscal year , Bear had . trillion in notional exposure on derivatives contracts, compared with . trillion at fiscal year-end and . trillion at the end of . Derivatives counterparties who worried about Bear’s ability to make good on their payments could get out of their derivative positions with Bear through assignments or novations. Assignments allow counterparties to assign their positions to someone else: if firm X has a derivatives contract with firm Y, then firm X can assign its position to firm Z, so that Z now is the one that has a derivatives contract with Y. Novations also allow counterparties to get out of their exposure to each other, but by bringing in a third party: instead of X facing Y, X faces Z and Z faces Y. Both assignments and novations are routine transactions on Wall Street. But on Tuesday, Brian Peters of the New York Fed advised Eichner at the SEC that the New York Fed was “seeing some HFs [hedge funds] wishing to assign trades the clients had done with Bear to other CPs [counterparties] so that Bear ‘steps out.’” Counterparties did not want to have Bear Stearns as a derivatives counterparty any more. Bear Stearns also encountered difficulties stepping into trades. Hayman Capital Partners, a hedge fund in Texas wanting to decrease its exposure to subprime mortgages, had decided to close out a relatively small million subprime derivative position with Goldman Sachs. Bear Stearns offered the best bid, so Hayman expected to assign its position to Bear, which would then become Goldman’s counterparty in the derivative. Hayman notified Goldman by a routine email on Tuesday, March , at : P.M. The reply minutes later was unexpected: “GS does not consent to this trade.”
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That startled Kyle Bass, Hayman’s managing partner. He told the FCIC he could not recall any counterparty rejecting a routine novation. Pressed for an explanation, Goldman the next morning offered no details: “Our trading desk would prefer to stay facing Hayman. We do not want to face Bear.” Adding to the mystery, minutes later Goldman agreed to accept Bear Sterns as the counterparty after all. But the damage was done. The news hit the street that Goldman had refused a routine transaction with one of the other big five investment banks. The message: don’t rely on Bear Stearns. CEO Alan Schwartz hoped an appearance on CNBC would reassure markets. Questioned about this incident, Schwartz said he had no knowledge of such a refusal and rhetorically asked, “Why do rumors start?” SEC Chairman Cox told reporters his agency was monitoring capital levels at Bear Stearns and other securities firms “on a constant basis” and has “a good deal of comfort about the capital cushions at these firms at the moment.” Still, the run on Bear accelerated. Many investors believed the Fed’s announcement about its new loan program was directed at Bear Stearns, and they worried about the facility’s not being available for several weeks. On Wednesday, March , the SEC noted that Bear paid another . billion for margin calls from nervous derivatives counterparties. Repo lenders who had already tightened the terms for their contracts over the preceding four or five months shortened the leash again, demanding more collateral from Bear Stearns. Worries about a default quickly mounted. By that evening, Bear’s ability to borrow in the repo market was drying up. The SEC noted that some large and important money funds, including Fidelity and Mellon, had told Bear after the close of business Wednesday they “might be hesitant to roll some funding tomorrow.” The SEC said that though they believed the amounts were “very manageable (between and billion),” the withdrawals would not send a helpful signal to the market. But the issue was almost moot. Schwartz called New York Fed President Timothy Geithner that night to discuss possible Fed flexibility in the event that some repo lenders did pull away. Upton, the treasurer, said that before that week, he had never worried about the disappearance of repo lending. By Thursday, he believed the end was near. Bear executives informed the board that the rumors were dissuading counterparties from doing business with Bear, that Bear was receiving and meeting significant margin calls, that billion in repo was not going to roll over, and that “there was a reasonable chance that there would not be enough cash to meet [Bear’s] needs.” Some repo lenders were already so averse to Bear that they stopped lending to the company at all, not even against Treasury collateral, Upton told the FCIC. Derivatives counterparties continued to run from Bear. By that night, liquidity had dwindled to a mere billion (see figure .). Bear had run out of cash in one week. Executives and regulators continued to believe the firm was solvent, however. Former SEC Chairman Cox testified before the FCIC, “At all times during the week of March to , up to and including the time of its agreement to be acquired by JP Morgan, Bear Stearns had a capital cushion well above what is required.”
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Bear Stearns Liquidity In the four days before Bear Stearns collapsed, the company’s liquidity dropped by $16 billion. IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS, DAILY $25 20 15 10 5 0 22
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Figure . “THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT PERMIT A HIGHER NUMBER” On Thursday evening, March , Bear Stearns informed the SEC that it would be “unable to operate normally on Friday.” CEO Alan Schwartz called JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon to request a billion credit line. Dimon turned him down, citing, according to Schwartz, JP Morgan’s own significant exposure to the mortgage market. Because Bear also had a large, illiquid portfolio of mortgage assets, JP Morgan would not render assistance without government support. Schwartz spoke with Geithner again. Schwartz insisted Bear’s problem was liquidity, not insufficient capital. A series of calls between Schwartz, Dimon, Geithner, and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson followed. To address Bear’s liquidity needs, the New York Fed made a . billion loan to Bear Stearns through JP Morgan on the morning of Friday, March . Standard & Poor’s lowered Bear’s rating three levels to BBB. Moody’s and Fitch also downgraded the company. By the end of the day, Bear was out of cash. Its stock plummeted , closing below . The markets evidently viewed the loan as a sign of terminal weakness. After markets closed on Friday, Paulson and Geithner informed Bear CEO Schwartz that the Fed loan to JP Morgan would not be available after the weekend. Without that loan, Bear could not conduct business. In fact, Bear Stearns had to find a buyer before the Asian markets opened Sunday night or the game would be over. Schwartz,
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Molinaro, Alix, and others spent the weekend in due diligence meetings with JP Morgan and other potential buyers, including the private equity firm J.C. Flowers and Co. According to Schwartz, the participants determined JP Morgan was the only candidate with the size and stature to make a credible offer within hours. As Bear Stearns’s clearing bank for repo trades, JP Morgan held much of Bear Stearns’s assets as collateral and had been assessing their value daily. This knowledge let JP Morgan move more quickly. On Sunday, March , JP Morgan informed the New York Fed and the Treasury that it was interested in a deal if it included financial support from the Fed. The Federal Reserve Board, again finding “unusual and exigent circumstances” as required under section () of the Federal Reserve Act, agreed to purchase . billion of Bear’s assets to get them off the firm’s books through a new entity called Maiden Lane LLC (named for a street alongside the New York Fed). Those assets— mostly mortgage-related securities, other assets, and hedges from Bear’s mortgage trading desk—would be under New York Fed management. To finance the purchases, JP Morgan made a . billion subordinated loan and the New York Fed lent . billion. Because of its loan, JP Morgan bore the risk of the first . billion of losses; the Fed would bear any further losses up to . billion. The Fed’s loan would be repaid as Maiden Lane sold the collateral. On Sunday night, with Maiden Lane in place, JP Morgan publicly announced a deal to buy Bear Stearns for a share. Minutes of Bear’s board meeting indicate that JP Morgan had considered but cut it to “because the government would not permit a higher number. . . . The Fed and the Treasury Department would not support a transaction where [Bear Stearns] equity holders received any significant consideration because of the ‘moral hazard’ of the federal government using taxpayer money to ‘bail out’ the investment bank’s stockholders.” Eight days later, on March , Bear Stearns and JP Morgan agreed to increase the price to . John Chrin, co-head of the financial institutions mergers and acquisitions group at JP Morgan, told the FCIC they increased the price to make Bear shareholders’ approval more likely. Bear CEO Schwartz told the FCIC the increase let Bear preserve the company’s value “to the greatest extent possible under the circumstances for our shareholders, our , employees, and our creditors.”
“IT WAS HEADING TO A BLACK HOLE” The SEC regulators Macchiaroli and Eichner were as stunned as everyone else by the speed of Bear’s collapse. Macchiaroli had had doubts as far back as August, he told the FCIC, but he and his colleagues expected Bear would be able to fund itself through the repo market, albeit at higher margins. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke later called the Bear Stearns decision the toughest of the financial crisis. The . trillion tri-party repo market had “really [begun] to break down,” Bernanke said. “As the fear increased,” short-term lenders began demanding more collateral, “which was making it more and more difficult for the financial firms to finance themselves and creating more and more liquidity pressure on
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them. And, it was heading sort of to a black hole.” He saw the collapse of Bear Stearns as threatening to freeze the tri-party repo market, leaving the short-term lenders with collateral they would try to “dump on the market. You would have a big crunch in asset prices.” “Bear Stearns, which is not that big a firm, our view on why it was important to save it—you may disagree—but our view was that because it was so essentially involved in this critical repo financing market, that its failure would have brought down that market, which would have had implications for other firms,” Bernanke told the FCIC. Geithner explained the need for government support for Bear’s acquisition by JP Morgan as follows: “The sudden discovery by Bear’s derivative counterparties that important financial positions they had put in place to protect themselves from financial risk were no longer operative would have triggered substantial further dislocation in markets. This would have precipitated a rush by Bear’s counterparties to liquidate the collateral they held against those positions and to attempt to replicate those positions in already very fragile markets.” Paulson told the FCIC that Bear had both a liquidity problem and a capital problem. “Could you just imagine the mess we would have had? If Bear had gone there were hundreds, maybe thousands of counterparties that all would have grabbed their collateral, would have started trying to sell their collateral, drove down prices, create even bigger losses. There was huge fear about the investment banking model at that time.” Paulson believed that if Bear had filed for bankruptcy, “you would have had Lehman going . . . almost immediately if Bear had gone, and just the whole process would have just started earlier.”
COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 15 The Commission concludes the failure of Bear Stearns and its resulting government-assisted rescue were caused by its exposure to risky mortgage assets, its reliance on short-term funding, and its high leverage. These were a result of weak corporate governance and risk management. Its executive and employee compensation system was based largely on return on equity, creating incentives to use excessive leverage and to focus on short-term gains such as annual growth goals. Bear experienced runs by repo lenders, hedge fund customers, and derivatives counterparties and was rescued by a government-assisted purchase by JP Morgan because the government considered it too interconnected to fail. Bear’s failure was in part a result of inadequate supervision by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which did not restrict its risky activities and which allowed undue leverage and insufficient liquidity.
16 MARCH TO AUGUST 2008: SYSTEMIC RISK CONCERNS
CONTENTS The Federal Reserve: “When people got scared”................................................. JP Morgan: “Refusing to unwind . . . would be unforgivable” ............................ The Fed and the SEC: “Weak liquidity position” ................................................ Derivatives: “Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk” ...................... Banks: “The markets were really, really dicey” ...................................................
JP Morgan’s federally assisted acquisition of Bear Stearns averted catastrophe—for the time being. The Federal Reserve had found new ways to lend cash to the financial system, and some investors and lenders believed the Bear episode had set a precedent for extraordinary government intervention. Investors began to worry less about a recession and more about inflation, as the price of oil continued to rise (hitting almost per barrel in July). At the beginning of , the stock market had fallen almost from its peak in the fall of . Then, in May , the Dow Jones climbed to ,, within of the record , set in October . The cost of protecting against the risk of default by financial institutions—reflected in the prices of credit default swaps—declined from the highs of March and April. “In hindsight, the markets were surprisingly stable and almost seemed to be neutral a month after Bear Stearns, leading all the way up to September,” said David Wong, Morgan Stanley’s treasurer. Taking advantage of the brief respite in investor concern, the top ten American banks and the four remaining big investment banks, anticipating losses, raised just under billion and billion, respectively, in new equity by the end of June. Despite this good news, bankers and their regulators were haunted by the speed of Bear Stearns’s demise. And they knew that the other investment banks shared Bear’s weaknesses: leverage, reliance on overnight funding, dependence on securitization markets, and concentrations in illiquid mortgage securities and other troubled assets. In particular, the run on Bear had exposed the dangers of tri-party repo agreements and the counterparty risk caused by derivatives contracts. And the word on the street—despite the assurances of Lehman CEO Dick Fuld at
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an April shareholder meeting that “the worst is behind us”—was that Bear would not be the only failure.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE: “WHEN PEOPLE GOT SCARED” The most pressing danger was the potential failure of the repo market—a market that “grew very, very quickly with no single regulator having a purview of it,” former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson would tell the FCIC. Market participants believed that the tri-party repo market was a relatively safe and durable source of collateralized short-term financing. It was on precisely this understanding that Bear had shifted approximately billion of its unsecured funding into repos in . But now it was clear that repo funding could be just as vulnerable to runs as were other forms of short-term financing. The repo runs of , which had devastated hedge funds such as the two Bear Stearns Asset Management funds and mortgage originators such as Countrywide, had seized the attention of the financial community, and the run on Bear Stearns was similarly eye-opening. Market participants and regulators now better appreciated how the quality of repo collateral had shifted over time from Treasury notes and securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to highly rated non-GSE mortgage– backed securities and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). At its peak before the crisis, this riskier collateral accounted for as much as of the total posted. In April , the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of had dramatically expanded protections for repo lenders holding collateral, such as mortgage-related securities, that was riskier than government or highly rated corporate debt. These protections gave lenders confidence that they had clear, immediate rights to collateral if a borrower should declare bankruptcy. Nonetheless, Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JP Morgan, told the FCIC, “When people got scared, they wouldn’t finance the nonstandard stuff at all.” To the surprise of both borrowers and regulators, high-quality collateral was not enough to ensure access to the repo market. Repo lenders cared just as much about the financial health of the borrower as about the quality of the collateral. In fact, even for the same collateral, repo lenders demanded different haircuts from different borrowers. Despite the bankruptcy provisions in the act, lenders were reluctant to risk the hassle of seizing collateral, even good collateral, from a bankrupt borrower. Steven Meier of State Street testified to the FCIC: “I would say the counterparties are a first line of defense, and we don’t want to go through that uncomfortable process of having to liquidate collateral.” William Dudley of the New York Fed told the FCIC, “At the first sign of trouble, these investors in tri-party repo tend to run rather than take the collateral that they’ve lent against. . . . So high-quality collateral itself is not sufficient when and if an institution gets in trouble.” Moreover, if a borrower in the repo market defaults, money market funds—frequent lenders in this market—may have to seize collateral that they cannot legally own. For example, a money market fund cannot hold long-term securities, such as
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agency mortgage–backed securities. Typically, if a fund takes possession of such collateral, it liquidates the securities immediately, even—as was the case during the crisis—into a declining market. As a result, funds simply avoided lending against mortgage-related securities. In the crisis, investors didn’t consider secured funding to be much better than unsecured, according to Darryll Hendricks, a managing director and global head of risk methodology at UBS, as well as the head of a private-sector task force on the repo market organized by the New York Fed. As noted, the Fed had announced a new program, the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), on the Tuesday before Bear’s collapse, but it would not be available until March . The TSLF would lend a total of up to billion of Treasury securities at any one time to the investment banks and other primary dealers—the securities affiliates of the large commercial banks and investment banks that trade with the New York Fed, such as Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, or Merrill Lynch—for up to days. The borrowers would trade highly rated securities, including debt in government-sponsored enterprises, in return for Treasuries. The primary dealers could then use those Treasuries as collateral to borrow cash in the repo market. Like the Term Auction Facility for commercial banks, described earlier, the TSLF would run as a regular auction to reduce the stigma of borrowing from the Fed. However, after Bear’s collapse, Fed officials recognized that the situation called for a program that could be up and running right away. And they concluded that the TSLF alone would not be enough. So, the Fed would create another program first. On the Sunday of Bear’s collapse, the Fed announced the new Primary Dealer Credit Facility—again invoking its authority under () of the Federal Reserve Act—to provide cash, not Treasuries, to investment banks and other primary dealers on terms close to those that depository institutions—banks and thrifts—received through the Fed’s discount window. The move came “just about minutes” too late for Bear, Jimmy Cayne, its former CEO, told the FCIC. Unlike the TSLF, which would offer Treasuries for days, the PDCF offered overnight cash loans in exchange for collateral. In effect, this program could serve as an alternative to the overnight tri-party repo lenders, potentially providing hundreds of billions of dollars of credit. “So the idea of the PDCF then was . . . anything that the dealer couldn’t finance—the securities that were acceptable under the discount window—if they couldn’t get financing in the market, they could get financing from the Federal Reserve,” said Seth Carpenter, deputy associate director in the Division of Monetary Affairs at the Federal Reserve Board. “And that way, you don’t have to worry. And by providing that support, other lenders know that they’re going to be able to get their money back the next day.” By charging the Federal Reserve’s discount rate and adding additional fees for regular use, the Federal Reserve encouraged dealers to use the PDCF only as a last resort. In its first week of operation, this program immediately provided over billion in cash to Bear Stearns (as bridge financing until the JP Morgan deal officially closed), Lehman Brothers, and the securities affiliate of Citigroup, among others. However, as the immediate post-Bear concerns subsided, use of the facility declined
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after April and ceased completely by late July. Because the dealers feared that markets would see reliance on the PDCF as an indication of severe distress, the facility carried a stigma similar to the Fed’s discount window. “Paradoxically, while the PDCF was created to mitigate the liquidity flight caused by the loss of confidence in an investment bank, use of the PDCF was seen both within Lehman, and possibly by the broader market, as an event that could trigger a loss of confidence,” noted the Lehman bankruptcy examiner. On May , the Fed broadened the kinds of collateral allowed in the TSLF to include other triple-A-rated asset-backed securities, such as auto and credit card loans. In June, the Fed’s Dudley urged in an internal email that both programs be extended at least through the end of the year. “PDCF remains critical to the stability of some of the [investment banks],” he wrote. “Amounts don’t matter here, it is the fact that the PDCF underpins the tri-party repo system.” On July , the Fed extended both programs through January , .
JP MORGAN: “REFUSING TO UNWIND . . . WOULD BE UNFORGIVABLE” The repo run on Bear also alerted the two repo clearing banks—JP Morgan, the main clearing bank for Lehman and Merrill Lynch, as it had been for Bear Stearns, and BNY Mellon, the main clearing bank for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley—to the risks they were taking. Before Bear’s collapse, the market had not really understood the colossal exposures that the tri-party repo market created for these clearing banks. As explained earlier, the “unwind/rewind” mechanism could leave JP Morgan and BNY Mellon with an enormous “intraday” exposure—an interim exposure, but no less real for its brevity. In an interview with the FCIC, Dimon said that he had not become fully aware of the risks stemming from his bank’s tri-party repo clearing business until the Bear crisis in . A clearing bank had two concerns: First, if repo lenders abandoned an investment bank, it could be pressured into taking over the role of the lenders. Second, and worse—if the investment bank defaulted, it could be stuck with unwanted securities. “If they defaulted intraday, we own the securities and we have to liquidate them. That’s a huge risk to us,” Dimon explained. To address those risks in , for the first time both JP Morgan and BNY Mellon started to demand that intraday loans to tri-party repo borrowers—mostly the large investment banks—be overcollateralized. The Fed increasingly focused on the systemic risk posed by the two repo clearing banks. In the chain-reaction scenario that it envisioned, if either JP Morgan or BNY Mellon chose not to unwind its trades one morning, the money funds and other repo lenders could be stuck with billions of dollars in repo collateral. Those lenders would then be in the difficult position of having to sell off large amounts of collateral in order to meet their own cash needs, an action that in turn might lead to widespread fire sales of repo collateral and runs by lenders. The PDCF provided overnight funding, in case money market funds and other
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repo lenders refused to lend as they had in the case of Bear Stearns, but it did not protect against clearing banks’ refusing exposure to an investment bank during the day. On July , Fed officials circulated a plan, ultimately never implemented, that addressed the possibility that one of the two clearing banks would become unwilling or unable to unwind its trades. The plan would allow the Fed to provide troubled investment banks, such as Lehman Brothers, with billion in tri-party repo financing during the day—essentially covering for JP Morgan or BNY Mellon if the two clearing banks would not or could not provide that level of financing. Fed officials made a case for the proposal in an internal memo: “Should a dealer lose the confidence of its investors or clearing bank, their efforts to pull away from providing credit could be disastrous for the firm and also cast widespread doubt about the instrument as a nearly risk free, liquid overnight investment.” But the New York Fed’s new plan shouldn’t be necessary as long as the PDCF was there to back up the overnight lenders, argued Patrick Parkinson, then deputy director of the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of Research and Statistics. “We should tell [JP Morgan] that with the PDCF in place refusing to unwind is unnecessary and would be unforgiveable,” he emailed Dudley and others. A week later, on July , Parkinson wrote to Fed Governor Kevin Warsh and Fed General Counsel Scott Alvarez that JP Morgan, because of its clearing role, was “likely to be the first to realize that the money funds and other investors that provide tri-party financing to [Lehman Brothers] are pulling back significantly.” Parkinson described the chain-reaction scenario, in which a clearing bank’s refusal to unwind would lead to a widespread fire sale and market panic. “Fear of these consequences is, of course, why we facilitated Bear’s acquisition by JPMC,” he said. Still, it was possible that the PDCF could prove insufficient to dissuade JP Morgan from refusing to unwind Lehman’s repos, Parkinson said. Because a large portion of Lehman’s collateral was ineligible to be funded by the PDCF, and because Lehman could fail during the day (before the repos were settled), JP Morgan still faced significant risks. Parkinson noted that even if the Fed lent as much as billion to Lehman, the sum might not be enough to ensure the firm’s survival in the absence of an acquirer: if the stigma associated with PDCF borrowing caused other funding counterparties to stop providing funding to Lehman, the company would fail.
THE FED AND THE SEC: “WEAK LIQUIDITY POSITION” Among the four remaining investment banks, one key measure of liquidity risk was the portion of total liabilities that the firms funded through the repo market: to for Lehman and Merrill Lynch, to for Morgan Stanley, and about for Goldman Sachs. Another metric was the reliance on overnight repo (which mature in one day) or open repo (which can be terminated at any time). Despite efforts among the investment banks to reduce the portion of their repo financing that was overnight or open, the ratio of overnight and open repo funding to total repo funding still exceeded for all but Goldman Sachs. Comparing the period between March and May to the period between July and August, Lehman’s percentage fell
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from to , Merrill Lynch’s fell from to , Morgan Stanley’s fell from to , and Goldman’s fell from to . Another measure of risk was the haircuts on repo loans—that is, the amount of excess collateral that lenders demanded for a given loan. Fed officials kept tabs on the haircuts demanded of investment banks, hedge funds, and other repo borrowers. As Fed analysts later noted, “With lenders worrying that they could lose money on the securities they held as collateral, haircuts increased—doubling for some agency mortgage securities and increasing significantly even for borrowers with high credit ratings and on relatively safe collateral such as Treasury securities.” On the day of Bear’s demise, in an effort to get a better understanding of the investment banks, the New York Fed and the SEC sent teams to work on-site at Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley. According to Erik Sirri, director of the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, the initial rounds of meetings covered the quality of assets, funding, and capital. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke would testify before a House committee that the Fed’s primary role at the investment banks in was not as a regulator but as a lender through the new emergency lending facilities. Two questions guided the Fed’s analyses: First, was each investment bank liquid—did it have access to the cash needed to meet its commitments? Second, was it solvent—was its net equity (the value of assets minus the value of liabilities) sufficient to cover probable losses? The U.S. Treasury also dispatched so-called SWAT teams to the investment banks in the spring of . The arrival of officials from the Treasury and the Fed created a full-time on-site presence—something the SEC had never had. Historically, the SEC’s primary concern with the investment banks had been liquidity risk, because these firms were entirely dependent on the credit markets for funding. The SEC already required these firms to implement so-called liquidity models, designed to ensure that they had sufficient cash available to sustain themselves on a stand-alone basis for a minimum of one year without access to unsecured funding and without having to sell a substantial amount of assets. Before the run on Bear in the repo market, the SEC’s liquidity stress scenarios—also known as stress tests—had not taken account of the possibility that a firm would lose access to secured funding. According to the SEC’s Sirri, the SEC never thought that a situation would arise where an investment bank couldn’t enter into a repo transaction backed by high-quality collateral including Treasuries. He told the FCIC that as the financial crisis worsened, the SEC began to see liquidity and funding risks as the most critical for the investment banks, and the SEC encouraged a reduction in reliance on unsecured commercial paper and an extension of the maturities of repo loans. The Fed and the SEC collaborated in developing two new stress tests to determine the investment banks’ ability to withstand a potential run or a systemwide disruption in the repo market. The stress scenarios, called “Bear Stearns” and “Bear Stearns Light,” were developed jointly with the remaining investment banks. In May, Lehman, for example, would be billion short of cash in the more stringent Bear Stearns scenario and billion short under Bear Stearns Light. The Fed conducted another liquidity stress analysis in June. While each firm ran
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different scenarios that matched its risk profile, the supervisors tried to maintain comparability between the tests. The tests assumed that each firm would lose of unsecured funding and a fraction of repo funding that would vary with the quality of its collateral. The stress tests, under just one estimated scenario, concluded that Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were relatively sound. Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers failed: the two banks came out billion and billion short of cash, respectively; each had only of the liquidity it would need under the stress scenario. The Fed’s internal report on the stress tests criticized Merrill’s “significant amount of illiquid fixed income assets” and noted that “Merrill’s liquidity pool is low, a fact [the company] does not acknowledge.” As for Lehman Brothers, the Fed concluded that “Lehman’s weak liquidity position is driven by its relatively large exposure to overnight [commercial paper], combined with significant overnight secured [repo] funding of less liquid assets.” These “less liquid assets” included mortgage-related securities—now devalued. Meanwhile, Lehman ran stress tests of its own and passed with billions in “excess cash.” Although the SEC and the Fed worked together on the liquidity stress tests, with equal access to the data, each agency has said that for months during the crisis, the other did not share its analyses and conclusions. For example, following Lehman’s failure in September, the Fed told the bankruptcy examiner that the SEC had declined to share two horizontal (cross-firm) reviews of the banks’ liquidity positions and exposures to commercial real estate. The SEC’s response was that the documents were in “draft” form and had not been reviewed or finalized. Adding to the tension, the Fed’s on-site personnel believed that the SEC on-site personnel did not have the background or expertise to adequately evaluate the data. This lack of communication was remedied only by a formal memorandum of understanding (MOU) to govern information sharing. According to former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, “One reason the MOU was needed was that the Fed was reluctant to share supervisory information with the SEC, out of concern that the investment banks would not be forthcoming with information if they thought they would be referred to the SEC for enforcement.” The MOU was not executed until July , more than three months after the collapse of Bear Stearns.
DERIVATIVES: “EARLY STAGES OF ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL SYSTEMIC RISK” The Fed’s Parkinson advised colleagues in an internal August email that the systemic risks of the repo and derivatives markets demanded attention: “We have given considerable thought to what might be done to avoid a fire sale of tri-party repo collateral. (That said, the options under existing authority are not very attractive—lots of risk to Fed/taxpayer, lots of moral hazard.) We still are at the early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk from close-out of OTC derivatives transactions by an investment bank’s counterparties and identifying potential mitigants.” The repo market was huge, but as discussed in earlier chapters, it was dwarfed by
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Notional Amount and Gross Market Value of OTC Derivatives Outstanding IN TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS, SEMIANNUAL Gross Market Value
Notional Amount $800
$40
700
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500
25
400
20
300
15
200
10
100
5 0
0 1999
2001
2003
SOURCE: Bank for International Settlements
2005
2007
2009 June 2010
Figure . the global derivatives market. At the end of June , the notional amount of the over-the-counter derivatives market was trillion and the gross market value was trillion (see figure .). Adequate information about the risks in this market was not available to market participants or government regulators like the Federal Reserve. Because the market had been deregulated by statute in , market participants were not subject to reporting or disclosure requirements and no government agency had oversight responsibility. While the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency did report information on derivatives positions from commercial banks and bank holding companies, it did not collect such information from the large investment banks and insurance companies like AIG, which were also major OTC derivatives dealers. During the crisis the lack of such basic information created heightened uncertainty. At this point in the crisis, regulators also worried about the interlocking relationships that derivatives created among the small number of large financial firms that act as dealers in the OTC derivatives business. A derivatives contract creates a credit relationship between parties, such that one party may have to make large and unexpected payments to the other based on sudden price or rate changes or loan defaults. If a party is unable to make those payments when they become due, that failure may
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cause significant financial harm to its counterparty, which may have offsetting obligations to third parties and depend on prompt payment. Indeed, most OTC derivatives dealers hedge their contracts with offsetting contracts; thus, if they are owed payments on one contract, they most likely owe similar amounts on an offsetting contract, creating the potential for a series of losses or defaults. Since these contracts numbered in the millions and allowed a party to have virtually unlimited leverage, the possibility of sudden large and devastating losses in this market could pose a significant danger to market participants and the financial system as a whole. The Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, led by former New York Fed President E. Gerald Corrigan and consisting of the major securities firms, had warned that a backlog in paperwork confirming derivatives trades and master agreements exposed firms to risk should corporate defaults occur. With urging from New York Fed President Timothy Geithner, by September , major market participants had significantly reduced the backlog and had ended the practice of assigning trades to third parties without the prior consent of their counterparties. Large derivatives positions, and the resulting counterparty credit and operational risks, were concentrated in a very few firms. Among U.S. bank holding companies, the following institutions held enormous OTC derivatives positions as of June , : . trillion in notional amount for JP Morgan, . trillion for Bank of America, . trillion for Citigroup, . trillion for Wachovia, and . trillion for HSBC. Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, which began to report their holdings only after they became bank holding companies in , held . and . trillion, respectively, in notional amount of OTC derivatives in the first quarter of . In , the current and potential exposure to derivatives at the top five U.S. bank holding companies was on average three times greater than the capital they had on hand to meet regulatory requirements. The risk was even higher at the investment banks. Goldman Sachs, just after it changed its charter, had derivatives exposure more than times capital. These concentrations of positions in the hands of the largest bank holding companies and investment banks posed risks for the financial system because of their interconnections with other financial institutions. Broad classes of OTC derivatives markets showed stress in . By the summer of , outstanding amounts of some types of derivatives had begun to decline sharply. As we will see, over the course of the second half of , the OTC derivatives market would undergo an unprecedented contraction, creating serious problems for hedging and price discovery. The Fed was uneasy in part because derivatives counterparties had played an important role in the run on Bear Stearns. The novations by derivatives counterparties to assign their positions away from Bear—and the rumored refusal by Goldman to accept Bear as a derivatives counterparty—were still a fresh memory across Wall Street. Chris Mewbourne, a portfolio manager at PIMCO, told the FCIC that the ability to novate ceased to exist and this was a key event in the demise of Bear Stearns. Credit derivatives in particular were a serious source of worry. Of greatest interest were the sellers of credit default swaps: the monoline insurers and AIG, which back-
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stopped the market in CDOs. In addition, the credit rating agencies’ decision to issue a negative outlook on the monoline insurers had jolted everyone, because they guaranteed hundreds of billions of dollars in structured products. As we have seen, when their credit ratings were downgraded, the value of all the assets they guaranteed, including municipal bonds and other securities, necessarily lost some value in the market, a drop that affected the conservative institutional investors in those markets. In the vernacular of Wall Street, this outcome is the knock-on effect; in the vernacular of Main Street, the domino effect; in the vernacular of the Fed, systemic risk.
BANKS: “THE MARKETS WERE REALLY, REALLY DICEY” By the fall of , signs of strain were beginning to emerge among the commercial banks. In the fourth quarter of , commercial banks’ earnings declined to a year low, driven by write-downs on mortgage-backed securities and CDOs and by record provisions for future loan losses, as borrowers had increasing difficulty meeting their mortgage payments—and even greater difficulty was anticipated. The net charge-off rate—the ratio of failed loans to total loans—rose to its highest level since , when the economy was coming out of the post-/ recession. Earnings continued to decline in —at first, more for big banks than small banks, in part because of write-downs related to their investment banking–type activities, including the packaging of mortgage-backed securities, CDOs, and collateralized loan obligations. Declines in market values required banks to write down the value of their holdings of these securities. As previously noted, several of the largest banks had also provided support to off-balance-sheet activities, such as money market funds and commercial paper programs, bringing additional assets onto their balance sheets— assets that were losing value fast. Supervisors had begun to downgrade the ratings of many smaller banks in response to their high exposures in residential real estate construction, an industry that virtually went out of business as financing dried up in mid-. By the end of , the FDIC had banks, mainly smaller ones, on its “problem list”; their combined assets totaled . billion. (When large banks started to be downgraded, in early , they stayed off the FDIC’s problem list, as supervisors rarely give the largest institutions the lowest ratings.) The market for nonconforming mortgage securitizations (those backed by mortgages that did not meet Fannie Mae’s or Freddie Mac’s underwriting or mortgage size guidelines) had also vanished in the fourth quarter of . Not only did these nonconforming loans prove harder to sell, but they also proved less attractive to keep on balance sheet, as house price forecasts looked increasingly grim. Already, house prices had fallen about for the year, depending on the measure. In the first quarter of , real estate loans in the banking sector showed the smallest quarterly increase since . IndyMac reported a decline in loan production for that quarter from a year earlier, because it had stopped making nonconforming loans. Washington Mutual, the largest thrift, discontinued all remaining lending through its subprime mortgage channel in April . But those actions could not reduce the subprime and Alt-A exposure that these
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large banks and thrifts already had. And on these assets, the markdowns continued in . Regulators began to focus on solvency, urging the banks to raise new capital. In January , Citigroup secured a total of billion in capital from Kuwait, Singapore, Saudi Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, and others. In April, Washington Mutual raised billion from an investor group led by the buyout firm TPG Capital. Wachovia raised billion in capital at the turn of the year and then an additional billion in April . Despite the capital raises, though, the downgrades by banking regulators continued. “The markets were really, really dicey during a significant part of this period, starting with August ,” Roger Cole, then-director of the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation at the Federal Reserve Board, told the FCIC. The same was true for the thrifts. Michael Solomon, a managing director in risk management manager in the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), told the FCIC, “It was hard for businesses, particularly small, midsized thrifts—to keep up with [how quickly the ratings downgrades occurred during the crisis] and change their business models and not get stuck without the chair when the music stopped . . . They got caught. The rating downgrades started and by the time the thrift was able to do something about it, it was too late . . . Business models . . . can’t keep up with what we saw in .” As the commercial banks’ health worsened in , examiners downgraded even large institutions that had maintained favorable ratings and required several to fix their risk management processes. These ratings downgrades and enforcement actions came late in the day—often just as firms were on the verge of failure. In cases that the FCIC investigated, regulators either did not identify the problems early enough or did not act forcefully enough to compel the necessary changes.
Citigroup: “Time to come up with a new playbook” For Citigroup, supervisors at the New York Fed, who examined the bank holding company, and at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, who oversaw the national bank subsidiary, finally downgraded the company and its main bank to “less than satisfactory” in April —five months after the firm’s announcement in November of billions of dollars in write-downs related to its mortgage-related holdings. The supervisors put the company under new enforcement actions in May and June. Only a year earlier, both the Fed and the OCC had upgraded the company, after lifting all remaining restrictions and enforcement actions related to complex transactions that it had structured for Enron and to the actions of its subprime subsidiary CitiFinancial, discussed in an earlier chapter. “The risk management assessment for is reflective of a control environment where the risks facing Citigroup continue to be managed in a satisfactory manner,” the New York Fed’s rating upgrade, delivered in its annual inspection report on April , , had noted. “During , all formal restrictions and enforcement actions between the Federal Reserve and Citigroup were lifted. Board and senior management remain actively engaged in improving relevant processes.” But the market disruption had jolted Citigroup’s supervisors. In November ,
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the New York Fed led a team of international supervisors, the Senior Supervisors Group, in evaluating of the largest firms to assess lessons learned from the financial crisis up to that point. Much of the toughest language was reserved for Citigroup. “The firm did not have an adequate, firm-wide consolidated understanding of its risk factor sensitivities,” the supervisors wrote in an internal November memo describing meetings with Citigroup management. “Stress tests were not designed for this type of extreme market event. . . . Management had believed that CDOs and leveraged loans would be syndicated, and that the credit risk in super senior AAA CDOs was negligible.” In retrospect, Citigroup had two key problems: a lack of effective enterprise-wide management to monitor and control risks and a lack of proper infrastructure and internal controls with respect to the creation of CDOs. The OCC appears to have identified some of these issues as early as but did not effectively act to rectify them. In particular, the OCC assessed both the liquidity puts and the super-senior tranches as part of its reviews of the bank’s compliance with the post-Enron enforcement action, but it did not examine the risks of these exposures. As for the issues it did spot, the OCC failed to take forceful steps to require mandatory corrective action, and it relied on management’s assurances in that the executives would strive to meet the OCC’s goals for improving risk management. In contrast, documents obtained by the FCIC from the New York Fed give no indication that its examination staff had any independent knowledge of those two core problems. An evaluation of the New York Fed’s supervision of Citigroup, conducted by examiners from other Reserve Banks (the December Operations Review of the New York Fed, which covered the previous four years), concluded: The supervision program for Citigroup has been less than effective. Although the dedicated supervisory team is well qualified and generally has sound knowledge of the organization, there have been significant weaknesses in the execution of the supervisory program. The team has not been proactive in making changes to the regulatory ratings of the firm, as evidenced by the double downgrades in the firm’s financial component and related subcomponents at year-end . Additionally, the supervisory program has lacked the appropriate level of focus on the firm’s risk oversight and internal audit functions. As a result, there is currently significant work to be done in both of these areas. Moreover, the team has lacked a disciplined and proactive approach in assessing and validating actions taken by the firm to address supervisory issues. Timothy Geithner, secretary of the Treasury and former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, reflected on the Fed’s oversight of Citigroup, telling the Commission, “I do not think we did enough as an institution with the authority we had to help contain the risks that ultimately emerged in that institution.” In January , an OCC review of the breakdown in the CDO business noted that the risk in the unit had grown rapidly since , after the OCC’s and Fed’s
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lifting of supervisory agreements associated with various control problems at Citigroup. In April , the Fed and OCC downgraded their overall ratings of the company and its largest bank subsidiary from (satisfactory) to (less than satisfactory), reflecting weaknesses in risk management that were now apparent to the supervisors. Both Fed and OCC officials cited the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of as an obstacle that prevented each from obtaining a complete understanding of the risks assumed by large financial firms such as Citigroup. The act made it more difficult— though not impossible—for regulators to look beyond the legal entities under their direct purview into other areas of a large firm. Citigroup, for example, had many regulators across the world; even the securitization businesses were dispersed across subsidiaries with different supervisors—including those from the Fed, OCC, SEC, OTS, and state agencies. In May and June , Citigroup entered into memoranda of understanding with both the New York Fed and OCC to resolve the risk management weaknesses that the events of had laid bare. In the ensuing months, Fed and OCC officials said, they were satisfied with Citigroup’s compliance with their recommendations. Indeed, in speaking to the FCIC, Steve Manzari, the senior relationship manager for Citigroup at the New York Fed from April to September , complimented Citigroup on its assertiveness in executing its regulators’ requests: aggressively replacing management, raising capital from investors in late , and putting in place a number of much needed “internal fixes.” However, Manzari went on, “Citi was trapped in what was a pretty vicious . . . systemic event,” and for regulators “it was time to come up with a new playbook.”
Wachovia: “The Golden West acquisition was a mistake” At Wachovia, which was supervised by the OCC as well as the OTS and the Federal Reserve, a end-of-year report showed that credit losses in its subsidiary Golden West’s portfolio of “Pick-a-Pay” adjustable-rate mortgages, or option ARMs, were expected to rise to about of the portfolio for ; in , losses in this portfolio had been less than .. It would soon become clear that the higher estimate for was not high enough. The company would hike its estimate of the eventual losses on the portfolio to by June and to by September. Facing these and other growing concerns, Wachovia raised additional capital. Then, in April, Wachovia announced a loss of million for the first three months of the year. Depositors withdrew about billion in the following weeks, and lenders reduced their exposure to the bank, shortening terms, increasing rates, and reducing loan amounts. By June, according to Angus McBryde, then Wachovia’s senior vice president for Treasury and Balance Sheet Management, management had launched a liquidity crisis management plan in anticipation of an even more adverse market reaction to second-quarter losses that would be announced in July. On June , Wachovia’s board ousted CEO Ken Thompson after he had spent years at the bank, of them at its helm. At the end of the month, the bank announced that it would stop originating Golden West’s Pick-a-Pay products and would
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waive all fees and prepayment penalties associated with them. On July , Wachovia reported an . billion second-quarter loss. The new CEO, Robert Steel, most recently an undersecretary of the treasury, announced a plan to improve the bank’s financial condition: raise capital, cut the stock dividend, and lay off to of the staff. The rating agencies and supervisors ignored those reassurances. On the same day as the announcement, S&P downgraded the bank, and the Fed, after years of “satisfactory” ratings, downgraded Wachovia to , or “less than satisfactory.” The Fed noted that projections showed losses that could wipe out the recently raised capital: losses alone could exceed billion, an amount that could cause a further ratings downgrade. The Fed directed Wachovia to reevaluate and update its capital plans and its liquidity management. Despite having consistently rated Wachovia as “satisfactory” right up to the summer meltdown, the Fed now declared that many of Wachovia’s problems were “long-term in nature and result[ed] from delayed investment decisions and a desire to have business lines operate autonomously.” The Fed bluntly criticized the board and senior management for “an environment with inconsistent and inadequate identification, escalation and coverage of all risktaking activities, including deficiencies in stress testing” and “little accountability for errors.” Wachovia management had not completely understood the level of risk across the company, particularly in certain nonbank investments, and management had delayed fixing these known deficiencies. In addition, the company’s board had not sufficiently questioned investment decisions. Nonetheless, the Fed concluded that Wachovia’s liquidity was currently adequate and that throughout the market disruption, management had minimized exposure to overnight funding markets. On August , the OCC downgraded Wachovia Bank and assessed its overall risk profile as “high.” The OCC noted many of the same issues as the Fed, and added particularly strong remarks about the acquisition of Golden West, identifying that mortgage portfolio and associated real estate foreclosures as the heart of Wachovia’s problem. The OCC noted that the board had “acknowledged that the Golden West acquisition was a mistake.” The OCC wrote that the market was focused on the company’s weakened condition and that some large fund providers had already limited their exposure to Wachovia. Like the Fed, however, the OCC concluded that the bank’s liquidity was adequate, unless events undermined market confidence. And, like the Fed, the OCC approved of the new management and a new, more hands-on oversight role for the board of directors. Yet Wachovia’s problems would continue, and in the fall regulators would scramble to find a buyer for the troubled bank.
Washington Mutual: “Management’s persistent lack of progress” Washington Mutual, often called WaMu, was the largest thrift in the country, with over billion in assets at the end of . At the time, billion of the home loans on its balance sheet were option ARMs, two times its capital and reserves, with
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concentrated exposure in California. The reason WaMu liked option ARMs was simple: in , in combination with other nontraditional mortgages such as subprime loans, they had generated returns up to times those on GSE mortgage–backed securities. But that was then. WaMu was forced to write off . billion for the fourth quarter of and another . billion in the first quarter of , mostly related to its portfolio of option ARMs. In response to these losses, the Office of Thrift Supervision, WaMu’s regulator, requested that the thrift address concerns about asset quality, earnings, and liquidity— issues that the OTS had raised in the past but that had not been reflected in supervisory ratings. “It has been hard for us to justify doing much more than constantly nagging (okay, ‘chastising’) through ROE [Reports of Examination] and meetings, since they have not really been adversely impacted in terms of losses,” the OTS’s lead examiner at the company had commented in a email. Indeed, the nontraditional mortgage portfolio had been performing very well through and . But with WaMu now taking losses, the OTS determined on February , , that its condition required a downgrade in its rating from a to a , or “less than satisfactory.” In March, the OTS advised that WaMu undertake “strategic initiatives”— that is, either find a buyer or raise new capital. In April, WaMu secured a billion investment from a consortium led by the Texas Pacific Group, a private equity firm. But bad news continued for thrifts. On July , the OTS closed IndyMac Bank in Pasadena, California, making that company the largest-ever thrift to fail. On July , , WaMu reported a . billion loss in the second quarter. WaMu’s depositors withdrew billion over the next two weeks. And the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco—which, as noted, had historically served with the other Federal Home Loan Banks as an important source of funds for WaMu and others—began to limit WaMu’s borrowing capacity. The OTS issued more downgrades in various assessment categories, while maintaining the overall rating at . As the insurer of many of WaMu’s deposits, the FDIC had a stake in WaMu’s condition, and it was not as generous as the OTS in its assessment. It had already dropped WaMu’s rating significantly in March , indicating a “high level of concern.” The FDIC expressly disagreed with the OTS’s decision to maintain the overall rating, recommending a instead. Ordinarily, would have triggered a formal enforcement action, but none was forthcoming. In an August interview, William Isaac, who was chairman of the FDIC from until , noted that the OTS and FDIC had competing interests. OTS, as primary regulator, “tends to want to see if they can rehabilitate the bank and doesn’t want to act precipitously as a rule.” On the other hand, “The FDIC’s job is to handle the failures, and it—generally speaking— would rather be tougher . . . on the theory that the sooner the problems are resolved, the less expensive the cleanup will be.” FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair underscored this tension, telling the FCIC that “our examiners, much earlier, were very concerned about the underwriting quality of WaMu’s mortgage portfolio, and we were actively opposed by the OTS in terms of going in and letting our [FDIC] examiners do loan-level analysis.”
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The Treasury’s inspector general would later criticize OTS’s supervision of Washington Mutual: “We concluded that OTS should have lowered WaMu’s composite rating sooner and taken stronger enforcement action sooner to force WaMu’s management to correct the problems identified by OTS. Specifically, given WaMu management’s persistent lack of progress in correcting OTS-identified weaknesses, we believe OTS should have followed its own policies and taken formal enforcement action rather than informal enforcement action.”
Regulators: “A lot of that pushback” In these examples and others that the Commission studied, regulators either failed or were late to identify the mistakes and problems of commercial banks and thrifts or did not react strongly enough when they were identified. In part, this failure reflects the nature of bank examinations conducted during periods of apparent financial calm when institutions were reporting profits. In addition to their role as enforcers of regulation, regulators acted something like consultants, working with banks to assess the adequacy of their systems. This function was, to a degree, a reflection of the supervisors’ “risk-focused” approach. The OCC Large Bank Supervision Handbook published in January explains, “Under this approach, examiners do not attempt to restrict risk-taking but rather determine whether banks identify, understand, and control the risks they assume.” As the crisis developed, bank regulators were slow to shift gears. Senior supervisors told the FCIC it was difficult to express their concerns forcefully when financial institutions were generating record-level profits. The Fed’s Roger Cole told the FCIC that supervisors did discuss issues such as whether banks were growing too fast and taking too much risk, but ran into pushback. “Frankly a lot of that pushback was given credence on the part of the firms by the fact that—like a Citigroup was earning to billion a quarter. And that is really hard for a supervisor to successfully challenge. When that kind of money is flowing out quarter after quarter after quarter, and their capital ratios are way above the minimums, it’s very hard to challenge.” Supervisors also told the FCIC that they feared aggravating a bank’s already-existing problems. For the large banks, the issuance of a formal, public supervisory action taken under the federal banking statutes marked a severe regulatory assessment of the bank’s risk practices, and it was rarely employed for banks that were determined to be going concerns. Richard Spillenkothen, the Fed’s head of supervision until early , attributed supervisory reluctance to “a belief that the traditional, nonpublic (behind-the-scenes) approach to supervision was less confrontational and more likely to induce bank management to cooperate; a desire not to inject an element of contentiousness into what was felt to be a constructive or equable relationship with management; and a fear that financial markets would overreact to public actions, possibly causing a run.” Spillenkothen argued that these concerns were relevant but that “at times they can impede effective supervision and delay the implementation of needed corrective action. One of the lessons of this crisis . . . is that the working presumption should be earlier and stronger supervisory follow up.”
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Douglas Roeder, the OCC’s senior deputy comptroller for Large Bank Supervision from to , said that the regulators were hampered by inadequate information from the banks but acknowledged that regulators did not do a good job of intervening at key points in the run-up to the crisis. He said that regulators, market participants, and others should have balanced their concerns about safety and soundness with the need to let markets work, noting, “We underestimated what systemic risk would be in the marketplace.” Regulators also blame the complexity of the supervisory system in the United States. The patchwork quilt of regulators created opportunities for banks to shop for the most lenient regulator, and the presence of more than one supervisor at an organization. For example, a large firm like Citigroup could have the Fed supervising the bank holding company, the OCC supervising the national bank subsidiary, the SEC supervising the securities firm, and the OTS supervising the thrift subsidiary—creating the potential for both gaps in coverage and problematic overlap. Successive Treasury secretaries and Congressional leaders have proposed consolidation of the supervisors to simplify this system over the years. Notably, Secretary Henry Paulson released the “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure” on March , , two weeks after the Bear rescue, in which he proposed getting rid of the thrift charter, creating a federal charter for insurance companies (now regulated only by the states), and merging the SEC and CFTC. The proposals did not move forward in .
COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 16 The Commission concludes that the banking supervisors failed to adequately and proactively identify and police the weaknesses of the banks and thrifts or their poor corporate governance and risk management, often maintaining satisfactory ratings on institutions until just before their collapse. This failure was caused by many factors, including beliefs that regulation was unduly burdensome, that financial institutions were capable of self-regulation, and that regulators should not interfere with activities reported as profitable. Large commercial banks and thrifts, such as Wachovia and IndyMac, that had significant exposure to risky mortgage assets were subject to runs by creditors and depositors. The Federal Reserve realized far too late the systemic danger inherent in the interconnections of the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market and did not have the information needed to act.
17 SEPTEMBER 2008: THE TAKEOVER OF FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC
CONTENTS “A good time to buy”........................................................................................... “The only game in town”.................................................................................... “It’s a time game . . . be cool”............................................................................... “The idea strikes me as perverse” ....................................................................... “It will increase confidence”................................................................................ “Critical unsafe and unsound practices” ............................................................ “They went from zero to three with no warning in between” ............................. “The worst-run financial institution”................................................................. “Wasn’t done at my pay grade”...........................................................................
From the fall of until Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship on September , , government officials struggled to strike the right balance between the safety and soundness of the two government-sponsored enterprises and their mission to support the mortgage market. The task was critical because the mortgage market was quickly weakening—home prices were declining, loan delinquencies were rising, and, as a result, the values of mortgage securities were plummeting. Lenders were more willing to refinance borrowers into affordable mortgages if these government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) would purchase the new loans. If the GSEs bought more loans, that would stabilize the market, but it would also leave the GSEs with more risk on their already-strained balance sheets. The GSEs were highly leveraged—owning and guaranteeing . trillion of mortgages with capital of less than . When interviewed by the FCIC, former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson acknowledged that after he was briefed on the GSEs upon taking office in June , he believed that they were “a disaster waiting to happen” and that one key problem was the legal definition of capital, which their regulator lacked discretion to adjust; indeed, he said that some people referred to it as “bullsh*t capital.” Still, the GSEs kept buying more of the riskier mortgage loans and securities, which by fall constituted multiples of their reported capital. The GSEs
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reported billions of dollars of net losses on these loans and securities, beginning in the third quarter of . But many in Treasury believed the country needed the GSEs to provide liquidity to the mortgage market by purchasing and guaranteeing loans and securities at a time when no one else would. Paulson told the FCIC that after the housing market dried up in the summer of , the key to getting through the crisis was to limit the decline in housing, prevent foreclosures, and ensure continued mortgage funding, all of which required that the GSEs remain viable. However, there were constraints on how many loans the GSEs could fund; they and their regulators had agreed to portfolio caps—limits on the loans and securities they could hold on their books—and a capital surplus requirement. So, even as each company reported billions of dollars in losses in and , their regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), loosened those constraints. “From the fall of , to the conservatorships, it was a tightrope with no safety net,” former OFHEO Director James Lockhart testified to the FCIC. Unfortunately, the balancing act ultimately failed and both companies were placed into conservatorship, costing the U.S. taxpayers billion—so far.
“A GOOD TIME TO BUY” In an August , , letter to Lockhart, Fannie Mae CEO Daniel Mudd sought immediate relief from the portfolio caps required by the consent agreement executed in May following Fannie’s accounting scandal. “We have witnessed growing evidence of turmoil in virtually all sectors of the housing finance market,” Mudd wrote, and “the immediate crisis in subprime is indicative of a serious liquidity event impacting the entire credit market, not just subprime.” As demand for purchasing loans dried up, large lenders like Countrywide kept loans that they normally securitized, and smaller lenders went under. A number of firms told Fannie that they would stop making loans if Fannie would not buy them. Mudd argued that a relaxed cap would let his company provide that liquidity. “A moderate, percent increase in the Fannie Mae portfolio cap would provide us with flexibility . . . and send a strong signal to the market that the GSEs are able to address liquidity events before they become crises.” He maintained that the consent agreement allowed OFHEO to lift the cap to address “market liquidity issues.” Moreover, the company had largely corrected its accounting and internal control deficiencies— the primary condition for removing the cap. Finally, he stressed that the GSEs’ charter required Fannie to provide liquidity and stability to the market. “Ultimately,” Mudd concluded, “this request is about restoring market confidence that the GSEs can fulfill their stabilizing role in housing.” Fannie Mae executives also saw an opportunity to make money. Because there was less competition, the GSEs could charge higher fees for guaranteeing securities and pay less for loans and securities they wanted to own, enabling them (in theory) to increase returns. Tom Lund, a longtime Fannie Mae executive who led the firm’s single-family business, told the FCIC that the market moved in Fannie Mae’s favor af-
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ter August as competitors dropped out and prices of loans and securities fell. Lund told FCIC staff that after the liquidity shock, Fannie had “more comfort that the relationship between risk and price was correct.” Robert Levin, the company’s chief business officer, recalled, “It was a good time to buy.” On August , OFHEO’s Lockhart notified Fannie that increasing the portfolio cap would be “premature” but the regulator would keep the request under “active consideration.” Lockhart wrote that he would not authorize changes, because Fannie could still guarantee mortgages even if it couldn’t buy them and because Fannie remained a “significant supervisory concern.” In addition, Lockhart noted that Fannie could not prudently address the problems in the subprime and Alt-A mortgage market, and the company’s charter did not permit it to address problems in the market for jumbo loans (mortgages larger than the GSEs’ loan limit). Although there had been progress in dealing with the accounting and internal control deficiencies, he observed, much work remained. Fannie still had not filed financial statements for or , “a particularly troubling issue in unsettled markets.” As Lockhart testified to the FCIC, “It became clear by August that the turmoil was too big for the Enterprises [the GSEs] to solve in a safe and sound manner.” He was worried that fewer controls would mean more losses. “They were fulfilling their mission,” Lockhart told the FCIC, “but they had no power to do more in a safe and sound manner. If their mission is to provide stability and lessen market turmoil, there was nothing in their capital structure” that would allow them to do so. Lockhart had worried about the financial stability of the two GSEs and about OFHEO’s ability to regulate the behemoths from the day he became director in May , and he advocated for more regulatory powers for his largely toothless agency. Lockhart pushed for the power to increase capital requirements and to limit growth, and he sought authority over mission goals set by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, as well as litigation authority independent of the Department of Justice. His shopping list also included the authority to put Fannie and Freddie into receivership, a power held by bank regulators over banks, and to liquidate the GSEs if necessary. As it stood, OFHEO had the authority to place the GSEs in conservatorship—in effect, to force a government takeover—but because it lacked funding to operate the GSEs as conservator, that authority was impracticable. The GSEs would deteriorate even further before Lockhart secured the powers he sought.
“THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN” But Fannie and Freddie were “the only game in town” once the housing market dried up in the summer of , Paulson told the FCIC. And by the spring of , “[the GSEs,] more than anyone, were the engine we needed to get through the problem.” Few doubted Fannie and Freddie were needed to support the struggling housing market. The question was how to do so safely. Purchasing and guaranteeing risky mortgage-backed securities helped make money available for borrowers, but it could also result in further losses for the two huge companies later on. “There’s a real tradeoff,” Lockhart said in late —a trade-off made all the more difficult by the state of
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the GSEs’ balance sheets. The value of risky loans and securities was swamping their reported capital. By the end of , guaranteed and portfolio mortgages with FICO scores less than exceeded reported capital at Fannie Mae by more than seven to one; Alt-A loans and securities, by more than six to one. Loans for which borrowers did not provide full documentation amounted to more than ten times reported capital. In mid-September, OFHEO relented and marginally loosened the GSEs’ portfolio cap, from about billion to billion. It allowed Fannie to increase the amount of mortgage loans and securities it owned by per year—a power that Freddie already had under its agreement with OFHEO. OFHEO ruled out more dramatic increases “because the remediation process is not yet finished, many safety and soundness issues are not yet resolved, and the criteria in the Fannie Mae consent agreement and Freddie Mac’s voluntary agreement have not been met.” As the year progressed, Fannie and Freddie became increasingly important to the mortgage market. By the fourth quarter of , they were purchasing of new mortgages, nearly twice the level. With trillion in mortgages resting on razor-thin capital, the GSEs were doomed if the market did not stabilize. According to Lockhart, “a withdrawal by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae or even a drop in confidence in the Enterprises would have created a self-fulfilling credit crisis.” In early October, Senator Charles Schumer and Representative Barney Frank introduced similar bills to temporarily lift portfolio limits on the GSEs by percent, or approximately billion, most of which would be designated for refinancing subprime loans. The measures, which Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke called “ill advised,” were not enacted. In November, Fannie and Freddie reported third-quarter losses of . billion and billion, respectively. At the end of December , Fannie reported that it had billion of capital to absorb potential losses on billion of assets and . trillion of guarantees on mortgage-backed securities; if losses exceeded ., it would be insolvent. Freddie would be insolvent if losses exceeded .. Moreover, there were serious questions about the validity of their “reported” capital.
“IT’S A TIME GAME . . . BE COOL” In the first quarter, real gross domestic product fell . at an annual rate, reflecting in part the first decline in consumer spending since the early s. The unemployment rate averaged in the first three months of , up from a low of . in spring of . As the Fed continued to cut interest rates, the economy was sinking further into recession. In February, Congress passed the Economic Stimulus Act, which raised the limits on the size of mortgages that Fannie and Freddie could purchase, among other measures. The push to get OFHEO to loosen requirements on the GSEs also continued. Schumer pressed OFHEO to justify or lower the capital surcharge; such a stringent requirement, he wrote Lockhart on February , hampered Fannie’s ability to provide financing to homeowners.
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Two days later, Fannie CEO Mudd reported losses in the fourth quarter of , acknowledging that Fannie was “working through the toughest housing and mortgage markets in a generation.” The company had issued . billion of preferred stock, had completed all requirements of the consent agreement with OFHEO, and was discussing with OFHEO the possibility of reducing the capital surplus requirement. The next day, Freddie also reported losses and said the company had raised billion of preferred stock. As both companies had filed current financial statements by this time, fulfilling a condition of lifting the restrictions imposed by the consent agreements, Lockhart announced that OFHEO would remove the portfolio caps on March , . He also said OFHEO would consider gradually lowering the capital surplus requirement, because both companies had made progress in satisfying their consent agreements and had recently raised capital through preferred stock offerings. Mudd told the FCIC that he sought relief from the capital surplus requirement because he did not want to face further regulatory discipline if Fannie fell short of required capital levels. On February , , the day after OFHEO lifted the growth limits, a New York Fed analyst noted to Treasury that the capital surcharge was a constraint that prevented the GSEs from providing additional liquidity to the secondary mortgage market. Calls to ease the surcharge also came from the marketplace. Mike Farrell, the CEO of Annaly Capital Management, warned Treasury Undersecretary Robert Steel that a crisis loomed in the credit markets that only the GSEs could solve. “We believe that we are nearing a tipping point; . . . lack of transparency on pricing for virtually every asset class” and “a dearth of buyers” foreshadowed worse news, Farrell wrote. Removing the capital surcharge and passing legislation to overhaul the GSEs would make it possible for them to provide more stability, he said. Farrell recognized that the GSEs might believe their return on capital would be insufficient, but contended that “they will have to get past that and focus on fulfilling their charters,” because “the big picture is that right now whatever is best for the economy and the financial security of America trumps the ROI [return on investment] for Fannie and Freddie shareholders.” Days before Bear Stearns collapsed, Steel reported to Mudd that he had “encouraging” conversations with Senator Richard Shelby, the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Representative Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, about the possibility of GSE reform legislation and capital relief for the GSEs. He intended to speak with Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd. Confident that the government desperately needed the GSEs to back up the mortgage market, Mudd proposed an “easier trade.” If regulators would eliminate the surcharge, Fannie Mae would agree to raise new capital. In a March email to Fannie chief business officer Levin, Mudd suggested that the capital surplus requirement might be reduced without any trade: “It’s a time game . . . whether they need us more . . . or if we hit the capital wall first. Be cool.”
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On the next day, March , Treasury and White House officials received additional information about Fannie’s condition. The White House economist Jason Thomas sent Steel an email enclosing an alarming analysis: it claimed that in reporting its financial results, Fannie was masking its insolvency through fraudulent accounting practices. The analysis, which resembled one offered in a March Barron’s article, stated: Any realistic assessment of Fannie Mae’s capital position would show the company is currently insolvent. Accounting fraud has resulted in several asset categories (non-agency securities, deferred tax assets, lowincome partnership investment) being overstated, while the guarantee obligation liability is understated. These accounting shenanigans add up to tens of billions of exaggerated net worth. Yet, the impact of a tsunami of mortgage defaults has yet to run through Fannie’s income statement and further annihilate its capital. Such grim results are a logical consequence of Fannie’s dual mandate to serve the housing market while maximizing shareholder returns. In trying to do both, Fannie has done neither well. With shareholder capital depleted, a government seizure of the company is inevitable. Given the turmoil of the Bear Stearns crisis, Paulson said he wanted to increase confidence in the mortgage market by having Fannie and Freddie raise capital. Steel told him that Treasury, OFHEO, and the Fed were preparing plans to relax the GSEs’ capital surcharges in exchange for assurances that the companies would raise capital. On March , , Steel also reported to his Treasury colleagues that William Dudley, then executive vice president of the New York Fed, wanted to “harden” the implicit government guarantee of Freddie and Fannie. Steel wrote that Dudley “leaned on me hard” to make the guarantee explicit in conjunction with dialing back the surcharge and attempting to raise new capital, and Steel worried about how this might affect the federal government’s balance sheet: “I do not like that and it has not been part of my conversation with anyone else. I view that as a very significant move, way above my pay grade to double the size of the U.S. debt in one fell swoop.”
“THE IDEA STRIKES ME AS PERVERSE” Regulators at OFHEO and the Treasury huddled with GSE executives to discuss lowering capital requirements if the GSEs would raise more capital. “The entire mortgage market was at risk,” Lockhart told the FCIC. The pushing and tugging continued. Paulson told the FCIC that personal commitments from Mudd and Freddie Mac CEO Richard Syron to raise capital cinched the deal. Just days earlier, on March , Syron had announced in a quarterly call to investors that his company would not raise new capital. Fannie and Freddie executives prepared a draft press release before a discussion with Lockhart and Steel. It announced a reduction in the capital surcharge from to . Lockhart was not pleased; the draft lacked a com-
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mitment to raise additional capital, stating instead that the GSEs planned to raise it “over time as needed.” It looked as if the GSEs were making the deal with their fingers crossed. In an email to Steel and the CEOs of both entities, Lockhart wrote: “The idea strikes me as perverse, and I assume it would seem perverse to the markets that a regulator would agree to allow a regulatee to increase its very high mortgage credit risk leverage (not to mention increasing interest rate risk) without any new capital.” The initial negotiations had the GSEs raising of capital for each of reduction in the surplus. Lockhart wrote in frustration, “We seem to have gone from to right through to to now to .” Despite Lockhart’s reservations, OFHEO announced the deal, unaltered in any material way, on March . OFHEO agreed to ease the capital restraint from to ; Fannie and Freddie pledged to “begin the process to raise significant capital,” giving no concrete commitment. Paulson told the FCIC that the agreement, which included a promise to raise capital, was “a no-brainer,” and that he had no memory of Lockhart ever having called it “perverse.” The market analyst Joshua Rosner panned the deal. “We view any reduction [in capital] as a comment not only on the GSEs but on the burgeoning panic in Washington,” he wrote. “If this action results in the destabilizing of the GSEs, OFHEO will go from being the only regulator that prevented its charges from getting into trouble, to a textbook example of why regulators should be shielded from outside political pressure.” Fannie would keep its promise by raising . billion in preferred stock. Freddie reneged. Executive Vice President Donald Bisenius offered two reasons why, in hindsight, Fannie Mae did not raise additional capital. First was protecting the assets of existing shareholders. “I’m sure [Fannie’s] investors are not very happy,” Bisenius told the FCIC. “Part two is . . . if you actually fundamentally believe you have enough capital to withstand even a fairly significant downturn in house prices, you wouldn’t raise capital.” Similarly, CEO Syron spoke of the downside of raising capital on August , : “Raising a lot more capital at these kinds of prices could be quite dilutive to our shareholders, so we have to balance the interest of our shareholders.” But Lockhart saw it differently; in his view, Syron’s public comments put “a good face on Freddie’s inability to raise capital.” He speculated that Syron was masking a different concern: lawsuits. “[Syron] was getting advice from his attorneys about the high risk of raising capital before releasing [quarterly earnings] . . . and our lawyers could not disagree because we know about their accounting issues,” Lockhart told the FCIC.
“IT WILL INCREASE CONFIDENCE” In May, the two companies announced further losses in the first quarter. Even as the situation deteriorated, on June OFHEO rewarded Fannie Mae for raising . billion in new capital by further lowering the capital surcharge, from to . In June, Fannie’s stock fell ; Freddie’s, . The price of protection on million in Fannie’s debt through credit default swaps jumped to , in June, up from
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, in May; between and , it had typically been about ,. In August, they both reported more losses for the second quarter. Even after both Fannie and Freddie became public companies owned by shareholders, they had continued to possess an asset that is hard to quantify: the implicit full faith and credit of the U.S. government. The government worried that it could not let the . trillion GSEs fail, because they were the only source of liquidity in the mortgage market and because their failure would cause losses to owners of their debt and their guaranteed mortgage securities. Uncle Sam had rescued GSEs before. It bailed out Fannie when double-digit inflation wrecked its balance sheet in the early s, and it came through in the mid-s for another GSE in duress, the Farm Credit System. In the mid-s, even a GSE-type organization, the Financing Corporation, was given a helping hand. As the market grappled with the fundamental question of whether Fannie and Freddie would be backed by the government, the yield on the GSEs’ long-term bonds rose. The difference between the rate that the GSEs paid on their debt and rates on Treasuries—a premium that reflects investors’ assessment of risk—widened in to one-half a percentage point. That was low compared with the same figure for other publicly traded companies, but high for the ultra-safe GSEs. By June , the spread had risen over the level; by September , just before regulators parachuted in, the spread had nearly doubled from its level to just under , making it more difficult and costly for the GSEs to fund their operations. On the other hand, the prices of Fannie Mae mortgage–backed securities actually increased slightly over this time period, while the prices of private-label mortgage–backed securities dramatically declined. For example, the price of the FNCI index—an index of Fannie mortgage–backed securities with an average coupon of —increased from in January to on September , , two days prior to the conservatorship. As another example, the price of the FNCI index—Fannie securities with an average coupon of —increased from to during the same time period. In July and August , Fannie suffered a liquidity squeeze, because it was unable to borrow against its own securities to raise sufficient cash in the repo market. Its stock price dove to less than a share. Fannie asked the Fed for help. A senior adviser in the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation gave the FCIC a bleak account of the situation at the two GSEs and noted that “liquidity was just becoming so essential, so the Federal Reserve agreed to help provide it.” On July , the Federal Reserve Board in Washington authorized the New York Fed to extend emergency loans to the GSEs “should such lending prove necessary . . . to promote the availability of home mortgage credit during a period of stress in financial markets.” Fannie and Freddie would never tap the Fed for that funding. Also on July , Treasury laid out a three-part legislative plan to strengthen the GSEs by temporarily increasing their lines of credit with the Treasury, authorizing Treasury to inject capital into the GSEs, and replacing OFHEO with the new Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), with the power to place the GSEs into receivership. Paulson told the Senate that regulators needed “a bazooka” at their disposal.
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“You are not likely to take it out,” Paulson told legislators. “I just say that by having something that is unspecified, it will increase confidence. And by increasing confidence it will greatly reduce the likelihood it will ever be used.” Fannie’s Mudd and Freddie’s Syron praised the plan. At the end of July, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of , giving Paulson his bazooka—the ability to extend secured lines of credit to the GSEs, to purchase their mortgage securities, and to inject capital. The -page bill also strengthened regulation of the GSEs by creating FHFA, an independent federal agency, as their primary regulator, with expanded authority over Fannie’s and Freddie’s portfolios, capital levels, and compensation. In addition, the bill raised the federal debt ceiling by billion to . trillion, providing funds to operate the GSEs if they were placed into conservatorship. After the Federal Reserve Board consented in mid-July to furnish emergency loans, Fed staff and representatives of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), along with Morgan Stanley, which acted as an adviser to Treasury, initiated a review of the GSEs. Timothy Clark, who oversaw the weeklong review for the Fed, told the FCIC that it was the first time they ever had access to information from the GSEs. He said that previously, “The GSEs [saw] the Fed as public enemy number one. . . . There was a battle between us and them.” Clark added, “We would deal with OFHEO, which was also very guarded. So we did not have access to info until they wanted funding from us.” Although Fed and OCC personnel were at the GSEs and conferring with executives, Mudd told the FCIC that he did not know of the agencies’ involvement until their enterprises were both in conservatorship. The Fed and the OCC discovered that the problems were worse than their suspicions and reports from FHFA had led them to believe. According to Clark, the Fed found that the GSEs were significantly “underreserved,” with huge potential losses, and their operations were “unsafe and unsound.” The OCC rejected the forecasting methodologies on which Fannie and Freddie relied. Using its own metrics, it found insufficient reserves for future losses and identified significant problems in credit and risk management. Kevin Bailey, the OCC deputy comptroller for regulatory policy, told the FCIC that Fannie’s loan loss forecasting was problematic, and that its loan losses therefore were understated. He added that Fannie had overvalued its deferred tax assets—because without future profits, deferred tax assets had no value. Loss projections calculated by Morgan Stanley substantiated the Fed’s and OCC’s findings. Morgan Stanley concluded that Fannie’s loss projection methodology was flawed, and resulted in the company substantially understating losses. Nearly all of the loss projections calculated by Morgan Stanley showed that Fannie would fall below its regulatory capital requirement. Fannie’s projections did not. All told, the litany of understatements and shortfalls led the OCC’s Bailey to a firm conclusion. If the GSEs were not insolvent at the time, they were “almost there,” he told the FCIC. Regulators also learned that Fannie was not charging off loans until they were delinquent for two years, a head-in-the-sand approach. Banks are required to charge off loans once they are days delinquent. For these and numerous other errors and flawed methodologies, Fannie and Freddie earned rebukes. “Given
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the role of the GSEs and their market dominance,” the OCC report said, “they should be industry leaders with respect to effective and proactive risk management, productive analysis, and comprehensive reporting. Instead they appear to significantly lag the industry in all respects.”
“CRITICAL UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES” Paulson told the FCIC that although he learned of the Fed and OCC findings by August , it took him three weeks to convince Lockhart and FHFA that there was a capital shortfall, that the GSEs were not viable, and that they should be placed under government control. On August , FHFA informed both Mudd and Syron that their firms were “adequately capitalized” under the regulations, a judgment based on financial information that was “certified and represented as true and correct by [GSE] management.” But FHFA also emphasized that it was “seriously concerned about the current level of Fannie Mae’s capital” if the housing market decline continued. Fannie’s prospects for increasing capital grew gloomier. Fannie informed Treasury on August —and repeatedly told FHFA—that raising capital was infeasible and that the company was expecting additional losses. Even Fannie’s “base-case earnings forecast” pointed to substantial pressure on solvency, and a “stressed” forecast indicated that “capital resources will continue to decline.” By September , Lockhart and FHFA agreed with Treasury that the GSEs needed to be placed into conservatorship. That day, Syron and Mudd received blistering midyear reviews from FHFA. The opening paragraph of each letter informed the CEOs that their companies had been downgraded to “critical concerns,” and that “the critical unsafe and unsound practices and conditions that gave rise to the Enterprise’s existing condition, the deterioration in overall asset quality and significant earnings losses experienced through June , as well as forecasted future losses, likely require recapitalization of the Enterprise.” A bad situation was expected to worsen. The -page report sent to Fannie identified sweeping concerns, including failures by the board and senior management, a significant drop in the quality of mortgages and securities owned or guaranteed by the GSE, insufficient reserves, the almost exclusive reliance on short-term funding, and the inability to raise additional capital. FHFA admonished management and the board for their “imprudent decisions” to “purchase or guarantee higher risk mortgage products.” The letter faulted Fannie for purchasing high-risk loans to “increase market share, raise revenue and meet housing goals,” and for attempting to increase market share by competing with Wall Street firms that purchased lower-quality securities. FHFA, noting “a conflict between prudent credit risk management and corporate business objectives,” found that these purchases of higher-risk loans were predicated on the relaxing of underwriting and eligibility standards. Using models that underestimated this risk, the GSE then charged fees even lower than what its own deficient models suggested were appropriate. FHFA determined that these lower fees were charged because “focus was improperly placed on market share and competing with Wall Street and [Freddie Mac].”
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Even after internal reports pointed to market problems, Fannie kept buying and guaranteeing riskier loan products, FHFA said. “Despite signs in the latter half of and of emerging problems, management continued activity in risky programs, and maintained its higher eligibility program for Alt-A loans without establishing limits.” The company also bought private-label securities backed by Alt-A and subprime loans. Losses were likely to be higher than the GSEs had estimated, FHFA found. FHFA also noted “increasing questions and concerns” regarding Fannie’s accounting. The models it used to forecast losses had not been independently validated or updated for several years. FHFA judged that in an up-to-date model, estimated losses would likely show a “material increase.” In addition, Fannie had overvalued its deferred tax assets. Applying more reasonable projections of future performance, FHFA found this benefit to be significantly overstated. The -page report delivered to Freddie included similarly harsh assessments of that GSE’s safety and soundness, but more severe criticisms of its management and board. In particular, the report noted a significant lack of market confidence, which had “eliminated the ability to raise capital.” FHFA, for its part, “lost confidence in the Board of Directors and the executive management team,” holding them accountable for losses stemming from “a series of ill-advised and poorly executed decisions and other serious misjudgments.” According to the regulator, they therefore could not be relied on, particularly in light of their widespread failures to resolve regulatory issues and address criticisms. In addition, FHFA said that Freddie’s failure to raise capital despite its assurances “invite[d]” the conclusion that the board and CEO had not negotiated “in good faith” about the capital surcharge reduction. As in its assessment of Fannie, FHFA found that Freddie’s unsafe and unsound practices included the purchase and guarantee of higher-risk loan products in and in a declining market. Even after being told by the regulator in that its purchases of subprime private-label securities had outpaced its risk management abilities, Freddie bought billion of subprime securities in each subsequent quarter. FHFA also found that “aggressive” accounting cast doubt on Freddie’s reported earnings and capital. Despite “clear signals” that losses on mortgage assets were likely, Freddie waited to record write-downs until the regulator threatened to issue a cease and desist order. Even then, one write-down was reversed “just prior to the issuance of the second quarter financial statements.” The regulator concluded that rising delinquencies and credit losses would “result in a substantial dissipation of earnings and capital.”
“THEY WENT FROM ZERO TO THREE WITH NO WARNING IN BETWEEN” Mudd told the FCIC that its regulator had never before communicated the kind of criticisms leveled in the September letter. He said the regulator’s “chronicling of the situation” then was “inconsistent with what you would consider better regulatory practice to be—like, first warning: fix it; second warning: fix it; third warning: you’re
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out of here. Instead, they went from zero to three with no warning in between.” A review of the examination reports and other documents provided by FHFA to the FCIC largely supports Mudd’s view on this specific point. While OFHEO’s examination reports noted concerns about increasing credit risk and slow remediation of deficiencies required by the May consent agreement, they do not include the sweeping criticisms contained in the September letter. Two days after their two companies were designated “critical concerns,” Mudd at Fannie and Syron at Freddie faced a government takeover. On September , FHFA Acting Deputy Director Chris Dickerson sent separate memos to Lockhart recommending that FHFA be appointed conservator for each GSE. Still, conservatorship was not a foregone conclusion. Paulson, Lockhart, and Bernanke met with Mudd, Syron, and their boards to persuade them to cede control. Essentially the GSEs faced a Hobson’s choice: take the horse offered or none at all. “They had to voluntarily agree to a consent agreement,” Lockhart told the FCIC. The alternative, a hostile action, invited trouble and “nasty lawsuits,” he noted. “So we made a . . . very strong case so the board of directors did not have a choice.” Paulson reminded the GSEs that he had authority to inject capital, but he would not do so unless they were in conservatorship. Mudd was “stunned and angry,” according to Paulson. Tom Lund, who ran Fannie Mae’s single-family business, told the FCIC that conservatorship came as a surprise to everyone. Levin told the FCIC that he never saw a government seizure coming. He never imagined, he said, that Fannie Mae was or might become insolvent. Interviewed in , Mudd told the FCIC: “I did not think in any way it was fair for the government to have been in a position of being in the chorus for the company to add capital, and then to inject itself in the capital structure.” The conservatorship memoranda reiterated all the damning evidence presented in the letters two days earlier. Losses at Fannie Mae for the year were estimated to be between billion and billion. Freddie Mac’s memorandum differed only in the details. Its losses, recorded at billion in the first six months of , were projected to end up between and billion by the end of the year. Although the boards had a choice, the only realistic option was assent. “We were going to agree to go in a conservatorship anyway,” Syron told the FCIC. “There was a very clear message that the [September ] letter was there as a mechanism to bring about a result.” Mudd agreed, observing that “the purpose of the letter was really to force conservatorship.” The boards of both companies voted to accept conservatorship. Both CEOs were ousted, but the fundamental problems persisted. As promised, the Treasury was prepared to take two direct steps to support solvency. First, it would buy up to billion of senior preferred stock from the GSEs and extend them short-term secured loans. In addition, it pledged to buy GSE mortgage–backed securities from Wall Street firms and others until the end of . Up front, Treasury bought from each GSE billion in preferred stock with a dividend. Each GSE also gave Treasury warrants to purchase common stock representing . of shares outstanding. Existing common and preferred shareholders were effectively wiped out. The decline in value of the preferred stock caused losses at many banks that held
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these securities, contributing to the failure of institutions and to the downgrading of to less than “well capitalized” by their regulators. Paulson told the FCIC that he was “naive” enough to believe that the action would halt the crisis because it “would put a floor under the housing market decline, and provide confidence to the market.” He realized he was wrong on the next day, when, as he told the FCIC, “Lehman started to go.” Former Treasury Assistant Secretary Neel Kashkari agreed. “We thought that after we stabilized Fannie and Freddie that we bought ourselves some time. Maybe a month, maybe three months. But they were such profound interventions, stabilizing such a huge part of the financial markets, that would buy us some time. We were surprised that Lehman then happened a week later, that Lehman had to be taken over or it would go into bankruptcy.” The firms’ failure was a huge event and increased the magnitude of the crisis, according to Fed Governor Kevin Warsh and New York Fed General Counsel Tom Baxter. Warsh also told the FCIC that the events surrounding the GSE takeover led to “a massive, underreported, underappreciated jolt to the system.” Then, according to Warsh, when the market grasped that it had misunderstood the risks associated with the GSEs, and that the government could have conceivably let them fail, it “caused investors to panic about the value of every asset, to reassess every portfolio.” FHFA Director Lockhart described the decision to put the GSEs into conservatorship in the context of Lehman’s failure. Given that the investment bank’s balance sheet was about one-fifth the size of Fannie Mae’s, he felt that the fallout from Lehman’s bankruptcy would have paled in comparison to a GSE failure. He said, “What happened after Lehman would have been very small compared to these . trillion institutions failing.” Major holders of GSE securities included the Chinese and Russian central banks, which, between them, owned more than half a trillion dollars of these securities, and U.S. financial firms and investment funds had even more extensive holdings. A Fed study concluded that U.S. banks owned more than trillion in GSE debt and securities—more than of the banks’ Tier capital and of their total assets at the time. Testifying before the FCIC, Mudd claimed that failure was all but inevitable. “In , the companies had no refuge from the twin shocks of a housing crisis followed by a financial crisis,” he said. “A monoline GSE structure asked to perform multiple tasks cannot withstand a multiyear home price decline on a national scale, even without the accompanying global financial turmoil. The model allowed a balance of business and mission when home prices were rising. When prices crashed far beyond the realm of historical experience, it became ‘The Pit and the Pendulum,’ a choice between horrible alternatives.”
“THE WORSTRUN FINANCIAL INSTITUTION” When interviewed by the FCIC, FHFA officials were very critical of Fannie’s management. John Kerr, the FHFA examiner (and an OCC veteran) in charge of Fannie examinations, minced no words. He labeled Fannie “the worst-run financial institution” he had seen in his years as a bank regulator. Scott Smith, who became
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associate director at FHFA after that agency replaced OFHEO, concurred; in his view, Fannie’s forecasting capabilities were not particularly well thought out, and lacked a variety of stress scenarios. Both officials noted Fannie’s weak forecasting models, which included hundreds of market simulations but scarcely any that contemplated declines in house prices. To Austin Kelly, an OFHEO examination specialist, there was no relying on Fannie’s numbers, because their “processes were a bowl of spaghetti.” Kerr and a colleague said that that they were struck that Fannie Mae, a multitrillion-dollar company, employed unsophisticated technology: it was less techsavvy than the average community bank. Nonetheless, OFHEO’s communications with Fannie prior to September did not fully reflect these criticisms. FHFA officials conceded that they had made mistakes in their oversight of Fannie and Freddie. They paid too much attention to fixing operational problems and did not react to Fannie’s increasing credit risk. Lockhart told the FCIC that more resources should have been dedicated to assessing credit risk of their mortgage assets and guarantees. Current FHFA Acting Director Edward DeMarco told the FCIC that it would not pass the “reasonable person test” to deny that OFHEO took its eye off the ball by not paying sufficient attention to credit risk and instead focused on operational risk, accounting and lack of audited results. To Mudd and others, OFHEO’s mistakes were not surprising. Mudd told the FCIC that the regulators’ skill levels were “developing but below average.” Henry Cisneros, a former housing and urban development secretary, expressed a similar view. “OFHEO,” Cisneros told the FCIC, “was puny compared to what Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could muster in their intelligence, their Ivy League educations, their rocket scientists in their place, their lobbyists, their ability to work the Hill.” The costs of the bailouts have been enormous and are expected to increase. From January , , through the third quarter of , the two companies lost billion, wiping out billion of combined capital that they had reported at the end of and the billion of capital raised by Fannie in . Treasury narrowed the gap with billion in support. FHFA has estimated that costs through will range from billion to billion. The Congressional Budget Office has projected that the economic cost of the GSEs’ downfall, including the total financial cost of government support as well as actual dollar outlays, could reach billion by .
“WASN’ T DONE AT MY PAY GRADE” Fannie’s two most senior executives were asked at an FCIC hearing how their charter could have been changed to make the company more sound, and to avoid the multibillion-dollar bailout. Mudd, who made approximately million from to , testified that “the thing that would have made the institution more sound or have produced a different outcome would have been for it to have become over time a more normal financial institution able to diversify, able to allocate capital, able to be
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long or short in the market, able to operate internationally. And if the trade for that would have been, you know, a cut in the so-called implicit ties with the government, I think that would have—that would have been a better solution.” Chief Business Officer Levin, who received approximately million from to , answered only that making such decisions “wasn’t done at my pay grade.”
COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 17 The Commission concludes that the business model of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the GSEs), as private-sector, publicly traded, profit-making companies with implicit government backing and a public mission, was fundamentally flawed. We find that the risky practices of Fannie Mae—the Commission’s case study in this area—particularly from on, led to its fall: practices undertaken to meet Wall Street’s expectations for growth, to regain market share, and to ensure generous compensation for its employees. Affordable housing goals imposed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) did contribute marginally to these practices. The GSEs justified their activities, in part, on the broad and sustained public policy support for homeownership. Risky lending and securitization resulted in significant losses at Fannie Mae, which, combined with its excessive leverage permitted by law, led to the company’s failure. Corporate governance, including risk management, failed at the GSEs in part because of skewed compensation methodologies. The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) lacked the authority and capacity to adequately regulate the GSEs. The GSEs exercised considerable political power and were successfully able to resist legislation and regulatory actions that would have strengthened oversight of them and restricted their risk-taking activities. In early , the decision by the federal government and the GSEs to increase the GSEs’ mortgage activities and risk to support the collapsing mortgage market was made despite the unsound financial condition of the institutions. While these actions provided support to the mortgage market, they led to increased losses at the GSEs, which were ultimately borne by taxpayers, and reflected the conflicted nature of the GSEs’ dual mandate. GSE mortgage securities essentially maintained their value throughout the crisis and did not contribute to the significant financial firm losses that were central to the financial crisis.
18 SEPTEMBER 2008: THE BANKRUPTCY OF LEHMAN
CONTENTS “Get more conservatively funded” ...................................................................... “This is not sounding good at all”....................................................................... “Spook the market” ............................................................................................ “Imagination hat” .............................................................................................. “Heads of family” ............................................................................................... “Tell those sons of bitches to unwind”................................................................. “This doesn’t seem like it is going to end pretty”.................................................. “The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail”........................................... “A calamity” .......................................................................................................
Solvency should be a simple financial concept: if your assets are worth more than your liabilities, you are solvent; if not, you are in danger of bankruptcy. But on the afternoon of Friday, September , , experts from the country’s biggest commercial and investment banks met at the Wall Street offices of the Federal Reserve to ponder the fate of Lehman Brothers, and could not agree whether or not the year-old firm was solvent. Only two days earlier, Lehman had reported shareholder equity—the measure of solvency—of billion at the end of August. Over the previous nine months, the bank had lost billion but raised more than billion in new capital, leaving it with more reported equity than it had a year earlier. But this arithmetic reassured hardly anyone outside the investment bank. Fed officials had been discussing Lehman’s solvency for months, and the stakes were very high. To resolve the question, the Fed would not rely on Lehman’s billion figure, given questions about whether Lehman was reporting assets at market value. As one New York Fed official wrote to colleagues in July, “Balance-sheet capital isn’t too relevant if you’re suffering a massive run.” If there is a run, and a firm can only get firesale prices for assets, even large amounts of capital can disappear almost overnight. The bankers thought Lehman’s real estate assets were overvalued. In light of
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Lehman’s unreliable valuation methods, the bankers had good reason for their doubts. None of the bankers at the New York Fed that weekend believed the billion in real estate assets (excluding real estate held for sale) on Lehman’s books was an accurate figure. If the assets were worth only half that amount (a likely scenario, given market conditions), then Lehman’s billion in equity would be gone. In a fire sale, some might sell for even less than half their stated value. “What does solvent mean?” JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon responded when the FCIC asked if Lehman had been solvent. “The answer is, I don’t know. I still could not answer that question.” JP Morgan’s Chief Risk Officer Barry Zubrow testified before the FCIC that “from a pure accounting standpoint, it was solvent,” although “it obviously was financing its assets on a very leveraged basis with a lot of short-term financing.” Testifying before the FCIC, former Lehman Brothers CEO Richard Fuld insisted his firm had been solvent: “There was no capital hole at Lehman Brothers. At the end of Lehman’s third quarter, we had . billion of equity capital.” Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke disagreed: “I believe it had a capital hole.” He emphasized that New York Federal Reserve Bank President Timothy Geithner, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, and SEC Chairman Christopher Cox agreed it was “just way too big a hole. And my own view is it’s very likely that the company was insolvent, even, not just illiquid.” Others, such as Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis, who that week considered acquiring Lehman with government support, had no doubts either. He told the FCIC that Lehman’s real estate and other assets had been overvalued by to billion—a message he had delivered to Paulson a few days before Lehman declared bankruptcy. It had been quite a week; it would be quite a weekend. The debate will continue over the largest bankruptcy in American history, but nothing will change the basic facts: a consortium of banks would fail to agree on a rescue, two last-minute deals would fall through, and the government would decide not to rescue this investment bank—for financial reasons, for political reasons, for practical reasons, for philosophical reasons, and because, as Bernanke told the FCIC, if the government had lent money, “the firm would fail, and not only would we be unsuccessful but we would have saddled the taxpayer with tens of billions of dollars of losses.”
“GET MORE CONSERVATIVELY FUNDED” After the demise of Bear Stearns in March , most observers—including Bernanke, Paulson, Geithner, and Cox—viewed Lehman Brothers as the next big worry among the four remaining large investment banks. Geithner said he was “consumed” with finding a way that Lehman might “get more conservatively funded.” Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn told Bernanke that in the wake of Bear’s collapse, some institutional investors believed it was a matter not of whether Lehman would fail, but when. One set of numbers in particular reinforced their doubts: on March , the day after JP Morgan announced its acquisition of Bear Stearns, the market
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(through credit default swaps on Lehman’s debt) put the cost of insuring million of Lehman’s five-year senior debt at , annually; for Merrill Lynch, the cost was ,; and for Goldman Sachs, ,. The chief concerns were Lehman’s real estate–related investments and its reliance on short-term funding sources, including . billion of commercial paper and billion of repos at the end of the first quarter of . There were also concerns about the firm’s more than , derivative contracts with a myriad of counterparties. As they did for all investments banks, the Fed and SEC asked: Did Lehman have enough capital—real capital, after possible asset write-downs? And did it have sufficient liquidity—cash—to withstand the kind of run that had taken down Bear Stearns? Solvency and liquidity were essential and related. If money market funds, hedge funds, and investment banks believed Lehman’s assets were worth less than Lehman’s valuations, they would withdraw funds, demand more collateral, and curtail lending. That could force Lehman to sell its assets at fire-sale prices, wiping out capital and liquidity virtually overnight. Bear proved it could happen. “The SEC traditionally took the view that liquidity was paramount in large securities firms, but the Fed, as a consequence of its banking mandate, had more of an emphasis on capital raising,” Erik Sirri, head of the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, told the FCIC. “Because the Fed had become the de facto primary regulator because of its balance sheet, its view prevailed. The SEC wanted to be collaborative, and so came to accept the Fed’s focus on capital. However, as time progressed, both saw the importance of liquidity with respect to the problems at the large investment banks.” In fact, both problems had to be resolved. Bear’s demise had precipitated Lehman’s “first real financing difficulties” since the liquidity crisis began in , Lehman Treasurer Paolo Tonucci told the FCIC. Over the two weeks following Bear’s collapse, Lehman borrowed from the Fed’s new lending facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), but had to be careful to avoid seeming overreliant on the PDCF for cash, which would signal funding problems. Lehman built up its liquidity to billion at the end of May, but it and Merrill performed the worst among the four investment banks in the regulators’ liquidity stress tests in the spring and summer of . Meanwhile, the company was also working to improve its capital position. First, it reduced real estate exposures (again, excluding real estate held for sale) from billion to billion at the end of May and to billion at the end of the summer. Second, it raised new capital and longer-term debt—a total of . billion of preferred stock and senior and subordinated debt from April through June . Treasury Undersecretary Robert Steel praised Lehman’s efforts, publicly stating that it was “addressing the issues.” But other difficulties loomed. Fuld would later describe Lehman’s main problem as one of market confidence, and he suggested that the company’s image was damaged by investors taking “naked short” positions (short selling Lehman’s securities without first borrowing them), hoping Lehman would fail, and potentially even helping it fail by eroding confidence. “Bear went down on rumors and a liquidity crisis of confidence,” Fuld told the FCIC. “Immediately there-
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after, the rumors and the naked short sellers came after us.” The company pressed the SEC to clamp down on the naked short selling. The SEC’s Division of Risk, Strategy and Financial Innovation shared with the FCIC a study it did concerning short selling. As Chairman Mary Schapiro explained to the Commission, “We do not have information at this time that manipulative short selling was the cause of the collapse of Bear and Lehman or of the difficulties faced by other investment banks during the fall of .” The SEC to date has not brought short selling charges related to the failure of these investment banks. On March , Lehman reported better-than-expected earnings of million for the first quarter of . Its stock jumped nearly , to .. But investors and analysts quickly raised questions, especially concerning the reported value of Lehman’s real estate assets. Portfolio.com called Lehman’s write-downs “suspiciously minuscule.” In a speech in May, David Einhorn of Greenlight Capital, which was then shorting Lehman’s stock, noted the bank’s large portfolio of commercial real estate loans and said, “There is good reason to question Lehman’s fair value calculations. . . . I suspect that greater transparency on these valuations would not inspire market confidence.” Nell Minow, editor and co-founder of the Corporate Library, which researches and rates firms on corporate governance, raised other reasons that observers might have been skeptical of management at Lehman. “On Lehman Brothers’ [board], . . . they had an actress, a theatrical producer, and an admiral, and not one person who understood financial derivatives.” The Corporate Library gave Lehman a D rating in June , a grade it downgraded to F in September . On June , Lehman announced a preliminary . billion loss for its second quarter—the first loss since it became a public company in . The share price fell to . Three days later Lehman announced it was replacing Chief Operating Officer Joseph Gregory and Chief Financial Officer Erin Callan. The stock slumped again, to ..
“THIS IS NOT SOUNDING GOOD AT ALL” After Lehman reported its final second-quarter results on June , the New York Fed’s on-site monitor at Lehman, Kirsten Harlow, reported that there had been “no adverse information on liquidity, novations, terminations or ability to fund either secured or unsecured [funds].” The announced liquidity numbers were better that quarter, as were the capital numbers. Nevertheless, Lehman’s lenders and supervisors were worried. The next morning, William Dudley, then head of the New York Fed’s Markets Group (and its current president), emailed Bernanke, Geithner, Kohn, and others that the PDCF should be extended because it “remains critical to the stability” of some of the investment banks—particularly Lehman. “I think without the PDCF, Lehman might have experienced a full blown liquidity crisis,” he wrote. Just one week after the earnings release, Harlow reported that Lehman was indeed having funding difficulties. Four financial institutions had “trading issues” with Lehman and had reduced their exposure to the firm, including Natixis, a
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French investment bank that had already eliminated all activity with Lehman. JP Morgan reported that large pension funds and some smaller Asian central banks were reducing their exposures to Lehman, as well as to Merrill Lynch. And Citigroup requested a to billion “comfort deposit” to cover its exposure to Lehman, settling later for billion. In an internal memo, Thomas Fontana, the head of risk management in Citigroup’s global financial institutions group, wrote that “loss of confidence [in Lehman] is huge at the moment.” Timothy Clark, senior adviser in the Federal Reserve’s banking supervision and regulation division, was short and direct: “This is not sounding good at all.” On June , results from the regulators’ most recent stress test showed that Lehman would need billion more than the billion in its liquidity pool to survive a loss of all unsecured borrowings and varying amounts of secured borrowings. Lehman’s borrowings in the overnight commercial paper market were increasing, however, from billion at the end of November to billion at the end of May . And it was reliant on repo funding, particularly the portions that matured overnight and were collateralized by illiquid assets. As of mid-June, of Lehman’s liquidity was dependent on borrowing against nontraditional securities, such as illiquid mortgage-related securities—which could not be financed with the PDCF and of which investors were becoming increasingly wary. On July , Federated Investors—a large money market fund and one of Lehman’s largest tri-party repo lenders—notified JP Morgan, Lehman’s clearing bank, that Federated would “no longer pursue additional business with Lehman,” because JP Morgan was “unwilling to negotiate in good faith” and had “become increasingly uncooperative” on repo terms. Dreyfus, another large money market fund and a Lehman tri-party repo lender, also pulled its repo line from the firm.
“SPOOK THE MARKET” As the Fed considered the risks of the tri-party repo market, it also mulled over more specific measures to help Lehman. The New York Fed and FDIC both rejected the company’s proposal to convert to a bank holding company, a proposal which Geithner told Fuld was “gimmicky” and “[could not] solve a liquidity/capital problem.” A proposal by the Fed’s Dudley followed the Bear Stearns model: billion of Lehman’s assets would be held by a new special-purpose vehicle, financed by billion of Lehman’s equity and a billion loan from the Fed. This proposal would remove the illiquid assets from the market and potentially avert a fire sale that could render Lehman insolvent. It didn’t go anywhere. But when that idea was floated in July, the need for such action was still somewhat speculative. Not so by August. In an August email to colleagues at the Federal Reserve and Treasury, Patrick Parkinson, then the deputy director of the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of Research and Statistics, described a “game plan” that would () identify activities of Lehman that could significantly harm financial markets and the economy if it filed for chapter bankruptcy protection, () gather information
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to more accurately assess the potential effects of its failure, and () identify risk mitigation actions for areas of serious potential harm. As they now realized, regulators did not know nearly enough about over-thecounter derivatives activities at Lehman and other investment banks, which were major OTC derivatives dealers. Investment banks disclosed the total number of OTC derivative contracts they had, the total exposures of the contracts, and their estimated market value, but they did not publicly report the terms of the contracts or the counterparties. Thus, there was no way to know who would be owed how much and when payments would have to be made—information that would be critically important to analyze the possible impact of a Lehman bankruptcy on derivatives counterparties and the financial markets. Parkinson reviewed a standing recommendation to form a “default management group” of senior executives of major market participants to work with regulators to anticipate issues if a major counterparty should default. The recommendation was from the private-sector Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, the same group that had alerted the Fed to the backlog problem in the OTC derivatives market earlier in the decade. Parkinson suggested accelerating the formation of this group while being careful not to signal concerns about any one market participant. On August , Parkinson emailed New York Fed officials that he was worried that no sensible game plan could be formulated without more information. He was informed that New York Fed officials had just met with Lehman two days earlier to obtain derivative-related information, that they still needed more information, and that the meeting had “caused a stir,” which in turn required assurances that requests for information would not be limited to Lehman. New York Fed officials were also “very reluctant” to request copies of the master agreements that would shed light on the Lehman’s derivatives counterparties, because such a request would send a “huge negative signal.” The formation of the industry group seemed “less provocative,” wrote a New York Fed official, but could still “spook the market.” Parkinson believed that the information was important, but attempting to collect it was “not without risks.” He also recognized the difficulties in unraveling the complex dependencies among the many Lehman subsidiaries and their counterparties, which would keep lawyers and accountants busy for a long time. On August , Treasury’s Steve Shafran informed Parkinson that Secretary Paulson agreed on the need to collect information on OTC derivatives. It just had to be done in a way that minimized disruptions. On September , Parkinson circulated a draft letter requesting the information from Lehman CEO Fuld. Geithner would ask E. Gerald Corrigan, the Goldman Sachs executive and former New York Fed president who had co-chaired the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group report, to form an industry group to advise on information needed from a troubled investment bank. Parkinson, Shafran, and others would also create a “playbook” for an investment bank failure at Secretary Paulson’s request. Events over the following week would render these efforts moot.
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On September , executives from Lehman Brothers apprised executives at JP Morgan, Lehman’s tri-party repo clearing bank, of the third-quarter results that it would announce two weeks later. A . billion loss would reflect “significant asset write-downs.” The firm was also considering several steps to bolster capital, including an investment by Korea Development Bank or others, the sale of Lehman’s investment management division (Neuberger Berman), the sale of real estate assets, and the division of the company into a “good bank” and “bad bank” with private equity sponsors. The executives also discussed JP Morgan’s concerns about Lehman’s repo collateral. On Monday, September , more than New York Fed officials were notified of a meeting the next morning “to continue the discussion of near-term options for dealing with a failing nonbank.” They received a list documenting Lehman’s tri-party repo exposure at roughly billion. Before its collapse, Bear Stearns’s exposure had been only to billion. The documentation further noted that counterparties provided of Lehman’s repo financing, and that intraday liquidity provided by Lehman’s clearing banks could become a problem. Indeed, JP Morgan, Citigroup, and Bank of America had all demanded more collateral from Lehman, with the threat they might “cut off Lehman if they don’t receive it.” On Tuesday morning, September , news there would be no investment from Korea Development Bank shook the market. Lehman’s stock plunged from the day before, closing at .. To prepare for an afternoon call with Bernanke, Geithner directed his staff to “put together a quick ‘what’s different? what’s the same?’ list about [Lehman] vs [Bear Stearns], as well as about mid-March (then) vs. early Sept (now).” The Fed’s Parkinson emailed Treasury’s Shafran about his concerns that Lehman would announce further losses the next week, that it might not be able to raise equity, and that even though its liquidity position was better than Bear Stearns’s had been, Lehman remained vulnerable to a loss of confidence. At : P.M., Paulson convened a call with Cox, Geithner, Bernanke, and Treasury staff “to deal with a possible Lehman bankruptcy.” At : P.M., Treasury Chief of Staff Jim Wilkinson emailed Michelle Davis, the assistant secretary for public affairs at Treasury, to express his distaste for government assistance: “We need to talk. . . . I just can’t stomach us bailing out lehman. . . . Will be horrible in the press don’t u think.” That same day, Fuld agreed to post an additional . billion of collateral to JP Morgan. Lehman’s bankruptcy estate would later claim that Lehman did so because of JP Morgan’s improper threat to withhold repo funding. Zubrow said JP Morgan requested the collateral because of its growing exposure as a derivatives trading counterparty to Lehman. Steven Black, JP Morgan’s president, said he requested billion from Lehman, which agreed to post . billion. He did not believe the request put undue pressure on Lehman. On Tuesday night, executives of Lehman and JP Morgan met again at Lehman’s request to discuss options for raising capital. The JP Morgan group was not impressed. “[Lehman] sent the Junior Varsity,” JP Morgan executives reported to Black. “They have no proposal and are looking to us for ideas/credit line to bridge them to the first quarter when they intend to split into good bank/bad bank.” Black responded, “Let’s give them an order for the same drugs
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they have apparently been taking to think we would do something like that.” The Lehman bankruptcy estate has a different view. It alleges Black agreed to send a due diligence team, following Dimon’s suggestion that his firm might be willing to purchase Lehman preferred stock, but instead sent over senior risk managers to probe Lehman’s confidential records and plans. The bankruptcy estate alleges that later that night, JP Morgan demanded that Lehman execute amended agreements to its tri-party repo services before preannouncing its third-quarter earnings at : the next morning. The amendments required Lehman to provide additional guarantees, increased Lehman’s potential liability, and gave JP Morgan additional control over Lehman bank accounts. Again, the Lehman bankruptcy estate argues that Lehman executed the agreements because JP Morgan executives led Lehman to believe its bank would refuse to extend intraday credit if Lehman did not do so. JP Morgan denies this. Black told the FCIC, “JPMC never told Lehman that it would stop extending credit and clearing if the September Agreements were not executed before the markets opened on [Wednesday,] September , .” Before the market opened on Wednesday, Lehman announced its . billion third-quarter loss, including a . billion write-down. Four hours later, Matthew Rutherford, an adviser to Treasury, emailed colleagues that several large money funds had reduced their exposure to Lehman, although there was not yet “a wholesale pull back of [repo] lines.” “Importantly, Fidelity, the largest fund complex, stressed that while they hadn’t made any significant shifts yet today, they were still in the process of making decisions and wanted to update me later in the day,” Rutherford wrote. By Friday, Fidelity would have reduced its tri-party repo lending to Lehman to less than billion from over billion the previous Friday; according to Fidelity’s response to an FCIC survey of market participants, in the week prior to Bear’s demise in March, Fidelity had pulled its entire . billion repo line to that company.
“IMAGINATION HAT” At the Federal Reserve, working groups were directed to “spend the next few hours fleshing out how a Fed-assisted BofA acquisition transaction might look, how a private consortium of preferred equity investors transaction might look, and how a Fed takeout of tri-party repo lenders would look.” That day, New York Fed Senior Vice President Patricia Mosser circulated her opinion on Dudley’s request for “thoughts on how to resolve Lehman.” She laid out three options: () find a buyer at any price, () wind down Lehman’s affairs, or () force it into bankruptcy. Regarding option , Mosser said it “should be done in a way that requires minimal temporary support. . . . No more Maiden Lane LLCs and no equity position by [the] Fed. Moral hazard and reputation cost is too high. If the Fed agrees to another equity investment, it signals that everything [the Fed] did in March in terms of temporary liquidity backstops is useless. Horrible precedent; in the long run MUCH worse than option .” Option , bankruptcy, would be “[a] mess on every level, but fixes the moral hazard problem.”
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On Wednesday night, a New York Fed official circulated a “Liquidation Consortium” game plan to colleagues. The plan was to convene in one room senior-level representatives of Lehman’s counterparties in the tri-party repo, credit default swap, and over-the-counter derivatives markets—everyone who would suffer most if Lehman failed—and have them explore joint funding mechanisms to avert a failure. According to the proposed game plan, Secretary Paulson would tell the participants they had until the opening of business in Asia the following Monday morning (Sunday night, New York time) to devise a credible plan. The game plan stated that “we should have in mind a maximum number of how much we are willing to finance before the meeting starts, but not divulge our willingness to do so to the consortium.” Indeed, Paulson would tell the consortium when it met two days later that the government was willing to let Lehman fail. Former Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis told the FCIC that Treasury Secretary Paulson had called him on Wednesday, September , and asked him to take another look at acquiring Lehman, assuring him that Fuld was ready to deal. Paulson and Geithner had arranged for Fuld and Lewis to discuss an acquisition in July, but Fuld had not been interested in selling the entire firm at that time. Because of this history, Lewis expressed his concerns to Paulson that Fuld would not want to sell the entire company or would not be willing to sell at a realistic price. Still, a team of Bank of America executives began reviewing Lehman’s books, and on the next day, Fuld sounded optimistic about a deal. But Bank of America determined that Lehman’s assets were overvalued, and Lewis told Paulson there would be no deal without government assistance. Undeterred, Paulson told Lewis—as Lewis informed the FCIC—to put on his “imagination hat” and figure out a deal. His insistence kept the Bank of America executives working, but on Friday, September , Lewis called Paulson to repeat his assessment—no government support, no deal. Apparently Fuld had been kept out of the loop, and began to call Lewis at home. Lewis’s wife told Fuld that Lewis would not come to the phone and to stop calling. On Thursday September , an email time-stamped : A.M. from Susan McCabe, a Goldman Sachs executive, to Dudley and others set the tone for the day: “It is not pretty, This is getting pretty scary and ugly again. . . . They [Lehman] have much bigger counter-party risk than Bear did, especially in Derivatives market, so [t]he market is getting very spooked, nervous. Also have Aig, Wamu concerns. This is just spinning out of control again. Just fyi, this is shaping up as going to be a rough day.” Bernanke was informed that if Lehman failed, “it would be a much more complex proposition to unwind their positions than it would have been to unwind the positions held by Bear Stearns,” because Lehman was “nearly twice the size of Bear Stearns.” Some believed government action was required. At : A.M., Hayley Boesky, a senior New York Fed official, forwarded to her colleagues an email from the hedge fund manager Louis Bacon suggesting the New York Fed could “attempt to stabilize or support the LEH situation” but noting that “none of the above will fix the fundamental problem, which is too many bad assets that need to get off too many balance sheets.”
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At : P.M., Fed officials circulated the outline of a plan to create a “Lehman Default Management Group,” a group of Lehman counterparties and creditors who would make plans to cope with a Lehman bankruptcy. They would agree to hold off on fully exercising their rights to close out their trades with Lehman; instead, they would establish a process to “net down”—that is, reduce—all exposures using a common valuation method. A little before midnight on Thursday, Boesky notified colleagues that panicked hedge funds had called to say they were “expecting [a] full blown recession” and that there was a “full expectation that Leh goes, wamu and then ML [Merrill Lynch].” They were “ALL begging, pleading for a large scale solution which spans beyond just LEH.” Boesky compared the level of panic to the failure of Bear Stearns—“On a scale of to , where is Bear-Stearns-week-panic, I would put sentiment today at a .” At almost the same time, JP Morgan demanded that Lehman post another billion in cash “by the opening of business tomorrow in New York”; if it didn’t, JP Morgan would “exercise our right to decline to extend credit to you.” JP Morgan CEO Dimon, President Black, and CRO Zubrow had first made the demand in a phone call earlier that evening to Lehman CEO Fuld, CFO Ian Lowitt, and Treasurer Paolo Tonucci. Tonucci told the JP Morgan executives on the call that Lehman could not meet the demand. Dimon said Lehman’s difficulties in coming up with the money were not JP Morgan’s problem, Tonucci told the FCIC. “They just wanted the cash. We made the point that it’s too much cash to mobilize. There was no give on that. Again, they said ‘that’s not our problem, we just want the cash.’” When Tonucci asked what would keep JP Morgan from asking for billion tomorrow, Dimon replied, “Nothing, maybe we will.” Under normal circumstances, Tonucci would not have tolerated this treatment, but circumstances were far from normal. “JPM as ‘clearing bank’ continues to ask for more cash collateral. If we don’t provide the cash, they refuse to clear, we fail,” was the message circulated in an email to Lehman executives on Friday, September . So Lehman “delivered the billion in cash only by pulling virtually every unencumbered asset it could deliver.” JP Morgan’s Zubrow saw it differently. He told the FCIC that the previously posted . billion of collateral by Lehman was “inappropriate” because it was “illiquid” and “could not be reasonably valued.” Moreover, Zubrow said the potential collateral shortfall was greater than billion. Lehman’s former CEO, Fuld, told the FCIC that he agreed to post the billion because JP Morgan said it would be returned to Lehman at the close of business the following day. The Lehman bankruptcy estate made the same allegation. This dispute is now the subject of litigation; the Lehman bankruptcy estate is suing JP Morgan to retrieve the billion—and the original . billion.
“HEADS OF FAMILY” Should Lehman be allowed to go bankrupt? Within the government, sentiments varied. On Friday morning, as Secretary Paulson headed to New York to “sort through
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this Lehman mess,” Wilkinson wrote that he still “[couldn’t] imagine a scenario where we put in [government] money . . . we shall see.” That afternoon, Fed Governor Warsh wrote, in response to a colleague’s hope the Fed would not have to protect some of Lehman’s debt holders, “I hope we don[’]t protect anything!” But on Friday, Fed Chairman Bernanke was taking no chances. He stayed behind in Washington, in case he had to convene the Fed’s board to exercise its emergency lending powers. Early Friday evening, Treasury Secretary Paulson summoned the “heads of family”—the phrase used by Harvey Miller, Lehman’s bankruptcy counsel, to describe the CEOs of the big Wall Street firms—to the New York Fed’s headquarters. Paulson told them that a private-sector solution was the only option to prevent a Lehman bankruptcy. The people in the room needed to come up with a realistic set of options to help limit damage to the system. A sudden and disorderly wind-down could harm the capital markets and pose the significant risk of a precipitous drop in asset prices, resulting in collateral calls and reduced liquidity: that is, systemic risk. He could not offer the prospect of containing the damage if the executives were unable to fashion an orderly resolution of the situation, as had been done in for Long-Term Capital Management. Paulson did offer the Fed’s help through regulatory approvals and access to lending facilities, but emphasized that the Fed would not provide “any form of extraordinary credit support.” As New York Fed General Counsel Tom Baxter told the FCIC, Paulson made it clear there would be no government assistance, “not a penny.” H. Rodgin Cohen, a veteran Wall Street lawyer who has represented most of the major banks, including Lehman, told the FCIC that the government’s “not a penny” posture was a calculated strategy: “I don’t know exactly what the government was thinking, but my impression was they were playing a game of chicken or poker or whatever. It was said on more than one occasion that it would be very politically difficult to rescue Lehman. There had been a lot of blowback after Bear Stearns. I believe the government thought that it could, with respect to a game of chicken, persuade the private sector to take a big chunk” of Lehman’s liabilities. The Fed’s internal liquidation consortium game plan would seem to confirm Cohen’s view, given that it contemplated a financial commitment, even though that was not to be divulged. Moreover, notwithstanding Paulson’s “not a penny” statement, the United Kingdom’s chancellor of the exchequer, Alistair Darling, said that Paulson told him that “the FRBNY might be prepared to provide Barclays with regulatory assistance to support a transaction if it was required.” At that consortium meeting on Friday night, Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit asked if the group was also going to talk about AIG. Timothy Geithner said simply: “Let’s focus on Lehman.”
“TELL THOSE SONS OF BITCHES TO UNWIND” What would happen if JP Morgan refused to provide intraday credit for Lehman in the tri-party repo market on Monday, September ? The Fed had been considering this possibility since the summer. As Parkinson noted, the fundamental problem was that even if Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the SEC would want Lehman’s broker-
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dealer to live on and would not want the Fed in its position as lender to grab tri-party collateral. Parkinson told the FCIC staff that Zubrow informed him over the weekend that JP Morgan would not unwind Lehman’s repos on Monday if the Fed did not expand the types of collateral that could be financed through the PDCF lending facility. Earlier in the year, Parkinson had said that JP Morgan’s refusal to unwind would be unforgiveable. Now he told Geithner to “tell those sons of bitches . . . to unwind.” Merrill CEO John Thain told the FCIC that by Saturday morning, the group of executives reviewing Lehman’s assets had estimated that they were overvalued by anywhere from to billion. Thain thought that was more than the assembled executives would be willing to finance and, therefore, Thain believed Lehman would fail. If Lehman failed, Thain believed, Merrill would be next. So he had called Ken Lewis, the CEO of Bank of America, and they met later that day at Bank of America’s New York corporate apartment. By Sunday, the two agreed that Bank of America would acquire Merrill for per share, payable in Bank of America stock. On Saturday afternoon, Lehman’s counsel provided the Fed with a document describing how Lehman’s default on its obligations would “trigger a cascade of defaults through to the [subsidiaries] which have large OTC [derivatives] books.” Bernanke, Fed Governor Kohn, Geithner, and other senior Fed officials subsequently participated in a conference call to discuss the possibility of going “to Congress to ask for other authorities,” something Geithner planned to “pitch.” However, Fed General Counsel Scott Alvarez cautioned others not to mention the plan to JP Morgan, because he did not want to “suggest Fed willingness to give JPMC cover to screw [Lehman] or anyone else.” By Saturday night, however, it appeared that the parade of horrors that would result from a Lehman bankruptcy had been avoided. An agreement apparently had been reached. Barclays would purchase Lehman, excluding to billion of assets financed by the private consortium (even though the bankers in the consortium had estimated those assets to be significantly overvalued). Michael Klein, an adviser to Barclays, had told Lehman President Bart McDade that Barclays was willing to purchase Lehman, given the private consortium agreement to assist the deal. It seemed a deal would be completed.
“THIS DOESN’T SEEM LIKE IT IS GOING TO END PRETTY” But on Sunday, things went terribly wrong. At : A.M., Barclays CEO John Varley and President Robert Diamond told Paulson, Geithner, and Cox that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) had declined to approve the deal. The issue boiled down to a guarantee—the New York Fed required Barclays to guarantee Lehman’s obligations from the sale until the transaction closed, much as JP Morgan had done for Bear Stearns in March. Under U.K. law, the guarantee required a Barclays shareholder vote, which could take to days. Though it could waive that requirement, the FSA asserted that such a waiver would be unprecedented, that it had not heard about this guarantee until Saturday night, and that Barclays did not really want to take on that obligation anyway.
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Geithner pleaded with FSA Chairman Callum McCarthy to waive the shareholder vote, but McCarthy wanted the New York Fed to provide the guarantee instead of Barclays. Otherwise, according to the FSA, “Barclays would have had to provide a (possibly unlimited) guarantee, for an undefined period of time, covering prior and future exposures and liabilities of Lehman that would continue to apply including in respect of all transactions entered into prior to the purchase, even in the event the transaction ultimately failed.” For Paulson, such a guarantee by the Fed was unequivocally out of the question. The guarantee could have put the Fed on the hook for tens of billions of dollars. If the run on Lehman had continued despite the guarantee, Barclays’ shareholders could reject the acquisition, and the Fed would be in possession of an insolvent bank. Baxter told the FCIC that Barclays had known all along that the guarantee was required, because JP Morgan had to provide the same type of guarantee when it acquired Bear Stearns. Indeed, Baxter said he was “stunned” at this development. He believed that the real reason Barclays said it could not guarantee Lehman’s obligations was the U.K. government’s discomfort with the transaction. On Sunday morning, Treasury’s Wilkinson emailed JP Morgan Investment Bank CEO Jes Staley that he was in a meeting with Paulson and Geithner and that things did not look good. He concluded, “This doesn’t seem like it is going to end pretty.” In another note a little more than an hour later, he added that there would be no government assistance: “No way [government] money is coming in. . . . I’m here writing the usg coms [United States government communications] plan for orderly unwind . . . also just did a call with the WH [White House] and usg is united behind no money. No way in hell Paulson could blink now . . . we will know more after this [CEO meeting] this morning but I think we are headed for winddown unless barclays deal gets untangled.” It did not. Paulson made a last-ditch pitch to his U.K. counterpart, Darling, without success. Two years later, Darling admitted that he had vetoed the transaction: “Yeah I did. Imagine if I had said yes to a British bank buying a very large American bank which . . . collapsed the following week.” He would have found himself telling a British audience, “Everybody sitting in this room and your children and your grandchildren and their grandchildren would be paying for years to come.” That Bank of America had taken itself out of the picture may have played a role in Darling’s decision: “My first reaction was ‘If this is such a good deal how come no American bank is going to go near it?’” So Darling concluded that for Barclays to accept the guarantee, which could have a grave impact on the British economy, was simply out of the question: “I spoke to Hank Paulson and said ‘Look, there’s no way we could allow a British bank to take over the liability of an American bank,’ which in effect meant the British taxpayer was underwriting an American bank.” Following that decision in London, Lehman Brothers was, for all practical purposes, dead. Cohen, Lehman’s counsel at the time, told the FCIC, “When Secretary Paulson came out of the meeting with Geithner and Cox, they called Lehman’s presi-
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dent and me over and said, ‘We have the consortium, but the British government won’t do it. Darling said he did not want the U.S. cancer to spread to the U.K.’” At around : P.M., Lehman’s team—President Bart McDade, CFO Ian Lowitt, Head of Principal Investing Alex Kirk, and others—reconvened at Lehman’s offices to “digest what obviously was stark news.” Upon arriving, they heard that the New York Fed would provide more flexible terms for the PDCF lending facility, which would include expanding the types of collateral borrowers could use. McDade, Kirk, Lowitt, and Miller returned to the New York Fed building and met with the Fed’s Baxter and Dudley, the SEC’s Sirri, and others to discuss the expanded PDCF program. According to McDade and Kirk, the government officials—led by Baxter— made it plain they would not permit Lehman to borrow against the expanded types of collateral, as other firms could. The sentiment was clear but the reasons were vague, McDade told the FCIC. He said the refusal to allow Lehman to provide the expanded types of collateral made the difference in Lehman’s being able to obtain the funding needed to open for business on Monday. Baxter explained to the FCIC, however, that Lehman’s broker-dealer affiliate—not the holding company—could borrow against the expanded types of collateral. A New York Fed email written at : P.M. on that Sunday, September , stated that Lehman’s counsel was informed of the expansion of PDCF-eligible collateral but that such collateral would not be available to the broker-dealer if it filed for bankruptcy. The minutes of Lehman’s September board meeting show that the Fed rejected Lehman’s request for an even broader range of collateral to be eligible for PDCF financing and preferred that Lehman’s holding company—but not the broker-dealer— file for bankruptcy and that the broker-dealer “be wound down in an orderly fashion.” In a letter dated September , the New York Fed informed Lehman Senior Vice President Robert Guglielmo that the broker-dealer could finance expanded types of collateral with the PDCF, but that letter was not sent until : A.M. on September —after Lehman had filed for bankruptcy. The Lehman broker-dealer borrowed to billion from the PDCF each day over the next three days. As Kirk recounted to the FCIC, during that Sunday meeting at the New York Fed, government officials stepped out for an hour and came back to ask: “Are you planning on filing bankruptcy tonight?” A surprised Miller replied that “no one in the room was authorized to file the company, only the Board could . . . and the Board had to be called to a meeting and have a vote. . . . There would be some lag in terms of having to put all the papers together to actually file it. There was a practical issue that you couldn’t . . . get it done quickly.” Unmoved, government officials explained that directors of Lehman’s U.K. subsidiary—LBIE—would be personally liable if they did not file for bankruptcy by the opening of business Monday. As Kirk recalled, “They then told us ‘we would like you to file tonight. . . . It’s the right thing to do, because there’s something else which we can’t tell you that will happen this evening. We would like both events to happen tonight before the opening of trading Monday morning.’” The second event would turn out to be the announcement of Bank of America’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch.
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“THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WAS THAT LEHMAN HAD TO FAIL” Miller insisted that there had to be an alternative, because filing for bankruptcy would be “Armageddon.” Lehman had prepared a presentation arguing that a Lehman bankruptcy would be catastrophic. It would take at least five years to resolve, cost to billion, and cause major disruptions in the United States and abroad. Baxter told the FCIC, “I knew that the consequences were going to be bad; that wasn’t an issue. Lehman was in denial at that point in time. There was no way they believed that this story ends with a Lehman bankruptcy . . . they kept thinking that they were going to be bailed out by the taxpayer of the United States. And I’m not trying to convince you that that belief was a crazy belief because they had seen that happen in the Bear case.” Baxter’s mission, however, was to “try to get them to understand that they weren’t going to be rescued, and then focus on what their real options were, which were drift into Monday morning with nothing done and then have chaos break out, or alternatively file.” He concluded, “From my point of view, first thing was to convince Harvey that it was far better to file than to go into Monday and have complete pandemonium break out. And then he had to have discussions with the Lehman Board because they had a fiduciary duty to resolve what was in the best interests of the company and its shareholders and other stakeholders.” “The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail,” Miller testified to the FCIC. He stated that Baxter provided no further details on the government’s plan for the fallout from bankruptcy, but assured him that the situation was under control. Then, Miller told the FCIC, Baxter told the Lehman delegation to leave the Fed offices. “They basically threw us out,” Miller said. Miller remembered telling his colleagues as they left the building, “‘I don’t think they like us.’” Miller continued: We went back to the headquarters, and it was pandemonium up there— it was like a scene from [the film] It’s a Wonderful Life with the run on the savings and loan crisis. . . . [A]ll of paparazzi running around. There was a guy there . . . in a sort of a Norse god uniform with a helmet and a picket sign saying “Down with Wall Street.” . . . There were hundreds of employees going in and out. . . . Bart McDade was reporting to the board what had happened. Most of the board members were stunned. Henry Kaufman, in particular, was asking “How could this happen in America?” The group informed the board that the Barclays deal had fallen apart. The government had instructed the board to file for bankruptcy. SEC’s Cox called. With Tom Baxter also on the line, Cox told the board that the situation was serious and required action. The board asked Cox if he was directing them to file for bankruptcy. Cox and Baxter conferred for a few minutes, and then answered that the decision was the board’s to make. The board again asked if Cox and Baxter were telling them to file for bankruptcy. Cox and Baxter conferred again, then replied that they believed the gov-
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ernment’s position had been made perfectly clear at the meeting at the Fed earlier in the day. Following that call, McDade advised the board that Lehman would be unable to obtain funding without government assistance. The board voted to file for bankruptcy. The company filed at : A.M. on Monday morning.
“A CALAMITY” Fed Chairman Bernanke told the FCIC that government officials understood a Lehman bankruptcy would be catastrophic: We never had any doubt about that. It was going to have huge impacts on funding markets. It would create a huge loss of confidence in other financial firms. It would create pressure on Merrill and Morgan Stanley, if not Goldman, which it eventually did. It would probably bring the short-term money markets into crisis, which we didn’t fully anticipate; but, of course, in the end it did bring the commercial paper market and the money market mutual funds under pressure. So there was never any doubt in our minds that it would be a calamity, catastrophe, and that, you know, we should do everything we could to save it. “What’s the connection between Lehman Brothers and General Motors?” he asked rhetorically. “Lehman Brothers’ failure meant that commercial paper that they used to finance went bad.” Bernanke noted that money market funds, in particular one named the Reserve Primary Fund, held Lehman’s paper and suffered losses. He explained that this “meant there was a run in the money market mutual funds, which meant the commercial paper market spiked, which [created] problems for General Motors.” “As the financial industry came under stress,” Paulson told the FCIC, “investors pulled back from the market, and when Lehman collapsed, even major industrial corporations found it difficult to sell their paper. The resulting liquidity crunch showed that firms had overly relied on this short term funding and had failed to anticipate how restricted the commercial paper market could become in times of stress.” Harvey Miller testified to the FCIC that “the bankruptcy of Lehman was a catalyst for systemic consequences throughout the world. It fostered a negative reaction that endangered the viability of the financial system. As a result of failed expectations of the financial markets and others, a major loss of confidence in the financial system occurred.” On the day that Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the Dow plummeted more than points; billion in value from retirement plans, government pension funds, and other investment portfolios disappeared. As for Lehman itself, the bankruptcy affected about , subsidiaries and affiliates with billion in assets and liabilities, the firm’s more than , creditors, and about , employees. Its failure triggered default clauses in derivatives contracts,
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allowing its counterparties to have the option of seizing its collateral and terminating the contracts. After the parent company filed, about insolvency proceedings of its subsidiaries in foreign countries followed. In the main bankruptcy proceeding, about , claims—exceeding billion—have been filed against Lehman as of September . Miller told the FCIC that Lehman’s bankruptcy “represents the largest, most complex, multi-faceted and far-reaching bankruptcy case ever filed in the United States.” The costs of the bankruptcy administration are approaching billion; as of this writing, the proceeding is expected to last at least another two years. In his testimony before the FCIC, Bernanke admitted that the considerations behind the government’s decision to allow Lehman to fail were both legal and practical. From a legal standpoint, Bernanke explained, “We are not allowed to lend without a reasonable expectation of repayment. The loan has to be secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank. Remember, this was before TARP. We had no ability to inject capital or to make guarantees.” A Sunday afternoon email from Bernanke to Fed Governor Warsh indicated that more than billion in capital assistance would have been needed to prevent Lehman’s failure. “In case I am asked: How much capital injection would have been needed to keep LEH alive as a going concern? I gather B or so from the private guys together with Fed liquidity support was not enough.” In March, the Fed had provided a loan to facilitate JP Morgan’s purchase of Bear Stearns, invoking its authority under section () of the Federal Reserve Act. But, even with this authority, practical considerations were in play. Bernanke explained that Lehman had insufficient collateral and the Fed, had it acted, would have lent into a run: “On Sunday night of that weekend, what was told to me was that—and I have every reason to believe—was that there was a run proceeding on Lehman, that is people were essentially demanding liquidity from Lehman; that Lehman did not have enough collateral to allow the Fed to lend it enough to meet that run.” Thus, “If we lent the money to Lehman, all that would happen would be that the run [on Lehman] would succeed, because it wouldn’t be able to meet the demands, the firm would fail, and not only would we be unsuccessful but we would [have] saddled the [t]axpayer with tens of billions of dollars of losses.” The Fed had no choice but to stand by as Lehman went under, Bernanke insisted. As Bernanke acknowledged to the FCIC, however, his explanation for not providing assistance to Lehman was not the explanation he offered days after the bankruptcy—at that time, he said that he believed the market was prepared for the event. On September , , he testified: “The failure of Lehman posed risks. But the troubles at Lehman had been well known for some time, and investors clearly recognized—as evidenced, for example, by the high cost of insuring Lehman’s debt in the market for credit default swaps—that the failure of the firm was a significant possibility. Thus, we judged that investors and counterparties had had time to take precautionary measures.” In addition, though the Federal Reserve subsequently asserted that it did not have the legal ability to save Lehman because the firm did not have sufficient collateral to secure a loan from the Fed under section (), the authority to lend under that provision is very broad. It requires not that loans be fully secured but rather that they be “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve
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bank.” Indeed, in March , Federal Reserve General Counsel Scott Alvarez concluded that requiring loans under () to be fully secured would “undermine the very purpose of section (), which was to make credit available in unusual and exigent circumstances to help restore economic activity.” To CEO Fuld and others, the Fed’s emergency lending powers under section () provided a permissible vehicle to obtain government support. Although Fed officials discussed and dismissed many ideas in the chaotic days leading up to the bankruptcy, the Fed did not furnish to the FCIC any written analysis to illustrate that Lehman lacked sufficient collateral to secure a loan under (). Fuld asserted to the FCIC that in fact, “Lehman had adequate financeable collateral. . . . [O]n September , the Friday night preceding Lehman’s bankruptcy filing, Lehman financed itself and did not need access to the Fed’s discount window. . . . What Lehman needed on that Sunday night was a liquidity bridge. We had the capital. Along with its excess available collateral, Lehman also could have used whole businesses as collateral—such as its Neuberger Berman subsidiary—as did AIG some two days later.” Fuld also rejected assertions about Lehman’s capital hole. He told the FCIC, “As of August , , two weeks prior to the bankruptcy filing, Lehman had . . . . billion in equity capital. Positive equity of . billion is very different from the negative or billion ‘holes’ claimed by some.” Moreover, Fuld maintained that Lehman would have been saved if it had been granted bank holding company status—as were Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley the week after Lehman’s bankruptcy. The Fed chairman denied any bias against Lehman Brothers. In his view, the only real resolution short of bankruptcy had been to find a buyer. Bernanke said: “When the potential buyers were unable to carry through—in the case of Bank of America, because they changed their minds and decided they wanted to buy Merrill instead; in the case of Barclays, [because they withdrew] . . . we essentially had no choice and had to let it fail.” During the September , , meeting of the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee, some members stated that the government should not have prevented Lehman’s failure because doing so would only strengthen the perception that some firms were “too big to fail” and erode market discipline. They noted that letting Lehman fail was the only way to provide credibility to the assertion that no firm was “too big to fail” and one member stated that the market was beginning to “play” the Treasury and Federal Reserve. Other meeting participants believed that the disorderly failure of a key firm could have a broad and disruptive effect on financial markets and the economy, but that the appropriate solution was capital injections, a power the Federal Reserve did not have. Bernanke’s view was that only a fiscal and perhaps regulatory response could address the potential for wide-scale failure of financial institutions. Merrill’s Thain made it through the Lehman weekend by negotiating a lifesaving acquisition by Bank of America, formerly Lehman’s potential suitor. Thain blamed the failure to bail out Lehman on politicians and regulators who feared the political consequences of rescuing the firm. “There was a tremendous amount of criticism of what was done with Bear Stearns so that JP Morgan would buy them,” Thain told
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the FCIC. “There was a criticism of bailing out Wall Street. It was a combination of political unwillingness to bail out Wall Street and a belief that there needed to be a reinforcement of moral hazard. There was never a discussion about the legal ability of the Fed to do this.” He noted, “There was never discussion to the best of my recollection that they couldn’t [bail out Lehman]. It was only that they wouldn’t.” Thain also told the FCIC that in his opinion, “allowing Lehman to go bankrupt was the single biggest mistake of the whole financial crisis.” He wished that he and the other Wall Street executives had tried harder to convince Paulson and Geithner to prevent Lehman’s failure: “As I think about what I would do differently after that weekend . . . is try to grab them and shake them that they can’t let this happen. . . . They were not very much in the mood to listen. They were not willing to listen to the idea that there had to be government support. . . . The group of us should have just grabbed them and shaken them and said, ‘Look, you guys could not do this.’ But we didn’t, and they were not willing to entertain that discussion.” FCIC staff asked Thain if he and the other executives explicitly said to Paulson, Geithner, or anyone else, “You can’t let this happen.” Thain replied, “We didn’t do it strongly enough. We said to them, ‘Look, this is going to be bad.’ But it wasn’t like, ‘No . . . you have to help.’” Another prominent member of that select group, JP Morgan’s Dimon, had a different view. He told the FCIC, “I didn’t think it was so bad. I hate to say that. . . . But I [thought] it was almost the same if on Monday morning the government had saved Lehman. . . . You still would have terrible things happen. . . . AIG was going to have their problems that had nothing to do with Lehman. You were still going to have the runs on the other banks and you were going to have absolute fear and panic in the global markets. Whether Lehman itself got saved or not . . . the crisis would have unfolded along a different path, but it probably would have unfolded.” Fed General Counsel Alvarez and New York Fed General Counsel Baxter told the FCIC that there would have been questions either way. As Baxter put it, “I think that if the Federal Reserve had lent to Lehman that Monday in a way that some people think—without adequate collateral and without other security to ensure repayment—this hearing and other hearings would have only been about how we wasted the taxpayers’ money.”
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COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 18 The Commission concludes the financial crisis reached cataclysmic proportions with the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Lehman’s collapse demonstrated weaknesses that also contributed to the failures or near failures of the other four large investment banks: inadequate regulatory oversight, risky trading activities (including securitization and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives dealing), enormous leverage, and reliance on short-term funding. While investment banks tended to be initially more vulnerable, commercial banks suffered from many of the same weaknesses, including their involvement in the shadow banking system, and ultimately many suffered major losses, requiring government rescue. Lehman, like other large OTC derivatives dealers, experienced runs on its derivatives operations that played a role in its failure. Its massive derivatives positions greatly complicated its bankruptcy, and the impact of its bankruptcy through interconnections with derivatives counterparties and other financial institutions contributed significantly to the severity and depth of the financial crisis. Lehman’s failure resulted in part from significant problems in its corporate governance, including risk management, exacerbated by compensation to its executives and traders that was based predominantly on short-term profits. Federal government officials decided not to rescue Lehman for a variety of reasons, including the lack of a private firm willing and able to acquire it, uncertainty about Lehman’s potential losses, concerns about moral hazard and political reaction, and erroneous assumptions that Lehman’s failure would have a manageable impact on the financial system because market participants had anticipated it. After the fact, they justified their decision by stating that the Federal Reserve did not have legal authority to rescue Lehman. The inconsistency of federal government decisions in not rescuing Lehman after having rescued Bear Stearns and the GSEs, and immediately before rescuing AIG, added to uncertainty and panic in the financial markets.
19 SEPTEMBER 2008: THE BAILOUT OF AIG
CONTENTS “Current liquidity position is precarious” ........................................................... “Spillover effect” ................................................................................................. “Like a gnat on an elephant” ..............................................................................
Nine billion dollars is a lot of money, but as AIG executives and the board examined their balance sheet and pondered the markets in the second week of September , they were almost certain billion in cash could not keep the company alive through the next week. The AIG corporate empire held more than trillion in assets, but most of the liquid assets, including cash, were held by regulated insurance subsidiaries whose regulators did not allow the cash to flow freely up to the holding company, much less out to troubled subsidiaries such as AIG Financial Products. The company’s liabilities, especially those due in the near future, were much larger than the billion on hand. On Friday, September , , AIG was facing challenges on a number of fronts. It had to fund . billion of its own commercial paper on that day because traditional investors—for example, money market funds—no longer wanted even shortterm unsecured exposure to AIG; and the company had another . billion coming due the following week. On another front, the repo lenders—who had the comfort of holding collateral for their loans to AIG (. billion in mostly overnight funding)—were nonetheless becoming skittish about the perceived weakness of the company and the low quality of most of its collateral: mortgage-related securities. On a third front, AIG had already put up billions of dollars in collateral to its credit default swap counterparties. By June of , counterparties were demanding . billion, and AIG had posted . billion. By September , the calls had soared to . billion, and AIG had paid . billion—. billion to Goldman alone—and it looked very likely that AIG would need to post billions more in the near future. That day, S&P and Moody’s both warned of potential coming downgrades to AIG’s credit rating, which, if they happened, would lead to an estimated billion in new collateral calls. A downgrade would also trigger liquidity puts that
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AIG had written on commercial paper, requiring AIG to come up with another to billion. Finally, AIG was increasingly strained by its securities lending business. As a lender of securities, AIG received cash from borrowers, typically equal to between and of the market value of the securities they lent. As borrowers began questioning AIG’s stability, the company had to accept below-market terms—sometimes accepting cash equal to only of the value of the securities. Furthermore, AIG had invested this cash in mortgage-related assets, whose value had fallen. Since September , state regulators had worked with AIG to reduce exposures of the securities lending program to mortgage-related assets, according to testimony by Eric Dinallo, the former superintendent of the New York State Insurance Department (NYSID). Still, by the end of June , AIG had invested billion in cash in mortgage-related securities, which had declined in value to . billion. By late August , the parent company had to provide . billion to its struggling securities lending subsidiary, and counterparties were demanding billion to offset the shortfall between the cash collateral provided and the diminished value of the securities. According to Dinallo, the collateral call disputes between AIG and its credit default swap counterparties hindered an orderly wind down of the securities lending business, and in fact accelerated demands from securities lending counterparties. That Friday, AIG’s board dispatched a team led by Vice Chairman Jacob Frenkel to meet with top officials at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Elsewhere in the building, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and New York Fed President Timothy Geithner were telling Wall Street bankers that they had the weekend to devise a solution to prevent Lehman’s bankruptcy without government assistance. Now came this emergency meeting regarding another beleaguered American institution. “Bottom line,” the New York Fed later reported of that meeting, “[AIG’s] Treasurer estimates that parent and [Financial Products] have – days before they are out of liquidity.” AIG posed a simple question: how could it obtain an emergency loan under the Federal Reserve’s () authority? Without a solution, there was no way this conglomerate, despite more than trillion in assets, would survive another week.
“CURRENT LIQUIDITY POSITION IS PRECARIOUS” AIG’s visit to the New York Fed may have been an emergency, but it should not have been a surprise. With the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), the Fed had effectively opened its discount window—traditionally available only to depository institutions—to investment banks that qualified as primary dealers; AIG did not qualify. But over the summer, New York Fed officials had begun to consider providing emergency collateralized funding to even more large institutions that were systemically important. That led the regulators to look closely at two trillion-dollar holding companies, AIG and GE Capital. Both were large participants in the commercial paper market: AIG with billion in outstanding paper, GE Capital with billion. In
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August, the New York Fed set up a team to study the two companies’ funding and liquidity risk. On August , New York Fed officials met with Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) regulators to discuss AIG. The OTS said that it was “generally comfortable with [the] firm’s current liquidity . . . [and] confident that the firm could access the capital markets with no problem if it had to.” The New York Fed did not agree. On August , , Kevin Coffey, an analyst from the Financial Sector Policy and Analysis unit, wrote that despite raising billion earlier in the year, “AIG is under increasing capital and liquidity pressure” and “appears to need to raise substantial longer term funds to address the impact of deteriorating asset values on its capital and available liquidity as well as to address certain asset/liability funding mismatches.” Coffey listed six concerns: () AIG’s significant losses on investments, primarily because of securities lending activities; () . billion in mark-to-market losses on AIG Financial Products’ credit default swap book and related margin calls, for which AIG had posted . billion in collateral by mid-August; () significant near-term liabilities; () commitments to purchase collateralized debt obligations due to outstanding liquidity puts; () ratings-based triggers in derivative contracts that could cause significant additional collateral calls if AIG were downgraded; and () limited standby credit facilities to manage sudden cash needs. He noted Moody’s and S&P had highlighted worries about earnings, capital, and liquidity following AIG’s second-quarter earnings. The agencies warned they would downgrade AIG if it did not address these issues. Four days later, Goldman Sachs issued a report to clients that echoed much of Coffey’s internal analysis. The report, “Don’t Buy AIG: Potential Downgrades, Capital Raise on the Horizon,” warned that “we foresee – billion in economic losses from [AIG’s credit default swap] book, which could result in larger cash outlays . . . resulting in a significant shift in the risk quality of AIG’s assets. . . . Put simply, we have seen this credit overhang story before with another stock in our coverage universe, and foresee outcomes similar in nature but on a much larger scale.” Goldman appeared to be referring to Bear Stearns. Ira Selig, a manager at the New York Fed, emailed the Goldman report to Coffey and others. “The bottom line: large scale cash outflows and posting of collateral could substantially weaken AIG’s balance sheet,” the manager wrote. On September , the New York Fed’s Danielle Vicente noted the situation had worsened: “AIG’s current liquidity position is precarious and asset liability management appears inadequate given the substantial off balance sheet liquidity needs.” Liquidating an billion securities portfolio to cover liabilities would mean substantial losses and “potentially” affect prices, she wrote. Borrowing against AIG’s securities through the Fed’s PDCF might allow AIG to unwind its positions calmly while satisfying immediate cash needs, but Vicente questioned whether the PDCF was “necessary for the survival of the firm.” Arguably, however, AIG’s volatile funding sources made the firm vulnerable to runs. Off-balance-sheet commitments—including collateral calls, contract terminations, and liquidity puts—could be as high as
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billion if AIG was downgraded. Yet AIG had only billion of revolving credit facilities in addition to the to billion of cash it had on hand at the time. The rating agencies waited to see how AIG would address its liquidity and capital needs. Analysts worried about the losses in AIG’s credit default swaps and investment portfolios, about rating agency actions, and about subsequent impacts on capital. Indeed, Goldman’s August report on AIG concluded that the firm itself and the rating agencies were in denial about impending losses. By early September, management was no longer in denial. At the Friday, September , meeting at the New York Fed, AIG executives reported that the company was “facing serious liquidity issues that threaten[ed] its survival viability” and that a downgrade, possibly after a rating agency meeting September , would trigger billions of dollars in collateral calls, liquidity puts, and other liquidity needs. AIG’s stock had fallen significantly (shares hit an intraday low of . Friday, down from a . close the day before) and credit default swap spreads had reached during the day, indicating that protection on million of AIG debt would cost approximately . million per year. AIG reported it was having problems with its commercial paper, able to roll only . billion of the . billion that matured on September . In addition, some banks were pulling away and even refusing to provide repo funding. Assets were illiquid, their values had declined, borrowing was restricted, and raising capital was not viable.
“SPILLOVER EFFECT” The New York Fed knew that a failure of AIG would have dramatic, far-reaching consequences. By the evening of September , after the meeting with AIG executives, that possibility looked increasingly realistic. Hayley Boesky of the New York Fed emailed William Dudley and others. “More panic from [hedge funds]. Now focus is on AIG,” she wrote. “I am hearing worse than LEH. Every bank and dealer has exposure to them.” Shortly before midnight, New York Fed Assistant Vice President Alejandro LaTorre emailed Geithner, Dudley, and other senior officials about AIG: “The key takeaway is that they are potentially facing a severe run on their liquidity over the course of the next several (approx. ) days if they are downgraded. . . . Their risk exposures are concentrated among the largest international banks (both U.S. and European) across a wide array of product types (bank lines, derivatives, securities lending, etc.) meaning [there] could be significant counterparty losses to those firms in the event of AIG’s failure.” New York Fed officials met on Saturday morning, and gathered additional information about AIG’s financial condition, but according to New York Fed General Counsel Tom Baxter, it “seemed clear that the private sector solution would materialize for AIG.” Indeed, Christopher Flowers, head of J. C. Flowers & Co., a private equity firm, had spoken to AIG CEO Robert Willumstad the prior Thursday, and the two had called Warren Buffett to discuss a possible deal. Willumstad told the FCIC
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that he was in contact with about a dozen private equity firms over the weekend. AIG executives also worked with then-Superintendent Eric Dinallo to help craft a deal that would have allowed AIG’s regulated subsidiaries to essentially lend money to the parent company. Fed officials reported to AIG executives during a conference call on Saturday that “they should not be particularly optimistic [about financial assistance], given the hurtles [sic] and history of [the Fed’s] - lending [authority].” And by the end of the day on Saturday, AIG appeared to the Fed to be pursuing private-sector leads. “It was clear from the conversation that Flowers [is] actively involved in working with everything (AIG, regulators, bankers, etc) in putting together both the ‘term sheet’ with AIG, and providing analysis to NYSID on liquidity profile of the parent company,” Patricia Mosser, a senior vice president at the New York Fed, wrote to LaTorre and others. On Sunday morning, September , Adam Ashcraft of the New York Fed circulated a memo, “Comment on Possible - Lending to AIG,” discussing the effect of a fire sale by AIG on asset markets. In an accompanying email, Ashcraft wrote that the “threat” by AIG to sell assets was “a clear attempt to scare policymakers into giving [AIG] access to the discount window, and avoid making otherwise hard but viable options: sell or hedge the CDO risk (little to no impact on capital), sell subsidiaries, or raise capital.” Before a : P.M. meeting, LaTorre sent an analysis, “Pros and cons of lending to AIG,” to colleagues. The pros included avoiding a messy collapse and dislocations in markets such as commercial paper. If AIG collapsed, it could have a “spillover effect on other firms involved in similar activities (e.g. GE Finance)” and would “lead to B increase in European bank capital requirements.” In other words, European banks that had lowered credit risk—and, as a result, lowered capital requirements— by buying credit default swaps from AIG would lose that protection if AIG failed. AIG’s bankruptcy would also affect other companies because of its “non-trivial exotic derivatives book,” a . trillion over-the-counter derivatives portfolio of which trillion was concentrated in large counterparties. The memo also noted that an AIG failure “could cause dislocations in CDS market [that] . . . could leave dealer books significantly unbalanced.” The cons of a bailout included a “chilling effect” on private-sector solutions thought to be under way; the possibility that a Fed loan would be insufficient to keep AIG afloat, “undermining efficacy of - lending as a policy tool”; an increase in moral hazard; the perception that it would be “incoherent” to lend to AIG and not Lehman; the possibility of assets being insufficient to cover the potential liquidity hole. LaTorre concluded, “Without punitive terms, lending [to AIG] could reward poor risk management,” which included AIG’s unwillingness to sell or hedge some of its CDO risk. The private-sector solutions LaTorre referred to had hit a wall, however. By Sunday afternoon, Flowers had been “summarily dismissed” by AIG’s board. Flowers told the FCIC that under his proposal, his firm and Allianz, the giant insurance company, would have each invested billion in exchange for the stock of AIG subsidiaries. With
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approval from the NYSID, the subsidiaries would “upstream” billion to the parent company, and the parent company would get access to bridge financing from the Fed. Then, Allianz would take control of AIG almost immediately. Flowers said that he was surprised by AIG’s unwillingness to negotiate. “I’m not saying it would have worked or that it was perfect as written, but it was astounding to me that given what happened, nobody bothered to check this [deal] out,” he said. Willumstad referred to the Flowers deal as a “so-called offer”—he did not consider it to be a “serious effort,” and so it was “dismissed immediately.” With respect to the other potential investors AIG spoke with over the weekend, Willumstad said that negotiations were unsuccessful because every potential deal would have required government assistance—something Willumstad had been assured by the “highest levels” would not be forthcoming. On Monday morning—after Lehman had declared bankruptcy, and with no private-sector solution on the horizon—the Fed initiated an effort to have JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs assemble a syndicate of banks to lend about billion to keep AIG afloat. In the afternoon, the rating agencies announced their assessments, which were even worse than expected. All three rating agencies announced downgrades of AIG: S&P by three notches to A-, and Moody’s and Fitch by two notches to A and A, respectively. The downgrades triggered an additional billion in cash collateral calls on AIG Financial Products’ credit default swaps. Goldman Sachs alone requested . billion. Demands hit billion, and AIG’s payouts increased to . billion. The company’s stock plummeted to . from the closing price of . the previous Friday—a fraction of its all-time high of .. The syndicate of banks did not agree on a deal, despite the expectations of Fed officials. “Once Lehman filed [for bankruptcy] on the morning of the th, everyone decided that, ‘we’ve got to protect our own balance sheet,’ and the banks that were going to provide the billion decided that they were not going to,” Baxter told the FCIC. Sarah Dahlgren, a senior New York Fed official, agreed with Baxter. Lehman’s bankruptcy “was the end of the private-sector solution,” she told the Commission. After the markets closed, AIG informed the New York Fed it was unable to access the short-term commercial paper market. Regulators spent the next several hours preparing for a late-night teleconference with Geithner. The “Lead point,” according to an email circulated to the Fed’s AIG monitoring group, was that “the size, name, franchise and market presence (wholesale and retail) [of AIG] raise questions about potential worldwide contagion, should this franchise become impaired.” Late that night, for the second time since the beginning of the crisis, the Federal Reserve Board invoked section () of the Federal Reserve Act to bail out a company. As it had done for Bear Stearns, the New York Fed, with the support of the Treasury, would rescue a brand-name financial institution. The Federal Open Market Committee was briefed about AIG. Members were told that AIG faced a liquidity crisis but that it was unclear if there were also solvency issues. In addition, the staff noted that money market funds had even broader exposure to AIG than to Lehman and that the parent company could run out of money quite soon, even within days.
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On Tuesday morning, the Fed put a number on the table: it would loan billion so that AIG could meet its immediate obligations. The collateral would be the assets of the parent company and its primary nonregulated subsidiaries, plus the stock of almost all the regulated insurance subsidiaries. The Fed stated that “a disorderly failure of AIG could add to already significant levels of financial market fragility and lead to substantially higher borrowing costs, reduced household wealth, and materially weaker economic performance.” By Wednesday, a share of AIG sold for as little as .. The previous eight years’ profits of billion would be dwarfed by the . billion loss for this one year, . But billion would soon prove insufficient. Treasury added . billion under its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Ultimately, according to the Congressional Oversight Panel, taxpayer funds committed to AIG reached billion. The panel faulted the government for deciding to bail out AIG too hastily: “With AIG, the Federal Reserve and Treasury broke new ground. They put the U.S. taxpayer on the line for the full cost and full risk of rescuing a failing company.” The Treasury Department defended its decision, saying that the panel report “overlooks the basic fact that the global economy was on the brink of collapse and there were only hours in which to make critical decisions.”
“LIKE A GNAT ON AN ELEPHANT” The Office of Thrift Supervision has acknowledged failures in its oversight of AIG. In a March , , congressional hearing, Acting Director Scott Polakoff testified that supervisors failed to recognize the extent of liquidity risk of the Financial Products subsidiary’s credit default swap portfolio. John Reich, a former OTS director, told the FCIC that as late as September , he had “no clue—no idea—what [AIG’s] CDS liability was.” According to Mike Finn, the director for the OTS’s northeast region, the OTS’s authority to regulate holding companies was intended to ensure the safety and soundness of the FDIC-insured subsidiary of AIG and not to focus on the potential impact on AIG of an uninsured subsidiary like AIG Financial Products. Finn ignored the OTS’s responsibilities under the European Union’s Financial Conglomerates Directive (FCD)—responsibilities the OTS had actively sought. The directive required foreign companies doing business in Europe to have the equivalent of a “consolidated supervisor” in their home country. Starting in , the OTS worked to persuade the European Union that it was capable of serving as AIG’s “home country consolidated supervisor.” In the agency wrote: “AIG and its subsidiaries are subject to consolidated supervision by OTS. . . . As part of its supervision, OTS will conduct continuous on-site reviews of AIG and its subsidiaries.” Yet even Reich told FCIC staff that he did not understand his agency’s responsibilities under the FCD. The former director said he was never sure what authority the OTS had over AIG Financial Products, which he said had slipped through a regulatory gap.
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Further undermining the OTS’s claim that it lacked authority over AIG Financial Products are its own actions: the OTS did in fact examine the subsidiary, albeit much too late to matter. OTS examiners argued they got little cooperation from Joseph Cassano, the head of the subsidiary. Joseph Gonzales, the examiner in charge from April to November , told FCIC staff, “I overheard one employee saying that Joe Cassano felt that [the OTS was] overreaching our scope by going into FP.” The OTS did not look carefully at the credit default swap portfolio guaranteed by the parent company—even though AIG did describe the nature of its super-senior portfolio in its annual reports at that time, including the dollar amount of total credit default swaps that it had written. Gonzales said that the OTS did not know about the CDS during the – period. After a limited review in July —conducted a week before Goldman sent AIG Financial Products its first demand for collateral— the OTS concluded that the risk in the CDS book was too small to be measured and decided to put off a more detailed review until . The agency’s stated reason was its limited time and staff resources. In February , AIG reported billions of dollars in losses and material weaknesses in the way it valued credit default swap positions. Yet the OTS did not initiate an in-depth review of the credit default swaps until September —ten days before AIG went to the Fed seeking a rescue—completing the review on October , more than a month after AIG failed. It was, former OTS director of Conglomerate Operations Brad Waring admitted, “in hindsight, a bad choice.” Reich told the FCIC that before , AIG had not been a great concern. He also acknowledged that the OTS had never fully understood the Financial Products unit, and thus couldn’t regulate it. “At the simplest level, . . . an organization like OTS cannot supervise AIG, GE, Merrill Lynch, and entities that have worldwide offices. . . . I would be the first to say that for an organization like OTS to pretend that it has total responsibility over AIG and all of its subsidiaries . . . it’s like a gnat on an elephant— there’s no way.” Reich said that for the OTS to think it could regulate AIG was “totally impractical and unrealistic. . . . I think we thought we could grow into that responsibility. . . . But I think that was sort of pie in the sky dreaming.” Geithner agreed, and told Reich so bluntly. Reich told the FCIC about a phone call from Geithner after the rescue. “About all I can remember is the foul language that I heard on the other end of the line,” Reich said. He recalled Geithner telling him. “‘You guys have handed me a bag of sh*t.’ I just listened.”
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COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 19 The Commission concludes AIG failed and was rescued by the government primarily because its enormous sales of credit default swaps were made without putting up initial collateral, setting aside capital reserves, or hedging its exposure—a profound failure in corporate governance, particularly its risk management practices. AIG’s failure was possible because of the sweeping deregulation of over-thecounter (OTC) derivatives, including credit default swaps, which effectively eliminated federal and state regulation of these products, including capital and margin requirements that would have lessened the likelihood of AIG’s failure. The OTC derivatives market’s lack of transparency and of effective price discovery exacerbated the collateral disputes of AIG and Goldman Sachs and similar disputes between other derivatives counterparties. AIG engaged in regulatory arbitrage by setting up a major business in this unregulated product, locating much of the business in London, and selecting a weak federal regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). The OTS failed to effectively exercise its authority over AIG and its affiliates: it lacked the capability to supervise an institution of the size and complexity of AIG, did not recognize the risks inherent in AIG’s sales of credit default swaps, and did not understand its responsibility to oversee the entire company, including AIG Financial Products. Furthermore, because of the deregulation of OTC derivatives, state insurance supervisors were barred from regulating AIG’s sale of credit default swaps even though they were similar in effect to insurance contracts. If they had been regulated as insurance contracts, AIG would have been required to maintain adequate capital reserves, would not have been able to enter into contracts requiring the posting of collateral, and would not have been able to provide default protection to speculators; thus AIG would have been prevented from acting in such a risky manner. AIG was so interconnected with many large commercial banks, investment banks, and other financial institutions through counterparty credit relationships on credit default swaps and other activities such as securities lending that its potential failure created systemic risk. The government concluded AIG was too big to fail and committed more than billion to its rescue. Without the bailout, AIG’s default and collapse could have brought down its counterparties, causing cascading losses and collapses throughout the financial system.
20 CRISIS AND PANIC
CONTENTS Money market funds: “Dealers weren’t even picking up their phones” ............... Morgan Stanley: “Now we’re the next in line”..................................................... Over-the-counter derivatives: “A grinding halt” ................................................. Washington Mutual: “It’s yours”......................................................................... Wachovia: “At the front end of the dominoes as other dominoes fell”................. TARP: “Comprehensive approach” .................................................................... AIG: “We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient”..................... Citigroup: “Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman”............................... Bank of America: “A shotgun wedding” .............................................................
September , —the date of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the takeover of Merrill Lynch, followed within hours by the rescue of AIG—marked the beginning of the worst market disruption in postwar American history and an extraordinary rush to the safest possible investments. Creditors and investors suspected that many other large financial institutions were on the edge of failure, and the Lehman bankruptcy seemed to prove that at least some of them would not have access to the federal government’s safety net. John Mack, CEO of Morgan Stanley during the crisis, told the FCIC, “In the immediate wake of Lehman’s failure on September , Morgan Stanley and similar institutions experienced a classic ‘run on the bank,’ as investors lost confidence in financial institutions and the entire investment banking business model came under siege.” “The markets were very bad, the volatility, the illiquidity, some things couldn’t trade at all, I mean completely locked, the markets were in terrible shape,” JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon recalled to the FCIC. He thought the country could face unemployment. “We could have survived it in my opinion, but it would have been terrible. I would have stopped lending, marketing, investing . . . and probably laid off , people. And I would have done it in three weeks. You get companies starting to take actions like that, that’s what a Great Depression is.” Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner told the FCIC, “You had people starting to take their deposits out of very, very strong banks, long way removed in distance and
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risk and business from the guys on Wall Street that were at the epicenter of the problem. And that is a good measure, classic measure of incipient panic.” In an interview in December , Geithner said that “none of [the biggest banks] would have survived a situation in which we had let that fire try to burn itself out.” Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke told the FCIC, “As a scholar of the Great Depression, I honestly believe that September and October of was the worst financial crisis in global history, including the Great Depression. If you look at the firms that came under pressure in that period . . . only one . . . was not at serious risk of failure. . . . So out of maybe the , of the most important financial institutions in the United States, were at risk of failure within a period of a week or two.” As it had on the weekend of Bear’s demise, the Federal Reserve announced new measures on Sunday, September , to make more cash available to investment banks and other firms. Yet again, it lowered its standards regarding the quality of the collateral that investment banks and other primary dealers could use while borrowing under the two programs to support repo lending, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). And, providing a temporary exception to its rules, it allowed the investment banks and other financial companies to borrow cash from their insured depository affiliates. The investment banks drew liberally on the Fed’s lending programs. By the end of September, Morgan Stanley was getting by on . billion of Fed-provided life support; Goldman was receiving . billion. But the new measures did not quell the market panic. Among the first to be directly affected were the money market funds and other institutions that held Lehman’s billion in unsecured commercial paper and made loans to the company through the tri-party repo market. Investors pulled out of funds with known exposure to that jeopardy, including the Reserve Management Company’s Reserve Primary Fund and Wachovia’s Evergreen Investments. Other parties with direct connections to Lehman included the hedge funds, investment banks, and investors who were on the other side of Lehman’s more than , over-the-counter derivatives contracts. For example, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan, and UBS together had more than , outstanding trades with Lehman as of May . The Lehman bankruptcy caused immediate problems for these OTC derivatives counterparties. They had the right under U.S. bankruptcy law to terminate their derivatives contracts with Lehman upon its bankruptcy, and to the extent that Lehman owed them money on the contracts they could seize any Lehman collateral that they held. However, any additional amount owed to them had to be claimed in the bankruptcy proceeding. If they had posted collateral with Lehman, they would have to make a claim for the return of that collateral, and disputes over valuation of the contracts would still have to be resolved. These proceedings would delay payment and most likely result in losses. Moreover, any hedges that rested on these contracts were now gone, increasing risk. Investors also pulled out of funds that did not have direct Lehman exposure. The managers of these funds, in turn, pulled billion out of the commercial paper market in September and shifted billions of dollars of repo loans to safer collateral, putting further pressure on investment banks and other finance companies that de-
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Cost of Interbank Lending As concerns about the health of bank counterparties spread, lending banks demanded higher interest rates to compensate for the risk. The one-month LIBOROIS spread measures the part of the interest rates banks paid other banks that is due to this credit risk. Strains in the interbank lending markets appeared just after the crisis began in 2007 and then peaked during the fall of 2008. IN PERCENT, DAILY 4%
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NOTE: Chart shows the spread between the one-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the overnight index swap rate (OIS), both closely watched interest rates. SOURCE: Bloomberg
Figure .
pended on those markets. “When the commercial paper market died, the biggest corporations in America thought they were finished,” Harvey Miller, the bankruptcy attorney for the Lehman estate, told the FCIC. Investors and uninsured depositors yanked tens of billions of dollars out of banks whose real estate exposures might be debilitating (Washington Mutual, Wachovia) in favor of those whose real estate exposures appeared manageable (Wells Fargo, JP Morgan). Hedge funds withdrew tens of billions of dollars of assets held in custody at the remaining investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, and even Merrill Lynch, as the just-announced Bank of America acquisition wouldn’t close for another three and a half months) in favor of large commercial banks with prime brokerage businesses (JP Morgan, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank), because the commercial banks had more diverse sources of liquidity than the investment banks as well as large bases of insured deposits. JP Morgan and BNY Mellon, the tri-party repo clearing banks, clamped down on their intraday exposures, demanding more collateral than ever from the remaining investment banks and other primary dealers. Many banks refused to lend to one another; the cost of interbank lending rose to unprecedented levels (see figure .).
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On Monday, September , the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than points, or , the largest single-day point drop since the / terrorist attacks. These drops would be exceeded on September —the day that the House of Representatives initially voted against the billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) proposal to provide extraordinary support to financial markets and firms— when the Dow Jones fell and financial stocks fell . For the month, the S&P would lose billion of its value, a decline of —the worst month since September . And specific institutions would take direct hits.
MONEY MARKET FUNDS: “DEALERS WEREN’ T EVEN PICKING UP THEIR PHONES” When Lehman declared bankruptcy, the Reserve Primary Fund had million invested in Lehman’s commercial paper. The Primary Fund was the world’s first money market mutual fund, established in by Reserve Management Company. The fund had traditionally invested in conservative assets such as government securities and bank certificates of deposit and had for years enjoyed Moody’s and S&P’s highest ratings for safety and liquidity. In March , the fund had advised investors that it had “slightly underperformed” its rivals, owing to a “more conservative and risk averse manner” of investing—“for example, the Reserve Funds do not invest in commercial paper.” But immediately after publishing this statement, it quietly but dramatically changed that strategy. Within months, commercial paper grew from zero to one-half of Reserve Primary’s assets. The higher yields attracted new investors and the Reserve Primary Fund was the fastest-growing money market fund complex in the United States in , , and —doubling in the first eight months of alone. Earlier in , Primary Fund’s managers had loaned Bear Stearns money in the repo market up to two days before Bear’s near-collapse, pulling its money only after Bear CEO Alan Schwartz appeared on CNBC in the company’s final days, Primary Fund Portfolio Manager Michael Luciano told the FCIC. But after the governmentassisted rescue of Bear, Luciano, like many other professional investors, said he assumed that the federal government would similarly save the day if Lehman or one of the other investment banks, which were much larger and posed greater apparent systemic risks, ran into trouble. These firms, Luciano said, were too big to fail. On September , when Lehman declared bankruptcy, the Primary Fund’s Lehman holdings amounted to . of the fund’s total assets of . billion. That morning, the fund was flooded with redemption requests totaling . billion. State Street, the fund’s custodian bank, initially helped the fund meet those requests, largely through an existing overdraft facility, but stopped doing so at : A.M. With no means to borrow, Primary Fund representatives reportedly described State Street’s action as “the kiss of death” for the Primary Fund. Despite public assurances from the fund’s investment advisors, Bruce Bent Sr. and Bruce Bent II, that the fund was
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committed to maintaining a . net asset value, investors requested an additional billion later on Monday and Tuesday, September . Meanwhile, on Monday, the fund’s board had determined that the Lehman paper was worth cents on the dollar. That appraisal had quickly proved optimistic. After the market closed Tuesday, Reserve Management publicly announced that the value of its Lehman paper was zero, “effective :PM New York time today.” As a result, the fund broke the buck. Four days later, the fund sought SEC permission to officially suspend redemptions. Other funds suffering similar losses were propped up by their sponsors. On Monday, Wachovia’s asset management unit, Evergreen Investments, announced that it would support three Evergreen mutual funds that held about million in Lehman paper. On Wednesday, BNY Mellon announced support for various funds that held Lehman paper, including the billion Institutional Cash Reserves fund and four of its trademark Dreyfus funds. BNY Mellon would take an after-tax charge of million because of this decision. Over the next two years, money market funds— based in the United States, in Europe—would receive such assistance to keep their funds from breaking the buck. After the Primary Fund broke the buck, the run took an ominous turn: it even slammed money market funds with no direct Lehman exposure. This lack of exposure was generally known, since the SEC requires these funds to report details on their investments at least quarterly. Investors pulled out simply because they feared that their fellow investors would run first. “It was overwhelmingly clear that we were staring into the abyss—that there wasn’t a bottom to this—as the outflows picked up steam on Wednesday and Thursday,” Fed economist Patrick McCabe told the FCIC. “The overwhelming sense was that this was a catastrophe that we were watching unfold.” “We were really cognizant of the fact that there weren’t backstops in the system that were resilient at that time,” the Fed’s Michael Palumbo said. “Liquidity crises, by their nature, invoke rapid, emergent episodes—that’s what they are. By their nature, they spread very quickly.” An early and significant casualty was Putnam Investments’ billion Prime Money Market Fund, which was hit on Wednesday with a wave of redemption requests. The fund, unable to liquidate assets quickly enough, halted redemptions. One week later, it was sold to Federated Investors. Within a week, investors in prime money market funds—funds that invested in highly rated securities—withdrew billion; within three weeks, they withdrew another billion. That money was mostly headed for other funds that bought only Treasuries and agency securities; indeed, it was more money than those funds could invest, and they had to turn people away (see figure .). As a result of the unprecedented demand for Treasuries, the yield on four-week Treasuries fell close to , levels not seen since World War II. Money market mutual funds needing cash to honor redemptions sold their now illiquid investments. Unfortunately, there was little market to speak of. “We heard
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Investments in Money Market Funds In a flight to safety, investors shifted from prime money market funds to money market funds investing in Treasury and agency securities. IN TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS, DAILY $2
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Figure . anecdotally that the dealers weren’t even picking up their phones. The funds had to get rid of their paper; they didn’t have anyone to give it to,” McCabe said. And holding unsecured commercial paper from any large financial institution was now simply out of the question: fund managers wanted no part of the next Lehman. An FCIC survey of the largest money market funds found that many were unwilling to purchase commercial paper from financial firms during the week after Lehman. Of the respondents, the five with the most drastic reduction in financial commercial paper cut their holdings by half, from billion to billion. This led to unprecedented increases in the rates on commercial paper, creating problems for borrowers, particularly for financial companies, such as GE Capital, CIT, and American Express, as well as for nonfinancial corporations that used commercial paper to pay their immediate expenses such as payroll and inventories. The cost of commercial paper borrowing spiked in mid-September, dramatically surpassing the previous highs in (see figure .). “You had a broad-based run on commercial paper markets,” Geithner told the FCIC. “And so you faced the prospect of some of the largest companies in the world and the United States losing the capacity to fund and access those commercial paper markets.” Three decades of easy borrowing for those with top-rated credit in a very liquid market had disappeared almost overnight. The panic threatened to disrupt the payments system through which financial institutions transfer trillions of dollars in
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Cost of Short-Term Borrowing During the crisis, the cost of borrowing for lower-rated nonfinancial firms spiked. IN PERCENT, DAILY 7% 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 2007
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!"#$ &'()* +, -'. ,/0.12 3.-)..* -'. 01-. /1+2 34 ,.5(*26-+.0 01-.2 *(*7*1*5+18 5(9/1*+., :;<=><? -'1- 3(00().2 34 +,,@+*A BC6214 5(99.05+18 /1/.0 1*2 -'. 01-. /1+2 (* ,+9+810 /1/.0 34 -'. 3.,-601-.2 5(9/1*+.,D &!EFG#$ H.2.018 F.,.0I. J(102 (K L(I.0*(0,
Figure . cash and assets every day and upon which consumers rely—for example, to use their credit cards and debit cards. “At that point, you don’t need to map out which particular mechanism—it’s not relevant anymore—it’s become systemic and endemic and it needs to be stopped,” Palumbo said. The government responded with two new lending programs on Friday, September . Treasury would guarantee the net asset value of eligible money market funds, for a fee paid by the funds. And the Fed would provide loans to banks to purchase high-quality-asset-backed commercial paper from money market funds. In its first two weeks, this program loaned banks billion, although usage declined over the ensuing months. The two programs immediately slowed the run on money market funds. With the financial sector in disarray, the SEC imposed a temporary ban on shortselling on the stocks of about banks, insurance companies, and securities firms. This action, taken on September , followed an earlier temporary ban put in place over the summer on naked short-selling—that is, shorting a stock without arranging to deliver it to the buyer—of financial stocks in order to protect them from “unlawful manipulation.” Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and other senior officials had decided they needed a more systematic approach to dealing with troubled firms and troubled markets. Paulson started seeking authority from Congress for TARP. “One
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thing that was constant about the crisis is that we were always behind. It was always morphing and manifesting itself in ways we didn’t expect,” Neel Kashkari, then assistant secretary of the treasury, told the FCIC. “So we knew we’d get one shot at this authority and it was important that we provided ourselves maximum firepower and maximum flexibility. We specifically designed the authority to allow us basically to do whatever we needed to do.” Kashkari “spent the next two weeks basically living on Capitol Hill.” As discussed below, the program was a tough sell.
MORGAN STANLEY: “NOW WE’RE THE NEXT IN LINE” Investors scrutinized the two remaining large, independent investment banks after the failure of Lehman and the announced acquisition of Merrill. Especially Morgan Stanley. On Monday, September , the annual cost of protecting million in Morgan Stanley debt through credit default swaps jumped to ,—from , on Friday—about double the cost for Goldman. “As soon as we come in on Monday, we’re in the eye of the storm with Merrill gone and Lehman gone,” John Mack, then Morgan Stanley’s CEO, said to the FCIC. He later added, “Now we’re the next in line.” Morgan Stanley officials had some reason for confidence. On the previous Friday, the company’s liquidity pool was more than billion—Goldman’s was billion—and, like Goldman, it had passed the regulators’ liquidity stress tests months earlier. But the early market indicators were mixed. David Wong, Morgan Stanley’s treasurer, heard early from his London office that several European banks were not accepting Morgan Stanley as a counterparty on derivatives trades. He called those banks and they agreed to keep their trades with Morgan Stanley, at least for the time being. But Wong well knew that rumors about derivatives counterparties fleeing through novations had contributed to the demise of Bear and Lehman. Repo lenders, primarily money market funds, likewise did not panic immediately. On Monday, only a few of them requested slightly more collateral. But the relative stability was fleeting. Morgan Stanley immediately became the target of a hedge fund run. Before the financial crisis, it had typically been prime brokers like Morgan Stanley who were worried about their exposures to hedge fund clients. Now the roles were reversed. The Lehman episode had revealed that because prime brokers were able to reuse clients’ assets to raise cash for their own activities, clients’ assets could be frozen or lost in bankruptcy proceedings. To protect themselves, hedge funds pulled billions of dollars in cash and other assets out of Morgan Stanley, Merrill, and Goldman in favor of prime brokers in bank holding companies, such as JP Morgan; big foreign banks, such as Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse; and custodian banks, such as BNY Mellon and Northern Trust, which they believed were safer and more transparent. Fund managers told the FCIC that some prime brokers took aggressive measures to prevent hedge fund customers from demanding their assets. For example, “Most [hedge funds] request cash movement from [prime brokers] primarily through a fax,” the hedge fund manager Jonathan Wood told the FCIC. “What tends to happen in very stressful times is those
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faxes tend to get lost. I’m not sure that’s just coincidental . . . that was collateral for whatever lending [prime brokers] had against you and they didn’t want to give it [away].” Soon, hedge funds would suffer unprecedented runs by their own investors. According to an FCIC survey of hedge funds that survived, investor redemption requests averaged of client funds in the fourth quarter of . This pummeled the markets. Money invested in hedge funds totaled . trillion, globally, at the end of , but because of leverage, their market impact was several times larger. Widespread redemptions forced hedge funds to sell extraordinary amounts of assets, further depressing market prices. Many hedge funds would halt redemptions or collapse. On Monday, hedge funds requested about billion from Morgan Stanley. Then, on Tuesday morning, Morgan Stanley announced a profit of . billion for the three months ended August , , about the same as that period a year earlier. Mack had decided to release the good news a day early, but this move had backfired. “One hedge fund manager said to me after the fact . . . that he thought preannouncing earnings a day early was a sign of weakness. So I guess it was, because people certainly continued to short our stock or sell our stock—I don’t know if they were shorting it but they were certainly selling it,” Mack told the FCIC. Wong said, “We were managing our funding . . . but really there were other things that were happening as a result of the Lehman bankruptcy that were beginning to affect, really ripple through and affect some of our clients, our more sophisticated clients.” The hedge fund run became a billion torrent on Wednesday, the day after AIG was bailed out and the day that “many of our sophisticated clients started to liquefy,” as Wong put it. Many of the hedge funds now sought to exercise their contractual capability to borrow more from Morgan Stanley’s prime brokerage without needing to post collateral. Morgan Stanley borrowed billion from the Fed’s PDCF on Tuesday, billion on Wednesday, and . billion on Friday. These developments triggered the event that Fed policymakers had worried about over the summer: an increase in collateral calls by the two tri-party repo clearing banks, JP Morgan and BNY Mellon. As had happened during the Bear episode, the two clearing banks became concerned about their intraday exposures to Morgan Stanley, Merrill, and Goldman. On Sunday of the Lehman weekend, the Fed had lowered the bar on the collateral that it would take for overnight lending through the PDCF. But the PDCF was not designed to take the place of the intraday funding provided by JP Morgan and BNY Mellon, and neither of them wanted to accept for their intraday loans the lower-quality collateral that the Fed was accepting for its overnight loans. They would not make those loans to the three investment banks without requiring bigger haircuts, which translated into requests for more collateral. “Big intraday issues at the clearing banks,” the SEC’s Matt Eichner informed New York Fed colleagues in an early Wednesday email. “They don’t want exposure and are asking for cash/securities. . . . Lots of desk level noise around [Morgan Stanley] and [Merrill Lynch] and taking the name. Not pretty.” “Taking the name” is Wall Street parlance for accepting a counterparty on a trade. On Thursday, BNY Mellon requested billion in collateral from Morgan Stanley.
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And New York Fed officials reported that JP Morgan was “thinking” about requesting . billion on top of a . billion on deposit. According to a Fed examiner at Citigroup, a banker from that firm had said that “Morgan [Stanley] is the ‘deer in the headlights’ and having significant stress in Europe. It’s looking like Lehman did a few weeks ago.” Commercial paper markets also seized up for Morgan Stanley. From Friday, September , to the end of September, the amount of the firm’s outstanding commercial paper had fallen nearly , and it had rolled over only million. By comparison, on average Morgan Stanley rolled over about million every day in the last two weeks of August. On Saturday, Morgan Stanley executives briefed the New York Fed on the situation. By this time, the firm had a total of . billion in PDCF funding and . billion in TSLF funding from the Fed. Morgan Stanley’s liquidity pool had dropped from billion to billion in one week. Repo lenders had pulled out billion and hedge funds had taken billion out of Morgan Stanley’s prime brokerage. That run had vastly exceeded the company’s most severe scenario in stress tests administered only one month earlier. During the week, Goldman Sachs had encountered a similar run. Its liquidity pool had fallen from about billion on the previous Friday to billion on Thursday. At the end of the week, its Fed borrowing totaled billion from the PDCF and . billion from the TSLF. Lloyd Blankfein, Goldman’s CEO, told the FCIC, We had tremendous liquidity through the period. But there were systemic events going on, and we were very nervous. If you are asking me what would have happened but for the considerable government intervention, I would say we were in—it was a more nervous position than we would have wanted [to be] in. We never anticipated the government help. We weren’t relying on those mechanisms. . . . I felt good about it, but we were going to bed every night with more risk than any responsible manager should want to have, either for our business or for the system as a whole—risk, not certainty. Bernanke told the FCIC that the Fed believed the run on Goldman that week could lead to its failure: “[Like JP Morgan,] Goldman Sachs I would say also protected themselves quite well on the whole. They had a lot of capital, a lot of liquidity. But being in the investment banking category rather than the commercial banking category, when that huge funding crisis hit all the investment banks, even Goldman Sachs, we thought there was a real chance that they would go under.” Although it did not keep pace with Morgan Stanley’s use of the Fed’s facilities, Goldman Sachs would continue to access the Fed’s facilities, increasing its PDCF borrowing to a high of billion in October and its TSLF borrowing to a high of . billion in December. On Sunday, September , both Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs applied to the Fed to become bank holding companies. “In my -year history, [Goldman and
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Morgan Stanley] had consistently opposed Federal Reserve supervision—[but after Lehman,] those franchises saw that they were next unless they did something drastic. That drastic thing was to become bank holding companies,” Tom Baxter, the New York Fed’s general counsel, told the FCIC. The Fed, in tandem with the Department of Justice, approved the two applications with extraordinary speed, waiving the standard five-day antitrust waiting period. Morgan Stanley instantly converted its billion industrial loan company into a national bank, subject to supervision by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and Goldman converted its billion industrial loan company into a state-chartered bank that was a member of the Federal Reserve System, subject to supervision by the Fed and New York State. The Fed would begin to supervise the two new bank holding companies. The two companies gained the immediate benefit of emergency access to the discount window for terms of up to days. But, more important, “I think the biggest benefit is it would show you that you’re important to the system and the Fed would not make you a holding company if they thought in a very short period of time you’d be out of business,” Mack told the FCIC. “It sends a signal that these two firms are going to survive.” In a show of confidence, Warren Buffett invested billion in Goldman Sachs, and Mitsubishi UFJ invested billion in Morgan Stanley. Mack said he had been waiting all weekend for confirmation of Mitsubishi’s investment when, late Sunday afternoon, he received a call from Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson. “Basically they said they wanted me to sell the firm,” Mack told the FCIC. Less than an hour later, Mitsubishi called to confirm its investment and the regulators backed off. Despite the weekend announcements, however, the run on Morgan Stanley continued. “Over the course of a week, a decreasing number of people [were] willing to do new repos,” Wong said. “They just couldn’t lend anymore.” By the end of September, Morgan Stanley’s liquidity pool would be billion. But Morgan Stanley’s liquidity depended critically on borrowing from two Fed programs, billion from the PDCF and billion from the TSLF. Goldman Sachs’s liquidity pool had recovered to about billion, backed by . billion from the PDCF and billion from the TSLF.
OVERTHECOUNTER DERIVATIVES: “A GRINDING HALT” Trading in the over-the-counter derivatives markets had been declining as investors grew more concerned about counterparty risk and as hedge funds and other market participants reduced their positions or exited. Activity in many of these markets slowed to a crawl; in some cases, there was no market at all—no trades whatsoever. A sharp and unprecedented contraction of the market occurred. “The OTC derivatives markets came to a grinding halt, jeopardizing the viability of every participant regardless of their direct exposure to subprime mortgage-backed securities,” the hedge fund manager Michael Masters told the FCIC. “Furthermore, when the OTC derivatives markets collapsed, participants reacted by liquidating their positions in other assets those swaps were designed to hedge.” This market was
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unregulated and largely opaque, with no public reporting requirements and little or no price discovery. With the Lehman bankruptcy, participants in the market became concerned about the exposures and creditworthiness of their counterparties and the value of their contracts. That uncertainly caused an abrupt retreat from the market. Badly hit was the market for derivatives based on nonprime mortgages. Firms had come to rely on the prices of derivatives contracts reflected in the ABX indices to value their nonprime mortgage assets. The ABX.HE.BBB- -, whose decline in had been an early bellwether for the market crisis, had been trading around cents on the dollar since May. But trading on this index had become so thin, falling from an average of about transactions per week from January to September to fewer than transactions per week in October , that index values weren’t informative. So, what was a valid price for these assets? Price discovery was a guessing game, even more than it had been under normal market conditions. The contraction of the OTC derivatives market had implications beyond the valuation of mortgage securities. Derivatives had been used to manage all manner of risk—the risk that currency exchange rates would fluctuate, the risk that interest rates would change, the risk that asset prices would move. Efficiently managing these risks in derivatives markets required liquidity so that positions could be adjusted daily and at little cost. But in the fall of , everyone wanted to reduce exposure to everyone else. There was a rush for the exits as participants worked to get out of existing trades. And because everyone was worried about the risk inherent in the next trade, there often was no next trade—and volume fell further. The result was a vicious circle of justifiable caution and inaction. Meanwhile, in the absence of a liquid derivatives market and efficient price discovery, every firm’s risk management became more expensive and difficult. The usual hedging mechanisms were impaired. An investor that wanted to trade at a loss to get out of a losing position might not find a buyer, and those that needed hedges would find them more expensive or unavailable. Several measures revealed the lack of liquidity in derivatives markets. First, the number of outstanding contracts in a broad range of OTC derivatives sharply declined. Since its deregulation by federal statute in December , this market had increased more than sevenfold. From June , to the end of the year, however, outstanding notional amounts of OTC derivatives fell by more than . This decline defied historical precedent. It was the first significant contraction in the market over a six-month period since the Bank for International Settlements began keeping statistics in . Moreover, it occurred during a period of great volatility in the financial markets. At such a time, firms usually turn to the derivatives market to hedge their increased risks—but now they fled the market. The lack of liquidity in derivatives markets was also signaled by the higher prices charged by OTC derivatives dealers to enter into contracts. Dealers bear additional risks when markets are illiquid, and they pass the cost of those risks on to market participants. The cost is evident in the increased “bid-ask spread”—the difference between the price at which dealers were willing to buy contracts (the bid price) and the price at which they were willing to sell them (the ask price). As markets became less
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liquid during the crisis, dealers worried that they might be saddled with unwanted exposure. As a result, they began charging more to sell contracts (raising their ask price), and the spread rose. In addition, they offered less to buy contracts (lowered their bid price), because they feared involvement with uncreditworthy counterparties. The increase in the spread in these contracts meant that the cost to a firm of hedging its exposure to the potential default of a loan or of another firm also increased. The cost of risk management rose just when the risks themselves had risen. Meanwhile, outstanding credit derivatives contracted by between December , when they reached their height of . trillion in notional amount, and the latest figures as of June , when they had fallen to . trillion. In sum, the sharp contraction in the OTC derivatives market in the fall of greatly diminished the ability of institutions to enter or unwind their contracts or to effectively hedge their business risks at a time when uncertainty in the financial system made risk management a top priority.
WASHINGTON MUTUAL: “IT’S YOURS” In the eight days after Lehman’s bankruptcy, depositors pulled . billion out of Washington Mutual, which now faced imminent collapse. WaMu had been the subject of concern for some time because of its poor mortgage-underwriting standards and its exposures to payment-option adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). Moody’s had downgraded WaMu’s senior unsecured debt to Baa, the lowest-tier investment-grade rating, in July, and then to junk status on September , citing “WAMU’s reduced financial flexibility, deteriorating asset quality, and expected franchise erosion.” The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) determined that the thrift likely could not “pay its obligations and meet its operating liquidity needs.” The government seized the bank on Thursday, September , , appointing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver; many unsecured creditors suffered losses. With assets of billion as of June , , WaMu thus became the largest insured depository institution in U.S. history to fail—bigger than IndyMac, bigger than any bank or thrift failure in the s and s. JP Morgan paid . billion to acquire WaMu’s banking operations from the FDIC on the same day; on the next day, WaMu’s parent company (now minus the thrift) filed for Chapter bankruptcy protection. FDIC officials told the FCIC that they had known in advance of WaMu’s troubles and thus had time to arrange the transaction with JP Morgan. JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon said that his bank was already examining WaMu’s assets for purchase when FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair called him and asked, “Would you be prepared to bid on WaMu?” “I said yes we would,” Dimon told the FCIC. “She called me up literally the next day and said—‘It’s yours.’ . . . I thought there was another bidder, by the way, the whole time, otherwise I would have bid a dollar—not [. billion], but we wanted to win.” The FDIC insurance fund came out of the WaMu bankruptcy whole. So did the uninsured depositors, and (of course) the insured depositors. But the FDIC never contemplated using FDIC funds to protect unsecured creditors, which it could have done by invoking the “systemic risk exception” under the FDIC Improvement Act of
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. (Recall that FDICIA required that failing banks be dismantled at the least cost to the FDIC unless the FDIC, the Fed, and Treasury agree that a particular company’s collapse poses a risk to the entire financial system; it had not been tested in years.) Losses among those creditors created panic among the unsecured creditors of other struggling banks, particularly Wachovia—with serious consequences. Nevertheless, FDIC Chairman Bair stood behind the decision. “I absolutely do think that was the right decision,” she told the FCIC. “WaMu was not a well-run institution.” She characterized the resolution of WaMu as “successful.” The FDIC’s decision would be hotly debated. Fed General Counsel Scott Alvarez told the FCIC that he agreed with Bair that “there should not have been intervention in WaMu.” But Treasury officials felt differently: “We were saying that’s great, we can all be tough, and we can be so tough that we plunge the financial system into the Great Depression,” Treasury’s Neel Kashkari told the FCIC. “And so, I think, in my judgment that was a mistake. . . . [A]t that time, the economy was in such a perilous state, it was like playing with fire.”
WACHOVIA: “AT THE FRONT END OF THE DOMINOES AS OTHER DOMINOES FELL” Wachovia, having bought Golden West, was the largest holder of payment-option ARMs, the same product that had helped bring down WaMu and Countrywide. Concerns about Wachovia—then the fourth-largest bank holding company—had also been escalating for some time. On September , the Merrill analyst Ed Najarian downgraded the company’s stock to “underperform,” pointing to weakness in its option ARM and commercial loan portfolios. On September , Wachovia executives met Fed officials to ask for an exemption from rules that limited holding companies’ use of insured deposits to meet their liquidity needs. The Fed did not accede; staff believed that Wachovia’s cash position was strong and that the requested relief was a “want” rather than a “need.” But they changed their minds after the Lehman bankruptcy, immediately launching daily conference calls to discuss liquidity with Wachovia management. Depositor outflows increased. On September , the Fed supported the company’s request to use insured deposits to provide liquidity to the holding company. On September , a Saturday, Wells Fargo Chairman Richard M. Kovacevich told Robert Steel, Wachovia’s CEO and recently a Treasury undersecretary, that Wells might be interested in acquiring the besieged bank, and the two agreed to speak later in the week. The same day, Fed Governor Kevin Warsh suggested that Steel also talk to Goldman. As a former vice chairman of Goldman, Steel could easily approach the firm, but the ensuing conversations were short; Goldman was not interested. Throughout the following week, it became increasingly clear that Wachovia needed to merge with a stronger financial institution. Then, WaMu’s failure on September “raised creditor concern about the health of Wachovia,” the Fed’s Alvarez told the FCIC. “The day after the failure of WaMu, Wachovia Bank depositors accelerated the withdrawal of significant amounts from their accounts,” Alvarez said. “In ad-
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dition, wholesale funds providers withdrew liquidity support from Wachovia. It appeared likely that Wachovia would soon become unable to fund its operations.” Steel said, “As the day progressed, some liquidity pressure intensified as financial institutions began declining to conduct normal financing transactions with Wachovia.” David Wilson, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s lead examiner at Wachovia, agreed. “The whole world changed” for Wachovia after WaMu’s failure, he said. The FDIC’s Bair had a slightly different view. WaMu’s failure “was practically a nonevent,” she told the FCIC. “It was below the fold if it was even on the front page . . . barely a blip given everything else that was going on.” The run on Wachovia Bank, the country’s fourth-largest commercial bank, was a “silent run” by uninsured depositors and unsecured creditors sitting in front of their computers, rather than by depositors standing in lines outside bank doors. By noon on Friday, September , creditors were refusing to roll over the bank’s short-term funding, including commercial paper and brokered certificates of deposit. The FDIC’s John Corston testified that Wachovia lost . billion of deposits and . billion of commercial paper and repos that day. By the end of the day on Friday, Wachovia told the Fed that worried creditors had asked it to repay roughly half of its long-term debt— billion to billion. Wachovia “did not have to pay all these funds from a contractual basis (they had not matured), but would have difficulty [borrowing from these lenders] going forward given the reluctance to repay early,” Richard Westerkamp, the Richmond Fed’s lead examiner at Wachovia, told the FCIC. In one day, the value of Wachovia’s -year bonds fell from cents to cents on the dollar, and the cost of buying protection on million of Wachovia debt jumped from , to almost ,, annually. Wachovia’s stock fell , wiping out billion in market value. Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan, whose agency regulated Wachovia’s commercial bank subsidiary, sent FDIC Chairman Bair a short and alarming email stating that Wachovia’s liquidity was unstable. “Wachovia was at the front end of the dominoes as other dominoes fell,” Steel told the FCIC. Government officials were not prepared to let Wachovia open for business on Monday, September , without a deal in place. “Markets were already under considerable strain after the events involving Lehman Brothers, AIG, and WaMu,” the Fed’s Alvarez told the FCIC. “There were fears that the failure of Wachovia would lead investors to doubt the financial strength of other organizations in similar situations, making it harder for those institutions to raise capital.” Wells Fargo had already expressed interest in buying Wachovia; by Friday, Citigroup had as well. Wachovia entered into confidentiality agreements with both companies on Friday and the two suitors immediately began their due diligence investigations. The key question was whether the FDIC would provide assistance in an acquisition. Though Citigroup never considered making a bid that did not presuppose such assistance, Wells Fargo was initially interested in purchasing all of Wachovia without it. FDIC assistance would require the first-ever application of the systemic risk exception under FDICIA. Over the weekend, federal officials hurriedly considered the
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systemic risks if the FDIC did not intervene and if creditors and uninsured depositors suffered losses. The signs for the bank were discouraging. Given the recent withdrawals, the FDIC and OCC predicted in an internal analysis that Wachovia could face up to billion of additional cash outflows the following week—including, most prominently, billion of further deposit outflows, as well as billion from corporate deposit accounts and billion from retail brokerage customers. Yet Wachovia had only billion in cash and cash equivalents. While the FDIC and OCC estimated that the company could use its collateral to raise another billion through the Fed’s discount window, the repo market, and the Federal Home Loan Banks, even those efforts would bring the amount on hand to only billion to cover the potential billion outflow. During the weekend, the Fed argued that Wachovia should be saved, with FDIC assistance if necessary. Its analysis focused on the firm’s counterparties and other “interdependencies” with large market participants, and stated that asset sales by mutual funds could cause short-term funding markets to “virtually shut down.” According to supporting analysis by the Richmond Fed, mutual funds held billion of Wachovia debt, which Richmond Fed staff concluded represented “significant systemic consequences”; and investment banks, “already weak and exposed to low levels of confidence,” owned billion of Wachovia’s billion debt and deposits. These firms were in danger of becoming “even more reliant on Federal Reserve support programs, such as PDCF, to support operations in the event of a Wachovia[-led] disruption.” In addition, Fed staff argued that a Wachovia failure would cause banks to “become even less willing to lend to businesses and households. . . . [T]hese effects would contribute to weaker economic performance, higher unemployment, and reduced wealth.” Secretary Paulson had recused himself from the decision because of his ties to Steel, but other members of Treasury had “vigorously advocated” saving Wachovia. White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten called Bair on Sunday to express support for the systemic risk exception. At about : P.M. on Sunday, September , Wells’s Kovacevich told Steel that he wanted more time to review Wachovia’s assets, particularly its commercial real estate holdings, and could not make a bid before Monday if there were to be no FDIC assistance. So Wells and Citigroup came to the table with proposals predicated on such assistance. Wells offered to cover the first billion of losses on a pool of billion worth of assets as well as of subsequent losses, if they grew large enough, capping the FDIC’s losses at billion. Citigroup wanted the FDIC to cover losses on a different, and larger, pool of billion worth of assets, but proposed to cover the first billion of losses and an additional billion a year for three years, while giving the FDIC billion in Wachovia preferred stock and stock warrants (rights to buy stock at a predetermined price) as compensation; the FDIC would cover any additional losses above billion. FDIC staff expected Wachovia’s losses to be between billion and billion. On the basis of that analysis and the particulars of the offers, they estimated that the
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Wells proposal would cost the FDIC between . billion and . billion, whereas the Citigroup proposal would cost the FDIC nothing. Late Sunday, Wachovia submitted its own proposal, under which the FDIC would provide assistance directly to the bank so that it could survive as a stand-alone entity. But the FDIC still hadn’t decided to support the systemic risk exception. Its board—which included the heads of the OCC and OTS—met at : A.M. on Monday, September , to decide Wachovia’s fate before the markets opened. FDIC Associate Director Miguel Browne hewed closely to the analysis prepared by the Richmond Fed: Wachovia’s failure carried the risk of knocking down too many dominoes in lines stretching in too many directions whose fall would hurt too many people, including American taxpayers. He also raised concerns about potential global implications and reduced confidence in the dollar. Bair remained reluctant to intervene in private financial markets but ultimately agreed. “Well, I think this is, you know . . . one option of a lot of not-very-good options,” she said at the meeting. “I have acquiesced in that decision based on the input of my colleagues, and the fact the statute gives multiple decision makers a say in this process. I’m not completely comfortable with it but we need to move forward with something, clearly, because this institution is in a tenuous situation.” To win the approval of Bair and John Reich (the OTS director who served on the FDIC board), Treasury ultimately agreed to take the unusual step of funding all government losses from the proposed transaction. Without this express commitment from Treasury, the FDIC would have been the first to bear losses out of its Deposit Insurance Fund, which then held about . billion; normally, help would have come from Treasury only after that fund was depleted. According to the minutes of the meeting, Bair thought it was “especially important” that Treasury agree to fund losses, given that “it has vigorously advocated the transaction.” After just minutes, the FDIC board voted to support government assistance. The resolution also identified the winning bidder: Citigroup. “It was the fog of war,” Bair told the FCIC. “The system was highly unstable. Who was going to take the chance that Wachovia would have a depository run on Monday?” Wachovia’s board quickly voted to accept Citigroup’s bid. Wachovia, Citigroup, and the FDIC signed an agreement in principle and Wachovia and Citigroup executed an exclusivity agreement that prohibited Wachovia from, among other things, negotiating with other potential acquirers. In the midst of the market turmoil, the Federal Open Market Committee met at the end of September , at about the time of the announced Citigroup acquisition of Wachovia and the invocation of the systemic risk exception. “The planned merger of two very large institutions led to some concern among FOMC participants that bigger and bigger firms were being created that would be ‘too big to fail,’” according a letter from Chairman Bernanke to the FCIC. He added that he “shared this concern, and voiced my hope that TARP would create options other than mergers for managing problems at large institutions and that subsequently, through the process of regulatory reform, we might develop good resolution mechanisms and decisively address the issues of financial concentration and too big to fail.”
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Citigroup and Wachovia immediately began working on the deal—even as Wachovia’s stock fell . to . on September , the day that TARP was initially rejected by lawmakers. They faced tremendous pressure from the regulators and the markets to conclude the transaction before the following Monday, but the deal was complicated: Citigroup was not acquiring the holding company, just the bank, and Citigroup wanted to change some of the original terms. Then came a surprise: on Thursday morning, October , Wells Fargo returned to the table and made a competing bid to buy all of Wachovia for a share—seven times Citigroup’s bid, with no government assistance. There was a great deal of speculation over the timing of Wells Fargo’s new proposal, particularly given IRS Notice -. This administrative ruling, issued just two days earlier, allowed an acquiring company to write off the losses of an acquired company immediately, rather than spreading them over time. Wells told the SEC that the IRS ruling permitted the bank to reduce taxable income by billion in the first year following the acquisition rather than by billion per year for three years. However, Wells said this “was itself not a major factor” in its decision to bid for Wachovia without direct government assistance. Former Wells chairman Kovacevich told the FCIC that Wells’s revised bid reflected additional due diligence, the point he had made to Wachovia CEO Steel at the time. But the FDIC’s Bair said Kovacevich told her at the time that the tax change had been a factor leading to Wells’s revised bid. On Thursday, October , three days after accepting Citigroup’s federally assisted offer, Wachovia’s board convened an emergency : P.M. session to discuss Wells’s revised bid. The Wachovia board voted unanimously in favor. At about : A.M. Friday, Wachovia’s Steel, its General Counsel Jane Sherburne, and FDIC Chairman Bair called Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit to inform him that Wachovia had signed a definitive merger agreement with Wells. Steel read from prepared notes. Pandit was stunned. “He was disappointed. That’s an understatement,” Steel told the FCIC. Pandit thought Citigroup and Wachovia already had a deal. After Steel and Sherburne dropped off the phone call, Pandit asked Bair if Citigroup could keep its original loss-sharing agreement to purchase Wachovia if it matched Wells’s offer of a share. Bair said no, reasoning that the FDIC was not going to stand in the way of a private deal. Nor was it the role of the agency to help Citigroup in a bidding war. She also told the FCIC that she had concerns about Citigroup’s own viability if it acquired Wachovia for that price. “In reality, we didn’t know how unstable Citigroup was at that point,” Chairman Bair said. “Here we were selling a troubled institution . . . with a troubled mortgage portfolio to another troubled institution. . . . I think if that deal had gone through, Citigroup would have had to have been bailed out again.” Later Friday morning, Wachovia announced the deal with Wells with the blessing of the FDIC. “This agreement won’t require even a penny from the FDIC,” Kovacevich said in the press release. Steel added that the “deal enables us to keep Wachovia intact and preserve the value of an integrated company, without government support.” On Monday, October , Citigroup filed suit to enjoin Wells Fargo’s acquisition of
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Wachovia, but without success. The Wells Fargo deal would close at midnight on December , for per share. IRS Notice - was repealed in . The Treasury’s inspector general, who later conducted an investigation of the circumstances of its issuance, reported that the purpose of the notice was to encourage strong banks to acquire weak banks by removing limitations on the use of tax losses. The inspector general concluded that there was a legitimate argument that the notice may have been an improper change of the tax code by Treasury; the Constitution allows Congress alone to change the tax code. A congressional report estimated that repealing the notice saved about billion of tax revenues over years. However, the Wells controller, Richard Levy, told the FCIC that to date Wells has not recognized any benefits from the notice, because it has not yet had taxable income to offset.
TARP: “COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH” Ten days after the Lehman bankruptcy, the Fed had provided nearly billion to investment banks and commercial banks through the PDCF and TSLF lending facilities, in an attempt to quell the storms in the repo markets, and the Fed and Treasury had announced unprecedented programs to support money market funds. By the end of September, the Fed’s balance sheet had grown to . trillion. But the Fed was running out of options. In the end, it could only make collateralized loans to provide liquidity support. It could not replenish financial institutions’ capital, which was quickly dissolving. Uncertainty about future losses on bad assets made it difficult for investors to determine which institutions could survive, even with all the Fed’s new backstops. In short, the financial system was slipping away from its lender of last resort. On Thursday, September , the Fed and Treasury proposed what Secretary Paulson called a “comprehensive approach” to stem the mounting crisis in the financial system by purchasing the toxic mortgage-related assets that were weighing down many banks’ balance sheets. In the early hours of Saturday, September , as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were preparing to become bank holding companies, Treasury sent Congress a draft proposal of the legislation for TARP. The modest length of that document—just three pages—belied its historical significance. It would give Treasury the authority to spend as much as billion to purchase toxic assets from financial institutions. The initial reaction was not promising. For example, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd said on Tuesday, “This proposal is stunning and unprecedented in its scope—and lack of detail, I might add.” “There are very few details in this legislation,” Ranking Member Richard Shelby said. “Rather than establishing a comprehensive, workable plan for resolving this crisis, I believe this legislation merely codifies Treasury’s ad hoc approach.” Paulson told a Senate committee on Tuesday, “Of course, we all believe that the very best thing we can do is make sure that the capital markets are open and that
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lenders are continuing to lend. And so that is what this overall program does, it deals with that.” Bernanke told the Joint Economic Committee Wednesday: “I think that this is the most significant financial crisis in the post-War period for the United States, and it has in fact a global reach. . . . I think it is extraordinarily important to understand that, as we have seen in many previous examples of different countries and different times, choking up of credit is like taking the lifeblood away from the economy.” He told the House Financial Services Committee on the same day, “People are saying, ‘Wall Street, what does it have to do with me?’ That is the way they are thinking about it. Unfortunately, it has a lot to do with them. It will affect their company, it will affect their job, it will affect their economy. That affects their own lives, affects their ability to borrow and to save and to save for retirement and so on.” By the evening of Sunday, September , as bankers and regulators hammered out Wachovia’s rescue, congressional negotiators had agreed on the outlines of a deal. Senator Mel Martinez, a former HUD secretary and then a member of the Banking Committee, told the FCIC about a meeting with Paulson and Bernanke that Sunday: I just remember thinking, you know, Armageddon. The thing that was the most frightening about it is that even with them asking for extraordinary powers, that they were not at all assured that they could prevent the kind of financial disaster that I think really was greater than the Great Depression. . . . And obviously to a person like myself I think you think, “Wow, if these guys that are in the middle of it and hold the titles that they hold believe this to be as dark as they’re painting it, it must be pretty darned dark.” Nevertheless, on Monday, September , just hours after Citigroup had announced its proposed government-assisted acquisition of Wachovia, the House rejected TARP by a vote of to . The markets’ response was immediate: the Dow Jones Industrial Average quickly plunged points, or almost . To broaden the bill’s appeal, TARP’s supporters made changes, including a temporary increase in the cap on FDIC’s deposit insurance coverage from , to , per customer account. On Wednesday evening, the Senate voted in favor by a margin of to . On Friday, October , the House agreed, to , and President George W. Bush signed the law, which had grown to pages. TARP’s stated goal was to restore liquidity and confidence in financial markets by providing “authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers.” To provide oversight for the billion program, the legislation established the Congressional Oversight Panel and the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP). But the markets continued to deteriorate. On Monday, October , the Dow closed below , for the first time in four years; by the end of the week it was down al-
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most , points, or , below its peak in October . The spread between the interest rate at which banks lend to one another and interest rates on Treasuries—a closely watched indicator of market confidence—hit an all-time high. And the dollar value of outstanding commercial paper issued by both financial and nonfinancial companies had fallen by billion in the month between Lehman’s failure and TARP’s enactment. Even firms that had survived the previous disruptions in the commercial paper markets were now feeling the strain. In response, on October , the Fed created yet another emergency program, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, to purchase secured and unsecured commercial paper directly from eligible issuers. This program, which allowed firms to roll over their debt, would be widely used by financial and nonfinancial firms. The three financial firms that made the greatest use of the program were foreign institutions: UBS (which borrowed a cumulative billion over time), Dexia ( billion), and Barclays ( billion). Other financial firms included GE Capital ( billion), Prudential Funding (. billion), and Toyota Motor Credit Corporation (. billion). Nonfinancial firms that participated included Verizon (. billion), Harley-Davidson (. billion), McDonald’s, ( million) and Georgia Transmission ( million). Treasury was already rethinking TARP. The best way to structure the program was not obvious. Which toxic assets would qualify? How would the government determine fair prices in an illiquid market? Would firms holding these assets agree to sell them at a fair price if doing so would require them to realize losses? How could the government avoid overpaying? Such problems would take time to solve, and Treasury wanted to bring stability to the deteriorating markets as quickly as possible. The key concern for markets and regulators was that they weren’t sure they understood the extent of toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions—so they couldn’t be sure which banks were really solvent. The quickest reassurance, then, would be to simply recapitalize the financial sector. The change was allowed under the TARP legislation, which stated that Treasury, in consultation with the Fed, could purchase financial instruments, including stock, if they deemed such purchases necessary to promote financial market stability. However, the new proposal would pose a host of new problems. By injecting capital in these firms, the government would become a major shareholder in the private financial sector. On Sunday, October , after agreeing to the terms of the capital injections, Paulson, Bernanke, Bair, Dugan, and Geithner selected a small group of major financial institutions to which they would immediately offer capital: the four largest commercial bank holding companies (Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan, and Wells), the three remaining large investment banks (Goldman and Morgan Stanley, which were now bank holding companies, and Merrill, which Bank of America had agreed to acquire), and two important clearing and settlement banks (BNY Mellon and State Street). Together, these nine institutions held more than trillion in assets, or about of all assets in U.S. banks. Paulson summoned the firms’ chief executives to Washington on Columbus Day, October . Along with Bernanke, Bair, Dugan, and Geithner, Paulson explained that Treasury had set aside billion from TARP to purchase equity in financial
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institutions under the newly formed Capital Purchase Program (CPP). Specifically, Treasury would purchase senior preferred stock that would pay a dividend for the first five years; the rate would rise to thereafter to encourage the companies to pay the government back. Firms would also have to issue stock warrants to Treasury and agree to abide by certain standards for executive compensation and corporate governance. The regulators had already decided to allocate half of these funds to the nine firms assembled that day: billion each to Citigroup, JP Morgan, and Wells; billion to Bank of America; billion each to Merrill, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman; billion to BNY Mellon; and billion to State Street. “We didn’t want it to look or be like a nationalization” of the banking sector, Paulson told the FCIC. For that reason, the capital injections took the form of nonvoting stock, and the terms were intended to be attractive. Paulson emphasized the importance of the banks’ participation to provide confidence to the system. He told the CEOs: “If you don’t take [the capital] and sometime later your regulator tells you that you are undercapitalized . . . you may not like the terms if you have to come back to me.” All nine firms took the deal. “They made a coherent, I thought, a cogent argument about responding to this crisis, which, remember, was getting dramatically worse. It wasn’t leading to a run on some of the banks but it was getting worse in the marketplace,” JP Morgan’s Dimon told the FCIC. To further reassure markets that it would not allow the largest financial institutions to fail, the government also announced two new FDIC programs the next day. The first temporarily guaranteed certain senior debt for all FDIC-insured institutions and some holding companies. This program was used broadly. For example, Goldman Sachs had billion in debt backed by the FDIC outstanding in January , and billion at the end of , according to public filings; Morgan Stanley had billion at the end of and billion at the end of . GE Capital, one of the heaviest users of the program, had billion of FDIC-backed debt outstanding at the end of and billion at the end of . Citigroup had billion of FDIC guaranteed debt outstanding at the end of and billion at the end of ; JPMorgan Chase had billion outstanding at the end of and billion at the end of . The second provided deposit insurance to certain non-interest-bearing deposits, like checking accounts, at all insured depository institution. Because of the risk to taxpayers, the measures required the Fed, the FDIC, and Treasury to declare a systemic risk exception under FDICIA, as they had done two weeks earlier to facilitate Citigroup’s bid for Wachovia. Later in the week, Treasury opened TARP to qualifying “healthy” and “viable” banks, thrifts, and holding companies, under the same terms that the first nine firms had received. The appropriate federal regulator—the Fed, FDIC, OCC, or OTS— would review applications and pass them to Treasury for final approval. The program was intended not only to restore confidence in the banking system but also to provide banks with sufficient capital to fulfill their “responsibilities in the areas of lending, dividend and compensation policies, and foreclosure mitigation.”
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“The whole reason for designing the program was so many banks would take it, would have the capital, and that would lead to lending. That was the whole purpose,” Paulson told the FCIC. However, there were no specific requirements for those banks to make loans to businesses and households. “Right after we announced it we had critics start saying, ‘You’ve got to force them to lend,’” Paulson said. Although he said he couldn’t see how to do this, he did concede that the program could have been more effective in this regard. The enabling legislation did have provisions affecting the compensation of senior executives and participating firms’ ability to pay dividends to shareholders. Over time, these provisions would become more stringent, and the following year, in compliance with another measure in the act that created TARP, Treasury would create the Office of the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation to review the appropriateness of compensation packages among TARP recipients. Treasury invested about billion in financial institutions under TARP’s Capital Purchase Program by the end of ; ultimately, it would invest billion in financial institutions. In the ensuing months, Treasury would provide much of TARP’s remaining billion to specific financial institutions, including AIG ( billion plus a billion lending facility), Citigroup ( billion plus loss guarantees), and Bank of America ( billion). On December , it established the Automotive Industry Financing Program, under which it ultimately invested billion of TARP funds to make investments in and loans to automobile manufacturers and auto finance companies, specifically General Motors, GMAC, Chrysler, and Chrysler Financial. On January , , President Bush notified Congress that he intended not to access the second half of the billion in TARP funds, so that he might “‘ensure that such funds are available early’ for the new administration.” As of September —two years after TARP’s creation—Treasury had allocated billion of the billion authorized. Of that amount, billion had been repaid, billion remained outstanding, and . billion in losses had been incurred. About billion of the outstanding funds were in the Capital Purchase Program. Treasury still held large stakes in GM ( of common stock), Ally Financial (formerly known as GMAC; ), and Chrysler (). Moreover, . billion of TARP funds remained invested in AIG in addition to . billion of loans from the New York Fed and a billion non-TARP equity investment by the New York Fed in two of AIG’s foreign insurance companies. By December , all nine companies invited to the initial Columbus Day meeting had fully repaid the government. Of course, TARP was only one of more than two dozen emergency programs totaling trillions of dollars put in place during the crisis to stabilize the financial system and to rescue specific firms. Indeed, TARP was not even the largest. Many of these programs are discussed in this and previous chapters. For just some examples: The Fed’s TSLF and PDCF programs peaked at billion and billion, respectively. Its money market funding peaked at billion in January , and its Commercial Paper Funding Facility peaked at billion, also in January . When it was introduced, the FDIC’s program to guarantee senior debt for all FDIC-insured
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institutions stood ready to backstop as much as billion in bank debt. The Fed’s largest program, announced in November , purchased . trillion in agency mortgage–backed securities.
AIG: “WE NEEDED TO STOP THE SUCKING CHEST WOUND IN THIS PATIENT” AIG would be the first TARP recipient that was not part of the Capital Purchase Program. It still had two big holes to fill, despite the billion loan from the New York Fed. Its securities-lending business was underwater despite payments in September and October of billion that the Fed loan had enabled; and it still needed billion to pay credit default swap (CDS) counterparties, despite earlier payments of billion. On November , the government announced that it was restructuring the New York Fed loan and, in the process, Treasury would purchase billion in AIG preferred stock. As was done in the Capital Purchase Program, in return for the equity provided, Treasury received stock warrants from AIG and imposed restrictions on dividends and executive compensation. That day, the New York Fed created two off-balance-sheet entities to hold AIG’s bad assets associated with securities lending (Maiden Lane II) and CDS (Maiden Lane III). Over the next month, the New York Fed loaned Maiden Lane II . billion so that it could purchase mortgage-backed securities from AIG’s life insurance company subsidiaries. This enabled those subsidiaries to pay back their securitieslending counterparties, bringing to . billion the total payments AIG would make with government help. These payments are listed in figure .. Maiden Lane III was created with a . billion loan from the New York Fed and an AIG investment of billion, supported by the Treasury investment. That money went to buy CDOs from of AIG Financial Products’ CDS counterparties. The CDOs had a face value of . billion, which AIG Financial Products had guaranteed through its CDS. Because AIG had already posted billion in collateral to its counterparties, Maiden Lane III paid . billion to those counterparties, providing them with the full face amount of the CDOs in return for the cancellation of their rights under the CDS. A condition of this transaction was that AIG waive its legal claims against those counterparties. These payments are listed in figure .. Goldman Sachs received billion in payments from Maiden Lane III related to the CDS it had purchased from AIG. During the FCIC’s January , , hearing, Goldman CEO Lloyd Blankfein testified that Goldman Sachs would not have lost any money if AIG had failed, because his firm had purchased credit protection to cover the difference between the amount of collateral it demanded from AIG and the amount of collateral paid by AIG. Documents submitted to the FCIC by Goldman after the hearing do show that the firm owned . billion of credit protection in the form of CDS on AIG, although much of that protection came from financially unstable companies, including Citibank (. million), which itself had to be propped up by the government, and Lehman (. million), which was bankrupt by the
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Payments to AIG Counterparties Payments to AIG Securities Lending Counterparties
Payments to AIG Credit Default Swap Counterparties
IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS Sept. 18 to Dec. 12, 2008
IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS As of Nov. 17, 2008
Barclays Deutsche Bank BNP Paribas Goldman Sachs Bank of America HSBC Citigroup Dresdner Kleinwort Merrill Lynch UBS ING Morgan Stanley Société Générale AIG International Credit Suisse Paloma Securities Citadel TOTAL
$7.0 6.4 4.9 4.8 4.5 3.3 2.3 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 $43.7
Of this total, $19.5 billion came from Maiden Lane II, $17.2 billion came from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and $7 billion came from AIG.
Maiden Collateral Lane III payments payment from AIG
Société Générale $6.9 Goldman Sachs 5.6 Merrill Lynch 3.1 Deutsche Bank 2.8 UBS 2.5 Calyon 1.2 Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank 1.0 Bank of Montreal 0.9 Wachovia 0.8 Barclays 0.6 Bank of America 0.5 Royal Bank of Scotland 0.5 Dresdner Bank AG 0.4 Rabobank 0.3 Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.1 HSBC Bank USA 0.0 TOTAL $27.1
$9.6 8.4 3.1 5.7 1.3 3.1 0.8 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.2 $35.0
NOTE: Amounts may not add due to rounding. SOURCE: Special Inspector General for TARP
Figure . time AIG was rescued. In an FCIC hearing, Goldman CFO David Viniar said that those counterparties had posted collateral. Goldman also argued that the billion of CDS protection that it purchased from AIG was part of Goldman’s “matched book,” meaning that Goldman sold billion in offsetting protection to its own clients; it provided information to the FCIC indicating that the billion received from Maiden Lane III was entirely paid to its clients. Without the federal assistance, Goldman would have had to find the billion some other way.
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Goldman also produced documents to the FCIC that showed it received . billion from AIG related to credit default swaps on CDOs that were not part of Maiden Lane III. Of that . billion, . billion was received after, and thus made possible by, the federal bailout of AIG. And most—. billion—of the total was for proprietary trades (that is, trades made solely for Goldman’s benefit rather than on behalf of a client) largely relating to Goldman’s Abacus CDOs. Thus, unlike the billion received from AIG on trades in which Goldman owed the money to its own counterparties, this . billion was retained by Goldman. That AIG’s counterparties did not incur any losses on their investments—because AIG, once it was backed by the government, paid claims to CDS counterparties at of face value—has been widely criticized. In November , SIGTARP faulted the New York Fed for failing to obtain concessions. The inspector general said that seven of the top eight counterparties had insisted on coverage and that the New York Fed had agreed because efforts to obtain concessions from all counterparties had little hope of success. SIGTARP was highly critical of the New York Fed’s negotiations. From the outset, it found, the New York Fed was poorly prepared to assist AIG. To prevent AIG’s failure, the New York Fed had hastily agreed to the billion bailout on substantially the same terms that a private-sector group had contemplated. SIGTARP blamed the Fed’s own negotiating strategy for the outcome, which it described as the transfer of “billions of dollars of cash from the Government to AIG’s counterparties, even though senior policy makers contend that assistance to AIG’s counterparties was not a relevant consideration.” In June , TARP’s Congressional Oversight Panel criticized the AIG bailout for having a “poisonous” effect on capital markets. The report said the government’s failure to require “shared sacrifice” among AIG’s creditors effectively altered the relationship between the government and the markets, signaling an implicit “too big to fail” guarantee for certain firms. The report said the New York Fed should have insisted on concessions from counterparties. Treasury and Fed officials countered that concessions would have led to an instant ratings downgrade and precipitated a run on AIG. New York Fed officials told the FCIC that they had very little bargaining power with counterparties who were protected by the terms of their CDS contracts. And, after providing a billion loan, the government could not let AIG fail. “Counterparties said ‘we got the collateral, the contractual rights, you’ve been rescued by the Fed, Uncle Sam’s behind you, why would we let you out of a contract you agreed to?” New York Fed General Counsel Tom Baxter told the FCIC. “And then the question was, should we use our regulatory power to leverage counterparties. From my view, that would have been completely inappropriate, an abuse of power, and not something we were willing to even contemplate.” Sarah Dahlgren, who was in charge of the Maiden Lane III transaction at the New York Fed, said the government could not have threatened bankruptcy. “There was a financial meltdown,” she told the FCIC. “The credibility of the United States government was on the line.” SIGTARP acknowledged that the New York Fed “felt ethi-
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cally restrained from threatening an AIG bankruptcy because it had no actual plans to carry out such a threat” and that it was “uncomfortable interfering with the sanctity of the counterparties’ contractual rights with AIG,” which were “certainly valid concerns.” Geithner has said he was confident that full reimbursement was “absolutely” the right decision. “We did it in a way that I believe was not just least cost to the taxpayer, best deal for the taxpayer, but helped avoid much, much more damage than would have happened without that.” New York Fed officials told the FCIC that threats to AIG’s survival continued after the billion loan on September . “If you don’t fix the [securities] lending or the CDOs, [AIG would] blow through the billion. So we needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient,” Dahlgren said. “It wasn’t just AIG—it was the financial markets. . . . It kept getting worse and worse and worse.” Baxter told the FCIC that Maiden Lane III stopped the “hemorrhage” from AIG Financial Products, which was paying collateral to counterparties by drawing on the billion government loan. In addition, because Maiden Lane III received the CDOs underlying the CDS, “as value comes back in those CDOs, that’s value that is going to be first used to pay off the Fed loan; . . . the likely outcome of Maiden Lane III is that we’re going to be paid in full,” he said. In total, the Fed and Treasury had made available over billion in assistance to AIG to prevent its failure. As of September , , the total outstanding assistance has been reduced to . billion, primarily through the sale of AIG business units.
CITIGROUP: “LET THE WORLD KNOW THAT WE WILL NOT PULL A LEHMAN” The failed bid for Wachovia reflected badly on Citigroup. Its stock fell on October , , the day Wachovia announced that it preferred Wells’s offer, and another within a week. “Having agreed to do the deal was a recognition on our part that we needed it,” Edward “Ned” Kelly III, vice chairman of Citigroup, told the FCIC. “And if we needed it and didn’t get it, what did that imply for the strength of the firm going forward?” Roger Cole, then head of banking supervision at the Federal Reserve Board, saw the failed acquisition as a turning point, the moment “when Citi really came under the microscope.” “It was regarded [by the market] as an indication of bad management at Citi that they lost the deal, and had it taken away from them by a smarter, more astute Wells Fargo team,” Cole told the FCIC. “And then here’s an organization that doesn’t have the core funding [insured deposits] that we were assuming that they would get by that deal.” Citigroup’s stock rose the day after the Columbus Day announcement that it would receive government capital, but the optimism did not last. Two days later, Citigroup announced a . billion net loss for the third quarter, concentrated in subprime and Alt-A mortgages, commercial real estate investments, and structured
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investment vehicle (SIV) write-downs. The bank’s stock fell in the following week and, by November , hit single digits for the first time since . The market’s unease was heightened by press speculation that the company’s board had lost confidence in senior management, Kelly said. On November , the company announced that the value of the SIVs had fallen by . billion in the month since it had released third-quarter earnings. Citigroup was therefore going to bring the remaining . billion in off-balance-sheet SIV assets onto its books. Investors clipped almost another off the value of the stock, its largest single-day drop since the October stock market crash. Two days later, the stock closed at .. Credit defaults swaps on Citigroup reached a steep , annually to protect million in Citigroup debt against default. According to Kelly, these developments threatened to make perceptions become a reality for the bank: “[Investors] look at those spreads and say, ‘Is this some place I really want to put my money?’ And that’s not just in terms of wholesale funding, that’s people who also have deposits with us at various points.” The firm’s various regulators watched the stock price, the daily liquidity, and the CDS spreads with alarm. On Friday, November , the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) imposed a . billion cash “lockup” to protect Citigroup’s London-based broker-dealer. FDIC examiners knew that this action would be “very damaging” to the bank’s liquidity and worried that the FSA or other foreign regulators might impose additional cash requirements in the following week. By the close of business Friday, there was widespread concern that if the U.S. government failed to act, Citigroup might not survive; its liquidity problems had reached “crisis proportions.” Among regulators at the FDIC and the Fed, there was no debate. Fed Chairman Bernanke told the FCIC, “We were looking at this firm [in the fall of ] and saying, ‘Citigroup is not a very strong firm, but it’s only one firm and the others are okay,’ but not recognizing that that’s sort of like saying, ‘Well, four out of your five heart ventricles are fine, and the fifth one is lousy.’ They’re all interconnected, they all connect to each other; and, therefore, the failure of one brings the others down.” The FDIC’s Arthur Murton emailed his colleague Michael Krimminger on November : “Given that the immediate risk is liquidity, the way to address that is by letting counterparties know that they will be protected both at the bank and holding company level. . . . [T]he main point is to let the world know that we will not pull a Lehman.” Krimminger, special adviser to the FDIC chairman, agreed: “At this stage, it is probably appropriate to be clear and direct that the US government will not allow Citi to fail to meet its obligations.” Citigroup’s own calculations suggested that a drop in deposits of just . would wipe out its cash surplus. If the trend of recent withdrawals continued, the company could expect a outflow of deposits per day. Unless Citigroup received a large and immediate injection of funds, its coffers would be empty before the weekend. Meanwhile, Citigroup executives remained convinced that the company was sound and that the market was simply panicking. CEO Pandit argued, “This was not a fundamental situation, it was not about the capital we had, not about the funding we had at that time, but with the stock price where it was . . . perception becomes reality.” All
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that was needed, Citigroup contended, was for the government to expand access to existing liquidity facilities. “People were questioning what everything was worth at the time. . . . [T]here was a flight not just to quality and safety, but almost a flight to certainty,” Kelly, then Pandit’s adviser, told the FCIC. The FDIC dismissed Citigroup’s request that the government simply expand its access to existing liquidity programs, concluding that any “incremental liquidity” could be quickly eliminated as depositors rushed out the door. Officials also believed the company did not have sufficient high-quality collateral to borrow more under the Fed’s mostly collateral-based liquidity programs. In addition to the billion from TARP, Citigroup was already getting by on substantial government support. As of November , it had . billion outstanding under the Fed’s collateralized liquidity programs and million under the Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility. And it had borrowed billion from the Federal Home Loan Banks. In December, Citigroup would have a total of billion in senior debt guaranteed by the FDIC under the debt guarantee program. On Sunday, November , FDIC staff recommended to its board that a third systemic risk exception be made under FDICIA. As they had done previously, regulators decided that a proposed resolution had to be announced over the weekend to buttress investor confidence before markets opened Monday. The failure of Citigroup “would significantly undermine business and household confidence,” according to FDIC staff. Regulators were also concerned that the economic effects of a Citigroup failure would undermine the impact of the recently implemented Capital Purchase Program under TARP. Treasury agreed to provide Citigroup with an additional billion in TARP funds in exchange for preferred stock with an dividend. This injection of cash brought the company’s TARP tab to billion. The bank also received . billion in capital benefits related to its issuance of preferred stock and the government’s guarantee of certain assets. Under the guarantee, Citigroup and the government would identify a billion pool of assets around which a protective “ring fence” would be placed. In effect, this was a loss-sharing agreement between Citigroup and the federal government. “There was not a huge amount of science in coming to that [ billion] number,” Citigroup’s Kelly told the FCIC. He said the deal was structured to “give the market comfort that the catastrophic risk has been taken off the table.” When its terms were finalized in January , the guaranteed pool, which contained mainly loans and residential and commercial mortgage–backed securities, was adjusted downward to billion. Citigroup assumed responsibility for the first . billion in losses on the ringfenced assets. The federal government would assume responsibility for of all losses above that amount. Should these losses actually materialize, Treasury would absorb the first billion using TARP funds, the FDIC would absorb the next billion from the Deposit Insurance Fund (for which it had needed to approve the systemic risk exception), and the Fed would absorb the balance. In return, Citigroup agreed to grant the government billion in preferred stock, as well as warrants that gave the government the option to purchase additional shares. After analyzing the
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quality of the protected assets, FDIC staff projected that the Deposit Insurance Fund would not incur any losses. Once again, the FDIC Board met late on a Sunday to determine the fate of a struggling institution. Brief dissent on the P.M. conference call came from OTS Director John Reich, who questioned why similar relief had not been extended to OTS-supervised thrifts that failed earlier. “There isn’t any doubt in my mind that this is a systemic situation,” he said. But he added, In hindsight, I think there have been some systemic situations prior to this one that were not classified as such. The failure of IndyMac pointed the focus to the next weakest institution, which was WaMu, and its failure pointed to Wachovia, and now we’re looking at Citi and I wonder who’s next. I hope that all of the regulators, all of us, including Treasury and the Fed, are looking at these situations in a balanced manner, and I fear there has been some selective creativity exercised in the determination of what is systemic and what’s not and what’s possible for the government to do and what’s not. The FDIC Board approved the proposal unanimously. The announcement beat the opening bell, and the markets responded positively: Citigroup’s stock price soared almost , closing at .. The ring fence would stay in place until December , at which time Citigroup terminated the government guarantee in tandem with repaying billion in TARP funds. In December , Treasury announced the sale of its final shares of Citigroup’s common stock.
BANK OF AMERICA: “A SHOTGUN WEDDING” With Citigroup stabilized, the markets would quickly shift focus to the next domino: Bank of America, which had swallowed Countrywide earlier in the year and, on September , had announced it was going to take on Merrill Lynch as well. The merger would create the world’s largest brokerage and reinforce Bank of America’s position as the country’s largest depository institution. Given the share prices of the two companies at the time, the transaction was valued at billion. But the deal was not set to close until the first quarter of the following year. In the interim, the companies continued to operate as independent entities, pending shareholder and regulatory approval. For that reason, Merrill CEO John Thain and Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis had represented their companies separately at the Columbus Day meeting at Treasury. Treasury would invest the full billion in Bank of America only after the Merrill acquisition was complete. In October, Merrill Lynch reported a net loss for the third quarter of . billion. In its October earnings press release, Merrill Lynch described write-downs related to its CDO positions and other real estate–related securities and assets affected by the “severe market dislocations.” Thain told investors on the conference call that Merrill’s strategy was to clean house. It now held less than billion in asset-backed-security
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CDOs and no Alt-A positions at all. “We’re down to million in subprime on our trading books,” Thain said. “We cut our non-U.S. mortgage business positions in half.” The Fed approved the merger on November , noting that both Bank of America and Merrill were well capitalized and would remain so after the merger, and that Bank of America “has sufficient financial resources to effect the proposal.” Shareholders of both companies approved the acquisition on December . But then Bank of America executives began to have second thoughts, Lewis told the FCIC. In mid-November, Merrill Lynch’s after-tax losses for the fourth quarter had been projected to reach about billion; the projection grew to about billion by December , billion by December , and billion by December . Lewis said he learned only on December that Merrill’s losses had “accelerated pretty dramatically.” Lewis attributed the losses to a “much, much, higher deterioration of the assets we identified than we had expected going into the fourth quarter.” In a January conference call, Lewis and CFO Joe Price told investors that the bank had not been aware of the extent of Merrill’s fourth-quarter losses at the time of the shareholder vote. “It wasn’t an issue of not identifying the assets,” Ken Lewis said. “It was that we did not expect the significant deterioration, which happened in mid- to late December that we saw.” Merrill’s Thain contests that version of events. He told the FCIC that Merrill provided daily profit and loss reports to Bank of America and that bank executives should have known about losses as they occurred. The SEC later brought an enforcement action against Bank of America, charging the company with failing to disclose about . billion of known and expected Merrill Lynch losses before the December shareholder vote. According to the SEC’s complaint, these insufficient disclosures deprived shareholders of material information that was critical to their ability to fairly evaluate the merger. In February , Bank of America would pay million to settle the SEC’s action. On December , Lewis called Treasury Secretary Paulson to inform him that Bank of America was considering invoking the material adverse change (MAC) clause of the merger agreement, which would allow the company to exit or renegotiate the terms of the acquisition. “The severity of the losses were high enough that we should at least consider a MAC,” Lewis told the FCIC. “The acceleration, we thought, was beyond what should be happening. And then secondly, you had a major hole being created in the capital base with the losses—that dramatically reduced [Merrill Lynch’s] equity.” That afternoon, Lewis flew from North Carolina to Washington to meet at the Fed with Paulson and Fed Chairman Bernanke. The two asked Lewis to “stand down” on invoking the clause while they considered the situation. Paulson and Bernanke concluded that an attempt by Bank of America to invoke the MAC clause “was not a legally reasonable option.” They believed that Bank of America would be ultimately unsuccessful in the legal action, and that the attendant litigation would likely result in Bank of America still being contractually bound to acquire a considerably weaker Merrill Lynch. Moreover, Bernanke thought the market would lose faith in Bank of America’s management, given that review, preparation,
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and due diligence had been ongoing for “ months.” The two officials also believed that invoking the clause would lead to a broader systemic crisis that would result in further deterioration at the two companies. Neither Merrill nor its CEO, John Thain, was informed of these deliberations at Bank of America. Lewis told the FCIC that he didn’t contact Merrill Lynch about the situation because he didn’t want to create an “adversarial relationship” if it could be avoided. When Thain later found out that Bank of America had contemplated putting the MAC clause into effect, he was skeptical about its chances of success: “One of the things we negotiated very heavily was the Material Adverse Change clause. [It] specifically excluded market moves . . . [and] pretty much nothing happened to Merrill in the fourth quarter other than the market move.” On Sunday, December , Paulson informed Lewis that invoking the clause would demonstrate a “colossal loss of judgment” by the company. Paulson reminded Lewis that the Fed, as its regulator, had the legal authority to replace Bank of America’s management and board if they embarked on a “destructive” strategy that had “no reasonable legal basis.” Bernanke later told his general counsel: “Though we did not order Lewis to go forward, we did indicate that we believed that going forward [with the clause] would be detrimental to the health (safety and soundness) of his company.” Congressman Edolphus Towns of New York would later refer to the Bank of America and Merrill Lynch merger as “a shotgun wedding.” Regulators began to discuss a rescue package similar to the one for Citigroup, including preferred shares and an asset pool similar to Citigroup’s ring fence. The staff ’s analysis was essentially the same as it had been for Citigroup. Meanwhile, Lewis decided to “deescalate” the situation, explaining that when the secretary of the treasury and the chairman of the Fed say that invoking the MAC would cause systemic risk, “then it obviously gives you pause.” At a board meeting on December , Lewis told his board that the Fed and Treasury believed that a failed acquisition would pose systemic risk and would lead to removal of management and the board at the insistence of the government, and that the government would provide assistance “to protect [Bank of America] against the adverse impact of certain Merrill Lynch assets,” although such assistance could not be provided in time for the merger’s close on January , . The board decided not to exercise the MAC and to proceed as planned, with the understanding that the government’s assistance would be “fully documented” by the time fourth-quarter earnings were announced in mid-January. “Obviously if [the MAC clause] actually would cause systemic risk to the financial system, then that’s not good for Bank of America,” Lewis told the FCIC. “Which is finally the conclusion that I came to and the board came to.” The merger was completed on January , , with no hint of government assistance. By the time the acquisition became official, the purchase price of billion announced in September had fallen to billion, thanks to the decline in the stock prices of the two companies over the preceding three months. On January , Bank of America received the billion in capital from TARP that had been allocated to Merrill Lynch, adding to the billion it had received in October.
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In addition to those TARP investments, at the end of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch had borrowed billion under the Fed’s collateralized programs ( billion through the Term Auction Facility and billion through the PDCF and TSLF) and billion under the Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility. (During the previous fall, Bank of America’s legacy securities arm had borrowed as much as billion under TSLF and as much as billion under PDCF.) Also at the end of , the bank had issued . billion in senior debt guaranteed by the FDIC under the debt guarantee program. And it had borrowed billion from the Federal Home Loan Banks. Yet despite Bank of America’s recourse to these many supports, the regulators worried that it would experience liquidity problems if the fourth-quarter earnings were weak. The regulators wanted to be ready to announce the details of government support in conjunction with Bank of America’s disclosure of its fourth-quarter performance. They had been working on the details of that assistance since late December, and had reason to be cautious: for example, of Bank of America’s repo and securities-lending funding, a total of billion, was rolled over every night, and Merrill “legacy” businesses also funded billion overnight. A onenotch downgrade in the new Bank of America’s credit rating would contractually obligate the posting of billion in additional collateral; a two-notch downgrade would require another billion. Although the company remained adequately capitalized from a regulatory standpoint, its tangible common equity was low and, given the stressed market conditions, was likely to fall under . Low levels of tangible common equity—the most basic measure of capital—worried the market, which seemed to think that in the midst of the crisis, regulatory measures of capital were not informative. On January , the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, after “intense” discussions, agreed on the terms: Treasury would use TARP funds to purchase billion of Bank of America preferred stock with an dividend. The bank and the three pertinent government agencies—Treasury, the Fed, and the FDIC—designated an asset pool of billion, primarily from the former Merrill Lynch portfolio, whose losses the four entities would share. The pool was analogous to Citigroup’s ring fence. In this case, Bank of America would be responsible for the first billion in losses on the pool, and the government would cover of any additional losses. Should the government losses materialize, Treasury would cover , up to a limit of . billion, and the FDIC , up to a limit of . billion. Ninety percent of any additional losses would be covered by the Fed. The FDIC Board had a conference call at P.M. on Thursday, January , and voted for the fourth time, unanimously, to approve a systemic risk exception under FDICIA. The next morning, January , Bank of America disclosed that Merrill Lynch had recorded a . billion net loss on real estate-related write-downs and charges. It also announced the billion TARP capital investment and billion ring fence that the government had provided. Despite the government’s support, Bank of America’s stock closed down almost from the day before.
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Over the next several months Bank of America worked with its regulators to identify the assets that would be included in the asset pool. Then, on May , Bank of America asked to exit the ring fence deal, explaining that the company had determined that losses would not exceed the billion that Bank of America was required to cover in its first-loss position. Although the company was eventually allowed to terminate the deal, it was compelled to compensate the government for the benefits it had received from the market’s perception that the government would insure its assets. On September , Bank of America agreed to pay a million termination fee: million to Treasury, million to the Fed, and million to the FDIC.
COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 20 The Commission concludes that, as massive losses spread throughout the financial system in the fall of , many institutions failed, or would have failed but for government bailouts. As panic gripped the market, credit markets seized up, trading ground to a halt, and the stock market plunged. Lack of transparency contributed greatly to the crisis: the exposures of financial institutions to risky mortgage assets and other potential losses were unknown to market participants, and indeed many firms did not know their own exposures. The scale and nature of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market created significant systemic risk throughout the financial system and helped fuel the panic in the fall of : millions of contracts in this opaque and deregulated market created interconnections among a vast web of financial institutions through counterparty credit risk, thus exposing the system to a contagion of spreading losses and defaults. Enormous positions concentrated in the hands of systemically significant institutions that were major OTC derivatives dealers added to uncertainty in the market. The “bank runs” on these institutions included runs on their derivatives operations through novations, collateral demands, and refusals to act as counterparties. A series of actions, inactions, and misjudgments left the country with stark and painful alternatives—either risk the total collapse of our financial system or spend trillions of taxpayer dollars to stabilize the system and prevent catastrophic damage to the economy. In the process, the government rescued a number of financial institutions deemed “too big to fail”—so large and interconnected with other financial institutions or so important in one or more financial markets that their failure would have caused losses and failures to spread to other institutions. The government also provided substantial financial assistance to nonfinancial corporations. As a result of the rescues and consolidation of financial institutions through failures and mergers during the crisis, the U.S. financial sector is now more concentrated than ever in the hands of a few very large, systemically significant institutions. This concentration places greater responsibility on regulators for effective oversight of these institutions.
PART V
The Aftershocks
21 THE ECONOMIC FALLOUT
CONTENTS Households : “I’m not eating. I’m not sleeping”................................................... Businesses: “Squirrels storing nuts” .................................................................... Commercial real estate: “Nothing’s moving”....................................................... Government: “States struggled to close shortfalls” .............................................. The financial sector: “Almost triple the level of three years earlier”.....................
Panic and uncertainty in the financial system plunged the nation into the longest and deepest recession in generations. The credit squeeze in financial markets cascaded throughout the economy. In testifying to the Commission, Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan described the impact of the financial crisis on the economy: “Over the course of the crisis, we, as an industry, caused a lot of damage. Never has it been clearer how poor business judgments we have made have affected Main Street.” Indeed, Main Street felt the tremors as the upheaval in the financial system rumbled through the U.S. economy. Seventeen trillion dollars in household wealth evaporated within months, and reported unemployment hit . at its peak in October . As the housing bubble deflated, families that had counted on rising housing values for cash and retirement security became anchored to mortgages that exceeded the declining value of their homes. They ratcheted back on spending, cumulatively putting the brakes on economic growth—the classic “paradox of thrift,” described almost a century ago by John Maynard Keynes. In the aftermath of the panic, when credit was severely tightened, if not frozen, for financial institutions, companies found that cheap and easy credit was gone for them, too. It was tougher to borrow to meet payrolls and to expand inventories; businesses that had neither credit nor customers trimmed costs and laid off employees. Still today, credit availability is tighter than it was before the crisis. Without jobs, people could no longer afford their house payments. Yet even if moving could improve their job prospects, they were stuck with houses they could not sell. Millions of families entered foreclosure and millions more fell behind on their mortgage payments. Others simply walked away from their devalued properties, returning the keys to the banks—an action that would destroy families’ credit for
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years. The surge in foreclosed and abandoned properties dragged home prices down still more, depressing the value of surrounding real estate in neighborhoods across the country. Even those who stayed current on their mortgages found themselves whirled into the storm. Towns that over several years had come to expect and rely on the housing boom now saw jobs and tax revenue vanish. As their resources dwindled, these communities found themselves saddled with the municipal costs they had taken on in part to expand services for a growing population. Sinking housing prices upended local budgets that relied on property taxes. Problems associated with abandoned homes required more police and fire protection. At FCIC hearings around the country, regional experts testified that the local impact of the crisis has been severe. From to , for example, banks in Sacramento had stopped lending and potential borrowers retreated, said Clarence Williams, president of the California Capital Financial Development Corporation. Bankers still complain to him not only that demand from borrowers has fallen off but also that they may be subject to increased regulatory scrutiny if they do make new loans. In September , when the FCIC held its Sacramento hearing, that region’s once-robust construction industry was still languishing. “Unless we begin to turn around demand, unless we begin to turn around the business situation, the employment is not going to increase here in the Sacramento area, and housing is critical to it. It is a vicious circle,” Williams testified. The effects of the financial crisis have been felt in individual U.S. households and businesses, big and small, and around the world. Policy makers on the state, national, and global levels are still grappling with the aftermath, as are the homeowners and lenders now dealing with the complications that entangle the foreclosure process.
HOUSEHOLDS: “I’M NOT EATING. I’M NOT SLEEPING” The recession officially began in December . By many measures, its effects on the job market were the worst on record, as reflected in the speed and breadth of the falloff in jobs, the rise of the ranks of underemployed workers, and the long stretches of time that millions of Americans were and still are surviving without work. The economy shed . million jobs in —the largest annual plunge since record keeping began in . By December , the United States had lost another . million jobs. Through November , the economy had regained nearly million jobs, putting only a small dent in the declines. The underemployment rate—the total of unemployed workers who are actively looking for jobs, those with part-time work who would prefer full-time jobs, and those who need jobs but say they are too discouraged to search—increased from . in December to . in December , reaching . in October . This was the highest level since calculations for that labor category were first made in . As of November , the underemployment rate stood at . The average length of time individuals spent unemployed spiked from . weeks in June to . weeks in June , and . weeks in June . Fifty-nine percent of
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all job seekers, according to the most recent government statistics, searched for work for at least weeks. The labor market is daunting across the board, but it is especially grim among African American workers, whose jobless rate is ., about percentage points above the national average; workers between the ages of and years old, at .; and Hispanics, at .. And the impact has been especially severe in certain professions: unemployment in construction, for instance, climbed to an average of . in , and averaged . during the first months of . Real gross domestic product, the nation’s measure of economic output adjusted for inflation, fell at an annual rate of in the third quarter of and . in the fourth quarter. After falling again in the first half of and then modestly growing in the second half, average GDP for the year was . lower than in , the biggest drop since . Looking at the labor market, Edward Lazear, chairman of President George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisers during the crisis, told the Commission that the financial crisis was linked with today’s economic problems: “I think most of it had to do with investment. . . . Panic in financial markets and tightness in financial markets that persisted through prevented firms from investing in the way that they otherwise would, and I think that slows the rehiring of workers and still continues to be a problem in labor markets.” In June , the nation officially emerged out of the recession that had begun months earlier. The good news still had not reached many of the . million Americans who were out of work, who could not find full-time work, or who had stopped looking for work as of November . Jeannie McDermott of Bakersfield told the FCIC she started a business refilling printer ink cartridges, but in a tight economy, she didn’t earn enough to make a living. She said she had been searching for a fulltime job since . Households suffered the impact of the financial crisis not only in the job market but also in their net worth and their access to credit. Of the trillion lost from to the first quarter of in household net wealth—the difference between what households own and what they owe—about . trillion was due to declining house prices, with much of the remainder due to the declining value of financial assets. As a point of reference, GDP in was . trillion. And, as a separate point, the amount of wealth lost in the dot-com crash early in the decade was . trillion, with far fewer repercussions for the economy as a whole. The painful drop in real estate and financial asset values followed a . trillion run-up in household debt from to . Aided by the gains in home prices and, to a lesser degree, stock prices, households’ net wealth had reached a peak of trillion in the second quarter of . The collapse of the housing and stock markets erased much of the gains from the run-up—while household debt remained near historic highs, exceeding even the levels of . As of the third quarter of , despite firmer stock and housing prices and a decline in household borrowing, household net worth totaled . trillion, a . drop-off from its pinnacle just three years earlier (see figure .). Nationwide, home prices dropped from their peak in to their low point
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Household Net Worth The crisis wiped out much more wealth than other recent events such as the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000. IN TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS $70 60 50 $54.9 40 30 20 10 0 1952
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NOTE: Net worth is assets minus liabilities for U.S. households. SOURCE: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Report
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early in . The homeownership rate declined from its peak of . in to . as of the fall of . Because so many American households own homes, and because for most homeowners their housing represents their single most important asset, these declines have been especially debilitating. Borrowing via home equity loans or cash-out refinancing has fallen sharply. At an FCIC hearing in Bakersfield, California, Marie Vasile explained how her family had relocated miles into the mountains to a rental house to help her husband’s fragile health. Their old home was put up for sale and languished on the market, losing value. Eventually, she and her husband found buyers willing to take their house in a “short sale”—that is, a sale at a price less than the balance of the mortgage. But because the lender was acting slowly to approve that deal, they risked losing the sale and then going into foreclosure. “To top this all off,” Vasile told commissioners, “my husband is in the position of possibly losing his job. . . . So not only do I have a house that I don’t know what’s happening to, I don’t know if he’s going to have a job come December. This is more than I can handle. I’m not eating. I’m not sleeping.” Serious mortgage delinquencies—payments that are late days or more or homes in the foreclosure process—have spread since the crisis. Among regions, the
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eastern states in the Midwest (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Michigan) had the highest delinquency rate, topping in . By fall , this rate had risen to .. Other regions also endured high rates—especially the so-called sand states, where the housing crisis was the worst. The third quarter serious delinquency rate for Florida was .; Nevada, .; Arizona, .; and California, .. The data company CoreLogic identified the housing markets with the worst records of “distressed” sales, which include short sales and sales of foreclosed properties. Las Vegas led the list in mid-, with distressed sales accounting for more than of all home sales. “The state was overbuilt and some , jobs were predicated on a level of growth and consumer spending that seemed to evaporate almost overnight,” Jeremy Aguero, an economic and marketing analyst who follows the Nevada economy, testified to the Commission. The performance of the stock market in the wake of the crisis also reduced wealth. The Standard and Poor’s Index fell by a third in —the largest singleyear decline since —as big institutional investors moved to Treasury securities and other investments that they perceived as safe. Individuals felt these effects not only in their current budgets but also in their prospects for retirement. By one calculation, assets in retirement accounts such as (k)s lost . trillion, or about a third of their value, between September and December . While the stock market has recovered somewhat, the S&P as of December , , was still about below where it was at the start of . Similarly, stock prices worldwide plummeted more than in but rebounded by in , according to the MSCI World Index stock fund (which represents a collection of , global stocks). The financial market fallout jeopardized some public pension plans—many of which were already troubled before the crisis. In Colorado, state budget officials warned that losses of billion, unaddressed, could cause the Public Employees Retirement Association plan—which covers , public workers and teachers—to go bust in two decades. The state cut retiree benefits to adjust for the losses. Montana’s public pension funds lost billion, or a fourth of their value, in the six months following the downturn, in part because of investments in complex Wall Street securities. Even before the fall of , consumer confidence had been on a downward slope for months. The Conference Board reported in May that its measure of consumer confidence fell to the lowest point since late . By early , confidence had plummeted to a new low; it has recovered somewhat since then but has remained stubbornly bleak. “[We find] nobody willing to make a decision. . . . nobody willing to take a chance, because of the uncertainty in the economic environment, and that goes for both the state and the federal level,” the commercial real estate developer and appraiser Gregory Bynum testified at the FCIC’s Bakersfield hearing. Influenced by the dramatic loss in wealth and by job insecurity, households have cut back on debt. Total credit card debt expanded every year for two decades until it peaked at billion at the end of . Almost two years later, that total had fallen , to billion. The actions of banks have also played an important role: since
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, they have tightened lending standards, reduced lines of credit on credit cards, and increased fees and interest rates. In the third quarter of , of banks imposed standards on credit cards that were tighter than those in place in the previous quarter. In the fourth quarter, did so, meaning that many banks tightened again. In fact, a significant number of banks tightened credit card standards quarter after quarter until the summer of . Only in the latest surveys have even a small numbers of banks begun to loosen them. Faced with financial difficulties, over . million households declared bankruptcy in , up from approximately . million in . Together, the decline in households’ financial resources, banks’ tightening of lending standards, and consumers’ lack of confidence have led to large cuts in spending. Consumer spending, which in the United States makes up more than two-thirds of GDP, fell at an annual rate of roughly . in the second half of and then fell again in the first half of . Gains since then have been modest. Spending on cars and trucks fell by an extraordinary between the end of and the spring of , in part because consumer financing was less available as well as because of job and wage losses.
BUSINESSES: “SQUIRRELS STORING NUTS” When the financial panic hit in September , business financing dried up. Firms that could roll over their commercial paper faced higher interest rates and shorter terms. Those that could not roll over their paper relied on old-fashioned financing— bank loans—or used their own cash reserves. Large firms, one analyst said at the time, turned to their cash balances like “squirrels storing nuts.” Jeff Agosta, an executive at Devon Energy Corporation, told the FCIC that had the government not supported the commercial paper market, “We would have been eating grasshoppers and living in tents. Things could have been that bad.” While his expression was hyperbolic, the fear was very real. The lack of credit and the sharp drop in demand took its toll on businesses. In , just under , U.S. companies filed for bankruptcy protection. That figure more than tripled to nearly , in . Firms’ long-term plans suddenly had to be reevaluated—the effects of those decisions persist, even though credit markets have recovered somewhat. As for the banks, by mid- they had begun to restrict access to credit even for large and medium-size businesses. The Federal Open Market Committee noted this tightening when it announced on September , , that it was cutting the federal funds rate. After the Lehman bankruptcy, companies such as Gannett Corporation, FairPoint Communications, and Duke Energy drew down their existing lines of credit because they were worried about getting shut out of credit markets. Without access to credit, with cash reserves dwindling, and with uncertainty about the economy high, corporations laid off workers or cut their investments, inhibiting growth and reducing their potential for improving productivity. A survey of chief financial officers found that of U.S. companies were somewhat or very affected by credit constraints, leading to decisions to make cuts in capital investment,
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technology, and elsewhere. News headlines chronicled the problems: scarce capital forced midsize firms to pare back investments and shutter offices, while industrial companies including Caterpillar, Corning, and John Deere; pharmaceutical companies such as Merck and Wyeth; and tech companies alike laid off employees as the recession took hold. Some businesses struggled to cover payrolls and the financing of inventory. The introduction in October of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, under which the Federal Reserve loaned money to nonfinancial entities, enabled the commercial paper market to resume functioning at more normal rates and terms. But even with the central bank’s help, nearly of banks tightened credit standards and lending in the fourth quarter of . And small businesses particularly felt the squeeze. Because they employ nearly of the country’s private-sector workforce, “loans to small businesses are especially vital to our economy,” Federal Reserve Board Governor Elizabeth Duke told Congress early in . Unlike the larger firms, which had come to rely on capital markets for borrowing, these companies had generally obtained their credit from traditional banks, other financial institutions, nonfinancial companies, or personal borrowing by owners. The financial crisis disrupted all these sources, making credit more scarce and more expensive. In a survey of small businesses by the National Federation of Independent Business in , of respondents called credit “harder to get.” That figure compares with in and a previous peak, at around , during the credit crunch of . Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke said in a July speech that getting a small business loan was still “very difficult.” He also noted that banks’ loans to small businesses had dropped from more than billion in the second quarter of to less than billion in the first quarter of . Another factor—hesitancy to take on more debt in an anemic economy—is certainly behind some of the statistics tracking lending to small businesses. Speaking on behalf of the Independent Community Bankers of America, C. R. Cloutier, president and CEO of Midsouth Bank in Lafayette, Louisiana, told the FCIC, “Community banks are willing to lend. That’s how banks generate a return and survive. However, quality loan demand is down. . . . I can tell you from my own bank’s experience, customers are scared about the economic climate and are not borrowing. . . . Credit is available, but businesses are not demanding it.” Still, creditworthy borrowers seeking loans face tighter credit from banks than they did before the crisis, surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest. Historically, banks charged a percentage point premium over their funding costs on business loans, but that premium had hit points by year-end and had continued to rise in , raising the costs of borrowing. Small businesses’ access to credit also declined when the housing market collapsed. During the boom, many business owners had tapped the rising equity in their homes, taking out low-interest home equity loans. Seventeen percent of small employers with a mortgage refinanced it specifically to capitalize their businesses. As housing prices declined, their ability to use this option was reduced or blocked altogether by the lenders. Jerry Jost told the FCIC he borrowed against his home to help
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his daughter start a bridal dress business in Bakersfield several years ago. When the economy collapsed, Jost lost his once-profitable construction business, and his daughter’s business languished. The Jost family has exhausted its life savings while struggling to find steady work and reliable incomes. The standards for credit card loans, another source of financing for small businesses, also became more stringent. In the Fed’s April Senior Loan Officer Survey, a majority of banks indicated that their standards for approving credit card accounts for small businesses were tighter than “the longer-run average level that prevailed before the crisis.” Banks had continued to tighten their terms on business credit card loans to small businesses, for both new and existing accounts, since the end of . But the July update of the Fed survey showed the first positive signs since the end of that banks were easing up on underwriting standards for small businesses. In an effort to assist small business lenders, the Federal Reserve in March created the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), a program to aid securitization of loans, including auto loans, student loans, and small business loans. Another federal effort aimed at improving small businesses’ access to credit was guidance in February from the Federal Reserve and other regulators, advising banks to try to meet the credit needs of “creditworthy small business borrowers” with the assurances that government supervisors would not hinder those efforts. Yet the prevailing headwinds have been difficult to overcome. Without access to credit, many small businesses that had depleted their cash reserves had trouble paying bills, and bankruptcies and loan defaults rose. Defaults on small business loans increased to in , from in . Overall, the current state of the small business sector is a critical factor in the struggling labor market: ailing small businesses have laid people off in large numbers, and stronger small businesses are not hiring additional workers. Independent finance companies, which had often funded themselves by issuing commercial paper, were constrained as well. The business finance company CIT Group Inc. was one such firm. Even . billion in additional capital support from the federal Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) program did not save CIT from filing for bankruptcy protection in November . Still, some active lenders to smaller businesses, such as GE Capital, a commercial lender with a focus on middlemarket customers, were able to continue to offer financing. GE Capital’s commercial paper borrowing fared better than others’. Nonetheless, the terms of the company’s borrowing did worsen. In , it registered to borrow up to billion in commercial paper through one government program and issued . billion in long-term debt and . billion in commercial paper under another program. That GE Capital had trimmed commercial paper before the crisis to less than of its total debt, or about billion, also softened the effects of the crisis on the company. “A decision was made that it would be prudent for us to reduce our reliance on the commercial paper market, and we did,” Mark Barber, the deputy treasurer of GE Company and GE Capital, told the Commission.
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The firm put more than billion in cash on its balance sheet, with billion in back-up bank lines of credit, if needed. The decline in global trade also hurt the U.S. economy as well as economies across the world. As the financial crisis peaked in Europe and the United States, exports collapsed in nearly every major trading country. The decline in exports shaved more than percentage points off GDP growth in the third and fourth quarters of . Recently, exports have begun to recover, and as of the fall of they are back near precrisis levels.
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE: “NOTHING’S MOVING” Commercial real estate—offices, stores, warehouses—also took a pounding, an indicator both of the sector’s reliance on the lending markets, which were impaired by the crisis, and of its role as a barometer of business activity. Companies do not need more space if they go out of business, lay off workers, or decide not to expand. Weak demand, in turn, lowers rents and forces landlords to give their big tenants incentives to stay put. One example: two huge real estate brokerages with headquarters in New York City received nine months’ free rent for signing leases in and . In fall , commercial vacancy rates were still sky-high, with of all office space unoccupied. And the actual rate is probably much higher because layoffs create “shadow vacancies”—a couple of desks here, part of a floor there—that tenants must fill before demand picks back up. In the absence of demand, banks remain unwilling to lend to all but the safest projects involving the most creditworthy developers that have precommitted tenants. “Banks are neither financing, nor are they dumping their bad properties, creating a log jam,” one developer told a National Association of Realtors survey. “Nothing’s moving.” In Nevada, where tourism and construction once fed the labor force, commercial property took a huge hit. Office vacancies in Las Vegas are now hovering around , compared with their low of midway through . Vacancies in retail commercial space in Las Vegas top , compared with historical vacancy rates of to . The economic downturn tugged national-brand retailers into bankruptcy, emptying out the anchor retail space in Nevada’s malls and shopping centers. As demand for vacant property fell, land values in and around Las Vegas plummeted. Because lenders were still reluctant, few developers nationally could afford to build or buy, right into the fall of . Lehman’s bankruptcy meant that Monday Properties came up short in its efforts to build a million, -story glass office tower in Arlington, Virginia, across the river from Washington, D.C. Potential tenants wanted to know if the developer had financing; potential lenders wanted to know if it had tenants. “It’s a bit of a cart-and-horse situation,” said CEO Anthony Westreich, who in October took the big risk of starting construction on the building without signed tenants or permanent financing. The collapse of teetering financial institutions put commercial real estate developers and commercial landlords in binds when overextended banks suddenly pulled out of commercial construction loans. And when banks
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failed and were taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission, the commercial landlords overnight lost major bank tenants and the long-term leases that went with them. In California, at least banks have failed since . Almost half of commercial real estate loans were underwater as of February , meaning the loans were larger than the market value of the property. Commercial real estate loans are especially concentrated among the holdings of community and regional banks. Some commercial mortgages were also securitized, and by August , the delinquency rate on these packaged mortgages neared —the highest in the history of the industry and an ominous sign for real estate a full two years after the height of the financial storm. At the end of , the default rate had been .. Near the end of , it was not at all clear when or even if the commercial real estate market had hit bottom. Green Street Advisors of Newport Beach, California, which tracks real estate investment trusts, believed that it reached its nadir in mid. About half of the decline between and has been recovered, according to Mike Kirby, Green Street’s director of research. “Nevertheless,” Kirby added, “values remain roughly shy of their peak.” That’s one perspective. On the other side, Moody’s Investors Service, whose REAL Commercial Property Price Index tracks sales of commercial buildings, says it is too early to make a call. Moody’s detected some signs of a pickup in the spring and fall of , and Managing Director Nick Levidy said, “We expect commercial real estate prices to remain choppy until transaction volumes pick up.” The largest commercial real estate loan losses are projected for and beyond, according to a report issued by the Congressional Oversight Panel. And, looking forward, nearly billion in commercial real estate debt will come due from through .
GOVERNMENT: “STATES STRUGGLED TO CLOSE SHORTFALLS”
State and local government finances The recession devastated not only many companies and their workers but also state and local governments that saw their tax revenue fall—just when people who had lost their jobs, or were in bankruptcy or foreclosure proceedings, were demanding more services. Those services included Medicaid, unemployment compensation, and welfare, in addition to local assistance for mental health care, for children, and for the homeless. “At least states struggled to close shortfalls when adopting budgets for the current fiscal year,” recently reported the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a Washington think tank. “A critical aspect of our situation in Sacramento and . . . throughout the state is that these increased demands for services are occurring at a time that resources . . . are being dramatically reduced,” Bruce Wagstaff, the agency administrator with Sacramento’s Countywide Services Agency, explained to the Commission. Unlike the federal government, almost every state is constitutionally required to produce a balanced budget, so running a deficit is not an option. Sujit CanagaRetna, a senior fiscal analyst with the Council of State Governments, told the FCIC that the
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budget shortfalls facing the states “are staggering numbers. It’s not just the big states; it’s almost all states.” He said the “great transformation” occurring in state finances means states are forced to “reorient their whole stance vis a vis the kind of programs and services they offer their citizens.” In the fiscal year alone, which started July , states must come up with billion in savings or new revenue to balance their budgets, one study estimated. By the fall of , there was some good news: revenue from some taxes and fees in some states had started to pick up, or at least slowed their rate of decline. In a September report, the National Conference of State Legislatures declared that the states “are waiting to see if the economy will sustain this nascent revenue growth. . . . And despite recent revenue improvements, more gaps loom as states confront the phase out of federal stimulus funds, expiring tax increases and growing spending pressures.” Some states were hit harder than others, either because they were particularly affected by the crisis or because they came into the crisis with structural budget problems. In , New Jersey Governor Chris Christie proposed chopping billion—or a quarter—of the state budget to eliminate a deficit. California officials struggled through the summer and fall to close a billion shortfall, an amount larger than the entire budgets of some states. Nonetheless, the state’s independent budget analysis office said in November that the deficit had instead grown to billion— billion in the billion budget for this year and billion in the fiscal year commencing in June . As people lost jobs, many also lost their health insurance, helping to drive . million Americans into the Medicaid program in alone, an increase—the largest in a single year since the early days of this government health insurance plan, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation, a nonprofit organization focusing on health care research. Every state showed an enrollment increase: in nine states it was greater than ; in Nevada and Wisconsin, greater than . States share the cost of Medicaid with the federal government. Congress included billion in the stimulus package to help them with this expense, and it has extended the assistance through June at a reduced level. If the economy has not improved by then, Kaiser predicts, paying for this program will be another huge potential source of trouble for the states. The National League of Cities recently said that U.S. cities are in their worst fiscal shape in at least a quarter of a century and probably have not yet hit bottom—even after four straight years of falling revenue. Because property taxes are one of the main source of revenue for most local governments, and because some local assessors are only now recording lower property values, their revenue is likely to continue to decline for at least several more years. “The effects of a depressed real estate market, low levels of consumer confidence, and high levels of unemployment will likely play out in cities through , and beyond,” the survey of cities reported. The authors of the survey projected that revenue would fall in , and cities’ budgets would shrink another , the largest cutbacks in the years for which the group has published the report.
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Investors now look askance at once-solid state and local bonds, raising borrowing costs for many states and making their task of balancing the budget even harder. Municipalities in Florida, the state with the third-highest rate of home foreclosures, saw borrowing costs rise when they sold million in bonds in September .
Impact at the federal level The federal government’s response to the financial crisis and the ensuing recession “included some of the most aggressive fiscal and monetary policies in history,” said the economists Mark Zandi and Alan Blinder. “Yet almost every one of these policy initiatives remain controversial to this day, with critics calling them misguided, ineffective or both.” The government’s fiscal initiatives began soon after the recession started: the Economic Stimulus Act of , signed into law in February, provided roughly billion in tax rebates for households and tax incentives for businesses. In October , at the height of the crisis, the billion TARP was enacted; and in early , the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of was enacted to stimulate the weakening economy, costing another billion in tax cuts and government spending. Beginning with the rate cuts in mid- through the implementation of the TALF in early , the Federal Reserve provided support to the economy throughout the crisis. Aside from its emergency lending programs put in place during the financial crisis, the Fed put about . trillion into the economy from September to October —primarily by buying financial assets such as mortgages-backed securities and Treasury bonds, a process known as “quantitative easing.” And in November , officials announced another billion in easing, designed to keep long-term and short-term interest rates down. In October , the Treasury Department reported that the TARP program would cost far less than the billion that Congress had appropriated in the fall of , because banks had begun to repay the Treasury in . In fact, Treasury said, TARP would wind up costing about billion, mostly owing to the bailout of the automakers General Motors and Chrysler and the mortgage modification program. The latest estimates from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) put its cost at billion. As reported earlier, the CBO projects that the economic cost of the GSEs’ downfall, including the financial cost of government support and actual dollar outlays, could reach billion by . Overall, as spending increased and revenues declined during the recession, the federal deficit grew from billion in to . trillion in . And it is estimated to have risen to . trillion in .
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR: “ALMOST TRIPLE THE LEVEL OF THREE YEARS EARLIER” While the overall economy has struggled, the story for the financial sector is somewhat different. Like other sectors of the economy, the financial industry has cut
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jobs. After growing steadily for years, employment in the financial sector fell by , in , , in , and another , in . Areas dependent on the financial industry, such as Charlotte, North Carolina, have been hit hard. The unemployment rate in the Charlotte area rose from . in to a recent peak of . in February . Between January and December , banks have failed; most were small and medium-size banks. The number of small banks on the FDIC’s list of troubled institutions rose from in the second quarter of to in the third quarter, the largest number since March . Though a number of large financial institutions failed or nearly failed during the crisis, on the whole they have done better since the fall of . Total financial sector profits peaked at billion in and then fell to billion in , the lowest level since the early s. They have since rebounded in and , boosted by low interest rates and access to lowcost government borrowing. Financial sector profits were billion in and reached an annual rate of billion in the fall of . Within the financial sector, commercial bank profits rose from . billion in the first quarter of to . billion in the first quarter of . The gains were concentrated among the larger banks. For banks with assets greater than billion, profits more than doubled, from . billion to . billion, from the first quarter of to the first quarter of . For commercial banks with less than billion in assets, profits rose only , from less than billion to . billion. The securities industry has reported record profits and is once again distributing large bonuses. Just for those who work in New York City, bonuses at Wall Street securities firms in were . billion, up from the year before, with “average compensation [rising] by percent to more than ,.” After reporting billion of losses during and , the New York State Comptroller reported that in , “industry profits reached a record . billion—almost triple the level of three years earlier.”
22 THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
CONTENTS Foreclosures on the rise: “Hard to talk about any recovery” ............................... Initiatives to stem foreclosures: “Persistently disregard” ...................................... Flaws in the process: “Speculation and worst-case scenarios” ............................ Neighborhood effects: “I’m not leaving”..............................................................
FORECLOSURES ON THE RISE: “HARD TO TALK ABOUT ANY RECOVERY” Since the housing bubble burst, about four million families have lost their homes to foreclosure and another four and a half million have slipped into the foreclosure process or are seriously behind on their mortgage payments. When the economic damage finally abates, foreclosures may total between million and more than million, according to various estimates. The foreclosure epidemic has hurt families and undermined home values in entire zip codes, strained school systems as well as community support services, and depleted state coffers. Even if the economy began suddenly booming the country would need years to recover. Prior to , the foreclosure rate was historically less than . But the trend since the housing market collapsed has been dramatic: In , . of all houses, or out of , received at least one foreclosure filing. In the fall of , in every outstanding residential mortgage loans in the United States was at least one payment past due but not yet in foreclosure—an ominous warning that this wave may not have crested. Distressed sales account for the majority of home sales in cities around the country, including Las Vegas, Phoenix, Sacramento, and Riverside, California. Returning to the , borrowers whose loans were pooled into CMLTI NC: by September , many had moved or refinanced their mortgages; by that point, , had entered foreclosure (mostly in Florida and California), and had started loan modifications. Of the , still active loans then, were seriously past due in their payments or currently in foreclosure. The causes of foreclosures have been analyzed by many academics and government agencies. Two events are typically necessary for a mortgage default. First, monthly payments become unaffordable owing to unemployment or other financial
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hardship, or because mortgage payments increase. And second (in the opinion of many, now the more important factor), the home’s value becomes less than the debt owed—in other words, the borrower has negative equity. “The evidence is irrefutable,” Laurie Goodman, a senior managing director with Amherst Securities, told Congress in : “Negative equity is the most important predictor of default. When the borrower has negative equity, unemployment acts as one of many possible catalysts, increasing the probability of default.” After falling from their peak in to the spring of , home prices have rebounded somewhat, but improvements are uneven across regions. Nationwide, . million households, or . of those with mortgages, owe more on their mortgages than the market value of their house (see figure .). In Nevada, of homes with mortgages are under water, the highest rate in the country; in California, the rate is . Given the extraordinary prevalence and extent of negative equity, the phenomenon of “strategic defaults” has also been on the rise: homeowners purposefully walk away from mortgage obligations when they perceive that their homes are worth less than what they owe and they believe that the value will not be going up anytime soon. By the fall of , three states particularly hard hit by foreclosures—California, Florida, and Nevada—reported some recent improvement in the initiation of foreclosures, but in November Nevada’s rate was still five times higher than the national average. Foreclosure starts climbed in states from their levels a year earlier, with the largest increases in Washington State (which has . unemployment), Indiana (. unemployment), and South Carolina (. unemployment), according to the Mortgage Bankers Association. In Ohio, the city of Cleveland and surrounding Cuyahoga County are bulldozing blocks of abandoned houses down to the dirt with the aim of creating a northeastern Ohio “bank” of land preserved for the future. To do this, authorities seize blighted properties for unpaid taxes, and they take donations of homes from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Fannie Mae, and some private lenders. Now, the county finds itself under increasing duress, having endured , foreclosures in . After years of high unemployment and a fragile economy, the financial crisis took vulnerable residents and “shoved them over the edge of the cliff,” Jim Rokakis, Cuyahoga’s treasurer, told the Commission. In a spring survey, of the responding mayors ranked the prevalence of nonprime or subprime mortgages as either first or second on a list of factors causing foreclosures in their cities. Almost all the mayors, , said they expected the foreclosure problems to stay the same or worsen in their cities over the next year. “There has been no meaningful decline in the inventory of distressed properties found in the housing market,” Guy Cecala, the chief executive and publisher of Inside Mortgage Finance Publications, told a congressional panel overseeing the Troubled Asset Relief Program in October . “It is hard to talk about any recovery of the housing market when the share of distressed property transactions remains close to percent.”
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“Underwater” Mortgages Many mortgage holders find themselves underwater; that is, owing more than their homes are worth. This is particularly true in Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, and Nevada. SHARE OF LOANS WITH NEGATIVE EQUITY, THIRD QUARTER 2010 >50% 30–49 WA
15–29 0–14 NA
MT ND
OR
ME VT
MN
ID SD
WY
NY
WI MI
NV
PA
IA
NE
OH
UT
IL
CA
IN WV
CO KS
NH MA CT RI NJ DE DC MD
VA
MO KY
NC TN
AZ
OK
NM
AR
SC MS
TX
AL
GA
U.S. average 23%
LA
FL AK
HI
SOURCE: CoreLogic
Figure .
“There was a fundamental change in our financial services sector that really is the reason we’re in this crisis, this economic crisis, and is the reason we’re seeing and will see in total probably before we’re done, between and million foreclosure filings in this country,” John Taylor, the president and CEO of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, explained to the FCIC. “And by the way, a few hundred thousand people, even a million people going into foreclosure, you can kind of blame and say, ‘Well they should have known better.’ But [or] million American families can’t all be wrong. They can’t all be greedy and they can’t all be stupid.”
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INITIATIVES TO STEM FORECLOSURES: “PERSISTENTLY DISREGARD” The same system that was so efficient at creating millions of mortgage loans over the past decade has been ineffective at resolving problems in the housing market, including the efforts of homeowners to modify their mortgages. As mortgage problems mounted, the federal and state governments responded with financial incentives to encourage banks to adjust interest rates, spread loan payments over longer terms, or simply write down mortgage debts. But to date, federal auditors and independent consumer watchdogs have given the federal government’s and the banks’ mortgage modification programs poor grades. The Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) is falling short of the to million families targeted for help by the end of . (The program’s resources come from the federal TARP funds.) As of December , HAMP has resulted in the permanent modification of only , mortgages. Meanwhile, the banks report that they have independently approved . million loan alterations of various kinds, although many of these modifications simply roll missed payments into a new mortgage and thus result in higher monthly payments. The effectiveness of state mortgage modification and foreclosure assistance programs is unclear. Some are just getting started. New Jersey, for instance, will begin a million “HomeKeeper Program” in , to offer some residents who face foreclosure because of unemployment or “substantial underemployment” a deferred-payment, no-interest loan so that they can continue making payments on their mortgages. During a series of hearings in communities around the country affected by the housing crisis, the Commission heard from many witnesses about the extraordinary difficulties they had encountered in seeking to modify their mortgages and stay in their homes. Borrowers who have been paying down mortgages for years and have built up substantial equity are especially susceptible to being turned down for loan modifications, because the lender would prefer that they simply sell their homes. Kirsten Keefe, a senior staff attorney with the Empire Justice Center in Albany, New York, brought this issue to regulators’ attention in March . Speaking to the Federal Reserve Board’s Consumer Advisory Council in Washington, Keefe identified trends among borrowers in New York who tried to qualify for the government’s HAMP program. “We are also routinely hearing that folks who have a lot of equity are . . . being denied HAMP modifications,” she said. Diane Thompson, from the National Consumer Law Center, testified to the United States Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in November about the challenges of the program. She stated, “Only a very few of the potentially eligible borrowers have been able to obtain permanent modifications. Advocates continue to report that borrowers are denied improperly for HAMP . . . and that some servicers persistently disregard HAMP applications.” Competing incentives may encourage banks to view foreclosure as quicker, cleaner, and often cheaper than modifying the terms of existing mortgages.
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For them, foreclosure is a prudent response to default because, the data suggest, many borrowers who receive temporary or permanent forgiveness on their terms will slide into default again. Also, servicers may receive substantial fees for guiding a mortgage through the foreclosure process, creating an incentive to deny a modification. Frequently, there’s another complication to attempting a foreclosure or modification: the second mortgages that were layered onto first mortgages. The first mortgages were commonly sold by banks into the securitization machine. The second mortgages were often retained by the same lenders who typically service the mortgage: that is, they process the monthly payments and provide customer service to borrowers. If a first mortgage is modified or foreclosed on, the entire value of the second mortgage may be wiped out. Under these circumstances, the lender holding that second lien has an incentive to delay a modification into a new loan that would make the mortgage payments more affordable to the borrower. The country’s leading banks now hold on their books more than billion in second mortgages. To the extent the banks have reported these loans as performing, the loans have not been marked down on their books. The actual value of these second mortgages could be much less than their billion-plus reported value. The danger of future losses is self-evident. Some frustrated first-lien investors have sued servicers, asserting they are not protecting investors’ financial interests. Instead, they claim that because the servicer is holding the second lien, the servicers are looking after their own balance sheets by encouraging borrowers to keep up the payments on their second mortgage when they cannot afford to make payments on both obligations. According to Laurie Goodman, for mortgage modifications to work, the holders of the second mortgages will have to accept some losses—a potentially expensive proposition. A number of other obstacles have made modifications difficult. For example, there are competing interests among various investors in a mortgage-backed security. Proceeds from a foreclosure may be enough to pay off the investors holding the highest-rated tranches of securities, while the holders of the lower tranches would likely be wiped out. As a result, the holders of the lower-rated tranches might prefer a modification, if it produced more cash flow than a foreclosure. Other efforts in the private and public sectors to address the foreclosure crisis have focused on encouraging short sales. In theory, short sales should help borrowers, neighborhoods, and lenders. Borrowers avoid foreclosure; neighborhoods avoid vacant, dilapidated homes that encourage crime; and lenders avoid some of the costs of foreclosure. Nonetheless, such deals frequently stall because the process is cumbersome, demands coordination, and eats up resources. For example, lenders can be reluctant to sign off on the buyer’s bid because they are not sure that the home is being sold at the highest possible price. In addition, when there are two mortgages, the holders of the first and second mortgages must both agree to the resolution.
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FLAWS IN THE PROCESS: “SPECULATION AND WORSTCASE SCENARIOS” In , additional issues have come to the fore, as problems with individual foreclosures have revealed systemic flaws in how lenders documented and processed mortgages for securitization. Legal experts and consumer advocates told the Commission that procedural and documentation problems with foreclosure have been laid out in court cases and academic studies for years, but were ignored until the number of foreclosures rose so dramatically. All of the nation’s state attorneys general banded together in the fall of to investigate foreclosure irregularities, identify possible solutions, and explore potential redress for borrowers who were harmed by improper foreclosures. For example, lenders have relied on “robo-signers” who substituted speed for accuracy by signing, and sometimes backdating, hundreds of affidavits claiming personal knowledge of facts about mortgages that they did not actually know to be true. One such “robosigner,” Jeffrey Stephan of GMAC, said that he signed , affidavits in a month— roughly per minute, in a -hour workweek—making it highly unlikely that he verified payment histories in each individual case of foreclosure. In addition, a number of court cases have been filed alleging invalid notarizations, forged signatures, backdated mortgage paperwork, and failure to demonstrate having legal standing to foreclose—that is, being the entity with the right to repossess a home. The problem of legal standing arose because the rapid growth of mortgage securitization outpaced the ability of the legal and financial system to accurately record who owns the mortgage. During the securitization process, loans were sold multiple times. To speed up processing, the financial industry created Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), an organization made up of , mortgage lenders. It tracks changes in servicing rights and ownership interests in mortgage loans. MERS is designated as the “mortgagee of record” on behalf of its members, a status that is meant to give it the legal right to foreclose if the borrower fails to pay the loan. MERS has registered million mortgages since launching in and had million loans outstanding as of November . The standing of MERS or its designees to foreclose has been called into question by courts and academics, however. In a hearing before the House Judiciary Committee on the foreclosure crisis, New York State Supreme Court Justice F. Dana Winslow testified that “standing has become such a pervasive issue that I frequently use the term ‘presumptive mortgagee in foreclosure’” to describe MERS. Because of “multiple unrecorded transfers of the legal ownership of the [m]ortgage,” it is unclear whether MERS continued to be the mortgagee after subsequent sales of the loan, according to Winslow. Moreover, courts have held that MERS does not own the underlying note and therefore cannot transfer the note or the deed of trust, or foreclose upon the property. Winslow also highlighted other deficiencies in MERS’ standing, many involving sloppy paperwork: the failure to produce the correct promissory notes in court during
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foreclosure proceedings; gaps in the chain of title, including printouts of the title that have differed substantially from information provided previously; retroactive assignments of notes and mortgages in an effort to clean up the paperwork problems from earlier years; questionable signatures on assignments and affidavits attesting to the ownership of the note and mortgage; and questionable notary stamps on assignments. On November , , a bankruptcy court ruled that the Bank of New York could not foreclose on a loan it had purchased from Countrywide, because MERS had failed to endorse or deliver the note to the Bank of New York as required by the pooling and servicing agreement. This ruling could have further implications, because it was customary for Countrywide to maintain possession of the note and related loan documents when loans were securitized. Across the market, some mortgage securities holders have sued the issuers of those securities, demanding that the issuers rescind their purchases. If the legal challenges succeed, investors that own mortgage-backed securities could force the issuers to buy them back at the original price—possibly with interest. The issuers would then be the owners of the securities and would bear the risk of loss. The Congressional Oversight Panel, in a report issued in November , said it is on the lookout for such risks: “If documentation problems prove to be pervasive and, more importantly, throw into doubt the ownership of not only foreclosed properties but also pooled mortgages, the consequences could be severe.” This sentiment was echoed by University of Iowa law professor Katherine Porter who has studied foreclosures and the law: “It is lack of knowledge of how widespread the problems may be that is turning the allegations into a crisis. Lack of knowledge feeds speculation and worst-case scenarios.” Adam Levitin, a Georgetown University associate professor of law, has estimated that the claims could be in the trillions of dollars, rendering major U.S. banks insolvent.
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS: “I’M NOT LEAVING” For the millions of Americans who paid their bills, never flipped a house, and had never heard of a CDO, the financial crisis has been long, bewildering, and painful. A crisis that started with a housing boom that became a bubble has come back full circle to forests of “for sale” signs—but this time attracting few buyers. Stores have shuttered; employers have cut jobs; hopes have fled. Too many Americans today find themselves in suburban ghost towns or urban wastelands, where properties are vacant and construction cranes do not lift a thing for months. Renters, who never bought into the madness, are also among the victims as lenders seize property after landlords default on loans. Renters can lose the roof over their heads as well as their security deposits. In Minneapolis, as many as of buildings with foreclosures in and were renter-occupied, according to statistics cited in testimony by Deputy Assistant Secretary Erika Poethig from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity.
THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
For children, a repossessed house—whether rented or bought—is destabilizing. The impact of foreclosures on children around the country has been enormous. Onethird of the children who experienced homelessness after the financial crisis did so because of foreclosures of the housing that their parents owned or were renting, according to a recent study. One school official in Nevada told the Commission about the significant challenges to the educational system created by the economic crisis. All around, the demand from people who need help is outstripping community resources. Coast to coast, communities are trying to stretch housing aid budgets to help people displaced by foreclosures. In Nevada, for example, Clark County, which contains . million people living in and around Las Vegas, was forced to cut its Financial Housing Assistance program, despite the clear needs in the community. Gail Burks, the president and chief executive of the Nevada Fair Housing Center, told the Commission that her group finds that many they counsel through the foreclosure process are in despair. “It’s very stressful. There are times that the couples we are helping end up divorcing, sometimes before the process is over. . . . We’ve also seen threats of suicide.” And the stories continue. Karen Mann, the appraiser from Discovery Bay, California, testified to the Commission about her family’s circumstances. Her daughter and son-in-law refinanced their mortgage into an adjustable-rate mortgage. When the time came for the rate to adjust upward, new financial troubles made the payments more than the family could afford. Because the market value of the home was nearly equal to their mortgage debt, the family’s attempts to get the mortgage modified were fruitless. They lined up a buyer for a short sale, but the deal was nixed. Then, when medical problems created yet another challenge, the couple and their four children moved in with Mann. “The children were relocated to new schools, and the adults dealt with the pain and emotional suffering while they were trying to rebuild their lives,” Mann said. The couple filed for bankruptcy. Two months after the bankruptcy was completed, the lender asked them if they wanted to modify their mortgage. In Cape Coral, Florida, Dawn Hunt and her husband, a mailman, and their two children live in an attractive ranch-style home they bought for about , more than a decade ago. It was a quiet, -year-old subdivision where most of the residents were homeowners. In and , builders rushed to the area and threw up dozens of new homes on empty lots. Homebuilder Comfort Homes of Florida LLC broke ground for a house across the street from the Hunts, but did not complete it. This fall, the house sat vacant, an empty shell. No stucco was ever applied to the concrete block exterior, and the house had no interior walls. A wasp nest decorated the electrical box near the front door. The untended grass had grown four feet high. Sharp sand spurs in the brush made it difficult to approach the property. Two doors down from the Hunts, another house was also vacant, left empty when a family split up and moved a year earlier. They abandoned a car in the garage. The roof leaked, and a blue plastic tarp put in place to keep the rain out now flaps in the breeze. The Hunts called the police after vandals broke into the house one night; intruders have been back twice more in the daylight.
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Now of the homes in the Hunts’ neighborhood are in default, are in the foreclosure process, or have been taken back by the bank. Most of the other houses in the community are occupied by renters whose absentee landlords bought the houses when the homeowners lost their homes to their banks. The Hunts’ house has lost two-thirds of its value from the peak of the market. Nonetheless, even though the neighborhood is not as lovely as it used to be, Dawn Hunt told the FCIC, “I’m not leaving.”
COMMISSION CONCLUSIONS ON CHAPTER 22 The Commission concludes the unchecked increase in the complexity of mortgages and securitization has made it more difficult to solve problems in the mortgage market. This complexity has created powerful competing interests, including those of the holders of first and second mortgages and of mortgage servicers; has reduced transparency for policy makers, regulators, financial institutions, and homeowners; and has impeded mortgage modifications. The resulting disputes and inaction have caused pain largely borne by individual homeowners and created further uncertainty about the health of the housing market and financial institutions.
Dissenting Statement of Commissioner
Commissioner
KEITH
D OUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN
HENNESSEY
Vice Chairman
BILL
THOMAS
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS
CONTENTS Introduction....................................................................................................... How Our Approach Differs from Others’ .......................................................... Stages of the Crisis.............................................................................................. The Ten Essential Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis........................ The Credit Bubble: Global Capital Flows, Underpriced Risk, and Federal Reserve Policy................................................................................. The Housing Bubble .......................................................................................... Turning Bad Mortgages into Toxic Financial Assets .......................................... Big Bank Bets and Why Banks Failed................................................................ Two Types of Systemic Failure............................................................................ The Shock and the Panic.................................................................................... The System Freezing ..........................................................................................
INTRODUCTION We have identified ten causes that are essential to explaining the crisis. In this dissenting view: • • • •
We explain how our approach differs from others’; We briefly describe the stages of the crisis; We list the ten essential causes of the crisis; and We walk through each cause in a bit more detail.
We find areas of agreement with the majority’s conclusions, but unfortunately the areas of disagreement are significant enough that we dissent and present our views in this report. We wish to compliment the Commission staff for their investigative work. In many ways it helped shape our thinking and conclusions. Due to a length limitation recently imposed upon us by six members of the Commission, this report focuses only on the causes essential to explaining the crisis. We regret that the limitation means that several important topics that deserve a much fuller discussion get only a brief mention here.
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HOW OUR APPROACH DIFFERS FROM OTHERS’ During the course of the Commission’s hearings and investigations, we heard frequent arguments that there was a single cause of the crisis. For some it was international capital flows or monetary policy; for others, housing policy; and for still others, it was insufficient regulation of an ambiguously defined shadow banking sector, or unregulated over-the-counter derivatives, or the greed of those in the financial sector and the political influence they had in Washington. In each case, these arguments, when used as single-cause explanations, are too simplistic because they are incomplete. While some of these factors were essential contributors to the crisis, each is insufficient as a standalone explanation. The majority’s approach to explaining the crisis suffers from the opposite problem–it is too broad. Not everything that went wrong during the financial crisis caused the crisis, and while some causes were essential, others had only a minor impact. Not every regulatory change related to housing or the financial system prior to the crisis was a cause. The majority’s almost -page report is more an account of bad events than a focused explanation of what happened and why. When everything is important, nothing is. As an example, non-credit derivatives did not in any meaningful way cause or contribute to the financial crisis. Neither the Community Reinvestment Act nor removal of the Glass-Steagall firewall was a significant cause. The crisis can be explained without resorting to these factors. We also reject as too simplistic the hypothesis that too little regulation caused the crisis, as well as its opposite, that too much regulation caused the crisis. We question this metric for determining the effectiveness of regulation. The amount of financial regulation should reflect the need to address particular failures in the financial system. For example, high-risk, nontraditional mortgage lending by nonbank lenders flourished in the s and did tremendous damage in an ineffectively regulated environment, contributing to the financial crisis. Poorly designed government housing policies distorted market outcomes and contributed to the creation of unsound mortgages as well. Countrywide’s irresponsible lending and AIG’s failure were in part attributable to ineffective regulation and supervision, while Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s failures were the result of policymakers using the power of government to blend public purpose with private gains and then socializing the losses. Both the “too little government” and “too much government” approaches are too broad-brush to explain the crisis. The majority says the crisis was avoidable if only the United States had adopted across-the-board more restrictive regulations, in conjunction with more aggressive regulators and supervisors. This conclusion by the majority largely ignores the global nature of the crisis. For example: • A credit bubble appeared in both the United States and Europe. This tells us that our primary explanation for the credit bubble should focus on factors common to both regions.
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House Price Appreciation in Selected Countries, 2002-2008 The United States was one of many countries to experience rapid house price growth 2002 INDEX = 100 United States
United Kingdom
Spain
200 192 158 150 118 100 ’02
’04
’06
’02
’08
Australia
’04
’06
’08
’02
France
’04
’06
’08
Ireland
200 168 152
150
142 100 ’02
’04
’06
’08
’02
’04
’06
’08
’02
’04
’06
’08
SOURCES: Standard and Poors, Nationwide, Banco de España, AusStats, FNAIM, Permanent TSB
• The report largely ignores the credit bubble beyond housing. Credit spreads declined not just for housing, but also for other asset classes like commercial real estate. This tells us to look to the credit bubble as an essential cause of the U.S. housing bubble. It also tells us that problems with U.S. housing policy or markets do not by themselves explain the U.S. housing bubble. • There were housing bubbles in the United Kingdom, Spain, Australia, France and Ireland, some more pronounced than in the United States. Some nations with housing bubbles relied little on American-style mortgage securitization. A good explanation of the U.S. housing bubble should also take into account its parallels in other nations. This leads us to explanations broader than just U.S. housing policy, regulation, or supervision. It also tells us that while failures in U.S. securitization markets may be an essential cause, we must look for other things that went wrong as well. • Large financial firms failed in Iceland, Spain, Germany, and the United Kingdom, among others. Not all of these firms bet solely on U.S. housing assets, and
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they operated in different regulatory and supervisory regimes than U.S. commercial and investment banks. In many cases these European systems have stricter regulation than the United States, and still they faced financial firm failures similar to those in the United States. These facts tell us that our explanation for the credit bubble should focus on factors common to both the United States and Europe, that the credit bubble is likely an essential cause of the U.S. housing bubble, and that U.S. housing policy is by itself an insufficient explanation of the crisis. Furthermore, any explanation that relies too heavily on a unique element of the U.S. regulatory or supervisory system is likely to be insufficient to explain why the same thing happened in parts of Europe. This moves inadequate international capital and liquidity standards up our list of causes, and it moves the differences between the regulation of U.S. commercial and investment banks down that list. Applying these international comparisons directly to the majority’s conclusions provokes these questions: • If the political influence of the financial sector in Washington was an essential cause of the crisis, how does that explain similar financial institution failures in the United Kingdom, Germany, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland, and Denmark? • How can the “runaway mortgage securitization train” detailed in the majority’s report explain housing bubbles in Spain, Australia, and the United Kingdom, countries with mortgage finance systems vastly different than that in the United States? • How can the corporate and regulatory structures of investment banks explain the decisions of many U.S. commercial banks, several large American university endowments, and some state public employee pension funds, not to mention a number of large and midsize German banks, to take on too much U.S. housing risk? • How did former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s “deregulatory ideology” also precipitate bank regulatory failures across Europe? Not all of these factors identified by the majority were irrelevant; they were just not essential. The Commission’s statutory mission is “to examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States.” By focusing too narrowly on U.S. regulatory policy and supervision, ignoring international parallels, emphasizing only arguments for greater regulation, failing to prioritize the causes, and failing to distinguish sufficiently between causes and effects, the majority’s report is unbalanced and leads to incorrect conclusions about what caused the crisis. We begin our explanation by briefly describing the stages of the crisis.
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STAGES OF THE CRISIS As of December , the United States is still in an economic slump caused by a financial crisis that first manifested itself in August and ended in early . The primary features of that financial crisis were a financial shock in September and a concomitant financial panic. The financial shock and panic triggered a severe contraction in lending and hiring beginning in the fourth quarter of . Some observers describe recent economic history as a recession that began in December and continued until June , and from which we are only now beginning to recover. While this definition of the recession is technically accurate, it obscures a more important chronology that connects financial market developments with the broader economy. We describe recent U.S. macroeconomic history in five stages: • A series of foreshocks beginning in August , followed by an economic slowdown and then a mild recession through August , as liquidity problems emerged and three large U.S. financial institutions failed; • A severe financial shock in September , in which ten large financial institutions failed, nearly failed, or changed their institutional structure; triggering • A financial panic and the beginning of a large contraction in the real economy in the last few months of ; followed by • The end of the financial shock, panic, and rescue at the beginning of ; followed by • A continued and deepening contraction in the real economy and the beginning of the financial recovery and rebuilding period. As of December , the United States is still in the last stage. The financial system is still recovering and being restructured, and the U.S. economy struggles to return to sustained strong growth. The remainder of our comments focuses on the financial crisis in the first three stages by examining its ten essential causes.
THE TEN ESSENTIAL CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS The following ten causes, global and domestic, are essential to explaining the financial and economic crisis. I. Credit bubble. Starting in the late s, China, other large developing countries, and the big oil-producing nations built up large capital surpluses. They loaned these savings to the United States and Europe, causing interest rates to fall. Credit spreads narrowed, meaning that the cost of borrowing to finance risky investments declined. A credit bubble formed in the United States and Europe, the most notable manifestation of which was increased
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II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
investment in high-risk mortgages. U.S. monetary policy may have contributed to the credit bubble but did not cause it. Housing bubble. Beginning in the late s and accelerating in the s, there was a large and sustained housing bubble in the United States. The bubble was characterized both by national increases in house prices well above the historical trend and by rapid regional boom-and-bust cycles in California, Nevada, Arizona, and Florida. Many factors contributed to the housing bubble, the bursting of which created enormous losses for homeowners and investors. Nontraditional mortgages. Tightening credit spreads, overly optimistic assumptions about U.S. housing prices, and flaws in primary and secondary mortgage markets led to poor origination practices and combined to increase the flow of credit to U.S. housing finance. Fueled by cheap credit, firms like Countrywide, Washington Mutual, Ameriquest, and HSBC Finance originated vast numbers of high-risk, nontraditional mortgages that were in some cases deceptive, in many cases confusing, and often beyond borrowers’ ability to repay. At the same time, many homebuyers and homeowners did not live up to their responsibilities to understand the terms of their mortgages and to make prudent financial decisions. These factors further amplified the housing bubble. Credit ratings and securitization. Failures in credit rating and securitization transformed bad mortgages into toxic financial assets. Securitizers lowered the credit quality of the mortgages they securitized. Credit rating agencies erroneously rated mortgage-backed securities and their derivatives as safe investments. Buyers failed to look behind the credit ratings and do their own due diligence. These factors fueled the creation of more bad mortgages. Financial institutions concentrated correlated risk. Managers of many large and midsize financial institutions in the United States amassed enormous concentrations of highly correlated housing risk. Some did this knowingly by betting on rising housing prices, while others paid insufficient attention to the potential risk of carrying large amounts of housing risk on their balance sheets. This enabled large but seemingly manageable mortgage losses to precipitate the collapse of large financial institutions. Leverage and liquidity risk. Managers of these financial firms amplified this concentrated housing risk by holding too little capital relative to the risks they were carrying on their balance sheets. Many placed their firms on a hair trigger by relying heavily on short-term financing in repo and commercial paper markets for their day-to-day liquidity. They placed solvency bets (sometimes unknowingly) that their housing investments were solid, and liquidity bets that overnight money would always be available. Both turned out to be bad bets. In several cases, failed solvency bets triggered liquidity crises, causing some of the largest financial firms to fail or nearly fail. Firms were insufficiently transparent about their housing risk, creating uncertainty in mar-
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kets that made it difficult for some to access additional capital and liquidity when needed. Risk of contagion. The risk of contagion was an essential cause of the crisis. In some cases, the financial system was vulnerable because policymakers were afraid of a large firm’s sudden and disorderly failure triggering balancesheet losses in its counterparties. These institutions were deemed too big and interconnected to other firms through counterparty credit risk for policymakers to be willing to allow them to fail suddenly. Common shock. In other cases, unrelated financial institutions failed because of a common shock: they made similar failed bets on housing. Unconnected financial firms failed for the same reason and at roughly the same time because they had the same problem: large housing losses. This common shock meant that the problem was broader than a single failed bank–key large financial institutions were undercapitalized because of this common shock. Financial shock and panic. In quick succession in September , the failures, near-failures, and restructurings of ten firms triggered a global financial panic. Confidence and trust in the financial system began to evaporate as the health of almost every large and midsize financial institution in the United States and Europe was questioned. Financial crisis causes economic crisis. The financial shock and panic caused a severe contraction in the real economy. The shock and panic ended in early . Harm to the real economy continues through today.
We now describe these ten essential causes of the crisis in more detail.
THE CREDIT BUBBLE: GLOBAL CAPITAL FLOWS, UNDERPRICED RISK, AND FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY The financial and economic crisis began with a credit bubble in the United States and Europe. Credit spreads narrowed significantly, meaning that the cost of borrowing to finance risky investments declined relative to safe assets such as U.S. Treasury securities. The most notable of these risky investments were high-risk mortgages. The U.S. housing bubble was the most visible effect of the credit bubble but not the only one. Commercial real estate, high-yield debt, and leveraged loans were all boosted by the surplus of inexpensive credit. There are three major possible explanations for the credit bubble: global capital flows, the repricing of risk, and monetary policy.
Global capital flows Starting in the late s, China, other large developing countries, and the big oilproducing nations consumed and invested domestically less than they earned. As
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China and other Asian economies grew, their savings grew as well. In addition, boosted by high global oil prices, the largest oil-producing nations built up large capital surpluses and looked to invest in the United States and Europe. Massive amounts of inexpensive capital flowed into the United States, making borrowing inexpensive. Americans used the cheap credit to make riskier investments than in the past. The same dynamic was at work in Europe. Germany saved, and its capital flowed to Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke describes the strong relationship between financial account surplus growth (the mirror of current account deficit growth) and house price appreciation: “Countries in which current accounts worsened and capital inflows rose . . . had greater house price appreciation [from to ] . . . The relationship is highly significant, both statistically and economically, and about percent of the variability in house price appreciation across countries is explained.” Global imbalances are an essential cause of the crisis and the most important macroeconomic explanation. Steady and large increases in capital inflows into the U.S. and European economies encouraged significant increases in domestic lending, especially in high-risk mortgages.
The repricing of risk Low-cost capital can but does not necessarily have to lead to an increase in risky investments. Increased capital flows to the United States and Europe cannot alone explain the credit bubble. We still don’t know whether the credit bubble was the result of rational or irrational behavior. Investors may have been rational—their preferences may have changed, making them willing to accept lower returns for high-risk investments. They may have collectively been irrational—they may have adopted a bubble mentality and assumed that, while they were paying a higher price for risky assets, they could resell them later for even more. Or they may have mistakenly assumed that the world had gotten safer and that the risk of bad outcomes (especially in U.S. housing markets) had declined. For some combination of these reasons, over a period of many years leading up to the crisis, investors grew willing to pay more for risky assets. When the housing bubble burst and the financial shock hit, investors everywhere reassessed what return they would demand for a risky investment, and therefore what price they were willing to pay for a risky asset. Credit spreads for all types of risk around the world increased suddenly and sharply, and the prices of risky assets plummeted. This was most evident in but not limited to the U.S. market for financial assets backed by high-risk, nontraditional mortgages. The credit bubble burst and caused tremendous damage.
Monetary policy The Federal Reserve significantly affects the availability and price of capital. This leads some to argue that the Fed contributed to the increased demand for risky in-
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vestments by keeping interest rates too low for too long. Critics of Fed policy argue that, beginning under Chairman Greenspan and continuing under Chairman Bernanke, the Fed kept rates too low for too long and created a bubble in housing. Dr. John B. Taylor is a proponent of this argument. He argues that the Fed set interest rates too low in – and that these low rates fueled the housing bubble as measured by housing starts. He suggests that this Fed-created housing bubble was the essential cause of the financial crisis. He further argues that, had federal funds rates instead followed the path recommended by the Taylor Rule (a monetary policy formula for setting the funds rate), the housing boom and subsequent bust would have been much smaller. He also applies this analysis to European economies and concludes that similar forces were at play. Current Fed Chairman Bernanke and former Fed Chairman Greenspan disagree with Taylor’s analysis. Chairman Bernanke argues that the Taylor Rule is a descriptive rule of thumb, but that “simple policy rules” are insufficient for making monetary policy decisions. He further argues that, depending on the construction of the particular Taylor Rule, the monetary policy stance of the Fed may not have diverged significantly from its historical path. Former Chairman Greenspan adds that the connection between short-term interest rates and house prices is weak—that even if the Fed’s target for overnight lending between banks was too low, this has little power to explain why rates on thirty-year mortgages were also too low. This debate intertwines several monetary policy questions: • How heavily should the Fed weigh a policy rule in its decisions to set interest rates? Should monetary policy be mostly rule-based or mostly discretionary? • If the Fed thinks an asset bubble is developing, should it use monetary policy to try to pop or prevent it? • Were interest rates too low in –? • Did too-low federal funds rates cause or contribute to the housing bubble? This debate is complex and thus far unresolved. Loose monetary policy does not necessarily lead to smaller credit spreads. There are open questions about the link between short-term interest rates and house price appreciation, whether housing starts are the best measure of the housing bubble, the timing of housing price increases relative to the interest rates in –, the European comparison, and whether the magnitude of the bubble can be explained by the gap between the Taylor Rule prescription and historic rates. At the same time, many observers argue that Taylor is right that short-term interest rates were too low during this period, and therefore that his argument is at least plausible if not provable. We conclude that global capital flows and risk repricing caused the credit bubble, and we consider them essential to explaining the crisis. U.S. monetary policy may have been an amplifying factor, but it did not by itself cause the credit bubble, nor was it essential to causing the crisis. The Commission should have focused more time and energy on exploring these questions about global capital flows, risk repricing, and monetary policy. Instead, the
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Commission focused thousands of staff hours on investigation, and not nearly enough on analyzing these critical economic questions. The investigations were in many cases productive and informative, but there should have been more balance between investigation and analysis.
Conclusions: • The credit bubble was an essential cause of the financial crisis. • Global capital flows lowered the price of capital in the United States and much of Europe. • Over time, investors lowered the return they required for risky investments. Their preferences may have changed, they may have adopted an irrational bubble mentality, or they may have mistakenly assumed that the world had become safer. This inflated prices for risky assets. • U.S. monetary policy may have contributed to the credit bubble but did not cause it.
THE HOUSING BUBBLE The housing bubble had two components: the actual homes and the mortgages that financed them. We look briefly at each component and its possible causes. There was a housing bubble in the United States—the price of U.S. housing increased by more than could be explained by market developments. This included both a national housing bubble and more concentrated regional bubbles in four “Sand States”: California, Nevada, Arizona, and Florida. Conventional wisdom is that a bubble is hard to spot while you’re in one, and painfully obvious after it has burst. Even after the U.S. housing bubble burst, there is no consensus on what caused it. While we still don’t know the relative importance of the possible causes of the housing bubble, we can at least identify some of the most important hypotheses: • Population growth. Arizona, Florida, Nevada, and parts of California all experienced population growth that far exceeded the national average. More people fueled more demand for houses. • Land use restrictions. In some areas, local zoning rules and other land use restrictions, as well as natural barriers to building, made it hard to build new houses to meet increased demand resulting from population growth. When supply is constrained and demand increases, prices go up. • Over-optimism. Even absent market fundamentals driving up prices, shared expectations of future price increases can generate booms. This is the classic explanation of a bubble. • Easy financing. Nontraditional (and higher risk) mortgages made it easier for potential homebuyers to borrow enough to buy more expensive homes. This doesn’t mean they could afford those homes or future mortgage payments in
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the long run, but only that someone was willing to provide the initial loan. Mortgage originators often had insufficient incentive to encourage borrowers to get sustainable mortgages. Some combination of the first two factors may apply in parts of the Sand States, but these don’t explain the nationwide increase in prices. The closely related and nationwide mortgage bubble was the largest and most significant manifestation of a more generalized credit bubble in the United States and Europe. Mortgage rates were low relative to the risk of losses, and risky borrowers, who in the past would have been turned down, found it possible to obtain a mortgage. In addition to the credit bubble, the proliferation of nontraditional mortgage products was a key cause of this surge in mortgage lending. Use of these products increased rapidly from the early part of the decade through . There was a steady deterioration in mortgage underwriting standards (enabled by securitizers that lowered the credit quality of the mortgages they would accept, and credit rating agencies that overrated the subsequent securities and derivatives). There was a contemporaneous increase in mortgages that required little to no documentation. As house prices rose, declining affordability would normally have constrained demand, but lenders and borrowers increasingly relied on nontraditional mortgage products to paper over this affordability issue. These mortgage products included interest-only adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), pay-option ARMs that gave borrowers flexibility on the size of early monthly payments, and negative amortization products in which the initial payment did not even cover interest costs. These exotic mortgage products would often result in significant reductions in the initial monthly payment compared with even a standard ARM. Not surprisingly, they were the mortgages of choice for many lenders and borrowers focused on minimizing initial monthly payments. Fed Chairman Bernanke sums up the situation this way: “At some point, both lenders and borrowers became convinced that house prices would only go up. Borrowers chose, and were extended, mortgages that they could not be expected to service in the longer term. They were provided these loans on the expectation that accumulating home equity would soon allow refinancing into more sustainable mortgages. For a time, rising house prices became a self-fulfilling prophecy, but ultimately, further appreciation could not be sustained and house prices collapsed.” This explanation posits a relationship between the surge in housing prices and the surge in mortgage lending. There is not yet a consensus on which was the cause and which the effect. They appear to have been mutually reinforcing. In understanding the growth of nontraditional mortgages, it is also difficult to determine the relative importance of causal factors, but again we can at least list those that are important: • Nonbank mortgage lenders like New Century and Ameriquest flourished under ineffective regulatory regimes, especially at the state level. Weak disclosure standards and underwriting rules made it easy for irresponsible lenders to issue
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mortgages that would probably never be repaid. Federally regulated bank and thrift lenders, such as Countrywide, Wachovia, and Washington Mutual, had lenient regulatory oversight on mortgage origination as well. • Mortgage brokers were paid for new originations but did not ultimately bear the losses on poorly performing mortgages. Mortgage brokers therefore had an incentive to ignore negative information about borrowers. • Many borrowers neither understood the terms of their mortgage nor appreciated the risk that home values could fall significantly, while others borrowed too much and bought bigger houses than they could ever reasonably expect to afford. • All these factors were supplemented by government policies, many of which had been in effect for decades, that subsidized homeownership but created hidden costs to taxpayers and the economy. Elected officials of both parties pushed housing subsidies too far. The Commission heard convincing testimony of serious mortgage fraud problems. Excruciating anecdotes showed that mortgage fraud increased substantially during the housing bubble. There is no question that this fraud did tremendous harm. But while that fraud is infuriating and may have been significant in certain areas (like Florida), the Commission was unable to measure the impact of fraud relative to the overall housing bubble. The explosion of legal but questionable lending is an easier explanation for the creation of so many bad mortgages. Lending standards were lax enough that lenders could remain within the law but still generate huge volumes of bad mortgages. It is likely that the housing bubble and the crisis would have occurred even if there had been no mortgage fraud. We therefore classify mortgage fraud not as an essential cause of the crisis but as a contributing factor and a deplorable effect of the bubble. Even if the number of fraudulent loans was not substantial enough to have a large impact on the bubble, the increase in fraudulent activity should have been a leading indicator of deeper structural problems in the market.
Conclusions: • Beginning in the late s and accelerating in the s, there was a large and sustained housing bubble in the United States. The bubble was characterized both by national increases in house prices well above the historical trend and by more rapid regional boom-and-bust cycles in California, Nevada, Arizona, and Florida. • There was also a contemporaneous mortgage bubble, caused primarily by the broader credit bubble. • The causes of the housing bubble are still poorly understood. Explanations include population growth, land use restrictions, bubble psychology, and easy financing. • The causes of the mortgage bubble and its relationship to the housing bubble
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are also still poorly understood. Important factors include weak disclosure standards and underwriting rules for bank and nonbank mortgage lenders alike, the way in which mortgage brokers were compensated, borrowers who bought too much house and didn’t understand or ignored the terms of their mortgages, and elected officials who over years piled on layer upon layer of government housing subsidies. • Mortgage fraud increased substantially, but the evidence gathered by the Commission does not show that it was quantitatively significant enough to conclude that it was an essential cause.
TURNING BAD MORTGAGES INTO TOXIC FINANCIAL ASSETS The mortgage securitization process turned mortgages into mortgage-backed securities through the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as Countrywide and other “private label” competitors. The securitization process allows capital to flow from investors to homebuyers. Without it, mortgage lending would be limited to banks and other portfolio lenders, supported by traditional funding sources such as deposits. Securitization allows homeowners access to enormous amounts of additional funding and thereby makes homeownership more affordable. It also can diversify housing risk among different types of lenders. If everything else is working properly, these are good things. Everything else was not working properly. Some focus their criticism on the form of these financial instruments. For example, financial instruments called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) were engineered from different bundled payment streams from mortgage-backed securities. Some argue that the conversion of a bundle of simple mortgages to a mortgagebacked security, and then to a collateralized debt obligation, was a problem. They argue that complex financial derivatives caused the crisis. We conclude that the details of this engineering are incidental to understanding the essential causes of the crisis. If the system works properly, reconfiguring streams of mortgage payments has little effect. The total amount of risk in a mortgage is unchanged if the pieces are put together in a different way. Unfortunately, the system did not work as it should have. There were several flaws in the securitization and collateralization process that made things worse. • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as Countrywide and other private label competitors, all lowered the credit quality standards of the mortgages they securitized. A mortgage-backed security was therefore “worse” during the crisis than in preceding years because the underlying mortgages were generally of poorer quality. This turned a bad mortgage into a worse security. • Mortgage originators took advantage of these lower credit quality securitization standards and the easy flow of credit to relax the underwriting discipline in the loans they issued. As long as they could resell a mortgage to the secondary market, they didn’t care about its quality.
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• The increasing complexity of housing-related assets and the many steps between the borrower and final investor increased the importance of credit rating agencies and made independent risk assessment by investors more difficult. In this respect, complexity did contribute to the problem, but the other problems listed here are more important. • Credit rating agencies assigned overly optimistic ratings to the CDOs built from mortgage-backed securities. By erroneously rating these bundles of mortgage-backed security payments too highly, the credit rating agencies substantially contributed to the creation of toxic financial assets. • Borrowers, originators, securitizers, rating agencies, and the ultimate buyers of the securities into which the risky mortgages were packaged all failed to exercise prudence and perform due diligence in their respective transactions. In particular, CDO buyers who were, in theory, sophisticated investors relied too heavily on credit ratings. • Many financial institutions chose to make highly concentrated bets on housing prices. While in some cases they did that with whole loans, they were able to more easily and efficiently do so with CDOs and derivative securities. • Regulatory capital standards, both domestically and internationally, gave preferential treatment to highly rated debt, further empowering the rating agencies and increasing the desirability of mortgage-backed structured products. • There is a way that housing bets can be magnified using a form of derivative. A synthetic CDO is a security whose payments mimic that of a CDO that contains real mortgages. This is a “side bet” that allows you to assume the same risk as if you held pieces of actual mortgages. To the extent that investors and financial institutions wanted to increase their bets on housing, they were able to use synthetic CDOs. The risks in these synthetic CDOs, however, are zero-sum, since for every investor making a bet that housing performance will fall there must be other investors with equal-sized bets in the opposite direction. These are related but different problems. While many involve the word “derivative,” it is a mistake to bundle them together and say, “Derivatives or CDOs caused the crisis.” In each case, we assign responsibility for the failures to the people and institutions rather than to the financial instruments they used.
Conclusions: Rather than “derivatives and CDOs caused the financial crisis,” it is more accurate to say: • • • •
Securitizers lowered credit quality standards; Mortgage originators took advantage of this to create junk mortgages; Credit rating agencies assigned overly optimistic ratings; Securities investors and others failed to perform sufficient due diligence;
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• International and domestic regulators encouraged arbitrage toward lower capital standards; • Some investors used these securities to concentrate rather than diversify risk; and • Others used synthetic CDOs to amplify their housing bets.
The dangerous imprecision of the term “shadow banking” Part II of the majority’s report begins with an extensive discussion of the failures of the “shadow banking system,” which it defines as a “financial institutions and activities that in some respects parallel banking activities but are subject to less regulation than commercial banks.” The majority’s report suggests that the shadow banking system was a cause of the financial crisis. “Shadow banking” is a term used to represent a collection of different financial institutions, instruments, and issues within the financial system. Indeed, “shadow banking” can refer to any financial activity that transforms short-term borrowing into long-term lending without a government backstop. This term can therefore include financial instruments and institutions as diverse as: • The tri-party repo market; • Structured Investment Vehicles and other off-balance-sheet entities used to increase leverage; • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; • Credit default swaps; and • Hedge funds, monoline insurers, commercial paper, money market mutual funds, and investment banks. As discussed in other parts of this paper, some of these items were important causes of the crisis. No matter what their individual roles in causing or contributing to the crisis, however, they are undoubtedly different. It is a mistake to group these issues and problems together. Each should be considered on its merits, rather than painting a poorly defined swath of the financial sector with a common brush of “too little regulation.”
BIG BANK BETS AND WHY BANKS FAILED The story so far involves significant lost housing wealth and diminished values of securities financing those homes. Yet even larger past wealth losses did not bring the global financial system to its knees. The key differences in this case were leverage and risk concentration. Highly correlated housing risk was concentrated in large and highly leveraged financial institutions in the United States and much of Europe. This leverage magnified the effect of a housing loss on a financial institution’s capital reserve, and the concentration meant these losses occurred in parallel.
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In effect, many of the largest financial institutions in the world, along with hundreds of smaller ones, bet the survival of their institutions on housing prices. Some did this knowingly; others not. Many investors made three bad assumptions about U.S. housing prices. They assumed: • A low probability that housing prices would decline significantly; • Prices were largely uncorrelated across different regions, so that a local housing bubble bursting in Nevada would not happen at the same time as one bursting in Florida; and • A relatively low level of strategic defaults, in which an underwater homeowner voluntarily defaults on a non-recourse mortgage. When housing prices declined nationally and quite severely in certain areas, these flawed assumptions, magnified by other problems described in previous steps, created enormous financial losses for firms exposed to housing investments. An essential cause of the financial and economic crisis was appallingly bad risk management by the leaders of some of the largest financial institutions in the United States and Europe. Each failed firm that the Commission examined failed in part because its leaders poorly managed risk. Based on testimony from the executives of several of the largest failed firms and the Commission staff ’s investigative work, we can group common risk management failures into several classes: • Concentration of highly correlated (housing) risk. Firm managers bet massively on one type of asset, counting on high rates of return while comforting themselves that their competitors were doing the same. • Insufficient capital. Some of the failed institutions were levered : or higher. This meant that every of assets was financed with of equity capital and of debt. This made these firms enormously profitable when things were going well, but incredibly sensitive to even a small loss, as a percent decline in the market value of these assets would leave them technically insolvent. In some cases, this increased leverage was direct and transparent. In other cases, firms used Structured Investment Vehicles, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, and other off-balance-sheet entities to try to have it both ways: further increasing their leverage while appearing not to do so. Highly concentrated, highly correlated risk combined with high leverage makes a fragile financial sector and creates a financial accident waiting to happen. These firms should have had much larger capital cushions and/or mechanisms for contingent capital upon which to draw in a crisis. • Overdependence on short-term liquidity from repo and commercial paper markets. Just as each lacked sufficient capital cushions, in each case the failing firm’s liquidity cushion ran out within days. The failed firms appear to have based their liquidity strategies on the flawed assumption that both the firm and
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these funding markets would always be healthy and functioning smoothly. By failing to provide sufficiently for disruptions in their short-term financing, management put their firm’s survival on a hair trigger. • Poor risk management systems. A number of firms were unable to easily aggregate their housing risks across various business lines. Once the market began to decline, those firms that understood their total exposure were able to effectively sell or hedge their risk before the market turned down too far. Those that didn’t were stuck with toxic assets in a disintegrating market.
Solvency failure versus liquidity failure The Commission heard testimony from the former heads of Bear Stearns, Lehman, Citigroup, and AIG, among others. A common theme pervaded the testimony of these witnesses: • We were solvent before the liquidity run started. • Someone (unnamed) spread bad information and started an unjustified liquidity run. • Had that unjustified liquidity run not happened, given enough time we would have recovered and returned to a position of strength. • Therefore, the firm failed because we ran out of time, and it’s not my fault. In each case, experts and regulators contested the former CEO’s “we were solvent” claim. Technical issues make it difficult to prove otherwise, especially because the answer depends on when solvency is measured. After a few days of selling assets at firesale prices during a liquidity run, a highly leveraged firm’s balance sheet will look measurably worse. In each case, whether or not the firm was technically solvent, the evidence strongly supports the claim that those pulling back from doing business with the firm were not irrational. In each of the cases we examined, there were huge financial losses that at a minimum placed the firm’s solvency in serious doubt. Interestingly, in each case, the CEO was willing to admit that he had poorly managed his firm’s liquidity risk, but unwilling to admit that his firm was insolvent or nearly so. In each case the CEO’s claims were highly unpersuasive. These firm managers knew or should have known that they were risking the solvency and therefore the survival of their firms.
Conclusions: • Managers of many large and midsize financial institutions in the United States and Europe amassed enormous concentrations of highly correlated housing risk on their balance sheets. In doing so they turned a building housing crisis into a subsequent crisis of failing financial institutions. Some did this knowingly; others, unknowingly. • Managers of the largest financial firms further amplified these big bad bets by
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holding too little capital and having insufficiently robust access to liquidity. Many placed their firms on a hair trigger by becoming dependent upon shortterm financing from commercial paper and repo markets for their day-to-day funding. They placed failed solvency bets that their housing investments were solid, and failed liquidity bets that overnight money would always be there no matter what. In several cases, failed solvency bets triggered liquidity crises, causing some of the largest financial firms to fail or nearly fail.
“Investment banks caused the crisis” A persistent debate among members of the Commission was the relative importance of a firm’s legal form and regulatory regime in the failures of large financial institutions. For example, Commissioners agreed that investment bank holding companies were too lightly (barely) regulated by the SEC leading up to the crisis and that the Consolidated Supervised Entities program of voluntary regulation of these firms failed. As a result, no regulator could force these firms to strengthen their capital or liquidity buffers. There was agreement among Commissioners that this was a contributing factor to the failure of these firms. The Commission split, however, on whether the relatively weaker regulation of investment banks was an essential cause of the crisis. Institutional structure and differential regulation of various types of financial institutions were less important in causing the crisis than common factors that spanned different firm structures and regulatory regimes. Investment banks failed in the United States, and so did many commercial banks, large and small, despite a stronger regulatory and supervisory regime. Wachovia, for example, was a large insured depository institution supervised by the Fed, OCC, and FDIC. Yet it experienced a liquidity run that led to its near failure and prompted the first-ever invocation of the FDIC’s systemic risk exception. Insurance companies failed as well, notably AIG and the monoline bond insurers. Banks with different structures and operating in vastly differing regulatory regimes failed or had to be rescued in the United Kingdom, Germany, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Spain, Switzerland, Ireland, and Denmark. Some of these nations had far stricter regulatory and supervisory regimes than the United States. The bad loans in the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Spain were financed by federally-regulated lenders–not by “shadow banks.” Rather than attributing the crisis principally to differences in the stringency of regulation of these large financial institutions, it makes more sense to look for common factors: • Different types of financial firms in the United States and Europe made highly concentrated, highly correlated bets on housing. • Managers of different types of financial firms in the United States and Europe poorly managed their solvency and liquidity risk.
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TWO TYPES OF SYSTEMIC FAILURE Government policymakers were afraid of large firms’ sudden and disorderly failure and chose to intervene as a result. At times, intervention itself contributed to fear and uncertainty about the stability of the financial system. These interventions responded to two types of systemic failure.
Systemic failure type one: contagion We begin by defining contagion and too big to fail. If financial firm X is a large counterparty to other firms, X’s sudden and disorderly bankruptcy might weaken the finances of those other firms and cause them to fail. We call this the risk of contagion, when, because of a direct financial link between firms, the failure of one causes the failure of another. Financial firm X is too big to fail if policymakers fear contagion so much that they are unwilling to allow it to go bankrupt in a sudden and disorderly fashion. Policymakers make this judgment in large part based on how much counterparty risk other firms have to the failing firm, along with a judgment about the likelihood and possible damage of contagion. Policymakers may also act if they worry about the effects of a failed firm on a particular financial market in which that firm is a large participant. The determination of too big to fail rests in the minds of the policymakers who must decide whether to “bail out” a failing firm. They may be more likely to act if they are uncertain about the size of counterparty credit risk or about the health of an important financial market, or if broader market or economic conditions make them more risk averse. This logic can explain the actions of policymakers in several cases in : • In March, the Fed facilitated JPMorgan’s purchase of Bear Stearns by providing a bridge loan and loss protection on a pool of Bear’s assets. While policymakers were concerned about the failure of Bear Stearns itself and its direct effects on other firms, their decision to act was heightened by their uncertainty about potential broader market instability and the potential impact of Bear Stearns’ sudden failure on the tri-party repo market. • In September, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. Policymakers in effect promised that “the line would be drawn between debt and equity,” such that equity holders were wiped out but GSE debt would be worth cents on the dollar. They made this decision because banking regulators (and others) treated Fannie and Freddie debt as equivalent to Treasuries. A bank cannot hold all of its assets in debt issued by General Electric or AT&T, but can hold it all in Fannie or Freddie debt. The same is true for many other investors in the United States and around the world–they assumed that GSE debt was perfectly safe and so they weighted it too heavily in their portfolios. Policymakers were convinced that
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this counterparty risk faced by many financial institutions meant that any write-down of GSE debt would trigger a chain of failures throughout the financial system. In addition, GSE debt was used as collateral in short-term lending markets, and by extension, their failure would have led to a sudden massive contraction of credit beyond what did occur. Finally, mortgage markets depended so heavily on the GSEs for securitization that policymakers concluded that their sudden failure would effectively halt the creation of new mortgages. All three reasons led policymakers to conclude that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were too big to fail. • In September, the Federal Reserve, with support from Treasury, “bailed out” AIG, preventing it from sudden disorderly failure. They took this action because AIG was a huge seller of credit default swaps to a number of large financial firms, and they were concerned that an AIG default would trigger mandatory write-downs on those firms’ balance sheets, forcing counterparties to scramble to replace hedges in a distressed market and potentially triggering a cascade of failures. AIG also had important lines of business in insuring consumer and business activities that would have been threatened by a failure of AIG’s financial products division and potentially led to severe shocks to business and consumer confidence. The decision to aid AIG was also influenced by the extremely stressed market conditions resulting from other institutional failures in prior days and weeks. • In November, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and Treasury provided assistance to Citigroup. Regulators feared that the failure of Citigroup, one of the nation’s largest banks, would both undermine confidence the financial system gained after TARP and potentially lead to the failures of Citi’s major counterparties.
Conclusion: The risk of contagion was an essential cause of the crisis. In some cases the financial system was vulnerable because policymakers were afraid of a large firm’s sudden and disorderly failure triggering balance-sheet losses in its counterparties. These institutions were too big and interconnected to other firms, through counterparty credit risk, for policymakers to be willing to allow them to fail suddenly.
Systemic failure type two: a common shock If contagion is like the flu, then a common shock is like food poisoning. A common factor affects a number of firms in the same way, and they all get sick at the same time. In a common shock, the failure of one firm may inform us about the breadth or depth of the problem, but the failure of one firm does not cause the failure of another. The common factor in this case was concentrated losses on housing-related assets in large and midsize financial firms in the United States and some in Europe.
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These losses wiped out capital throughout the financial sector. Policymakers were not just dealing with a single insolvent firm that might transmit its failure to others. They were dealing with a scenario in which many large, midsize, and small financial institutions took large losses at roughly the same time.
Conclusion: Some financial institutions failed because of a common shock: they made similar failed bets on housing. Unconnected financial firms were failing for the same reason and at roughly the same time because they had the same problem of large housing losses. This common shock meant the problem was broader than a single failed bank–key large financial institutions were undercapitalized because of this common shock. We examine two frequently debated topics about the events of September .
“The government should not have bailed out _____” Some argue that no firm is too big to fail, and that policymakers erred when they “bailed out” Bear Stearns, Fannie and Freddie, AIG, and later Citigroup. In our view, this misses the basic arithmetic of policymaking. Policymakers were presented, for example, with the news that “AIG is about to fail” and counseled that its sudden and disorderly failure might trigger a chain reaction. Given the preceding failures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the Merrill Lynch merger, Lehman’s bankruptcy, and the Reserve Primary Fund breaking the buck, market confidence was on a knife’s edge. A chain reaction could cause a run on the global financial system. They feared not just a run on a bank, but a generalized panic that might crash the entire system–that is, the risk of an event comparable to the Great Depression. For a policymaker, the calculus is simple: if you bail out AIG and you’re wrong, you will have wasted taxpayer money and provoked public outrage. If you don’t bail out AIG and you’re wrong, the global financial system collapses. It should be easy to see why policymakers favored action–there was a chance of being wrong either way, and the costs of being wrong without action were far greater than the costs of being wrong with action.
“Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson should not have chosen to let Lehman fail” This is probably the most frequently discussed element of the financial crisis. To make this case one must argue: • Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson had a legal and viable option available to them other than Lehman filing bankruptcy. • They knew they had this option, considered it, and rejected it.
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• They were wrong to do so. • They had a reason for choosing to allow Lehman to fail. We have yet to find someone who can make a plausible case on all four counts. We think that these three policymakers would have saved Lehman if they thought they had a legal and viable option to do so. In hindsight, we also think they were right at the time–they did not have a legal and viable option to save Lehman. Many prominent public officials and market observers have accused these three of making a mistake. These critics usually argue that these three should have saved Lehman. When asked what else they could have done, the critic’s usual response is, “I don’t know, but surely they could have done something. They chose not to and caused the crisis.” Those who want to label Lehman’s failure a policy mistake are obliged to suggest an alternate course of action. The Fed’s assistance for Bear Stearns, and FDIC and Treasury’s assistance for Wachovia, followed a pattern. In each case, the failing firm or the government found a buyer, and the government subsidized the purchase. In the case of Bear Stearns, the government subsidized the purchase, and in the case of Wachovia, the government made clear that assistance would be available if it were needed. The specific mechanics of the subsidy differed between the two cases, but in each bailout the key condition was the presence of a willing buyer. Lehman had no willing buyer. Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch instead, and no other American financial institution was willing or able to step up. For months, government officials had tried and failed to facilitate transactions with possible domestic and foreign purchasers. At the end of “Lehman weekend,” the most viable candidate was the British bank Barclays. To make the purchase, Barclays needed either a shareholder vote, which would take several weeks to execute, or the permission of their regulator. They could get neither in the time available. Lehman was therefore facing an imminent liquidity run without a path to success. There was no buyer. There was the possibility that Barclays might be a buyer, some weeks in the future. Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson were then confronted with the question of whether to provide an effectively uncapped loan to Lehman to supplant its disappearing liquidity while Lehman searched for a buyer. This loan would have to come from the Fed, since before the enactment of the TARP legislation, Treasury had no authority to provide such financing. The law limits the Fed in these cases. The Fed can only provide secured loans. They were able to make this work for Bear Stearns and AIG because there were sufficient unencumbered assets to serve as collateral. Fed officials argue that Lehman had insufficient unpledged assets to secure the loan it would have needed to survive. Former Lehman executives and Fed critics argue otherwise, even though private market participants were unwilling to provide credit. Was there another option? The Fed leaders would have had to direct the staff to re-evaluate in a more optimistic way the analysis of Lehman’s balance sheet to justify a secured loan. They then would have had to decide to provide liquidity support to
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Lehman for an indefinite time period while Lehman searched for a buyer. That asset revaluation would later have come under intense legal scrutiny, especially given the likely large and potentially uncapped cost to the taxpayer. In the meantime, other creditors to Lehman could have cashed out at cents on the dollar, leaving taxpayers holding the bag for losses. Fed Chairman Bernanke, his general counsel Scott Alvarez, and New York Fed general counsel Thomas C. Baxter Jr. all argued in sworn testimony that this option would not have been legal. Bernanke suggested that it also would have been unwise because, in effect, the Fed would have been providing an open-ended commitment to allow Lehman to shop for a buyer. Bernanke testified that such a loan would merely waste taxpayer money for an outcome that was quite unlikely to change. Based on their actions to deal with other failing financial institutions in , we think these policymakers would have taken any available option they thought was legal and viable. This was an active team that was in all cases erring on the side of intervention to reduce the risk of catastrophic outcomes. Fed Chairman Bernanke said that he “was very, very confident that Lehman’s demise was going to be a catastrophe.” We find it implausible to conclude that they would have broken pattern on this one case at such an obviously risky moment if they had thought they had another option. Some find it inconceivable that policymakers could be confronted with a situation in which there was no legal and viable course of action to avoid financial catastrophe. In this case, that is what happened.
THE SHOCK AND THE PANIC Conventional wisdom is that the failure of Lehman Brothers triggered the financial panic. This is because Lehman’s failure was unexpected and because the debate about whether government officials could have saved Lehman is so intense. The focus on Lehman’s failure is too narrow. The events of September were a chain of one firm failure after another: • Sunday, September , FHFA put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. • This was followed by “Lehman weekend at the New York Fed,” which was in fact broader than just Lehman. At the end of that weekend, Bank of America had agreed to buy Merrill Lynch, Lehman was filing for bankruptcy, and AIG was on the verge of failure. • Monday, September , Lehman filed for Chapter bankruptcy protection. • Tuesday, September , the Reserve Primary Fund, a money market mutual fund, “broke the buck” after facing an investor run. Its net asset value declined below , meaning that an investment in the fund had actually lost money. This is a critical psychological threshold for a money market fund. On the same day, the Fed approved an billion emergency loan to AIG to prevent it from sudden failure.
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• Thursday, September , the Bush Administration, supported by Fed Chairman Bernanke, proposed to Congressional leaders that they appropriate funds for a new Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) to recapitalize banks. • Friday, September , the billion TARP was publically announced. • Sunday, September , the Fed agreed to accept Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as bank holding companies, putting them under the Fed’s regulatory purview. After this, there were no large standalone investment banks remaining in the United States. • Thursday, September , the FDIC was appointed receiver of Washington Mutual and later sold it to JPMorgan. • Monday, September , the TARP bill failed to pass the House of Representatives, and the FDIC agreed to provide assistance to facilitate a sale of Wachovia to Citigroup. • Wednesday, October , the Senate passed a revised TARP bill. Two days later, the House passed it, and the President signed it into law. Wells Fargo, rather than Citigroup, bought Wachovia. • As the month progressed, interbank lending rates soared, indicating the heightened fear and threatening a complete freeze of lending. The financial panic was triggered and then amplified by the close succession of these events, and not just by Lehman’s failure. Lehman was the most unexpected bad news in that succession, but it’s a mistake to attribute the panic entirely to Lehman’s failure. There was growing realization by investors that mortgage losses were concentrated in the financial system, but nobody knew precisely where they lay.
Conclusion: In quick succession in September , the failure, near-failure, or restructuring of ten firms triggered a global financial panic. Confidence and trust in the financial system began to evaporate as the health of almost every large and midsize financial institution in the United States and Europe was questioned. We briefly discuss two of these failures.
The Reserve Primary Fund The role of the Reserve Primary Fund’s failure in triggering the panic is underappreciated. This money market mutual fund faced escalating redemption requests and had to take losses from its holdings of Lehman debt. On Tuesday, September , it broke the buck in a disorganized manner. Investors who withdrew early recouped cents on the dollar, with the remaining investors bearing the losses. This spread fear among investors that other similarly situated funds might follow. By the middle of the following week, prime money market mutual fund investors had withdrawn billion. When the SEC was unable to reassure market participants that the problem was isolated, money market mutual fund managers, in anticipation of future runs, refused to
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renew the commercial paper they were funding and began to convert their holdings to Treasuries and cash. Corporations that had relied on commercial paper markets for short-term financing suddenly had to draw down their backstop lines of credit. No one had expected these corporate lines of credit to be triggered simultaneously, and this “involuntary lending” meant that banks would have to pull back on other activities.
The role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in causing the crisis The government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were elements of the crisis in several ways: • They were part of the securitization process that lowered mortgage credit quality standards. • As large financial institutions whose failures risked contagion, they were massive and multidimensional cases of the too big to fail problem. Policymakers were unwilling to let them fail because: – Financial institutions around the world bore significant counterparty risk to them through holdings of GSE debt; – Certain funding markets depended on the value of their debt; and – Ongoing mortgage market operation depended on their continued existence. • They were by far the most expensive institutional failures to the taxpayer and are an ongoing cost. There is vigorous debate about how big a role these two firms played in securitization relative to “private label” securitizers. There is also vigorous debate about why these two firms got involved in this problem. We think both questions are less important than the multiple points of contact Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had with the financial system. These two firms were guarantors and securitizers, financial institutions holding enormous portfolios of housing-related assets, and the issuers of debt that was treated like government debt by the financial system. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not by themselves cause the crisis, but they contributed significantly in a number of ways.
THE SYSTEM FREEZING Following the shock and panic, financial intermediation operated with escalating frictions. Some funding markets collapsed entirely. Others experienced a rapid blowout in spreads following the shock and stabilized slowly as the panic subsided and the government stepped in to backstop markets and firms. We highlight three funding markets here: • Interbank lending. Lending dynamics changed quickly in the federal funds market where banks loan excess reserves to one another overnight. Even large
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banks were unable to get overnight loans, compounding an increasingly restricted ability to raise short-term funds elsewhere. • Repo. By September , repo rates increased substantially, and haircuts ballooned. Nontraditional mortgages were no longer acceptable collateral. • Commercial paper. The failure of Lehman and the Reserve Primary Fund breaking the buck sparked a run on prime money market mutual funds. Money market mutual funds withdrew from investing in the commercial paper market, leading to a rapid increase in funding costs for financial and nonfinancial firms that relied on commercial paper. The inability to find funding, financial firm deleveraging, and macroeconomic weakness translated into tighter credit for consumers and businesses. Securitization markets for other kinds of debt collapsed rapidly in and still have not recovered fully, cutting off a substantial source of financing for credit cards, car loans, student loans, and small business loans. Decreased credit availability, the collapse of the housing bubble, and additional wealth losses from a declining stock market led to a sharp contraction in consumption and output and an increase in unemployment. Real GDP contracted at an annual rate of . percent in the third quarter of , . percent in the fourth quarter, and . percent in the first quarter of . The economic contraction in the fourth quarter of was the worst in nearly three decades. Firms and households that had not previously been directly affected by the financial crisis suddenly pulled back–businesses stopped hiring and halted new investments, while families put spending plans on hold. After the panic began, the rate at which the economy shed jobs jumped, going from an average of , jobs lost per month in the first three quarters of , to an average of over , jobs lost per month in the fourth quarter of and the first quarter of . The economy continued to lose jobs through most of , with the unemployment rate peaking at . percent in October and remaining above . percent for the rest of and the first eleven months of . While the shock and panic therefore appear to have ended in early , the harm to the real economy continues through today. Firms and families are still deleveraging and are uncertain about both future economic growth and the direction of future policy. The final tragedy of the financial and economic crisis is that the needed recovery is slow and looks to be so for a while longer.
NOTES 1. A vote of the Commission on December 6, 2010, limited dissenters to nine pages each in the approximately 550-page commercially published book. No limits apply to the official version submitted to the President and the Congress. 2. Ben S. Bernanke, “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble,” Speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia, January 3, 2010 (www.federalreserve.gov/ newsevents/speech/bernanke20100103a.htm). 3. Ibid.
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4. “Risky borrowers” does not mean poor. While many risky borrowers were low-income, a borrower with unproven income applying for a no-documentation mortgage for a vacation home was also risky. 5. Bernanke, “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble.” 6. The Commission vigorously debated the relative importance and the motivations of the different types of securitizers in lowering credit quality. We think that both types of securitizers were in part responsible and that these debates are less important than the existence of lower standards and how this problem fits into the broader context. 7. While bad information created by credit rating agencies was an essential cause of the crisis, it is less clear why they did this. Important hypotheses include: (1) bad analytic models that failed to account for correlated housing price declines across wide geographies, (2) an industry model that encouraged the rating agencies to skew their ratings upward to generate business, and (3) a lack of market competition due to their government-induced oligopoly. 8. In most cases during the crisis, the three key policymakers were Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, and Federal Reserve Bank of New York President Timothy Geithner. Other officials were key in particular cases, such as FHFA Director Jim Lockhart’s GSE actions and FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair’s extension of temporary loan guarantees to bank borrowing in the fall of 2008. During the financial recovery and rebuilding stage that began in early 2009, the three key policymakers were Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, and White House National Economic Council Director Larry Summers. 9. Ben S. Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, session 1: The Federal Reserve, September 2, transcript, p. 78.
F I NA N C IA L C R I SI S I N QU I RY C OM M I S SI ON
DI S SE N T I N G S TAT E M E N T PETER J. WALLISON ARTHUR F. BURNS FELLOW IN FINANCIAL POLICY STUDIES AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE JANAUARY 2011
Contact: pwallison@aei.org
INTRODUCTION Why a Dissent? The question I have been most frequently asked about the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (the “FCIC” or the “Commission”) is why Congress bothered to authorize it at all. Without waiting for the Commission’s insights into the causes of the financial crisis, Congress passed and the President signed the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA), far reaching and highly consequential regulatory legislation. Congress and the President acted without seeking to understand the true causes of the wrenching events of 2008, perhaps following the precept of the President’s chief of staff—“Never let a good crisis go to waste.” Although the FCIC’s work was not the full investigation to which the American people were entitled, it has served a useful purpose by focusing attention again on the financial crisis and whether—with some distance from it—we can draw a more accurate assessment than the media did with what is often called the “first draft of history.” To avoid the next financial crisis, we must understand what caused the one from which we are now slowly emerging, and take action to avoid the same mistakes in the future. If there is doubt that these lessons are important, consider the ongoing efforts to amend the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA). Late in the last session of the 111th Congress, a group of Democratic congressmembers introduced HR 6334. This bill, which was lauded by House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank as his “top priority” in the lame duck session of that Congress, would have extended the CRA to all “U.S. nonbank financial companies,” and thus would apply, to even more of the national economy, the same government social policy mandates responsible for the mortgage meltdown and the financial crisis. Fortunately, the bill was not acted upon. Because of the recent election, it is unlikely that supporters of H.R. 6334 will have the power to adopt similar legislation in the next Congress, but in the future other lawmakers with views similar to Barney Frank’s may seek to mandate similar requirements. At that time, the only real bulwark against the government’s use of private entities for social policy purposes will be a full understanding of how these policies were connected to the financial crisis of 2008. Like Congress and the Administration, the Commission’s majority erred in assuming that it knew the causes of the financial crisis. Instead of pursuing a thorough study, the Commission’s majority used its extensive statutory investigative authority to seek only the facts that supported its initial assumptions—that the crisis was caused by “deregulation” or lax regulation, greed and recklessness on Wall Street, predatory lending in the mortgage market, unregulated derivatives and a financial system addicted to excessive risk-taking. The Commission did not seriously investigate any other cause, and did not effectively connect the factors 443
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it investigated to the financial crisis. The majority’s report covers in detail many elements of the economy before the financial crisis that the authors did not like, but generally failed to show how practices that had gone on for many years suddenly caused a world-wide financial crisis. In the end, the majority’s report turned out to be a just so story about the financial crisis, rather than a report on what caused the financial crisis.
What Caused the Financial Crisis? George Santayana is often quoted for the aphorism that “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Looking back on the financial crisis, we can see why the study of history is often so contentious and why revisionist histories are so easy to construct. There are always many factors that could have caused an historical event; the difficult task is to discern which, among a welter of possible causes, were the significant ones—the ones without which history would have been different. Using this standard, I believe that the sine qua non of the financial crisis was U.S. government housing policy, which led to the creation of 27 million subprime and other risky loans—half of all mortgages in the United States— which were ready to default as soon as the massive 1997-2007 housing bubble began to deflate. If the U.S. government had not chosen this policy path—fostering the growth of a bubble of unprecedented size and an equally unprecedented number of weak and high risk residential mortgages—the great financial crisis of 2008 would never have occurred. Initiated by Congress in 1992 and pressed by HUD in both the Clinton and George W. Bush Administrations, the U.S. government’s housing policy sought to increase home ownership in the United States through an intensive effort to reduce mortgage underwriting standards. In pursuit of this policy, HUD used (i) the affordable housing requirements imposed by Congress in 1992 on the governmentsponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, (ii) its control over the policies of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and (iii) a “Best Practices Initiative” for subprime lenders and mortgage banks, to encourage greater subprime and other high risk lending. HUD’s key role in the growth of subprime and other high risk mortgage lending is covered in detail in Part III. Ultimately, all these entities, as well as insured banks covered by the CRA, were compelled to compete for mortgage borrowers who were at or below the median income in the areas in which they lived. This competition caused underwriting standards to decline, increased the numbers of weak and high risk loans far beyond what the market would produce without government influence, and contributed importantly to the growth of the 1997-2007 housing bubble. When the bubble began to deflate in mid-2007, the low quality and high risk loans engendered by government policies failed in unprecedented numbers. The effect of these defaults was exacerbated by the fact that few if any investors— including housing market analysts—understood at the time that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been acquiring large numbers of subprime and other high risk loans in order to meet HUD’s affordable housing goals. Alarmed by the unexpected delinquencies and defaults that began to appear in mid-2007, investors fled the multi-trillion dollar market for mortgage-backed
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securities (MBS), dropping MBS values—and especially those MBS backed by subprime and other risky loans—to fractions of their former prices. Mark-tomarket accounting then required financial institutions to write down the value of their assets—reducing their capital positions and causing great investor and creditor unease. The mechanism by which the defaults and delinquencies on subprime and other high risk mortgages were transmitted to the financial system as a whole is covered in detail in Part II. In this environment, the government’s rescue of Bear Stearns in March of 2008 temporarily calmed investor fears but created a significant moral hazard; investors and other market participants reasonably believed after the rescue of Bear that all large financial institutions would also be rescued if they encountered financial difficulties. However, when Lehman Brothers—an investment bank even larger than Bear—was allowed to fail, market participants were shocked; suddenly, they were forced to consider the financial health of their counterparties, many of which appeared weakened by losses and the capital writedowns required by markto-market accounting. This caused a halt to lending and a hoarding of cash—a virtually unprecedented period of market paralysis and panic that we know as the financial crisis of 2008.
Weren’t There Other Causes of the Financial Crisis? Many other causes of the financial crisis have been cited, including some in the report of the Commission’s majority, but for the reasons outlined below none of them alone—or all in combination—provides a plausible explanation of the crisis. Low interest rates and a flow of funds from abroad. Claims that various policies or phenomena—such as low interest rates in the early 2000s or financial flows from abroad—were responsible for the growth of the housing bubble, do not adequately explain either the bubble or the destruction that occurred when the bubble deflated. The U.S. has had housing bubbles in the past—most recently in the late 1970s and late 1980s—but when these bubbles deflated they did not cause a financial crisis. Similarly, other developed countries experienced housing bubbles in the 2000s, some even larger than the U.S. bubble, but when their bubbles deflated the housing losses were small. Only in the U.S. did the deflation of the most recent housing bubble cause a financial meltdown and a serious financial crisis. The reason for this is that only in the U.S. did subprime and other risky loans constitute half of all outstanding mortgages when the bubble deflated. It wasn’t the size of the bubble that was the key; it was its content. The 1997-2007 U.S. housing bubble was in a class by itself. Nevertheless, demand by investors for the high yields offered by subprime loans stimulated the growth of a market for securities backed by these loans. This was an important element in the financial crisis, although the number of mortgages in this market was considerably smaller than the number fostered directly by government policy. Without the huge number of defaults that arose out of U.S. housing policy, defaults among the mortgages in the private market would not have caused a financial crisis. Deregulation or lax regulation. Explanations that rely on lack of regulation or deregulation as a cause of the financial crisis are also deficient. First, no significant deregulation of financial institutions occurred in the last 30 years. The repeal of a
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portion of the Glass-Steagall Act, frequently cited as an example of deregulation, had no role in the financial crisis.1 The repeal was accomplished through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which allowed banks to affiliate for the first time since the New Deal with firms engaged in underwriting or dealing in securities. There is no evidence, however, that any bank got into trouble because of a securities affiliate. The banks that suffered losses because they held low quality mortgages or MBS were engaged in activities—mortgage lending—always permitted by GlassSteagall; the investment banks that got into trouble—Bear Stearns, Lehman and Merrill Lynch—were not affiliated with large banks, although they had small bank affiliates that do not appear to have played any role in mortgage lending or securities trading. Moreover, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) substantially increased the regulation of banks and savings and loan institutions (S&Ls) after the S&L debacle in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and it is noteworthy that FDICIA—the most stringent bank regulation since the adoption of deposit insurance—failed to prevent the financial crisis. The shadow banking business. The large investment banks—Bear, Lehman, Merrill, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley—all encountered difficulty in the financial crisis, and the Commission majority’s report lays much of the blame for this at the door of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for failing adequately to supervise them. It is true that the SEC’s supervisory process was weak, but many banks and S&Ls—stringently regulated under FDICIA—also failed. This casts doubt on the claim that if investment banks had been regulated like commercial banks— or had been able to offer insured deposits like commercial banks—they would not have encountered financial difficulties. The reality is that the business model of the investment banks was quite different from banking; it was to finance a short-term trading business with short-term liabilities such as repurchase agreements (often called repos). This made them especially vulnerable in the panic that occurred in 2008, but it is not evidence that the existence of investment banks, or the quality of their regulation, was a cause of the financial crisis. Failures of risk management. Claims that there was a general failure of risk management in financial institutions or excessive leverage or risk-taking are part of what might be called a “hindsight narrative.” With hindsight, it is easy to condemn managers for failing to see the dangers of the housing bubble or the underpricing of risk that now looks so clear. However, the FCIC interviewed hundreds of financial experts, including senior officials of major banks, bank regulators and investors. It is not clear that any of them—including the redoubtable Warren Buffett—were sufficiently confident about an impending crisis that they put real money behind their judgment. Human beings have a tendency to believe that things will continue to go in the direction they are going, and are good at explaining why this must be so. Blaming the crisis on the failure to foresee it is facile and of little value for policymakers, who cannot legislate prescience. The fact that virtually all participants in the financial system failed to foresee this crisis—as they failed to foresee every other crisis—does not tell us anything about why this crisis occurred or what we should do to prevent the next one. 1
See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, “Deregulation and the Financial Crisis: Another Urban Myth,” Financial Services Outlook, American Enterprise Institute, October 2009.
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Securitization and structured products. Securitization—often pejoratively described as the “originate to distribute process”—has also been blamed for the financial crisis. But securitization is only a means of financing. If securitization was a cause of the financial crisis, so was lending. Are we then to condemn lending? For decades, without serious incident, securitization has been used to finance car loans, credit card loans and jumbo mortgages that were not eligible for acquisition by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The problem was not securitization itself, it was the weak and high risk loans that securitization financed. Under the category of securitization, it is necessary to mention the role of collateralized debt obligations, known as CDOs. These instruments were “toxic assets” because they were ultimately backed by the subprime mortgages that began to default in huge numbers when the bubble deflated, and it was difficult to determine where those losses would ultimately settle. CDOs, accordingly, for all their dramatic content, were just another example of the way in which subprime and other high risk loans were distributed throughout the world’s financial system. The question still remains why so many weak loans were created, not why a system that securitized good assets could also securitize bad ones. Credit default swaps and other derivatives. Despite a diligent search, the FCIC never uncovered evidence that unregulated derivatives, and particularly credit default swaps (CDS), was a significant contributor to the financial crisis through “interconnections”. The only company known to have failed because of its CDS obligations was AIG, and that firm appears to have been an outlier. Blaming CDS for the financial crisis because one company did not manage its risks properly is like blaming lending generally when a bank fails. Like everything else, derivatives can be misused, but there is no evidence that the “interconnections” among financial institutions alleged to have caused the crisis were significantly enhanced by CDS or derivatives generally. For example, Lehman Brothers was a major player in the derivatives market, but the Commission found no indication that Lehman’s failure to meet its CDS and other derivatives obligations caused significant losses to any other firm, including those that had written CDS on Lehman itself. Predatory lending. The Commission’s report also blames predatory lending for the large build-up of subprime and other high risk mortgages in the financial system. This might be a plausible explanation if there were evidence that predatory lending was so widespread as to have produced the volume of high risk loans that were actually originated. In predatory lending, unscrupulous lenders take advantage of unwitting borrowers. This undoubtedly occurred, but it also appears that many people who received high risk loans were predatory borrowers, or engaged in mortgage fraud, because they took advantage of low mortgage underwriting standards to benefit from mortgages they knew they could not pay unless rising housing prices enabled them to sell or refinance. The Commission was never able to shed any light on the extent to which predatory lending occurred. Substantial portions of the Commission majority’s report describe abusive activities by some lenders and mortgage brokers, but without giving any indication of how many such loans were originated. Further, the majority’s report fails to acknowledge that most of the buyers for subprime loans were government agencies or private companies complying with government affordable housing requirements.
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Why Couldn’t We Reach Agreement? After the majority’s report is published, many people will lament that it was not possible to achieve a bipartisan agreement on the facts. It may be a surprise that I am asking the same question. If the Commission’s investigation had been an objective and thorough investigation, many of the points I raise in this dissent would have been known to the other commissioners before reading this dissent, and perhaps would have been influential with them. Similarly, I might have found facts that changed my own view. But the Commission’s investigation was not structured or carried out in a way that could ever have garnered my support or, I believe, the support of the other Republican members. One glaring example will illustrate the Commission’s lack of objectivity. In March 2010, Edward Pinto, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) who had served as chief credit officer at Fannie Mae, provided to the Commission staff a 70-page, fully sourced memorandum on the number of subprime and other high risk mortgages in the financial system immediately before the financial crisis. In that memorandum, Pinto recorded that he had found over 25 million such mortgages (his later work showed that there were approximately 27 million).2 Since there are about 55 million mortgages in the U.S., Pinto’s research indicated that, as the financial crisis began, half of all U.S. mortgages were of inferior quality and liable to default when housing prices were no longer rising. In August, Pinto supplemented his initial research with a paper documenting the efforts of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), over two decades and through two administrations, to increase home ownership by reducing mortgage underwriting standards.3 This research raised important questions about the role of government housing policy in promoting the high risk mortgages that played such a key role in both the mortgage meltdown and the financial panic that followed. Any objective investigation of the causes of the financial crisis would have looked carefully at this research, exposed it to the members of the Commission, taken Pinto’s testimony, and tested the accuracy of Pinto’s research. But the Commission took none of these steps. Pinto’s research was never made available to the other members of the FCIC, or even to the commissioners who were members of the subcommittee charged with considering the role of housing policy in the financial crisis. Accordingly, the Commission majority’s report ignores hypotheses about the causes of the financial crisis that any objective investigation would have considered, while focusing solely on theories that have political currency but far less plausibility. This is not the way a serious and objective inquiry should have been carried out, but that is how the Commission used its resources and its mandate. There were many other deficiencies. The scope of the Commission’s work was determined by a list of public hearings that was handed to us in early December 2009. At that point the Commission members had never discussed the possible causes of the crisis, and we were never told why those particular subjects were important or were chosen as the key issues for a set of hearings that would form the backbone 2 3
Edward Pinto, “Triggers of the Financial Crisis” (Triggers memo), http://www.aei.org/paper/100174.
Edward Pinto, “Government Housing Policies in the Lead-up to the Financial Crisis: A Forensic Study,” http//ww.aei.org/docLib/Government-Housing-Policies-Financial-Crisis-Pinto-102110.pdf.
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of all the Commission’s work. The Commission members did not get together to discuss or decide on the causes of the financial crisis until July, 2010, well after it was too late to direct the activities of the staff. The Commission interviewed hundreds of witnesses, and the majority’s report is full of statements such as “Smith told the FCIC that….” However, unless the meeting was public, the commissioners were not told that an interview would occur, did not know who was being interviewed, were not encouraged to attend, and of course did not have an opportunity to question these sources or understand the contexts in which the quoted statements were made. The Commission majority’s report uses these opinions as substitutes for data, which is notably lacking in their report; opinions in general are not worth much, especially in hindsight and when given without opportunity for challenge. The Commission’s authorizing statute required that the Commission report on or before December 15, 2010. The original plan was for us to start seeing drafts of the report in April. We didn’t see any drafts until November. We were then given an opportunity to submit comments in writing, but never had an opportunity to go over the wording as a group or to know whether our comments were accepted. We received a complete copy of the majority’s report, for the first time, on December 15. It was almost 900 double-spaced pages long. The date for approval of the report was eight days later, on December 23. That is not the way to achieve a bipartisan report, or the full agreement of any group that takes the issues seriously. This dissenting statement is organized as follows: Part I summarizes the main points of the dissent. Part II describes how the failure of subprime and other high risk mortgages drove the growth of the bubble and weakened financial institutions around the world when these mortgages began to default. Part III outlines in detail the housing policies of the U.S. government that were primarily responsible for the fact that approximately one half of all U.S. mortgages in 2007 were subprime or otherwise of low quality. Part IV is a brief conclusion.
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SUMMARY Although there were many contributing factors, the housing bubble of 19972007 would not have reached its dizzying heights or lasted as long, nor would the financial crisis of 2008 have ensued, but for the role played by the housing policies of the United States government over the course of two administrations. As a result of these policies, by the middle of 2007, there were approximately 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages in the U.S. financial system—half of all mortgages outstanding—with an aggregate value of over $4.5 trillion.4 These were unprecedented numbers, far higher than at any time in the past, and the losses associated with the delinquency and default of these mortgages fully account for the weakness and disruption of the financial system that has become known as the financial crisis. Most subprime and Alt-A mortgages are high risk loans. A subprime mortgage is a loan to a borrower who has blemished credit, usually signified by a FICO credit score lower than 660.5 Typically, a subprime borrower has failed in 4
Unless otherwise indicated, all estimates for the number of subprime and Alt-A mortgages outstanding, as well as the use of specific terms such as loan to value ratios and delinquency rates, come from research done by Edward Pinto, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Pinto is also a consultant to the housing finance industry and a former chief credit officer of Fannie Mae. Much of this work is posted on both my and Pinto’s scholar pages at AEI as follows: http://www.aei.org/docLib/Pinto-SizingTotal-Exposure.pdf, which accounts for all 27 million high risk loans; http://www.aei.org/docLib/ Pinto-Sizing-Total-Federal-Contributions.pdf, which covers the portion of these loans that were held or guaranteed by federal agencies and the four large banks that made these loans under CRA; and http:// www.aei.org/docLib/Pinto-High-LTV-Subprime-Alt-A.pdf, which covers the acquisition of these loans by government agencies from the early 1990s. The information in these memoranda is fully cited to original sources. These memoranda were the data exhibits to a Pinto memorandum submitted to the FCIC in January 2010, and revised and updated in March 2010 (collectively, the “Triggers memo”). 5
One of the confusing elements of any study of the mortgage markets is the fact that the key definitions have never been fully agreed upon. For many years, Fannie Mae treated as subprime loans only those that it purchased from subprime originators. Inside Mortgage Finance, a common source of data on the mortgage market, treated and recorded as subprime only those loans reported as subprime by the originators or by Fannie and Freddie. Other loans were recorded as prime, even if they had credit scores that would have classified them as subprime. However, a FICO credit score of less than 660 is generally regarded as a subprime loan, no matter how originated. That is the standard, for example, used by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. In this statement and in Pinto’s work on this issue, loans that are classified as subprime by their originators are called “self-denominated” subprime loans, and loans to borrowers with FICO scores of less than 660 are called subprime by characteristic. Fannie and Freddie reported only a very small percentage of their loans as subprime, so in effect the subprime loans acquired by Fannie and Freddie should be added to the self-denominated subprime loans originated by others in order to derive something closer to the number and principal amount of the subprime loans outstanding in the financial system at any given time. One of the important elements of Edward Pinto’s work was to show that Fannie and Freddie, for many years prior to the financial crisis, were buying loans that should have been classified as subprime because of the borrowers’ credit scores and not simply because they were originated by subprime lenders. Fannie and Freddie did not do this until after they were taken over by the federal government. This lack of disclosure on the part of the GSEs appears to have been a factor in the failure of many market observers to foresee the potential severity of the mortgage defaults when the housing bubble deflated in 2007.
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the past to meet other financial obligations. Before changes in government policy in the early 1990s, most borrowers with FICO scores below 660 did not qualify as prime borrowers and had difficulty obtaining mortgage credit other than through the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), the government’s original subprime lender, or through a relatively small number of specialized subprime lenders. An Alt-A mortgage is one that is deficient by its terms. It may have an adjustable rate, lack documentation about the borrower, require payment of interest only, or be made to an investor in rental housing, not a prospective homeowner. Another key deficiency in many Alt-A mortgages is a high loan-to-value ratio—that is, a low downpayment. A low downpayment for a home may signify the borrower’s lack of financial resources, and this lack of “skin in the game” often means a reduced borrower commitment to the home. Until they became subject to HUD’s affordable housing requirements, beginning in the early 1990s, Fannie and Freddie seldom acquired loans with these deficiencies. Given the likelihood that large numbers of subprime and Alt-A mortgages would default once the housing bubble began to deflate in mid- 2007—with devastating effects for the U.S. economy and financial system—the key question for the FCIC was to determine why, beginning in the early 1990s, mortgage underwriting standards began to deteriorate so significantly that it was possible to create 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages. The Commission never made a serious study of this question, although understanding why and how this happened must be viewed as one of the central questions of the financial crisis. From the beginning, the Commission’s investigation was limited to validating the standard narrative about the financial crisis—that it was caused by deregulation or lack of regulation, weak risk management, predatory lending, unregulated derivatives and greed on Wall Street. Other hypotheses were either never considered or were treated only superficially. In criticizing the Commission, this statement is not intended to criticize the staff, which worked diligently and effectively under difficult circumstances, and did extraordinarily fine work in the limited areas they were directed to cover. The Commission’s failures were failures of management.
1. Government Policies Resulted in an Unprecedented Number of Risky Mortgages Three specific government programs were primarily responsible for the growth of subprime and Alt-A mortgages in the U.S. economy between 1992 and 2008, and for the decline in mortgage underwriting standards that ensued. The GSEs’ Affordable Housing Mission. The fact that high risk mortgages formed almost half of all U.S. mortgages by the middle of 2007 was not a chance event, nor did it just happen that banks and other mortgage originators decided on their own to offer easy credit terms to potential homebuyers beginning in the 1990s. In 1992, Congress enacted Title XIII of the Housing and Community Development Act of 19926 ( the GSE Act), legislation intended to give low and
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Public Law 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, H.R. 5334, enacted October 28, 1992.
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moderate income7 borrowers better access to mortgage credit through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This effort, probably stimulated by a desire to increase home ownership, ultimately became a set of regulations that required Fannie and Freddie to reduce the mortgage underwriting standards they used when acquiring loans from originators. As the Senate Committee report said at the time, “The purpose of [the affordable housing] goals is to facilitate the development in both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of an ongoing business effort that will be fully integrated in their products, cultures and day-to-day operations to service the mortgage finance needs of low-and-moderate-income persons, racial minorities and inner-city residents.”8 The GSE Act, and its subsequent enforcement by HUD, set in motion a series of changes in the structure of the mortgage market in the U.S. and more particularly the gradual degrading of traditional mortgage underwriting standards. Accordingly, in this dissenting statement, I will refer to the subprime and Alt-A mortgages that were acquired because of the affordable housing AH goals, as well as other subprime and Alt-A mortgages, as non-traditional mortgages, or NTMs The GSE Act was a radical departure from the original conception of the GSEs as managers of a secondary market in prime mortgages. Fannie Mae was established as a government agency in the New Deal era to buy mortgages from banks and other loan originators, providing them with new funds with which to make additional mortgages. In 1968, it was authorized to sell shares to the public and became a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE)9—a shareholder-owned company with a government mission to maintain a liquid secondary market in mortgages. Freddie Mac was chartered by Congress as another GSE in 1970. Fannie and Freddie carried out this mission effectively until the early 1990s, and in the process established conservative lending standards for the mortgages they were willing to purchase, including such elements as downpayments of 10 to 20 percent, and minimum credit standards for borrowers. The GSE Act, however, created a new “mission” for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—a responsibility to support affordable housing—and authorized HUD to establish and administer what was in effect a mortgage quota system in which a certain percentage of all Fannie and Freddie mortgage purchases had to be loans to low-and- moderate income (LMI) borrowers—defined as persons with income at or below the median income in a particular area or to borrowers living in certain low income communities. The AH goals put Fannie and Freddie into direct competition with the FHA, which was then and is today an agency within HUD that functions as the federal government’s principal subprime lender. 7 Low income is usually defined as 80 percent of area median income (AMI) and moderate income as 100 percent of AMI. 8 Report of the Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate to accompany S. 2733. Report 102-282, May 15, 1992, pp. 34-5. 9 Fannie and Freddie were considered to be government sponsored enterprises because they had been chartered by Congress and were given various privileges (such as exemption from the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) and a line of credit at the Treasury that signaled a special degree of government support. As a result, the capital markets (which continued to call them “Agencies”) assumed that in the event of financial difficulties the government would stand behind them. This implied government backing gave them access to funding that was lower cost than any AAA borrower and often only a few basis points over the applicable Treasury rate.
454
Dissenting Statement
Over the next 15 years, HUD consistently enhanced and enlarged the AH goals. In the GSE Act, Congress had initially specified that 30 percent of the GSEs’ mortgage purchases meet the AH goals. This was increased to 42 percent in 1995, and 50 percent in 2000. By 2008, the main LMI goal was 56 percent, and a special affordable subgoal had been added requiring that 27 percent of the loans acquired by the GSEs be made to borrowers who were at or below 80 percent of area median income (AMI). Table 10, page 510, shows that Fannie and Freddie met the goals in almost every year between 1996 and 2008. There is very little data available concerning Fannie and Freddie’s acquisitions of subprime and Alt-A loans in the early 1990s, so it is difficult to estimate the GSEs’ year-by-year acquisitions of these loans immediately after the AH goals went into effect. However, Pinto estimates the total value of these purchases at approximately $4.1 trillion (see Table 7, page 504). As shown in Table 1, page 456, on June 30, 2008, immediately prior to the onset of the financial crisis, the GSEs held or had guaranteed 12 million subprime and Alt-A loans. This was 37 percent of their total mortgage exposure of 32 million loans, which in turn was approximately 58 percent of the 55 million mortgages outstanding in the U.S. on that date. Fannie and Freddie, accordingly, were by far the dominant players in the U.S. mortgage market before the financial crisis and their underwriting standards largely set the standards for the rest of the mortgage financing industry. The Community Reinvestment Act. In 1995, the regulations under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)10 were tightened. As initially adopted in 1977, the CRA and its associated regulations required only that insured banks and S&Ls reach out to low-income borrowers in communities they served. The new regulations, made effective in 1995, for the first time required insured banks and S&Ls to demonstrate that they were actually making loans in low-income communities and to low-income borrowers.11 A qualifying CRA loan was one made to a borrower at or below 80 percent of the AMI, and thus was similar to the loans that Fannie and Freddie were required to buy under HUD’s AH goals. In 2007, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC), an umbrella organization for community activist organizations, reported that between 1997 and 2007 banks that were seeking regulatory approval for mergers committed in agreements with community groups to make over $4.5 trillion in CRA loans.12 A substantial portion of these commitments appear to have been converted into mortgage loans, and thus would have contributed substantially to the number of subprime and other high risk loans outstanding in 2008. For this reason, they deserved Commission investigation and analysis. Unfortunately, as outlined in Part III, this was not done. Accordingly, the GSE Act put Fannie and Freddie, FHA, and the banks that were seeking CRA loans into competition for the same mortgages—loans to borrowers at or below the applicable AMI. HUD’s Best Practices Initiative. In 1994, HUD added another group to this list when it set up a “Best Practices Initiative,” to which 117 members of the Mortgage 10
Pub.L. 95-128, Title VIII of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 1147, 12 U.S.C. § 2901 et seq. 11
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/2000-6500.html.
12
See http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/cdfis/report-silver-brown.pdf.
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455
Bankers Association eventually adhered. As shown later, this program was explicitly intended to encourage a reduction in underwriting standards so as to increase access by low income borrowers to mortgage credit. Countrywide was by far the largest member of this group and by the early 2000s was also competing, along with others, for the same NTMs sought by Fannie and Freddie, FHA, and the banks under the CRA . With all these entities seeking the same loans, it was not likely that all of them would find enough borrowers who could meet the traditional mortgage lending standards that Fannie and Freddie had established. It also created ideal conditions for a decline in underwriting standards, since every one of these competing entities was seeking NTMs not for purposes of profit but in order to meet an obligation imposed by the government. The obvious way to meet this obligation was simply to reduce the underwriting standards that impeded compliance with the government’s requirements. Indeed, by the early 1990s, traditional underwriting standards had come to be seen as an obstacle to home ownership by LMI families. In a 1991 Senate Banking Committee hearing, Gail Cincotta, a highly respected supporter of low-income lending, observed that “Lenders will respond to the most conservative standards unless [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] are aggressive and convincing in their efforts to expand historically narrow underwriting.”13 In this light, it appears that Congress set out deliberately in the GSE Act not only to change the culture of the GSEs, but also to set up a mechanism that would reduce traditional underwriting standards over time, so that home ownership would be more accessible to LMI borrowers. For example, the legislation directed the GSEs to study “The implications of implementing underwriting standards that—(A) establish a downpayment requirement for mortgagors of 5 percent or less;14 (B) allow the use of cash on hand as a source of downpayments; and (C) approve borrowers who have a credit history of delinquencies if the borrower can demonstrate a satisfactory credit history for at least the 12-month period ending on the date of the application for the mortgage.”15 None of these elements was part of traditional mortgage underwriting standards as understood at the time. I have been unable to find any studies by Fannie or Freddie in response to this congressional direction, but HUD treated these cues as a mandate to use the AH goals as a mechanism for eroding the traditional standards. HUD was very explicit about this, as shown in Part II. In the end, the goal was accomplished by gradually expanding the requirements and enlarging the AH goals over succeeding years, so that the only way Fannie and Freddie could meet the AH goals was by purchasing increasing numbers of subprime and Alt-A mortgages, and particularly mortgages with low or no downpayments. Because the GSEs were the dominant players in the mortgage market, their purchases also put competitive pressure on the other entities that were subject to government control—FHA and the banks 13 Allen Fishbein, “Filling the Half-Empty Glass: The Role of Community Advocacy in Redefining the Public Responsibilities of Government-Sponsored Housing Enterprises”, Chapter 7 of Organizing Access to Capital: Advocacy and the Democratization of Financial Institutions, 2003, Gregory Squires, editor. 14 At that time the GSEs’ minimum downpayment was 5 percent, and was accompanied by conservative underwriting. The congressional request was to break through that limitation. 15
GSE Act, Section 1354(a).
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Dissenting Statement
under CRA—to reach deeper into subprime lending in order to find the mortgages they needed to comply with their own government requirements. This was also true of the mortgage banks—the largest of which was Countrywide—that were bound to promote affordable housing through HUD’s Best Practices Initiative. By 2008, the result of these government programs was an unprecedented number of subprime and other high risk mortgages in the U.S. financial system. Table 1 shows which agencies or firms were holding the credit risk of these mortgages-or had distributed it to investors through mortgage-backed securities (MBS)-immediately before the financial crisis began. As Table 1 makes clear, government agencies, or private institutions acting under government direction, either held or had guaranteed 19.2 million of the NTM loans that were outstanding at this point. By contrast, about 7.8 million NTMs had been distributed to investors through the issuance of private mortgage-backed securities, or PMBS,16 primarily by private issuers such as Countrywide and other subprime lenders. The fact that the credit risk of two-thirds of all the NTMs in the financial system was held by the government or by entities acting under government control demonstrates the central role of the government’s policies in the development of the 1997-2007 housing bubble, the mortgage meltdown that occurred when the bubble deflated, and the financial crisis and recession that ensued. Similarly, the fact that only 7.8 million NTMs were held by investors and financial institutions in the form of PMBS shows that this group of NTMs were less important as a cause of the financial crisis than the government’s role. The Commission majority’s report focuses almost entirely on the 7.8 million PMBS, and is thus an example of its determination to ignore the government’s role in the financial crisis. Table 1.17 Entity
No. of Subprime and Alt-A Loans
Unpaid Principal Amount
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac FHA and other Federal* CRA and HUD Programs Total Federal Government Other (including subprime and Alt-A PMBS issued by Countrywide, Wall Street and others)
12 million 5 million 2.2 million 19.2 million 7.8 million
$1.8 trillion $0.6 trillion $0.3 trillion $2.7 trillion $1.9 trillion
27 million
$4.6 trillion
Total
*Includes Veterans Administration, Federal Home Loan Banks and others.
To be sure, the government’s efforts to increase home ownership through the AH goals succeeded. Home ownership rates in the U.S. increased from approximately 64 percent in 1994 (where it had been for 30 years) to over 69 percent in 2004.18 Almost everyone in and out of government was pleased with this—a long term goal 16 In the process known as securitization, securities backed by a pool of mortgages (mortgagebacked securities, or MBS) and issued by private sector firms were known as private label securities (distinguishing them from securities issued by the GSEs or Ginnie Mae) or private MBS (PMBS). 17 See Edward Pinto’s analysis in Exhibit 2 to the Triggers Memo, April 21, 2010, p.4. http://www.aei.org/ docLib/Pinto-Sizing-Total-Federal-Contributions.pdf. 18
Census Bureau data.
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457
of U.S. housing policyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;until the true costs became clear with the collapse of the housing bubble in 2007. Then an elaborate process of shifting the blame began.
2. The Great Housing Bubble and Its Effects Figure 1 below, based on the data of Robert J. Shiller, shows the dramatic growth of the 1997-2007 housing bubble in the United States. By mid-2007, home prices in the U.S. had increased substantially for ten years. The growth in real dollar terms had been almost 90 percent, ten times greater than any other housing bubble in modern times. As discussed below, there is good reason to believe that the 19972007 bubble grew larger and extended longer in time than previous bubbles because of the governmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s housing policies, which artificially increased the demand for housing by funneling more money into the housing market than would have been available if traditional lending standards had been maintained and the government had not promoted the growth of subprime lending. Figure 1. The Bubble According to Shiller
That the 1997-2007 bubble lasted about twice as long as the prior housing bubbles is significant in itself. Mortgage quality declines as a housing bubble grows and originators try to structure mortgages that will allow buyers to meet monthly payments for more expensive homes; the fact that the most recent bubble was so long-lived was an important element in its ultimate destructiveness when it deflated. Why did this bubble last so long? Housing bubbles deflate when delinquencies and defaults begin to appear in unusual numbers. Investors and creditors realize that the risks of a collapse are mounting. One by one, investors cash in and leave. Eventually, the bubble tops out, those who are still in the game run for the doors, and a deflation in prices sets in. Generally, in the past, this process took three or four years. In the case of the most recent bubble, it took ten. The reason for this longevity is that one
458
Dissenting Statement
major participant in the market was not in it for profit and was not worried about the risks to itself or to those it was controlling. It was the U.S. government, pursuing a social policy—increasing homeownership by making mortgage credit available to low and moderate income borrowers—and requiring the agencies and financial institutions it controlled or could influence through regulation to keep pumping money into housing long after the bubble, left to itself, would have deflated. Economists have been vigorously debating whether the Fed’s monetary policy in the early 2000s caused the bubble by keeping interest rates too low for too long. Naturally enough, Ben Bernanke and Alan Greenspan have argued that the Fed was not at fault. On the other hand, John Taylor, author of the Taylor rule, contends that the Fed’s violation of the Taylor rule was the principal cause of the bubble. Raghuram Rajan, a professor at the Chicago Booth School of Business, argues that the Fed’s low interest rates caused the bubble, but that the Fed actually followed this policy in order to combat unemployment rather than deflation.19 Other theories blame huge inflows of funds from emerging markets or from countries that were recycling the dollars they received from trade surpluses with the U.S. These debates, however, may be missing the point. It doesn’t matter where the funds that built the bubble actually originated; the important question is why they were transformed into the NTMs that were prone to failure as soon as the great bubble deflated. Figure 2 illustrates clearly that the 1997-2007 bubble was built on a foundation of 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages and shows the relationship between the cumulative growth in the dollar amount of NTMs and the growth of the bubble over time. It includes both GSE and CRA contributions to the number of outstanding NTMs above the normal baseline of 30 percent,20 and estimated CRA lending under the merger-related commitments of the four large banks—Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Citibank and JPMorgan Chase—that, with their predecessors, made most of the commitments. As noted above, these commitments were made in connection with applications to federal regulators for approvals of mergers or acquisitions. The dollar amounts involved were taken from a 2007 report by the NCRC,21 and adjusted for announced loans and likely rates of lending. The cumulative estimated CRA
19 See, Bernanke testimony before the FCIC, September 2, 2010, Alan Greenspan, in “The Crisis,” Second Draft: March 9, 2010, Taylor, in testimony before the FCIC on October 20, 2009, John B. Taylor, Getting Off Track, Hoover Institution Press, 2009; and Raghuram Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 108-110. 20
It appears that the GSEs’ normal intake of mortgages included about 30 percent that were made to borrowers who were at or below the median income in the area in which they lived and were thus eligible for AH credit. It was only when the AH goals rose above this level, beginning in 1995, that government policy required the GSEs to acquire more AH qualifying loans than they would have purchased as a matter of course. In the case of the CRA contributions, the baseline is 1992, and includes the commitments made by the four largest banks and their predecessors listed in the NCRC report, adjusted for the loans actually announced by the banks after that date. 21 In 2007, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition published a report on principal amount of CRA loans that banks had committed to make in connection with merger applications. The report claimed that these commitments exceeded $4.5 trillion. The original report was removed from the NCRC’s website, but can still be found at http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/ cdfis/report-silver-brown.pdf. A portion of these commitments were in fact fulfilled through CRA qualifying loans. A full discussion of these commitments and the number of loans made pursuant to them is contained in Section III.
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production line also includes almost $1 trillion in NTM lending by Countrywide Financial under HUD’s Best Practices Initiative.22 Figure 2. The Effect of Government Policies on the Growth of the Bubble
It is not true that every bubble--even a large bubble-- has the potential to cause a financial crisis when it deflates. This is clear in Table 2 below, prepared by Professor Dwight Jaffee of the Haas Business School at U.C. Berkley. The table shows that in other developed countries—many of which also had large bubbles during the 1997-2007 period—the losses associated with mortgage delinquencies and defaults when these bubbles deflated were far lower than the losses suffered in the U.S. when the 1997-2007 deflated.
22
See note 144.
460
Dissenting Statement Table 2.23 Troubled Mortgages, Western Europe and the United States ≥ 3 Month Arrears %
Belgium
0.46%
Denmark France
0.53%
Ireland Italy
3.32%
Portugal Spain
1.17%
Sweden UK U.S. All Loans U.S. Prime U.S. Subprime
Impaired or Doubtful %
Foreclosures
Year 2009
0.93%
2009 2008
3.00%
2009 2008 0.24%
2009 2009
2.44%
0.19%
2009 2009
9.47% 6.73% 25.26%
4.58% 3.31% 15.58%
2009 2009 2009
3.04% 1.00%
Source: European Mortgage Federation (2010) and Mortgage Bankers Association for U.S. Data.
The underlying reasons for the outcomes in Professor Jaffee’s data were provided in testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in September 2010 by Dr. Michael Lea, Director of the Corky McMillin Center for Real Estate at San Diego State University: The default and foreclosure experience of the U.S. market has been far worse than in other countries. Serious default rates remain less than 3 percent in all other countries and less than 1 percent in Australia and Canada. Of the countries in this survey only Ireland, Spain and the UK have seen a significant increase in mortgage default during the crisis. There are several factors responsible for this result. First sub-prime lending was rare or non-existent outside of the U.S. The only country with a significant subprime share was the UK (a peak of 8 percent of mortgages in 2006). Subprime accounted for 5 percent of mortgages in Canada, less than 2 percent in Australia and negligible proportions elsewhere. …[T]here was far less “risk layering” or offering limited documentation loans to subprime borrowers with little or no downpayment. There was little “no doc” lending…the proportion of loans with little or no downpayment was less than the U.S. and the decline in house prices in most countries was also less…[L]oans in other developed countries are with recourse and lenders routinely go after borrowers for deficiency judgments.24
The fact that the destructiveness of the 1997-2007 bubble came from its composition—the number of NTMs it contained—rather than its size is also illustrated by data on foreclosure starts published by the Mortgage Bankers
23
Dwight M. Jaffee, “Reforming the U.S. Mortgage Market Through Private Market Incentives,” Paper prepared for presentation at “Past, Present and Future of the Government Sponsored Enterprises,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Nov 17, 2010, Table 4.
24 Dr. Michael J. Lea, testimony before the Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance of the Senate Banking Committee, September 29, 2010, p.6.
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461
Association (MBA).25 This data allows a comparison between the foreclosure starts that have thus far come out of the 1997-2007 bubble and the foreclosure starts in the two most recent housing bubbles (1977-1979 and 1985-1989) shown in Figure 1. After the housing bubble that ended in 1979, when almost all mortgages were prime loans of the traditional type, foreclosure starts in the ensuing downturn reached a high point of only .87 percent in 1983. After the next bubble, which ended in 1989 and in which a high proportion of the loans were the traditional type, foreclosure starts reached a high of 1.32 percent in 1994. However, after the collapse of the 1997-2007 bubble—in which half of all mortgages were NTMs—foreclosure starts reached the unprecedented level (thus far) of 5.3 percent in 2009. And this was true despite numerous government and bank efforts to prevent or delay foreclosures. All the foregoing data is significant for a proper analysis of the role of government policy and NTMs in the financial crisis. What it suggests is that whatever effect low interest rates or money flows from abroad might have had in creating the great U.S. housing bubble, the deflation of that bubble need not have been destructive. It wasn’t just the size of the bubble; it was also the content. The enormous delinquency rates in the U.S. (see Table 3 below) were not replicated elsewhere, primarily because other developed countries did not have the numbers of NTMs that were present in the U.S. financial system when the bubble deflated. As shown in later sections of this dissent, these mortgage defaults were translated into huge housing price declines and from there—through the PMBS they were holding—into actual or apparent financial weakness in the banks and other firms that held these securities. Accordingly, if the 1997-2007 housing bubble had not been seeded with an unprecedented number of NTMs, it is likely that the financial crisis would never have occurred.
3. Delinquency Rates on Nontraditional Mortgages NTMs are non-traditional because, for many years before the government adopted affordable housing policies, mortgages of this kind constituted only a small portion of all housing loans in the United States.26 The traditional residential mortgage—known as a conventional mortgage—generally had a fixed rate, often for 15 or 30 years, a downpayment of 10 to 20 percent, and was made to a borrower who had a job, a steady income and a good credit record. Before the GSE Act, even subprime loans, although made to borrowers with impaired credit, often involved substantial downpayments or existing equity in homes.27 Table 3 shows the delinquency rates of the NTMs that were outstanding on June 30, 2008. The grayed area contains virtually all the NTMs. The contrast in quality, based on delinquency rates, between these loans and Fannie and Freddie prime loans in lines 9 and 10 is clear. 25
Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey.
26
See Pinto, “Government Housing Policies in the Lead-Up to the Financial Crisis: A Forensic Study,” November 4, 2010, p.58, http://www.aei.org/docLib/Government-Housing-Policies-Financial-CrisisPinto-102110.pdf. 27
Id., p.42.
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Dissenting Statement Table 3.28 Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgages
Loan Type
Estimated # of Loans
Total Delinquency Rate (30+ Days and in Foreclosure)
6.7 million
45.0%
2. Option Arm
1.1 million
30.5%
3. Alt-A (inc. Fannie/Freddie/FHLBs private MBS holdings)
2.4 million†
23.0%
4. Fannie Subprime/Atl-A/Nonprime
6.6 million
17.3%
5. Freddie Subprime/Alt-A/Nonprime 6. Government
4.1 million 4.8 million
13.8% 13.5%
1. High Rate Subprime (including Fannie/ Freddie private MBS holdings)
Subtotal # of Loans 7. Non-Agency Jumbo Prime 8. Non-Agency Conforming Prime * 9. Fannie Prime ** 10. Freddie Prime *** Total # of Loans
25.7 million 9.4 million ‡ 11.2 million 8.7 million 55 million
6.8% 5.6% 2.6% 2.0%
* Includes an estimated 1 million subprime (FICO<660) that were (i) not high rate and (ii) non-prime CRA and HUD Best Practices Initiative loans. These are included in the “CRA and HUD Programs” line in Table 1. ** Excludes Fannie subprime/Alt-A/nonprime. *** Excludes Freddie subprime/Alt-A/nonprime. † Excludes loans owned or securitized by Fannie and Freddie. ‡ Non-agency jumbo prime and conforming prime counted together. Total delinquency data sources: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 & 8: Lender Processing Services, LPS Mortgage Monitor, June 2009. 4 & 9: Based on Fannie Mae 2009 2Q Credit Supplement. Converted from a serious delinquency rate (90+ days & in foreclosure) to an estimated Total Delinquency Rate (30+ days and in foreclosure). 5 & 10: Based on Freddie Mac 2009 2Q Financial Results Supplement. Converted from a serious delinquency rate (90+ days & in foreclosure) to an estimated Total Delinquency Rate (30+ days and in foreclosure).
4. The Origin and Growth of Subprime PMBS It was only in 2002 that the market for subprime PMBS—that is private mortgage-backed securities backed by subprime loans or other NTMs—reached $100 billion. In that year, the top five issuers were GMAC-RFC ($11.5 billion), Lehman ($10.6 billion), CS First Boston ($10.5 billion), Bank of America ($10.4 billion) and Ameriquest ($9 billion).29 The issuances of PMBS that year totaled $134 billion, of which $43 billion in PMBS were issued by Wall Street financial institutions. In subsequent years, as the market grew, Wall Street institutions fell behind the major subprime issuers, so that by 2005—the biggest year for subprime PMBS issuance—only Lehman was among the top five issuers and Wall Street issuers as a group were only 27 percent of the $507 billion in total PMBS issuance in that year.30 28
Id., Figure 53.
29
Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual—Vol. II, p143.
30
Id., p.140.
Peter J. Wallison
463
One of the many myths about the financial crisis is that Wall Street banks led the way into subprime lending and the GSEs followed. The Commission majority’s report adopts this idea as a way of explaining why Fannie and Freddie acquired so many NTMs. This notion simply does not align with the facts. Not only were Wall Street institutions small factors in the subprime PMBS market, but well before 2002 Fannie and Freddie were much bigger players than the entire PMBS market in the business of acquiring NTM and other subprime loans. Table 7, page 504, shows that Fannie and Freddie had already acquired at least $701 billion in NTMs by 2001. Obviously, the GSEs did not have to follow anyone into NTM or subprime lending; they were already the dominant players in that market before 2002. Table 7 also shows that in 2002, when the entire PMBS market was $134 billion, Fannie and Freddie acquired $206 billion in whole subprime mortgages and $368 billion in other NTMs, demonstrating again that the GSEs were no strangers to risky lending well before the PMBS market began to develop. Further evidence about which firms were first into subprime or NTM lending is provided by Fannie’s 2002 10-K. This disclosure document reports that 14 percent of Fannie’s credit obligations (either in portfolio or guaranteed) had FICO credit scores below 660 as of December 31, 2000, 16 percent at the end of 2001 and 17 percent at the end of 2002.31 So Fannie and Freddie were active and major buyers of subprime loans in years when the PMBS market had total issuances of only $55 billion (2000) and $94 billion (2001). In other words, it would be more accurate to say that Wall Street followed Fannie and Freddie into subprime lending rather than vice versa. At the same time, the GSEs’ purchases of subprime whole loans throughout the 1990s stimulated the growth of the subprime lending industry, which ultimately became the mainstay of the subprime PMBS market in the 2000s. 2005 was the biggest year for PMBS subprime issuances, and Ameriquest ($54 billion) and Countrywide ($38 billion) were the two largest issuers in the top 25. These numbers were still small in relation to what Fannie and Freddie had been buying since data became available in 1997. The total in Table 7 for Fannie and Freddie between 1997 and 2007 is approximately $1.5 trillion for subprime loans and over $4 trillion for all NTMs as a group. Because subprime PMBS were rich in NTM loans eligible for credit under HUD’s AH goals, Fannie and Freddie were also the largest individual purchasers of subprime PMBS from 2002 to 2006, acquiring 33 percent of the total issuances, or $579 billion.32 In Table 3 above, which organizes mortgages by delinquency rate, these purchases are included in line 1, which had the highest rate of delinquency. These were self-denominated subprime—designated as subprime by the lender when originated—and thus had low FICO scores and usually a higher interest rate than prime loans; many also had low downpayments and were subject to other deficiencies. Ultimately, HUD’s policies were responsible for both the poor quality of the subprime and Alt-A mortgages that backed the PMBS and for the enormous size to which this market grew. This was true not only because Fannie and Freddie 31
2003 10-K, Table 33, p.84 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/310522/000095013303001151/ w84239e10vk.htm#031. 32 See Table 3 of “High LTV, Subprime and Alt-A Originations Over the Period 1992-2007 and Fannie, Freddie, FHA and VA’s Role” found at http://www.aei.org/docLib/Pinto-High-LTV-Subprime-Alt-A.pdf.
464
Dissenting Statement
stimulated the growth of that market through their purchases of PMBS, but also because the huge inflow of government or government-directed funds into the housing market turned what would have been a normal housing bubble into a bubble of unprecedented size and duration. This encouraged and enabled unprecedented growth in the PMBS market in two ways. First, the gradual increase of the AH goals, the competition between the GSEs and the FHA, the effect of HUD’s Best Practices Initiative, and bank lending under the CRA, assured a continuing flow of funds into weaker and weaker mortgages. This had the effect of extending the life of the housing bubble as well as increasing its size. The growth of the bubble in turn disguised the weakness of the subprime mortgages it contained; as housing prices rose, subprime borrowers who might otherwise have defaulted were able to refinance their mortgages, using the equity that had developed in their homes solely through rising home prices. Without the continuous infusion of government or government-directed funds, delinquencies and defaults would have begun showing up within a year or two, bringing the subprime PMBS market to a halt. Instead, the bubble lasted ten years, permitting that market to grow until it reached almost $2 trillion. Second, as housing prices rose in the bubble, it was necessary for borrowers to seek riskier mortgages so they could afford the monthly payments on more expensive homes. This gave rise to new and riskier forms of mortgage debt, such as option ARMs (resulting in negative amortization) and interest-only mortgages. Mortgages of this kind could be suitable for some borrowers, but not for those who were only eligible for subprime loans. Nevertheless, subprime loans were necessary for PMBS, because they generally bore higher interest rates and thus could support the yields that investors were expecting. As subprime loans were originated, Fannie and Freddie were willing consumers of those that might meet the AH goals; moreover, because of their lower cost of funds, they were able to buy the “best of the worst,” the highest quality among the NTMs on offer. These factors—the need for higher yielding loans and the ability of Fannie and Freddie to pay up for the loans they wanted—drove private sector issuers further out on the risk curve as they sought to meet the demands of investors who were seeking exposure to subprime PMBS. From the investors’ perspective, as long as the bubble kept growing, PMBS were offering the high yields associated with risk but were not showing commensurate numbers of delinquencies and defaults.
5. What was Known About NTMs Prior to the Crisis? Virtually everyone who testified before the Commission agreed that the financial crisis was initiated by the mortgage meltdown that began when the housing bubble began to deflate in 2007. None of these witnesses, however, including the academics consulted by the Commission, the representatives of the rating agencies, the officers of financial institutions that were ultimately endangered by the mortgage downdraft, regulators and supervisors of financial institutions and even the renowned investor Warren Buffett,33 seems to have understood the dimensions 33
See Buffett, testimony before the FCIC, June 2, 2010.
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of the NTM problem or recognized its significance before the bubble deflated. The Commission majority’s report notes that “there were warning signs.” There always are if one searches for them; they are most visible in hindsight, in which the Commission majority, and many of the opinions it cites for this proposition, happily engaged. However, as Michael Lewis’s acclaimed book, The Big Short, showed so vividly, very few people in the financial world were actually willing to bet money— even at enormously favorable odds—that the bubble would burst with huge losses. Most seem to have assumed that NTMs were present in the financial system, but not in unusually large numbers. Even today, there are few references in the media to the number of NTMs that had accumulated in the U.S. financial system before the meltdown began. Yet this is by far the most important fact about the financial crisis. None of the other factors offered by the Commission majority to explain the crisis—lack of regulation, poor regulatory and risk management foresight, Wall Street greed and compensation policies, systemic risk caused by credit default swaps, excessive liquidity and easy credit—do so as plausibly as the failure of a large percentage of the 27 million NTMs that existed in the financial system in 2007. It appears that market participants were unprepared for the destructiveness of this bubble’s collapse because of a chronic lack of information about the composition of the mortgage market. In September 2007, for example, after the deflation of the bubble had begun, and various financial firms were beginning to encounter capital and liquidity difficulties, two Lehman Brothers analysts issued a highly detailed report entitled “Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?”34 In the tables associated with the report, they estimated the total unpaid principal balance of subprime and Alt-A mortgages outstanding at $2.4 trillion, about half the actual number at the time. Based on this assessment, when they applied a stress scenario in which housing prices declined about 30 percent, they still found that “[t]he aggregate losses in the residential mortgage market under the ‘stressed’ housing conditions could be about $240 billion, which is manageable, assuming it materializes over a five-to six-year horizon.” In the end, of course, the losses were much larger, and were recognized under mark-to-market accounting almost immediately, rather than over a five to six year period. But the failure of these two analysts to recognize the sheer size of the subprime and Alt-A market, even as late as 2007, is the important point. Along with most other observers, the Lehman analysts were not aware of the true composition of the mortgage market in 2007. Under the “stressed” housing conditions they applied, they projected that the GSEs would suffer aggregate losses of $9.5 billion (net of mortgage insurance coverage) and that their guarantee fee income would be more than sufficient to cover these losses. Based on known losses and projections recently made by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), the GSEs’ credit losses alone could total $350 billion—more than 35 times the Lehman analysts’ September 2007 estimate. The analysts could only make such a colossal error if they did not realize that 37 percent—or $1.65 trillion—of the GSEs’ credit risk portfolio consisted of subprime and Alt-A loans (see Table 1, supra) or that these weak loans would account for about 75% of the GSEs’ default losses over 200734
Vikas Shilpiekandula and Olga Gorodetski, “Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?” Lehman Brothers Fixed Income U.S. Securitized Products Research, September 7, 2007.
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2010.35 It is also instructive to compare the Lehman analysts’ estimate that the 2006 vintage of subprime loans would suffer lifetime losses of 19 percent under “stressed” conditions to other, later, more informed estimates. In early 2010, for example, Moody’s made a similar estimate for the 2006 vintage and projected a 38 percent loss rate after the 30 percent decline in housing prices had actually occurred.36 The Lehman loss rate projection suggests that the analysts did not have an accurate estimate of the number of NTMs actually outstanding in 2006. Indeed, I have not found any studies in the period before the financial crisis in which anyone— scholar or financial analyst—actually seemed to understand how many NTMs were in the financial system at the time. It was only after the financial crisis, when my AEI colleague, Edward Pinto, began gathering this information from various unrelated and disparate sources that the total number of NTMs in the financial markets became clear. As a result, all loss projections before Pinto’s work were bound to be faulty. Much of the Commission majority’s report, which criticizes firms, regulators, corporate executives, risk managers and ratings agency analysts for failure to perceive the losses that lay ahead, is sheer hindsight. It appears that information about the composition of the mortgage market was simply not known when the bubble began to deflate. The Commission never attempted a serious study of what was known about the composition of the mortgage market in 2007, apparently satisfied simply to blame market participants for failing to understand the risks that lay before them, without trying to understand what information was actually available. The mortgage market is studied constantly by thousands of analysts, academics, regulators, traders and investors. How could all these people have missed something as important as the actual number of NTMs outstanding? Most market participants appear to have assumed in the bubble years that Fannie and Freddie continued to adhere to the same conservative underwriting policies they had previously pursued. Until Fannie and Freddie were required to meet HUD’s AH goals, they rarely acquired subprime or other low quality mortgages. Indeed, the very definition of a traditional prime mortgage was a loan that Fannie and Freddie would buy. Lesser loans were rejected, and were ultimately insured by FHA or made by a relatively small group of subprime originators and investors. Although anyone who followed HUD’s AH regulations, and thought through their implications, would have realized that Fannie and Freddie must have been shifting their buying activities to low quality loans, few people had incentives to uncover the new buying pattern. Investors believed that there was no significant risk in MBS backed by Fannie and Freddie, since they were thought (correctly, as it turns out) to be implicitly backed by the federal government. In addition, the GSEs were exempted by law from having to file information with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)--they agreed to file voluntarily in 2002--leaving them free from disclosure obligations and questions from analysts about the quality of their mortgages. When Fannie voluntarily began filing reports with the SEC in 2003, it disclosed 35 Fannie Mae, 2010 Second Quarter Credit Supplement, http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/sec/2010/ q2credit_summary.pdf. 36
“Moody’s Projects Losses of Almost Half of Original Balance from 2007 Subprime Mortgage Securities,” http://seekingalpha.com/article/182556-moodys-projects-losses-of-almost-half-of-originalbalance-from-2007-subprime-mortgage-securities.
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that 16 percent of its credit obligations on mortgages had FICO scores of less than 660—the common definition of a subprime loan. There are occasionally questions about whether a FICO score of 660 is the appropriate dividing line between prime and subprime loans. The federal bank regulators use 660 as the dividing line,37 and in the credit supplement it published for the first time with its 2008 10-K, Fannie included loans with FICO scores below 660 to disclose its exposure to loans that were other than prime. As of December 31, 2008, borrowers with a FICO of less than 660 had a serious delinquency rate about four times that for borrowers with a FICO equal to or greater than 660 (6.74% compared to 1.72%).38 Fannie did not point out in its filing that a FICO score of less than 660 was considered a subprime loan. Although at the end of 2005 Fannie was exposed to $311 billion in subprime loans it reported in its 2005 10-K (not filed with the SEC until May 2, 2007) that: “The percentage of our single-family mortgage credit book of business consisting of subprime mortgage loans or structured Fannie Mae MBS backed by subprime mortgage loans was not material as of December 31, 2005.”[emphasis supplied]39 Fannie was able to make this statement because it defined subprime loans as loans it purchased from subprime lenders. Thus, in its 2007 10-K report, Fannie stated: “Subprime mortgage loans are typically originated by lenders specializing in these loans or by subprime divisions of large lenders, using processes unique to subprime loans. In reporting our subprime exposure, we have classified mortgage loans as subprime if the mortgage loans are originated by one of these specialty lenders or a subprime division of a large lender.”40[emphasis supplied] The credit scores on these loans, and the riskiness associated with these credit scores, were not deemed relevant. Accordingly, as late as its 2007 10-K report, Fannie was able to make the following statements, even though it is likely that at that point it held or guaranteed enough subprime loans to drive the company into insolvency if a substantial number of these loans were to default: Subprime mortgage loans, whether held in our portfolio or backing Fannie Mae MBS, represented less than 1% of our single-family business volume in each of 2007, 2006 and 2005.41 [emphasis supplied] We estimate that subprime mortgage loans held in our portfolio or subprime mortgage loans backing Fannie Mae MBS, excluding re-securitized private label mortgage related securities backed by subprime mortgage loans, represented approximately 0.3% of our single-family mortgage credit book of business as of December 31, 2007, compared with 0.2% and 0.1% as of December 31, 2006 and 2005, respectively.42[emphasis supplied]
These statements could have lulled market participants and others—including 37 Office of Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision advised in its “Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending Programs”, published in 2001, http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/SRletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf that “the term ‘subprime’ refers to the credit characteristics of individual borrowers. Subprime borrowers typically have weakened credit histories that include payment delinquencies and possibly more severe problems such as charge-offs, judgments, and bankruptcies.” A FICO score of 660 or below was evidence of “relatively high default probability.” 38
Derived from Table 12.
39
Fannie Mae, 2005 10-K report, filed May 2, 2007.
40
Fannie Mae, 2007 Form 10K, pp. 129 and 155.
41
Fannie Mae, 2007 Form 10K, p.129.
42
Fannie Mae, 2007 Form 10K, p.130.
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Dissenting Statement
the Lehman analysts—into believing that Fannie and Freddie did not hold or had not guaranteed substantial numbers of high risk loans, and thus that there were many fewer such loans in the financial system than in fact existed. Of course, in the early 2000s there was no generally understood definition of the term “subprime,” so Fannie and Freddie could define it as they liked, and the assumption that the GSEs only made prime loans continued to be supported by their public disclosures. So when Fannie and Freddie reported their loan acquisitions to various mortgage information aggregators they did not report those mortgages as subprime or Alt-A, and the aggregators continued to follow industry practice by placing virtually all the GSEs’ loans in the “prime” category. Without understanding Fannie and Freddie’s peculiar and self-serving loan classification methods, the recipients of information about the GSEs’ mortgage positions simply seemed to assume that all these mortgages were prime loans, as they had always been in the past, and added them to the number of prime loans outstanding. Accordingly, by 2008 there were approximately 12 million more NTMs in the financial system—and 12 million fewer prime loans—than most market participants realized. Appendix 1 shows that the levels of delinquency and default would be 86 percent higher than expected if there were 12 million NTMs in the financial system instead of 12 million prime loans. Appendix 2 shows that the levels of delinquency would be 150 percent higher than expected if the feedback effect of mortgage delinquencies—causing lower housing prices, in a downward spiral—were taken into account. These differences in projected losses could have misled the rating agencies into believing that, even if the bubble were to deflate, the losses on mortgage failures would not be so substantial as to have a more than local effect and would not adversely affect the AAA tranches in MBS securitizations. The Commission never looked into this issue, or attempted to determine what market participants believed to be the number of subprime and other NTMs outstanding in the system immediately before the financial crisis. Whenever possible in the Commission’s public hearings, I asked analysts and other market participants how many NTMs they believed were outstanding before the financial crisis occurred. It was clear from the responses that none of the witnesses had ever considered that question, and it appeared that none suspected that the number was large enough to substantially affect losses after the collapse of the bubble. It was only on November 10, 2008, after Fannie had been taken over by the federal government, that the company admitted in its 10-Q report for the third quarter of 2008 that it had classified as subprime or Alt-A loans only those loans that it purchased from self-denominated subprime or Alt-A originators, and not loans that were subprime or Alt-A because of their risk characteristics. Even then Fannie wasn’t fully candid. After describing its classification criteria, Fannie stated, “[H]owever, we have other loans with some features that are similar to Alt-A and subprime loans that we have not classified as Alt-A or subprime because they do not meet our classification criteria.”43 This hardly described the true nature of Fannie’s obligations. On the issue of the number of NTMs outstanding before the crisis the Commission studiously averted its eyes, and the Commission majority’s report 43 Fannie Mae, 2008 3rd quarter 10-Q. p.115, http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/earnings/2008/q32008. pdf.
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never addresses the question. HUD’s role in pressing for a reduction in mortgage underwriting standards escaped the FCIC’s attention entirely, the GSEs’ AH goals are mentioned only in passing, CRA is defended, and neither HUD’s Best Practices Initiative nor FHA’s activities are mentioned at all. No reason is advanced for the accumulation of subprime loans in the bubble other than the idea—implicit in the majority’s report—that it was profitable. In sum, the majority’s report is Hamlet without the prince of Denmark. Indeed, the Commission’s entire investigation seemed to be directed at minimizing the role of NTMs and the role of government housing policy. In this telling, the NTMs were a “trigger” for the financial crisis, but once the collapse of the bubble had occurred the “weaknesses and vulnerabilities” of the financial system— which had been there all along—caused the crisis. These alleged deficiencies included a lack of adequate regulation of the so-called “shadow banking system” and over-the-counter derivatives, the overly generous compensation arrangements on Wall Street, and securitization (characterized as “the originate to distribute model”). Coincidentally, all these purported weaknesses and vulnerabilities then required more government regulation, although their baleful presence hadn’t been noted until the unprecedented number of subprime and Alt-A loans, created largely to comply with government housing policies, defaulted.
6. Conclusion What is surprising about the many views of the causes of the financial crisis that have been published since the Lehman bankruptcy, including the Commission’s own inquiry, is the juxtaposition of two facts: (i) a general agreement that the bubble and the mortgage meltdown that followed its deflation were the precipitating causes—sometimes characterized as the “trigger”—of the financial crisis, and (ii) a seemingly studious effort to avoid examining how it came to be that mortgage underwriting standards declined to the point that the bubble contained so many NTMs that were ready to fail as soon as the bubble began to deflate. Instead of thinking through what would almost certainly happen when these assets virtually disappeared from balance sheets, many observers—including the Commission majority in their report—pivoted immediately to blame the “weaknesses and vulnerabilities” of the free market or the financial or regulatory system, without considering whether any system could have survived such a blow. One of the most striking examples of this approach was presented by Larry Summers, the head of the White House economic council and one of the President’s key advisers. In a private interview with a few of the members of the Commission (I was not informed of the interview), Summers was asked whether the mortgage meltdown was the cause of the financial crisis. His response was that the financial crisis was like a forest fire and the mortgage meltdown like a “cigarette butt” thrown into a very dry forest. Was the cigarette butt, he asked, the cause of the forest fire, or was it the tinder dry condition of the forest?44 The Commission majority adopted the idea that it was the tinder-dry forest. Their central argument is that the mortgage meltdown as the bubble deflated triggered the financial crisis because of the “vulnerabilities” inherent in the U.S. financial system at the time—the absence 44
FCIC, Summers interview, p.77.
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of regulation, lax regulation, predatory lending, greed on Wall Street and among participants in the securitization system, ineffective risk management, and excessive leverage, among other factors. One of the majority’s singular notions is that “30 years of deregulation” had “stripped away key safeguards” against a crisis; this ignores completely that in 1991, in the wake of the S&L crisis, Congress adopted the FDIC Improvement Act, which was by far the toughest bank regulatory law since the advent of deposit insurance and was celebrated at the time of its enactment as finally giving the regulators the power to put an end to bank crises. The forest metaphor turns out to be an excellent way to communicate the difference between the Commission’s report and this dissenting statement. What Summers characterized as a “cigarette butt” was 27 million high risk NTMs with a total value over $4.5 trillion. Let’s use a little common sense here: $4.5 trillion in high risk loans was not a “cigarette butt;” they were more like an exploding gasoline truck in that forest. The Commission’s report blames the conditions in the financial system; I blame 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages—half of all mortgages outstanding in the U.S. in 2008—and a number that appears to have been unknown to most if not all market participants at the time. No financial system, in my view, could have survived the failure of large numbers of high risk mortgages once the bubble began to deflate, and no market could have avoided a panic when it became clear that the number of defaults and delinquencies among these mortgages far exceeded anything that even the most sophisticated market participants expected. This conclusion has significant policy implications. If in fact the financial crisis was caused by government housing policies, then the Dodd-Frank Act was legislative overreach and unnecessary. The appropriate policy choice was to reduce or eliminate the government’s involvement in the residential mortgage markets, not to impose significant new regulation on the financial system. **** The balance of this statement will outline (i) how the high levels of delinquency and default among the NTMs were transmitted as losses to the financial system, and (ii) how the government policies summarized above caused the accumulation of an unprecedented number of NTMs in the U.S. and around the globe.
II. HOW 27 MILLION NTMS PRECIPITATED A FINANCIAL CRISIS Although the Commission never defined the financial crisis it was supposed to investigate, it is necessary to do so in order to know where to start and stop. If, for example, the financial crisis is still continuing, then the effect of government policies such as the Troubled Asset Repurchase Program (TARP) should be evaluated. However, it seems clear that Congress wanted the Commission to concentrate on what caused the unprecedented events that occurred largely in the fall of 2008, and for this purpose Ben Bernanke’s definition of the financial crisis seems most appropriate: The credit boom began to unravel in early 2007 when problems surfaced with subprime mortgages—mortgages offered to less-creditworthy borrowers—and house prices in parts of the country began to fall. Mortgage delinquencies and defaults rose, and the downturn in house prices intensified, trends that continue today. Investors, stunned by losses on assets they had believed to be safe, began to pull back from a wide range of credit markets, and financial institutions—reeling from severe losses on mortgages and other loans—cut back their lending. The crisis deepened [in September 2008], when the failure or near-failure of several major financial firms caused many financial and credit markets to freeze up.”45
In other words, the financial crisis was the result of the losses suffered by financial institutions around the world when U.S. mortgages began to fail in large numbers; the crisis became more severe in September 2008, when the failure of several major financial firms—which held or were thought to hold large amounts of mortgage-related assets—caused many financial markets to freeze up. This summary encapsulates a large number of interconnected events, but it makes clear that the underlying cause of the financial crisis was a rapid decline in the value of one specific and widely held asset: U.S. residential mortgages. The next question is how, exactly, these delinquencies and losses caused the financial crisis. The following discussion will show that it was not all mortgages and mortgage-backed securities that were the source of the crisis, but primarily NTMs— including PMBS backed by NTMs. Traditional mortgages, which were generally prime mortgages, did not suffer substantial losses at the outset of the mortgage meltdown, although as the financial crisis turned into a recession and housing prices continued to fall, losses among prime mortgages began to approach the level of prime mortgage losses that had occurred in past housing crises. However, those levels were far lower than the losses on NTMs, which reached levels of delinquency and default between 15 and 45 percent (depending on the characteristics of the loans in question) because the loans involved were weaker as a class than in any previous housing crisis. The fact that they were also far larger in number than any 45
Speech at Morehouse College, April 14, 2009.
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Dissenting Statement
previous bubble was what caused the catastrophic housing price declines that fueled the financial crisis.
1. How Failures Among NTMs were Transmitted to the Financial System When the housing bubble began to deflate in mid-2007, delinquency rates among NTMs began to increase substantially. Previously, although these mortgages were weak and high risk, their delinquency rates were relatively low. This was a consequence of the bubble itself, which inflated housing prices so that homes could be sold with no loss in cases where borrowers could not meet their mortgage obligations. Alternatively, rising housing prices—coupled with liberal appraisal rules—created a form of free equity in a home, allowing the home to be refinanced easily, perhaps even at a lower interest rate. However, rising housing prices eventually reached the point where even easy credit terms could no longer keep the good times rolling, and at that point the bubble flattened and weak mortgages became exposed for what they were. As Warren Buffett has said, when the tide goes out, you can see who’s swimming naked. The role of the government’s housing policy is crucial at this point. As discussed earlier, if the government had not been directing money into the mortgage markets in order to foster growth in home ownership, NTMs in the bubble would have begun to default relatively soon after they were originated. The continuous inflow of government or government-backed funds, however, kept the bubble growing—not only in size but over time—and this tended to suppress the significant delinquencies and defaults that had brought previous bubbles to an end in only three or four years. That explains why PMBS based on NTMs could become so numerous and so risky without triggering the delinquencies and defaults that caused earlier bubbles to deflate within a shorter period. With losses few and time to continue originations, Countrywide and others were able to securitize subprime PMBS in increasingly large amounts from 2002 ($134 billion) to 2006 ($483 billion) without engendering the substantial increase in delinquencies that would ordinarily have alarmed investors and brought the bubble to a halt.46 Indeed, the absence of delinquencies had the opposite effect. As investors around the world saw housing prices rise in the U.S. without any significant losses even among subprime and other high-yielding loans, they were encouraged to buy PMBS that—although rated AAA—still offered attractive yields. In other words, as shown in Figure 2, government housing policies—AH goals imposed on the GSEs, the decline in FHA lending standards, HUD’s pressure for reduced underwriting standards among mortgage bankers, and CRA requirements for insured banks— by encouraging the growth of the bubble, increased the worldwide demand for subprime PMBS. Then, in mid-2007, the bubble began to deflate, with catastrophic consequences.
46
Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual—Volume II, MBS database.
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2. The Defaults Begin The best summary of how the deflation of the housing bubble led to the financial crisis was contained in the prepared testimony that FDIC chair Sheila Bair delivered to the FCIC in a September 2 hearing: Starting in mid 2007, global financial markets began to experience serious liquidity challenges related mainly to rising concerns about U.S. mortgage credit quality. As home prices fell, recently originated subprime and non-traditional mortgage loans began to default at record rates. These developments led to growing concerns about the value of financial positions in mortgage-backed securities and related derivative instruments held by major financial institutions in the U.S. and around the world. The difficulty in determining the value of mortgage-related assets and, therefore, the balance-sheet strength of large banks and non-bank financial institutions ultimately led these institutions to become wary of lending to one another, even on a short-term basis.47 [emphasis supplied]
All the important elements of what happened are in Chairman Bair’s succinct statement: (i) in mid 2007, the markets began to experience liquidity challenges because of concerns about the credit quality of NTMs; (ii) housing prices fell; NTMs began to default at record rates; (iii) it was difficult to determine the value of MBS, and thus the financial condition of the institutions that held them; and, (iv) finally, as a consequence of this uncertainty—especially after the failure of Lehman—financial institutions would not lend to one another. That phenomenon was the financial crisis. The following discussion will show how each of these steps operated to bring down the financial system.
Markets Began to Experience Liquidity Challenges To understand the transmission mechanism, it is necessary to distinguish between PMBS, on the one hand, and the MBS that were distributed by government agencies such as FHA/Ginnie Mae and the GSEs (referred to jointly as “Agencies” in this section). As shown in Table 1, by 2008, the 27 million NTMs in the U.S. financial system were held as (i) whole mortgages, (ii) MBS guaranteed by the GSEs, or insured or held by a government agency or a bank under the CRA, or (iii) as PMBS securitized by private firms such as Countrywide. The 27 million NTMs had an aggregate unpaid principal balance of more than $4.5 trillion, and the portion represented by PMBS consisted of 7.8 million mortgages with an aggregate unpaid principal balance of approximately $1.9 trillion. As mortgage delinquencies and defaults multiplied in the U.S. financial system, the losses were transmitted to financial institutions through their holdings of PMBS. How did this happen, and what role was played by government housing policy? Both Agency MBS and PMBS pass through to investors the principal and interest received on the mortgages in a pool that backs an issue of securities; the difference between them is the way they protect investors against credit risk—i.e., the possibility of losses in the event that the mortgages in the pool begin to default. The Agencies insure or place a guarantee on all the securities issued by a pool they or some other entity creates. Because of the Agencies’ real or perceived government 47
Sheila C. Bair, “Systemically Important Institutions and the Issue of ‘Too-Big-to-Fail,’” Testimony to the FCIC, September 2, 2010, p.3.
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Dissenting Statement
backing, all these securities are rated or considered to be AAA. PMBS rely on a classification and subordination system known as “tranching” to provide some investors in the pool with a degree of assurance that they will not suffer losses because of mortgage defaults. In the tranching system, different classes of securities are issued by the pool. The rights of some classes to receive payments of principal and interest from the mortgages in the pool are subordinated to the rights of other classes, so that the superior classes are more likely to receive payment even if there are some defaults among the mortgages in the pool. Through this mechanism, approximately 90 percent of an issue of PMBS could be rated AAA or AA, even if the underlying mortgages are NTMs that have a higher rate of delinquency than prime loans. In theory, for example, if the historic rates of loss on a pool of NTMs is, say, five percent, then those losses will be absorbed by the ten percent of the securities holders who are in the classes rated lower than AAA or AA. Of course, if the losses are greater than anticipated—exactly what happened as the recent bubble began to deflate—they will reach into the higher classes and substantially reduce their value.48 It is not clear whether, in 2007 or 2008, mortgage delinquencies and defaults had actually caused cash losses in the AAA tranches of PMBS, but the rate at which delinquencies and defaults among NTMs were occurring throughout the financial system was so high that such losses were a distinct possibility—obviously a matter of great concern to investors. This means that investors in PMBS and government-backed Agency MBS had different experiences when the bubble began to deflate. Those who invested in Agency MBS did not suffer losses (the U.S. government has thus far protected all investors in Agency MBS), while those who invested in PMBS were exposed to losses if the losses on the underlying mortgages were so great that they threatened to invade the AAA and AA classes. Even if no cash losses had actually been suffered, the holders of PMBS would see a sharp decline in the market value of their holdings as investors—shocked by the large number of defaults on mortgages—fled the assetbacked market. So when we look for the direct effect of mortgage failures on the financial condition of various financial institutions in the financial crisis we should look only to the PMBS, not the MBS issued by the Agencies. In addition, the default and delinquency ratios on the loans underlying the PMBS were higher than similar ratios among the loans held or guaranteed by the Agencies. Many of the loans which backed the PMBS were the self-denominated subprime loans (that is, made by subprime lenders explicitly to subprime borrowers) and were classified in the worst-performing categories in Table 3. In part, the betterperforming characteristics of the NTMs held or guaranteed by the Agencies was due to the fact that the Agencies were not buying for economic purposes—to make profits—but only to meet government requirements such as the AH goals. They did not want or need the higher-yielding and thus more risky mortgages that backed the PMBS, because they did not need higher yields in order to sell their MBS. In addition, because of their lower cost funding, the Agencies could pay more for the NTMs they bought and thus could acquire the “best of the worst.” 48 A thorough description of the tranching system, and many more details about various methods of protecting senior tranches, is contained in Gary B. Gorton, Slapped By the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 82-113.
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PMBS are Connected to All Other NTMs Through Housing Prices But this does not mean that only the failure of the PMBS was responsible for the financial crisis. In a sense, all mortgages are linked to one another through housing prices, and housing prices in turn are highly sensitive to delinquencies and defaults on mortgages. This is a characteristic of mortgages that is not present in other securitized assets. If a credit card holder defaults on his obligations it has little effect on other credit card holders, but if a homeowner defaults on a mortgage the resulting foreclosure has an effect on the value of all homes in the vicinity and thus on the quality of all mortgages on those homes. Accordingly, the PMBS were intimately connected—through housing prices—to the NTMs securitized by the Agencies. Because there were so many more NTMs held or securitized by the Agencies (see Table 1), their unprecedented numbers—even in cases where they had a lower average rate of delinquency and default than the NTMs that backed the PMBS—was the major source of downward pressure on housing prices throughout the United States. Weakening housing prices, in turn, caused more mortgage defaults, among both NTMs in general and the particular NTMs that were the collateral for PMBS. In other words, the NTMs underlying the PMBS were weakened by the delinquencies and defaults among the much larger number of mortgages held or guaranteed as MBS by the Agencies. In reality, then, the losses on the PMBS were much higher than they would have been if the government’s housing policies had not brought into being 19 million other NTMs that were failing in unprecedented numbers. These failures drove down housing prices by 30 percent--an unprecedented decline—which multiplied the losses on the PMBS. Finally, the funds that the government directed into the housing market in pursuit of its social policies enlarged the housing bubble and extended it in time. The longer housing bubbles grow, the riskier the mortgages they contain; lenders are constantly trying to find ways to keep monthly mortgage payments down while borrowers are buying more expensive houses. While the bubble was growing, the risks that were building within it were obscured. Borrowers who would otherwise have defaulted on their loans, bringing an end to the bubble, were able to use the rising home prices to refinance, sometimes at lower interest rates. With delinquency rates relatively low, investors did not have a reason to exit the mortgage markets, and the continuing flow of funds into mortgages allowed the bubble to extend for an unprecedented 10 years. This in turn enabled the PMBS market to grow to enormous size and thus to have a more calamitous effect when it finally collapsed. If the government policies that provided a continuing source of funding for the bubble had not been pursued, it is doubtful that there would have been a PMBS market remotely as large as the one that developed, or that—when the housing bubble collapsed—the losses to financial institutions would have been as great.
PMBS, as Securities, are Vulnerable to Investor Sentiment In addition to their link to the Agencies’ NTMs through housing prices, PMBS were particularly vulnerable to changes in investor sentiment about mortgages. The fact that the mortgages underlying the PMBS were held in securitized form was an important element of the crisis. There are many reasons for the popularity
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Dissenting Statement
of mortgage securitization. Beginning in 2002, for example, the Basel regulations provided that mortgages held in the form of MBS—presumably because of their superior liquidity compared to whole mortgages—required a bank to hold only 1.6 percent risk-based capital, while whole mortgages required risk-based capital backing of four percent. This made all forms of MBS, including PMBS, much less expensive to hold than whole mortgages. In addition, mortgages in securitized form could be traded more easily, and used more readily as a source of liquidity through repurchase agreements. However, some of the benefits of securitized mortgages are also detriments when certain mortgage market conditions prevail. If housing values are declining, losses on whole mortgages are recognized only slowly in bank financial statements and will be recognized even more slowly in the larger market. PMBS, however, are far more vulnerable to swings in sentiment than whole mortgages held on bank balance sheets. First, because they are more easily traded, PMBS values can be more quickly and adversely affected by negative information about the underlying mortgages than whole mortgages in the same principal amount. PMBS markets tend to be thin, because PMBS pools differ from one another. If investors believe that mortgages in general are declining in value, or they learn of a substantial and unexpected number of defaults and delinquencies, they may abandon the market for all PMBS, causing the general PMBS price level to fall precipitously. For example, in his book Slapped by the Invisible Hand, Professor Gary Gorton of Yale notes that the ABX index, initially published in late 2006, for the first time gave investors a picture of how others saw the value of a selected group of PMBS pools. The index showed steeply declining values, which caused many investors to withdraw from the market. Gorton observed: “I view the ABX indices as revealing hitherto unknown information, namely, the aggregated view that subprime was worth significantly less…It is not clear whether the housing bubble was burst by the ability to short the subprime housing market or whether house prices were going down and the implications of this were aggregated and revealed by the ABX indices”49 Whatever the underlying reason, as shown in Figure 3, this seems to be exactly what happened in the financial crisis. The result was a crash in the MBS market as investors fled what looked like major oncoming losses.
49
Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand, note 41, pp.121-123.
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Figure 3. The MBS market reacts to the bubble’s deflation
Source: Thompson Reuters Debt Capital Markets Review, Fourth Quarter 2008, available at http:// thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/league_tables/debt_equity/ (accessed July 30, 2009).
The decline in housing values had a profound adverse effect on the liquidity of all financial institutions that were exposed to PMBS. As noted above, one of the benefits of holding PMBS, especially those with AAA ratings, was that they were readily marketable. As such, they were considered sound and secure investments, carried on balance sheets at par and suitable to serve as collateral for short term financing through repurchase agreements, or “repos.” In a repo transaction, a borrower sells a security to a lender with an option to repurchase it at a price that provides the lender with a return appropriate for a secured loan. The lender assumes that if its counterparty defaults the collateral can be sold. Accordingly, if the collateral asset loses its reputation for high quality and liquidity, it loses much of its value for both capital and liquidity purposes, even if the collateral itself has not actually suffered losses. This is what happened to AAA-rated PMBS as housing prices first leveled off and then began to fall in 2007, and as mortgage delinquencies rolled in at rates no one had expected. As discussed more fully below, when AAArated PMBS became unmarketable they lost their value for liquidity purposes, making it difficult or impossible for many financial institutions to fund themselves using these assets as collateral for repos. This was the liquidity challenge to which Chairman Bair referred in her testimony. The near-failure of Bear Stearns in March 2008 was an excellent example of how the unexpected collapse of the PMBS market could cause a substantial loss of liquidity by a financial institution, and ultimately its inability to survive the resulting loss in market confidence. The FCIC staff ’s review of the liquidity problems of Bear Stearns showed that the loss of the PMBS market was the single event that was crippling for Bear, because it eliminated a major portion of the firm’s liquidity
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pool—AAA-rated PMBS—as a useful source of repo financing. According to the Commission staff ’s Preliminary Investigative Report on Bear, prepared for hearings on May 5 and 6, 2010, 97.4 percent of Bear’s short term funding was secured and only 2.6 percent unsecured. “As of January 11, 2008,” the FCIC staff reported, “$45.9 billion of Bear Stearns’ repo collateral was composed of agency (Fannie and Freddie) mortgage-related securities, $23.7 billion was in non-agency securitized asset backed securities [i.e., PMBS], and $19 billion was in whole loans.”50 The Agency MBS was unaffected by the collapse of the PMBS market, and could still be used for funding. Thus, about 27 percent of Bear’s readily available sources of funding consisted of PMBS that became unusable for repo financing when the PMBS market disappeared. The loss of this source of liquidity put the firm in serious jeopardy; rumors swept the market about Bear’s condition, and clients began withdrawing funds. Bear’s officers told the Commission that the firm was profitable in its first 2008 quarter—the quarter in which it failed; ironically they also told the Commission’s staff that they had moved Bear’s short term funding from commercial paper to MBS because they believed that collateral-backed funding would be more stable. In the week beginning March 10, 2008, according to the FCIC staff report, Bear had over $18 billion in cash reserves, but by March 13 the liquidity pool had fallen to $2 billion.51 It was clear that Bear—solvent and profitable or not—could not survive a run that was fueled by fear and uncertainty about its liquidity and the possibility of its insolvency. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the Commission’s staff focused on Bear because the Commission’s majority apparently believed that the business model of investment banks, which relied on relatively high leverage and repo or other short term financing, was inherently unstable. The need to rescue Bear was thought to be evidence of this fact. Clearly, the five independent investment banks—Bear, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs—were badly damaged in the financial crisis. Only two of them remain independent firms, and those two are now regulated as bank holding companies by the Federal Reserve. Nevertheless, it is not clear that the investment banks fared any worse than the much more heavily regulated commercial banks—or Fannie and Freddie which were also regulated more stringently than the investment banks but not as stringently as banks. The investment banks did not pass the test created by the mortgage meltdown and the subsequent financial crisis, but neither did a large number of insured banks— IndyMac, Washington Mutual (WaMu) and Wachovia, to name the largest—that were much more heavily regulated and, in addition, offered insured deposits and had access to the Fed’s discount window if they needed emergency funds to deal with runs. The view of the Commission majority, that investment banks—as part of the so-called “shadow banking system”—were special contributors to the financial crisis, seems misplaced for this reason. They are better classified not as contributors to the financial crisis but as victims of the panic that ensued after the housing bubble and the PMBS market collapsed. Bear went down because the delinquencies and failures of an unprecedentedly large number of NTMs caused the collapse of the PMBS market; this destroyed the 50
FCIC, “Investigative Findings on Bear Stearns (Preliminary Draft),” April 29, 2010, p.16.
51
Id., p.45.
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usefulness of AAA-rated PMBS as assets that Bear and others relied on for both capital and liquidity, and thus raised questions about the firm’s ability to meet its obligations. Investment banks like Bear Stearns were not commercial banks; instead of using short term deposits to hold long term assets—the hallmark of a bank— their business model relied on short-term funding to carry the short term assets of a trading business. Contrary to the views of the Commission majority, there is nothing inherently wrong with that business model, but it could not survive an unprecedented financial panic as severe as that which followed the collapse in value of an asset class as large and as liquid as AAA-rated subprime PMBS.
Mortgage Defaults at Record Rates Created Balance Sheet Losses Chairman Bair also pointed to the relationship between the decline in the value of PMBS and “the balance sheet strength” of financial institutions that held these assets. Adding to liquidity-based losses, balance sheet writedowns were another major element of the loss transmission mechanism. Securitized assets held by financial institutions are subject to the rules of fair value accounting, and must be marked to market under certain circumstances. Thus, banks and other financial institutions that are holding securitized mortgages in the form of PMBS could be subject to large accounting losses—but not necessarily cash losses—if investor sentiment were to turn against securitized mortgages and market values decline. Accordingly, once large numbers of delinquencies and losses started showing up in the mortgage markets generally and in the mortgage pools that backed the PMBS, it was not necessary for all the losses to be realized before the PMBS lost substantial value. All that was necessary was that the market for these assets become seriously impaired. This is exactly what happened in the middle of 2007, leading immediately not only to severe adverse liquidity consequences for financial institutions that held PMBS but also to capital writedowns that made them appear unstable and possibly insolvent. These mark-to-market capital losses could be greater than the actual credit losses to be anticipated. As one Federal Reserve study put it, “The financial turmoil…put downward pressure on prices of structured finance products across the whole spectrum of [asset-backed] securities, even those with only minimal ties to the riskiest underlying assets…[I]n addition to discounts from higher expected credit risk, large mark-to-market discounts are generated by uncertainty about the quality of the underlying assets, by illiquidity, and by price volatility…This illiquidity discount is the main reason why the mark-to-market discount here, and in most similar analyses, is larger than the expected credit default rates on underlying assets.”52 In other words, the illiquidity discount associated with the uncertainties in value of collateral are and can be substantially larger than the credit default spread, since the spread reflects only anticipated credit losses. As shown so dramatically in Figure 3, the collapse of the market for PMBS was a seminal event in the history of the financial crisis. Even though delinquencies had only just begun to show up in mortgage pools, the absence of a functioning 52 Daniel Beltran, Laurie Pounder and Charles Thomas, “Foreign Exposure to Asset-Backed Securities of U.S. Origin,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers 939, August 2008, pp. 11-14.
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market meant that PMBS simply could not be sold at anything but distress prices. The inability of financial institutions to liquidate their PMBS assets at anything like earlier values had dire consequences, especially under mark-to-market accounting rules, and was the crux of the crisis. In effect, a whole class of assets—involving almost $2 trillion—came to be called “toxic assets” in the media, and had to be written down substantially on the balance sheets of financial institutions around the world. Although this made financial institutions look weaker than they actually were, the PMBS they held, despite being unmarketable at that point, were in many cases still flowing cash at close to expected rates. Instead of a slow decline in value— which would have occurred if whole mortgages were held on bank balance sheets and gradually deteriorated in quality—the loss of marketability of these securities caused a crash in value. The Commission majority did not discuss the significance of mark-tomarket accounting in its report. This was a serious lapse, given the views of many that accounting policies played an important role in the financial crisis. Many commentators have argued that the resulting impairment charges to balance sheets reduced the GAAP equity of financial institutions and, therefore, their capital positions, making them appear financially weaker than they actually were if viewed on the basis of the cash flows they were receiving.53 The investor panic that began when unanticipated and unprecedented losses started to appear among NTMs generally and in the PMBS mortgage pools now spread to financial institutions themselves; investors were no longer sure which of these institutions could survive severe mortgage-related losses. This process was succinctly described in an analysis of fair value or mark-to-market accounting in the financial crisis issued by the Institute of International Finance, an organization of the world’s largest banks and financial firms: [O]ften-dramatic write-downs of sound assets required under the current implementation of fair-value accounting adversely affect market sentiment, in turn leading to further write-downs, margin calls and capital impacts in a downward spiral that may lead to large-scale fire-sales of assets, and destabilizing, pro-cyclical feedback effects These damaging feedback effects worsen liquidity problems and contribute to the conversion of liquidity problems into solvency problems.54 [emphasis in the original]
At least one study attempted to assess the effect of this on financial institutions overall. In January 2009, Nouriel Roubini and Elisa Parisi-Capone estimated the mark-to-market losses on MBS backed by both prime loans and NTMs. Their estimate was slightly over $1 trillion, of which U.S. banks and investment banks were estimated to have lost $318 billion on a mark-to-market basis.55 This would be a dramatic loss if all of it were realized. In 2008, the U.S. banking system had total assets of $10 trillion; the five largest investment banks had
53
FCIC Draft Staff Report, “The Role of Accounting During the Financial Crisis,” p.16.
54
Institute of International Finance, “IIF Board of Directors - Discussion Memorandum on Valuation in Illiquid Markets,” April 7, 2008, p.1. 55 Nouriel Roubini and Elisa Parisi-Carbone, “Total $3.6 Trillion Projected Loan and Securities Losses in U.S. $1.8 Trillion of Which Borneby U.S. Banks/Brokers,” RGE Monitor, January 2009, p.8.
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total assets of $4 trillion.56 If we assume that the banks had a leverage ratio of about 15-to-1 in 2008 and the investment banks about 30-to-1, that would mean that the equity capital position of the banking industry as a whole would be about $650 billion and the same number for the investment banks would be about $130 billion, for a total of $780 billion. Under these circumstances, the collapse of the PMBS market alone reduced the capital positions of U.S. banks and investment banks by approximately 41 percent on a mark-to-market basis. This does not mean that any actual losses were suffered, only that the assets concerned might have to be written down or could not be sold for the price at which they were previously carried on the firm’s balance sheet. In addition, Roubini and Parisi-Capone estimated that U.S. commercial and investment banks suffered a further mark-to-market loss of $225 billion on unsecuritized subprime and Alt-A mortgages.57 They also estimated that mark-tomarket losses for financial institutions outside the U.S. would be about 40 percent of U.S. losses, so there was likely to be a major effect on banks and other financial institutions around the world—depending, of course, on their capital position at the time the PMBS market stopped functioning. I am not aware of any data showing the mark-to-market effect of the collapse of the PMBS market on other U.S. financial institutions, but it can be assumed that they also suffered similar losses in proportion to their holdings of PMBS. Losses of this magnitude would certainly be enough—when combined with other losses on securities and loans not related to mortgages—to call into question the stability of a large number of banks, investment banks and other financial institutions in the U.S. and around the world. However, there was one other factor that exacerbated the adverse effect of the loss of a market for PMBS. Although accounting rules did not require all PMBS to be written down, investors and counterparties did not know which financial institutions were holding the weakest assets and how much of their assets would have to be written down over time. Whatever that amount, it would reduce their capital positions at a time when investors and counterparties were anxious about their stability. This was the balance sheet effect that was the third element of Chairman Bair’s summary. To summarize, then, the following are the steps through which the government’s housing policies transmitted losses—through PMBS—to the largest financial institutions: (i) the 19 million NTMs acquired or guaranteed by the Agencies were major contributors to the growth of the bubble and its extension in time; (ii) the growth of the bubble suppressed the losses that would ordinarily have brought the development of NTM-backed PMBS to a halt; (ii) competition for NTMs drove subprime lenders further out the risk curve to find high-yielding mortgages to securitize, especially when these loans did not appear to be producing losses commensurate with their risk; (iv) when the bubble finally burst, the unprecedented number of delinquencies and defaults among all NTMs—the great majority of which were held or guaranteed by the Agencies—caused investors to 56
Timothy F. Geithner, “Reducing Systemic Risk in a Dynamic Financial System,” Remarks at the Economic Club of New York, June 9, 2008, available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/ tfg080609.html.
57 Nouriel Roubini and Elisa Parisi-Carbone, “Total $3.6 Trillion Projected Loan and Securities Losses,” p.7.
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flee the PMBS market, reducing the liquidity of the financial institutions that held the PMBS; and (v) mark-to-market accounting required these institutions to write down the value of the PMBS they held, as well as their other mortgage-related assets, reducing their capital positions and raising further questions about their stability and solvency.
Government Actions Create a Panic More than any other phenomenon, the financial crisis of 2008 resembles an old-fashioned investor and creditor panic. In the classic study, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Charles Kindleberger and Robert Aliber make a distinction between a remote cause and a proximate cause of a panic: “Causa remota of any crisis is the expansion of credit and speculation, while causa proxima is some incident that saps the confidence of the system and induces investors to sell commodities, stocks, real estate, bills of exchange, or promissory notes and increase their money holdings.”58 In the great financial panic of 2008, it is reasonably clear that the remote cause was the build-up of NTMs in the financial system, primarily— as I have shown in this analysis—as a result of government housing policy. This unprecedented increase in weak and risky assets set the financial system up for a crisis of some kind. The event that turned a potential crisis into a full-fledged panic—the proximate cause of the panic—was also the government’s action: the rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 and the subsequent failure to rescue Lehman Brothers six months later. In terms of its ultimate cost to the public, this was one of the great policy errors of all time, and the reasons for the misjudgments that led to it have not yet been fully explored. The lesson taught by the rescue of Bear was that all large financial institutions—and especially those larger than Bear—would be rescued. The moral hazard introduced by this one act irreparably changed the position of Lehman Brothers and every other large firm in the world’s financial system. From that time forward, (i) the critical need for more capital became less critical; the likelihood of a government bailout would reassure creditors, so there was no need to dilute the shareholders any further by raising additional capital; (ii) firms such as Lehman, that might have been saved through an acquisition by a larger firm or an infusion of fresh capital by a strategic investor, drove harder bargains with potential acquirers; (iii) the potential acquirers themselves waited for the U.S. government to pick up some of the cost, as it had with Bear—an offer that never came in Lehman’s case; and (iv) the Reserve Fund, a money market mutual fund, apparently assuming that Lehman would be rescued, decided not to sell the heavily discounted Lehman commercial paper it held; instead, with devastating results for the money market fund industry, it waited to be bailed out on the assumption that Lehman would be saved. But Lehman was not saved, and its creditors were not bailed out. At a time when large mark-to-market losses among U.S. financial firms raised questions about which large financial institutions were insolvent or unstable, the demise of Lehman was a major shock. It overturned all the rational expectations about government 58 Charles P. Kindleberger and Robert Aliber, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, 5th edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005, p.104.
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policies that market participants had developed after the Bear rescue. With no certainty about who was strong or who was weak, there was a headlong rush to U.S. government securities. Banks—afraid that their counterparties would want a return of their investments or their corporate customers would draw on lines of credit—began to hoard cash. Banks wouldn’t lend to other banks, even overnight. As Chairman Bair suggested, that was the financial crisis. Everything after that was simply cleaning up the mess. This analysis lays the principal cause of the financial crisis squarely at the feet of the unprecedented number of NTMs that were brought into the U.S. financial markets by government housing policy. These weak and high risk loans helped to build the bubble, and when the bubble deflated they defaulted in unprecedented numbers. This threatened losses in the PMBS that were held by financial institutions in the U.S. and around the world, impairing both their liquidity and their apparent stability. The accumulation of 27 million subprime and Alt-A mortgages was not a random event, or even the result of major forces such as global financial imbalances or excessively low interest rates. Instead, these loans and the bubble to which they contributed were the direct consequence of something far more mundane: U.S. government housing policy, which—led by HUD over two administrations— deliberately reduced mortgage underwriting standards so that more people could buy homes. While this process was going on, everyone was pleased. Homeownership in the U.S. actually grew to the highest level ever recorded. But the result was a financial catastrophe from which the U.S. has still not recovered.
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Dissenting Statement
III. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN FOSTERING THE GROWTH OF THE NTM MARKET The preceding section of this dissenting statement described the damage that was done to the financial system by the unprecedented number of defaults and delinquencies that occurred among the 27 million NTMs that were present there in 2008. Given the damage they caused, the most important question about the financial crisis is why so many low quality mortgages were created. Another way to state this question is to ask why mortgage standards declined so substantially before and during the 1997-2007 bubble, allowing so many NTMs to be created. This massive and unprecedented change in underwriting standards had to have a cause—some factor that was present during the 1990s and thereafter that was not present in any earlier period. Part III addresses this fundamental question. The conventional explanation for the financial crisis is the one given by Fed Chairman Bernanke in the same speech at Morehouse College quoted at the outset of Part II: Saving inflows from abroad can be beneficial if the country that receives those inflows invests them well. Unfortunately, that was not always the case in the United States and some other countries. Financial institutions reacted to the surplus of available funds by competing aggressively for borrowers, and, in the years leading up to the crisis, credit to both households and businesses became relatively cheap and easy to obtain. One important consequence was a housing boom in the United States, a boom that was fueled in large part by a rapid expansion of mortgage lending. Unfortunately, much of this lending was poorly done, involving, for example, little or no down payment by the borrower or insufficient consideration by the lender of the borrower’s ability to make the monthly payments. Lenders may have become careless because they, like many people at the time, expected that house prices would continue to rise--thereby allowing borrowers to build up equity in their homes--and that credit would remain easily available, so that borrowers would be able to refinance if necessary. Regulators did not do enough to prevent poor lending, in part because many of the worst loans were made by firms subject to little or no federal regulation. [Emphasis supplied]59
In other words, the liquidity in the world financial market caused U.S. banks to compete for borrowers by lowering their underwriting standards for mortgages and other loans. Lenders became careless. Regulators failed. Unregulated originators made bad loans. One has to ask: is it plausible that banks would compete for borrowers by lowering their mortgage standards? Mortgage originators—whether S&Ls, commercial banks, mortgage banks or unregulated brokers—have been competing for 100 years. That competition involved offering the lowest rates and the most benefits to potential borrowers. It did not, however, generally result in 59
Speech at Morehead College April 14, 2009.
485
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Dissenting Statement
or involve the weakening of underwriting standards. Those standards—what made up the traditional U.S. mortgage—were generally 15 or 30 year amortizing loans to homebuyers who could provide a downpayment of at least 10-to-20 percent and had good credit records, jobs and steady incomes. Because of its inherent quality, this loan was known as a prime mortgage. There were subprime loans and subprime lenders, but in the early 1990s subprime lenders were generally niche players that made loans to people who could not get traditional mortgage loans; the number of loans they generated was relatively small and bore higher than normal interest rates to compensate for the risks of default. In addition, mortgage bankers and others relied on FHA insurance for loans with low downpayments, impaired credit and high debt ratios. Until the 1990s, these NTMs were never more than a fraction of the total number of mortgages outstanding. The reason that low underwriting standards were not generally used is simple. Low standards would result in large losses when these mortgages defaulted, and very few lenders wanted to hold such mortgages. In addition, Fannie and Freddie were the buyers for most middle class mortgages in the United States, and they were conservative in their approach. Unless an originator made a traditional mortgage it was unlikely that Fannie or Freddie or another secondary market buyer could be found for it. This is common sense. If you produce an inferior product—whether it’s a household cleaner, an automobile, or a loan—people soon recognize the lack of quality and you are out of business. This was not the experience with mortgages, which became weaker and riskier as the 1990s and 2000s progressed. Why did this happen? In its report, the Commission majority seemed to assume that originators of mortgages controlled the quality of mortgages. Much is made in the majority’s report of the so-called “originate to distribute” idea, where an originator is not supposed to care about the quality of the mortgages because they would eventually be sold off. The originator, it is said, has no “skin in the game.” The motivation for making poor quality mortgages in this telling is to earn fees, not only on the origination but in each of the subsequent steps in the securitization process. This theory turns the mortgage market upside down. Mortgage originators could make all the low quality mortgages they wanted, but they wouldn’t earn a dime unless there was a buyer. The real question, then, is why there were buyers for inferior mortgages and this, as it turns out, is the same as asking why mortgage underwriting standards, beginning in the early 1990s, deteriorated so badly. As Professor Raghuram Rajan notes in Fault Lines, “[A]s brokers came to know that someone out there was willing to buy subprime mortgage-backed securities without asking too many questions, they rushed to originate loans without checking the borrowers’ creditworthiness, and credit quality deteriorated. But for a while, the problems were hidden by growing house prices and low defaults—easy credit masked the problems caused by easy credit—until house prices stopped rising and the flood of defaults burst forth.”60 Who were these buyers? Table 1, reporting the number of NTMs outstanding on June 30, 2008, identified government agencies and private organizations required by the government to acquire, hold or securitize NTMs as responsible for two-thirds 60
Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines, p.44.
Peter J. Wallison
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of these mortgages, about 19 million. The table also identifies the private sector as the securitizer of the remaining one-third, about 7.8 million loans. In other words, if we are looking for the buyer of the NTMs that were being created by originators at the local level, the government’s policies would seem to be the most likely culprit. The private sector certainly played a role, but it was a subordinate one. Moreover, what the private sector did was respond to demand—that’s what the private sector does—but the government’s role involved deliberate policy, an entirely different matter. Of its own volition, it created a demand that would not otherwise have been there. The deterioration in mortgage standards did not occur—contrary to the Commission majority’s apparent view—because banks and other originators suddenly started to make deficient loans; nor was it because of insufficient regulation at the originator level. The record shows unambiguously that government regulations made FHA, Fannie and Freddie, mortgage banks and insured banks of all kinds into competing buyers. All of them needed NTMs in order to meet various government requirements. Fannie and Freddie were subject to increasingly stringent affordable housing requirements; FHA was tasked with insuring loans to low-income borrowers that would not be made unless insured; banks and S&Ls were required by CRA to show that they were also making loans to the same group of borrowers; mortgage bankers who signed up for the HUD Best Practices Initiative and the Clinton administration’s National Homeownership Strategy were required to make the same kind of loans. Profit had nothing to do with the motivations of these firms; they were responding to government direction. Under these circumstances, it should be no surprise that underwriting standards declined, as all of these organizations scrambled to acquire the same low quality mortgages.
1. HUD’s Central Role In testimony before the House Financial Services Committee on April 14, 2010, Shaun Donovan, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, said in reference to the GSEs: “Seeing their market share decline [between 2004 and 2006] as a result of [a] change of demand, the GSEs made the decision to widen their focus from safer prime loans and begin chasing the non-prime market, loosening longstanding underwriting and risk management standards along the way. This would be a fateful decision that not only proved disastrous for the companies themselves –but ultimately also for the American taxpayer.” Earlier, in a “Report to Congress on the Root Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis,” in January 2010, HUD declared “The serious financial troubles of the GSEs that led to their being placed into conservatorship by the Federal government provides strong testament to the fact that the GSEs were, indeed, overexposed to unduly risky mortgage investments. However, the evidence suggests that the GSEs’ decisions to purchase or guarantee non-prime loans was motivated much more by efforts to chase market share and profits than by the need to satisfy federal regulators.” 61 [emphasis supplied] Finger-pointing in Washington is endemic when problems occur, and 61
Report to Congress on the Root Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis , January 2010, p.xii, http://www. huduser.org/portal/publications/hsgfin/foreclosure_09.html.
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Dissenting Statement
agencies and individuals are constantly trying to find scapegoats for their own bad decisions, but HUD’s effort to blame Fannie and Freddie for the decline in underwriting standards sets a new standard for running from responsibility. Contrast the 2010 statement quoted above with this statement by HUD in 2000, when it was significantly increasing Fannie and Freddie’s affordable housing goals: Lower-income and minority families have made major gains in access to the mortgage market in the 1990s. A variety of reasons have accounted for these gains, including improved housing affordability, enhanced enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, more flexible mortgage underwriting, and stepped-up enforcement of the Fair Housing Act. But most industry observers believe that one factor behind these gains has been the improved performance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under HUD’s affordable lending goals. HUD’s recent increases in the goals for 2001-03 will encourage the GSEs to further step up their support for affordable lending.62 [emphasis supplied]
Or this statement in 2004, when HUD was again increasing the affordable housing goals for Fannie and Freddie: Millions of Americans with less than perfect credit or who cannot meet some of the tougher underwriting requirements of the prime market for reasons such as inadequate income documentation, limited downpayment or cash reserves, or the desire to take more cash out in a refinancing than conventional loans allow, rely on subprime lenders for access to mortgage financing. If the GSEs reach deeper into the subprime market, more borrowers will benefit from the advantages that greater stability and standardization create.63[emphasis supplied]
Or, finally, this statement in a 2005 report commissioned by HUD: More liberal mortgage financing has contributed to the increase in demand for housing. During the 1990s, lenders have been encouraged by HUD and banking regulators to increase lending to low-income and minority households. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) housing goals and fair lending laws have strongly encouraged mortgage brokers and lenders to market to low-income and minority borrowers. Sometimes these borrowers are higher risk, with blemished credit histories and high debt or simply little savings for a down payment. Lenders have responded with low down payment loan products and automated underwriting, which has allowed them to more carefully determine the risk of the loan.64 [emphasis supplied]
Despite the recent effort by HUD to deny its own role in fostering the growth of subprime and other high risk mortgage lending, there is strong—indeed irrefutable—evidence that, beginning in the early 1990s, HUD led an ultimately successful effort to lower underwriting standards in every area of the mortgage market where HUD had or could obtain influence. With support in congressional legislation, the policy was launched in the Clinton administration and extended almost to the end of the Bush administration. It involved FHA, which was under the direct control of HUD; Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were subject to HUD’s affordable housing regulations; and the mortgage banking industry, which— while not subject to HUD’s legal jurisdiction—apparently agreed to pursue HUD’s 62
Issue Brief: HUD’s Affordable Housing Goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, p.5.
63
Final Rule, http://fdsys.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2004-11-02/pdf/04-24101.pdf.
64
HUD PDR, May 2005, HUD Contract C-OPC-21895, Task Order CHI-T0007, “Recent House Price Trends and Homeownership Affordability”, p.85.
Peter J. Wallison
489
policies out of fear that they would be brought under the Community Reinvestment Act through legislation.65 In addition, although not subject to HUD’s jurisdiction, the new tighter CRA regulations that became effective in 1995 led to a process in which community groups could obtain commitments for substantial amounts of CRA-qualifying mortgages and other loans to subprime borrowers when banks were applying for merger approvals.66 By 2004, HUD believed it had achieved the “revolution” it was looking for: Over the past ten years, there has been a ‘revolution in affordable lending’ that has extended homeownership opportunities to historically underserved households. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been a substantial part of this ‘revolution in affordable lending’. During the mid-to-late 1990s, they added flexibility to their underwriting guidelines, introduced new low-downpayment products, and worked to expand the use of automated underwriting in evaluating the creditworthiness of loan applicants. HMDA data suggest that the industry and GSE initiatives are increasing the flow of credit to underserved borrowers. Between 1993 and 2003, conventional loans to low income and minority families increased at much faster rates than loans to upper-income and nonminority families.67[emphasis supplied]
This turned out to be an immense error of policy. By 2010, even the strongest supporters of affordable housing as enforced by HUD had recognized their error. In an interview on Larry Kudlow’s CNBC television program in late August, Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass.)—the chair of the House Financial Services Committee and previously the strongest congressional advocate for affordable housing—conceded that he had erred: “I hope by next year we’ll have abolished Fannie and Freddie . . . it was a great mistake to push lower-income people into housing they couldn’t afford and couldn’t really handle once they had it.” He then added, “I had been too sanguine about Fannie and Freddie.”68
2. The Decline of Mortgage Underwriting Standards Before the enactment of the GSE Act in 1992, and HUD’s adoption of a policy thereafter to reduce underwriting standards, the GSEs followed conservative underwriting practices. For example, in a random review by Fannie Mae of 25,804 loans from October 1988 to January 1992, over 78 percent had LTV ratios of 80 percent or less, while only 5.75 percent had LTV ratios of 91 to 95 percent.69 High risk lending was confined primarily to FHA (which was controlled by HUD) and specialized subprime lenders who often sold the mortgages they originated to FHA. What caused these conservative standards to decline? The Commission majority, 65 Steve Cocheo, “Fair-lending pressure builds,” ABA Banking Journal, vol. 86, 1994, http://www.questia. com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5001707340. 66
See NCRC, CRA Commitments, 2007.
67
Federal Register,vol. 69, No. 211, November 2, 2004, Rules and Regulations, p.63585, http://fdsys.gpo. gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2004-11-02/pdf/04-24101.pdf .
68
Larry Kudlow, “Barney Frank Comes Home to the Facts,” GOPUSA, August 23, 2010, available at www.gopusa.com/commentary/2010/08/kudlow-barney-frank-comes-home-to-the-facts.php#ixz z0zdCrWpCY (accessed September 20, 2010). 69
Document in author’s files.
490
Dissenting Statement
echoing Chairman Bernanke, seems to believe that the impetus was competition among the banks, irresponsibility among originators, and the desire for profit. The majority’s report offers no other explanation. However, there is no difficulty finding the source of the reductions in mortgage underwriting standards for Fannie and Freddie, or for the originators for whom they were the buyers. HUD made clear in numerous statements that its policy—in order to make credit available to low-income borrowers—was specifically intended to reduce underwriting standards. The GSE Act enabled HUD to put Fannie and Freddie into competition with FHA, and vice versa, creating what became a contest to lower mortgage standards. As the Fannie Mae Foundation noted in a 2000 report, “FHA loans constituted the largest share of Countrywide’s [subprime lending] activity, until Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began accepting loans with higher LTVs [loan-to-value ratios] and greater underwriting flexibilities.”70 Under the GSE Act, the HUD Secretary was authorized to establish affordable housing goals for Fannie and Freddie. Congress required that these goals include a low and moderate income goal and a special affordable goal (discussed below), both of which could be adjusted in the future. Among the factors the secretary was to consider in establishing the goals were national housing needs and “the ability of the enterprises [Fannie and Freddie] to lead the industry in making mortgage credit available for low-and moderate-income families.” The Act also established an interim affordable housing goal of 30 percent for the two-year period beginning January 1, 1993. Under this requirement, 30 percent of the GSEs’ mortgage purchases had to be affordable housing loans, defined as loans to borrowers at or below the AMI.71 Further, the Act established a “special affordable” goal to meet the “unaddressed needs of, and affordable to, low-income families in low-income areas and very low-income families.” This category was defined as follows: “(i) 45 percent shall be mortgages of low-income families who live in census tracts in which the median income does not exceed 80 percent of the area median income; and (ii) 55 percent shall be mortgages of very low income families,” which were later defined as 60 percent of AMI.72 Although the GSE Act initially required that the GSEs spend on special affordable mortgages “not less than 1 percent of the dollar amount of the mortgage purchases by the [GSEs] for the previous year,” HUD raised this requirement substantially in later years. Ultimately, it became the most difficult affordable housing AH burden for Fannie and Freddie to meet. Finally, the GSEs were directed to: “(A) assist primary lenders to make housing credit available in areas with low-income and minority families; and (B) assist insured depository institutions to meet their obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977.”73 There will be more on the CRA and its effect on the quality of mortgages later in this section. Congress also made clear in the act that its intention was to call into question the high quality underwriting guidelines of the time. It did so by directing Fannie and Freddie to “examine— 70
Fannie Mae Foundation, “Making New Markets: Case Study of Countrywide Home Loans,” 2000, http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/programs/pdf/rep_newmortmkts_countrywide.pdf. 71
GSE Act, Section 1332.
72
Id., Section 1333.
73
Id., Section 1335.
Peter J. Wallison
491
(1) The extent to which the underwriting guidelines prevent or inhibit the purchase or securitization of mortgages for houses in mixed-use, urban center, and predominantly minority neighborhoods and for housing for low-and moderateincome families; (2) The standards employed by private mortgage insurers and the extent to which such standards inhibit the purchase and securitization by the enterprises of mortgages described in paragraph (1); and (3) The implications of implementing underwriting standards that— (A) establish a downpayment requirement for mortgagors of 5 percent or less; (B) allow the use of cash on hand as a source of downpayments; and (C) approve borrowers who have a credit history of delinquencies if the borrower can demonstrate a satisfactory credit history for at least the 12-month period ending on the date of the application for the mortgage.”74
I could not find a record of reports by Fannie and Freddie required under this section of the act, but it would have been fairly clear to both companies, and to HUD, what Congress wanted in asking for these studies. Prevailing underwriting standards were inhibiting mortgage financing for low and moderate income (LMI) families, and would have to be substantially relaxed in order to meet the goals of the Act. Whatever the motivation, HUD set out to assure that downpayment requirements were substantially reduced (eventually they reached zero) and past credit history became a much less important issue when mortgages were made (permitting subprime mortgages to become far more common). Until 1995, HUD enforced the temporary AH goals originally put in place by the GSE Act. With the exception of the special affordable requirements, which were small at this point, these goals were not burdensome. In the ordinary course of their business, the GSEs seem to have bought enough mortgages made to borrowers below the AMI to qualify for the 30 percent AH goal. In 1995, however, HUD raised the LMI goal to 40 percent, applicable to 1996, and to 42 percent for subsequent years. In terms of its effect on Fannie and Freddie, HUD’s most important move at this time was to set a Special Affordable goal (low and very low income borrowers) of 12 percent, which increased to 14 percent in 1997. Efforts to find loans to low or very low income borrowers (80 percent and 60 percent of AMI, respectively) that did not involve high risks would prove difficult. As early as November 1995, even before the effect of these new and higher goals, Fannie’s staff had already recognized that Fannie’s Community Homebuyer Program (CHBP), which featured a 97 percent loan-to-value (LTV) ratio—i.e., 3 percent downpayment75—was showing significant rates of serious delinquency that exceeded Fannie’s expected rates by 26percent in origination year 1992, 93 percent in 1993 and 57 percent in 1994.76 In 1995, continuing its efforts to erode underwriting standards in order to increase homeownership, HUD issued a policy statement entitled “The National Homeownership Strategy: Partners in the American Dream.” The Strategy was prepared by HUD, “under the direction of Secretary Henry G. Cisneros, in response 74
Id., Section 1354(a).
75
Fannie Mae, “Opening Doors with Fannie Mae’s Community Lending Products,” 1995, p.3.
76
Fannie Mae, Memo from Credit Policy Staff to Credit Policy Committee, “CHBP Performance,” November 14, 1995, p.1.
492
Dissenting Statement
to a request from President Clinton.”77 The first paragraph of Chapter 1 stated: “The purpose of the National Homeownership Strategy is to achieve an all-time high level of homeownership in America within the next 6 years through an unprecedented collaboration of public and private housing industry organizations.” The Strategy paper then noted that “industry representatives agreed to the formation of working groups to help develop the National Homeownership Strategy” and made clear that one of its purposes was to increase homeownership by reducing downpayments: “Lending institutions, secondary market investors, mortgage insurers, and other members of the partnership should work collaboratively to reduce homebuyer downpayment requirements. Mortgage financing with high loan-to-value ratios should generally be associated with enhanced homebuyer counseling and, where available, supplemental sources of downpayment assistance.”78 According to a HUD summary, the purpose of the Strategy was to make financing “more available, affordable, and flexible.”79 [emphasis supplied] It continued: The inability (either real or perceived) of many younger families to qualify for a mortgage is widely recognized as a very serious barrier to homeownership. The National Homeownership Strategy commits both government and the mortgage industry to a number of initiatives designed to: Cut transaction costs through streamlined regulations and technological and procedural efficiencies. Reduce downpayment requirements and interest costs by making terms more flexible, providing subsidies to low- and moderate-income families, and creating incentives to save for homeownership. Increase the availability of alternative financing products in housing markets throughout the country.80 [emphasis supplied]
Reductions in downpayments, the area on which HUD particularly concentrated in pursuing its AH goals and the National Homeownership Strategy, are especially important in weakening underwriting standards. Table 4, below, based on a large sample of loans from the 1990s, shows the risk relationships between downpayments and mortgage risks. It is particularly instructive to note that when low downpayments (i.e., high LTVs) are combined with low FICO scores (subprime loans) the expected delinquencies and defaults are multiplied several fold. For example, when a loan with a FICO score below 620 is combined with a downpayment of five percent, the risk of default is 4.2 times greater than it would be if the downpayment were 25 percent.
77 HUD, “The National Homeownership Strategy: Partners in the American Dream,” available at http:// web.archive.org/web/20010106203500/www.huduser.org/publications/affhsg/homeown/chap1.html. 78
Id., Chapter 4, Action 35.
79
The term “flexible” has a special meaning when HUD uses it. See note 8 supra.
80
HUD, Urban Policy Brief No.2, August 1995, available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/txt/ hdbrf2.txt.
493
Peter J. Wallison Table 4.81 High LTVs enhance the risk of low FICO scores
Row 1
Column 1 FICO Score
Column 2 ≤ 70% LTV
Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 71-80% LTV 81-90% LTV 91-95% LTV Relation of Column 5 to Column 3
Row 2
< 620
1.0
4.8
11
20
4.2 times
Row 3 Row 4
620-679 680-720
0.5 0.2
2.3 1.0
5.3 2.3
9.4 4.1
4.1 times 4.1 times
Row 5
> 720
0.1
0.4
0.9
1.6
4 times
Despite these obvious dangers, HUD saw the erosion of downpayment requirements imposed by the private sector as one of the keys to the success of its strategy to increase home ownership through the “partnership” it had established with the mortgage financing community: “The amount of borrower equity is an important factor in assessing mortgage loan quality. However, many low-income families do not have access to sufficient funds for a downpayment. While members of the partnership have already made significant strides in reducing this barrier to home purchase, more must be done. In 1989 only 7 percent of home mortgages were made with less than 10 percent downpayment. By August 1994, low downpayment mortgage loans had increased to 29 percent.”82 [emphasis supplied] HUD’s policy was highly successful in achieving the goals it sought. In 1989, only one in 230 homebuyers bought a home with a downpayment of 3 percent or less, but by 2003 one in seven buyers was providing a downpayment at that level, and by 2007 the number was less than one in three. The gradual increase in LTVs and CLTVs (first and second loans combined to produce a lower downpayment) under HUD’s policies is shown in Figure 4. Note the date (1992) when HUD began to have some influence over the downpayments that the GSEs would accept. That HUD’s AH goals were the reason Fannie increased its high LTV (low downpayment) lending is clearly described in a Fannie presentation to HUD assistant secretary Albert Trevino on January 10, 2003: “Analyses of the market demonstrate the greatest barrier to home ownership for most renters are related to wealth—the lack of money for a downpayment…our low-downpayment lending— negligible until 1994—has grown considerably. It is a key part of our strategy to serve low-income and minority borrowers.” The figure that accompanied that statement showed that Fannie’s home purchase loans over 95 percent LTV had increased from one percent in 1994 to 7.9 percent in 2001.83
81
“Deconstructing the Subprime Debacle Using New Indices of Underwriting Quality and Economic Conditions: A First Look,” by Anderson, Capozza, and Van Order, found at http://www.ufanet.com/ DeconstructingSubprimeJuly2008.pdf. 82
HUD’s “National Homeownership Strategy – Partners in the American Dream,” http://web.archive. org/web/20010106203500/www.huduser.org/publications/affhsg/homeown/chap1.html. 83
”Fannie Mae’s Role in Affordable Housing Finance: Connecting World Capital Markets and America’s Homebuyers,” Presentation to HUD Assistant Secretary Albert Trevino, January 10, 2003.
494
Dissenting Statement Figure 4. Estimated Percentage of Home Purchase Volume with an LTV or CLTV >=97% (Includes FHA and Conventional Loans*) and Combined Foreclosure Start Rate for Conventional and Government Loans
*Fannie‘s percentage of home purchase loans with an LTV or CLTV >=97% used as the proxy for conventional loans. Sources: FHA 2009 Actuarial Study, and HUD”s Office of Policy Development and Research - Profiles of GSE Mortgage Purchases in 1999 and 2000, in 2001-2004, and in 2005-2007, and Fannie’s 2007 10-K. Compiled by Edward Pinto.
The close relationship between low downpayments and delinquencies and defaults on mortgages is shown in Figure 5, which compares the increase in FHA 97 percent (or greater) CLTV or LTV mortgages to the increase in the foreclosure start rate on all loans published by the Mortgage Bankers Association. Figure 5. Relationship between low downpayments and delinquencies or defaults on mortgages
Sources: MBA National Delinquency Survey, FHA 2009 Actuarial Study, and HUD’s Office of Policy Development and Research - Profiles of GSE Mortgage Purchases in 1999 and 2000, in 2001-2004, and in 2005-2007, SMR’s “Piggyback Mortgage Lending,” and Fannie’s 2007 10-K. Fannie is used as the proxy on the conventional market. Compiled by Edward Pinto.
Peter J. Wallison
495
In 1995, HUD also ruled that Fannie and Freddie could get AH credit for buying PMBS that were backed by loans to low-income borrowers.84 This provided an opportunity for subprime lenders to create pools of subprime mortgages that were likely to be AH goals-rich. These were then sold through Wall Street underwriters to Fannie and Freddie, which became the largest buyers of these high risk PMBS between 2002 and 2005.85 These PMBS pools were not bought for profit. As Adolfo Marzol, Fannie’s Chief Credit Officer, noted to Fannie CEO Dan Mudd in a 2005 memorandum, “large 2004 private label [PMBS] volumes were necessary to achieve challenging minority lending goals and housing goals.”86 There is a strong possibility that by creating a market for PMBS backed by NTMs Fannie and Freddie enabled Wall Street—which had previously focused on securitizing prime jumbo loans—to get its start in developing an underwriting business in PMBS based on NTMs. HUD pursued these policies throughout the balance of the Clinton administration and into the administration of George W. Bush. Ultimately, they would lead to the mortgage meltdown in 2007, as vast numbers of mortgages with low or no downpayments and other non-traditional features suffused the financial system. But in June, 1995, the dangers in HUD’s policies were not recognized. As President Clinton said in a 1995 speech, “Our homeownership strategy will not cost the taxpayers one extra red cent. It will not require legislation. It will not add more federal programs or grow the Federal bureaucracy.”87 The lesson here is that the government can accomplish a lot of its goals without growing, as long as it has the power to enlist the private sector. That does not mean, however, as we have all now learned, that the taxpayers will not ultimately be faced with the costs. The next significant move in the AH goals was made under HUD Secretary Andrew Cuomo, and it was a major step. On July 29, 1999, HUD issued a press release with the heading “Cuomo Announces Action to Provide $2.4 trillion in Mortgages for Affordable Housing for 28.1 Million Families.”88 The release began: “Housing and Urban Development Secretary Andrew Cuomo today announced a policy to require the nation’s two largest housing finance companies to buy $2.4 trillion in mortgages over the next 10 years to provide affordable housing for about 28.1 million low-and moderate-income families.” This was followed by a quote from President Clinton to emphasize the importance of the initiative: “During the last six and a half years, my Administration has put tremendous emphasis on promoting homeownership and making housing more affordable for all Americans…Today, the homeownership rate is at an all-time high, with more than 66 percent of all American families owning their homes. Today, we take another significant step.” The release then pointed out that the AH goals would be substantially raised and that “[u]nder the higher goals, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will buy an additional $488.3 billion in mortgages that will be used to provide affordable housing for 7 million more low-and moderate-income families over the next 10 years. Those new mortgages and families are over and above the $1.9 trillion in mortgages for 84
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/09/AR2008060902626.html.
85
See Footnote 32.
86
Fannie Mae, internal memo, Adolfo Marzol to Dan Mudd, “RE: Private Label Securities,” March 2, 2005. 87
William J. Clinton, Remarks on the National Homeownership Strategy, June 5, 1995.
88
HUD Press Release, HUD No. 99-131, July 29, 1999.
496
Dissenting Statement
21.1 million families that would have been generated if the current goals had been retained.” The release also noted that “Fannie Mae Chairman Franklin D. Raines joined Cuomo at the news conference in which Cuomo announced the HUD action. Raines committed Fannie Mae to reaching HUD’s increased Affordable Housing goals.” The policy behind this substantial increase in the AH goals was expressed in HUD’s discussion of the rule-making: “To fulfill the intent of [the GSE Act], the GSEs should lead the industry in ensuring that access to mortgage credit is made available for very low-, low- and moderate-income families and residents of underserved areas. HUD recognizes that, to lead the mortgage industry over time, the GSEs will have to stretch to reach certain goals and close the gap between the secondary mortgage market and the primary mortgage market. This approach is consistent with Congress’ recognition that ‘the enterprises will need to stretch their efforts to achieve’ the goals.”89 [emphasis supplied] The new AH goals announced in 1999 were not finally issued until October 2000. Their specifics were stunning and drove Fannie and Freddie into a new and far more challenging era. The basic goal, an LMI requirement of 42 percent, was raised to 50 percent, and the special affordable goal was raised from 14 percent to 20 percent. As a result, 75 percent of the increase in goals was concentrated in the lowand very-low income category—where the risks were the greatest. A HUD memo summarized the new rules:90 For each year from 2001 through 2003, the goals are: • Low- and moderate-income goal. At least 50 percent of the dwelling units financed by each GSE’s mortgage purchases should be for families with incomes no greater than area median income (AMI), defined as median income for the metropolitan area or nonmetropolitan county. The corresponding goal was 42 percent for 1997-2000. • Special affordable goal. At least 20 percent of the dwelling units financed by each GSE’s mortgage purchases should be for very low-income families (those with incomes no greater than 60 percent of AMI) or for low-income families (those with incomes no greater than 80 percent of LMI) in low-income areas. The corresponding goal was 14 percent for 1997-2000. • Underserved areas goal. At least 31 percent of the dwelling units financed by each GSE’s mortgage purchases should be for units located in underserved areas. Research by HUD and others has demonstrated that low-income and high-minority census tracts have high mortgage denial rates and low mortgage origination rates, and this forms the basis for HUD’s definition of underserved areas. The corresponding goal was 24 percent for 1997-2000.
HUD’s new and more stringent AH goal requirements immediately stimulated strong interest at the GSEs for CRA loans, substantial portions of which were likely to be goals-qualifying. This is evident in a speech by Fannie’s Vice Chair, Jamie Gorelick, to an American Bankers Association conference on October 30,
89 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2000_register&docid=page+6504365092. 90
HUD, Office of Policy Development and Research, Issue Brief No. 5, January 2001, p.3.
Peter J. Wallison
497
2000, just after HUD announced the latest increase in the AH goals for the GSEs: Your CRA business is very important to us. Since 1997, we have done nearly $7 billion in specially targeted CRA business—all with depositories like yours. But that is just the beginning. Before the decade is over, Fannie Mae is committed to finance over $20 billion in specially targeted CRA business and over $500 billion in CRA business altogether… We want your CRA loans because they help us meet our housing goals… We will buy them from your portfolios, or package them into securities… We will also purchase CRA mortgages you make right at the point of origination... You can originate CRA loans for our purchase with one of our CRA-friendly products, like our 3 percent down Fannie 97. Or we have special community lending products with flexible underwriting and special financing… Our approach is “CRA your way”.91
The 50 percent level in the new HUD regulations was a turning point. Fannie and Freddie had to stretch a bit to reach the previous goal of 42 percent, but 50 percent was a significant challenge. As Dan Mudd told the Commission, Fannie Mae’s mission regulator, HUD, imposed ever-higher housing goals that were very difficult to meet during my tenure as CEO [2005-2008]. The HUD goals greatly impacted Fannie Mae’s business, as a great deal of time, resources, energy, and personnel were dedicated to finding ways to meet these goals. HUD increased the goals aggressively over time to the point where they exceeded the 50% mark, requiring Fannie Mae to place greater emphasis on purchasing loans to underserved areas. Fannie Mae had to devote a great deal of resources to running its business to satisfy HUD’s goals and subgoals.92
Mudd’s point can be illustrated with simple arithmetic. At the 50 percent level, for every mortgage acquired that was not goal-qualifying, Fannie and Freddie had to acquire a goal-qualifying loan. Although about 30 percent of prime loans were likely to be goal-qualifying in any event (because they were made to borrowers at or below the applicable AMI), most prime loans were not. Subprime and other NTM loans were goals-rich, but not every such loan was goal-qualifying. Accordingly, in order to meet a 50 percent goal, the GSEs had to purchase ever larger amounts of goals-rich NTMs in order to acquire sufficient quantities of goals-qualifying loans. Thus, in a presentation to HUD in 2004, Fannie argued that to meet a 57 percent LMI goal (which was under consideration by HUD at the time) it would have to acquire 151.5 percent more subprime loans than the goal in order to capture enough goal-qualifying loans.93 Moreover, with the special affordable category at 20 percent in 2004, the GSEs had to acquire large numbers of NTM loans from borrowers who were at or below 60 percent of the AMI. This requirement drove Fannie and Freddie even further into risk territory in search of loans that would meet this subgoal. 91 Jamie S. Gorelick, Remarks at American Bankers Association conference, October 30, 2000. http:// web.archive.org/web/20011120061407/www.fanniemae.com/news/speeches/speech_152.html. 92
Daniel H. Mudd’s Responses to the Questions Presented in the FCIC’s June 3, 2010, letter, Answer to Question 6: How influential were HUD’s affordable housing guidelines in Fannie Mae’s purchase of subprime and Alt-A loans? Were Alt-A loans “goals-rich”? Were Alt-A loans net positive for housing goals? 93
Fannie Mae, “Discussion of HUD’s Proposed Housing Goals,” Presentation to the Department of Housing and Urban development, June 9, 2004.
498
Dissenting Statement
Most of what was going on here was under the radar, even for specialists in the housing finance field, but not everyone missed it. In a paper published in 2001,94 financial analyst Josh Rosner recognized the deterioration in mortgage standards although he did not recognize how many loans were subject to this problem: Over the past decade Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have reduced required down payments on loans that they purchase in the secondary market. Those requirements have declined from 10% to 5% to 3% and in the past few months Fannie Mae announced that it would follow Freddie Mac’s recent move into the 0% down payment mortgage market. Although they are buying low down payment loans, those loans must be insured with ‘private mortgage insurance’ (PMI). On homes with PMI, even the closing costs can now be borrowed through unsecured loans, gifts or subsidies. This means that not only can the buyer put zero dollars down to purchase a new house but also that the mortgage can finance the closing costs…. [I]t appears a large portion of the housing sector’s growth in the 1990’s came from the easing of the credit underwriting process….The virtuous cycle of increasing homeownership due to greater leverage has the potential to become a vicious cycle of lower home prices due to an accelerating rate of foreclosures.95[emphasis supplied]
The last increase in the AH goals occurred in 2004, when HUD raised the LMI goal to 52 percent for 2005, 53 percent for 2006, 55 percent for 2007 and 56 percent for 2008. Again, the percentage increases in the special affordable category outstripped the general LMI goal, putting added pressure on Fannie and Freddie to acquire additional risky NTMs. This category increased from 20 percent to 27 percent over the period. In the release that accompanied the increases, HUD declared: Millions of Americans with less than perfect credit or who cannot meet some of the tougher underwriting requirements of the prime market for reasons such as inadequate income documentation, limited downpayment or cash reserves, or the desire to take more cash out in a refinancing than conventional loans allow, rely on subprime lenders for access to mortgage financing. If the GSEs reach deeper into the subprime market, more borrowers will benefit from the advantages that greater stability and standardization create.96 [emphasis supplied]
Fannie did indeed reach deeper into the subprime market, confirming in a March 2003 presentation to HUD, “Higher goals force us deeper into FHA and subprime.”97According to HUD data, as a result of the AH goals Fannie Mae’s acquisitions of goal-qualifying loans (which were primarily subprime and Alt-A) increased (i) for very low income borrowers from 5.2 percent of their acquisitions in 1993 to 12.2 percent in 2007; (ii) for special affordable borrowers from 6.4 percent in 1993 to 15.2 percent in 2007; and (iii) for less than median income borrowers (which includes the other two categories) from 29.2 percent in 1993 to 41.5 percent in 2007.98 94 Josh Rosner, “Housing in the New Millennium: A Home Without Equity is Just a Rental With Debt,” June, 2001, p.7, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1162456. 95
Id., p.29.
96
http://fdsys.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2004-11-02/pdf/04-24101.pdf, p.63601.
97
Fannie Mae, “The HUD Housing Goals”, March 2003.
98
HUD, Office of Policy Development and Research, Profiles of GSE Mortgage Purchases, 1992-2000, 2001-2004, and 2005-2007.
Peter J. Wallison
499
By 2004, Fannie and Freddie were sufficiently in need of subprime loans to meet the AH goals that their CEOs, as the following account shows, went to a meeting of mortgage bankers to ask for more subprime loan production: The top executives of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae [Richard Syron and Franklin Raines] made no bones about their interest in buying loans made to borrowers formerly considered the province of nonprime and other niche lenders. …Fannie Mae Chairman and [CEO] Franklin Raines told mortgage bankers in San Francisco that his company’s lender-customers ‘need to learn the best from the subprime market and bring the best from the prime market into [the subprime market].’ He offered praise for nonprime lenders that, he said, ‘are some of the best marketers in financial services.’… We have to push products and opportunities to people who have lesser credit quality,” he said.99 [emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, by 2004, when HUD put new and tougher AH goals into effect, Fannie and Freddie were using every available resource to meet the goals, including subprime loans, Alt-A loans and the purchase of PMBS. Some observers, including the Commission’s majority, have claimed that the GSEs bought NTM loans and PMBS for profit—that these instruments did not assist Fannie and Freddie in meeting the AH goals and therefore must have been acquired because they were profitable. However, the statement by Adolfo Marzol reported above, and the data in Table 5 furnished to the Commission by Fannie Mae shows that all three categories of NTMs—subprime loans (i.e., loans to borrowers with FICO scores less than 660), Alt-A loans and PMBS (called PLS for “Private Label Securities” in the table)— fulfilled the AH goals or subgoals for the years and in the percentages shown below. (Bolded numbers exceeded the applicable goal.) Table 5 also shows, significantly, that the gradual increase in Fannie’s purchases of these NTMs closely followed the gradual increase in the goals between 1996 and 2008.
99 Neil Morse, “Looking for New Customers,” Mortgage Banking, December 1, 2004. It may be significant that the chairman of Freddie Mac at the time, Leland Brendsel, did not attend the 2000 press conference or pledge support for HUD’s new goals. Raines must have forgotten his 1999 pledge to Secretary Cuomo and his speech to the mortgage bankers when he wrote in a letter to The Wall Street Journal on August 3, 2010: “The facts about the financial collapse of Fannie and Freddie are pretty clear and a matter of public record. The company managers, their regulator and the Treasury have all said that the losses which crippled the companies were caused by the purchase of loans with lower credit standards between 2005 and 2007. The companies explicitly changed their credit standards in order to regain market share after Wall Street began to define market credit standards in 2004.”
500
Dissenting Statement Table 5.100 Nontraditional Mortgages and the Affordable Housing Goals
Year
Low & Moderate Income Base Goal
Special Affordable Base Goal
Underserved Base Goal
Actual* Goal Credit Score <660 Originations
Actual*
Goal
Actual*
Goal
1996 1997
38.08% 38.04%
40 % 42%
12.31% 12.35%
12% 14%
32.10% 33.03%
21% 24%
1998 1999
37.72% 40.36%
42% 42%
11.76% 14.04%
14% 14%
29.37% 30.87%
24% 24%
2000 2001
43.69% 45.98%
42% 50%
17.83% 17.90%
14% 20%
35.79% 34.91%
24% 31%
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
49.66% 49.18% 52.71% 54.39% 56.34% 55.47% 55.24%
50% 50% 50% 52% 53% 55% 56%
20.09% 19.38% 22.14% 24.21% 25.85% 24.76% 25.50%
20% 20% 20% 22% 23% 25% 27%
37.29% 34.12% 37.54% 44.38% 46.34% 46.45% 45.39%
31% 31% 31% 37% 38% 38% 39%
Alt-A Originations 1999 48.83% 2000 40.61% 2001 39.05% 2002 42.77% 2003 42.42% 2004 44.13% 2005 43.12% 2006 40.43% 2007 39.02% 2008 42.37%
42% 42% 50% 50% 50% 50% 52% 53% 55% 56%
24.17% 18.74% 16.41% 18.13% 16.81% 18.56% 18.57% 18.09% 17.29% 18.52%
14% 14% 20% 20% 20% 20% 22% 23% 25% 27%
37.41% 41.03% 40.66% 40.08% 37.34% 40.08% 45.36% 46.40% 50.29% 42.10%
24% 24% 31% 31% 31% 31% 37% 38% 38% 39%
50%
19.57%
20%
47.09%
31%
52% 53% 55% 56%
19.86% 23.51% 19.21% 17.68%
22% 23% 25% 27%
61.13% 60.12% 54.55% 64.45%
37% 38% 38% 39%
PLS Backed by Subprime 2003 51.43% 2004 ^ 2005 50.95% 2006 60.63% 2007 52.96% 2008 51.42%
*% of unit financed that qualified for base goals. ^ Not included in housing goals scoring in 2004
Table 5 also shows that ordinary subprime loans, Alt-A loans and PMBS backed by subprime loans were not always sufficient to meet the AH goals. For 100 Fannie Mae, disk produced for FCIC, April 7, 2010. Throughout this analysis, I have not discussed the GSEs’ compliance with the “Underserved Base Goal,” which is included in this table. The Underserved Base Goal applied mostly to minorities and involved a different set of lending decisions than the LMI goal and the Special Affordable Goal.
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Peter J. Wallison
this reason, Fannie developed special categories of loans in which the firm waived some of its regular underwriting requirements in order to supplement what they were getting from higher quality NTMs. The two principal categories were My Community Mortgage (MCM) and Expanded Approval (EA). In many cases, these two categories enabled Fannie to meet the AH goals, but at the cost of much higher delinquency rates than occurred among higher quality NTMs they acquired. As the years progressed and the AH goals increased, Fannie had to acquire increasing numbers of loans in these categories, and as shown in Table 6 these increasing numbers also exhibited increasing delinquency rates: Table 6.101 Higher Risk Loans Produced Higher Delinquency Rates at Fannie Mae
2004 & Prior 2005 2006 2007
Goals by Vintage EA/MCM & Housing Goals EA/MCM & Housing Goals EA/MCM & Housing Goals EA/MCM & Housing Goals
Loan Count 115,686 56,822 110,539 224, 513
Serious Delinquency Rate 17.59% 22.35% 25.19% 29.70%
Just how desperate Fannie and Freddie were to meet their AH goals is revealed by Fannie’s behavior in 2004. As reported in the American Banker on May 13, 2005, “A House Financial Services Committee report shared with lawmakers Thursday accused Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac of engaging over several years in a series of dubious transactions to meet their affordable-housing goals…The report cited several large transactions entered into by Fannie under which sellers were allowed to repurchase loans without recourse. For example, it said that in September 2003, Fannie bought the option to buy up to $12 billion of multifamily mortgage loans from Washington Mutual, Inc., for a fee of $2 million, the report said. Under the agreement, the GSE permitted WaMu to repurchase the loans…’ This was the largest multifamily transaction ever undertaken by Fannie Mae and was critical for Fannie Mae to reach the affordable-housing goals, the report said.”102 A clearer statement of what happened here is contained in WaMu’s 10-K for 2003. Freddie had engaged in a similar but larger transaction with WaMu in 2003, reported as follows in WaMu’s 10-K dated December 31, 2003: Other noninterest income increased in 2003 compared with 2002 partially due to fees paid to the Company [WaMu] by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“FHLMC” or Freddie Mac”). The Company received $100 million in nonrefundable fees to induce the Company to swap approximately $6 billion of multi-family loans for 100% of the beneficial interest in those loans in the form of mortgage-backed securities issued by Freddie Mac. Since the Company has the unilateral right to collapse the securities after one year, the Company has effectively retained control over the loans. Accordingly, the assets continue to be accounted for and reported as loans. This transaction was undertaken by Freddie Mac in order to facilitate fulfilling its 2003 affordable housing goals as set by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Fannie and Freddie were both paying holders of mortgages to temporarily transfer to them possession of goal-qualifying loans that the GSEs could use to satisfy the AH goals for the year 2003. After the end of the year, the seller had an 101
Fannie Mae, “GSE Credit Losses,” presentation to House Financial Services Committee, April 16, 2010.
102
Rob Blackwell, “Two GSEs Cut Corners to Hit Goals, Report Says,” American Banker, May 13, 2005, p.1.
502
Dissenting Statement
absolute right to reacquire these loans. There can be little doubt, then, that as early as 2003, Fannie and Freddie were under so much pressure to find the subprime or other loans that they needed to meet their affordable housing obligations that they were willing to pay substantial sums to window-dress their reports to HUD.
3. The Affordable Housing Goals were the Sole Reason That the GSEs’ Acquired So Many NTMs Up to this point, we have seen that HUD’s policy was to reduce underwriting standards in order to make mortgage credit more readily available to low-income borrowers, and that Fannie and Freddie not only took the AH goals seriously but were willing to go to extraordinary lengths to make sure that they met them. Nevertheless, it seems to have become an accepted idea in some quarters— including in the Commission majority’s report—that Fannie and Freddie bought large numbers of subprime and Alt-A loans between 2004 and 2007 in order to recover the market share they had lost to subprime lenders such as Countrywide or Wall Street, or to make profits. Although there is no evidence whatever for this belief—and a great deal of evidence to the contrary—it has become another urban myth, repeated so often in books, blogs and other media that it has attained a kind of reality.103 The formulations of the idea vary a bit. As noted earlier, HUD has claimed— absurdly, in light of its earlier efforts to reduce mortgage underwriting standards— that the GSEs were “chasing the nonprime market” or “chasing market share and profits,” principally between 2004 and 2007. The inference, all too easily accepted, is that this is another example of private greed doing harm, but it is clear that HUD was simply trying to evade its own culpability for using the AH goals to degrade the GSEs’ mortgage underwriting standards over the 15 year period between 1992 and 2007. The Commission majority also adopted a version of this idea in its report, blaming the GSEs’ loosening of their underwriting standards on a desire to please stock market analysts and investors, as well as to increase management compensation. None of HUD’s statements about its efforts to reduce underwriting standards managed to make it into the Commission majority’s report, which relied entirely on the idea that the GSEs’ underwriting standards were reduced by their desire to “follow Wall Street and other lenders in [the] rush for fool’s gold.” These claims place the blame for Fannie and Freddie’s insolvency—and the huge number of low quality mortgages in the U.S. financial system immediately prior to the financial crisis—on the firms’ managements. They absolve the government, particularly HUD, from responsibility. The GSEs’ managements made plenty of mistakes—and won’t be defended here—but taking risks to compete for market share was not something they actually did. Because of the AH goals, Fannie and 103 See, e.g., Barry Ritholtz, “Get Me ReWrite!” in Bailout Nation, Bailouts, Credit, Real Estate, Really, Really Bad Calls, May 13, 2010, http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2010/05/rewriting-the-causes-of-thecredit-crisis/print/; Dean Baker, “NPR Tells Us that Republicans Believe that Fannie and Freddie Caused the Crash” Beat the Press Blog, Center for Economic and Policy Research http://www.cepr.net/index.php/ blogs/beat-the-press/npr-tells-us-that-republicans-believe-that-fannie-and-freddie-caused-the-crash; Charles Duhigg, “Roots of the Crisis,” Frontline, Feb 17, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ meltdown/themes/howwegothere.html.
Peter J. Wallison
503
Freddie were major buyers of NTMs well before Wall Street firms and the subprime lenders who came to dominate the business entered the subprime PMBS market in any significant way. Moreover, the GSEs did not (indeed, could not) appreciably increase their purchases of NTMs during the years 2005 and 2006, when they had lost market share to the real PMBS issuers, Countrywide and other subprime lenders. The following discussion addresses each of the claims about the GSEs’ motives in turn, and in the end will show that the only plausible motive for their actions was their effort to comply with HUD’s AH goals.
Did the GSEs acquire NTMs to “compete for market share” with Wall Street or others? The idea that Fannie and Freddie were newcomers to the purchase of NTMs between 2004 and 2007, and reduced their underwriting standards so they could compete for market share with Wall Street or others, is wrong. As shown in Table 7, the GSEs’ acquisition of subprime loans and other NTMs began in the 1990s, when they first became subject to the AH goals. Research shows that, in contravention of their earlier standards, the GSEs began to acquire high loan-to-value (LTV) mortgages in 1994, shortly after the enactment of the GSE Act and the imposition of the AH goals, and by 2001—before the PMBS market reached $100 billion in annual issuances—the GSEs had already acquired at least $700 billion in NTMs, including over $400 billion in subprime loans.104 Far from following Wall Street or anyone else into subprime loans between 2004 and 2007, the GSEs had become the largest buyers of subprime and other NTMs many years before the PMBS market began to develop. Given these facts, it would be more accurate to say that Wall Street and the subprime lenders who later came to dominate the PMBS market followed the GSEs into subprime lending. Table 7 does not show any significant increase in the GSEs’ acquisition of NTMs from 2004 to 2007, and the amount of subprime PMBS they acquired during this period actually decreased. This is consistent with the fact—outlined below—that the GSEs did not make any special effort to compete for market share during these years.
104 Pinto, “Government Housing Policies in the Lead-up to the Financial Crisis: A Forensic Study,” Chart 52, p.148, http://www.aei.org/docLib/Government-Housing-Policies-Financial-Crisis-Pinto-102110.pdf.
504
Dissenting Statement Table 7.105 GSE Purchases of Subprime and Alt-A loans
$ in billions Subprime PMBS
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1997-2007 $3* $18* $18* $11* $16* $38 $82 $180 $169 $110 $62 $707
Subprime loans**
$37
Alt-A PMBS
Unk. Unk, Unk. Unk. Unk. $18
$83
$74
$65
$159 $206 $262 $144 $139 $138 $195 $1,502
Alt-A loans*** Unk. Unk, Unk. Unk. Unk. $66 High LTV $32 $44 $62 $61 $84 $87 loans**** Total*****
$72
$12
$30
$36
$43
$15
$154
$77 $64 $77 $157 $178 $619 $159 $123 $126 $120 $226 $1,124
$145 $154 $137 $259 $415 $592 $541 $547 $568 $676 $4,106
*Total purchases of PMBS for 1997-2001 are known. Subprime purchases for these years were estimated based upon the percentage that subprime PMBS constituted of total PMBS purchases in 2002 (57%). **Loans where borrower’s FICO <660. *** Fannie and Freddie used their various affordable housing programs and individual lender variance programs (many times in conjunction with their automated underwriting systems once these came into general use in the late-1990s) to approve loans with Alt-A characteristics. However, they generally did not classify these loans as Alt-A. Classification as Alt-A started in the early-1990s. There is an unknown number of additional loans that had higher debt ratios, reduced reserves, loosened credit requirements, expanded seller contributions, etc. The volume of these loans is not included. ****Loans with an original LTV or original combined LTV >90% (given industry practices, this effectively means >=95%). Data to estimate loans with CLTV.>90% is unavailable prior to 2003. Amounts for 2003-2007 are grossed up by 60% to account for the impact of loans with a CLTV >90%. These estimates are based on disclosures by Fannie and Freddie that at the end of 2007 their total exposures to loans with an LTV or CLTV >90% was 50% and 75% percent respectively higher than their exposure to loans with an LTV >90%. Fannie reports on p. 128 of its 2007 10-K that 15% of its entire book had an original combined LTV >90%. Its Original LTV percentage >90% (without counting the impact of any 2nd mortgage simultaneously negotiated) is 9.9%. Freddie reports on p60 of its Q2:2008 10 Q that 14% of its portfolio had an original combined LTV >90%. Its OLTV percentage >90% (without counting any simultaneous 2nd) is 8%. While Fannie and Freddie purchased only the first mortgage, these loans had the same or higher incidence of default as a loan with an LTV of >90%. *****Since loans may have more than one characteristic, they may appear in more than one category. Totals are not adjusted to take this into account.
The claim that the GSEs loosened their underwriting standards in order to compete specifically with “Wall Street” can be easily dismissed—unless the Commission majority and others who have made this statement are including Countrywide (which was based in California) or other subprime lenders in the term “Wall Street.” Assuming, however, that the Commission majority and other commentators have been using the term Wall Street to apply to the commercial and investment banks that operate in the financial markets of New York, the data shows that Wall Street was not a significant participant in the subprime PMBS market between 2004 and 2007 or at any time before or after those dates. The top five players in 2004 were subprime lenders Ameriquest ($55 billion) and Countrywide ($40 billion), followed by Lehman Brothers ($27 billion), GMAC RFC ($26 billion), and New Century ($22 billion). Other than Lehman, some other Wall Street firms were scattered through the list of the top 25, but were not significant players as a group. In 2005, the biggest year for subprime issuances, the five leaders were the same, and the total for all Wall Street institutions was $137 billion, or about 27
105
Id.
Peter J. Wallison
505
percent of the $508 billion issued that year.106 In 2006, Lehman had dropped out of the top five and Countrywide had taken over the leadership among the issuers, but Wall Street’s share had not significantly changed. By the middle of 2007, the PMBS market had declined to such a degree that the market share numbers were meaningless. However, in that year the GSEs’ market share in NTMs increased because they had to continue buying NTMs—even though others had defaulted or left the business—in order to comply with the AH goals. Accordingly, if Fannie had ever loosened its lending standards to compete with some group, that group was not Wall Street. The next question is whether the GSEs loosened their underwriting standards to compete with Countrywide, Ameriquest and the other subprime lenders who were the dominant players in the PMBS market between 2004 and 2007. Again, the answer seems clearly to be no. The subprime PMBS market was very small until 2002, when for the first time it exceeded $100 billion and reached $134 billion in subprime PMBS issuances.107 Yet, Table 7 shows that in 2002 alone the GSEs bought $206 billion in subprime loans, more than the total amount securitized by all the subprime lenders and others combined in that year. The discussion of internal documents that follows will focus almost exclusively on Fannie Mae. The Commission concentrated its investigation on Fannie and it was from Fannie that the Commission received the most complete set of internal documents. By the early 2000s, Countrywide had succeeded in creating an integrated system of mortgage distribution that included originating, packaging, issuing and underwriting NTMs through PMBS. Other subprime lenders, as noted above, were also major issuers, but they sold their PMBS through Wall Street firms that were functioning as underwriters. The success of Countrywide and other subprime lenders as distributors of NTMs through PMBS was troubling to Fannie for two reasons. First, Countrywide had been Fannie’s largest supplier of subprime mortgages; the fact that it could now securitize mortgages it formerly sold to Fannie meant that Fannie would have more difficulty finding subprime mortgages that were AH goals-eligible. In addition, the GSEs knew that their support in Congress depended heavily on meeting the AH goals and “leading the market” in lending to low income borrowers. In 2005 and 2006, the Bush administration and a growing number of Republicans in Congress were calling for tighter regulation of Fannie and Freddie, and the GSEs needed allies in Congress to hold this off. The fact that subprime lenders were taking an increasing market share in these years—suggesting that the GSEs were no longer the most important sources of low income mortgage credit—was thus a matter of great concern to Fannie’s management. Without strong support among the Democrats in Congress, there was a significant chance that the Republican Congress would enact tougher regulatory legislation. This was expressed at Fannie as concern about a loss of “relevance,” and provoked wide-ranging consideration within the firm about how they could regain their leadership role in low-income lending. Nevertheless, although Fannie had strong reasons for wanting to compete for market share with Countrywide and others, it did not have either the operational 106
Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual—Volume II, pp. 139 and 140.
107
Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Market Statistical Annual—Volume II, p.143.
506
Dissenting Statement
or financial capacity to do so. In the end, Fannie was unable to take any significant action during the key years 2005 and 2006 that would regain market share from the subprime lenders or anyone else. They reduced their underwriting standards to the degree necessary to keep pace with the increasing AH goals, but not to go significantly beyond those requirements. In a key memo dated June 27, 2005 (the “Crossroads” memo), Tom Lund, Executive Vice President for Single Family Business, addressed the question of Fannie’s loss of market share and how this share position could be regained. The date of this memo is important. It shows that even in the middle of 2005 there was still a debate going on within Fannie about whether to compete for market share with Countrywide and the other subprime issuers. No such competition had actually begun. Lund starts the discussion in the memo by saying “We are at a strategic crossroad…[his ellipses] We face two stark choices: 1. Stay the Course [or] 2. Meet the Market Where the Market Is”. “Staying the course” meant trying to maintain the mortgage quality standards that Fannie had generally followed up to that point (except as necessary to meet HUD’s AH goals). “Meeting the market” meant competing with Countrywide and others not only by acquiring substantially more NTMs than the AH goals required, but also by acquiring much riskier mortgages than Fannie—which specialized in fixed rate mortgages—had been buying up to that time. These riskier potential acquisitions would have included much larger numbers of Option ARMs (involving negative amortization) and other loans involving multiple (or “layered”) risks with which Fannie had no prior experience. Thus, Lund noted that to compete in this business Fannie lacked “capabilities and infrastructure…knowledge… willingness to compete on price..[and] a value proposition for subprime.” His conclusion was as stark as the choice: “Realistically, we are not in a position to ‘Meet the Market’ today.” “Therefore,” Lund continued, “we recommend that we: Pursue a ‘Stay the Course’ strategy and test whether market changes are cyclical vs secular.”108 [emphasis supplied] In the balance of the Crossroads memo, Lund notes that subprime and Alt-A loans are driving the “leakage” of “goals rich” products to PMBS issuers. He points out the severity of the loss of market share, but never suggests that this changes his view that Fannie was unequipped to compete with Countrywide and others at that time. According to an internal FCIC staff investigation, dated March 31, 2010, other senior officials—Robert Levin (Executive Vice President and Chief Business Officer), Kenneth Bacon (Executive Vice President for Housing and Community Development), and Pamela Johnson (Senior Vice President for Single Family Business)—all concurred that Fannie should follow Lund’s recommendation to “stay the course.” There is no indication in any of Fannie’s documents after June 2005 that Lund’s “Stay the Course” recommendation was ever changed or challenged during 2005 or 2006—the period when Fannie and Freddie were supposed to have begun to acquire large numbers of NTMs (beyond what was required to meet the AH goals) in order to compete with Countrywide or (in some telling) Wall Street. Thus, in June 2006, one year after the Lund Crossroads memo, Stephen B. Ashley, then the chairman of the board, told Fannie’s senior executives: “2006 is a 108
Tom Lund, “Single Family Guarantee Business: Facing Strategic Crossroads” June 27, 2005.
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Peter J. Wallison
transition year. To be sure, there are still issues to resolve. The consent order with OFHEO [among other things, the order raised capital requirements temporarily] is demanding. And from a strategy standpoint, it is clear that until we have eliminated operations and control weaknesses, taking on more risk or opening new lines of business will be viewed dimly by our regulators.”109 [emphasis supplied] So, again, we have confirmation that Fannie’s top officials did not believe that the firm was in any position—in the middle of 2006—to take on the additional risk that would be necessary s to compete with Countrywide and other subprime lenders that were selling PMBS backed by subprime and other NTMs. Moreover, there is very strong financially-based evidence that Fannie either never tried or was never financially able to compete for market share with Countrywide and other subprime lenders from 2004 to 2007. For example, set out below are Fannie’s key financial data, published by OFHEO, its former regulator, in early 2008.110 Table 8. Fannie Mae Financial Highlights Earnings Performance: Net Income ($ billions) Net Interest Income ($ billions) Guarantee Fees ($ billions) Net Interest margin (%) Average Guarantee Fee (bps) Return on Common Equity (%) Dividend Payout Ratio (%)
2003 8.1 19.5 3.4 2.12 21.9 27.6 20.8
2004 5.0 18.1 3.8 1.86 21.8 16.6 42.1
2005 6.3 11.5 4.0 1.31 22.3 19.5 17.2
2006 4.2 6.8 4.3 0.85 22.2 11.3 32.4
2007 -2.1 4.6 5.1 0.57 23.7 -8.3 N/M
Table 8 shows that Fannie’s average guarantee fee increased during the period from 2003 to 2007. To understand the significance of this, it is necessary to understand the way the mortgage business works. Most of Fannie’s guarantee business—the business that competed with securitizations of PMBS by Countrywide and others—was done with wholesale sellers of mortgage pools. In these deals, the wholesaler or issuer, a Countrywide or a Wells Fargo, would assemble a pool of mortgages and look for a guaranty mechanism that would offer the best pricing. In the case of a Fannie MBS, the key issue was the GSEs’ guarantee fee, because that determined how much of the profit the issuer would be able to retain. In the case of a PMBS issue, it was the amount and cost of the credit enhancement needed to attain a AAA rating for a large percentage of the securities backed by the mortgage pool. The issuer had a choice of securitizing through Fannie, Freddie or one of the Wall Street underwriters. Thus, if Fannie wanted to compete with the private issuers for subprime and other loans there was only one way to do it—by reducing its guarantee fees (called “G-fees” at Fannie and Freddie) and in this way making itself a more attractive outlet than using a Wall Street underwriter. The fact that Fannie does not appear to have done so is strong evidence that it never tried to compete for share with Countrywide and the other subprime issuers after the date of the Crossroads memo in June 2005. The OFHEO financial summary also shows that Fannie in reality had very 109
Stephen B. Ashley Fannie Mae Chairman, remarks at senior management meeting, June 27, 2006.
110
OFHEO, “Mortgage Markets and the Enterprises in 2007,” pp. 33-34.
508
Dissenting Statement
little flexibility to compete by lowering its G-fees. Its net income and its return on equity were all declining quickly during this period, and a cut in its G-fees would have hastened this decline. Finally, there are Fannie’s own reports about its acquisitions of subprime loans. According to Fannie’s 10-K reports for 2004 (which, as restated, covered periods through 2006) and 2007, Fannie’s acquisition of subprime loans barely increased from 2004 through 2007. These are the numbers: Table 9.111 Fannie Mae’s Acquisition of Subprime Loans, 2004-2007
FICO <620
2004 5%
2005 5%
2006 6%
2007 6%
FICO 620-<660
11%
11%
11%
12%
These percentages are consistent with Fannie’s effort to comply with the gradual increase in the AH goals during the years 2004 through 2007; they are not consistent with an effort to substantially increase its purchases of subprime mortgages in order to compete with firms like Countrywide that were growing their market share through securitizing subprime and other loans. Finally, Fannie’s 2005 10-K (which, as restated and filed in May 2007, also covered 2005 and 2006), contains a statement similar to that made in 2006, confirming that the GSE made no effort to compete for subprime loans (except as necessary to meet the AH goals), and that in fact it lost market share by declining to do so in 2004, 2005 and 2006: [I]n recent years, an increasing proportion of single-family mortgage loan originations has consisted of non-traditional mortgages such as interest-only mortgages, negativeamortizing mortgages and sub-prime mortgages, and demand for traditional 30-year fixed-rate mortgages has decreased. We did not participate in large amounts of these non-traditional mortgages in 2004, 2005 and 2006 because we determined that the pricing offered for these mortgages often offered insufficient compensation for the additional credit risk associated with these mortgages. These trends and our decision not to participate in large amounts of these non-traditional mortgages contributed to a significant loss in our share of new single-family mortgages-related securities issuances to private-label issuers during this period, with our market share decreasing from 45.0% in 2003 to 29.2% in 2004, 23.5% in 2005 and 23.7 in 2006.112 [emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, despite losing market share to Countrywide and others in 2004, 2005 and 2006, Fannie did not attempt to acquire unusual numbers of subprime loans in order to regain this share. Instead, it continued to acquire only the subprime and other NTM loans that were necessary to meet the AH goals. That the AH goals were Fannie’s sole motive for acquiring NTMs is shown by the firm’s actions after the PMBS market collapsed in 2007. At that point, Fannie’s market share began to rise as Countrywide and others could not continue to issue PMBS. Nevertheless, despite the losses on subprime loans that were beginning to show up in the markets, Fannie continued to buy NTMs until they were taken over by the government in 111 Fannie Mae, 2004 10-K. These totals do not include Fannie’s purchases of subprime PMBS. http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/sec/2004/2004_form10K.pdf;jsessionid=N3RRJCZPD5SOVJ2FQSH SFGI, p.141 and Fannie’s 2007 10-K, http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/sec/2008/form10k_022708.pdf ;jsessionid=N3RRJCZPD5SOVJ2FQSHSFGI, p.127. 112
Fannie Mae, 2005 10-K, p.37.
Peter J. Wallison
509
September 2008. The reason for this nearly reckless behavior is obvious—they were still subject to the AH goals, which were increasing through this period. If they had only acquired these NTMs to compete with Countrywide and others for market share the competition was already over; their competitors had abandoned the field. But the fact is that Fannie did not—or could not—increase its market share between 2004 and 2006 shows without question that market share was not the reason they had acquired so many NTMs by the time they failed in September 2008. Beleaguered by accounting problems, suffering diminished profitability, and lacking the capability to evaluate the risks of the new kinds of mortgages they would have to buy, Fannie had no option but to stay the course they had been following for 15 years. The NTMs they bought during the period from 2004 to 2007 were acquired to comply with the AH goals and not to increase their market share—as much as Fannie might have preferred to do so. Fannie’s market share finally did increase in 2007, when the asset-backed market collapsed, Countrywide weakened, and neither Countrywide nor anyone else could continue to securitize mortgages. In a report to the board of directors on October 16, 2007, Mudd reported that Fannie’s market share, which was 20 percent of the whole market at the beginning of 2007, had risen to 42 percent.113 That leaves one other possibility—that Fannie and Freddie were buying NTMs because they were profitable. That issue is addressed in the next section.
Did Fannie acquire NTMs because these loans were profitable? From time to time, commentators on the GSEs have suggested that the GSEs’ real motive for acquiring NTMs was not that they had to comply with the AH goals, but that they were seeking the profits these risky loans produced. This could have been true in the 1990s, but after the major increase in the AH goals in 2000 Fannie began to recognize that complying with the goals was reducing the firm’s profitability. By 2007, Fannie was asking for relief from the goals. The following table, drawn from a FHFA publication, shows the applicable AH goals over the period from 1996 through 2008 and the GSEs’ success in meeting them.
113
Fannie Mae, Minutes of a Meeting of the Board of Directors, October 16, 2007, p.18.
510
Dissenting Statement Table 10.114 GSEs’ Success in Meeting Affordable Housing Goals, 1996-2007 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Low & Mod Housing Goals
40%
42%
42%
42%
42%
50%
50%
50%
50%
52%
53%
55%
56%
Fannie Actual Freddie Actual
45%
45%
44%
46%
50%
51%
52%
52%
53%
55%
57%
56%
54%
41%
43%
43%
46%
50%
53%
50%
51%
52%
54%
56%
56%
51%
12% 14% 14% 14% 14% 20% 20% 20% 20% 22% 23% 25% 27% Special Affordable Goal
Fannie Actual
15%
17%
15%
18%
19%
22%
21%
21%
24%
24%
28%
27%
Freddie Actual Underserved Goal
14%
15%
16%
18%
21%
23%
20%
21%
23%
26%
26%
26%
23%
21%
24%
24%
24%
24%
31%
31%
31%
31%
37%
38%
38%
39%
25%
29%
27%
27%
31%
33%
33%
32%
32%
41%
43%
43%
39%
28%
26%
26%
27%
29%
32%
31%
33%
34%
43%
44%
43%
38%
Fannie Actual Freddie Actual
26%
As the table shows, Fannie and Freddie exceeded the AH goals virtually each year, but not by significant margins. They simply kept pace with the increases in the goals as these requirements came into force over the years. This alone suggests that they did not increase their purchases in order to earn profits. If that was their purpose they would have substantially exceeded the goals, since their financial advantages (low financing costs and low capital requirements) allowed them to pay more for the mortgages they wanted than any of their competitors. As HUD noted in 2000: “Because the GSEs have a funding advantage over other market participants, they have the ability to underprice their competitors and increase their market share.”115 As early as 1999, there were clear concerns at Fannie about how the 50 percent LMI goal—which HUD had signaled as its next move—would be met. In a June 15, 1999, memorandum,116 four Fannie staff members proposed three categories of rules changes that would enable Fannie to meet the goals more easily: (i) persuade HUD to change the goals accounting (what goes into the numerator and denominator); (ii) enter other businesses where the pickings might be goalsrich, such as manufactured housing and, significantly, Alt-A and subprime (“Efforts to expand into Alt-A and A-markets (the highest grade of subprime lending) should also yield incremental business that will have a salutary effect on our low-and moderate-income score”); and (iii) persuade HUD to adopt different methods of goals scoring. By 2000, Fannie was effectively in competition with banks that were required to make mortgage loans under CRA to roughly the same population of low-income borrowers targeted in HUD’s AH goals. Rather than selling their CRA loans to Fannie and Freddie, banks and S&Ls had begun to retain the loans in portfolio. In a presentation in November 2000, Barry Zigas, a Senior Vice President of Fannie, noted that “Our own anecdotal evidence suggests that this increase [in banks’ and 114 FHFA Mortgage Market Note 10-2, http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15408/Housing%20Goals%2019962009%2002-01.pdf.pdf. 115
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2000_register&docid=page+65093 -65142. 116 Bell, Kinney, Kunde and Weech, through Zigas and Marks internal memo Frank Raines, “RE: HUD Housing Goals Options,” June 15, 1999.
Peter J. Wallison
511
S&Ls’ holding loans in portfolio] is due in part to below-market CRA products.”117 In other words, banks and S&Ls subject to CRA were making mortgage loans at below market interest rates, and thus could not sell them without taking losses. This was troubling for Fannie because it meant that in order to capture these loans they would have to increase what they were willing to pay for these loans. Doing so would underprice the risks they would be assuming. It is important to recognize what was happening. Fannie, and the banks and S&Ls under CRA, were now competing for the same kinds of NTMs, and were doing so by lowering their mortgage underwriting standards and adding flexibilities and subsidies. Simply as a result of supply and demand, all of the participants in this competition were required to pay higher prices for these increasingly risky mortgages. The banks and S&Ls that acquired these loans could not sell them, without taking a loss, when market interest rates were higher than the rates on the mortgages. This is the first indication in the documents that the FCIC received from Fannie that competition for subprime loans among the GSEs, banks, S&Ls, and FHA was causing the underpricing of risk—one of the principal causes of the mortgage meltdown and thus the financial crisis. In January 2003, Fannie began planning for how to confront HUD before the next round of increases in the AH goals, expected to occur in 2004. In an “Action Plan for the Housing Goals Rewrite,” dated January 22, 2003, Fannie staff reviewed a number of options, and concluded that “Fannie should strongly oppose: goals increases and new subgoals.” (Slide 35)118 In March 2003, as Fannie prepared for new increases in the AH goals, its staff prepared a presentation, perhaps for HUD or for policy defense in public forums. The apparent purpose was to show that the goals should not be increased significantly in 2004. Slide 5 stated: In 2002, Fannie Mae exceeded all our goals for the 9th straight year. But it was probably the most challenging environment we’ve ever faced. Meeting the goals required heroic 4th quarter efforts on the part of many across the company. Vacations were cancelled. The midnight oil burned. Moreover, the challenge freaked out the business side of the house. Especially because the tenseness around meeting the goals meant that we considered not doing deals—not fulfilling our liquidity function—and did deals at risks and prices we would not have otherwise done.119 [emphasis supplied]
By September 2004, it was becoming clear that continuing increases in the AH goals were having a major adverse effect on Fannie’s profitability. In a memorandum to Brian Graham (another Fannie official), Paul Weech, Director of Market Research and Policy Development, wrote: “Meeting the goals in difficult markets imposes significant costs on the Company and potentially causes marketdistorting behaviors. In 1998, 2002, and 2003 especially, the Company has had to pursue certain transactions as much for housing goals attainment as for the economics of the transaction.”120 In a June 2005 presentation entitled “Costs and Benefits of Mission 117
Barry Zigas, “Fannie Mae and Minority Lending: Assessment and Action Plan” Presentation, November 16, 2000. 118
Fannie Mae, “Action Plan for the Housing Goals Rewrite,” January 22, 2003.
119
Fannie Mae, “The HUD Housing Goals,” March 2003.
120
Fannie Mae internal memo, Paul Weech to Brian Graham, “RE: Mission Legislation,” September 3, 2004.
512
Dissenting Statement
Activities,”121 the authors noted in slide 10 that AH goal costs had risen from $2,632,500 in 2000 to $13,447,500 in 2003. Slide 17 is entitled: “Meeting Future HUD Goals Appear Quite Daunting and Potentially Costly” and reports, “Based on 2003 experience where goal acquisition costs (relative to Fannie Mae model fees) cost between $65 per goals unit in the first quarter to $370 per unit in the fourth quarter, meeting the shortfall could cost the company $6.5-$36.5 million to purchase sufficient units.” The presentation concludes (slide 20): “Cost of mission activities— explicit and implicit—over the 2000-2004 period likely averaged approximately $200 million per year.” Earlier, I noted the efforts of Fannie and Freddie to window-dress their records for HUD by temporarily acquiring loans that would comply with the AH goals, while giving the seller the option to reacquire the loans at a later time. In 2005, we begin to see efforts by Fannie’s staff to accomplish the same window-dressing in another way--delaying acquisitions of non-goal-eligible loans so Fannie can meet the AH goals in that year; we also see the first efforts to calculate systematically the effect of goal-compliance on Fannie’s profitability. In a presentation dated September 30, 2005, Barry Zigas, the key Fannie official on affordable housing, outlined a “business deferral option.” Under that initiative, Fannie would ask seven major lenders to defer until 2006 sending non-goal loans to Fannie for acquisition. This would reduce the denominator of the AH goal computation and thus bring Fannie nearer to goal compliance in the 4th quarter of 2005. The cost of the deferral alone was estimated at $30-$38 million.122 In a presentation to HUD on October 31, 2005, entitled “Update on Fannie Mae’s Housing Goals Performance,”123 Fannie noted several “Undesirable Tradeoffs Necessary to Meet Goals.” These included significant additional credit risk, and negative returns (“Deal economics are well below target returns; some deals are producing negative returns” and “G-fees may not cover expected losses”). One of the most noteworthy points was the following: “Liquidity to Questionable Products: Buying exotic product encourages continuation of risky lending; many products present with significant risk-layering; consumers are at risk of payment shock and loss of equity; potential need to waive our responsible lending policies to get goals business.” Much of the narrative about the financial crisis posits that unscrupulous and unregulated mortgage originators tricked borrowers into taking on bad mortgages. The idea that predatory lending was a major source of the NTMs in the financial system in 2008 is a significant element of the Commission majority’s report, although the Commission was never able to provide any data to support this point. This Fannie slide suggests that loans later dubbed “predatory” might actually have been made to comply with the AH goals. This possibility is suggested, too, in a message sent in 2004 to Freddie’s CEO, Richard Syron, by Freddie’s chief risk manager, David Andrukonis, when Syron was considering whether to authorize a “Ninja” (no income/no jobs/no assets) product that he ultimately approved. Andrukonis argued against authorizing Freddie’s purchase: “The potential for the perception and reality 121
Fannie Mae, “Costs and Benefits of Mission Activities, Project Phineas,” June 14, 2005.
122
Barry Zigas, “Housing Goals and Minority Lending,” September 30, 2005.
123
Fannie Mae, “Update on Fannie Mae’s Housing Goals Performance,” Presentation to the U.S. Department of Housing and Development, October 31, 2005.
Peter J. Wallison
513
of predatory lending, with this product is great.”124 But the product was approved by Freddie, probably for the reason stated by another Freddie employee: “The Alt-A [(low doc/no doc)] business makes a contribution to our HUD goals.”125 On May 5, 2006, a Fannie staff memo to the Single Family Business Credit Committee revealed the serious credit and financial problems Fannie was facing when acquiring subprime mortgages to meet the AH goals. The memo describes the competitive landscape, in which “product enhancements from Freddie Mac, FHA, Alt-A and subprime lenders have all contributed to increased competition for goals rich loans…On the issue of seller contributions [in which the seller of the home pays cash expenses for the buyer] even FHA has expanded their guidelines by allowing 6% contributions for LTVs up to 97% that can be used toward closing, prepaid expenses, discount points and other financing concessions.”126 The memorandum is eye-opening for what it says about the credit risks Fannie had to take in order to get the goals-rich loans it needed to meet HUD’s AH requirements for 2006. Table 11 below shows the costs of NTMs in terms of the guarantee fee (G-fee) “gap.” (In order to determine whether a loan contributed to a return on equity, Fannie used a G-fee pricing model that took into account credit risk as well as a number of other factors; a G-fee “gap” was the difference between the G-fees required by the pricing model for a particular loan to contribute to a return on equity and a loan that did not.) The table in this memo shows the results for three subprime products under consideration, a 30 year fixed rate mortgage (FRM), a 5 year ARM, and 35 and 40 year fixed rate mortgages. For simplicity, this analysis will discuss only the 30 year fixed rate product. The table shows that the base product, the 30 year FRM, with a zero downpayment should be priced according to the model at a G-fee of 106 basis points. However, the memo reports that Fannie is actually buying loans like that at a price consistent with an annual fee of 37.50 basis points, producing a gap (or loss from the model) of 68.50 basis points. The reason the gap is so large is shown in the table: the anticipated default rate on that zerodown mortgage was 34 percent. The table then goes on to look at other possible loan alternatives, with the following results:
124
Freddie Mac, internal email, Donna Cogswell on behalf of David Andrukonis to Dick Syron, “RE: No Income/No Asset (NINA) Mortgages,” September 7, 2004. 125
126
Freddie Mac, internal email from Mike May to Dick Syron, “FW: FINAL NINA Memo,” October 6, 2004.
Fannie Mae, internal memo, Single Family Business Product Management and Development to Single Family Business Credit Committee, “RE: PMD Proposal for Increasing Housing Goal Loans,” May 5, 2006, p.6.
514
Dissenting Statement Table 11.127 Fannie Mae Took Losses on Higher Risk Mortgages Necessary to Meet the Affordable Housing Goals
Individual Enhancements (cost analysis for “base” MCM enhancement-not layered)
30 YR FRM Model Fee
Average Default %
Gap
Base: 100% LTV, 20% MI
106
34
-68.50
Interest First (IF) Seller Contribution (SC)
129 115
40 23
-91.50 -77.50
Temporary B/D (BD) Zero Down (ZD)
118 106
37 34
-80.50 -68.50
Manufactured Housing (MH)
227
42
-189.50
From this report, it is clear that in order to meet the AH goals Fannie had to pay up for goals-rich mortgages, taking a huge credit risk along the way. The dismal financial results that were developing at Fannie as a result of the AH goals were also described in Fannie’s 10-K report for 2006, which anticipated both losses of revenue and higher credit losses as a result of acquiring the mortgages required by the AH goals: [W]e have made, and continue to make, significant adjustments to our mortgage loan sourcing and purchase strategies in an effort to meet HUD’s increased housing goals and new subgoals. These strategies include entering into some purchase and securitization transactions with lower expected economic returns than our typical transactions. We have also relaxed some of our underwriting criteria to obtain goalsqualifying mortgage loans and increased our investments in higher-risk mortgage loan products that are more likely to serve the borrowers targeted by HUD’s goals and subgoals, which could increase our credit losses. [emphasis supplied]128
The underlying reasons for the “lower expected returns” were reported in February 2007 in a document the FCIC received from Fannie, which noted that for 2006 the “cash flow cost” of meeting the housing goals was $140 million while the “opportunity cost” was $470 million.129 In a report to HUD on the AH goals, dated April 11, 2007, Fannie described these costs as follows: “The largest costs [of meeting the goals] are opportunity costs of foregone revenue. In 2006, opportunity cost was about $400 million, whereas the cash flow cost was about $134 million. If opportunity cost was $0, our shareholders would be indifferent to the deal. The cash flow cost is the implied out of pocket cost.”130 By this time, “Alignment Meetings”—in which Fannie staff considered how they would meet the AH goals—were taking place almost monthly (according to the frequency with which presentations to Alignment meetings occur in the documentary record). In an Alignment Meeting on June 22, 2007, on a “Housing Goals Forecast,” three plans were considered for meeting the 2007 AH goals, even 127
Id., p.8.
128
Fannie Mae, 2006 10-K, p.146.
129
Fannie Mae, “Business Update,” presentation. “Cash flow cost” equals expected revenue minus expected loss. Expected revenue is what will be received in G-fees; expected loss includes G&A and credit losses. “Opportunity cost” is the G-fee actually charged minus the model fee—the fee that Fannie’s model would impose to guarantee a mortgage of the same quality in order to earn a fair market return on capital. 130
Fannie Mae, “Housing Goals Briefing for HUD,” April 11, 2007.
Peter J. Wallison
515
though half the year was already gone. One of the plans was forecast to result in opportunity costs of $767.7 million, while the other two plans resulted in opportunity costs of $817.1 million.131 In a Forecast meeting on July 27, 2007, a “Plan to Meet Base Goals,” which probably meant the topline LMI goal including all subgoals, was placed at $1.156 billion for 2007.132 Finally, in a December 21, 2007, letter to Brian Montgomery, Assistant Secretary of Housing, Fannie CEO Daniel Mudd asked that, in light of the financial and economic conditions then prevailing in the country—particularly the absence of a PMBS market and the increasing number of mortgage delinquencies and defaults— HUD’s AH goals for 2007 be declared “infeasible.” He noted that HUD also has an obligation to “consider the financial condition of the enterprise when determining the feasibility of goals.” Then he continued: “Fannie Mae submits that the company took all reasonable actions to meet the subgoals that were both financially prudent and likely to contribute to the achievement of the subgoals….In 2006, Fannie Mae relaxed certain underwriting standards and purchased some higher risk mortgage loan products in an effort to meet the housing goals. The company continued to purchase higher risk loans into 2007, and believes these efforts to acquire goals-rich loans are partially responsible for increasing credit losses.”133 [emphasis supplied] This statement confirms two facts that are critical on the question of why Fannie (and Freddie) acquired so many high risk loans in 2006 and earlier years: first, the companies were trying to meet the AH goals established by HUD and not because these loans were profitable. It also shows that the efforts of HUD and others— including the Commission majority in its report—to blame the managements of Fannie and Freddie for purchasing the loans that ultimately dragged them to insolvency is misplaced. Finally, in a July 2009 report, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA, the GSEs’ new regulator, replacing OFHEO), noted that Fannie and Freddie both followed the practice of cross-subsidizing the subprime and Alt-A loans that they acquired: Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac consider model-derived estimates of cost in determining the single-family guarantee fees they charge, their pricing often subsidizes their guarantees on some mortgages using higher returns they expect to earn on guarantees of other loans. In both 2007 and 2008, cross-subsidization in single-family guarantee fees charged by the Enterprises was evident across product types, credit score categories, and LTV ratio categories. In each case, there were crosssubsidies from mortgages that posed lower credit risk on average to loans that posed higher credit risk. The greatest estimated subsidies generally went to the highest-risk mortgages.134
The higher risk mortgages were the ones most needed by Fannie and Freddie to meet the AH goals. Needless to say, there is no need to cross-subsidize the G-fees of loans that are acquired because they are profitable. Accordingly, both market share and profitability must be excluded as reasons that Fannie (and Freddie) acquired subprime and Alt-A loans between 2004 and 131
Fannie Mae, “Housing Goals Forecast,” Alignment Meeting, June 22, 2007.
132
Fannie Mae, Forecast Meeting, July 27, 2007 slide 4.
133
Fannie Mae letter, Daniel Mudd to Asst. Secretary Brian Montgomery, December 21, 2007, p.6.
134
FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Single Family Guarantee Fees in 2007 and 2008, p.33.
516
Dissenting Statement
2007. The only remaining motive—and the valid one—was the effect of the AH goals imposed by HUD. In 2008, after its takeover by the government, Fannie Mae finally published a credit supplement to its 2008 10-K, which contained an accounting of its subprime and Alt-A credit exposure. The table is reproduced below in order to provide a picture of the kinds of loans Fannie acquired in order to meet the AH goals. Loans may appear in more than one category, so the table does not reveal Fannie’s total net exposure to each category, nor does it include Fannie’s holdings of non-Fannie MBS or PMBS, for which it did not have loan level data. Note the reference to $8.4 billion in the column for subprime loans. As noted earlier, Fannie classified as subprime only those loans that it purchased from subprime lenders. However, Fannie included loans with FICO scores of less than 660 in the table, indicating that they are not prime loans but without classifying them formally as subprime. In a later credit supplement, filed in August 2009, Fannie eliminated the duplications among the loans in Table 12, and reported that as of June 30, 2009, it held the credit risk on NTMs with a total unpaid principal amount of $2.7 trillion. The average loan amount was $151,000, for a total of 5.73 million NTM loans.135 This number does not include Fannie’s holdings of subprime PMBS as to which it does not have loan level data.
135
http://www.fanniemae.com/ir/pdf/sec/2009/q2credit_summary.pdf, p.5.
71.1% 0.3% 87.2% 42.8% 698 10.7% 10.1% 0.1% 70.4% 13.5%
2.42% 46.5% 71.8% 10.2% 70.0% 11.6% 724 4.5% 9.4% 90.0% 89.7% 9.4% 20.9%
100.0% 100.0 % 100.0% 100.0%
Serious Delinquency Rate
Origination Years 2005-2007
Weighted Average Original Loan-to-value Ratio
Original Loan-to-Value Ratio >90
Weighted Average Mark-to Market Loan-to-Value Ratio
Mark-to-Mark Loan-to-Value Ratio >100
Weighted Average FICO
FICO < 620
FICO ≥ 620 and <660
Fixed-rate
Principal Residence
Condo/Co-op
Credit Enhanced (2)
% of 2007 Credit Losses (3)
% of 2008 Q3 Credit Losses (3)
% of 2008 Q4 Credit Losses (3)
% of 2008 Credit Losses (3) 2.9%
2.2%
3.8%
0.9%
34.2%
33.1%
36.2%
15.0%
35.0%
16.2%
84.9%
39.6%
7.7%
1.3%
725
35.6%
93.4%
9.1%
75.4%
80.9%
8.42%
$241,943
7.8%
$212.9
Interest-Only Loans
11.8%
11.5%
11.3%
18.8%
35.0%
4.9%
96.8%
93.6%
0.0%
100.0%
588
15.9%
76.3%
22.2%
76.7%
56.3%
9.03%
$126,604
4.5%
$ 123.0
Loans with FICO <620
17.4%
17.2%
16.8%
21.9%
36.3%
6.6%
94.4%
92.3%
100.0%
0.0%
641
17.6%
77.5%
21.1%
77.5%
55.0%
5.64%
$141,746
9.4%
$ 256.1
Loans with FICO ≥ 620 and < 660
21.3%
23.1%
21.5%
17.4%
92.5%
9.8%
97.1%
94.2%
19.4%
9.8%
694
38.2%
97.6%
100.0%
97.3%
58.8%
6.33%
$141,569
10.2%
$ 278.3
Loans with Original LTV Ratio >90%
5.4%
5.2%
5.4%
6.4%
94.1%
5.9%
99.4%
96.5%
0.0%
100.0%
592
38.5%
97.7%
100.0%
98.1%
69.8%
15.97%
$119,607
1.0%
$ 27.3
Loans with FICO < 620 and Original LTV Ratio > 90%
45.6%
43.2%
47.6%
29.2%
38.6%
10.8%
77.8%
72.3%
8.7%
0.7%
719
23.2%
81.0%
5.3%
72.6%
72.7%
7.03%
$170,250
10.1%
$ 292.4
Alt-A Loans (1)
2.0%
2.0%
2.1%
1.0%
63.4%
4.7%
96.6%
73.1%
27.8%
47.6%
623
24.5%
87.3%
6.8%
77.2%
80.7%
14.29%
$150,445
0.3%
$ 8.4
Subprime Loans (1)
0.4%
1.1%
0.2%
0.0%
11.3%
11.5%
98.2%
95.2%
0.2%
0.6%
762
0.4%
69.9%
0.0%
68.4%
1.4%
0.12%
$579,528
0.7%
$ 19.9
Jumbo Conforming Loans (1)
Alt-A, Subprime, and Jumbo Conforming Loans are calculated as a percentage of the single-family mortgage credit book of business, which includes government loans. Government loans are guaranteed or insured by the U.S. Government or its agencies, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the Rural Housing and Community Facilities Program and the Department of Agriculture. (2) Unpaid principal balance of all loans with credit enhancement as a percentage of unpaid principal balance of single-family conventional mortgage credit book of business. Includes primary mortgage insurance, pool insurance, lender recourse and other credit enhancement. (3) Expressed as a percentage of credit losses for the single-family mortgage credit book of business. For information on total credit losses, refer to Fannie Mae’s 2008 Form 10-K.
(1)
62.0%
$148,824
Average Unpaid Principal Balance
76.3%
$142,502 5.61%
100.0%
$17.3 0.6%
$2,730.9
NegativeAmortizing Loans
Share of Single-Family Conventional Credit Book (1)
Overall Book
Unpaid Principal Balance (billions)*
As of Dec 31, 2008
Table 12. Fannie Mae Credit Profile by Key Product Features: Credit Characteristics of Single-Family Conventional Mortgage Credit Book of Business136
Peter J. Wallison
517
518
Dissenting Statement
Freddie Mac. As noted earlier, in its limited review of the role of the GSEs in the financial crisis, the Commission spent most of its time and staff resources on a review of Fannie Mae, and for that reason this dissent focuses primarily on documents received from Fannie. However, things were not substantially different at Freddie Mac. In a document dated June 4, 2009, entitled “Cost of Freddie Mac’s Affordable Housing Mission,” a report to the Business Risk Committee, of the Board of Directors,136 several points were made that show the experience of Freddie was no different than Fannie’s: •
Our housing goals compliance required little direct subsidy prior to 2003, but since then subsidies have averaged $200 million per year.
•
Higher credit risk mortgages disproportionately tend to be goal-qualifying. Targeted affordable lending generally requires ‘accepting’ substantially higher credit risk.
•
We charge more for targeted (and baseline) affordable single-family loans, but not enough to fully offset their higher incremental risk.
•
Goal-qualifying single-family loans accounted for the disproportionate share of our 2008 realized losses that was predicted by our models. (slide 2)
•
In 2007 Freddie Mac failed two subgoals, but compliance was subsequently deemed infeasible by the regulator due to economic conditions. In 2008 Freddie Mac failed six goals and subgoals, five of which were deemed infeasible. No enforcement action was taken regarding the sixth missed goal because of our financial condition. (slide 3)
•
Goal-qualifying loans tend to be higher risk. Lower household income correlates with various risk factors such as less wealth, less employment stability, higher loan-to-value ratios, or lower credit scores. (slide 7)
•
Targeted affordable loans have much higher expected default probabilities... Over one-half of targeted affordable loans have higher expected default probabilities than the highest 5% of non-goal-qualifying loans. (Slide 8)
The use of the affordable housing goals to force a reduction in the GSEs’ underwriting standards was a major policy error committed by HUD in two successive administrations, and must be recognized as such if we are ever to understand what caused the financial crisis. Ultimately, the AH goals extended the housing bubble, infused it with weak and high risk NTMs, caused the insolvency of Fannie and Freddie, and—together with other elements of U.S. housing policy—was the principal cause of the financial crisis itself. When Congress enacted the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), it transferred the responsibility for administering the affordable housing goals from HUD to FHFA. In 2010, FHFA modified and simplified the AH goals, and eliminated one of their most troubling elements. As Fannie had noted, if the AH goals exceed the number of goals-eligible borrowers in the market, they were being forced to allocate credit, taking it from the middle class and providing it to lowincome borrowers. In effect, there was a conflict between their mission to advance affordable housing and their mission to maintain a liquid secondary mortgage 136 Freddie Mac, “Cost of Freddie Mac’s Affordable Housing Mission,” Business Risk Committee, Board of Directors, June 4, 2009.
Peter J. Wallison
519
market for most mortgages in the U.S. The new FHFA rule does not require the GSEs to purchase more qualifying loans than the percentage of the total market that these loans constitute.137 This does not solve all the major problems with the AH goals. In the sense that the goals enable the government to direct where a private company extends credit, they are inherently a form of government credit allocation. More significantly, the competition among the GSEs, FHA and the banks that are required under the CRA to find and acquire the same kind of loans will continue to cause the same underpricing of risk on these loans that eventually brought about the mortgage meltdown and the financial crisis. This is discussed in the next section and the section on the CRA.
4. Competition Between the GSEs and FHA for Subprime and Alt-A Mortgages One of the important facts about HUD’s management of the AH goals was that it placed Fannie and Freddie in direct competition with FHA, an agency within HUD. This was already noted in some of the Fannie documents cited above. Fannie treated this as a conflict of interest at HUD, but there is a strong case that this competition is exactly what HUD and Congress wanted. It is important to recall the context in which the GSE Act was enacted in 1992. In 1990, Congress had enacted the Federal Credit Reform Act.138 One of its purposes was to capture in the government’s budget the risks to the government associated with loan guarantees, and in effect it placed a loose budgetary limit on FHA guarantees. For those in Congress and at HUD who favored increased mortgage lending to low income borrowers and underserved communities, this consequence of the FCRA may have been troubling. What had previously been a free way to extend support to groups who were not otherwise eligible for conventional mortgages—which generally required a 20 percent downpayment and the indicia of willingness and ability to pay—now appeared to be potentially restricted. Requiring the GSEs to take up the mantle of affordable housing would have looked at the time like a solution, since Fannie and Freddie had unlimited access to funds in the private markets and were off-budget entities. Looked at from this perspective, it would make sense for Congress and HUD to place the GSEs and FHA in competition, just as it made sense to put Fannie and Freddie in competition with one another for affordable loans. With all three entities competing for the same kinds of loans, and with HUD’s control of both FHA’s lending standards and the GSEs’ affordable housing requirements, underwriting requirements would inevitably be reduced. HUD’s explicit and frequently expressed interest in reducing mortgage underwriting standards, as a means of making mortgage credit available to low income borrowers, provides ample evidence of HUD’s motives for creating this competition. 137 Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2010-2011 Enterprise Housing Goals; Enterprise Book-Entry Procedures; Final Rule, 12 CFR Parts 1249 and 1282, Federal Register, September 14, 2010, p.55892. 138 Title V of the Congressional Budget Act of 1990. Under the FCRA, HUD must estimate the annual cost of FHA’s credit subsidy for budget purposes. The credit subsidy is the net of its estimated receipts reduced by its estimated payments.
520
Dissenting Statement
Established in 1934, now a part of HUD and administered by the Federal Housing Administrator (who is also the Assistant Secretary of Housing), FHA insures 100 percent of an eligible mortgage. It was established to provide financing to people who could not meet the standards for a bank-originated conventional loan. The loans it insured had a maximum LTV of 80 percent in 1934. This went to 95 percent in 1950, and 97 percent in 1961.139 With its maximum LTV remaining at 97 percent, FHA maintained average FICO scores for its borrowers just below 660 from 1996 to 2006. During this period, the average FICO score for a conventional subprime borrower was somewhat lower.140 Beginning in 1993, shortly after Fannie and Freddie were introduced as competitors, FHA began to increase its percentage of loans with low downpayments. This had the predictable effect on its delinquency rates, as shown in the figure below prepared by Edward Pinto with data from FHA, the FDIC, and the MBA: Figure 6.
Despite its reductions in required downpayments, FHA’s market share vis-a vis the GSEs began to decline. According to GAO data, in 1996, FHA’s market share among lower-income borrowers was 26 percent while the GSEs’ share was 23.8 percent. By 2005, FHA’s share was 9.8 percent, while the GSEs’ share was 31.9 percent. It appears that early on Fannie Mae deliberately targeted FHA borrowers with its Community Homebuyer Program (CHBP). In a memorandum prepared in 1993, Fannie’s Credit Policy group compared Fannie’s then-proposed CHBP program to FHA’s requirements under its 1-to-4 family loan program (Section 203(b)) and showed that most of Fannie’s requirements were competitive or better. 139
Kerry D. Vandell, “FHA Restructuring Proposals: Alternatives and Implications,” Fannie Mae Housing Policy Debate, vol. 6, Issue 2, 1995, pp. 308-309
140 GAO, “Federal Housing Administration: Decline in Agency’s Market Share Was Associated with Product and Process Developments of Other Mortgage Market Participants,” GAO-07-645, June 2007, pp. 42 and 44.
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FHA also appears to have tried to lead the GSEs. In 1999—just before the AH goals for Fannie and Freddie were to be raised—FHA almost doubled its originations of loans with LTVs equal to or greater than 97 percent, going from 22.9 percent in 1998 to 43.84 percent in 1999.141 It also offered additional concessions on underwriting standards in order to attract subprime business. The following is from a Quicken ad in January 2000 (emphasis in the original),142 which is likely to have been based on an FHA program as it existed in 1999: Borrowers can purchase with a minimum down payment. Without FHA insurance, many families can’t afford the homes they want because down payments are a major roadblock. FHA down payments range from 1.25% to 3% of the sale price and are significantly lower than the minimum that many lenders require for conventional or sub-prime loans. With FHA loans, borrowers need as little as 3% of the “total funds” required. In addition to the funds needed for the down payment, borrowers also have to pay closing costs, prepaid fees for insurance and interest, as well as escrow fees which include mortgage insurance, hazard insurance, and months worth of property taxes. A FHA-insured home loan can be structured so borrowers don’t pay more than 3% of the total out-of-pocket funds, including the down payment. The combined total of out-of-pocket funds can be a gift or loan from family members. FHA allows homebuyers to use gifts from family members and non-profit groups to cover their down payment and additional closing costs and fees. In fact, even a 100% gift or a personal loan from a relative is acceptable. FHA’s credit requirements are flexible. Compared to credit requirements established by many lenders for other types of home loans, FHA focuses only on a borrower’s last 12-24 month credit history. In addition, there is no minimum FICO score - mortgage bankers look at each application on a case-by-case basis. It is also perfectly acceptable for people with NO established credit to receive a loan with this program. FHA permits borrowers to have a higher debt-to-income ratio than most insurers typically allow. Conventional home loans allow borrowers to have 36% of their gross income attributed to their new monthly mortgage payment combined with existing debt. FHA program allows borrowers to carry 41%, and in some circumstances, even more.
It is important to remember that 1999 is the year that HUD was planning a big step-up in the AH goals for the GSEs—from 42 percent LMI to 50 percent, with even larger percentage increases in the special affordable category that would be most competitive with FHA. The last major increase in the percent of FHA’s loans with LTVs equal to or greater than 97 percent had occurred in 1991, the year before the GSE Act imposed the AH goals on Fannie and Freddie, and in effect directed them to consider downpayments of 5 percent or less. In 1991, FHA’s percentage of loans
141 Integrated Financial Engineering, “Actuarial Review of the Federal Housing Administration Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund (Excluding HECMs) for Fiscal Year 2009,” prepared for U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, November 6, 2009, p.42. 142 Quicken press release, “Quicken Loans First To Offer FHA Home Mortgages Nationally On The Internet With HUD´s approval, Intuit expands home ownership nationwide, offering consumers widest variety of home loan options”, January 20, 2000, http://web.intuit.com/about_intuit/press_ releases/2000/01-20.html.
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equal to or greater than 97 percent rose suddenly from 4.4 percent to 17.1 percent.143 Again, FHA, under the control of HUD, appears to be offering competition to the GSEs that would lead them to reduce their underwriting standards. Since FHA is a government agency, its actions cannot be explained by a profit motive. Instead, it seems clear that FHA reduced its lending standards as part of a HUD policy to lead Fannie and Freddie in the same direction. The result of Fannie’s competition with FHA in high LTV lending is shown in the following figure, which compares the respective shares of FHA and Fannie in the category of loans with LTVs equal to or greater than 97 percent, including Fannie loans with a combined LTV equal to or greater than 97 percent. Figure 7.
Whether a conscious policy of HUD or not, competition between the GSEs and FHA ensued immediately after the GSEs were given their affordable housing mission in 1992. The fact that FHA, an agency controlled by HUD, substantially increased the LTVs it would accept in 1991 (just before the GSEs were given their affordable housing mission) and again in 1999 (just before the GSEs were required to increase their affordable housing efforts) is further evidence that HUD was coordinating these policies in the interest of creating competition between FHA and the GSEs. The effect was to drive down underwriting standards, which HUD had repeatedly described as its goal.
5. Enlisting Mortgage Bankers and Subprime Lenders in Affordable Housing In 1994, HUD began a program to enlist other members of the mortgage financing community in the effort to reduce underwriting standards. In that year, 143 GAO, “Federal Housing Administration: Decline in Agency’s Market Share Was Associated with Product and Process Developments of Other Mortgage Market Participants,” GAO-07-645, June 2007, pp. 42 and 44.
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the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA)—a group of mortgage financing firms not otherwise regulated by the federal government and not subject to HUD’s legal authority—agreed to join a HUD program called the “Best Practices Initiative.”144 The circumstances surrounding this agreement are somewhat obscure, but at least one contemporary account suggests that the MBA signed up to avoid an effort by HUD to cover mortgage bankers under the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which up to that point had only applied only to government-insured banks. In mid-September [1994], the Mortgage Bankers Association of Americawhose membership includes many bank-owned mortgage companies, signed a three-year master best-practices agreement with HUD. The agreement consisted of two parts: MBA’s agreement to work on fair-lending issues in consultation with HUD and a model best-practices agreement that individual mortgage banks could use to devise their own agreements with HUD. The first such agreement, signed by Countrywide Funding Corp., the nation’s largest mortgage bank, is summarized [below]. Many have seen the MBA agreement as a preemptive strike against congressional murmurings that mortgage banks should be pulled under the umbrella of the CRA.145 As the first member of the MBA to sign, Countrywide probably realized that there were political advantages in being seen as assisting low-income mortgage lending, and it became one of a relatively small group of subprime lenders who were to prosper enormously as Fannie and Freddie began to look for sources of the subprime loans that would enable them to meet the AH goals. By 1998, there were 117 MBA signatories to HUD’s Best Practices Initiative, which was described as follows: The companies and associations that sign “Best Practices” Agreements not only commit to meeting the responsibilities under the Fair Housing Act, but also make a concerted effort to exceed those requirements. In general, the signatories agree to administer a review process for loan applications to ensure that all applicants have every opportunity to qualify for a mortgage. They also assent to making loans of any size so that all borrowers may be served and to provide information on all loan programs for which an applicant qualifies…. The results of the initiative are promising. As lenders discover new, untapped markets, their minority and low-income loans applications and originations have risen. Consequently, the homeownership rate for low-income and minority groups has increased throughout the nation.146
Countrywide was by far the most important participant in the HUD program. Under that program, it made a series of multi-billion dollar commitments, culminating in a “trillion dollar commitment” to lend to minority and low income 144
HUD’s Best Practices Initiative was described this way by HUD: “Since 1994, HUD has signed Fair Lending Best Practices (FLBP) Agreements with lenders across the nation that are individually tailored to public-private partnerships that are considered on the leading edge. The Agreements not only offer an opportunity to increase low-income and minority lending but they incorporate fair housing and equal opportunity principles into mortgage lending standards. These banks and mortgage lenders, as represented by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., serve as industry leaders in their communities by demonstrating a commitment to affirmatively further fair lending.” Available at: http://www.hud.gov/ local/hi/working/nlwfal2001.cfm. 145
Steve Cocheo, “Fair-Lending Pressure Builds”, ABA Banking Journal, vol. 86, 1994, http://www. questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5001707340.
146 HUD, “Building Communities and New Markets for the 21st Century,” FY 1998 Report , p.75, http:// www.huduser.org/publications/polleg/98con/NewMarkets.pdf.
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families, which in part it fulfilled by selling subprime and other NTMs to Fannie and Freddie. In a 2000 report, the Fannie Mae Foundation noted: “FHA loans constituted the largest share of Countrywide’s activity, until Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began accepting loans with higher LTVs and greater underwriting flexibilities.”147 In late 2007, a few months before its rescue by Bank of America, Countrywide reported that it had made $789 billion in mortgage loans toward its trillion dollar commitment.148
6. The Community Reinvestment Act The most controversial element of the vast increase in NTMs between 1993 and 2008 was the role of the CRA.149 The act, which is applicable only to federally insured depository institutions, was originally adopted in 1977. Its purpose in part was to “require each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use its authority when examining financial institutions to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operations of such institutions.” The enforcement provisions of the Act authorized the bank regulators to withhold approvals for such transactions as mergers and acquisitions and branch network expansion if the applying bank did not have a satisfactory CRA rating. CRA did not have a substantial effect on subprime lending in the years after its enactment until the regulations under the act were tightened in 1995. The 1995 regulations required insured banks to acquire or make “flexible and innovative” mortgages that they would not otherwise have made. In this sense, the CRA and Fannie and Freddie’s AH goals are cut from the same cloth. There were two very distinct applications of the CRA. The first, and the one with the broadest applicability, is a requirement that all insured banks make CRA loans in their respective assessment areas. When the Act is defended, it is almost always discussed in terms of this category—loans in bank assessment areas. Banks (usually privately) complain that they are required by the regulators to make imprudent loans to comply with CRA. One example is the following statement by a local community bank in a report to its shareholders: Under the umbrella of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), a tremendous amount of pressure was put on banks by the regulatory authorities to make loans, especially mortgage loans, to low income borrowers and neighborhoods. The regulators were very heavy handed regarding this issue. I will not dwell on it here but they required [redacted name] to change its mortgage lending practices to meet certain CRA goals, even though we argued the changes were risky and imprudent.150
On the other hand, the regulators defend the act and their actions under it, and particularly any claim that the CRA had a role in the financial crisis. The most frequently cited defense is a speech by former Fed Governor Randall Kroszner on 147
Fannie Mae Foundation, “Making New Markets: Case Study of Countrywide Home Loans,” 2000, http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/programs/pdf/rep_newmortmkts_countrywide.pdf.
148 “Questions and Answers from Countrywide about Lending,” December 11, 2007, available at http:// www.realtown.com/articles/article/print/id/768. 149
12 U.S.C. 2901.
150
Original letter in author’s files.
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December 3, 2008,151 in which he said in pertinent part: Only 6 percent of all the higher-priced loans [those that were considered CRA loans because they bore high interest rates associated with their riskier character] were extended by CRA-covered lenders to lower-income borrowers or neighborhoods in their assessment areas, the local geographies that are the primary focus for CRA evaluation purposes. This result undermines the assertion by critics of the potential for a substantial role for the CRA in the subprime crisis. [emphasis supplied]
There are two points in this statement that require elaboration. First, it assumes that all CRA loans are high-priced loans. This is incorrect. Many banks, in order to be sure of obtaining the necessary number of loans to attain a satisfactory CRA rating, subsidized the loans by making them at lower interest rates than their risk characteristics would warrant. This is true, in part, because CRA loans are generally loans to low income individuals; as such, they are more likely than loans to middle income borrowers to be subprime and Alt-A loans and thus sought after by FHA, Fannie and Freddie and subprime lenders such as Countrywide; this competition is another reason why their rates are likely to be lower than their risk characteristics. Second, while bank lending under CRA in their assessment areas has probably not had a major effect on the overall presence of subprime loans in the U.S. financial system, it is not the element about CRA that raises the concerns about how CRA operated to increase the presence of NTMs in the housing bubble and in the U.S. financial system generally. There is another route through which CRA’s role in the financial crisis likely to be considerably more significant. In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act for the first time allowed banks to merge across state lines under federal law (as distinct from interstate compacts). Under these circumstances, the enforcement provisions of the CRA, which required regulators to withhold approvals of applications for banks that did not have satisfactory CRA ratings, became particularly relevant for large banks that applied to federal bank regulators for merger approvals. In a 2007 speech, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke stated that after the enactment of the Riegle-Neal legislation, “As public scrutiny of bank merger and acquisition activity escalated, advocacy groups increasingly used the public comment process to protest bank applications on CRA grounds. In instances of highly contested applications, the Federal Reserve Board and other agencies held public meetings to allow the public and the applicants to comment on the lending records of the banks in question. In response to these new pressures, banks began to devote more resources to their CRA programs.”152 This modest description, although accurate as far as it goes, does not fully describe the effect of the law and the application process on bank lending practices. In 2007, the umbrella organization for many low-income or community “advocacy groups,” the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, published a report entitled “CRA Commitments” which recounted the substantial success of its members in using the leverage provided by the bank application process to obtain trillions of dollars in CRA lending commitments from banks that had applied to 151 152
Randall Kroszner, Speech at the Confronting Concentrated Poverty Forum, December 3, 2008.
Ben S. Bernanke, “The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges,” March 30, 2007, p2.
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federal regulators for merger approvals. The opening section of the report states (bolded language in the original):153 Since the passage of CRA in 1977, lenders and community organizations have signed over 446 CRA agreements totaling more than $4.5 trillion in reinvestment dollars flowing to minority and lower income neighborhoods. Lenders and community groups will often sign these agreements when a lender has submitted an application to merge with another institution or expand its services. Lenders must seek the approval of federal regulators for their plans to merge or change their services. The four federal financial institution regulatory agencies will scrutinize the CRA records of lenders and will assess the likely future community reinvestment performance of lenders. The application process, therefore, provides an incentive for lenders to sign CRA agreements with community groups that will improve their CRA performance. Recognizing the important role of collaboration between lenders and community groups, the federal agencies have established mechanisms in their application procedures that encourage dialogue and cooperation among the parties in preserving and strengthening community reinvestment. [emphasis supplied]
A footnote to this statement reports: The Federal Reserve Board will grant an extension of the public comment period during its merger application process upon a joint request by a bank and community group. In its commentary to Regulation Y, the Board indicates that this procedure was added to facilitate discussions between banks and community groups regarding programs that help serve the convenience and needs of the community. In its Corporate Manual, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency states that it will not offer the expedited application process to a lender that does not intend to honor a CRA agreement made by the institution that it is acquiring.
153
See Note 12 supra.
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Peter J. Wallison
In its report, the NCRC listed all 446 commitments and includes the following summary list of year-by-year commitments: Table 13. Year
Annual Dollars ($ millions)
Total Dollars ($ millions)
2007
12, 500
4,566,480
2006 2005
258,000 100,276
4,553,980 4,298,980
2004 2003
1,631,140 711,669
4,195,704 2,564,564
2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1980
152,859 414,184 13,681 103,036 812,160 221,345 49,678 26,590 6,128 10,716 33,708 2,443 1,614 2,260 1,248 357 516 73 219 1 6 5 13
1,852,895 1,700,036 1,285,852 1,272,171 1,169,135 356,975 135,630 85,952 59,362 53,234 42,518 8,811 6,378 4,764 2,504 1,256 899 382 309 90 89 83 78
1979 1978 1977
15 0 50
65 50 50
The size of these commitments, which far outstrip the CRA loans made in assessment areas, suggests the potential significance of the CRA as a cause of the financial crisis. It is noteworthy that the Commission majority was not willing even to consider the significance of the NCRC’s numbers. In connection with its only hearing on the housing issue, and before any research had been done on the NCRC statements, the Commission published a report absolving CRA of any responsibility for the financial crisis.154 154
FCIC, “The Community Reinvestment Act and the Mortgage Crisis.” Preliminary Staff Report, http:// www.fcic.gov/reports/pdfs/2010-0407-Preliminary_Staff_Report_-_CRA_and_the_Mortgage_Crisis. pdf.
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Dissenting Statement
To understand CRA’s role in the financial crisis, the relevant statistic is the $4.5 trillion in bank CRA lending commitments that the NCRC cited in its 2007 report. (This document and others that are relevant to this discussion were removed from the NCRC website, www.ncrc.org, after they received publicity but can still be found on the web155). One important question is whether the bank regulators cooperated with community groups by withholding approvals of applications for mergers and acquisitions until an agreement or commitment for CRA lending satisfactory to the community groups had been arranged. It is not difficult to imagine that the regulators did not want the severe criticism from Congress that would have followed their failure to assist community groups in reaching agreements with and getting commitments from banks that had applied for these approvals. In statements in connection with mergers it has approved the Fed has said that commitments by the bank participants about future CRA lending have no influence on the approval process. A Fed official also told the Commission’s staff that the Fed did not consider these commitments in connection with merger applications. The Commission did not attempt to verify this statement, but accepted it at face value from a Fed staff official. Nevertheless, there remains no explanation for why banks have been making these enormous commitments in connection with mergers, but not otherwise. The largest of the commitments, in terms of dollars, were made by four banks or their predecessors—Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, and Wells Fargo—in connection with mergers or acquisitions as shown in Table 14 below.
155
http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/cdfis/report-silver-brown.pdf.
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Peter J. Wallison Table 14. Announced CRA Commitments in Connection with a Merger or Acquisition by Four Largest Banks and Their Predecessors Final bank
Acquired or merged bank/entity with a corresponding announcement of a CRA commitment
CRA commitment (year announced and dollar amount)
Wells Fargo
First Union acquired by Wachovia
2001 ($35 b.)
SouthTrust acquired by Wachovia
2004 ($75 b.)
Chemical merges with Manufacturers Hanover
1991 ($72.5 m.)
NBD acquired by First Chicago
1995 ($2 b.)
Home Savings acquired by Washington Mutual
1998 ($120 b.)
Dime acquired by Washington Mutual
2001 ($375 b.)
Bank One acquired by JPMorgan Chase
2004 ($800 b.)
Continental acquired by Bank of America
1994 ($1 b.)
Bank of America (acquired by NationsBank, which kept the Bank of America name).
1998 ($350 b.)
Bank of Boston acquired by Fleet
1999 ($14.6 b.)
Fleet
2004 ($750 b.)
Travelers
1998 ($115 b.) 1998 ($115 b.)
Cal Fed
2002 ($120 b.)
JPMorgan Chase
Bank of America
Citibank
Compiled by Edward Pinto from the NCRC 2007 report CRA Commitments, found at http://www. community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/cdfis/report-silver-brown.pdf , NCRC testimony regarding Bank of America’s $1.5 trillion in CRA agreements and commitments in conjunction with its 2008 acquisition of Countrywide found at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ taylor_testimony_-_4.15.10.pdf.
Given the enormous size of the commitments reported by NCRC, the key questions are: (i) how many of these commitments were actually fulfilled by the banks that made them, (ii) where are these loans today, and (iii) how are these loans performing? Currently, in light of the severely limited Commission investigation of this issue, there are only partial answers to these questions. Were the loans actually made? The banks that made these commitments apparently came under pressure from community groups to fulfill them. In an interview by Brad Bondi of the Commission’s staff, Josh Silver of the NCRC noted that community groups did follow up these commitments. Bondi: Who follows up…to make sure that these banks honor their voluntary agreements or their unilateral commitments?
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Dissenting Statement
Silver: Actually part of some of these CRA agreements was meeting with the bank two or three times a year and actually going through, ‘Here’s what you’ve promised. Here’s what you’ve loaned.’ That would happen on a one-on-one basis with the banks and the community organizations.156
Nevertheless, when the Commission staff asked the four largest banks (Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo) for data on whether the merger-related commitments were fulfilled and in what amount, most of the banks supplied only limited information. They contended that they did not have the information or that it was too difficult to get, and the information they supplied was sketchy at best. In some cases, the information supplied to the Commission by the banks, in letters from their counsel, reflected fewer loans than they had claimed in press releases to have made in fulfillment of their commitments. The press release amounts were JPMorgan Chase (including WaMu, $835 billion), Citi ($274 billion), and Bank of America ($229 billion), totaled $1.3 trillion in CRA loans between 2001 and 2008, and had been presented to the Commission by Edward Pinto in the Triggers memo.157 No Wells Fargo press releases could be found, but in response to questions from the Commission Wells provided a great deal of data in spread sheets that could not be interpreted or understood without further discussion with representatives of the bank. However, the Commission terminated the investigation of the merger-related CRA commitments in August 2010, before the necessary data could be gathered. For this reason, the Wells data could not be unpacked, interpreted in discussion with Wells officials, and analyzed. After I protested the limited efforts of the Commission on this issue in October 2010, the Commission made a belated attempt to restart the investigation of the merger-related CRA commitments in November. However, only one bank had responded by the deadline for submission of this dissenting statement. As with the bank responses, additional work was required to understand the information received, and there was no time, and no Commission staff, to follow up. As a result of the dilatory nature of the Commission’s investigation, it was impossible to determine how many loans were actually made under their mergerrelated CRA commitments by the four banks and their predecessors. This in turn impeded any effort to find out where these loans are today and hence their delinquency rates. It appears that in many instances the Commission management constrained the staff in their investigation into CRA by limiting the number of document requests and interviews and by preventing the staff from following up with the institutions that failed to respond adequately to requests for data. Where are these mortgages today? Where these loans are today must necessarily be a matter of speculation. Some of the banks told the FCIC staff that they do not distinguish between CRA loans and other loans, and so could not provide this information. Under the GSE Act, Fannie and Freddie had an affirmative obligation to help banks to meet their CRA obligations, and they undoubtedly served as a buyer for the loans made by the largest banks and their predecessors pursuant to 156 157
Interview of Josh Silver of the National Community Reinvestment Coalition, June 16, 2010.
Edward Pinto, Exhibit 2 to the Triggers memo, dated April 21, 2010, http://www.aei.org/docLib/ Pinto-Sizing-Total-Federal-Contributions.pdf.
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531
the commitments. In a press release in 2003, for example, Fannie reported that it had acquired $394 billion in CRA loans, about $201 billion of which occurred in 2002.158 This amounted to approximately 50 percent of Fannie’s AH acquisitions for that year. In the Triggers memo, based on his research, Pinto estimated that Fannie and Freddie purchased about 50 percent of all CRA loans over the period from 2001 to 2007 and that, of the balance, about 10-15 percent were insured by FHA, 10-15 percent were sold to Wall Street, and the rest remain on the books of the banks that originated the loans.159 Many of these loans are likely unsaleable in the secondary market because they were made at rates that did not compensate for risk or lacked mortgage insurance—again, the competition for these loans among the GSEs, FHA and the banks operating under CRA requirements inevitably raised their prices and thus underpriced their risk. To sell these loans, the banks holding them would have to take losses, which many are unwilling to do. What are the delinquency rates? Under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act HMDA), banks are required to provide data to the Fed from which the delinquency rates on loans that have high interest rates can be calculated. It was assumed that these were the loans that might bear watching as potentially predatory. When Fannie and Freddie, FHA, Countrywide and other subprime lenders and banks under CRA are all seeking the same loans—roughly speaking, loans to borrowers at or below the AMI—it is likely that these loans when actually made will bear concessionary interest rates so that their rate spread is not be reportable under HMDA. It’s just supply and demand. Accordingly, the banks that made CRA loans pursuant to their commitments have no obligation to record and report their delinquency rates, and as noted above several of the large banks that made major commitments recorded by the NCRC told FCIC staff that they don’t keep records about the performance of CRA loans apart from other mortgages. However, in the past few years, Bank of America has been reporting the performance of CRA loans in its annual report to the SEC on form 10-K. For example, the bank’s 10-K for 2009 contained the following statement: “At December 31, 2009, our CRA portfolio comprised six percent of the total residential mortgage balances, but comprised 17 percent of nonperforming residential mortgage loans. This portfolio also comprised 20 percent of residential net charge-offs during 2009. While approximately 32 percent of our residential mortgage portfolio carries risk mitigation protection, only a small portion of our CRA portfolio is covered by this protection.”160 This could be an approximation for the delinquency rate on the merger-related CRA loans that the four banks made in fulfilling their commitments, but without definitive information on the number of loans made and the banks’ current holdings it is impossible to make this estimate with any confidence. In a letter from its counsel, another bank reported serious delinquency rates on the loans made pursuant to its merger-related commitments ranging from 5 percent to 50 percent, with the largest sample showing a 25 percent delinquency rate. 158 “Fannie Mae Passes Halfway Point in $2 Trillion American Dream Commitment; Leads Market in Bringing Housing Boom to Underserved Families, Communities” http://findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi_m0EIN/is_2003_March_18/ai_98885990/pg_3/?tag=content;col1. 159
Triggers memo, p.47.
160
Bank of America, 2009 10-K, p.57.
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Dissenting Statement
Further investigation of this issue is necessary, including on the role of the bank regulators, in order to determine what effect, if any, the merger-related commitments to make CRA loans might have had on the number of NTMs in the U.S. financial system before the financial crisis.
IV. CONCLUSION This dissenting statement argues that the U.S. government’s housing policies were the major contributor to the financial crisis of 2008. These policies fostered the development of a massive housing bubble between 1997 and 2007 and the creation of 27 million subprime and Alt-A loans, many of which were ready to default as soon as the housing bubble began to deflate. The losses associated with these weak and high risk loans caused either the real or apparent weakness of the major financial institutions around the world that held these mortgages—or PMBS backed by these mortgages—as investments or as sources of liquidity. Deregulation, lack of regulation, predatory lending or the other factors that were cited in the report of the FCIC’s majority were not determinative factors. The policy implications of this conclusion are significant. If the crisis could have been prevented simply by eliminating or changing the government policies and programs that were primarily responsible for the financial crisis, then there was no need for the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, adopted by Congress in July 2010 and often cited as one of the important achievements of the Obama administration and the 111th Congress. The stringent regulation that the Dodd-Frank Act imposes on the U.S. economy will almost certainly have a major adverse effect on economic growth and job creation in the United States during the balance of this decade. If this was the price that had to be paid for preventing another financial crisis then perhaps it’s one that will have to be borne. But if it was not necessary to prevent another crisis—and it would not have been necessary if the crisis was caused by actions of the government itself—then the Dodd-Frank Act seriously overreached. Finally, if the principal cause of the financial crisis was ultimately the government’s involvement in the housing finance system, housing finance policy in the future should be adjusted accordingly.
533
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Dissenting Statement
APPENDIX 1 Hypothetical Losses in Two Scenarios (No feedback) Scenario 1 is what was known to market professional during the 2nd half of 2007; Scenario 2 is the actual condition of the mortgage market. Second mortgage/home equity loan losses are excluded. Assumptions used: Number of mortgages= 53 million; Total value of first mortgages=$9.155 trillion; Losses on Prime=1.2%% (assumes 3% foreclosure rate & 40% severity); Losses on Subprime/Alt-A=12% (assumes 30% foreclosure rate & 40% severity); Average size of mortgage: $173,000 Losses in Scenario 1 Number of mortgages: 53 million Prime=40 million Subprime/Alt-A = 13 million (7.7. PMBS million + FHA/VA=5.2 million) Aggregate Value: Prime =$6.9 trillion ($173,000 X 40 million); Subprime/Alt-A=$2.25 trillion ($173,000 X 13 million) Losses on foreclosures: $353 billion ($6.9 trillion prime X 1.2%=$83 billion + $2.25 trillion subprime/Alt-A X 12%=$270 billion Overall loss percentage: 3.5% Losses in Scenario 2 Number of mortgages: 53 million Prime: 27 million Subprime/Alt-A: Original subprime/Alt-A: 13 million Other subprime/Alt-A: 13 million (10.5 F&F (excludes 1.25 million already counted in PMBS) + 2.5 million other loans not securitized (mostly held by the large banks)) Aggregate Value: Prime= $4.7 trillion ($173,000 X 27 million); Subprime/Alt-A = $4.5 trillion ($173,000 X 26 million) Losses on foreclosures: $596 billion ($4.7 trillion X 1.2%=$56 billion + $4.5 trillion X 12%=$540 billion) Overall loss percentage: 6.5%, for an increase of 86% Note: No allowance for feedback effectâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;that is, fall in home prices as a result of larger number of foreclosures in Scenario 2. With feedback effect, losses would 535
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be even larger in Scenario 2 because a larger number of foreclosures would drive down housing prices further and faster. This feedback effect will likely cause total first mortgage losses to approach $1 trillion or 10% of outstanding first mortgages.
APPENDIX 2 Hypothetical Losses in Two Scenarios (with feedback) Scenario 1 is what was known to market professional during the 2nd half of 2007; Scenario 2 is the actual condition of the mortgage market. Second mortgage/home equity loan losses are excluded. Assumptions used: Number of mortgages= 53 million; Total value of first mortgages=$9.155 trillion; Scenario 1: Losses on prime=1.2%% (assumes 3% foreclosure rate & 40% severity); Losses on self-denominated subprime & Alt-A=14% ((assumes 35% foreclosure rate & 40% severity); Losses on FHA/VA=5.25% (assumes 15% foreclosure rate and 35% severity) Scenario 2: Losses on prime=1.6%% (assumes 3.5% foreclosure rate and 45% severity); Losses on self-denominated subprime & Alt-A=25% (assumes 45% foreclosure rate & 55% severity); Losses on FHA/VA & unknown subprime/Alt-A=15% (assumes 30% foreclosure rate & 50% severity) Average size of mortgage: Prime: $173,000 ($6.75 trillion/39 million) Subprime/Alt-A/FHA/VA: $182,000 ($2.4 trillion/13 million Losses in Scenario 1 Number of mortgages: 53 million Prime=40 million Subprime/Alt-A=7.7 million PMBS FHA, and VA=5.2 million Aggregate Value: Prime =$6.9 trillion ($173,000 X 39 million); Subprime/Alt-A=$1.7 trillion ($220,000 X 7.7 million) FHA/VA= $700 billion ($130,000x5.2 million) Total expected foreclosures: 4.7 million (3% X 39 million + 35% X 7.7 million + 15% X 5.2 million) Losses on foreclosures: $360 billion ($6.9 trillion prime X 1.2%=$83 billion + 1.7 trillion subprime/Alt-A X 14%=$240 billion + $700 billion X 5.25%=37 billion) Overall loss percentage: 3.9%
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Losses in Scenario 2 Number of mortgages: 53 million Prime: 27 million Original subprime/Alt-A: 7.7 million FHA/VA: 5.2 million Other subprime/Alt-A: 13 million (10.5 F&F (excludes 1.25 million already counted in PMBS), 2.5 million other loans not securitized (mostly held by the large banks)) Aggregate Value: Prime= $4.7 trillion ($173,000 X 27 million); Original Subprime/Alt-A = $1.7 trillion ($220,000 X 7.7 million) FHA/VA= $700 billion ($130,000x5.2 million) Other subprime/Alt-A: $2 trillion ($154,000X13 million Total expected foreclosures: 8.4 million (3.5% X 27 million=0.95 million, 45% X 7.7 million=3.5 million, 30% X 13 million=3.9 million) Losses on foreclosures: $890 billion ($4.7 trillion X 1.6%=$60 billion + $1.7 trillion X 25%=$425 billion + $700 billion X 15% = $105 billion + $2 trillion X 15% = $300 billion) Overall loss percentage: 9.8%, for an increase of 150%
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY
Italicized terms within definitions are defined separately. ABCP see asset-backed commercial paper. ABS see asset-backed security. ABX.HE A series of derivatives indices constructed from the prices of credit default swaps that each reference individual subprime mortgage–backed securities; akin to an index like the Dow Jones Industrial Average. adjustable-rate mortgage A mortgage whose interest rate changes periodically over time. affordable housing goals Goals originally set by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (now by the Federal Housing Finance Agency) for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to allocate a specified part of their mortgage business to serve low- and moderate-income borrowers. ARM see adjustable-rate mortgage. ARS see auction rate securities. asset-backed commercial paper Short-term debt secured by assets. asset-backed security Debt instrument secured by assets such as mortgages, credit card loans or auto loans. auction rate securities Long-term bonds whose interest rate may be reset at regular short-term intervals by an auction process. bank holding company Company that controls a bank. broker-dealer A firm, often the subsidiary of an investment bank, that buys and sells securities for itself and others. capital Assets minus liabilities; what a firm owns minus what it owes. Regulators often require financial firms to hold minimum levels of capital. Capital Purchase Program TARP program providing financial assistance to -plus U.S. financial institutions through the purchase of senior preferred shares in the corporations on standardized terms. CDO see collateralized debt obligation. CDO squared CDO that holds other CDOs. CDS see credit default swap. CFTC see Commodity Futures Trading Commission. collateralized debt obligation Type of security often composed of the riskier portions of mortgage-backed securities. commercial paper Short-term unsecured corporate debt. Commercial Paper Funding Facility Emergency program created by the Federal Reserve in to purchase three-month unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper from eligible companies. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Independent federal agency that regulates trading in futures and options.
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Community Reinvestment Act federal law encouraging depository institutions to make loans and provide services in the local communities in which they take deposits. Consolidated Supervised Entities program A Securities and Exchange Commission program created in and terminated in that provided voluntary supervision for the five largest investment bank conglomerates. Counterparty A party to a contract. CP see commercial paper. CPP see Capital Purchase Program. CRA see Community Reinvestment Act. credit default swap A type of credit derivative allowing a purchaser of the swap to transfer loan default risk to a seller of the swap. The seller agrees to pay the purchaser if a default event occurs. The purchaser does not need to own the loan covered by the swap. credit enhancement Insurance or other protection that may be purchased for a loan or pool of loans to offset losses in the event of default. credit loss Loss from delayed payments or defaults on loans. credit rating agency Private company that evaluates the credit quality of securities and provides ratings on those securities; the largest are Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Investors Service, and Standard & Poor’s. credit risk Risk to a lender that a borrower will fail to repay the loan. CSE Consolidated Supervised Entity (see Consolidated Supervised Entities program). debt-to-income ratio One measure of a borrower’s ability to repay a loan, generally calculated by dividing the borrower’s monthly debt payments by gross monthly income. delinquency rate The number of loans for which borrowers fail to make timely loan payments divided by total loans. Department of Housing and Urban Development Cabinet-level federal department responsible for housing policies and programs. Department of Justice Cabinet-level federal department responsible for enforcement of laws and administration of justice, led by the attorney general. Department of Treasury Treasury of the federal government; prints and mints all currency and coins, collects federal taxes, manages U.S. government debt instruments, supervises national banks and thrifts, and advises on domestic and international fiscal policy. Its mission includes protecting the integrity of the financial system. depository institution Financial institution, such as a commercial bank, thrift (savings and loan), or credit union, that accepts deposits, including deposits insured by the FDIC. derivative Financial contract whose price is determined (derived) from the value of an underlying asset, rate, index, or event. Fannie Mae Nickname for the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), a governmentsponsored enterprise providing financing for the home mortgage market. FCIC Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. FDIC see Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Independent federal agency charged primarily with insuring deposits at financial institutions, examining and supervising some of those institutions, and shutting down failing institutions. Federal Housing Administration Part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development that provides insurance on mortgage loans made by FHA-approved lenders. Federal Housing Finance Agency Independent federal regulator of government-sponsored enterprises; created by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of as successor to the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and the Federal Housing Finance Board. Federal Open Market Committee Its members are the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Appendix A: Glossary
541
System and certain of the presidents of the Federal Reserve Banks; oversees market conditions and implements monetary policy through such means as setting interest rates. Federal Reserve Bank of New York One of regional Federal Reserve Banks, with responsibility for regulating bank holding companies in New York State and nearby areas. Federal Reserve U.S. central banking system created in in response to financial panics, consisting of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, DC, and Federal Reserve Banks around the country; its mission is to implement monetary policy through such means as setting interest rates, supervising and regulating banking institutions, maintaining the stability of the financial system, and providing financial services to depository institutions. FHA see Federal Housing Administration. FHFA see Federal Housing Finance Agency. FICO score A measure of a borrower’s creditworthiness based on the borrower’s credit data; developed by the Fair Isaac Corporation. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network Treasury office that collects and analyzes information about financial transactions to combat money laundering, terroristfinancing, and other financial crimes. FinCEN see Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. FOMC see Federal Open Market Committee. foreclosure Legal process whereby a mortgage lender gains ownership of the real property securing a defaulted mortgage. Freddie Mac Nickname for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), a government-sponsored enterprise providing financing for the home mortgage market. Ginnie Mae Nickname for the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), a government-sponsored enterprise; guarantees pools of VA and FHA mortgages. Glass-Steagall Act Banking Act of creating the FDIC to insure bank deposits; prohibited commercial banks from underwriting or dealing in most types of securities, barred banks from affiliating with securities firms, and introduced other banking reforms. In , the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act that prohibited affiliations between banks and securities firms. government-sponsored enterprise A private corporation, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, created by the federal government to pursue certain public policy goals designated in its charter. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act legislation that lifted certain remaining restrictions established by the Glass-Steagall Act. GSE see government-sponsored enterprise. haircut The difference between the value of an asset and the amount borrowed against it. hedge In finance, a way to reduce exposure or risk by taking on a new financial contract. hedge fund A privately offered investment vehicle exempted from most regulation and oversight; generally open only to high-net-worth investors. HOEPA see Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act federal law that gave the Federal Reserve new responsibility to address abusive and predatory mortgage lending practices. Housing and Economic Recovery Act law including measures to reform and regulate the GSEs; created the Federal Housing Finance Agency. HUD see Department of Housing and Urban Development. hybrid CDO A CDO backed by collateral found in both cash CDOs and synthetic CDOs. illiquid assets Assets that cannot be easily or quickly sold. interest-only loan Loan that allows borrowers to pay interest without repaying principal until the end of the loan term.
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Appendix A: Glossary
leverage A measure of how much debt is used to purchase assets; for example, a leverage ratio of : means that of assets were purchased with of debt and of capital. LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate, an interest rate at which banks are willing to lend to each other in the London interbank market. liquidity Holding cash and/or assets that can be quickly and easily converted to cash. liquidity put A contract allowing one party to compel the other to buy an asset under certain circumstances. It ensures that there will be a buyer for otherwise illiquid assets. loan-to-value ratio Ratio of the amount of a mortgage to the value of the house, typically expressed as a percentage. “Combined” loan-to-value includes all debt secured by the house, including second mortgages. LTV ratio see loan-to-value ratio. mark-to-market The process by which the reported amount of an asset is adjusted to reflect the market value. monoline Insurance company, such as AMBAC and MBIA, whose single line of business is to guarantee financial products. mortgage servicer Company that acts as an agent for mortgage holders, collecting and distributing payments from borrowers and handling defaults, modifications, settlements, and foreclosure proceedings. mortgage underwriting Process of evaluating the credit characteristics of a mortgage and borrower. mortgage-backed security Debt instrument secured by a pool of mortgages, whether residential or commercial. NAV see net asset value. negative amortization loan Loan that allows a borrower to make monthly payments that do not fully cover the interest payment, with the unpaid interest added to the principal of the loan. net asset value Value of an asset minus any associated costs; for financial assets, typically changes each trading day. net charge-off rate Ratio of loan losses to total loans. non-agency mortgage-backed securities Mortgage-backed securities sponsored by private companies other than a government-sponsored enterprise (such as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac); also known as private-label mortgage-backed securities. notional amount A measure of the outstanding amount of over-the-counter derivatives contracts, based on the amount of the underlying referenced assets. novation A process by which counterparties may transfer derivatives positions. OCC see Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight Created in to oversee financial soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; its responsibilities were assumed in by its successor, the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Independent bureau within Department of Treasury that charters, regulates, and supervises all national banks and certain branches and agencies of foreign banks in the United States. Office of Thrift Supervision Independent bureau within Treasury that regulates all federally chartered and many state-chartered savings and loans/thrift institutions and their holding companies. OFHEO see Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. originate-to-distribute When lenders make loans with the intention of selling them to other financial institutions or investors, as opposed to holding the loans through maturity. originate-to-hold When lenders make loans with the intention of holding them through maturity, as opposed to selling them to other financial institutions or investors.
Appendix A: Glossary
543
origination Process of making a loan, including underwriting, closing, and providing the funds. OTS see Office of Thrift Supervision. par Face value of a bond. payment-option adjustable-rate mortgage (also called payment ARM or option ARM) Mortgages that allow borrowers to pick the amount of payment each month, possibly low enough to increase the principal balance. PDCF see Primary Dealer Credit Facility. PLS see private-label mortgage-backed securities. pooling Combining and packaging a group of loans to be held by a single entity. Primary Dealer Credit Facility Program established by the Federal Reserve in March that allowed eligible companies to borrow cash overnight to finance their securities. principal Amount borrowed. private mortgage insurance Insurance on the payment of a mortgage provided by a private firm at additional cost to the borrower to protect the lender. private-label mortgage-backed securities see non-agency mortgage-backed securities. repurchase agreement (repo) A method of secured lending where the borrower sells securities to the lender as collateral and agrees to repurchase them at a higher price within a short period, often within one day. SEC see Securities and Exchange Commission. section () Section of the Federal Reserve Act under which the Federal Reserve may make secured loans to nondepository institutions, such as investment banks, under “unusual and exigent” circumstances. Securities and Exchange Commission Independent federal agency responsible for protecting investors by enforcing federal securities laws, including regulating stock and security options exchanges and other electronic securities markets, the issuance and sale of securities, broker-dealers, other securities professionals, and investment companies. securitization Process of pooling debt assets such as mortgages, car loans, and credit card debt into a separate legal entity that then issues a new financial instrument or security for sale to investors. shadow banking Financial institutions and activities that in some respects parallel banking activities but are subject to less regulation than commercial banks. Institutions include mutual funds, investment banks, and hedge funds. short sale The sale of a home for less than the amount owed on the mortgage. short selling To sell a borrowed security in the expectation of a decline in value. SIV see structured investment vehicle. special purpose vehicle Entity created to fulfill a narrow or temporary objective; typically holds a portfolio of assets such as mortgage-backed securities or other debt obligations; often used because of regulatory and bankruptcy advantages. SPV see special purpose vehicle. structured investment vehicle Leveraged special purpose vehicle, funded through medium-term notes and asset-backed commercial paper, that invested in highly rated securities. synthetic CDO A CDO that holds credit default swaps that reference assets (rather than holding cash assets), allowing investors to make bets for or against those referenced assets. systemic risk In financial terms, that which poses a threat to the financial system. systemic risk exception Clause in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) under which the FDIC may commit its funds to rescue a financial institution. TAF see Term Auction Facility. TALF see Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. TARP see Troubled Asset Relief Program.
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Appendix A: Glossary
Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility Federal Reserve program, supported by TARP funds, to aid securitization of asset-based loans such as auto loans, student loans, and small business loans. Term Auction Facility Program in which the Federal Reserve made funds available to all depository institutions at once through a regular auction. Term Securities Lending Facility Emergency program in which the Federal Reserve made up to billion in Treasury securities available to banks or broker/dealers that traded directly with the Federal Reserve. tranche From the French, meaning a slice; used to refer to the different types of mortgage-backed securities and CDO bonds that provide specified priorities and amounts of returns: “senior” tranches have the highest priority of returns and therefore the lowest risk/interest rate; mezzanine tranches have mid levels of risk/return; and “equity” (also known as “residual” or “first loss”) tranches typically receive any remaining cash flows. Troubled Asset Relief Program Government program to address the financial crisis, signed into law in October to purchase or insure up to billion in assets and equity from financial and other institutions. TSLF see Term Securities Lending Facility. undercapitalized Condition in which a business does not have enough capital to meet its needs, or to meet its capital requirements if it is a regulated entity. Write-downs Reducing the value of an asset as it is carried on a firm’s balance sheet because the market value has fallen.
APPENDIX B: LIST OF HEARINGS AND WITNESSES
Public Meeting of the FCIC, Washington, DC, September , Statements by commissioners
Roundtable Discussion, Washington, DC, October , Martin Baily, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies, Brookings Institution Simon Johnson, Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Hal S. Scott, Nomura Professor and Director of the Program on International Financial Systems, Harvard Law School Joseph Stiglitz, Professor, Columbia Business School, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (Department of Economics) and the School of International and Public Affairs John B. Taylor, Mary and Robert Raymond Professor of Economics and the Bowen H. and Janice Arthur McCoy Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University Luigi Zingales, Robert C. McCormack Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance and the David G. Booth Faculty Fellow, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Roundtable Discussion, Washington, DC, November , David A. Moss, The John G. McLean Professor, Harvard Business School Carmen M. Reinhart, Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for International Economics, University of Maryland
Public Hearing, Washington, DC, Day , January , Session : Financial Institution Representatives Lloyd C. Blankfein, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. James Dimon, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, JPMorgan Chase & Co. John J. Mack, Chairman of the Board, Morgan Stanley Brian T. Moynihan, Chief Executive Officer and President, Bank of America Corporation
Session : Financial Market Participants Michael Mayo, Managing Director and Financial Services Analyst, Calyon Securities (USA) Inc. J. Kyle Bass, Managing Partner, Hayman Advisors, LP Peter J. Solomon, Founder and Chairman, Peter J. Solomon Company
Session : Financial Crisis Impacts on the Economy
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Appendix B: List of Hearings and Witnesses
Mark Zandi, Chief Economist and Co-founder, Moody’s Economy.com Kenneth T. Rosen, Chair, Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, University of California, Berkeley Julia Gordon, Senior Policy Counsel, Center for Responsible Lending C. R. “Rusty” Cloutier, President and Chief Executive Officer, MidSouth Bank, N.A., Past Chairman, Independent Community Bankers Association
Public Hearing, Washington, DC, Day , January , Session : Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—Federal Officials Eric H. Holder Jr., Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Session : Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—State and Local Officials Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois John W. Suthers, Attorney General, State of Colorado Denise Voigt Crawford, Commissioner, Texas Securities Board, and President, North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. Glenn Theobald, Chief Counsel, Miami-Dade County Police Department; Chairman, Mayor Carlos Alvarez Mortgage Fraud Task Force
Forum to Explore the Causes of the Financial Crisis, American University Washington College of Law, Washington, DC, Day , February , Session : Interconnectedness of Financial Institutions; “Too Big to Fail” Randall Kroszner, Norman R. Bobins Professor of Economics, University of Chicago
Session : Macroeconomic Factors and U.S. Monetary Policy Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Associate Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
Session : Risk Taking and Leverage John Geanakoplos, James Tobin Professor of Economics, Yale University
Session : Household Finances and Financial Literacy Annamaria Lusardi, Joel Z. and Susan Hyatt Professor of Economics, Dartmouth University; Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research
Forum to Explore the Causes of the Financial Crisis, American University Washington College of Law, Washington, DC, Day , February , Session : Mortgage Lending Practices and Securitization Chris Mayer, Paul Milstein Professor of Real Estate, Columbia University; Visiting Scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research
Session : Government-Sponsored Enterprises and Housing Policy Dwight Jaffee, Willis Booth Professor of Banking, Finance, and Real Estate; Co-chair, Fisher Center for Real Estate and Urban Economics, University of California, Berkeley
Session : Derivatives and Other Complex Financial Instruments Markus Brunnermeier, Edwards S. Sanford Professor of Economics, Princeton University
Appendix B: List of Hearings and Witnesses
547
Session : Firm Structure and Risk Management Anil Kashyap, Edward Eagle Brown Professor of Economics and Finance and Richard N. Rosett Faculty Fellow, University of Chicago
Session : Shadow Banking Gary Gorton, Professor of Finance, School of Management, Yale University
Public Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Rayburn House Office Building, Room , Washington, DC, Day , April , Session : The Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Session : Subprime Origination and Securitization Richard Bitner, Managing Director of Housingwire.com; Author, Confessions of a Subprime Lender: An Insider’s Tale of Greed, Fraud, and Ignorance Richard Bowen, Former Senior Vice President and Business Chief Underwriter, CitiMortgage, Inc. Patricia Lindsay, Former Vice President, Corporate Risk, New Century Financial Corporation Susan Mills, Managing Director of Mortgage Finance, Citi Markets & Banking, Global Securitized Markets
Session : Citigroup Subprime-Related Structured Products and Risk Management Murray C. Barnes, Former Managing Director, Independent Risk, Citigroup, Inc. David C. Bushnell, Former Chief Risk Officer, Citigroup, Inc. Nestor Dominguez, Former Co-head, Global Collateralized Debt Obligations, Citi Markets & Banking, Global Structured Credit Products Thomas G. Maheras, Former Co-chief Executive Officer, Citi Markets & Banking
Public Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Rayburn House Office Building, Room , Washington, DC, Day , April , Session : Citigroup Senior Management Charles O. Prince, Former Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Citigroup, Inc. Robert Rubin, Former Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors, Citigroup, Inc.
Session : Office of the Comptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke Jr., Former Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Public Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), Rayburn House Office building, Room , Washington, DC, Day , April , Session : Fannie Mae Robert J. Levin, Former Executive Vice President and Chief Business Officer, Fannie Mae Daniel H. Mudd, Former President and Chief Executive Officer, Fannie Mae
Session : Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight Armando Falcon Jr., Former Director, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight James Lockhart, Former Director, Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight
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Appendix B: List of Hearings and Witnesses
Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room , Washington DC, Day , May , Session : Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System Paul Friedman, Former Senior Managing Director, Bear Stearns Samuel Molinaro Jr., Former Chief Financial Officer and Chief Operating Officer, Bear Stearns Warren Spector, Former President and Co-chief Operating Officer, Bear Stearns
Session : Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System James E. Cayne, Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Bear Stearns Alan D. Schwartz, Former Chief Executive Officer, Bear Stearns
Session : SEC Regulation of Investment Banks Charles Christopher Cox, Former Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission William H. Donaldson, Former Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission H. David Kotz, Inspector General, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Erik R. Sirri, Former Director Division of Trading & Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Public Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room , Washington DC, Day , May , Session : Perspective on the Shadow Banking System Henry M. Paulson Jr., Former Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury
Session : Perspective on the Shadow Banking System Timothy F. Geithner, Secretary, U.S. Department of the Treasury; Former President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Session : Institutions Participating in the Shadow Banking System Michael A. Neal, Vice Chairman, General Electric; Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, GE Capital Mark S. Barber, Vice President and Deputy Treasurer, GE Capital Paul A. McCulley, Managing Director, PIMCO Steven R. Meier, Chief Investment Officer, State Street
Public Hearing on Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, The New School Arnhold Hall, Theresa Lang Community & Student Center, West th Street, nd Floor, New York, NY, June , Session : The Ratings Process Eric Kolchinsky, Former Team Managing Director, US Derivatives, Moody’s Investors Service Jay Siegel, Former Team Managing Director, Moody’s Investors Service Nicolas S. Weill, Group Managing Director, Moody’s Investors Service Gary Witt, Former Team Managing Director, US Derivatives, Moody’s Investors Service
Session : Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis Warren E. Buffett, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Berkshire Hathaway Raymond W. McDaniel, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Moody’s Corporation
Session : The Credit Rating Agency Business Model Brian M. Clarkson, Former President and Chief Operating Officer, Moody’s Investors Service (written testimony only due to a medical emergency) Mark Froeba, Former Senior Vice President, US Derivatives, Moody’s Investors Service Richard Michalek, Former Vice President/Senior Credit Officer, Moody’s Investors Service
Appendix B: List of Hearings and Witnesses
549
Public Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room , Washington, DC, Day , June , Session : Overview of Derivatives Michael Greenberger, Professor, University of Maryland School of Law Steve Kohlhagen, Former Professor of International Finance, University of California, Berkeley, and former Wall Street derivatives executive Albert “Pete” Kyle, Charles E. Smith Chair Professor of Finance, University of Maryland Michael Masters, Chief Executive Officer, Masters Capital Management, LLC
Session : American International Group, Inc. and Derivatives Joseph J. Cassano, Former Chief Executive Officer, American International Group, Inc. Financial Products Robert E. Lewis, Senior Vice President and Chief Risk Officer, American International Group, Inc. Martin J. Sullivan, Former Chief Executive Officer, American International Group, Inc.
Session : Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Derivatives Craig Broderick, Managing Director, Head of Credit, Market, and Operational Risk, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Gary D. Cohn, President and Chief Operating Officer, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Public Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room , Washington DC, Day , July , Session : American International Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Steven J. Bensinger, Former Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, American International Group, Inc. Andrew Forster, Former Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, American International Group, Inc. Financial Services Elias F. Habayeb, Former Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, American International Group, Inc. Financial Services David Lehman, Managing Director, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc David Viniar, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.
Session : Derivatives: Supervisors and Regulators Eric R. Dinallo, Former Superintendant, New York State Insurance Department Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Clarence K. Lee, Former Managing Director for Complex and International Organizations, Office of Thrift Supervision
Public Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room , Washington DC, Day , September , Session : Wachovia Corporation Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System John H. Corston, Acting Deputy Director, Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection, U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Robert K. Steel, Former President and Chief Executive Officer, Wachovia Corporation
Session : Lehman Brothers Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., General Counsel and Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
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Appendix B: List of Hearings and Witnesses
Richard S. “Dick” Fuld Jr., Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Lehman Brothers Harvey R. Miller, Business Finance & Restructuring Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP Barry L. Zubrow, Chief Risk Officer, JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Public Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Room , Washington DC, Day , September , Session : The Federal Reserve Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Session : The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Public Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Greater Bakersfield, Kern County Board of Supervisors Chambers, Truxtun Avenue, Bakersfield, CA, September , Session : Welcome Congressman Kevin McCarthy, California’s nd District Ray Watson, Kern County Supervisor, District Irma Carson, Bakersfield City Councilwoman, Ward
Session : Local Banking Arnold Cattani, Chairman, Mission Bank Steve Renock, President and CEO, Kern Schools Federal Credit Union D. Linn Wiley, Vice Chairman, CVB Financial Corporation and Citizens Business Bank
Session : Residential and Community Real Estate Gregory D. Bynum, President, Gregory D. Bynum and Associates, Inc. Warren Peterson, Warren Peterson Construction, Inc.
Session : Local Housing Market Gary Crabtree, Principal Owner, Affiliated Appraisers Lloyd Plank, Lloyd E. Plank Real Estate Consultants
Session : Foreclosures and Loan Modifications Brenda Amble, Escrow Manager, Ticor Title Laurie McCarty, Coldwell Banker Preferred Jeannie McDermott, Small Business Owner
Session : Forum for Public Comment James Stephen Urner Marvin Dean Marie Vasile
Public Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—State of Nevada, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, Student Union Building, Las Vegas, NV, September , Session : Economic Analysis of the Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Jeremy Aguero, Principal, Applied Analysis
Session : The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Businesses of Nevada Steve Hill, Founder, Silver State Materials Corporation; Immediate Past Chairman, Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce William E. Martin, Vice Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Service st Bank of Nevada
Appendix B: List of Hearings and Witnesses
551
Wally Murray, President and Chief Executive Officer, Greater Nevada Credit Union Philip G. Satre, Chairman, International Gaming Technology (IGT); Chairman, NV Energy, Inc.
Session : The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Real Estate Daniel G. Bogden, United States Attorney, State of Nevada Gail Burks, President and Chief Executive Officer, Nevada Fair Housing Center Brian Gordon, Principal, Applied Analysis Jay Jeffries, Former Southwest Regional Sales Manager, Fremont Investment & Loan
Session : The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Public and Community Services Andrew Clinger, Director of the Department of Administration, Chief of the Budget Division, State of Nevada Jeffrey Fontaine, Executive Director, Nevada Association of Counties David Fraser, Executive Director, Nevada League of Cities Dr. Heath Morrison, Superintendent, Washoe County School District
Session : Forum for Public Comment Public Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Miami, Florida, Florida International University, Modesto A. Madique Campus, Miami, FL, September , Session : Overview of Mortgage Fraud William K. Black, Associate Professor of Economics and Law, University of Missouri–Kansas City Ann Fulmer, Vice President of Business Relations, Interthinx; Co-founder, Georgia Real Estate Fraud Prevention and Awareness Coalition Henry N. Pontell, Professor of Criminology, Law & Society and Sociology, University of California, Irvine
Session : Uncovering Mortgage Fraud in Miami Dennis J. Black, President, D. J. Black & Company Edward Gallagher, Executive Officer, Economic Crimes Bureau, Mortgage Fraud Task Force, Miami-Dade Police Department Jack Rubin, Senior Vice President, JPMorgan Chase Bank Ellen Wilcox, Special Agent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Session : The Regulation, Oversight, and Prosecution of Mortgage Fraud in Miami J. Thomas Cardwell, Commissioner, Office of Financial Regulation, State of Florida Wilfredo A. Ferrer, United States Attorney, Southern District of Florida R. Scott Palmer, Special Counsel and Chief of the Mortgage Fraud Task Force, Office of the Attorney General, State of Florida
Public Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, California Department of Education, Sacramento, CA, September , Session : Overview of the Sacramento Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Region Mark Fleming, Chief Economist, CoreLogic
Session : Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Fraud and Predatory Lending in the Sacramento Region Karen J. Mann, President and Chief Appraiser, Mann and Associates Real Estate Appraisers & Consultants Thomas C. Putnam, President, Putnam Housing Finance Consulting
552
Appendix B: List of Hearings and Witnesses
Kevin Stein, Associate Director, California Reinvestment Coalition Benjamin B. Wagner, United States Attorney, Eastern District of California
Session : The Mortgage Securitization Chain: From Sacramento to Wall Street Vicki Beal, Senior Vice President, Transaction Management, Clayton Holdings, LLC Kurt Eggert, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law D. Keith Johnson, Former President and Chief Executive Officer, Washington Mutual’s Long Beach Mortgage
Session : The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Sacramento Neighborhoods and Families Pam Canada, Chief Executive Officer, NeighborWorks Home Ownership Center–Sacramento Region Mona Tawatao, Regional Counsel, Legal Services of Northern California Bruce Wagstaff, Agency Administrator, County of Sacramento Countywide Services Agency Clarence Williams, President, California Capital Financial Development Corporation Henry W. Wirz, President and Chief Executive Officer, SAFE Credit Union
Public Testimony Presented Allen Carpenter Lovie M. Hollis Nia Lavulo
NOTES
Unless otherwise specified, data come from the sources listed below. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Reports: Debt, international capital flows, and the size and activity of various financial sectors Bureau of Economic Analysis: Economic output (GDP), spending, wages, and sector profit Bureau of Labor Statistics: Labor market statistics BlackBox Logic and Standard & Poorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s: Data on loans underlying CMLTI 2006-NC2 CoreLogic: Home prices Inside Mortgage Finance, 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual: Data on origination of mortgages, issuance of mortgage-backed securities and values outstanding Markit Group: ABX-HE index Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey: Mortgage delinquency and foreclosure rates 10-Ks, 10-Qs, and proxy statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission: Company-specific information Many of the documents cited on the following pages, along with other materials, are available on www.fcic.gov.
Chapter 1 1. Charles Prince, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 1: Citigroup Senior Management, April 8, 2010, transcript, p. 10. 2. Warren Buffett, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 2: Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis, June 2, 2010, transcript, p. 208; Warren Buffett, interview by FCIC, May 26, 2010. 3. Lloyd Blankfein, testimony before the First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 1: Financial Institution Representatives, January 13, 2010, transcript, p. 36. 4. Ben S. Bernanke, closed-door session with FCIC, November 17, 2009; Ben S. Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 1: The Federal Reserve, September 2, 2010, transcript, p. 27. 5. Alan Greenspan, written testimony for the FCIC, Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 1, session 1: The Federal Reserve, April 7, 2010, p. 9.
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Notes to Chapter 1
6. Richard C. Breeden, interview by FCIC, October 14, 2010. 7. Paul A. McCulley, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 3: Institutions Participating in the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 249. 8. Arnold Cattani, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Greater Bakersfield, session 2: Local Banking, September 7, 2010, transcript pp. 25, 61. 9. William Martin, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—State of Nevada, session 2: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Businesses of Nevada, September 8, 2010, transcript, p. 76. 10. Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 1, The Primary Market (: Inside Mortgage Finance, 2009), p. 4, “Mortgage Product by Origination.” 11. Data provided to the FCIC by National Association of Realtors: national home price data from sales of existing homes, comparing second-quarter 1998 ($135,800) and second-quarter 2006 ($227,100), the national peak in prices. 12. Core-based statistical area house prices for Sacramento–Arden–Arcade–Roseville CA Metropolitan Statistical Area, CoreLogic data. 13. Data provided by CoreLogic, Home Price Index for Urban Areas. FCIC staff calculated house price growth from January 2001 to peak of each market. Prices increased at least 50% in 401 cities, at least 75% in 217 cities, at least 100% in 112 cities, at least 125% in 63 cities, and more than 150% in 16 cities. 14. Updated data provided by James Kennedy and Alan Greenspan, whose data originally appeared in “Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, 2007-20 (March 2007). 15. “Mortgage Originations Rise in First Half of 2005; Demand for Interest Only, Option ARM and Alt-A Products Increases,” Mortgage Bankers Association press release, October 25, 2005. 16. In 2007, the weekly wage of New York investment banker was $16,849; of the average privately employed worker, $841. 17. Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances, tabulated by FCIC. 18. Angelo Mozilo, interview by FCIC, September 24, 2010. 19. Michael Mayo, testimony before the First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 2: Financial Market Participants, January 13, 2010, transcript, p. 114. 20. “Mortgage Originations Rise in First Half of 2005,” MBA press release, October 27, 2005. 21. Yuliya Demyanyk and Yadav K. Gopalan, “Subprime ARMs: Popular Loans, Poor Performance,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Bridges (Spring 2007). 22. Ann Fulmer, vice president of Business Relations, Interthinx (session 1: Overview of Mortgage Fraud), and Ellen Wilcox, special agent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (session 2: Uncovering Mortgage Fraud in Miami), testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Miami, September 21, 2010. 23. Julia Gordon and Michael Calhoun, Center for Responsible Lending, interview by FCIC, September 16, 2010. 24. Faith Schwartz, at Consumer Advisory Council meeting, Thursday, March 30, 2006. 25. Federal Reserve Board, “Mean Value of Mortgages or Home-Equity Loans for Families with Holdings,” in SCF Chartbook, June 15, 2009, tables updated to February 18, 2010. 26. Christopher Cruise, interview by FCIC, August 24, 2010. 27. Ibid. 28. Robert Kuttner, interview by FCIC, August 5, 2010. 29. Timothy Geithner, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 2: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 146. 30. James Ryan, chief marketing officer at CitiFinancial and John Schachtel, executive vice president of CitiFinancial, interview by FCIC, February 3, 2010. 31. These points were made to the FCIC by consumer advocates: e.g., Kevin Stein, associate director, California Reinvestment Coalition, at the Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, session 2: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Fraud and Predatory Lending in the Sacramento Region, September 23, 2010; Gail Burks, president and CEO, Nevada Fair Housing Center, at the Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—State of Nevada, session 3: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Real Estate, September 8, 2010. See also Federal Reserve Consumer Advisory Council transcripts, March 25, 2004; June 24, 2004; October 28, 2004; March 17, 2005; October 27, 2005; June 22, 2006; October 26, 2006.
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32. Bob Gnaizda, interview by FCIC, March 25, 2010. 33. James Rokakis, interview by FCIC, November 8, 2010. 34. Ibid. 35. Fed Governor Edward M. Gramlich, “Tackling Predatory Lending: Regulation and Education,” remarks at Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio, March 23, 2001. 36. Rokakis, interview. 37. John Taylor, chairman and chief executive officer, National Community Reinvestment Coalition, letter to Office of Thrift Supervision, July 3, 2000, provided to the FCIC. 38. Stein, testimony before the FCIC, transcript, pp. 73–74, 71. 39. U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Joint Report on Recommendations to Curb Predatory Home Mortgage Lending” (June 1, 2000). 40. Federal Reserve Board press release, December 12, 2001. 41. Sheila C. Bair, written testimony for the FCIF, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 2, panel 1: Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—Federal Officials, January 14, 2010, p. 11. 42. Fed Governor Edward M. Gramlich, “Predatory Lending,” remarks at the Housing Bureau for Seniors Conference, , January 18, 2002. 43. Sheila C. Bair, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 2, panel 1: Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—Federal Officials, January 14, 2010, transcript, p. 97. 44. Sheila C. Bair, interview by FCIC, March 29, 2010. 45. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 1:220, “Top B&C Lenders in 2000”; 1.223, “Top B&C Lenders in 2003.” 46. Ibid., 1:237, “Subprime Origination by State in 2001”; and 1:235, “Subprime Originations by State in 2003.” 47. Stein, testimony before the FCIC, September 23, 2010, transcript, p. 72. 48. Gail Burks, interview by FCIC, August 30, 2010. 49. Lisa Madigan, written testimony for the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 2: Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—State and Local Officials, January 14, 2010, p. 4–5; “Home Mortgage Lender settled ‘Predatory Lending’ Charges,” Federal Trade Commission press release, March 21, 2002. 50. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 1:220, “Top 25 B&C Lenders in 2003.” 51. Madigan, written testimony for the FCIC, January 14, 2010, pp. 4–5. 52. Ed Parker, interview by FCIC, May 26, 2010. 53. Prentiss Cox, interview by FCIC, October 15, 2010. 54. Ibid. 55. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 1:45, 47, 49, 51. 56. Alphonso Jackson, interview by FCIC, October 6, 2010. 57. Cox, interview; Madigan, written testimony for the FCIC, January 14, 2010, p. 11. 58. Cox, interview. Madigan, testimony before the FCIC, January 14, 2010, transcript, pp. 121–122. 59. John D. Hawke Jr. and John C. Dugan, written statements for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 2: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, April 8, 2010, pp. 4–5 and pp. 4–8, respectively. 60. Madigan, written testimony for the FCIC, January 14, 2010, pp. 9, 10. 61. Cox, interview. 62. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 1:4, “Mortgage Originations by Product.” Nonprime = Alt-A and subprime combined. 63. Marc S. Savitt, interview by FCIC, November 17, 2010. 64. Rob Barry, Matthew Haggman, and Jack Dolan, “Ex-convicts active in mortgage fraud,” Miami Herald, January 29, 2009. 65. J. Thomas Cardwell, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Miami, session 3: The Regulation, Oversight, and Prosecution of Mortgage Fraud in Miami, September 21, 2010, p. 8. 66. Savitt, interview. 67. Gary Crabtree, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Greater Bakersfield, session 4: Local Housing Market, September 7, 2010, p. 6. 68. Ibid.
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Notes to Chapter 1
69. Gary Crabtree, interview by FCIC, August 18, 2010. Crabtree, written testimony for the FCIC, September 7, 2010, pp. 6–7. 70. “FBI Warns of Mortgage Fraud ‘Epidemic’ from Terry Frieden,” CNN news report, September 17, 2004. 71. Kirstin Downey, “FBI Vows to Crack Down on Mortgage Fraud; Hot Real Estate Market Drives Reports of ‘Suspicious’ Activity, Agency Says,” Washington Post, February 15, 2005. 72. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Regulatory Policy and Programs Division, “Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Industry Assessment Based upon Suspicious Activity Report Analysis,” November 2006. See also Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, “Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2008.” 73. FinCEN response to FCIC interrogatories, October 14–15, 2010. 74. William K. Black, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Miami, session 1: Overview of Mortgage Fraud, September 21, 2010, p. 8. 75. Alberto Gonzales, interview by FCIC, November 1, 2010; Michael Mukasey, interview by FCIC, October 20, 2010. 76. Federal Reserve Consumer Advisory Council Meeting, October 28, 2004, transcript, p. 44. 77. Ibid., p. 45. 78. Ruhi Maker, interview by FCIC, October 25, 2010. 79. Kirstin Downey, “Many Buyers Opt for Risky Mortgages,” Washington Post, May 28, 2005. 80. “After the Fall: Soaring house prices have given a huge boost to the world economy. What happens when they drop?” The Economist, June 16, 2005. 81. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “The Economic Outlook,” prepared testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, 109th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 2005. 82. Ibid. 83. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, “The Economic Outlook,” prepared testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 2007. 84. Sheila Canavan, comments during of the Federal Reserve Consumer Advisory Council Meeting, October 27, 2005, transcript, p. 52. 85. David Leonhardt, “Be Warned: Mr. Bubble’s Worried Again,” New York Times, August 21, 2005. 86. Raghuram Rajan, interview by FCIC, November 22, 2010. 87. Ibid. 88. Ibid. 89. Raghuram G. Rajan, Fault Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten The World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 3. 90. Susan M. Wachter, interview by FCIC, October 6, 2010. 91. Mark Klipsch, quoted in “Blizzard Can’t Stop ASF 2005 Conference,” Asset Securitization Report, January 31, 2005. 92. Dennis J. Black, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Miami, session 2: Uncovering Mortgage Fraud in Miami, September 21, 2010, p. 1; for the appraiser’s petition, see http://appraiserspetition.com/. 93. Karen Mann, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Sacramento, session 2: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Fraud and Predatory Lending in the Sacramento Region, September 23, 2010. 94. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 2, The Secondary Market, p. 13, “Non-Agency MBS Issuance by Type,” and FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Moody’s SFDRS data. 95. Jamie Dimon, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 1: Financial Institution Representatives, January 13, 2010, transcript, p. 78. 96. Madelyn Antoncic, interview by FCIC, July 14, 2010. 97. Anton R. Valukas, Report of Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), March 11, 2010, 1:114, with n. 418. 98. Richard Bowen, interview by FCIC, February 27, 2010. 99. Richard Bowen, email to Robert Rubin, David Bushnell, Gary Crittenden, and Bonnie Howard, November 3, 2007.
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100. Robert Rubin, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Entities (GSEs), day 2, session 1: Citigroup Senior Management, April 8, 2010, transcript, p. 30. 101. Brad S. Karp, counsel for Citigroup, letter to FCIC, November 1, 2010, in response to FCIC request of September 21, 2010, for information regarding Richard Bowen’s November 3, 2007, email, p. 2. 102. Bowen, interview. 103. J. Kyle Bass, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 2: Financial Market Participants, January 13, 2010, transcript, pp. 143–44. 104. Herbert M. Sandler, “Comment on Joint ANPR for Proposed Revision to the Existing Risk-based Capital Rule,” letter to Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision, January 18, 2006. 105. Lewis Ranieri, interview by FDIC, July 30, 2010. 106. Angelo Mozilo, email to Eric Sieracki, April 13, 2006, re: 1Q2006 Earnings. 107. Angelo Mozilo, email to David Sambol, April 17, 2006, subject: sub-prime seconds. 108. David Sambol, email to Angelo Mozilo, April 17, 2006, re: Sub-prime seconds (cc Kurland, McMurray, and Bartlett). 109. Angelo Mozilo, email to David Sambol, April 17, 2006, subject: re: Sub-prime seconds (cc Kurland, McMurray, and Bartlett). 110. Sabeth Siddique, interview by FCIC, September 9, 2010. 111. “Survey of Nontraditional Mortgages” (actual title redacted), confidential Federal Reserve document obtained by FCIC, produced November 1, 2005, pp. 2, 3. 112. Susan Bies, interview by FDIC, October 11, 2010. 113. John Dugan, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 2: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, April 8, 2010, transcript, 114. Sabeth Siddique, interviews by FCIC, September 9, 2010, and October 25, 2010. 115. Bies, interview. 116. Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, quoted in Kirstin Downey, “Insurers Want Action on Risky Mortgages; Firms Want More Loan Restrictions,” Washington Post, August 19, 2006. 117. William A. Sampson, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, “MICA Testimony on NonTraditional Mortgages,” before the Senate Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation and the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., September 20, 2006. 118. Siddique, interviews, October 25, 2010, and September 9, 2010. 119. Consumer Advisory Council Meeting, March 30, 2006, transcript. 120. Consumer Advisory Council Meeting, June 22, 2006, transcript. 121. Siddique, interview, October 25, 2010; Bies, interview. 122. There is no central clearinghouse to calculate structured finance assets. The FCIC’s estimate is based on the amount of structured finance assets rated by Moody’s along with unrated agency RMBS, along with an estimate for structured finance assets not rated by Moody’s, using as sources Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Bloomberg, American CoreLogic Loan Performance, Fitch Ratings, Moody’s, S&P, Thomson Reuters, and SIFMA. 123. Alan Greenspan, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 1, session 1: The Federal Reserve, April 7, 2010, transcript, p. 29. 124. Mortgage Bankers Association, “National Delinquency Survey.” 125. CoreLogic, Inc., August 26, 2010, news release, second quarter, 2010. Second-quarter figures were an improvement from 11.2 million residential properties (24%) in negative equity in the first quarter of 2010. 126. Mark Zandi, written testimony for the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 3: Financial Crisis Impacts on the Economy, January 13, 2010, pp. 14, 15. 127. Dean Baker, interview by FCIC, August 18, 2010. 128. Warren Peterson, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Greater Bakersfield, session 3: Residential and Community Real Estate, September 7, 2010, transcript, pp. 106–7, 119–20, 107–8; Warren Peterson, interview by FCIC, August 24, 2010.
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Notes to Chapter 2
Chapter 2 1. Ben Bernanke, written testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 1, September 2, 2010, p. 2. 2. Alan Greenspan, “The Evolution of Banking in a Market Economy,” remarks at the Annual Conference of the Association of Private Enterprise Education, Arlington, Virginia, April 12, 1997. 3. Charles Calomiris and Gary Gorton, “The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and Bank Regulation,” in Calomiris, U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 98–100. Prior to the end of the Civil War, banks issued notes instead of holding deposits. Runs on that system occurred in 1814, 1819, 1837, 1839, 1857, and 1861 (ibid., pp. 98–99). 4. R. Alton Gilbert, “Requiem for Regulation Q: What It Did and Why It Passed Away,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 68, no. 2 (February 1986): 23. 5. FCIC, “Preliminary Staff Report: Shadow Banking and the Financial Crisis,” May 4, 2010, pp. 18– 25. 6. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., “The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks,” University of Illinois Law Review (2002): 239–40. 7. Frederic S. Mishkin, “Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical Perspective,” in Financial Markets and Financial Crises, ed. R. Glenn Hubbard (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 99; Wilmarth, “The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000,” p. 236. 8. Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Release, table L.208. Accessed December 29, 2010. 9. Kenneth Garbade, “The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 1980s,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review 12, no. 1 (May 2006): 32–33, 38–39 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=918498). To implement monetary policy, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York uses the repo market: it sets interest rates by borrowing Treasuries from and lending them to securities firms, many of which are units of commercial banks. 10. Alan Blinder, interview by FCIC, September 17, 2010. 11. Paul Volcker, interview by FCIC, October 11, 2010. 12. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “International Financial Risk Management,” remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations, November 19, 2002. 13. Richard C. Breeden, interview by FCIC, October 14, 2010. 14. Wilmarth, “The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000,” p. 241 and n. 102. 15. Thereafter, banks were only required to lend on collateral and set terms based upon what the market was offering. They also could not lend more than 10% of their capital to one subsidiary or more than 20% to all subsidiaries. Order Approving Applications to Engage in Limited Underwriting and Dealing in Certain Securities,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 73, no. 6 (Jul. 1987): 473–508; “Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities,” Federal Register 61, no. 251 (Dec. 30, 1996), 68750–56. 16. Julie L. Williams and Mark P. Jacobsen, “The Business of Banking: Looking to the Future,” Business Lawyer 50 (May 1995): 798. 17. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, prepared testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, H.R. 10, the Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997, 105th Cong., 1st sess., May 22, 1997. 18. FCIC staff calculations. 19. FCIC staff calculations. 20. FCIC staff calculations using First American/CoreLogic, National HPI Single-Family Combined (SFC). 21. This data series is relatively new. Those series available before 2009 showed no year-over-year national house price decline. First American/CoreLogic, National HPI Single-Family Combined (SFC). 22. For a general overview of the banking and thrift crisis of the 1980s, see FDIC, History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future, vol. 1, An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s (Washington, DC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 1997).
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23. Specifically, between 1980 and 1994, 1,617 federally insured banks with $302.6 billion in assets and 1,295 savings and loans with $621 billion in assets either closed or received FDIC or FSLIC assistance. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience, 1980– 1994 (Aug. 1998), pp. 4, 5. 24. William K. Black, Associate Professor of Economics and Law, University of Missouri–Kansas City, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis, session 1: Overview of Mortgage Fraud, September 21, 2010, p. 4. And see Kitty Calavita, Henry N. Pontell, and Robert H. Tillman, Big Money Crime: Fraud and Politics in the Savings and Loan Crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 28. 25. FDIC, History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future, 1:39. 26. U.S. Treasury Department, “Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations for Safer, More Competitive Banks” (February 1991), p. 55. 27. Testimony of John LaWare, Governor, Federal Reserve Board, at Hearings before Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs on the “Economic Implications of the Too Big to Fail Policy,” May 9, 1991, p. 11, http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ publications/tbtf/issue/3954/download/61094/housetbtf1991.pdf. FDIC, History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future, 1:251. 28. George G. Kaufman, “Too Big to Fail in U.S. Banking: Quo Vadis?” in Too Big to Fail: Policies and Practices in Government Bailouts, ed. Benton E. Gup (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), p. 163. 29. FCIC, “Preliminary Staff Report: Too-Big-to-Fail Financial Institutions,” August 31, 2010, pp. 6– 9.(Rep. McKinney is quoted from the transcript of the hearing before the House Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs). 30. Ibid., pp. 10, 19.
Chapter 3 1. Federal National Mortgage Association, Federal National Mortgage Association, Background and History (1975). 2. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1986 Report to Congress on the Federal National Mortgage Association (1987), p. 100. 3. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Bacon, “Privileged Position: Fannie Mae Expected to Escape Attempt at Tighter Regulation,” Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1992, and Stephen Labaton, “Power of the Mortgage Twins: Fannie and Freddie Guard Autonomy,” New York Times, November 12, 1991. 4. Armando Falcon Jr., written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 2: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, April 9, 2010, p. 2. 5. Wayne Passmore, “The GSE Implicit Subsidy and the Value of Government Ambiguity,” Federal Reserve Board Staff Working Paper 2005–05. See also Congressional Budget Office, “Updated Estimates of the Subsidies to the Housing GSEs,” April 8, 2004. 6. Federal Housing Finance Agency, Report to Congress, 2009 (2010), pp. 141, 158. 7. Fannie Mae Charter Act of 1968, §309(h), codified at 12 U.S.C. §1723a(h). The 1992 Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act repealed this provision and replaced it with more elaborate provisions. Currently, the GSEs typically define low- and moderate-income borrowers as those with income at or below median income for a given area. 8. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Regulations Implementing the Authority of the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development over the conduct of the Secondary market Operations of the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA),” Federal Register 43, no. 158 (August 15, 1978): 36199–226. 9. President William J. Clinton, “Remarks on the National Homeownership Strategy,” June 5, 1995. 10. President George W. Bush, “President’s Remarks to the National Association of Home Builders,” Greater Columbus Convention Center, Columbus, Ohio, October 2, 2004. 11. Andrew Cuomo, interview by FCIC, December 17, 2010. 12. Daniel Mudd, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 1: Fannie Mae, April 9, 2010, transcript, pp. 18–19.
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13. Richard Syron, interview by FCIC, August 31, 2010. 14. Senate Lobbying Disclosure Act Database (www.senate.gov/legislative/Public_Disclosure/ LDA_reports.htm); figures on employees and PACs compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics from Federal Elections Commission data. 15. Falcon, written testimony for the FCIC, April 9, 2010, p. 5. 16. James Lockhart, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 2: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, pp. 4–8, 17 (quotation). 17. Senator Mel Martinez, interview by FCIC, September 28, 2010. 18. June E. O’Neill, remarks before the Conference on Appraising Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Washington, D.C., May 14, 1998, p. 8. 19. Federal Housing Finance Agency, Report to Congress, 2008 (2009), tables 3, 4, 12, and 13. 20. Lawrence Lindsey, interview by FCIC, September 20, 2010. 21. Jim Callahan, interview by FCIC, October 18, 2010. 22. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), US ABS Outstanding. 23. Scott Patterson, interview by FCIC, August 12, 2010. 24. Gillian Tett, Fool’s Gold: How the Bold Dream of a Small Tribe at J. P. Morgan Was Corrupted by Wall Street Greed and Unleashed a Catastrophe (New York: Free Press, 2009), pp. 32–33, 49, 70, 115. 25. Emmanuel Derman, interview by FCIC, May 12, 2010. 26. Volcker, interview. 27. Vincent Reinhart, interview by FCIC, September 10, 2010. 28. Lindsey, interview. 29. A futures contract is a bilateral contract in which one party, the long position, is compensated if the price or index or rate underlying the contract rises while the other party, the short position, is compensated if it goes down. An options contract grants the right but not the obligation to purchase or sell a commodity or financial instrument at a particular price in the future; the option holder derives a benefit if the price moves in his or her favor. In a swaps contract, the two parties exchange streams of payments based on different benchmarks. 30. Securities options are regulated by the SEC. 31. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, Final Rule, Federal Registrar 58 (January 22, 1993): 5587. 32. Brooksley Born, chairperson, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Concerning the Overthe-Counter Derivatives Market,” prepared testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 1998. 33. GAO, “Financial Derivatives: Actions Needed to Protect the Financial System,” GGD-94-133 (Report to Congressional Requesters), May 18, 1994. 34. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, “Division of Enforcement” (www.cftc.gov/anr/anrenf98.htm). 35. “Joint Statement by Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan, and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt,” Treasury Department press release, May 7, 1998. 36. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “The Regulation of OTC Derivatives,” prepared testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., July 24, 1998. 37. GAO, “Long-Term Capital Management: Regulators Need to Focus Greater Attention on Systemic Risk,” GAO/GGD-00-3 (Report to Congressional Requesters), October 1999, pp. 7, 18, 39–40. The notional amount of OTC derivatives contracts is a standard measure used in reporting the outstanding volume of such contracts. Its calculation is based on the value of the underlying instrument, commodity, index, or rate that the swap is based on. It therefore may be of limited use in measuring the potential exposure of the parties to the contracts. For example, an interest rate swap based on changes in interest rate on a $100 million loan would likely involve only a small percentage of the $100 million notional amount. On the other hand, price changes on an oil swap based on $100 million worth of oil could be even more than the notional amount, depending on the volatility in oil prices. For credit default swaps, which are discussed in more detail later in this volume, the notional amount is usually a close measure of the potential financial exposure of the issuer or seller of the swap.
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38. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Private-sector Refinancing of the Large Hedge Fund, Long-Term Capital Management,” prepared testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., October 1, 1998. 39. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Financial Derivatives,” remarks before the Futures Industry Association, Boca Raton, Florida, March 19, 1999. 40. “Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act,” report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, November 1999. 41. Gross market value is the current price at which the outstanding swaps contract can be sold or replaced on the market. As such, that amount reflects the current amount owing on a contract but does not reflect the possible future exposure on these generally long-term instruments. 42. Bank for International Settlements, data on semiannual OTC derivatives statistics. 43. Alan Greenspan, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Entities (GSEs), day 1, session 1: The Federal Reserve, April 1, 2010, transcript, pp. 88–89. 44. Robert Rubin, testimony before the FCIC, FCIC Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Entities (GSEs), day 2, session 1: Citigroup Senior Management, April 8, 2010, transcript, pp. 108–10, 123–24. 45. Lawrence Summers, interview by FCIC, May 28, 2010. 46. Daniel K. Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008), p. 58. 47. Final Rule—Amendment to Regulations H and Y,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 75, no. 3 (March 1989), 164–66. 48. Tarullo, Banking on Basel, pp. 61–64. 49. For more on derivatives, see FCIC, “Preliminary Staff Report: Overview on Derivatives,” June 29, 2010. 50. Warren Buffett, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 2: Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis, June 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 312, 326, 325. 51. Eric R. Dinallo, former superintendant, New York State Insurance Department, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, session 2, Derivatives: Supervisors and Regulators, July 1, 2010, p. 7; Rochelle Katz, State of New York Insurance Department, letter to Bertil Lundqvist, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, June 16, 2000. 52. Data provided by AIG to the FCIC, CDS notional balances at year-end. 53. Bank for International Settlements, semiannual OTC derivatives statistics. 54. Dinallo testified that the market in CDS in September 2008 was estimated to be $62 trillion at a time when there was about $16 trillion of private-sector debt (written testimony for the FDIC, July 1, 2010, p. 9). 55. “AIGFP also participates as a dealer in a wide variety of financial derivatives transactions” (AIG, 2007 Form 10-K, p. 83). AIG’s notional derivatives outstanding were $2.1 trillion at the end of 2007, including $1.2 trillion of interest rate swaps, $0.6 trillion of credit derivatives, $0.2 trillion of currency swaps, and $0.2 trillion of other derivatives (p. 163). 56. FCIC staff calculations using data from Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; call reports. 57. Data provided to the FCIC by Goldman Sachs.
Chapter 4 1. 103 Public Law 103-328, September 29, 1994. Before the 1994 legislation, some states had voluntarily opened themselves up to out-of-state banks. FDIC, History of the Eighties: Lessons for the Future, vol. 1, An Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s (Washington, DC: FDIC, 1997), p. 130. 2. These were the largest banks as of 2007. See FCIC, “Preliminary Staff Report: Too-Big-to-Fail Financial Institutions,” August 31, 2010, p. 14. 3. Data from SNL Financial (www.snl.com/). 4. Public Law 104-208, sec. 2222, codified as 12 U.S.C. § 3311; law in effect as of January 3, 2007. 5. Arthur Levitt, interview by FCIC, October 1, 2010.
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6. John D. Hawke and John Dugan, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 2: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, April 8, 2010, transcript, pp. 169, 175. 7. Fed Vice Chairman Roger W. Ferguson Jr., “The Future of Financial Services—Revisited,” remarks at the Future of Financial Services Conference, University of Massachusetts, Boston, October 8, 2003. 8. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Government Regulation and Derivative Contracts,” speech at the Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Coral Gables, Florida, February 21, 1997. 9. Richard Spillenkothen, “Notes on the performance of prudential supervision in the years preceding the financial crisis by a former director of banking supervision and regulation at the Federal Reserve Board (1991 to 2006),” May 31, 2010, p. 28. 10. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System (February 1991), pp. XIX5, XIX-6, 67–69: “the existence of fewer agencies would concentrate regulatory power in the remaining ones, raising the danger of arbitrary or inflexible behavior. . . . Agency pluralism, on the other hand, may be useful, since it can bring to bear on general bank supervision the different perspectives and experiences of each regulator, and it subjects each one, where consultation and coordination are required, to the checks and balances of the others’ opinion.” 11. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 2, 1994, reprinted in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, May 1, 1994, p. 382. 12. Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 627 F.Supp. 695 (D.D.C. 1986); Kathleen Day, “Reinventing the Bank; With Depression-Era Law about to Be Rewritten, the Future Remains Unclear,” Washington Post, October 31, 1999. 13. Edward Yingling, quoted in “The Making of a Law,” ABA Banking Journal, December 1999. 14. The two-year exemption is contained in section 4(a)(2) of the Bank Holding Company Act. The Fed could have granted up to three one-year extensions of that exemption. 15. FCIC staff computations based on data from the Center for Responsive Politics. “Financial sector” here includes insurance companies, commercial banks, securities and investment firms, finance and credit companies, accountants, savings and loan institutions, credit unions, and mortgage bankers and brokers. 16. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System (February 1991); Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “H.R. 10, the Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997,” testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong., 1st sess., May 22, 1997. 17. Katrina Brooker, “Citi’s Creator, Alone with His Regrets,” New York Times, January 2, 2010. 18. John Reed, interview by FCIC, March 24, 2010. 19. FDIC Institution Directory; SNL Financial. 20. Fed Governor Laurence H. Meyer, “The Implications of Financial Modernization Legislation for Bank Supervision,” remarks at the Symposium on Financial Modernization Legislation, sponsored by Women in Housing and Finance, Washington, D.C., December 15, 1999. 21. Ben S. Bernanke, written testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 1: The Federal Reserve, September 2, 2010, p. 14. 22. Patricia A. McCoy et al., “Systemic Risk through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure,” Connecticut Law Review 41 (2009): 1345–47, 1353–55. 23. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Lessons from the Global Crises,” remarks before the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund, Program of Seminars, Washington, DC, September 27, 1999. 24. David A. Marshall, “The Crisis of 1998 and the Role of the Central Bank,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Economic Perspectives (1Q 2001): 2. 25. Commercial and industrial loans at all commercial banks, monthly, seasonally adjusted, from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors H.8 release; FCIC staff calculation of average change in loans outstanding over any two consecutive months in 1997 and 1998. 26. Franklin R. Edwards, “Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 13 (1999): 198.
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27. “Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,” Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, April 1999, p. 14. 28. Edwards, “Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management,” pp. 200, 197; and Bloomberg. 29. Ibid., pp. 197–205; Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management (New York: Random House, 2000), pp. 36–54, 77–84, 94–105, 123–30. 30. “Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,” pp. 11–12. 31. William J. McDonough, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, statement before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., October 1, 1998. 32. GAO, “Long-Term Capital Management: Regulators Need to Focus Greater Attention on Systemic Risk,” GAO/GGD-00-3 (Report to Congressional Requesters), October 1999, p. 39. 33. “Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,” pp. 13–14. 34. Lowenstein, When Genius Failed, pp. 205–18. 35. McDonough, statement before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, October 1, 1998. 36. Andrew F. Brimmer, “Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Central Banking and Systemic Risks in Capital Markets,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, no. 2 (Spring 1989) (lecture by a former Fed governor, analyzing the Fed’s market interventions in 1970, 1980 and 1987, and concluding that the Fed had consciously assumed a “strategic role as the ultimate source of liquidity in the economy at large”); Keith Garbade, “The Evolution of Repo Contracting Conventions in the 1980s,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review (May 2006): 33. 37. Harvey Miller, interview by FCIC, August 5, 2010. 38. Stanley O’Neal, interview by FCIC, September 16, 2010. 39. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Do efficient financial markets mitigate financial crises?” remarks before the 1999 Financial Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, October 19, 1999 (www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19991019.htm). 40. “Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management,” p. 16. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Philip Goldstein, et al. v. SEC, Opinion, Case No. 04-1434 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2006). 44. Time, February 15, 1999; Bob Woodward, Maestro: Greenspan’s Fed and the American Boom (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000). 45. SIFMA (Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association), Fact Book 2008, pp. 9–10. 46. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, 4th Qtr. 1996, p. 88 (Table L.213, line 18); 4th Qtr. 2001, p. 90 (Table L.213, line 20). 47. SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson, “Testimony Concerning Global Research Analyst Settlement,” before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong., 1st sess., May 7, 2003. 48. SEC, “SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements,” April 30, 2003; Financial Industry Regulatory Authority news release, “NASD Fines Piper Jaffray $2.4 Million for IPO Spinning,” July 12, 2004. 49. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., “Conflicts of Interest and Corporate Governance Failures at Universal Banks During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s: The Cases of Enron and WorldCom,” George Washington University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 234 (2007). 50. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “International Financial Risk Management,” remarks before the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, November 19, 2002. 51. Ferguson, “The Future of Financial Services—Revisited.” 52. Spillenkothen, “Notes on the performance of prudential supervision in the years preceding the financial crisis,” p. 28. 53. “First the Put; Then the Cut?” Economist, December 16, 2000, p. 81.
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54. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Risk and Uncertainty in Monetary Policy,” remarks at the Meetings of the American Economic Association, San Diego, California, January 3, 2004. See also Fed Governor Ben S. Bernanke, “Asset-Price ‘Bubbles’ and Monetary Policy,” remarks before the N.Y. Chapter of the National Association of Business Economics, New York, October 15, 2002. 55. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Reflections on Central Banking,” remarks at a symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 26, 2005. 56. Lawrence Lindsey, interview by FCIC, September 20, 2010. 57. The NYSE decided in 1970 to allow members to be publicly traded. See Andrew von Nordenflycht, “The Demise of the Professional Partnership? The Emergence and Diffusion of Publicly-Traded Professional Service Firms” (draft paper, Faculty of Business, Simon Fraser University, September 2006), pp. 20–21. 58. Peter Solomon, written testimony for the FCIC, First Public Hearing of FCIC, day 1, panel 2: Financial Market Participants, January 13, 2010, p. 2. 59. Brian R. Leach, interview by FCIC, March 4, 2010, p. 22. 60. Jian Cai, Kent Cherny, and Todd Milbourn, “Compensation and Risk Incentives in Banking and Finance,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic Commentary (September 14, 2010). 61. Carola Frydman and Raven E. Saks, “Historical Trends in Executive Compensation, 1936–2005” (2007), p.3. 62. Cai, Cherny, and Milbourn, “Compensation and Risk Incentives in Banking and Finance.” 63. Goldman Sachs, 2006 and 2009 10-K; Morgan Stanley, 2008 10-K; Merrill Lynch, 2005 and 2008 10-K. 64. “Gutfreund’s Pay Is Cut,” New York Times, December 23, 1987. 65. Merrill Lynch, “2007 Proxy Statement,” p. 38. 66. Goldman Sachs, “Proxy Statement for 2008 Annual Meeting of Shareholders,” March 7, 2008, p. 16: Blankfein received $600,000 base salary and a 2007 year-end bonus of $67.9 million. 67. Lehman Brothers, “Proxy Statement for Year-end 2007,” p. 28; JP Morgan Chase, “2007 Proxy Statement,” p. 16. 68. New York State Office of the State Comptroller, “New York City Securities Industry Bonus Pool,” February 23, 2010. The bonus pool is for securities industry (NAICS 523) employees who work in New York City. 69. “Banks Set for Record Pay, Top Firms on Pace to Award $145 Billion for 2009, Up 18%, WSJ Study Finds,” WSJ.com, January 14, 2010. 70. Sandy Weill, interview by FCIC, October 4, 2010. 71. Lord Adair Turner, interview by FCIC, November 30, 2010. 72. Ben S. Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 1: The Federal Reserve, September 2, 2010, transcript, p. 111. 73. Testimony of Armando Falcon Jr., former director Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 2: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, April 9, 2010, pp. 8–10. 74. Sheila C. Bair, written testimony for the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 2, panel 1: Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—Federal Officials, January 14, 2010, p. 22. 75. Mary L. Schapiro, written testimony for the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 2, panel 1: Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—Federal Officials, January 14, 2010, p.18. 76. Bloomberg LLC, Financial Analysis Function, Public Filings for JPM, Citigroup, Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, and Lehman Brothers. 77. Fannie Mae, SEC filings 10-K and 10-Q; see the 2009 10-K, p. 70, Total Assets and Fannie Mae MBS held by Third Parties; Federal Housing Finance Agency, Report to Congress, 2008 (2009), pp. 111, 128. 78. FCIC staff calculations. 79. SNL Financial Database and SEC public filings. 80. Calculated from proxy statements. 81. John Snow, interview by FCIC, October 7, 2010. 82. Ibid.
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Chapter 5 1. Gail Burks, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—State of Nevada, session 3: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Real Estate, September 8, 2010, p. 3. 2. Tom C. Putnam, president, Putnam Housing Finance Consulting, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, session 2: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Fraud and Predatory Lending in the Sacramento Region, September 23, 2010, pp. 3–4. 3. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1: Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, release date, December 9, 2010, Table L.1: Credit Market Debt Outstanding, and Table L.126: Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) 4. Jim Callahan, interview by FCIC, October 18, 2010. 5. Lewis Ranieri, former vice chairman of Salomon Brothers, interview by FCIC, July 30, 2010. 6. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience” (August 1998), pp. 29, 6–7, 407–8, 38. 7. Ibid., 417. 8. Ibid., pp. 9, 32, 36, 48 9. The figures throughout this discussion of CMLTI 2006-NC2 are FCIC staff calculations, based on analysis of loan-level data from Blackbox Inc. and Standard & Poor’s; Moody’s PDS database; Moody’s CDO EMS database; and Citigroup, Fannie Mae Term Sheet, CMLTI 2006-NC2, September 7, 2006, pp. 1, 3. See also Brad S. Karp, counsel for Citigroup, letter to FCIC, November 4, 2010, p. 1, pp. 2–3. All ratings of its tranches are as given by Standard & Poor’s. 10. Technically, this deal had two unrated tranches below the equity tranche, also held by Citigroup and the hedge fund. 11. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, “The Community Reinvestment Act: Its Evolution and New Challenges,” speech at the Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C., March 30, 2007. 12. Ibid. 13. See Glenn Canner and Wayne Passmore, “The Community Reinvestment Act and the Profitability of Mortgage-Oriented Banks,” Working Paper, Federal Reserve Board, March 3, 1997. Under the Community Reinvestment Act, low- and moderate-income borrowers have income that is at most 80% of area median income. 14. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Economic Development in Low- and Moderate-Income Communities,” speech at Community Forum on Community Reinvestment and Access to Credit: California’s Challenge, in Los Angeles, January 12, 1998. 15. John Dugan, interview by FCIC, March 12, 2010. 16. Lawrence B. Lindsey, interview by FCIC, September 20, 2010. 17. Souphala Chomsisengphet and Anthony Pennington-Cross, “The Evolution of the Subprime Mortgage Market,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 88, no. 1 (January/February 2006): 40 18. Southern Pacific Funding Corp, Form 8-K, September 14, 1998 19. The top 10 list is as of 1996, according to FCIC staff calculations using data from the following sources: Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 1, The Primary Market (Bethesda, Md.: Inside Mortgage Finance Publications, 2009), p. 214, “Top 25 B&C Lenders in 1996”; Thomas E. Foley, “Alternative Financial Ratios for the Effects of Securitization: Tools for Analysis,” Moody’s Investor Services, September 19, 1997, p. 5; and Moody’s Investor Service, “Subprime Home Equity Industry Outlook—The Party’s Over,” Moody’s Global Credit Research, October 1998. 20. “FDIC Announces Receivership of First National Bank of Keystone, Keystone, West Virginia,” Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency joint press release, September 1, 1999. 21. FCIC staff calculations using data from Inside MBS & ABS. 22. See Marc Savitt, interview by FCIC, November 17, 2010. 23. Henry Cisneros, interview by FCIC, October 13, 2010. 24. Glenn Loney, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010. 25. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, The Community Development, Credit Enhancement, and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1993, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., October 28, 1993, S. Rep. 103–169, p. 18. 26. Ibid., p. 19.
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27. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h) 2006. 28. Loans were subject to HOEPA only if they hit the interest rate trigger or fee trigger: i.e., if the annual percentage rate for the loan was more than 10 percentage points above the yield on Treasury securities having a comparable maturity or if the total charges paid by the borrower at or before closing exceeded $400 or 8% of the loan amount, whichever was greater. See Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, S. Rep. 103–169, p. 54. 29. Ibid., p. 24. 30. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Joint Report Concerning Reform to the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act” (July 1998), p. 56. 31. Griffith L. Garwood, director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “To the Officers and Managers in Charge of Consumer Affairs Examination and Consumer Complaint Programs,” Consumer Affairs Letter CA 98–1, January 20, 1998 32. GAO, “Large Bank Mergers: Fair Lending Review Could Be Enhanced with Better Coordination,” GAO/GGD-00–16 (Report to the Honorable Maxine Waters and the Honorable Bernard Sanders, House of Representatives), November 1999, p. 20. 33. Fed and HUD, “Joint Report,” pp. I–XXVII. 34. Griffith L. Garwood, director, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, memorandum to the Committee on Consumer and Community Affairs, “Memorandum concerning the Board’s Report to the Congress on the Truth in Lending and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Acts,” April 8, 1998, p. 42. 35. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, “Interagency Guidance on Subprime Lending” (March 1, 1999), p. 1 36. Ibid., pp. 1–7; quotation, p. 5. 37. U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “Curbing Predatory Home Lending” (June 1, 2000), pp. 13–14, 1–2, 81 (quotations, 2, 1–2). 38. Gail Burks, president and chief executive officer, Nevada Fair Housing Center, Inc., testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—State of Nevada, session 3: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Real Estate, September 8, 2010, transcript, p. 242–43.See also Kevin Stein, associate director, California Reinvestment Coalition, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, session 2: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Fraud and Predatory Lending in the Sacramento Region, September 23, 2010, pp. 8–9. See also his testimony at the same hearing, transcript, pp. 73–74. See Diane E. Thompson, of counsel, National Consumer Law Center, Inc., and Margot F. Saunders, of counsel, National Consumer Law Center, Inc., interview by FCIC, September 10, 2010. 39. Diane E. Thompson and Margot F. Saunders, both of counsel, National Consumer Law Center, interview by FCIC, September 10, 2010. 40. Gary Gensler, interview by FCIC, May 14, 2010. 41. Sheila Bair, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 2, panel 1: Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—Federal Officials, January 14, 2010, transcript, p. 97. 42. Sheila Bair, interview by FCIC, March 29, 2010. 43. Sandra F. Braunstein, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010, pp. 31–34. 44. Bair, interview. 45. Treasury and HUD, “Curbing Predatory Home Lending,” p. 31.
Chapter 6 1. Figures represented the compound average growth rate and FCIC staff calculations from CoreLogic National Home Price Index, Single-Family Combined (SCF); CoreLogic Loan Performance HPI August 2010. 2. Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 1, The Primary Market (Bethesda, Md.: Inside Mortgage Finance, 2009), p. 4, “Mortgage Originations by Product.” 3. Federal Reserve Board press release, May 27, 2004.
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4. Fed Governor Ben S. Bernanke, “The Great Moderation,” remarks at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, D.C., February 20, 2004. See also Olivier Blanchard and John Simon, “The Long and Large Decline in U.S. Output Volatility,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, no. 1 (2001): 135–64. 5. Fed Governor Ben S. Bernanke, “Deflation: Making Sure ‘It’ Doesn’t Happen Here,” remarks before the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2002. 6. FCIC staff calculations from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, H.15 Selected Interest Rate release, 3-month AA Nonfinancial Commercial Paper Rate, WCPN3M (weekly, ending Friday); U.S. Department of Treasury, Daily Treasury Yield Curve Rates, 1990 to Present. 7. This example assumes that the homeowner is able to come up with a larger down payment to cover 20% of the higher-priced home. Here, the difference would be about $13,000. 8. Federal Housing Finance Agency, “Data on the Risk Characteristics and Performance of SingleFamily Mortgages Originated from 2001 through 2008 and Financed in the Secondary Market” (September 13, 2010), Table 2a: Share of Single-Family Mortgages Originated from 2001 through 2008 and Acquired by the Enterprises or Finances with Private-Label MBS by Loan-to-Value Ratio and Borrower FICO Score at Origination, Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, p. 22. Prime borrowers are defined as those whose mortgages are financed by the government-sponsored enterprises. 9. Yuliya Demyanyk and Otto Van Hemert, “Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis” (December 5, 2008), table 1: Loan Characteristics at Origination for Different Vintages, p. 7. 10. FCIC staff calculations from CoreLogic/First American, Home Price Index for Single-Family Combined State HPI data, last updated August 2010, and CoreLogic State Home Price Index, provided to the FCIC by CoreLogic. Staff calculations of all annual growth rates are compound annual growth rates from January to January. 11. U.S. Census Bureau, “Housing Vacancies and Homeownership, CPS/HVS,” Table 14: Homeownership Rates for the US 1965 to Present. 12. Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell, and Kevin B. Moore, “Recent Changes in US Family Finances: Evidence from the 2001 and 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances,” Federal Reserve Bulletin (2006): Tables 8A and 8B, pp. A20–A23, A8. 13. Congressional Budget Office, “Housing Wealth and Consumer Spending,” Background Paper, January 2007, p. 15. 14. Mortgages may have been refinanced more than once in that year. 15. FCIC staff calculations with updated data provided by Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy, whose data originally appeared in “Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Federal Reserve Board, 2007-20 (March 2007). 16. CBO, “Housing Wealth and Consumer Spending,” p. 2. 17. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “The Economic Outlook,” prepared testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., November 13, 2002. 18. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, “Federal Reserve Board’s Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress,” prepared testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., February 12, 2004. 19. FCIC staff calculations from 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 1:4, “Mortgage Originations by Product” (total subprime volume); 2:13, “Non-Agency MBS Issuance by Type” (subprime PLS). 20. Ibid., 1:3, “Mortgage Origination Indicators”; 220, 227, “Mortgage Originations by Product.” 21. Bart McDade, interview by FCIC, April 16, 2010. 22. Presentation to the Lehman Board of Directors, March 20, 2007. Lehman had also acquired three international lenders during this time period. 23. New Century, 1999 10-K, March 30, 2000, p. 2. 24. Final Report of Michael J. Missal, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, in RE: New Century TRS Holdings, Chapter 11, Case No. 07-10416 (KJC), (Bankr. D.Del.), February 29, 2008, p 42. 25. New Century, 2000 10-K, April 2, 2001, p. 15; New Century, 2003 10-K, March 15, 2004, p. 13. Rankings from 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 1:220, 223. 26. Aseem Mital and Angelo Mozilo, quoted in Erick Bergquist, “Under Scrutiny, Ameriquest Details Procedures,” American Banker 170, no. 125 (June 30, 2005): 1. Volume and rankings from 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 1:220, 223.
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27. Lewis Ranieri, interview by FCIC, July 30, 2010. 28. James M. Lacko and Janis K. Pappalardo, “The Effect of Mortgage Broker Compensation Disclosures on Consumers and Competition: A Controlled Experiment,” Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics Staff Report (February 2004), p. 1. 29. Jay Jeffries, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—State of Nevada, session 3: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Real Estate, September 8, 2010, transcript, p. 177. 30. Brian Bucks and Karen Pence, “Do Borrowers Know Their Mortgage Terms?” Journal of Urban Economics 64 (2008): 223. 31. Michael Calhoun and Julia Gordon, interview by FCIC, September 16, 2010. 32. Annamaria Lusardi, “Americans’ Financial Capability,” report prepared for the FCIC, February 26, 2010, p. 3. 33. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Blackbox, S&P, and IP Recovery, provided by Antje Berndt, Burton Hollifield, and Patrik Sandas, in their paper, “The Role of Mortgage Brokers in the Subprime Crisis,” April 2010. 34. William C. Apgar and Allen J. Fishbein, “The Changing Industrial Organization of Housing Finance and the Changing Role of Community-Based Organizations,” working paper (Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, May 2004), p. 9. 35. Herb Sandler, interview by FCIC, September 22, 2010. 36. Wholesale Access, “Mortgage Brokers 2006” (August 2007), pp. 35, 37. 37. Jamie Dimon, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, panel 1: Financial Institution Representatives, January 13, 2010, transcript, p. 13. 38. October Research Corporation, executive summary of the 2007 National Appraisal Survey, p. 4. 39. Dennis J. Black, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Miami, session 2: Uncovering Mortgage Fraud in Miami, September 21, 2010, p. 8. 40. Karen J. Mann, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Sacramento, session 2: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Fraud and Predatory Lending in the Sacramento Region, September 23, 2010, p. 2. 41. Gary Crabtree, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Greater Bakersfield, session 4: Local Housing Market, September 7, 2010, transcript, p. 172. 42. Complaint, People of the State of New York v. First American Corporation and First American eAppraiseIT (N.Y. Sup. Ct. November 1, 2007), pp. 3, 7, 8. 43. Martin Eakes, quoted in Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Patrick McGeehan, “Along with a Lender, Is Citigroup Buying Trouble?” New York Times, October 22, 2000. 44. Pam Flaherty, quoted in Erick Bergquist, “Judging Citi, a Year Later: Subprime Reform ‘on Track’; Critics Unsatisfied,” American Banker, September 10, 2001. 45. “Citigroup Settles FTC Charges against the Associates Record-Setting $215 Million for Subprime Lending Victims,” Federal Trade Commission press release, September 19, 2002. 46. Mark Olson, interview by FCIC, October 4, 2010. 47. Timothy O’Brien, “Fed Assess Citigroup Unit $70 Million in Loan Abuse,” The New York Times, May 28, 2004. 48. Federal Reserve Board internal staff document, “The Problem of Predatory Lending,” December 5, 2000, pp. 10–13. 49. Federal Reserve Board, Morning Session of Public Hearing on Home Equity Lending, July 27, 2000, opening remarks by Governor Gramlich, p. 9. 50. Scott Alvarez, interview by FCIC, March 23, 2010. 51. Alan Greenspan, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day one, session 1: The Federal Reserve, April 7, 2010, p. 13. 52. Alan Greenspan, quoted in David Faber, And Then the Roof Caved In: How Wall Street’s Greed and Stupidity Brought Capitalism to Its Knees (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2009), pp. 53–54. 53. “Truth in Lending,” Federal Register 66, no. 245 (December 20, 2001): 65612 (quotation), 65608.
Notes to Chapter 6
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54. Robert B. Avery, Glenn B. Canner, and Robert E. Cook, “New Information Reported under HMDA and Its Application in Fair Lending Enforcement,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 91 (Summer 2005): 372. 55. Alan Greenspan, interview by FCIC, March 31, 2010 56. Sheila Bair, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 2: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, September 2, 2010, transcript, p. 191. 57. Dolores Smith and Glenn Loney, memorandum to Governor Edward Gramlich, “Compliance Inspections of Nonbank Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies,” August 31, 2000. 58. GAO, “Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending,” GAO 04–280 (Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate), January 2004, pp. 52–53. 59. Sandra Braunstein, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010. Transcript pp. 32–33. 60. Greenspan, interview. 61. Ibid. 62. Edward M. Gramlich, “Booms and Busts: The Case of Subprime Mortgages,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Review (2007): 109. 63. Edward Gramlich, quoted in Greg Ip, “Did Greenspan Add to Subprime Woes? Gramlich Says ExColleague Blocked Crackdown On Predatory Lenders Despite Growing Concerns,” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2007. See also Edmund L. Andrews, “Fed Shrugged as Subprime Crisis Spread,” New York Times, December 18, 2007. 64. Patricia McCoy and Margot Saunders, quoted in Binyamin Appelbaum, “Fed Held Back as Evidence Mounted on Subprime Loan Abuses,” Washington Post, September 27, 2009. 65. GAO, “Large Bank Mergers: Fair Lending Review Could be Enhanced with Better Coordination,” GAO/GDD-00-16 (Report to the Honorable Maxine Waters and Honorable Bernard Sanders, House of Representatives), November 1999; GAO, “Consumer Protection: Federal and State Agencies Face Challenges in Combating Predatory Lending.” 66. “Federal and State Agencies Announce Pilot Project to Improve Supervision of Subprime Mortgage Lenders,” Joint press release (Fed Reserve Board, OTC, FTC, Conference of State Bank Supervisors, American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators), July 17, 2007. 67. “Truth in Lending,” pp. 44522–23. “Higher-priced mortgage loans” are defined in the 2008 regulations to include mortgage loans whose annual percentage rate exceeds the “average prime offer rates for a comparable transaction” (as published by the Fed) by at least 1.5% for first-lien loans or 3.5% for subordinate-lien loans. 68. Alvarez, interview. 69. Raphael W. Bostic, Kathleen C. Engel, Patricia A. McCoy, Anthony Pennington-Cross, and Susan M. Wachter, “State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: The Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms,” Journal of Economics and Business 60 (2008): 47–66. 70. “Lending and Investment,” Federal Register 61, no. 190 (September 30, 1996): 50965. 71. Joseph A. Smith, “Mortgage Market Turmoil: Causes and Consequences,” testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 2007, p. 33 (Exhibit B), using data from the Mortgage Asset Research Institute. 72. Lisa Madigan, written testimony for the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 2, panel 2: Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—State and Local Officials, January 14, 2010, p.12. 73. Commitments compiled at National Community Reinvestment Coalition, “CRA Commitments” (2007). 74. Josh Silver, NCRC, interview by FCIC, June 16, 2010. 75. Data references based on Reginald Brown, counsel for Bank of America, letter to FCIC, June 16, 2010, p. 2; Jessica Carey, counsel for JPMorgan Chase, letter to FCIC, December 16, 2010; Brad Karp, counsel for Citigroup, letter to FCIC, March 18, 2010, in response to FCIC request; Wells Fargo public commitments 1990–2010, data provided by Wells Fargo to the FCIC. 76. Karp, letter to FCIC, March 18, 2010, in response to FCIC request. 77. Carey, letter to FCIC, December 16, 2010, p. 9; Brad Karp, counsel for JP Morgan, letter to FCIC, May 26, 2010, p. 10.
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Notes to Chapter 7
78. FCIC calculation based on Federal Housing Finance Agency, “Data on the Risk Characteristics and Performance of Single-Family Mortgages Originated in 2001–2008 and Financed in the Secondary Market” (August 2010), Table 1-C; this report covers all loans purchased or securitized by the GSEs or in private-label securitizations. Delinquency data provided by Wells Fargo covered 81% of loans. 79. “Orders Issued Under the Bank Holding Company Act,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 75, no. 4 (April 1989): 304. 80. “Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the Community Reinvestment Act,” Federal Register 54 (April 5, 1989): 13742. This remains the interagency policy. “Community Reinvestment Act: Interagency Questions and Answers Regarding Community Reinvestment; Notice,” Federal Register 75 (March 11, 2010): 11666. 81. Glenn Loney, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010. 82. “Community Reinvestment Act Regulations and Home Mortgage Disclosure; Final Rules,” Federal Register 60, no. 86 (May 4, 1995): 22155–223. 83. Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, memorandum to Board of Governors, August 10, 1998. 84. Federal Reserve Board press release, “Order Approving the Merger of Bank Holding Companies,” August 17, 1998, pp. 63–64. 85. Lloyd Brown, interview by FCIC, February 5, 2010. 86. Andrew Plepler, interview by FCIC, July 14, 2010. 87. Assuming 75% AAA tranche ($1.20), 10% AA tranche ($0.20), 8% A tranche ($0.30), 5% BBB tranche ($0.40), and 2% equity tranche ($2.00). See Goldman Sachs, “Effective Regulation: Part 1, Avoiding Another Meltdown,” March 2009, p. 22. 88. David Jones, interview by FCIC, October 19, 2010. See David Jones, “Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related Issues,” Journal of Banking and Finance 24, nos. 1–2 (January 2000): 35–58. 89. Henry Paulson, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 1: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010), transcript, p. 34. 90. Jones, interview.
Chapter 7 1. For example, an Alt-A loan may have no or limited documentation of the borrower’s income, may have a high loan-to-value ratio (LTV), or may be for an investor-owned property. 2. Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 2, The Secondary Market (Bethesda, MD: Inside Mortgage Finance, 2009), p. 9, “Mortgage & Asset Securities Issuance” (showing Wall St. securitizing a third more than Fannie and Freddie); p. 13, “Non-Agency MBS Issuance by Type.” FCIC staff calculations from 2004 to 2006 (for growth in private label MBS). 3. Charles O. Prince, interview by FCIC, March 17, 2010. 4. John Taylor, interview by FCIC, September 23, 2010. 5. William A. Fleckenstein and Frederick Sheeham, Greenspan’s Bubbles: The Age of Ignorance at the Federal Reserve (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), p. 181. 6. Alan Greenspan, “The Fed Didn’t Cause the Housing Bubble,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2009. See also Ben Bernanke, “Monetary Policy and the Housing Bubble,” speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia, January 3, 2010. 7. Alan Greenspan, testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong., 1st sess., February 16, 2005. 8. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, “The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account Deficit,” remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics, Richmond, Virginia, March 10, 2005. 9. Frederic Mishkin, interview by FCIC, October 1, 2010. 10. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, written testimony for the FCIC, Forum to Explore the Causes of the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 2: Macroeconomic Factors and U.S. Monetary Policy, February 26, 2010, pp. 25–26. . 11. Paul Krugman, interview by FCIC, October 6, 2010.
Notes to Chapter 7
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12. Ellen Schloemer, Wei Li, Keith Ernst, and Kathleen Keest, “Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market and Their Cost to Homeowners,” Center for Responsible Lending, December 2006, p. 22. 13. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 1, The Primary Market, p. 4, “Mortgage Originations by Product.” 14. Christopher Mayer, Karen Pence, and Shane M. Sherlund, “The Rise in Mortgage Defaults,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, no. 1 (Winter 2009): Table 2, Attributes for Mortgages in Subprime and Alt-A Pools, p. 31. 15. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 2:13, “Non-Agency MBS Issuance by Type.” 16. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 1:6, “Alternative Mortgage Originations”; previous data extrapolated in FCIC estimates from Golden West, Form 10-K for fiscal year 2005, and Federal Reserve, “Residential Mortgage Lenders Peer Group Survey: Analysis and Implications for First Lien Guidance,” November 30, 2005. 17. Inside Mortgage Finance. 18. Countrywide, 2005 Form 10-K, p. 39; 2007 Form 10-K, p. 47 (showing the growth in Countrywide’s originations). 19. Angelo Mozilo, email to Sambol and Kurland re: Sub-prime Seconds. See also Angelo Mozilo, email to Sambol, Bartlett, and Sieracki, re: “Reducing Risk, Reducing Cost,” May 18, 2006; Angelo Mozilo, interview by FCIC. September 24, 2010. 20. David Sambol, interview by FCIC, September 27, 2010. 21. See Countrywide, Investor Conference Call, January 27, 2004, transcript, p. 5. See also Jody Shenn, “Countrywide Adding Staff to Boost Purchase Share,” American Banker, January 28, 2004. 22. Patricia Lindsay, written testimony for the FCIC, hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 1, sess. 2: Subprime Origination and Securitization, April 7, 2010, p. 3 23. Andrew Davidson, interview by FCIC, October 29, 2020. 24. Ibid. 25. David Berenbaum, testimony before Senate Committee on Banking, Subcommittee on Housing, Transportation and Community Development, 110th Cong., 1st sess., June 26, 2007. 26. Email and data attachment from former Golden West employee to FCIC, subject: “re: Golden West Estimated Volume of Adjustable Rate Mortgage Originations,” December 6, 2010. 27. Herbert Sandler, interview by FCIC, September 22, 2010. 28. Washington Mutual, “Option ARM Focus Groups—Phase II,” September 17, 2003; Washington Mutual, “Option ARM Focus Groups—Phase I,” August 14, 2003, Exhibits 35 and 36 in Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, exhibits, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of High Risk Home Loans, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 13, 2010 (hereafter cited as PSI Documents), PDF pp. 330–51, available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/Financial_Crisis/041310Exhibits.pdf. 29. PSI Documents, Exhibits 35 and 36 pp. 330–51. 30. Ibid., pp. 330–51, 334. 31. Ibid., p. 345. 32. Ibid., p. 346. 33. Washington Mutual, “Option ARM Credit Risk,” August 2006, PSI Document Exhibit 37, p. 366. 34. PSI Documents Exhibit 37, p. 366, showing average FICO score of 698; p. 356; comparing conforming and jumbo originations. 35. Ibid., p. 357. 36. Document listing Countrywide originations by quarter from 2003 to 2007, provided by Bank of America. 37. Countrywide October 2003 Loan Program Guide (depicting a maximum CLTV of 80 and minimum FICO of 680) and July 2004 Loan Program Guide (showing 90% 620 FICO). 38. Countrywide Loan Program Guide, dated March 7, 2005. 39. Federal Reserve, “Residential Mortgage Lenders Peer Group Survey: Analysis and Implications for First Lien Guidance,” November 30, 2005, pp. 6, 8. 40. Angelo Mozilo, email to Carlos Garcia (cc: Stan Kurland), Subject: “Bank Assets,” August 1, 2005.
572
Notes to Chapter 7
41. Angelo Mozilo, email to Carlos Garcia (cc: Kurland), subject: “re: Fw: Bank Assets,” August 2, 2005. 42. Countrywide, 2005 Form 10-K, p. 57; 2007 Form 10-K, p. F-45. 43. See Washington Mutual, 2006 Form 10-K, p. 53. 44. John Stumpf, interview by FCIC, September 23, 2010. 45. Countrywide, 2007 Form 10-K, p. F-45; 2005 Form 10-K, p. 57 46. Washington Mutual, 2007 Form 10-K, p. 57; 2005 Form 10-K, p. 55 47. Kevin Stein, testimony before the FCIC, Sacramento Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis–San Francisco, day 1, session 2: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Fraud and Predatory Lending in the Sacramento Region, September 23, 2010, transcript, p. 72. 48. Mona Tawatao, in ibid., p. 228. 49. Real Estate Lending Standards, Federal Register 57 (December 31, 1992): 62890. 50. Ibid. 51. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, “Real Estate Lending Standards: Final Rule,” SR 93–1, January 11, 1993. 52. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, “Interagency Guidance on High LTV Residential Real Estate Lending,” October 8, 1999. 53. Final Report of Michael J. Missal, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, In RE: New Century TRS Holdings, Chapter 11, Case No. 07-10416 (KJC), (Bankr. D.Del.), February 29, 2008, pp. 128, 149, 128. 54. Yuliya Demyanyk and Otto Van Hemert, “Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,” Review of Financial Studies, May 2009. 55. Sandler, interview. 56. CoreLogic loan performance data for subprime and Alt-A loans, and CoreLogic total outstanding loans servicer data provided to the FCIC. 57. Christopher Mayer, Karen Pence, and Shane M. Sherlund, “The Rise in Mortgage Defaults,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 32. 58. William Black, testimony for the FCIC, Miami Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 1: Overview of Mortgage Fraud, September 21, 2010, p. 27. 59. Richard Bowen, interview by FCIC, February 27, 2010. 60. Jamie Dimon, testimony before the FCIC, January 13, 2010, p. 60. 61. This particular deal would be described as an excess-spread over-collateralized-based credit enhancement structure; see Gary Gorton, “The Panic of 2007,” paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Jackson Hole Conference, August 2008, p. 23. 62. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of data from BlackBox, S&P, and Bloomberg. The prospective loan pool for this deal originally contained 4,507 mortgages. Eight of these had been dropped from the pool by the time the bonds were issued. Therefore, these estimates may differ slightly from those reported in the deal prospectus because these estimates are based on a pool of 4,499 loans. 63. Ibid. 64. Federal Register 69 (January 7, 2004): 1904. The rules were issued in proposed form at Federal Register 68 (August 5, 2003): 46119. 65. See OTS Opinion re California Minimum Payment Statute, October 1, 2002, p. 6. 66. Comptroller of the Currency John Hawke, remarks before Women in Housing and Finance, Washington, D.C., February 12, 2002, attached to OCC News Release 2002-10, p. 2. 67. John Hawke, quoted in Jess Bravin and Paul Beckett, “Friendly Watchdog: Federal Regulator Often Helps Banks Fighting Consumers,” Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2002. 68. Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, “Making Credit Safer,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 157 (2008): 182-83, 192-94. 69. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank NA, 550 U.S. 1 (2007). 70. John Dugan, testimony before the FCIC, Public Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 2: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, April 8, 2010, transcript, p. 150. 71. Lisa Madigan, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 2, panel 2: Investigations into the Financial Crisis—State and Local Officials, January 14, 2010, transcript, p. 104.
Notes to Chapter 7
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72. John D. Hawke Jr., written testimony for the FCIC, Public Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 2: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, April 8, 2010, p. 6. 73. Citigroup Warehouse Lines of Credit with Mortgage Originators, in Global Securitized Markets, 2000–2010 (revised), produced by Citigroup; staff calculations. 74. Charles O. Prince, interview by FCIC, March 17, 2010. 75. Moody’s Special Report, “The ABCP Market in the Third Quarter of 1998,” February 2, 1999. 76. Moody’s 2007 Review and 2008 Outlook: US Asset-backed Commercial Paper, February 27, 2008. 77. Moody’s ABCP Reviews of Park Granada and Park Sienna. 78. Moody’s ABCP Program Review: Park Granada, July 16, 2007. 79. Letters from the American Securitization Forum (November 17, 2003) and State St. Bank (November 14, 2003) to the Office of Thrift Supervision. 80. Darryll Hendricks, interview by FCIC, August 6, 2010. 81. Citi August 29, 2006, Loan Sale. 82. Correspondence between Citi and New Century provided to FCIC. FCIC staff estimates from prospectus and Citigroup production dated November 4, 2010. Citi August 29, 2006, Loan Sale. 83. Fannie Mae Term Sheet. 84. For the more than 20 institutional investors around the world, see Citigroup letter to the FCIC re Senior Investors, October 14, 2010. The $582 million figure is based on FCIC staff estimates that, in turn, were based on analysis of Moody’s PDS database. 85. See Brad S. Karp, counsel for Citigroup, letter to FCIC, about senior investors, October 14, 2010, p. 2. See also Eric S. Goldstein, counsel for JPMorgan Chase & Co., letter to FCIC, November 16, 2010. 86. Citigroup letter to the FCIC, November 4, 2010. 87. See, e.g., Simon Kennedy, “BNP Suspends Funds Amid Credit-Market Turmoil,” August 9, 2007. (www.marketwatch.com/story/bnp-suspends-fund-valuations-amid-credit-market-turmoil). 88. See Brad S. Karp, letter to FCIC, about mezzanine investors, November 4, 2010, p. 1. The equity tranches were not offered for public sale but were retained by Citigroup. 89. FCIC staff estimates from prospectus and Citigroup production dated November 4, 2010. 90. Patricia Lindsay, interview by FCIC, March 24, 2010. 91. PSI Documents, Exhibit 59a: “Long Beach Mortgage Production, Incentive Plan 2004,” and Exhibit 60a (quoting page 2 of WaMu Home Loans Product Strategy PowerPoint presentation). 92. John M. Quigley, “Compensation and Incentives in the Mortgage Business,” Economists’ Voices (The Berkeley Electronic Press, October 2008), p. 2. 93. Barclays Capital, Bear Stearns, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, and UBS. 94. Figures are average top-tier pay worldwide in mortgages and MBS sales and trading. See Options Group, “2005 Global Financial Market Overview & Compensation Report” (October 2005), pp. 42, 52; Options Group, “2006 Global Financial Market Overview & Compensation Report” (November 2006), pp. 59, 69; and Options Group, “2007 Global Financial Market Overview & Compensation Report” (November 2007), pp. 73, 82. 95. See Merrill Lynch, 2007 Proxy Statement, p. 46. 96. See FCIC staff analysis of Moody’s Form 10-Ks for years 2005, 2006, and 2007. 97. See FCIC staff calculations based on Moody’s Form 10-Ks for years 2003–07. 98. “Moody’s Expands Moody’s Mortgage Metrics to Include Subprime Residential Mortgages,” September 6, 2006; FCIC staff estimate based on analysis of Moody’s SFDRS and PDS databases. 99. The ratings from the three agencies measure slightly different credit risk characteristics. S&P and Fitch base their ratings on the probability that a borrower will default; Moody’s bases its ratings on the expected loss to the investor. Despite such differences, investors and regulators tend to view the ratings as roughly equivalent. Ratings are divided into two categories: investment grade securities are rated BBB- to AAA, while securities rated below BBB- are considered speculative and are also referred to as junk (for S&P; similar levels for Moody’s are Baa to triple-A). 100. Richard Cantor and Frank Packer, “The Credit Rating Industry,” FRBNY Quarterly Review (Summer–Fall 1994): 6.
574
Notes to Chapter 7
101. Andrew J. Donahue, director, Division of Investment Management, SEC, “Speech by SEC Staff: Opening Remarks before the Commission Open Meeting,” Washington, DC, June 25, 2008. See also Lawrence J. White, “Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 214. 102. Lewis Ranieri, interview by FCIC, July 30, 2010. 103. Eric Kolchinsky, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 1: The Ratings Process, June 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 19–20. 104. See 15 U.S.C. 78o-7(c)(2). 105. Jerome S. Fons, testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., October 22, 2008, p. 2. 106. Arnold Cattani, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Greater Bakersfield, session 2: Local Banking, transcript, p. 60. 107. Gary Witt, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 1: The Ratings Process, June 2, 2010, transcript, p. 41. 108. Moody’s Investors Service, “Introducing Moody’s Mortgage Metrics: Subprime Just Became More Transparent,” September 7, 2009. 109. David Teicher, Moody’s Investors Service, interview by FCIC, May 4, 2010; “Moody’s Mortgage Metrics: A Model Analysis of Residential Mortgage Pools,” April 1, 2003. 110. Jay Siegel, interview by FCIC, May 26, 2010. 111. Teicher, interview. 112. Jay Siegel, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 1: The Ratings Process, June 2, 2010, transcript, p. 29. 113. Roger Stein, interview by FCIC, May 26, 2010. 114. Moody’s Investors Service, “Introducing Moody’s Mortgage Metrics.” 115. Stein, interview. 116. Jerome Fons, interview by FCIC, April 22, 2010. 117. Moody’s Rating Committee Memorandum, August 29, 2006. 118. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Moody’s PDS database. 119. Invoice from Moody’s Investors Service to Susan Mills, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., October 12, 2006. 120. Standard & Poor’s, Global New Issue Billing Form, Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-NC2, September 28, 2006. 121. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Moody’s SFDRS data as of April 2010. 122. Chris Cox, SEC chairman, prepared testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., June 15, 2006; “Freddie Mac, Four Former Executives Settle SEC Action Relating to Multi-Billion Dollar Accounting Fraud,” SEC press release, September 27, 2007. 123. James Lockhart, director, FHFA, speech to American Securitization Forum in Las Vegas, New Mexico, February 9, 2009 (p. 2, slide 4 of presentation shows the chart). 124. OFHEO Special Examination Report, December 2003. 125. In 2006, OFHEO issued its final Report of the Special Examination of Fannie Mae. OFHEO said that management engaged in numerous acts of misconduct, involving well over a dozen different forms of accounting manipulation and violations of generally accepted accounting principles. As in the case of Freddie, OFHEO said Fannie’s management sought to hit ambitious earnings-per-share targets that were linked to their own compensation. 126. Donald Bisenius, interview by FCIC, September 29, 2010. 127. Mortgage Market Statistical Annual 2009. 128. See Tables 5.1/5.2 in FHFA Conservatorship report for third-quarter 2010. 129. OFHEO Special Examination Report, September 2004, pp. 9–10. 130. Ibid., pp. 2, 10. 131. OFHEO, “2005 Report to Congress,” June 15, 2005, p. 15.
Notes to Chapter 8
575
132. Alan Greenspan, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 1, session 1: The Federal Reserve, April 7, 2010, transcript, p. 13. 133. FHFA, “Mortgage Market Note: Goals of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Context of the Mortgage Market: 1996–2009,” February 2010, p. 22; “FCIC calculations.” 134. FHFA, Report to Congress, 2008 (2009), pp. 116, 125. 135. BlackRock Solutions, “Fannie Mae’s Strategy and Business Model, Supplementary Exhibits,” December 2007. 136. Robert Levin, interview by FCIC, March 17, 2010. 137. Mark Winer, interview by FCIC, March 23, 2010. 138. John Weicher, former FHA commissioner, interview by FCIC, March 11, 2010. 139. Letter from Robert Levin to FCIC, June 17, 2010, p. 2.
Chapter 8 1. Joe Donovan, Credit Suisse, quoted in Michael Gregory, “The ‘What If ’s’ in ABS CDOs,” Asset Securitization Report, February 18, 2002. 2. FCIC staff calculations, using data from the U.S. Census, data in Moody’s CDO PDS database, and data in Moody’s CDO Enhanced Monitoring Service database. The FCIC selected CDOs with at least 10% of their collateral invested in mortgage-backed securities or with other characteristics that identified them as ABS CDOs. 3. Scott Eichel, quoted in Allison Pyburn, “CDO Machine? Managers, Mortgage Companies, Happy to Keep Fuel Coming,” Asset Securitization Report, May 23, 2005. 4. Patrick Parkinson, interview by FCIC, March 30, 2010. 5. Jian Hu, “Assessing the Credit Risk of CDOs Backed by Structured Finance Securities: Rating Analysts’ Challenges and Solutions,” Journal of Structured Finance 13, no. 3 (2007): 46. 6. Wing Chau, interview by FCIC, November 11, 2010. 7. CDOs that bought relatively senior tranches of mortgage-backed securities were known as highgrade; those that bought the BBB-rated and other junior tranches were known as mezzanine. 8. Joe Donovan, quoted in Gregory, “The ‘“What If ’s’ in ABS CDOs.” 9. Laurie Goodman et al., Subprime Mortgage Credit Derivatives (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2008), p. 315. 10. Hu, “Assessing the Credit Risk of CDOs Backed by Structured Finance Securities,” p. 47, Exhibit 5. 11. Issuance dropped in 2007 to $194 billion and virtually disappeared in 2008. FCIC staff estimates based on data provided by Moody’s CDO Enhanced Monitoring System (EMS). 12. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. 13. Nestor Dominguez, interview by FCIC, September 28, 2010. 14. Michael Lamont, interview by FCIC, September 21, 2010. 15. Chris Ricciardi, interview by FCIC, September 15, 2010. 16. Lamont, interview. 17. FCIC staff calculations using data in FCIC CDO manager and underwriter survey. 18. Mark Adelson, interview by FCIC, October 22, 2010. 19. FCIC staff calculations. Our estimate assumes an annual management fee of 0.10% of the total value of the deal—that is, the lowest normally earned in the industry—applied to the mortgage-focused multisector CDOs in the FCIC database. It does not include other income, such as interest on equity tranches retained by the managers. CDO managers responding to the FCIC survey reported management fees ranging from as low as 0.10% to as high as 0.40%. 20. “Summary of Key Fee Provisions for Cash CDOs as of January 2000–2010,” prepared by Moody’s for the FCIC. 21. FCIC Hedge Fund Survey. See FCIC website for details. 22. FCIC staff estimates based on Moody’s CDO Enhanced Monitoring Service. 23. Bloomberg LLC, Financial Analyst Function; Bear Stearns Companies Inc., Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended November 30, 2006, filed February 13, 2007, Exhibit 13. 24. The Options Group, “2005 Global Financial Market Overview & Compensation Report,” October 2005, p. 16.
576
Notes to Chapter 8
25. Moody’s, Kleros Real Estate CDO III, Ltd., CDO EMS Data, last updated May 27, 2008.The following discussion of CMLTI 2006-NC2 relies on FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. 26. Ricciardi, interview. 27. For example, Kleros III tranches were in Buckingham CDO, Buckingham CDO II, and Buckingham CDO III, all deals underwritten by Barclays. 28. Adelson, interview. 29. Chau, interview. 30. James Grant, “Up the Capital Structure” (December 15, 2006), in Mr. Market Miscalculates: The Bubble Years and Beyond (Mount Jackson, VA: Axios Press, 2008), 186. 31. UBS Global CDO Group, Presentation on Product Series (POPS), January 2007. 32. Dan Sparks, interview by FCIC, June 15, 2010. 33. Dominguez, interview. 34. The ratio of the book value of assets to equity ranged from 2.5 to 28.3 times for all SIVs; the average was 13.6 times. Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Special Report: Moody’s Update on Structured Investment Vehicles,” January 16, 2008, p. 13. 35. Mark Klipsch, quoted in Colleen Marie O’Connor, “Drought of CDO Collateral Tops Concerns,” Asset Securitization Report, October 18, 2004. 36. Bear Stearns Asset Management, Collateral Manager Presentation; Ralph Cioffi, interview by FCIC, October 19, 2010; Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2006 (total assets were $8,573,315,025); Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Master Fund, Ltd., financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2006 (total assets were $9,403,235,402). 37. James Cayne, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 1, session 2: Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System, May 5, 2010, p. 2; Warren Spector, interview by FCIC, March 30, 2010. 38. Cioffi, interview. 39. AIMA’s Illustrative Questionnaire for Due Diligence of Bear Stearns High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund; Bank of America presentation to Merrill Lynch’s Board of Directors, “Bear Steams Asset Management: What Went Wrong.” 40. Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2006; Financial Statements, Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Master Fund, Ltd., financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2006; BSAM fund chart prepared by JP Morgan. 41. FCIC staff calculations using data from FCIC survey of hedge funds. The hedge funds responding to the survey had a total of $1.2 trillion in investments. 42. IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2008, Table 1.2, page 23, “Typical ‘Haircut’ or Initial Margin.” 43. Alan Schwartz, interview by FCIC, April 23, 2010. 44. Cioffi, interview. 45. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 47. Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies, investor presentation, stating that “the fund is subject to conflicts of interest.” Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, L.P., Preliminary Confidential Private Placement Memorandum, August 2006. Everquest Financial Ltd., Form S-1, p. 13. 48. Bear Stearns Asset Management Collateral Manager, presentation, stating that Klio I collateral includes 73% RMBS and ABS and 27% CDOs, Klio II collateral includes 74% RMBS and ABS and 26% CDOs, and Klio III collateral includes 74% RMBS and ABS and 26% CDOs; Cioffi, interview. 49. Everquest Financial Ltd., Form S-1, pp. 9, 3. 50. Bear Stearns Asset Management, Collateral Manager Presentation. 51. Cioffi and Tannin Compensation Table, produced by Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP.
Notes to Chapter 8
577
52. Matt Tannin, Bear Stearns, email to Bella Borg-Brenner, Stillwater Capital, March 16, 2007; Greg Quental, Bear Stearns, email to Andrew Donnellan, Bear Stearns, et al., June 6, 2007. 53. Charles Prince, interview by FCIC, March 17, 2010. 54. Regulators in Japan and the United Kingdom also came down on the company in 2004 and 2005. In September 2004, Japan’s Financial Services Agency suspended Citibank’s ability to operate branches in Japan because of the bank’s participation in alleged illegal activity in that country, and in the following year the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority fined Citigroup $25 million for engaging in a bond trading scheme labeled “Dr. Evil” by Citigroup bond traders. Financial Services Agency, Government of Japan, “Administrative Actions on Citibank, N.A. Japan Branch,” September 17, 2004; Financial Services Authority, “Final Notice” to Citigroup Global Markets Limited, June 28, 2005 (www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/final/cgml_28jun05.pdf); David Reilly, “Moving the Market: Citigroup to Take $25 Million Hit in ‘Dr. Evil’ Case,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2005. 55. Prince, interview. 56. Robert Rubin, interview by FCIC, March 11, 2010. 57. Dominguez, interview by FCIC, March 2, 2010. The CDO desk earned revenues of $367 million in 2005. Paul, Weiss, Citigroup’s counsel, letter to FCIC, March 31, 2010, in re the FCIC’s second and third supplemental requests, “Response to Interrogatory No. 21.” 58. Janice Warne, interview by FCIC, February 2, 2010; Paul, Weiss, Citigroup’s counsel, letter to FCIC, March 1, 2010, “Response to Interrogatory No. 18.” 59. Paul, Weiss, Citigroup’s counsel, letter to FCIC, March 1, 2010, “Response to Interrogatory No. 18.” 60. Moody’s Investors Service, “CDOs with Short-Term Tranches: Moody’s Approach to Rating Prime-1 CDO Notes,” February 3, 2006, p. 11. 61. Citigroup Inc., Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007, filed February 22, 2008, p. 91. 62. Everquest Financial Ltd., Form S-1, May 9, 2007, p. 93. 63. Dominguez, interview, March 2, 2010. 64. Ibid.; Warne, interview. 65. Dominguez, interview, March 2, 2010. 66. Warne, interview. 67. GCIB Capital Markets Approval Committee, Coventree Capital, “Liquidity Put Option,” draft as of December 13, 2002, p. 4. 68. Ron Frake, interview by FCIC, March 11, 2010. 69. “Formal Agreement” between the Comptroller of the Currency and Citibank, July 22, 2003. 70. Moody’s Investors Service, “CDOs with Short-Term Tranches.” 71. Ibid.; Bank of America Corporation, Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2007, p. 19; Floyd Norris, “As Bank Profits Grew, Warning Signs Went Unheeded,” New York Times, November 16, 2007. 72. Dominguez, interview, March 2, 2010. 73. Paul, Weiss, Citigroup’s counsel, letter to FCIC, June 23, 2010, “Responses of Nestor Dominguez,” p. 6. 74. OCC, “Subprime CDO Valuation and Oversight Review—Conclusion Memorandum,” Memorandum from Michael Sullivan, RAD, and Ron Frake, NBE, to John Lyons, Examiner-in-Charge, Citibank, NA, January 17, 2008, p. 6, 75. Ibid. 76. Tobias Brushammar et al., memorandum to Nestor Dominguez et al., “Re: Liquidity Put Valuation,” October 19, 2006, pp. 1, 3–4; “Liquidity Put Discussion,” pt. 1, produced by Citi. 77. “Liquidity Put Discussion,” produced by Citi. 78. Data provided by Moody’s to the FCIC. 79. Gary Gorton, interview by FCIC, May 11, 2010. 80. AIG, 2008 10-K, p. 133. Assets are assigned a “risk weighting” or percentage that is then multiplied by 8% capital requirement to determine the amount of risk-based capital. 81. AIG, CDS notional balances at year-end 2000 through 2010 Q1, provided to the FCIC. 82. The total would reach $78 billion by 2007 (ibid.).
578
Notes to Chapter 8
83. Gene Park, interview by FCIC, May 18, 2010. 84. Craig Broderick, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 3: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Derivatives, June 30, 2010, transcript, pp. 289– 90. 85. Moody’s, “CDOs with Short-Term Tranches”; AIG, “Information Pertaining to the Multi-sector CDS Portfolio,” provided to the FCIC. 86. Park, interview. 87. AIG, CDS notional balances at year-end, 2000 through 2010 Q1. 88. Alan Frost, interview by FCIC, May 11, 2010. 89. AIG Financial Products Corp. Deferred Compensation Plan, March 18, 2005, p. 2. 90. Joseph Cassano, email to All Users, re: 2007 Special Compensation Plan, December 17, 2007. 91. Joseph Cassano compensation history, provided by AIG to the FCIC. 92. AIG, Form 8-K, filed May 1, 2005. 93. “Fact Sheet on AIGFP,” provided by Hank Greenberg, p. 4. 94. AIG, CDS notional balances at year-end. 95. Gene Park, email to Joseph Cassano, re: “CDO of ABS Approach Going Forward—Message to the Dealer Community,” February 28, 2006. 96. Henry M. Paulson Jr., testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 1: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 22. 97. Henry M. Paulson Jr., written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 1: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, p. 2. 98. Goldman Sachs, 2005 and 2006 10-K (appendix 5a to Goldman’s March 8, 2010, letter to the FCIC). 99. Appendix 5c to Goldman’s March 8, 2010, letter to the FCIC. 100. Goldman’s March 8, 2010, letter to the FCIC, p. 28 (subprime securities). 101. “Protection Bought by GS,” spreadsheet provided by Goldman Sachs to the FCIC. Specifically, IKB purchased $30 million of Class A notes, $40 million of Class B notes, and $30 million of Class C notes on June 9, 2004. TCW purchased $50 million of Class A notes in January 2005, and Wachovia purchased $45 million of Class A notes in March 2005. See ibid., Exhibit 1. 102. FCIC staff calculations based on data provided by Goldman Sachs. 103. “Protection Bought by GS,” spreadsheet. 104. FCIC calculations based on data provided by Goldman Sachs. 105. FCIC staff analysis based on data provided by Goldman Sachs. 106. Sparks, interview. 107. Of course, in theory the net impact on the financial system is not greater, because there is a winner for every loser in the derivatives market. 108. Sparks, interview. 109. From Goldman Sachs data provided to the FCIC in a handout titled “Amplification” and quoted at the FCIC’s Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 3: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Derivatives, June 30, 2010. 110. FCIC staff analysis based on data provided by Goldman Sachs. 111. Lloyd Blankfein, chairman of the board and chief executive officer, Goldman Sachs Group, interview by FCIC, June 16, 2010; Sparks, interview. 112. Gary Cohn, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 3: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Derivatives, June 30, 2010, transcript, p. 351. 113. Parkinson, interview. 114. Michael Greenberger, before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 1: Overview of Derivatives, June 30, 2010; oral testimony, transcript, p. 109; written testimony, p. 16. 115. Moody’s Investors Service, “Summary of Key Provisions for Cash CDOs as of January 2000– 2010.” 116. Gary Witt, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 1: The Ratings Process, June 2, 2010, pp. 12, 15.
Notes to Chapter 8
579
117. Ibid., 12. 118. Gary Witt, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 1: The Ratings Process, June 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 168, 436. 119. Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Approach to Rating Multisector CDOs,” September 15, 2000, p. 5. 120. Gary Witt, interview by FCIC, April 21, 2010. 121. Witt, written testimony for the FCIC, June 2, 2010, p. 17. 122. Gary Witt, follow-up interview by FCIC, May 13, 2010. 123. Witt, interview, April 21, 2010. 124. For example, Moody’s assumed that borrowers with different credit ratings would not default at the same time. The agency split the securities into three subcategories based on the average FICO score of the underlying mortgages: prime (FICO greater than 700), midprime (FICO between 700 and 625), and subprime (FICO under 625). Creating three FICO-based subcategories rather than the traditional two (prime and subprime) resulted in lower correlation assumptions, because mortgage-backed securities in different subcategories were assumed to be less correlated. “Moody’s Revisits Its Assumptions Regarding Structured Finance Default (and Asset) Correlations for CDOs,” June 27, 2005, pp. 15, 5, 7, 9, 4; Gary Witt, interview by FCIC, May 6, 2010. 125. Hedi Katz, “U.S. Subprime RMBS in CDOs,” Fitch Special Report, April 15, 2005, p. 3; Sten Bergman, “CDO Evaluator Applies Correlation and Monte Carlo Simulation to Determine Portfolio Quality,” Standard & Poor’s Global Credit Portal RatingsDirect, November 13, 2001, p. 8. 126. Ingo Fender and Janet Mitchell, “Structured Finance: Complexity, Risk and the Use of Ratings,” BIS Quarterly Review (June 2005): 68 (www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0506.pdf). 127. Based on an FCIC survey of 40 CDO managers and 11 underwriters about the process of creating and marketing CDOs. 128. Moody’s Investors Service, “Structured Finance Rating Transitions: 1983–2006,” January 2007, pp. 7, 64. Of structured finance securities originally rated triple-A between 1984 and 2006, 56% retained their original rating 5 years later, 5% were downgraded, and 39% were withdrawn. 129. Kyle Bass, testimony to the House Financial Services Committee, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Hearing on the Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market, 110th Cong., 1st sess., September 27, 2007, p. 11. 130. “Structured Finance Rating Transitions: 1983–2008,” Moody’s Credit Policy Special Comment, March 2009, p. 2. 131. Moody’s Investors Service, “Announcement: Moody’s Updates Its Key Assumptions for Rating Structured Finance CDOs,” December 11, 2008. 132. Ben Bernanke, closed-door session with FCIC, November 17, 2009. 133. Ann Rutledge, email to FCIC, November 16, 2010. Ann Rutledge is a principal in R&R Consulting, a coauthor of Elements of Structured Finance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), and a former employee of Moody’s Investor Service. She and co-principal Sylvain Raines first spoke to the FCIC on April 12, 2010. 134. From Moody’s “Structured Finance: Special Report,” the following page 1 headlines: “2004 U.S. CDO Review / 2005 Preview: Record Activity Levels Driven by Resecuritization CDOs and CLOs,” February 1, 2005; “2005 U.S. CDO Review: Looking Ahead to 2006: Record Year Follows Record Year,” February 6, 2006; “2008 U.S. CDO Outlook and 2007 Review: Issuance Down in 2007 Triggered by Subprime Mortgages Meltdown; Lower Overall Issuance Expected in 2008,” March 3, 2008. 135. Moody’s annual gross revenues for ABS CDO ratings was $11,730,234 in 2003, $22,210,695 in 2004, $40,332,909 in 2005, $91,285,905 in 2006, and $94,666,014 in 2007. Information provided by Moody’s, May 3, 2010. See also Moody’s Corporation 2006 10-K, p. 66 and Moody’s Corporation, 2007 10-K. 136. Witt, testimony before the FCIC, June 2, 2010, transcript, p. 46. 137. Witt, written testimony for the FCIC, June 2, 2010, p. 11; Witt, interview, April 21, 2010. 138. Eric Kolchinsky, interview by FCIC, April 27, 2010. 139. Witt, interview, April 21, 2010. 140. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database.
580
Notes to Chapter 9
141. Yuri Yoshizawa, interview by FCIC, May 17, 2010. The chart was labeled “Derivatives (America).” 142. Brian Clarkson, interview by FCIC, May 20, 2010. 143. Harvey Goldschmid, interview by FCIC, March 24, 2010; Annette Nazareth, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010. 144. Office of Thrift Supervision, letter to the SEC, February 11, 2004. 145. Lehman Brothers, Inc., letter to the SEC, March 8, 2004; J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., letter to the SEC, February 12, 2004; Deutsche Bank A.G. and Deutsche Bank Secs., letter to the SEC, February 18, 2004. 146. Harvey Goldschmid, interview by FCIC, April 8, 2010. 147. Closed meeting of the Securities and Exchange Commission, April 28, 2004. 148. In 2005, the Division of Market Regulation became the Division of Trading and Markets. For the sake of simplicity, throughout this report it is referred to as the Division of Market Regulation. 149. Erik Sirri, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010. Although there are more than 1,000 SEC examiners, collectively they regulate more than 5,000 broker-dealers (with more than 750,000 registered representatives) as well as other market participants. 150. Michael Macchiaroli, interview by FCIC, March 18, 2010. 151. The monitors met with senior business and risk managers at each CSE firm every month about general concerns and risks the firms were seeing. Written reports of these meetings were given to the director of market regulation every month. In addition, the CSE monitors met quarterly with the treasury and financial control functions of each CSE firm to discuss liquidity and funding issues. 152. Erik Sirri, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 1, session 3: SEC Regulation of Investment Banks, May 5, 2010. 153. Internal SEC memorandum, Re: “CSE Examination of Bear Stearns & Co. Inc.,” November 4, 2005. 154. Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Inspector General, “SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program,” Report No. 446-A, September 25, 2008, pp. 17–18. 155. Michael Macchiaroli, interview by FCIC, April 13, 2010. 156. Robert Seabolt, email to James Giles, Steven Spurry, and Matthew Eichner, October 1, 2007. 157. Matt Eichner, interview by FCIC, April 14, 2010; SEC, OIG, “SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program,” p. 109. 158. Goldschmid, interview. 159. GAO, “Financial Markets Regulation: Financial Crisis Highlights Need to Improve Oversight of Leverage at Financial Institutions,” GAO-09-739 (Report to Congressional Committees), July 2009, pp. 38–42. 160. Erik Sirri, “Securities Markets and Regulatory Reform,” remarks at the National Economists Club, Washington, D.C., April 9, 2009. 161. Harvey Goldschmid, interview, April 8, 2010. 162. “Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program,” SEC press release, September 26, 2008. 163. Mary Schapiro, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, day 2, panel 1: Current Investigations into the Financial Crisis—Federal Officials, January 14, 2010, transcript, p. 39. 164. The Fed remained the supervisor of JP Morgan at the holding company level. 165. Mark Olson, interview by FCIC, October 4, 2010. 166. Federal Reserve System, “Financial Holding Company Project,” January 25, 2008, p. 3.
Chapter 9 1. Warren Peterson, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Greater Bakersfield, session 3: Residential and Community Real Estate, September 7, 2010, pp. 1, 3. 2. Gary Crabtree, principal owner, Affiliated Appraisers, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Greater Bakersfield, session 4: Local Housing Market, September 7, 2010, p. 2.
Notes to Chapter 9
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3. Lloyd Plank, Lloyd E. Plank Real Estate Consultants, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Greater Bakersfield, session 4: Local Housing Market, September 7, 2010, p. 2. 4. CoreLogic Single Family Combined (SFC) Home Price Index, data accessed August 2010. FCIC calculation of change from January 1997 to April 2006, peak. 5. Professor Robert Shiller, Historical Housing data.. 6. Final Report of Michael J. Missal, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, In RE: New Century TRS Holdings, Chapter 11, Case No. 07-10416 (KJC), (Bankr. D.Del), February 29, 2008, pp. 145, 138, 139–40 (hereafter Missal). 7. Ibid., p. 3. 8. Nomura Fixed Income Research, “Notes from Boca Raton: Coverage from Selected Sessions of ABS East 2005,” September 20, 2005, pp. 5–7. 9. Alan Greenspan, “The Economic Outlook,” testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, 109th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 2005. 10. Christopher Mayer, written testimony for the FCIC, Forum to Explore the Causes of the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 5: Mortgage Lending Practices and Securitization, February 27, 2010, pp. 5–6. 11. Antonio Fatás, Prakash Kannan, Pau Rabanal, and Alasdair Scott, “Lessons for Monetary Policy from Asset Price Fluctuations Leaving the Board,” International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (Fall 2009), chapter 3. 12. James MacGee, “Why Didn’t Canada’s Housing Market Go Bust?” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Economic Comment (December 2, 2009). 13. Morris A. Davis, Andreas Lehnert, and Robert F. Martin, “The Rent-Price Ratio for the Aggregate Stock of Owner-Occupied Housing,” Federal Reserve Board Working Paper, May 2005, p. 2. 14. Price data from CoreLogic CSBA Home Price Index, Single-Family Combined. Rent data is Bureau of Labor Statistics, metro-level Consumer Price Index (CPI-U), Owners’ Equivalent Rent for Primary Residence; all index figures are adjusted so that Jan. 1997=1. Methods follow from Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, “House Prices and Fundamental Value,” Number 2004–27, October 1, 2004. 15. National Association of Realtors Housing Affordability Index, accessed from Bloomberg as composite Index (HOMECOMP). The index began in 1986. 16. The index also assumes that the qualifying ratio of 25%, so that the monthly principal & interest payment could not exceed 25% of the median family monthly income. More about the methodology can be found at National Association of Realtors, Methodology for the Housing Affordability Index. 17. Ben Bernanke, letter to FCIC Chairman Phil Angelides, December 21, 2010, p. 2. 18. Kristopher S. Gerardi, Christopher L. Foote, and Paul S. Willen, “Reasonable People Did Disagree: Optimism and Pessimism about the U.S. Housing Market Before the Crash,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 10-5, August 12, 2010. 19. Donald L. Kohn, “Monetary Policy and Asset Prices,” speech delivered at “Monetary Policy: A Journey from Theory to Practice,” a European Central Bank Colloquium held in honor of Otmar Issing, Frankfurt, Germany, March 16, 2006. 20. Richard A. Brown, “Rising Risks in Housing Markets,” memorandum to the National Risk Committee of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, March 21, 2005, pp. 1–2. 21. Board of Governors, memorandum from Josh Gallin and Andreas Lehnert to Vice Chairman [Roger] Ferguson, “Talking Points on House Prices,” May 5, 2005, p. 3. 22. Missal, p. 40. 23. William Black, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Miami, Florida, session 1: Overview of Mortgage Fraud, September 21, 2010, transcript, p. 78; and email from William Black to FCIC, December 12, 2010. 24. Reply of Attorney General Lisa Madigan (Illinois) to the FCIC, April 27, 2010, p. 7. 25. Chris Swecker, Assistant Director Criminal Investigative Division Federal Bureau of Investigation, statement before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., October 7, 2004. 26. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, “Mortgage Fraud Assessment,” November 2005.
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Notes to Chapter 9
27. Wilfredo Ferrer, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Miami, Florida, session 3: The Regulation, Oversight, and Prosecution of Mortgage Fraud in Miami, September 21, 2010, transcript, pp. 186–87. 28. Ann Fulmer, supplemental written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Miami, Florida, session 1: Overview of Mortgage Fraud, September 21, 2010, p. 2; Fulmer, testimony, transcript, pp. 80–81. 29. Ed Parker, interview by FCIC, May 26, 2010. 30. David Gussmann, interview by FCIC, March 30, 2010. 31. William H. Brewster, interview by FCIC, October 29, 2010. 32. Henry Pontell, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Miami, Florida, session 1: Overview of Mortgage Fraud, September 21, 2010, p. 1. 33. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, “The Internal Effects of the FBI’s Reprioritization, September 2004,” p. 1. 34. Chris Swecker, interview by FCIC, March 8, 2010. 35. Patrick Crowley, MortgageDaily.com, November 24, 2003. 36. Swecker, statement to the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, October 7, 2004. 37. William Black, written testimony for the FCIC, September 21, 2010, p. 17. 38. Francisco San Pedro, interview by FCIC, September 20, 2010. 39. FinCEN report to the FCIC on Countrywide SAR activity, 1999–2009. 40. OCC, letter to Bank of America, June 5, 2007. 41. Darcy Parmer, interview by FCIC, June 4, 2010. 42. FinCEN, “Mortgage Loan Fraud: An Industry Assessment Based on SAR Analysis,” November 2006, pp. 2, 6. 43. Swecker, statement before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, October 7, 2004. 44. Swecker, interview. 45. FinCEN, “Mortgage Loan Fraud Update: Suspicious Activity Report Filings from April–June 30, 2010,” p. 21. 46. DOJ, letter from Assistant Attorney General Ronald Welch to the FCIC, April 28, 2010, pp. 1, 3, October 21, 2010, p. 2. 47. Robert Mueller, interview by FCIC, December 14, 2010. 48. Alberto Gonzales, interview by FCIC, November 1, 2010. 49. OFHEO, “2007 Performance and Accountability Report,” pp. 13, 17. 50. Richard Spillenkothen, interview by FCIC, March 19, 2010. 51. Michael J. Mukasey, interview by FCIC, October 20, 2010. 52. DOJ response to FCIC request, April 16, 2010; see also DOJ response to FCIC request, April 28, 2010. 53. William Black, testimony before the FCIC, September 21, 2010, transcript, p. 38. 54. Swecker, interview. 55. Ellen Wilcox, special agent, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Miami, session 2: Uncovering Mortgage Fraud in Miami, September 21, 2010, transcript, p. 80; “Participant in $13 Million Mortgage Fraud Scheme Convicted by Polk County Jury,” Office of Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum press release, August 28, 2008. 56. Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County, Florida, State of Florida vs. Scott Almeida, et al., OSWP No. 2005-0256-TPA; July 23, 2007, see paragraphs 2, 17, 18, 19, 28, and 32. 57. Wilcox, testimony before the FCIC, September 21, 2010, transcript, pp. 98–99. 58. Gary Gorton, “The Panic of 2007,” paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole Conference, “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System,” August 2008. 59. Adam B. Ashcraft and Til Schuermann, “Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 318, March 2008, pp. 5–11. 60. Raymond McDaniel, quoted in the transcript of Moody’s Managing Director’s Town Hall Meeting, September 11, 2007.
Notes to Chapter 9
583
61. Keith Johnson, former president and chief operating officer of Clayton Holdings, Inc., interview by FCIC, September 2, 2010. 62. Frank Filipps, interview by FCIC, August 9, 2010. 63. Vicki Beal, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, session 3: The Mortgage Securitization Chain: From Sacramento to Wall Street, September 23, 2010, transcript, pp. 155, 155–56. 64. Beal, testimony before the FCIC, September 23, 2010, transcript, pp. 169, 157; see also Martha Coakley, Massachusetts Attorney General, comment letter to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding proposed rule regarding asset-backed securities, Release No. 33-9117; 34-61858; File No. S708-10, August 2, 2010, p. 6. 65. Beal, testimony before the FCIC, September 23, 2010, transcript, pp. 169–70. 66. D. Keith Johnson, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Sacramento, session 3: The Mortgage Securitization Chain: From Sacramento to Wall Street, September 23, 2010, transcript, pp. 183–84. 67. Ibid., p. 211. 68. Beal, testimony before the FCIC, September 23, 2010, transcript, p. 172. 69. John J. Goggins, senior vice president and general counsel, Moody’s, letter to FCIC regarding “September 27, 2010 Article Published in The New York Times Misconstruing Commission Testimony,” September 30, 2010. 70. Johnson, testimony before the FCIC, September 23, 2010, transcript, p. 174. 71. Missal, p. 67. 72. Roger Ehrnman, interview by FCIC, September 2, 2010; Johnson, testimony before the FCIC, September 23, 2010, transcript, p. 178. 73. Tony Peterson, interview by FCIC, October 14, 2010. 74. Joseph Schwartz, vice president in charge of mortgage acquisition due diligence, Deutsche Bank, interview by FCIC, July 21, 2010; William Collins Buell VI, head of mortgage acquisition, JP Morgan, interview by FCIC, September 15, 2010. 75. Richard M. Bowen, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 1, session 2: Subprime Origination and Securitization, April 7, 2010, p. 2. 76. Richard M. Bowen, interview by FCIC, February 27, 2010; FCIC correspondence with Richard M. Bowen. 77. Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 2, The Secondary Market (Bethesda, MD: Inside Mortgage Finance, 2009), p. 156; FCIC staff estimate based on analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. 78. See, for example, James C. Treadway Jr., “An Overview of Rule 415 and Some Thoughts About the Future,” remarks to the thirteenth annual meeting of the Securities Industry Association, Hot Springs, Virginia, October 8, 1983. 79. Shelley Parratt and Paula Dubberly, interview by the FCIC, October 1, 2010. 80. 17 C.F.R. Part 229.1111(a)(3), “Pool Assets,” revised as of April 1, 2005. 81. See Part V of complaint filed by Cambridge Place Investment Management Inc., dated July 9, 2010, in Suffolk County (Massachusetts) Superior Court, Cambridge Place Investment Management, Inc., v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., Case No. 10-27841, p. 71 (hereafter Cambridge Complaint), and Part V of complaint filed by Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, dated October 15, 2010, in Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois (Chancery Division), Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago v. Banc of America Funding Corp. et al., Case No. 10CH450B3, p. 173. 82. Cambridge Complaint, pp. 32–33, 61–63, 70–71, 75–76. 83. Bowen, interview. 84. D. Keith Johnson, former president and chief operating officer, Clayton Holdings, Inc., interview by FCIC, June 8, 2010. 85. A QIB was defined under Rule 144A to include “entities, acting for its own account or the accounts of other qualified institutional buyers, that in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis at least $100 million in securities of issuers that are not affiliated with the entity.” See 17 C.F.R. 230.144A, “Private Resale of Securities to Institutions.”
584
Notes to Chapter 9
86. Dennis Voigt Crawford, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 2, session 2: Current Investigation into the Financial Crisis—State and Local Officials, January 14, 2010, p. 112. 87. Richard Breeden, interview by FCIC, October 14, 2010. See Public Law 104–290 (Oct. 11, 1996); Rule 144A contained provisions that ensured it did not expand to the securities markets in which retail investors did participate. 88. Federal Reserve Board, SR 9724, “Risk-Focused Framework for Supervision of Large Complex Institutions,” October 27, 1997. 89. Alan Greenspan, “The Evolution of Bank Supervision,” speech before the American Bankers Association, Phoenix, Arizona, October 11, 1999. 90. Eugene Ludwig, interview by FCIC, September 2, 2010. 91. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Report on Systemic Risk and Supervision,” Draft of August 5, 2009, p. 2. 92. Rich Spillenkothen, “Notes on the performance of prudential supervision in the years preceding the financial crisis by a former director of banking supervision and regulation at the Federal Reserve Board (1991 to 2006),” May 31, 2010, 12. 93. Susan Bies, interview by FCIC, October 11, 2010. 94. Bernanke, letter to the FCIC, December 21, 2010. 95. John Snow, interview by FCIC, October 7, 2010. 96. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, and National Credit Union Administration, “Credit Risk Management Guidance for Home Equity Lending,” May 16, 2005. 97. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 1:3; “Residential Mortgage Lenders Peer Group Survey: Analysis and Implications for Guidance,” PowerPoint presentation, November 30, 2005, pp. 13, 3. 98. Sabeth Siddique, interview by the FCIC, September 9, 2010. 99. “Residential Mortgage Lenders Peer Group Survey: Analysis and Implications for Guidance,” PowerPoint, November 30, 2005. 100. Bies, interview. 101. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, and National Credit Union Administration, “Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products,” Federal Register 70 (December 29, 2005): 77,249, 72,252, 72,253. 102. Paul Smith, American Bankers Association, letter to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of Thrift Supervision, and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, March 29, 2006, p. 2. 103. Letter from American Financial Services Association to federal regulators 8, available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/comments/d1e85ce1–07ab-4acf-8db5–8d1747afba0a.pdf. 104. Letters to the Office of Thrift Supervision from the American Bankers Association (March 29, 2006), p. 2; the American Financial Services Association (March 28, 2006), p. 8; and Indymac Bank (March 29, 2006), p. 4. 105. The Housing Policy Council of the Financial Services Roundtable, letter to the Office of Thrift Supervision, March 29, 2006, p. 6. 106. Siddique, interview. 107. Binyamin Appelbaum and Ellen Nakashima, “Banking Regulator Played Advocate Over Enforcer: Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control, Then Fail,” Washington Post, November 23, 2008. 108. Bies, interview. 109. See, e.g. “Countrywide Seeks to Become Savings Bank; The Mortgage Lender Says It Is Planning to Apply to Convert Its Charter So It Will Be Regulated by One Federal Agency instead of Two,” Los Angeles Times, November 11, 2006, based on Bloomberg, Reuters. 110. Kim Sherer, interview by FCIC, August 3 2003. 111. Countrywide, “Briefing Paper: Meeting with Office of Thrift Supervision, Thursday July 13, 2006.”
Notes to Chapter 9
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112. Angelo Mozilo, email to John McMurray (cc Dave Sambol, Carlos Garcia), re: Pay Options, August 12, 2006; John McMurray, email to Angelo Mozilo (cc Kevin Bartlett, Carlos Garcia, Dave Sambol, re: Pay Options, August 13, 2006. 113. The cost of borrowing is reflected by credit spreads, the portion of interest rates that compensate investors for credit risk. Credit spreads are the interest rates that investors require above the so-called risk-free interest rate, usually measured in terms of Treasuries or interest rate swaps with similar characteristics. 114. Congressional Oversight Panel, “Commercial Real Estate Losses and the Risk to Financial Stability,” February 10, 2010, pp. 58–60. 115. Loan Syndication Trading Association, “The US Loan Market Today,” presentation. 116. Loan Syndication Trading Association, “Financial Reform and the Leveraged Loan Market,” presentation. 117. Ibid., Loan Syndication Trading Association, “Challenges Facing CLOs … and the Loan Market,” presentation. 118. Ibid., p. 14. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews at Consolidated Supervised Entities,” memorandum, April 26, 2007. 119. Michael Flaherty and Dena Aubin, “For Private Equity Market, All Eyes on First Data,” Reuters, September 4, 2007. 120. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consoldated Supervised Entities,” memorandum, July 5, 2007. 121. Charles Prince, quoted in “Citigroup chief stays bullish on buyouts,” Financial Times, July 9, 2007; testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and GovernmentSponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 1: Citigroup Senior Management, April 8, 2010, transcript, pp. 49–50. 122. Roben Farzad, Matthew Goldstein, David Henry, and Christopher Palmeri, “Not So Smart,” BusinessWeek, September 3, 2007. 123. Joseph Gyourko, “Understanding Commercial Real Estate: Just How Different from Housing Is It?” NBER Working Paper 14708, National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2009, pp. 23, 38. 124. CRE Finance Council, Compendium of Statistics, November 5, 2010, Exhibits 3, 2. 125. Joe Keohane, “Heartbreak Hotels,” Portfolio, November 11, 2008. 126. “Hilton Debt Clogs Lenders’ Balance Sheets,” Commercial Mortgage Alert, February 20, 2009. 127. Tom Marano, interview by FCIC, April 19, 2010. 128. Jeff Mayer and Tom Marano, “Fixed Income Overview,” Bear Stearns, March 29, 2007, p. 18. 129. Gyourko, “Understanding Commercial Real Estate: Just How Different from Housing Is It?” p. 1. 130. New York Federal Reserve Bank, “Maiden Lane LLC Holdings as of 9/30/2008.” 131. Anton R. Valukas, Report of Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), March 11, 2010, 2:356 (hereafter cited as Valukas). 132. Ibid., 2:356–58. 133. Madelyn Antoncic, “Lehman Brothers Risk Management,” August 7, 2007, p. 5; and Antoncic, interview by FCIC, July 14, 2010. 134. Valukas, 1:43, 4; Antoncic, interview. 135. Valukas, 1:45–62, 79–80. 136. Jody Shenn, “Lehman Said to Return to Mortgage Market through Aurora Unit (Update 1),” Bloomberg, October 21, 2009. 137. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” memoranda, October 6, 2006; December 6, 2007; February 2, 2007; March 30, 2007; May 31, 2007; July 5, 2007; August 3, 2007; September 5, 2007; October 5, 2007. 138. Erik Sirri, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010. 139. Valukas, 1:7; 18 nn. 63, 64; 3: 742, 815–22. 140. Valukas, 1:8, 20–21. 141. The People of the State of New York v. Ernst & Young LLP (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 21, 2010). 142. Ronald Marcus, interview by FCIC, July 23, 2010. 143. See Ronald S. Marcus, OTS, “Report of Examination Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.,” July 7, 2008, pp. 1–2.
586
Notes to Chapter 9
144. David Sambol, interview by FCIC, September 27, 2010. 145. See Countrywide Financial Corporation, Form 10-K, February 29, 2007, p. 47. See also Fannie Mae, “Single-Family Conventional Acquisition Characteristics: Overall” (2007); Fannie Mae, “Single Family Conventional Acquisition Characteristics: Countrywide Financial Corporation” (2007); Countrywide, “Response to June 23 Request: 11 and 12: Summary.” 146. “Single Family Guarantee Business: Facing Strategic Crossroads,” June 27, 2005. 147. Ibid. 148. Daniel Mudd, interview by FCIC, March 26, 2010. 149. “Single Family Guarantee Business: Facing Strategic Crossroads.” 150. “Single Family Guaranty Business Strategic Review Summary,” PowerPoint presentation, July 19, 2005. 151. Citigroup, “Project Phineas: Presentation to the Board of Directors,” executive summary, July 18 and 19, 2005. 152. “Single Family Conventional Acquisition Characteristics Overall,” produced by Fannie Mae. 153. Tom Lund, interview by FCIC, March 4, 2010. 154. Christopher Dickerson to James B. Lockhart III, “Proposed Appointment of the Federal Housing Finance Agency as Conservator for the Federal National Mortgage Association,” memorandum, September 6, 2008, p. 14 155. Fannie Mae, 3Q 2008 Form 10-Q, p. at 115; Fannie Mae, 2007 Form 10K, pp. 126–30. 156. By December 31, 2005, Freddie reported capital of $36.4 billion; $173 billion in loans to borrowers with FICO scores below 660; $80 billion in high LTV; and $93 billion in loans for non-owner-occupied homes. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, “Information Statement and Annual Report to Stockholders: For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007,” February 28, 2008, p. 74. 157. Richard Syron, interview by FCIC, August 31, 2010. 158. Anurag Saksena, interview by FCIC, June 22, 2010. 159. Donald Bisenius, interview by FCIC, September 29, 2010. 160. Saksena, interview. 161. “OFHEO, SEC Reach Settlement with Fannie Mae; Penalty Imposed,” Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight press release, May 23, 2006. 162. “Freddie Mac Voluntarily Adopts Temporary Limited Growth for Retained Portfolio,” Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation press release, August 1, 2006. 163. OFHEO, Report of the Special Examination of Fannie Mae, May 2006. 164. OFHEO Report: “Fannie Mae Façade; Fannie Mae Criticized for Earnings Manipulation,” Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight press release, May 23, 2006. 165. James Lockhart, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 2: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, April 9, 2010, p. 2. 166. Ibid., p. 1. 167. Robert J. Levin, Board of Director Presentation, PowerPoint presentation, January 2006. 168. Minutes of the February 21, 2006, meeting of the Board of Directors of Fannie Mae (approved on April 25, 2006). 169. Stephen B. Ashley, Chairman Fannie Mae, remarks prepared for delivery at the Senior Management Meeting, Cambridge, Maryland, June 27, 2006. 170. Fannie Mae, “Notes to Single Family Conventional Acquisition Report,” August 3, 2007; See also Federal National Mortgage Association, Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006, filed August 16, 2007. 171. FCIC staff estimates based on data provided by Fannie Mae. 172. Federal National Mortgage Association, “Form DEF 14A,” November 2, 2007, p. 42; Federal National Mortgage Association, Form 10-K, May 2, 2007, p. 202. 173. OFHEO, Report of the Special Examination for Fannie Mae, May 2006, p. 8. 174. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2005, filed June 28, 2006, pp. 3, 19. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2006, filed March 23, 2007, pp. 3, 22.
Notes to Chapter 9
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175. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Proxy Statement and Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders (May 7, 2007), Summary Compensation Table, p. 52 (for 2006 figures). Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Proxy Statement and Notice of Annual Meeting of Stockholders (July 12, 2006), Summary Compensation Table, p. 37 (for 2005 figures). 176. Ibid. 177. OFHEO, Report of the Special Examination for Fannie Mae, May 2006, pp. 3, 9–10, 15. 178. Ibid., p 2. 179. Ibid. 180. Ibid., pp. 7–8. 181. Ibid. 182. Mark Winer, interview by FCIC, March 23, 2010. 183. Todd Hempstead, interview by FCIC, March 23, 2010. 184. Daniel Mudd, interview by FCIC, March 26, 2010. 185. Dickerson to Lockhart, Fannie Mae conservatorship memo, September 6, 2008, p. 14. 186. Minutes of a Meeting of the Fannie Mae Board of Directors, April 21, 2007. 187. Minutes of a Meeting of the Fannie Mae Board of Directors, May 21, 2007. 188. Federal National Mortgage Association, Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007, p. 24. 189. FCIC staff estimate based on data provided by Fannie Mae. 190. “Deepen Segments—Develop Breadth,” Fannie Mae Strategic Plan, 2007–2011. 191. Enrico Dallavecchia, email to Daniel Mudd, “Budget 2008 and strategic investments,” July 16, 2007. 192. Enrico Dallavecchia, email to Michael Williams, “RE:,” July 16, 2007. 193. Daniel Mudd, email to Enrico Dallavecchia, “RE: Budget 2008 and strategic investments,” July 17, 2007. 194. Enrico Dallavecchia, interview by FCIC, March 16, 2010. 195. Freddie Mac, “Freddie Mac’s Business Strategy, Board of Directors Meeting,” March 2–3, 2007, pp. 3–4. 196. Freddie Mac, “Freddie Mac’s Business Strategy, Board of Directors Meeting,” March 2–3, 2007, pp. 3–4, 70, 73. 197. OFHEO, 2006 Report of Examination for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, pp. 8– 9, 10–11. 198. Federal Housing Finance Agency, “Mortgage Market Note 10–2: The Housing Goals of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Context of the Mortgage,” February 1, 2010. 199. “HUD Announces New Regulations to Provide $2.4 Trillion in Mortgages for Affordable Housing for 28.1 Million Families,” Department of Housing and Urban Development, press release, October 31, 2000. 200. Mudd, interview. 201. Robert Levin, interview by FCIC, March 17, 2010. 202. “HUD Finalizes Rule on New Housing Goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” Department of Housing and Urban Development press release, November 1, 2004. 203. Mudd, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session: 1 Fannie Mae, April 9, 2010, transcript, pp. 63– 64. 204. See FHFA, “Annual Report to Congress 2009,” pp. 131, 148. The numbers are for mortgage assets + outstanding MBS guaranteed. Total assets + MBS are slightly greater. 205. OFHEO, “2008 Report to Congress,” April 15, 2008. 206. Robert Levin, interview by FCIC, March 17, 2010; Robert Levin, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 1: Fannie Mae, April 9, 2010, transcript, pp. 68–72. 207. Tom Lund, interview by FCIC, March 4, 2010. 208. Dallavecchia, interview. 209. Todd Hempstead, interview by FCIC, March 23, 2010. 210. Kenneth Bacon, interview by FCIC, March 5, 2010.
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211. Stephen Ashley, interview by FCIC, March 31, 2010. 212. Levin, interview. 213. Mike Quinn, interview by FCIC, March 10, 2010. 214. Ashley, interview. 215. Armando Falcon, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 2: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, April 9, 2010, transcript, pp. 155–56, 192; .written testimony, p. 10. 216. Lockhart, written testimony for the FCIC, April 9, 2010, p. 6;; Lockhart, testimony before the FCIC, April 9, 2010, transcript, pp. 156–61. 217. James Lockhart, interview by FCIC, March 19, 2010. 218. Edward DeMarco, interview by FCIC, March 18, 2010; Maria Fernandez (with Alfred Pollard, Chris Dickerson, Jeffrey Spohn, and Jamie Newell), interview by FCIC, March 5, 2010. 219. Mike Price (with Janice Kuhl, Paul Manchester, Charlotte Reid, Alfred Pollard, and Kevin Sheehan), interview by FCIC, February 19, 2010. 220. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “HUD’s Housing Goals for the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) for the Years 2005–2008 and Amendments to HUD’s Regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” Federal Register 69, no. 211 (2 Nov. 2004): 63629. 221. FHFA, “The Housing Goals of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Context of the Mortgage Market.” 222. Daniel Mudd, letter to Brian Montgomery re affordable housing goals, December 21, 2007. 223. “Deepen Segments—Develop Breadth,” Fannie Mae Strategic Plan. 224. Brian D. Montgomery, Federal Housing Commissioner, to Daniel Mudd, Fannie Mae, typed letter, April 24, 2008; Brian D. Montgomery, Federal Housing Commissioner, to Richard F. Syron, Fannie Mae, typed letter, April 24, 2008. 225. “Cost of Freddie Mac’s Affordable Housing Mission,” PowerPoint presentation, June 4, 2009, pp. 7–8, 10–11. 226. Freddie’s net income was $4.8 billion in 2003, $2.6 billion in 2004, $2.1 billion in 2005, $2.3 billion in 2006, net loss of $3.1 billion in 2007, and net loss of $50.1 billion in 2008. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, Form 10-K, for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2009, filed February 24, 2010, Item 6, Selected Financial Data, p. 57 (for 2008 figure). Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, “Information Statement and Annual Report to Stockholders: For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007,” February 28, 2008, Selected Financial Data and Other Operating Measures, p. 28 (for 2003–07 figures). 227. “Cost and Benefits of Mission Activities: Project Phineas,” presentation, June 14, 2005. 228. March 13, 2007, Business Review Briefing; information confirmed by counsel to Fannie Mae on January 4, 2011. 229. “Fannie Mae’s Housing Goals,” Audit Team briefing, May 8, 2007. 230. “Fannie Mae Board of Directors Management Report,” PowerPoint presentation, July 17, 2007. 231. “Cost of Freddie Mac’s Affordable Housing Mission,” PowerPoint presentation, June 4, 2009, pp. 7–8, 10–11.
Chapter 10 1. Gary Gorton, interview by FCIC, May 11, 2010. 2. Lewis Ranieri, interview by FCIC, July 30, 2010. 3. Complaint, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre (S.D.N.Y. April 16, 2010). 4. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Securities and Exchange Commission, “Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured Finance Activities” (Notice of final interagency statement), January 5, 2007. 5. Wing Chau, interview by FDIC, November 11, 2010. 6. FCIC, Survey of 40 CDO Managers, Schedule A and B (1st production served on 28 managers, 2nd production served on 12 managers). 7. Vertical Capital, email response to FCIC survey, October 29, 2010.
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8. As two market observers would later write, “Starting in 2004, CDOs and CDO investors became the dominant class of agents pricing credit risk on sub-prime mortgage loans. . . . In the absence of restraints, lenders started originating unreasonably risky loans in late 2005 and continued to do so into 2007.” Mark Adelson and David Jacob, “The Sub-prime Problem: Causes and Lessons,” January 8, 2008, p. 1. 9. Scott Simon, quoted in Allison Pyburn, “CDO Investors Debate Morality of Spread Environment,” Asset Securitization Report, May 9, 2005, p. 1. 10. Armand Pastine, quoted in ibid. According to the FCIC database, PIMCO did manage one more new CDO, Costa Bella CDO, which was issued in December 2006. 11. Source on downgrades: Bloomberg. Source on events on default: Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s downgrades ratings of Notes issued by Maxim High Grade CDO I, Ltd.,” April 18, 2008, and “Moody’s downgrades ratings of Notes issued by Maxim High Grade CDO II, Ltd.,” April 18, 2008. 12. ACA Capital, 2006 10-K, p. 12. 13. “ISDA Publishes Template for Credit Default Swaps on Asset-Backed Securities with Pay As You Go Settlement,” International Swaps and Derivatives Association press release, June 21, 2005 (www.isda.org/press/press062105.html). Under the terms of the pay-as-you-go swap, if the referenced mortgage-backed security does not receive the full interest and principal payments, the pay-as-you-go protection seller is required to pay the buyer the amount of the shortfall. For long investors—the protection provider under the swap—the advantage was the leverage embedded in the trade: they did not have to come up with the cash up front for the principal amount of the bond; they simply agreed to receive quarterly swap fees in return for accepting the risk of loss if the securities experienced a shortfall. 14. Laura Schwartz, interview by FCIC, May 10, 2010. 15. Laurie S. Goodman, Shumin Li, Douglas J. Lucas, Thomas A. Zimmerman, and Frank J. Fabozzi, Subprime Mortgage Credit Derivatives (Frank J. Fabozzi Series) (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2008), p. 176. 16. Greg Lippmann, interview by FCIC, May 20, 2010. 17. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. 18. FCIC Hedge Fund Survey. From July through December 2006, several hedge funds with average assets under management of $4–$8 billion accumulated positions totaling more than $1.4 billion in mortgage-related CDO equity tranches and almost $3 billion of short positions in mortgage-related CDO mezzanine tranches. FCIC staff used a Moody’s proprietary CDO database to estimate the total mortgage-related CDO equity tranche issuance. Please see FCIC website for more information about the hedge fund survey. Note: the FCIC did not survey hedge funds that fully liquidated or closed. These funds may have purchased substantial “long only” positions in mortgage-related securities. 19. FCIC Hedge Fund Survey. See FCIC website for details. 20. Rabobank’s counsel, letter to Judge Fried of the Supreme Court of NY, May 11, 2010. 21. Norma Flow of Funds, information provided by Merrill Lynch. 22. Steven Ross, email to FCIC, December 21, 2010. 23. See letter from Rabobank’s counsel, letter to Judge Fried, May 11, 2010; the letter was never filed with the court because the case was settled. 24. Document of Magnetar Investments in Norma, Attachment G-13 (showing Magnetar purchases of equity tranche in Norma); provided by Merrill Lynch. 25. Information provided by Merrill Lynch, December 22, 2010. 26. Complaint, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre. 27. Ira Wagner, interview by FCIC, April 20, 2010. 28. Alan Roseman, interview by FCIC, May 17, 2010. 29. Schwartz, interview. 30. John Paulson, interview by FCIC, October 28, 2010. 31. “Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO,” SEC press release, July 15, 2010. 32. Jamie Mai and Ben Hockett, interview by FCIC, April 22, 2010. 33. Sihan Shu, interview by FCIC, September 27, 2010. 34. Steven Eisman, interview by FCIC, April 22, 2010. 35. James Grant, “Inside the Mortgage Machine,” in Mr. Market Miscalculates: The Bubble Years and Beyond (Mount Jackson, VA: Axios, 2008), pp. 180–81, 182–83. 36. Eisman, interview.
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Notes to Chapter 10
37. Michael Burry, interview by FCIC, May 18, 2010. 38. Paulson, interview. 39. Burry, interview. 40. FCIC Hedge Fund Survey. See FCIC website for details. 41. John Geanakoplos, written testimony for the FCIC, Forum to Explore the Causes of the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 3: Risk Taking and Leverage, February 26, 2010, p. 16. 42. OCC, “Subprime CDO Valuation and Oversight Review—Conclusion Memorandum,” memorandum from Michael Sullivan, RAD, and Ron Frake, NBE, to John Lyons, Examiner-in-Charge, Citibank, NA, January 17, 2008, p. 6; Paul, Weiss, Citigroup’s counsel, letter to FCIC, June 23, 2010, “Responses of Nestor Dominguez.” 43. Richard Bookstaber, interview by FCIC, May 11, 2010. 44. “RMBS and Citi-RMBS as a Percentage of Citi-CDO Portfolio Notionals,” produced by Citi for the FCIC. 45. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Securities and Exchange Commission, U.K. Financial Services Authority, and Japan Financial Services Authority, “Notes on Senior Supervisors’ Meetings with Firms,” November 19, 2007, p. 3. 46. FCIC staff estimates, based on analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. 47. Paul, Weiss, Citigroup’s counsel, letter to FCIC, March 1, 2010, in re the FCIC’s second supplemental request, “Response to Interrogatory no. 7”; Paul, Weiss, letter to FCIC, March 31, 2010, updated response to interrogatory no. 7, p. 5. 48. Nestor Dominguez, interview by FCIC, March 2, 2010; Paul, Weiss, letter of March 31, 2010, pp. 3–6. 49. Board Analyst Profile for Citigroup Inc., April 16, 2007. 50. SEC staff (Sam Forstein, Tim McGarey, Mary Ann Gadziala, Kim Mavis, Bob Sollazo, Suzanne McGovern, and Chris Easter), interview by FCIC, February 9, 2010. 51. Comptroller of the Currency, memorandum, Examination of Citigroup Risk Management (CRM), January 13, 2005, p. 3. 52. Ronald Frake, Comptroller of the Currency, letter to Geoffrey Coley, Citibank, N.A., December 22, 2005. 53. Federal Reserve, “New York Operations Review, May 17–25, 2005,” p. 4. 54. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Bank Supervision Group, “Operations Review Report,” December 2009. 55. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Summary of Supervisory Activity and Findings, Citigroup Inc., January 1, 2005–December 31, 2005,” April 10, 2006; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Summary of Supervisory Activity and Findings,” Citigroup Inc., January 1, 2004–December 31, 2004,” April 5, 2005. 56. Citigroup Inc., Form 8-K, April 3, 2006, Exhibit 99.1. 57. Federal Reserve Board, memo to Governor Susan Bies, February 17, 2006. 58. The board reversed a 15% reduction that had been implemented when the issues began and then added a 5% raise. Citigroup, 2006 Proxy Statement, p. 37. 59. Comptroller of the Currency, letter to Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit (Supervisory Letter 200805), February 14, 2008; quotation, p. 2. 60. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, letter to Vikram Pandit and the Board of the Directors of Citigroup, April 15, 2008, pp. 6–7. 61. Timothy Geithner, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 1: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 128. 62. Gene Park, interview by FCIC, May 18, 2010. 63. Andrew Forster, email to Gary Gorton, Alan Frost, et al., July 21, 2005. 64. Park, interview. 65. Gorton, interview. 66. Park, interview. 67. Gene Park, email to Joseph Cassano, February 28, 2006. 68. Park, interview.
Notes to Chapter 10
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69. Data supplied by AIG. The CDO—RFC CDO III Ltd.—was 93% subprime and 7% RMBS Home Equity, according to the AIG credit committee. A review by FCIC staff showed that the remaining 7% designated as RMBS Home Equity included subprime collateral. 70. AIG, “Residential Mortgage Presentation (Financial Figures are as of June 30, 2007),” August 9, 2007, p. 28. 71. Park, interview. 72. Joseph Cassano, interview by FCIC, June 25, 2010. 73. Park, interview. 74. Dow Kim, interview by FCIC, September 9, 2010. 75. Stanley O’Neal, interview by FCIC, September 16, 2010. 76. Kim, interview. 77. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. 78. Complaint, Coöperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen=Boerenleenbank v. Merrill Lynch, No. 601832/09 (N.Y.S. June 12, 2009), paragraph 147. 79. Kim, interview. 80. FCIC analysis based on Moody’s CDO EMS database. 81. Presentation to Merrill Lynch and Co. Board of Directors, “Leveraged Finance and Mortgage/CDO Review,” October 21, 2007, p. 35. 82. Chau, interview. 83. FCIC staff analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. 84. FCIC staff estimates based on Moody’s CDO EMS database. Data supplied by Merrill Lynch. Relevant information not provided for Robeco High Grade CDO I. 85. FCIC staff analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. 86. Data supplied by Merrill Lynch. 87. FCIC staff analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. The total value of Baa tranches issued by CDOs in the FCIC database was $684 million in 2003 and $3.9 billion in 2007; Aa tranches, $1.4 billion in 2003 and $8.3 billion in 2007; A tranches, $522 million in 2003 and $4.3 billion in 2007. 88. FCIC staff telephone discussion with SEC staff, September 1, 2010. 89. FCIC staff analysis of Moody’s CDO EMS database. 90. Chau, interview; for number of the CDOs he managed, FCIC staff analysis of Moody’s Enhanced CDO Monitoring Database. 91. Super Senior Credit Transactions Principal Collateral Provisions, December 7, 2007, produced by AIG. 92. Presentation to the Merrill Lynch Board, “Leveraged Finance and Mortgage/CDO Review,” p. 23; Jeff Kronthal, former head of Merrill Lynch’s Global Credit, Real Estate and Structured Products, interview by FCIC, September 14, 2010. 93. Al Yoon, “Merrill’s Own Subprime Warnings Unheeded,” Reuters, October 30, 2007. 94. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” internal memo to Erik Sirri and others, February 2, 2007, p. 3. 95. Ibid., p. 1. 96. Yoon, “Merrill’s Own Subprime Warnings Unheeded.” 97. Kim, interview. 98. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Fishtail, Bacchus, Sundance, and Slapshot: Four Enron Transactions Funded and Facilitated by U.S. Financial Institutions, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., January 2, 2003, S-Prt 107–82, pp. 36, 37. 99. “Interagency Statement on Sound Practices” (Notice of final interagency statement), January 5, 2007 (see n. 4, above). 100. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and Securities and Exchange Commission, “Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex Structured Finance Activities” (Notice of interagency statement with request for public comments),May 13, 2004. 101. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
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Notes to Chapter 10
102. John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 2: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, April 8, 2010, Appendix E: OCC Supervision of Citibank, N.A., p. 10. 103. “Interagency Statement on Sound Practices” (Notice of final interagency statement), January 5, 2007, p. 6. 104. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Joint Forum, “Credit Risk Transfer,” Bank for International Settlements, March 2005, pp. 3–4, 6–7, 5–10. 105. Ibid., p. 4. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid., pp. 3–4. 108. SEC, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, “Examination Report to Moody’s Investor Services, Inc.,” p. 4 (examination begun August 31, 2007). 109. Warren Buffett, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 2: Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis, June 2, 2010, transcript, p. 301. 110. Warren Buffett, interview by FCIC, May 26, 2010; Buffett, testimony before the FCIC, June 2, 2010, transcript, p. 302. 111. Eric Kolchinsky, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 1: The Ratings Process, June 2, 2010, p. 2. 112. Brian Clarkson, interview by FCIC, May 20, 2010. 113. Gary Witt, interview by FCIC, April 21, 2010. John Rutherford was the president and CEO of Moody’s Corporation from the time of its spin-off from Dun & Bradstreet in 2000 until he retired from the firm in 2005. 114. Jerome Fons, interview by FCIC, April 22, 2010. 115. Raymond McDaniel, interview by FCIC, May 21, 2010. 116. Clarkson, interview. 117. Ibid. 118. McDaniel, interview. 119. Raymond McDaniel, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 2: Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis, June 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 203–4. 120. Scott McCleskey, interview by FCIC, April 16, 2010. 121. Clarkson, interview. 122. Witt, interview. 123. Mark Froeba, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 3: The Credit Rating Agency Business Model, June 2, 2010, transcript, p. 347. 124. Clarkson, interview; McDaniel, interview. 125. Witt, interview; Gary Witt, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, Session 3: The Credit Rating Agency Business Model, June 2, 2010, transcript, p. 394. 126. Brian Clarkson, email to Ed Bankole, Pramila Gupta, Michael Kanef, Andrew Kriegler, Sam Pilcer, Andrew Silver, and Linda Stesney, subject: “June YTD AFG by analyst.xls,” July 5, 2001. 127. William May, email to Gus Harris, subject: “RE: BES and PEs,” January 12, 2006. 128. Yuri Yoshizawa, email to direct report managing directors, subject: “3Q Market Coverage-CDO,” October 5, 2007. 129. Clarkson, interview. 130. McDaniel, interview. 131. Witt, testimony before the FCIC, June 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 456–57. 132. Moody’s Investors Service: Managing Director’s Town Hall Meeting, September 11, 2007, transcript, pp. 42, 51–52. 133. Witt, interview.
Notes to Chapter 11
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134. Andrew Kimball, internal email, October 21, 2007, attaching memorandum, “Credit policy issues at Moody’s suggested by the subprime/liquidity crisis.” The susceptibility of a ratings committee to external pressures was shown in the constant proportion debt obligation (CPDO) scandal in Europe. 135. Ibid., p. 3. 136. David Teicher, project manager at Moody’s, interview by FCIC, May 4, 2010; Standard & Poor’s, “Credit FAQ: The Basics of Credit Enhancement in Securitizations,” RatingsDirect, June 24, 2008. 137. Richard Michalek, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 3: The Credit Rating Agency Business Model, June 2, 2010, transcript, p. 361. 138. Witt, interview. 139. Clarkson, interview. 140. Fons, interview. 141. Kimball, memorandum, “Credit policy issues at Moody’s,” p. 1. 142. Eric Kolchinsky, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 1: The Ratings Process, June 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 68–69. 143. E Kolchinsky, email to Y Fu and Y Yoshizawa, May 30, 2005. 144. Kolchinsky, testimony before the FCIC, June 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 68–69. 145. Eric Kolchinsky, interview by FCIC, April 14, 2010. 146. FCIC staff estimates, based on analysis of Moody’s SFDRS database. 147. Riachra O’Driscoll, email to Yuri Yoshizawa, subject: “Magnolia 2006–5 Class Ds,” April 27, 2006. 148. Kimball, memorandum, “Credit policy issues at Moody’s,” p. 2. 149. SEC, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, “Examination Report for Moody’s Investors Services, Inc.,” p. 2.
Chapter 11 1. William Dudley, interview by FCIC, October 15, 2010. 2. Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 2, The Secondary Market (Bethesda, Md.: Inside Mortgage Finance, 2009), p. 13, “Non-Agency MBS Issuance by Type.” 3. FCIC staff estimates based on Moody’s CDO Enhanced Monitoring System (EMS) database. 4. 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, 2:373, “Commercial MBS Issuance.” 5. Ben S. Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, letter to Phil Angelides, chairman of the FCIC, December 21, 2010. 6. Mark Zandi, Celia Chen, and Brian Carey, “Housing at the Tipping Point,” Moody’s Economy.com, October 2006, pp. 6–7. 7. CoreLogic Home Price Index, Single-Family Combined (available at www.corelogic.com/ Products/CoreLogic-HPI.aspx), FCIC staff calculations, January to January. 8. CoreLogic Census Bureau Statistical Area (CBSA) Home Price Index, FCIC staff calculations. 9. Data provided by Mark Fleming, chief economist for CoreLogic, in his written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, session 1: Overview of the Sacramento Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Region, September 9, 2010, figures 4, 5. 10. Mark Fleming, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, session 1: Overview of the Sacramento Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Region, September 9, 2010, transcript, p. 14. 11. Mortgage Bankers Association, National Delinquency Survey, data provided to the FCIC. 12. Ibid., with FCIC staff calculations. 13. FCIC staff analysis, “Analysis of housing data,” July 7, 2010. The underlying data come from CoreLogic and Loan Processing Svcs. Tabulations were provided to the FCIC by staff at the Federal Reserve. 14. Subprime and Alt-A mortgages are defined as those included in subprime or Alt-A securitizations, respectively. GSE mortgages included mortgages purchased or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. FHA mortgages included mortgages insured by the FHA or VA. 15. FCIC staff analysis.
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16. A recent analysis published by FHFA comes to very similar conclusions. See “Data on the Risk Characteristics and Performance of Single-Family Mortgages Originated from 2001 through 2008 and Financed in the Secondary Market,” September 13, 2010. 17. FCIC staff analysis, “Analysis of housing data and comparison with Ed Pinto’s analysis,” August 9, 2010. In the sample data provided by the Federal Reserve, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgages with a FICO score below 660 had an average rate of serious delinquency of 6.2% in 2008. In public reports, the GSEs stated that the average serious delinquency rates for loans with FICO scores less than 660 in their guarantee books was 6.3%. Fannie Mae 2008 Credit Supplement, p. 5; Freddie Mac Fourth Quarter 2008 Financial Results Supplement, March 11, 2009, p. 15. 18. In the sample data provided by the Federal Reserve, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgages with LTVs above 90% had an average rate of serious delinquency of 5.7% in 2008. In public reports, the GSEs stated that the average serious delinquency rates for loans with LTVs above 90% in their guarantee books was 5.8%. Fannie Mae 2008 Credit Supplement, p. 5; Freddie Mac Fourth Quarter 2008 Financial Results Supplement, March 11, 2009, p. 15. 19. Edward Pinto, “Memorandum: Sizing Total Federal Government and Federal Agency Contributions to Subprime and Alt-A Loans in U.S. First Mortgage Market as of 6.30.08,” Exhibit 2 with corrections through October 11, 2010 (www.aei.org/docLib/PintoFCICTriggersMemo.pdf). The 26.7 million loans include 6.7 million loans in subprime securitizations and another 2.1 million loans in Alt-A securitizations, for a total of 8.8 million mortgages in subprime or Alt-A pools, which Pinto calls “self-denominated” subprime and Alt-A, respectively. To these, he adds another 8.8 million loans with FICO scores below 660, which he labels “subprime by characteristic.” He also adds 6.3 million loans at the GSEs that are either interest-only loans, negative amortization loans, or loans with an LTV—including any second mortgage—greater than 90%, which he collectively refers to as “Alt-A by characteristic.” The last additions include an estimated 1.4 million loans insured by the FHA and VA with an LTV greater than 90%— out of a total of roughly 5.5 million FHA and VA loans—and 1.3 million loans in bank portfolios that are inferred to have his defined “Alt-A characteristics.” 20. Fannie Mae 2008 Credit Supplement, p. 5; Freddie Mac Fourth Quarter 2008 Financial Results Supplement, March 11, 2009. 21. Edward Pinto, “Yes, the CRA Is Toxic,” City Journal, Autumn 2009. 22. Neil Bhutta and Glenn Canner, “Did the CRA Cause the Mortgage Market Meltdown?” Federal Reserve Board of Governors, March 2009. The authors use the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data, which cover roughly 80% of the mortgage market in the United States—see Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, and Glenn B. Canner, “Opportunities and Issues in Using HMDA Data,” Journal of Real Estate Research 29, no. 4 (October 2007): 351–79. 23. Elizabeth Laderman and Carolina Reid, “Lending in low and moderate income neighborhoods in California: The Performance of CRA Lending During the Subprime Meltdown,” November 26, 2008, working paper to be presented at the Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets, Washington, DC, December 4, 2008. 24. FCIC, “Preliminary Staff Report: The Mortgage Crisis,” April 7, 2010. 25. Bank of America response letter to FCIC, August 20, 2010. 26. John Reed, interview by FCIC, March 4, 2010. 27. Lewis Ranieri, interview by FCIC, July 30, 2010. 28. Nicolas Weill, interview by FCIC, May 11, 2010. 29. Ibid. 30. Nicolas Weill, email to Raymond McDaniel and Brian Clarkson, July 4, 2007. 31. Moody’s Investors Service, “Early Defaults Rise in Mortgage Securitizations,” Structured Finance: Special Report, January 18, 2007, pp. 1, 3. 32. Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Downgrades Subprime First-lien RMBS-Global Credit Research Announcement,” July 10, 2007. 33. Weill, interview. 34. FCIC staff estimates, based on analysis of Blackbox data. 35. Data on Bear Stearns provided by JP Morgan to the FCIC.
Notes to Chapter 11
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36. Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Downgrades $33.4 billion of 2006 Subprime First-Lien RMBS and Affirms $280 billion Aaa’s and Aa’s,” October 11, 2007; “October 11 Rating Actions Related to 2006 Subprime First-Lien RMBS,” Structured Finance: Special Report, October 17, 2007, pp. 1–2. 37. FCIC staff estimates, based on analysis of Blackbox data. 38. FCIC staff estimates, based on analysis of Moody’s SFDRS data as of April 2010. 39. Moody’s Investors Service, “The Impact of Subprime Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities on Moody’s-Rated Structured Finance CDOs: A Preliminary Review,” Structured Finance: Special Comment, March 23, 2007, p. 2. 40. Yuri Yoshizawa, email to Noel Kirnon and Raymond McDaniel, cc Eric Kolchinsky, subject: “CSFB Pipeline information,” March 28, 2007. 41. Moody’s Investors Service, “First Quarter 2007 U.S. CDO Review: Climbing the Wall of Subprime Worry,” Structured Finance: Special Report, May 31, 2007, p. 2. 42. Richard Michalek, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis, session 3: The Credit Rating Agency Business Model, June 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 448–49. 43. “2007 MCO Strategic Plan Overview,” presentation by Ray McDaniel, July 2007. 44. Eric Kolchinsky—retaliation complaint, Chronology Prepared by Eric Kolchinsky. 45. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of Moody’s SFDRS; FCIC, “Preliminary Staff Report: Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis,” June 2, 2010. 46. Eric Kolchinsky, interview by FCIC, April 27, 2010. 4838–2303–6167 (checked–BLK ); Kolchinsky— retaliation complaint. 47. Eric Kolchinsky—retaliation complaint. 48. FCIC, “PSR: Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis,” pp. 30–33. 49. Bingham McCutchen, Fannie Mae counsel, letter to FCIC, September 21, 2010 (hereafter “Bingham Letter”); O’Melveny & Meyers LLP, Freddie Mac counsel, letter to FCIC, September 21, 2010 (hereafter “O’Melveny Letter”). 50. Federal Housing Finance Agency, “Conservator’s Report on the Enterprises’ Financial Performance: Third Quarter 2010,” tables 3.1 and 4.1. 51. Raymond Romano, interview by FCIC, September 14, 2010; Bingham Letter. 52. Bingham Letter. 53. Bingham Letter, Tab 3; Tab 1, “Repurchase Collections by Top Ten Sellers/Servicers.” 54. O’Melveny letter. 55. “Bank of America announces fourth-quarter actions with respect to its home loans and insurance business,” Bank of America press release, January 3, 2011. 56. Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, 2009–2010 Fact Book and Member Directory, Exhibit 3: Primary Insurance Activity (Insurance in Force) p 17. 57. Documents produced for the FCIC by United Guaranty Residential Insurance, MGIC, Genworth, RMIC, Triad, PMI, and Radian. 58. FCIC staff calculations based on productions from Fannie and Freddie. Figures are for Alt-A, option ARM Alt-A, and subprime loans. 59. FHFA, “Conservator’s Report: Third Quarter 2010.” Accounting changes for impairments have resulted in offsetting gains of $8 billion. 60. “FHFA Issue Subpoenas for PLS Documents,” Federal Housing Finance Agency news release, July 12, 2010. 61. Covington & Burling LLP, Freddie Mac counsel, letter to FCIC, October 19, 2010; see O’Melveny & Meyers LLP, letter to FCIC, dated October 19, 2010. 62. NERA Economic Consulting, “Credit Crisis Litigation Revisited: Litigating the Alphabet of Structured Products,” Part VII of a NERA Insights Series, June 4, 2010, p. 1. 63. Defendants Wells Fargo Asset Securities Corp. and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.’s Notice of Removal, Charles Schwab Corp. v. BNP Paribas Securities Corp, et al., No. cv-10-4030 (N.D. Cal. September 8, 2010).
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Notes to Chapter 12
64. Attorney General of Massachusetts, “Attorney General Martha Coakley and Goldman Sachs Reach Settlement Regarding Subprime Lending Issues,” May 11, 2009; “Morgan Stanley to Pay $102 Million for Role in Massachusetts Subprime Mortgage Meltdown under Settlement with AG Coakley’s Office,” June 24, 2010. 65. Complaint, Cambridge Place v. Morgan Stanley et al., No. 10-2741 (Mass. Super. Ct. filed July 9, 2010), p. 28. 66. Sarah Johnson, “How Far Can Fair Value Go?” CFO.com, May 6, 2008. 67. Vikas Shilpiekandula and Olga Gorodetsky, “Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?” Lehman Brothers Fixed Income, U.S. Securitized Products Research, September 7, 2007. 68. Moody’s Investor Service, “Default & Loss Rates of Structured Finance Securities: 1993–2009,” Special Comment, September 23, 2010. 69. Ben Bernanke, closed-door session with the FCIC, November 17, 2009. 70. Vikas Shilpiekandula and Olga Gorodetsky, “Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?,” September 7, 2007, p. 1. The Lehman analysts pegged ultimate subprime and Alt-A losses at $200 billion. Those forecasts were based, the analysts said, on a scenario in which house prices fell an average of 30% across the country. For the securitization figures, see Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 2, The Secondary Market. 71. IMF, “Financial Stress and Deleveraging: Macro-Financial Implications and Policy,” Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008, p. 78; IMF, “Containing Systemic Risks and Restoring Financial Soundness,” Global Financial Stability Report, April 2008. 72. FCIC staff estimates, based on Moody’s Investor Service, “Default & Loss Rates of Structured Finance Securities: 1993–2009,” Special Comment, September 23, 2010, and analysis of Moody’s Structured Finance Default Risk Service. 73. Ben Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 1: The Federal Reserve, September 2, 2010, transcript, p. 54.
Chapter 12 1. FCIC staff calculations using data in worksheets Markit ABX.HE. 06-1 prices and ABX.HE. 06-2 prices, produced by Markit; Nomura Fixed Income Research, CDO/CDS Update 12/18/06. The figures refer to the BBB- index of the ABX.HE. 06-2. 2. Nomura Fixed Income Research, CDO/CDS Update 12/18/06, p. 2. 3. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” internal memo to Erik Sirri and others, January 4, 2007. 4. Jim Chanos, interview by FCIC, October 5, 2010. 5. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” memo, January 4, 2007. 6. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, “The Economic Outlook,” testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 28, 2007. 7. Henry Paulson, quoted in Julie Haviv, “Bernanke Allays Subprime Fears as Beazer Faces Probe,” Reuters, March 28, 2007. 8. David Viniar, written testimony, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 27, 2010, pp. 3–4. 9. Michael Dinias, email to David Viniar and Craig Broderick, December 13, 2006, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 2. 10. Viniar, written testimony, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, pp. 3–4; Daniel Sparks, email to Tom Montag and Richard Ruzika, December 14, 2006, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 3. 11. Kevin Gasvoda, email to Genevieve Nestor and others, December 14, 2006, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 72. 12. David Viniar, email to Tom Montag, December 15, 2006, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 3. 13. Stacy Bash-Polley, email to Michael Swenson and others, December 20, 2006, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 151.
Notes to Chapter 12
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14. Tetsuya Ishikawa, email to Darryl Herrick, October 11, 2006, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 170c; Geoffrey Williams, email to Ficc-Mtgcorr-desk, October 24, 2006, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 170d. 15. Fabrice Tourre, email to Jonathan Egol and others, December 28, 2006, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 61. 16. Daniel Sparks, email to Tom Montag, January 31, 2007, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 91. 17. Fabrice Tourre, email to Marine Serres, January 23, 2007, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 62. 18. Lloyd Blankfein, email to Tom Montag, February 11, 2007, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 130. 19. FCIC calculations using data from “2004–2007 GS Synthetic CDOs,” produced by Goldman Sachs. 20. Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story, “Banks Bundled Bad Debt, Bet Against It and Won,” New York Times, December 24, 2009. 21. Lloyd Blankfein, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, first day, panel 1: Financial Institution Representatives, January 13, 2010, transcript, pp. 26–27. 22. “Goldman Sachs Clarifies Various Media Reports of Aspect of FCIC Hearing,” Goldman Sachs press release, January 14, 2010. 23. Gary Cohn, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 3: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Derivatives, June 30, 2010, transcript, p. 267. 24. Michael Swenson, opening statement, Hearing on Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, pp. 2–3. 25. Complaint, Basis Yield Alpha Fund v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al. (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2010), p. 29. 26. Blankfein, testimony before the FCIC, January 13, 2010, transcript, p. 140. 27. Craig Broderick, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 3: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and Derivatives, June 30, 2010, p. 1. 28. Craig Broderick, email to Alan Rapfogel and others, May 11, 2007, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Exhibit 84. 29. High Grade Risk Analysis, April 27, 2007, p. 4; High Grade—Enhanced Leverage Q&/A, June 13, 2007, stating “the percentage of underlying collateral in our investment grade structures collateralized by “sub-prime” mortgages is approximately 60. On the March 12, 2007, investor call, Matthew Tannin told investors that “most of the CDOs that we purchased are backed in some form by subprime” (Conference Call transcript, pp. 21–22). 30. Email from matt.tannin@gmail.com to matt.tannin@gmail.com, November 23, 2006. 31. Matthew Tannin, Bear Stearns, email to Chavanne Klaus, MEAG New York, March 7, 2007. 32. BSAM Conference Call, April 25, 2007, transcript, p. 5. 33. Matt Tannin, Bear Stearns, email to Klaus Chavanne, MEAG New York, March 7, 2007; Matthew Tannin, email to Steven Van Solkema, March 30, 2007; Complaint, SEC v. Cioffi, No. 08 Civ. 2457 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008), p. 32. 34. Jim Crystal, Bear Stearns, email to Ralph Cioffi (and others), March 22, 2007; Ralph Cioffi, Bear Stearns, email to Ken Mak, Bear Stearns, March 23, 2007. 35. Warren Spector, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 1, session 1: Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System, May 5, 2010, transcript, pp. 83–84. 36. Information provided to FCIC by legal counsel to Bank of America, September 28, 2010. 37. Ibid. 38. Alan Schwartz, interview by FCIC, April 23, 2010. Notably, as one of only two tri-party repo clearing banks, JP Morgan had more information about BSAM’s lending obligations than did most other market participants or regulators. As discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, this superior market knowledge later put JP Morgan in a position to step in and purchase Bear Stearns virtually overnight. 39. Email from Goldman to Bear, April 2, 2007. 40. Steven Van Solkema, Bear Stearns, internal email, Summary of CDO Analysis Using Credit Model, April 19, 2007.
598
Notes to Chapter 12
41. Matt Tannin, Bear Stearns, email from Gmail account to Ralph Cioffi, Bear Stearns, at his Hotmail account, April 22, 2007. 42. BSAM Conference Call, April 25, 2007, transcript. 43. Iris Semic, email to Matthew Tannin et al., May 1, 2007. 44. Robert Ervin, email to Ralph Cioffi et al., May 1, 2007; email from Goldman (ficc-ops-cdopricing) to rervin@bear.com, May 1, 2007. 45. BSAM Pricing Committee minutes, June 5, 2007; Robert Ervin, email to Greg Quental et al., May 10, 2007, showing that losses for the High Grade fund would be 7.02% if BSAM used the prices Lehman’s repo desk was using, rather than 11.45%—the loss without Lehman’s marks. 46. Email from “BSAM Hedge Fund Product Management (Generic),” May 16, 2007, produced by JP Morgan. 47. BSAMFCIC-e0000013. An untitled chart produced by JPMorgan shows losses would have been over $50 million less; NAV estimate reconciliation chart, produced by JPMorgan, shows losses would have been almost $25 million less. 48. BSAM Pricing Committee minutes, June 4, 2007. 49. Ralph Cioffi, interview by FCIC, October 19, 2010. 50. Ralph Cioffi, email to John Geissinger, June 6, 2007. 51. Schwartz, interview. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid.; CSE Program Memorandum to Erik Sirri and others through Matthew Eichner, July 5, 2007. 54. CSE Program Memorandum, July 5, 2007. 55. CSE Program Memorandum, July 5, 2007; Merrill Lynch analysis, “Bear Stearns Asset Mgm’t: What Went Wrong”; Paul Friedman, interview by FCIC, April 28, 2010. While most of the Bear Stearns executives interviewed by FCIC staff did not recall the percentage discount at which the collateral seized by Merrill Lynch was auctioned, they did believe that it was significant (e.g., Robert Upton, interview by FCIC, April 13, 2010). 56. “While the High Grade fund was not in default/had not missed any margin calls, creditors were cutting off its liquidity by increasing haircuts or not rolling repo facilities.” Bear Stearns Packet dated May 30, meeting held on June 20, produced by the Securities and Exchange Commission, p. 3; Upton, interview. 57. Warren Spector, email to Mary Kay Scucci, April 26, 2007. 58. Friedman, interview; Warren Spector, interview by FCIC, March 30, 2010; Sam Molinaro, interview by FCIC, April 9, 2010. 59. Thomas Marano, interview by FCIC, April 19, 2010; Spector, interview (on Marano’s being sent to Marin). 60. Fed Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, letter to FCIC Chairman Phil Angelides, December 21, 2010. 61. James Cayne, interview by FCIC, April 21, 2010. 62. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” memo to Erik Sirri and others, August 3, 2007, p. 2; SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” memo to Erik Sirri and others, July 5, 2007, p. 3, both produced by SEC. 63. Marano, interview. 64. Bill Jamison, internal email, June 21, 2007, produced by Federated. 65. JPMorgan, Directors Risk Policy Committee, “Worldwide Securities Services Risk Review,” September 18, 2007; Michael Alix, interview by FCIC, April 8, 2010. 66. For the downgrades, see Moody’s Investor Service, “Announcement: Moody’s Downgrades Subprime First-Lien RMBS,” July 10, 2007; Standard & Poor’s, “S&PCorrect: 612 U.S. Subprime RMBS Classes Put on Watch Neg; Methodology Revisions Announced,” July 11, 2007; Standard & Poor’s, “Various U.S. First-Lien Subprime RMBS Classes Downgraded,” July 12, 2007, p. 2; Glenn Costello, “U.S. Subprime Rating Surveillance Update,” Fitch Ratings, July 2007. 67. FCIC, “Preliminary Staff Report: Credit Ratings and the Financial Crisis,” June 2, 2010, p. 29. 68. Steven Eisman and Tom Warrack, Standard & Poor’s Structured Finance, July 10, 2007, teleconference, transcript, p. 16. 69. Andrew Forster, telephone conversation, July 11, 2007, transcript, pp. 3–5.
Notes to Chapter 13
599
70. Martin Sullivan, interview by FCIC, June 17, 2010; Steve Bensinger, interview by FCIC, June 16, 2010; Robert Lewis, interview by FCIC, June 15, 2010; Kevin McGinn, interview by FCIC, June 10, 2010; Andrew Forster, Elias Habayeb, and Steve Bensinger, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 1: American International Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., July 1, 2010, transcript, pp. 11, 61–62. 71. Clarence K. Lee, former managing director for Complex and International Organizations, Office of Thrift Supervision, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 2: Derivatives: Supervisors and Regulators, July 1, 2010, transcript, pp. 232–35. 72. Alan Frost, interview by FCIC, May 11, 2010. 73. Joseph Cassano, interview by FCIC, June 25, 2010. 74. “Information Pertaining to the Multi-Sector CDS Portfolio,” produced by AIG, with FCIC staff calculations. 75. Andrew Davilman, email to Alan Frost, subject: “Sorry to bother you on”; Frost, email to Davilman, subject: “Re: Sorry to bother you on”; Davilman, email to Frost, subject: “Re: Sorry to bother you on”—all July 26, 2007. 76. Goldman Sachs International, Collateral Invoice to AIG Financial Products Corp., July 27, 2007, produced by Goldman Sachs. 77. AIG hedges, January 2006–December 2008, produced by Goldman Sachs. 78. Andrew Forster, interview by FCIC, June 23, 2010. 79. Daniel Sparks, interview by FCIC, May 11, 2010. 80. “Valuation & Pricing Related to Initial Collateral Calls on Transactions with AIG,” produced by Goldman Sachs. 81. Jon Liebergall and Andrew Forster, telephone conversation, July 30, 2007, transcript, pp. 402–4. 82. David Viniar, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 1: American International Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., July 1, 2010, p. 2. 83. Liebergall and Forster, telephone conversation, July 30, 2007, transcript, p. 407. 84. Tom Athan, email to Andrew Forster, August 1, 2007.
Chapter 13 1. Henry Paulson, quoted in Kevin Carmichael and Peter Cook, “Paulson Says Subprime Rout Doesn’t Threaten Economy,” Bloomberg, July 26, 2007. 2. Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s ABCP Program Index: CP Outstanding as of 06/30/2007.” 3. Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Performance Overview: Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation,” June 30, 2007. 4. As noted, in the United States, there was a minimal capital charge for liquidity puts equal to 10% of the base 8%, or 0.8%. Staff of Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (the Federal Financial Services Supervisory Authority, Germany’s bank regulators), interview by FCIC, September 8, 2010. See also Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Interagency Guidance on the Eligibility of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Liquidity Facilities and the Resulting Risk-Based Capital Treatment,” August 4, 2005. For example, Citigroup would have held $200 million in capital against potential losses on the $25 billion in liquidity put exposure that it had accumulated on CDOs it had issued. 5. IKB, 2006/2007 Annual Report, June 28, 2007, p. 78. 6. Securities Fraud Complaint, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre, no. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y. April 15, 2010), p. 6. 7. IKB staff, interview by FCIC, August 27, 2010; Securities and Exchange Commission (plaintiff) v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre (defendants), Securities Fraud Complaint, 10-CV-3229, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, April 15, 2010, at 17, paragraph 58. 8. “Preliminary results for the first quarter (1 April-30 June 2007),” IKB press release, July 20, 2007. 9. IKB staff, interview; IKB, clarification of interview by FCIC, November 15, 2010; IKB, restated 2006/2007 Annual Report, p. 5. 10. Steven Meier, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 3: Institutions Participating in the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 307.
600
Notes to Chapter 13
11. Angelo Mozilo, testimony taken by the SEC in the matter of Countrywide Financial Corp., File No. LA-03370-A, November 9, 2007, pp. 150, 36–37. 12. Angelo Mozilo, email to Lyle Gramley, member of Board of Countrywide Financial Corporation (cc Michael Perry, chief executive officer, IndyMac Bank), August 1, 2007. 13. Eric Sieracki, quoted in Mark DeCambre, “Countrywide Defends Liquidity,” TheStreet.com, August 2, 2007. 14. “Minutes of a Special Telephonic Meeting of the Board of Directors of Countrywide Financial Corporation,” August 6, 2007, pp. 1, 2, 1. 15. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, letter to FCIC Chairman Phil Angelides, December 21, 2010. 16. Federal Reserve Staff, memo to Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Background on Countrywide Financial Corporation,” August 14, 2007, pp. 1–2. 17. Ibid., pp. 12–13. 18. Countrywide Financial Corporation, Form 8-K, Exhibit 99.1, filed August 6, 2007. See also “Minutes of a Special Telephonic Meeting of the Boards of Directors of Countrywide Financial Corporation and Countrywide Bank, FSB,” August 15, 2007. 19. Angelo Mozilo, interview by FCIC, September 24, 2010. 20. Kenneth Bruce, “Liquidity Is the Achilles Heel,” Merrill Lynch Analyst Report, August 15, 2007, p. 4; Kenneth Bruce, “Attractive Upside, but Not without Risk,” Merrill Lynch Analyst Report, August 13, 2007, p. 4. 21. Mozilo, interview; the article, by E. Scott Reckard and Annette Haddad, was titled “Credit Crunch Imperils Lender: Worries Grow about Countrywide’s Ability to Borrow—and Even a Possible Bankruptcy.” 22. Angelo Mozilo, quoted in “One on One with Angelo Mozilo, Chairman and CEO of Countrywide Financial,” Nightly Business Report, PBS, August 23, 2007, transcript; and in “CEO Exclusive: Countrywide CEO, Pt. 1,” The Call, CNBC, interview by Maria Bartiromo, August 23, 2007, transcript, p. 1. 23. Sebastian Boyd, “BNP Paribas Freezes Funds as Loan Losses Roil Markets,” Bloomberg, August 9, 2007. 24. “BNP Paribas Investment Partners Temporally [sic] Suspends the Calculation of the Net Asset Value of the following funds: Parvest Dynamic ABS, BNP Paribas ABS EURIBOR and BNP Paribas ABS EONIA,” BNP Paribas press release, August 9, 2007. 25. Paul A. McCulley, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 3: Institutions Participating in the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, pp. 237, 309. 26. Daniel M. Covitz, Nellie Liang, and Gustavo A. Suarez, “The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Panic in the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Market,” August 24, 2009, p. 39. 27. Ibid., figure 1, panel B, p. 33. 28. “The Federal Reserve Is Providing Liquidity to Facilitate the Orderly Functioning of Financial Markets,” Federal Reserve Board press release, August 10, 2007. 29. Federal Reserve Board, press release, August 17, 2007. 30. Henry Tabe, Moody’s Investors Service, “SIVs: An Oasis of Calm in the Sub-prime Maelstrom: Structured Investment Vehicles,” International Structured Finance: Special Report, July 20, 2007, p. 1. 31. Ibid. 32. Henry Tabe, interview by FCIC, October 4, 2010. 33. Moody’s Investors Service, “From Illiquidity to Liquidity: The Path Toward Credit Market Normalization,” Moody’s International Policy Perspectives, September 5, 2007, p. 1. 34. Tabe, interview. 35. Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Update on Structured Investment Vehicles,” Moody’s Special Report, January 16, 2008, p. 12. 36. Information provided to the FCIC by Deloitte LLP’s counsel, August 2, 2010. 37. Moody’s Rating Action, “Sigma Finance,” September 30, 2008; Henry Tabe, The Unravelling of Structured Investment Vehicles: How Liquidity Leaked through SIVs: Lessons in Risk Management and Regulatory Oversight ([Chatham, Kent]: Thoth Capital, 2010), p. 60. 38. The SEC indicated it is aware of at least 44 money market funds that were supported by affiliates because of SIV investments. See Securities and Exchange Commission, “Money Fund Reform” (Proposed rule), June 20, 2009, p. 14 n. 38.
Notes to Chapter 14
601
39. Christopher Condon and Rachel Layne, “GE Bond Fund Investors Cash Out After Losses from Subprime,” Bloomberg, November 15, 2007. 40. The identity of the investor has never been publicly disclosed. See Shannon D. Harrington and Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, “Bank of America to Liquidate $12 Billion Cash Fund,” Bloomberg, December 10, 2007. See also Michael M. Grynbaum, “Mortgage Crisis Forces the Closing of a Fund,” New York Times, December 11, 2007. 41. Rich Rokus, portfolio manager at Marshall Money Market Funds, interview by Crane Data, Money Fund Intelligence, June 2009; Crane Data, Money Fund Intelligence, January 2008. 42. Credit Suisse Institutional Money Market Fund, Inc., Notes to Financial Statements, December 31, 2008, Note 3, p. 30. 43. Florida Legislature, Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability, “The SBA [State Board of Administration] Is Correcting Problems Relating to Its Oversight of the Local Government Investment Pool,” Research Memorandum, March 31, 2009, p. 2. 44. SBA report, “Update on Sub-Prime Mortgage Meltdown and State Board of Administration Investments,” November 9, 2007, pp. 721–22.
Chapter 14 1. Bloomberg Professional, Write downs and Credit Losses vs. Capital Raised (WDCI) function, data reported for second half of 2007. Write-downs are for losses to holdings in structured finance and mortgages. 2. Roy C. Smith, Paper Fortune$: Modern Wall Street: Where It’s Been and Where It’s Going (New York: St. Martin’s 2009), p. 341. 3. Bloomberg Historical Prices Index December 31, 2007; CGS1U5; CBSC1U5; and CLEH1U5. Figures refer to credit default swaps on five-year senior debt. 4. Presentation to Merrill Lynch & Co. Board of Directors, “Leveraged Finance and Mortgage/CDO Review,” October 21, 2007, p. 23. 5. Presentation to Merrill board, October 21, 2007, p. 23. 6. Dow Kim, interview by FCIC, September 10, 2010. 7. Presentation to Merrill Board of Directors, October 21, 2007, p. 23. 8. Ibid., pp. 23–24. 9. Presentation to Merrill Lynch Risk Oversight Committee, “Market Risk Management Update,” September 26, 2007, p. 7. 10. Merrill Lynch, 1Q 2007 Earnings Call transcript, April 19, 2007, p. 3. 11. Merrill Lynch, 2Q 2007 Earnings Release, July 17, 2007, p. 1. 12. Merrill Lynch, 2Q 2007 Earnings Call transcript, July 17, 2007, pp. 8, 20. 13. Merrill Lynch Finance Committee Summary, July 22, 2007, p. 7. 14. Ibid. 15. Kim, interview. 16. Stanley O’Neal, interview by FCIC, September 16, 2010. 17. “ABS CDO Update” by Dale Lattanzio, July 2007, p. 10. 18. O’Neal, interview. 19. Merrill Lynch, 3Q 2007 Earnings Call transcript, October 24, 2007, pp. 7, 10. 20. SEC narrative chronology, Merrill Lynch specific, p. 1. 21. Nancy Moran and Rodney Yap, “O’Neal Ranks No. 5 on Payout List, Group Says: Table (Update1),” Bloomberg, November 2, 2007. 22. Kim interview; Merrill Lynch, 2007 Proxy Statement, April 27, 2007, p. 47. 23. Charles Prince, interview by FCIC, March 17, 2010; Robert Rubin, interview by FCIC, March 11, 2010. 24. Prince, interview. 25. Moody’s Investors Service, “Structured Finance Rating Transitions: 1983–2006,” Special Comment, January 2007. 26. Charles Prince, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 1: Citigroup Senior Management, April 8, 2010, transcript, p. 11.
602
Notes to Chapter 14
27. Prince, interview. 28. Tobias Brushammar, James Hua, Graham Jackson, and Subra Viswanathan, Citigroup memorandum to Nestor Dominguez, Janice Warne, Michael Raynes, and Jo-Anne Williams, subject: Liquidity Put Valuation, October 19, 2006. 29. Susan Mills, interview by FCIC, February 3, 2010; James Xanthos, interview by Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), March 24, 2009. 30. Susan Mills, testimony before the FCIC, hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 1, session 2: Subprime Origination and Securitization, April 7, 2010, transcript, pp. 186–87. 31. Mills, interview. 32. Murray Barnes, former managing director of Independent Risk, interview by FCIC, March 2, 2010. 33. Notes on Senior Supervisors’ Meeting with Firms, meeting between Citigroup and Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Securities and Exchange Commission, U.K. Financial Services Authority, and Japan FSA, November 19, 2007, p. 17. 34. Janice Warne, interview by FCIC, February 2, 2010; Nestor Dominguez, interview by FCIC, March 2, 2010. 35. Dominguez, interview. 36. Nestor Dominguez, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 1, session 3: Citigroup Subprime-Related Structured Products and Risk Management, April 7, 2010, transcript, pp. 282–83. 37. Barnes, interview. 38. Ibid. 39. Notes on Senior Supervisors’ Meeting with Firms, meeting with Citigroup, November 19, 2007, p. 6. 40. FCIC staff calculations. 41. Prince, testimony before the FCIC, April 8, 2010, transcript, p. 118; David Bushnell, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010. 42. Bushnell, interview. 43. Ellen “Bebe” Duke, Citigroup Independent Risk, interview by FCIC, March 18, 2010. 44. Barnes, interview. 45. James Xanthos, interview by Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), March 24, 2009. 46. Barnes, interview. 47. Prince, interview. 48. Robert Rubin, former chairman of the Executive Committee and adviser, interview by FCIC, March 11, 2010. 49. Thomas Maheras, former co-CEO of Citi Markets & Banking, interview by FCIC, March 10, 2010. 50. Prince, interview. 51. Citigroup, Presentation to the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding Overall CDO Business and Subprime Exposure, June 2007, p. 11. 52. Paul, Weiss, Citigroup’s counsel, response to FCIC Interrogatory #18, March 1, 2010. 53. Citigroup, 2Q 2007 Earnings Call Q&A transcript, July 20, 2007. 54. Complaint, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Citigroup Inc., 1:10-cv-01277 (D.D.C), July 29, 2010. 55. Federal Reserve Board of New York, letter to Vikram Pandit and the Board of the Directors of Citigroup, April 15, 2008, p. 11. 56. Dominguez, testimony before the FCIC, April 7, 2010, transcript, p. 281. 57. Maheras, interview, and testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 1, session 3: Citigroup Subprime-Related Structured Products and Risk Management, April 7, 2010, transcript, p. 269. 58. Bushnell, interview. 59. Prince, interview. 60. Complaint, Securities and Exchange Commission v. Citigroup Inc., p. 13. 61. Maheras, interview.
Notes to Chapter 14
603
62. Prince, interview; Charles Prince, email to Robert Rubin, re, September 9, 2007, 9:43 A.M. (on Thomas Maheras and super seniors). 63. Robert Rubin, email to Charles Prince, September 9, 2007, 5:30 P.M.; Charles Prince, email to Robert Rubin, September 9, 2007, 5: 51 P.M. 64. Robert Rubin, interview by FCIC, March 11, 2010. 65. Prince, interview. 66. Ibid. 67. Citigroup, “Risk Management Review: An Update to the Corporate Audit and Risk Management Committee,” October 15, 2007, p. 4. 68. Citigroup, Q3 2007 Earnings Call transcript, October 15, 2007. 69. Prince, interview. 70. Paul, Weiss, Citigroup’s counsel, letter to FCIC in re the FCIC’s second and third supplemental requests, March 31, 2010; Citigroup, 2008 Proxy Statement for fiscal year 2007, March 13, 2008, p. 74. 71. Federal Reserve Board of New York, letter to Vikram Pandit and the Board of Directors of Citigroup, April 15, 2008, p. 8. 72. FCIC staff calculations from Citigroup proxy statements (information for 2000–06) and information on 2007–09 provided by Paul, Weiss (on behalf of Citigroup), letter to FCIC, March 31, 2010, “Response to Interrogatory No. 7,” pp. 3–6. 73. Robert Rubin, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 2, session 1: Citigroup Senior Management, April 8, 2010, transcript, pp. 15–16. 74. John Reed, interview by FCIC, March 24, 2010. 75. AIG, Earnings Call credit supplement, August 9, 2007. 76. Joseph St. Denis, letter to House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, October 4, 2008, p. 4. 77. Joseph St. Denis, interview by FCIC, April 23, 2010. 78. Gene Park, interview by FCIC, May 18, 2010. 79. Jake Sun, interview by FCIC, June 21, 2010. 80. Alan Frost, interview by FCIC, May 11, 2010. 81. Pierre Micottis, interview by FCIC, June 24, 2010. 82. Park, interview. 83. PricewaterhouseCooper audit team, memo re 3Q07 review of AIG’s super-senior CDS portfolio, November 7, 2007, p. 2. 84. Joseph Cassano, interview by FCIC, June 25, 2010. 85. Park, interview. 86. Goldman’s submissions to the FCIC on its valuation and pricing related to collateral calls made to AIG are available on Goldman Sachs’s website (http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/on-the -issues/responses-fcic.print.html). 87. Andrew Forster, telephone call to Jon Liebergall, July 30, 2007, transcript. 88. PricewaterhouseCooper, memo to AIGFP 2007 2Q review files, August 8, 2007. 89. Andrew Forster, email to Joseph Cassano and Pierre Micottis, November 9, 2007, enclosing marks from Merrill Lynch, 90. AIG, Earnings Call credit supplement, August 9, 2007, pp. 28, 14, 21, 22. 91. These estimates are based on Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Maiden Lane III Quarterly Holdings Report,” January 2010. This probably isn’t a complete list of their positions, because not all CDO tranches are part of the Maiden Lane III portfolio. Of the 335 securities listed in that document, FCIC staff found data on 327 in Moody’s CDO EMS database and Bloomberg. For those 327 securities, 313 suffered a downgrade and 206 became materially impaired (i.e., were downgraded to Ca/C). Of the 139 initially rated Aaa, 134 suffered downgrades and 55 became materially impaired. 92. Alan Frost, email to Andrew Forster, August 16, 2007. 93. Cassano, interview. 94. Frost, email to Forster, August 16, 2007. 95. Tom Athan, email to Andrew Forster, cc Adam Budnick, September 11, 2007. 96. Joseph Cassano, email to Elias Habayeb, November 11, 2007.
604
Notes to Chapter 14
97. Minutes of the meeting of the AIG Audit Committee, November 6, 2007, p. 5. 98. Andrew Forster, email to Joseph Cassano, subject: GS Prices vs Others, November 18, 2007. 99. Goldman, submission to the FCIC, “Valuation & Pricing Related to Initial Collateral Calls on Transactions with AIG,” pp. 2–3. 100. Based on staff analysis of data provided to the FCIC by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation and Markit. ABX includes all tranches of the ABX.HE 06-2. TABX is constructed based on the reference obligations for the 06-2 and 07-1 BBB and BBB- tranches of the ABX. 101. Cassano, interview. 102. Andrew Forster, email to Alan Frost, August 16, 2007. 103. Tim Ryan, PricewaterhouseCooper, interview by FCIC, June 1, 2010. 104. SEC staff briefing of FCIC staff, June 4, 2010. 105. Joseph Cassano, email to Andrew Forster, Pierre Micottis, James Bridgwater, and Peter Robinson, subject: Fw: SS CDS Valuation, October 8, 2007. 106. PricewaterhouseCooper, minutes of meeting at AIGFP, October 11, 2007. See also PwC audit team, memo re 3Q07 review of AIG’s super-senior CDS portfolio, November 7, 2007, pp. 230–31. 107. AIG, 3Q 2007 Earnings Call transcript, November 7, 2007, pp. 5, 17. 108. PwC audit team memo, p. 6. 109. Goldman Sachs International, to AIG Financial Products Corp., “Amended Side Letter Agreement,” November 23, 2007. 110. Joe Cassano, email to Bill Dooley, November 27, 2007, attaching memo from Andrew Forster, “Collateral Call Status.” 111. Andrew Forster, “Collateral Call Status,” memo prepared for Joe Cassano. 112. Joe Cassano, email to Bill Dooley, subject: Collateral Calls, November 27, 2007. 113. Joe Cassano, email to Bill Dooley, subject: GS call back, November 30, 2007. 114. Goldman Sachs International, Collateral Invoice to AIG Financial Products Corp., margin call, November 23, 2007. 115. PwC audit team, memo, November 7, 2007, p. 5. 116. PricewaterhouseCooper, notes of a meeting to discuss super-senior valuations and collateral disputes, November 29, 2007, p. 2, produced by PwC. 117. Andrew Forster, interview by FCIC, June 21, 2010. 118. Martin Sullivan, interview by FDIC, June 17, 2010. 119. PwC, notes of meeting of November 29, 2007, p. 2. 120. Ibid., p. 3. 121. Kevin McGinn, email to Paul Narayanan, November 20, 2007. 122. Sullivan, interview. 123. AIG Investor Conference Call, December 5, 2007, transcript, pp. 4–6, 25. 124. Joseph Cassano, email to Michael Sherwood and David Viniar, subject: CDO Valuations, January 16, 2008. 125. Andrew Davilman, interview by FCIC, June 18, 2010; David Lehman, interview by FCIC, June 23, 2010. 126. “AIG/Goldman Sachs Collateral Call Timeline,” available on FCIC website at http://fcic.gov/ hearings/pdfs/2010–0701-AIG-Goldman-supporting-docs.pdf. 127. PricewaterhouseCooper, memo to AIG workpaper files, February 24, 2008, pp. 2–3, 10. 128. PricewaterhouseCooper, notes on a February 6, 2008, meeting with AIG, February 13, 2008, p. 2. 129. Martin Sullivan, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 2: American International Group, Inc. and Derivatives, June 30, 2010, transcript, p. 233. 130. PricewaterhouseCooper, notes on the AIG Audit Committee meeting, February 7, 2008, p. 2. 131. Joseph Cassano, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis. day 1, session 2: American International Group, Inc. and Derivatives, June 30, 2010, p. 233; Cassano, interview. 132. Office of Thrift Supervision, letter to AIG General Counsel and Board, March 7, 2008. 133. William Dudley, interview by FCIC, October 15, 2010.
Notes to Chapter 15
605
134. Adam B. Ashcraft, Morten L. Bech, and W. Scott Frame, “The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The Lender of Next to Last Resort?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no. 357 (November 2008), p. 4. 135. Federal Reserve Board, “October 2007 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices,” October 2007. 136. Frederic Mishkin, interview by FCIC, October 1, 2010. 137. Dudley, interview. 138. Ibid. 139. Ibid. 140. Standard & Poor’s, “Detailed Results of Subprime Stress Test of Financial Guarantors,” RatingsDirect, February 25, 2008. 141. Alan Roseman, interview by FCIC, May 17, 2010. 142. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” internal memo to Erik Sirri and others, November 6, 2007, p. 3. 143. Roseman, interview, May 17, 2010. 144. SEC, “Risk Management of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” internal memo to Erik Sirri and others, January 2, 2008, p. 2. 145. Bill Lockyer, State of California 2008 Debt Affordability Report: Making the Municipal Bond Market Work for Taxpayers in Turbulent Times (October 1, 2008), p. 4. 146. John J. McConnell and Alessio Saretto, “Auction Failures and the Market for Auction Rate Securities” (The Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, April 2009), p. 10. 147. Erik R. Sirri, director of Trading and Markets, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, “Municipal Bound Turmoil: Impact on Cities, Towns and States,” testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., March 12, 2008. 148. Georgetown University, “Annual Financial Report, 2008–2009,” p. 5. 149. Jacqueline Doherty, “The Sad Story of Auction-Rate Securities, Barrons, May 26, 2008. 150. “SEC Finalizes ARS Settlements with Bank of America, RBC, and Deutsche Bank,” SEC press release, June 3, 2009.
Chapter 15 1. “Prime Asset,” 2007 Upper HedgeWorld Prime Brokerage League Table, accessible at Gregory Zuckerman, “Hedge Funds, Once a Windfall, Contribute to Bear’s Downfall,” Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2008. 2. Jeff Mayer and Thomas Marano, “Fixed Income Overview,” March 29, 2007, p. 8, produced by JP Morgan. 3. Inside Mortgage Finance, The 2009 Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, vol. 2, The Secondary Market (Bethesda, MD: Inside Mortgage Finance, 2009), pp. 18–25. 4. FCIC staff estimates, based on Moody’s CDO EMS database. Different numbers are provided in Jeff Mayer and Thomas Marano, “Fixed Income Overview,” March 29, 2007, p. 16. 5. Samuel Molinaro, interview by FCIC, April 9, 2010; Michael Alix, interview by FCIC, April 8, 2010. 6. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” memorandum to Robert Colby and others, May 8, 2006. 7. Robert Upton, interview by FCIC, April 13, 2010. 8. SEC, “Risk Management Reviews of Consolidated Supervised Entities,” memorandum to Erik Sirri and others, March 1, 2007. 9. Ibid. 10. Bear Stearns, “Fitch Presentation,” PowerPoint slides, August 2007. 11. Upton, interview. 12. Bear Stearns, Form 10-K for the year ended November 30, 2007, filed January 29, 2008, pp. 52, 22. 13. Upton, interview. 14. Ibid. 15. Standard & Poor’s, Global Credit Portal RatingsDirect, “Research Update: Bear Stearns Cos. Inc. Outlook Revised to Negative; ‘A+/A-1’ Rating Affirmed,” August 3, 2007. 16. Jimmy Cayne, interview by FCIC, April 21, 2010.
606
Notes to Chapter 15
17. Matthew Eichner, interview by FCIC, April 14, 2010. 18. Wendy de Monchaux, interview by FCIC, April 27, 2010; Steven Meyer, interview by FCIC, April 22, 2010. 19. Mike Alix, interview by FCIC, April 8, 2010. 20. Eichner, interview. 21. Timeline Regarding Bear Stearns Companies Inc., April 3, 2008, produced by SEC. 22. SEC Office of Inspector General, Office of Audits, “SEC’s Oversight of Bear Stearns and Related Entities: The Consolidated Supervised Entity Program,” Report No. 446-A, September 25, 2008, pp. ix–x. 23. Michael Halloran, interview by FCIC. 24. Cayne, interview. 25. Samuel Molinaro, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 1, session 1: Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System, May 5, 2010, transcript, p. 43; Cayne, interview. 26. “Changes in Approved Commercial Paper List—10/01/2007–12/31/2007” and “Changes in Approved Commercial Paper List—1/01/2008–3/31/2008,” produced by Federated Advised Funds. 27. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform,” white paper, May 17, 2010, p. 7. 28. Seth Carpenter, interview by FCIC, September 20, 2010. 29. Information provided by Federated to the FCIC. 30. Scott Goebel, Kevin Gaffney, and Norm Lind (Fidelity employees), interview by FCIC, February 25, 2010. 31. Steve Meier, executive vice president State Street Global Advisors, interview by FCIC, March 15, 2010. 32. Timeline Regarding the Bear Stearns Companies Inc., April 3, 2008, pp. 1–2, provided to the FCIC. 33. Alan Schwartz, interview by FCIC, April 23, 2010. 34. Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., “The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000–2008,” November 22, 2009, Table 2, p. 15; SNL Financial. 35. Thomas Marano, interview by FCIC, April 19, 2010. 36. Paul Friedman, quoted in William Cohan, House of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Excess on Wall Street (New York: Doubleday, 2009), p. 71. Although Friedman acknowledged to the FCIC making the cited statements, and many others as well, he attributes them to anger and frustration over Bear Stearns’s failure. Currently, Friedman is employed at Guggenheim Securities, Inc., where he works for Alan Schwartz, the former president of Bear Stearns. Paul Friedman, interview by FCIC, April 28, 2010. 37. The Corporate Library, “The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.: Governance Profile,” June 20, 2008, p. 4. 38. Cayne, interview. 39. Molinaro, interview. 40. Cayne, interview; Schwartz (interview by FCIC) stated that bonuses for individual executives were discussed by the Compensation Committee, and the final recommendation for bonuses came from the CEO. 41. Alix, interview. 42. Bear Stearns, 2007 Performance Compensation Plan, p. I-1 (provided to the FCIC); Alix, interview. The salary cap had been raised from $200,000 to $250,000 in 2006 (Alix, interview; Cayne, interview). 43. Bebchuk et al., “The Wages of Failure,” Table 1, p. 12; Table 2, p. 15; Table 4, p. 20. The budget authority for the SEC in 2008 was $906 million; in 2010, it was $1.026 billion. 44. In 2006, Alix received $3 million in total compensation, Cayne received more than $38.3 million in salary and bonus, and Schwartz received more than $35.7 million in salary and bonus. SNL Financial; interviews with Spector and Alix. 45. Marano, interview. 46. Tom Marano, email to Alan Schwartz and Richie Metrick, February 12, 2008. 47. Matthew Eichner, email to James Giles et al., January 30, 2008. 48. Lou Lebedin, interview by FCIC, April 23, 2010.
Notes to Chapter 15
607
49. Timeline Regarding Bear Stearns Companies Inc., April 3, 2008, produced by SEC. 50. Upton, interview. 51. Minutes of Special Meeting of Bear Stearns Board of Directors, March 13, 2008. 52. Pat Lewis, Bear Stearns, email to Matthew Eichner, Steven Spurry, James Giles, and Kevin Silva, March 10, 2008. 53. Matthew Eichner, email to Brian Peters, March 11, 2008. 54. David Fettig, “The History of a Powerful Paragraph,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, June 2008. 55. James Embersit, email to Deborah Bailey, March 3, 2008. 56. In response to the FCIC’s interrogatories, JP Morgan produced a list of all payments Bear Stearns made to or received from OTC derivatives counterparties from March 10, 2008, through March 14, 2008. The spreadsheet was created in September 2008 by Bear Stearns in response to a request by the SEC Division of Trading and Markets. The large volume of novations away from Bear Stearns during the week of March 10, 2008 and the previous week was confirmed by the New York Federal Reserve and International Swaps and Derivatives Association. (New York Federal Reserve personnel, interview by FCIC; ISDA personnel, interviews by FCIC, May 13 and 27, 2010). 57. Brian Peters, email to Matthew Eichner, March 11, 2008. 58. Stuart Smith, email to Bear Stearns, March 11, 2008; Marvin Woolard, email Stuart Smith et al., March 11, 2008; Kyle Bass, interview by FCIC, April 30, 2010. 59. Bass, interview. 60. Debby LaMoy, email to Faina Epshteyn, March 12, 2008; Faina Epshteyn, email to Debby LaMoy, March 12, 2008. 61. Marvin Woolard, email to Stuart Smith et al., March 12, 2008. 62. CNBC video, Schwartz and CNBC’s David Faber, original air date March 12, 2008. 63. Yalman Onaran, “Bear Stearns Investor Lewis May Increase His Stake,” Bloomberg News, March 11, 2008. 64. Matthew Eichner, email to Erik Sirri, Robert Colby, and Michael Macchiaroli, March 12, 2008. 65. Minutes of Special Meeting of Bear Stearns Board of Directors, March 13, 2008, pp. 1–2. 66. Upton, interview. 67. Matthew Eichner, email to Erik Sirri, Robert Colby, and Michael Macchiaroli, March 12, 2008. 68. Alan Schwartz, interview by FCIC; Matthew Eichner, email to Erik Sirri, Robert Colby, and Michael Macchiaroli, March 13, 2008. 69. Upton, interview. 70. Minutes of Special Meeting of Bear Stearns Board of Directors, March 13, 2008 (“[Schwartz] said there had been seventeen billion dollars in cash with a two billion eight hundred million dollar backstop, unsecured line. The Board was told that twelve to fifteen billion dollars had gone out of TBSCI in the last two days and that TBSCI had received a billion dollars in margin calls”). 71. Upton, interview; Goebel, Gaffney, and Lind, interview; Steven Meier, interview by FCIC, March 15, 2010; Michael Macchiaroli, interview by FCIC, April 13, 2010. 72. Christopher Cox, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 1, session 3: SEC Regulation of Investment Banks, May 5, 2010, p. 6. 73. Timeline Regarding Bear Stearns Companies Inc., April 3, 2008, produced by SEC. 74. Jamie Dimon, interview by FCIC, October 20, 2010. 75. Alan Schwartz, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 1, session 2: Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System, May 5, 2010, transcript, p. 167; Schwartz, interview. 76. Schwartz., interview. 77. Ibid.; Molinaro, interview; Alix, interview. 78. John Chrin, interview by FCIC, April 28, 2010. 79. Dimon, interview by FCIC, October 20, 2010; minutes of Special Meeting of Bear Stearns Board of Directors, March 16, 2008. 80. Federal Reserve, “Report Pursuant to Section 129 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008: Loan to Facilitate the Acquisition of The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. by JP Morgan & Co.,” pp. 1, 4; Ernst & Young, “Project LLC: Summary of Findings and Observations Report,” June 26, 2008, p. 10.
608
Notes to Chapter 16
81. Contrary to what is stated in the board minutes (Special Meeting of Bear Stearns Board of Directors, March 16, 2008, p. 5), when FCIC staff interviewed Schwartz he said that the $2 a share price came from JP Morgan, not Paulson. Schwartz also told staff that because Bear did not receive “a lot of competing offers,” it had to accept JP Morgan’s offer of $2 a share. 82. Chrin, interview. 83. Alan Schwartz, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 1, session 2: Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System, May 5, 2010, transcript, p. 142. 84. Macchiaroli, interview. 85. Ben Bernanke, closed-door session with FCIC, November 17, 2009. 86. Ibid. 87. Timothy Geithner, president, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Actions by the New York Fed in Response to Liquidity Pressures in Financial Markets,” prepared testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., April 3, 2008, p. 10. 88. Henry Paulson, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 1: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, pp. 68, 59, 78.
Chapter 16 1. David Wong, interview by FCIC, October 15, 2010. 2. Josh Fineman and Yalman Onaran, “Lehman’s Fuld Says ‘Worst Is Behind Us’ in Crisis (Update3), Bloomberg, April 15, 2008. 3. Henry Paulson, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 1: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 28. 4. Viral V. Acharya and T. Sabri Öncü, “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and a Little Known Corner of Wall Street: The Repo Market,” Regulating Wall Street, July 16, 2010. 5. Sandie O’Connor, JP Morgan, interview by FCIC, March 4, 2010. 6. Jamie Dimon, interview by FCIC, October 20, 2010. 7. Adam Copeland, Antoine Martin, Michael Walker, “The Tri-Party Repo Market Before the 2010 Reforms,” FRBNY Staff Report No. 477, November 2010, p. 24. 8. Steven Meier, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 3: Institutions Participating in the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 276. 9. William Dudley, interview by FCIC, October 15, 2010. 10. Darryll Hendricks, interview by FCIC, August 6, 2010. 11. James Cayne, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 1, session 2: Investment Banks and the Shadow Banking System, May 5, 2010, transcript, p. 168. 12. Seth Carpenter, interview by FCIC, September 20, 2010. 13. Federal Reserve, “Regulatory Reform: Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PCDF),” Usage of Federal Reserve Credit and Liquidity Facilities, data available at www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ reform_pdcf.htm. 14. Anton R. Valukas, Report of Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), March 11, 2010, 4:1396–98; quotation, 1396 (hereafter cited as Valukas; available at http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/). 15. William Dudley, email to Chairman, June 17, 2008. 16. Dimon, interview. 17. Ibid. 18. Hendricks, interview. 19. Lucinda Brickler, email to Patrick Parkinson, July 11, 2008; Lucinda Brickler et al., memorandum to Timothy Geithner, July 11, 2008. 20. The $200 billion figure is noted in Patrick Parkinson, email to Ben Bernanke et al., July 20, 2008. 21. Brickler et al., memorandum, p. 1. 22. Patrick Parkinson, email to Lucinda Brickler, July 11, 2008. 23. Patrick Parkinson, email to Ben Bernanke et al., July 20, 2008. 24. Ibid.
Notes to Chapter 16
609
25. Based on chart in Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Developing Metrics for the Four Largest Securities Firms, August 2008, p. 5. 26. Ibid. 27. Tobias Adrian, Christopher Burke, and James McAndrews, “The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Current Issues in Economics and Finance 15, no. 4 (August 2009): 2. 28. Erik Sirri, interview by FCIC, April 9, 2010, p. 3. 29. Fed Chair Ben Bernanke, “Lessons from the Failure of Lehman Brothers,” testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 20, 2010, p. 1. 30. Valukas, 1:8 n. 30: Examiner’s Interview of Timothy F. Geithner, Nov. 24, 2009, p. 4. 31. Valukas, 4:1486. 32. Sirri, interview. 33. William Brodows and Til Schuermann, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Primary Dealer Monitoring: Initial Assessment of CSEs,” May 12, 2008, slides 9–10, 15–16. 34. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Primary Dealer Monitoring: Liquidity Stress Analysis,” June 25, 2008, p. 3. 35. Ibid., p. 5. 36. Valukas, 4:1489. 37. Ibid., 4:1496, 1497. 38. Christopher Cox, statement before the House Financial Services Committee, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 20, 2010, p. 5. 39. Patrick Parkinson, email to Steven Shafran, August 8, 2008. 40. Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, “Toward Greater Financial Stability: A Private Sector Perspective, The Report of the CRMPG II,” July 27, 2005. 41. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Statement Regarding Meeting on Credit Derivatives,” September 15, 2005; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “New York Fed Welcomes New Industry Commitments on Credit Derivatives,” March 13, 2006; Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Third Industry Meeting Hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,” September 27, 2006. 42. See Comptroller of the Currency, “OCC’s Quarterly Report on Bank Trading and Derivatives Activities, First Quarter 2009,” Table 1; the figures in the text are reached by subtracting exchange traded futures and options from total derivatives. 43. Chris Mewbourne, interview by FCIC, July 28, 2010. 44. This figure compares with a low in 2005, at the height of the mortgage boom, of $7 billion in problem assets. “Problem” institutions are those with financial, operational, or managerial weaknesses that threaten their continued financial viability; they are rated either a 4 or 5 under the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System. FDIC reporting for insured institutions—i.e., the regulated banking and thrift industry overall. See Quarterly Banking Profile: Fourth Quarter 2007= FDIC Quarterly 2, no. 1 (December 31, 2007): 1, 4; Quarterly Banking Profile: First Quarter 2008 = FDIC Quarterly 2, no. 2 (March 31, 2008): 2, 4; Quarterly Banking Profile: Second Quarter 2008 = FDIC Quarterly 2, no. 3 (June 30, 2008): 1. 45. By 2009, the problem list would swell to 702 banks, with assets of $403 billion. Quarterly Banking Profile: Fourth Quarter 2009 = FDIC Quarterly 4, no. 1 (December 31, 2009): 4. 46. Quarterly Banking Profile: First Quarter 2008, p. 4. 47. Roger Cole, interview by FCIC, August 2, 2010. 48. FCIC interview with Michael Solomon and Fred Phillips-Patrick, September 20, 2010. 49. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, letter to Charles Prince, April 9, 2007. 50. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Securities and Exchange Commission, U.K. Financial Services Authority, and Japan Financial Services Authority, “Notes on Senior Supervisors’ Meetings with Firms,” November 19, 2007, p. 3. 51. Federal Reserve Board, “FRB New York 2009 Operations Review: Close Out Report,” p. 3. 52. Timothy Geithner, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 1: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 210. 53. Steve Manzari and Dianne Dobbeck, interview by FCIC, April 26, 2010. 54. Federal Reserve Board, “Wachovia Case Study,” November 12 and 13, p. 20; 55. Angus McBryde, interview by FCIC, July 30, 2007.
610
Notes to Chapter 17
56. Thompson received a severance package worth about $8.7 million in compensation and accelerated vesting of stock. In addition, he negotiated himself three years of office space and a personal assistant at Wachovia’s expense. Thompson had previously received more than $21 million in salary and stock compensation in 2007 and more than $23 million in 2006; his total compensation from 2002 through 2008 exceeded $112 million. 57. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, letter to Wachovia, July 22, 2008, pp. 3–5. 58. Comptroller of the Currency, letter to Wachovia, August 4, 2008, with Report of Examination; letter, pp. 8, 3. 59. Ibid., pp. 3–6. 60. Ibid., letter, p. 2; Report of Examination, p. 18. 61. Ibid., Report of Examination, p. 12. 62. “Home Loans Discussion,” materials prepared for WaMu Board of Directors meeting, April 18, 2006, p. 4; Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of High Risk Home Loans, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 13, 2010, Exhibits, p. 83. 63. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Role of the Bank Regulators, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., April 16, 2010, Exhibits, p. 6. 64. OTS Regional Director Darrel Dochow, letter to FDIC Regional Director Stan Ivie, July 22, 2008. 65. Offices of Inspector General, Department of the Treasury and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Evaluation of Federal Regulatory Oversight of Washington Mutual Bank,” Report No. EVAL 10002, April 2010, pp. 31, 12. 66. FDIC, Confidential Problem Bank Memorandum, September 8, 2008, p. 4. 67. Treasury and FDIC IGs, “Evaluation of Federal Regulatory Oversight of WaMu,” p. 39. 68. Confidential OTS Memorandum to FDIC Regional Director, September 11, 2008; Treasury and FDIC IGs, “Evaluation of Federal Regulatory Oversight of WaMu,” pp. 45–47. 69. Quoted in Damian Paletta, “FDIC Presses Bank Regulators to Use Warier Eye,” Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2008. 70. Sheila Bair, interview by FCIC, August 18, 2010. 71. Treasury and FDIC IGs, “Evaluation of Federal Regulatory Oversight of WaMu,” p. 3. 72. Comptroller of the Currency, Large Bank Supervision: Comptroller’s Handbook, January 2010, p. 3. 73. Cole, interview. 74. Rich Spillenkothen, “Observations and Perspectives of the Director of Banking Supervision and Regulation at the Federal Reserve Board from 1991 to 2006 on the Performance of Prudential Supervision in the Years Preceding the Financial Crisis,” paper prepared for the FCIC, May 21, 2010, p. 24. 75. Doug Roeder, interview by FCIC, August 4, 2010. 76. “Treasury Releases Blueprint for Stronger Regulatory Structure,” Treasury Department press release, March 31, 2008.
Chapter 17 1. Henry Paulson, interview by FCIC, April 2, 2010; Henry Paulson, On The Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System (New York: Business Plus, 2010), p. 57. 2. Paulson, interview. 3. James Lockhart, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 2: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, April 9, 2010, transcript, p. 163. 4. Daniel Mudd, letter to James Lockhart, August 1, 2007, p. 1. 5. Ibid., pp. 1, 5. 6. Daniel Mudd, letter to shareholders, in Fannie Mae, “2007 Annual Report,” p. 3. 7. Thomas Lund, interview by FCIC, March 4, 2010. 8. Robert Levin, interview by FCIC, March 17, 2010. 9. James Lockhart, letter to Daniel Mudd, August 10, 2007, p. 1. 10. James Lockhart, letter to Senator Charles Schumer, August 10, 2007. 11. James Lockhart, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 2: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, April 4, 2010, pp. 12, 2, 12.
Notes to Chapter 17
611
12. Ibid., pp. 2, 4, 7. 13. Paulson, interview. 14. David Nason, Tony Ryan, and Jeremiah Norton, Treasury officials, interview by FCIC, March 12, 2010. 15. James Lockhart, quoted in Steven Sloan, “Setting an OFHEO Plan, But Wishing Otherwise,” American Banker, December 21, 2007. 16. Fannie Mae, “Single-Family Book Characteristics Report,” September 2008. 17. “OFHEO Provides Flexibility on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Mortgage Portfolios,” OFHEO news release, September 19, 2007, p. 1. 18. Lockhart, written testimony for the FCIC, April 4, 2010, p. 13. 19. Ben Bernanke, quoted in Eric Dash, “Fannie Mae to Be Allowed to Expand Its Portfolio,” New York Times, September 20, 2007. 20. Senator Charles E. Schumer, letter to OFHEO Director James B. Lockhart III, February 25, 2008; Schumer continued, “If you have decided that you will be keeping the capital surcharge in place . . . , I would like an explanation as to why you think upholding that restriction outweighs the importance of providing capital relief that could better position the GSEs to provide rescue products for borrowers stuck in unaffordable loans.” 21. “Fannie Mae Reports 2007 Financial Results,” Fannie Mae press release, February 17, 2008. 22. Daniel Mudd, interview by FCIC, March 26, 2010. 23. Robert Steel, email to Jeremiah Norton, February 28, 2008. 24. Michael Farrell, email to Robert Steel, March 6, 2008. 25. Emails between Robert K. Steel and Daniel Mudd, March 7, 2008. 26. Daniel Mudd, email to Robert Levin, March 7, 2008. 27. “Fannie Mae Insolvency and Its Consequences,” p. 1; attachment to email from Jason Thomas to Robert Steel, March 8, 2008. 28. Robert Steel, email to David Nason, Tony Ryan, Jeremiah Norton, and Neel Kashkari, subject: “re: GSEs,” March 16, 2008. 29. James Lockhart, interview by FCIC, March 19, 2010. 30. Paulson, interview. 31. James Lockhart, email to Daniel H. Mudd, Robert Steel, and Dick Syron, subject: “Re: announcement draft,” March 17, 2008. 32. Ibid. 33. “OFHEO, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Announce Initiative to Increase Mortgage Market Liquidity,” OFHEO news release, March 19, 2008. 34. Paulson, interview. 35. Joshua Rosner, “OFHEO Got Rolled,” GrahamFisher Weekly Spew, March 19, 2008. 36. Donald Bisenius, interview by FCIC, September 29, 2010. 37. “Freddie Mac CEO Richard Syron Talks about the Stock Slide,” PBS Nightly Business Report, Wednesday, August 6, 2008, transcript. 38. Lockhart, interview. 39. Daniel Mudd, letters to James Lockhart, August 1, 2008, and August 15, 2008. 40. Timothy P. Clark (senior adviser, Division of Banking and Supervision, Federal Reserve Board) and Scott Alvarez (general counsel, Federal Reserve Board), interview by FCIC, February 23, 2010. 41. “Board Grants Federal Reserve Bank of New York the Authority to Lend to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Should Such Lending Prove Necessary,” Federal Reserve Board press release, July 13, 2008. 42. Alvarez, interview. 43. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, testimony on GSE initiatives, Recent Developments in U.S. Financial Markets and the Regulatory Responses to Them, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., July 15, 2008. 44. “Statement by Daniel H. Mudd, President and CEO,” Fannie Mae press release, July 13, 2008. 45. Clark, interview 46. Mudd, interview. 47. Clark, interview. 48. Susan Eckert, Kevin Bailey, and other OCC staff, interview by FCIC, February 19, 2010.
612
Notes to Chapter 17
49. Ibid. 50. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “Observations—Allowance Process and Methodology,” August 2008 (last revised September 8, 2008), p. 3. 51. Paulson, interview. 52. Christopher H. Dickerson (FHFA Acting Deputy Director, Division of Enterprise Regulation), letter to Daniel H. Mudd (President and CEO of Fannie Mae), “Re: Notice of Proposed Capital Classification at June 30, 2008,” August 22, 2008, pp. 1, 2; Christopher H. Dickerson (FHFA Acting Deputy Director, Division of Enterprise Regulation), letter to Richard F. Syron (President and CEO of Freddie Mac), “Re: Notice of Proposed Capital Classification at June 30, 2008,” August 22, 2008. 53. “Draft—Mid-year Letter,” pp. 11–13 (quotation, p. 13), attached to Christopher H. Dickerson, letter to Daniel H. Mudd, September 4, 2008. 54. Dickerson to Mudd, September 4, 2008; Christopher H. Dickerson, letter to Richard Syron, September 4, 2008, with “Draft Mid Year Letter” attached. 55. “Draft—Mid-year Letter” (Fannie), pp. 5–7. 56. Ibid., p. 5. 57. Ibid., p. 6. 58. Ibid., pp. 9–10. 59. “Draft Mid Year Letter” (Freddie), pp. 1, 1–2, 7. 60. Ibid., p. 8. 61. Mudd, interview. 62. Christopher H. Dickerson to James B. Lockhart III, memorandum, “Proposed Appointment of the Federal Housing Finance Agency as Conservator for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,” September 6, 2008 (hereafter Freddie conservatorship memorandum); Christopher H. Dickerson to James B. Lockhart III, memorandum, Proposed Appointment of the Federal Housing Finance Agency as Conservator for the Federal National Mortgage Association,” September 6, 2008 (hereafter Fannie conservatorship memorandum). 63. Paulson, interview; Lockhart, interview; Paulson, On the Brink, p. 8. 64. Lockhart, testimony before the FCIC, April 9, 2010, transcript, p. 191. 65. Paulson, interview; Paulson, On the Brink, p. 10. 66. Paulson, On the Brink, p. 10. 67. Lund, interview. 68. Levin, interview. 69. Mudd, interview. 70. FHFA, Fannie conservatorship memorandum, pp. 2, 29. 71. FHFA, Freddie conservatorship memorandum, pp. 3, 29. 72. Syron, interview. 73. Daniel Mudd, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3,” session 1: Fannie Mae, April 9, 2010, transcript, p. 38. 74. Paul Nash, FDIC, letter to FCIC, providing responses to follow-up questions to Sheila Bair’s testimony during the September 2, 2010, hearing, p. 5. 75. Paulson, interview. 76. Neel Kashkari, interview by FCIC, November 2, 2010. 77. Tom Baxter, interview by FCIC, April 30, 2010; Kevin Warsh, interview by FCIC, October 28, 2010. 78. Warsh, interview. 79. Lockhart, testimony before the FCIC, April 9, 2010, transcript, p. 232. 80. Staff of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, memorandum to the Board of Governors, “Stress Scenarios on Bank Exposures to Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE) Debt,” January 24, 2005, p. 5. 81. Daniel Mudd, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 1: Fannie Mae, April 9, 2010, p. 3. 82. John Kerr, Scott Smith, Steve Corona (FHFA examination manager), and Alfred Pollard (FHFA general counsel), group interview by FCIC, March 12, 2010.
Notes to Chapter 18
613
83. Lockhart, interview. 84. Edward DeMarco, interview by FCIC, March 18, 2010. 85. Mudd, interview. 86. Henry Cisneros, interview by FCIC, October 13, 2010. 87. Mudd, testimony before the FCIC, April 9, 2010, transcript, p. 104. 88. Robert Levin, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), day 3, session 1: Fannie Mae, April 9, 2010, transcript, p. 104.
Chapter 18 1. Joseph Sommer, counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, email to Patrick M. Parkinson, deputy research director, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, et al., “Re: another option we should present re triparty?” July 13, 2008. 2. James Dimon, interview by FCIC, October 20, 2010. 3. Barry Zubrow, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 2: Lehman Brothers, September 1, 2010, p. 212. 4. Richard S. Fuld Jr., testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 2: Lehman Brothers, September 1, 2010, p. 148. See also Fuld’s written testimony at same hearing, p. 6. 5. Ben Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 1: The Federal Reserve, September 2, 2010, transcript, pp. 26, 89. 6. Kenneth D. Lewis, interview by FCIC, October 22, 2010. 7. Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, September 2, 2010, p. 22. 8. Bernanke told the examiner that the Federal Reserve, the SEC, and “markets in general” viewed Lehman as the next most vulnerable investment bank because of its funding model. Anton R. Valukas, Report of Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors, Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), March 11, 2010, 2:631 (hereafter cited as Valukas); see also 1:5 and n. 16, 2:609 and nn. 2133–34, 4:1417 and n. 5441, 4:1482 and n. 5728, 4:1494, and 5:1663 and n. 6269. Paulson, 2:632. Geithner told the examiner that following Bear Stearns’s near collapse, he considered Lehman to be the “most exposed” investment bank, 2:631; see also 1:5 and n. 16, 2:609, 4:1417 and n. 5441, 4:1482 and n. 5728, 4:1491 and n. 5769, and 5:1663 and n. 6269. Cox reported that after Bear Stearns collapsed, Lehman was the SEC’s “number one focus”; 1:5 and n. 16, and p. 1491 and n. 5769; see also 2:609, 631. 9. Timothy Geithner, quoted in Valukas, 1:8 and n. 30, 4:1496. 10. Donald L. Kohn, email to Bernanke, “Re: Lehman,” June 13, 2008. Valukas, 2:615; 2:609 and n. 2134. 11. Harvey R. Miller, bankruptcy counsel for Lehman Brothers, interview by FCIC, August 5, 2010; Lehman board minutes, September 14, 2008, p. 34. 12. Erik R. Sirri, interview by FCIC, April 1, 2010. 13. Paolo R. Tonucci, interview by FCIC, August 6, 2010. 14. Specifically, Lehman drew $1.6 billion on March 18; $2.3 billion on March 19 and 20; $2.7 billion on March 24; $2.1 billion on March 25 and 26; and $2 billion on April 16. Lehman Brothers, “Presentation to the Federal Reserve: Update on Capital, Leverage & Liquidity,” May 28, 2008, p. 15. See also Robert Azerad, vice president, Lehman Brothers, “2008 Q2—Liquidity Position (June 6, 2008),” p. 3. After its bankruptcy, Lehman drew $28 billion, $19.7 billion, and $20.4 billion, on September 15, 16, and 17, until Barclays replaced the Fed in providing financing. Valukas, 4:1399. See also David Weisbrod, senior vice president, Treasury and Securities Services–Risk Management, JPMorgan Chase & Co., email to James Dimon et al., “Re: TriParty Close,” September 15, 2008. 15. Thomas A. Russo, former vice chairman and chief legal officer, Lehman Brothers, email to Richard S. Fuld Jr., forwarding article by John Brinsley (originally sent to Russo by Robert Steel), “Paulson Says Investment Banks Making Progress in Raising Funds,” Bloomberg, June 13, 2008 (quoting Robert Steel), June 13, 2008.
614
Notes to Chapter 18
16. Richard S. Fuld Jr., interview by FCIC, April 28, 2010. 17. Valukas, 2:713 and nn. 2764–65, 2:715 and n. 2774. See also Russo, email to Fuld, “Fw: Rumors of hedge fund putting together a group to have another run at Lehman,” March 20, 2008 (forwarding discussions with SEC regarding short sellers). 18. Dan Chaudoin, Bruce Karpati, and Stephanie Shuler, Division of Enforcement, SEC, interview by FCIC, April 6, 2010; Mary L. Schapiro, chairman, SEC, written responses to written questions—specifically, response to question 13—from FCIC, asked after the hearing on January 14, 2010. 19. Jesse Eisinger, “The Debt Shuffle: Wall Street Cheered Lehman’s Earnings, but There Are Questions about Its Balance Sheet,” Portfolio.com, March 20, 2008. 20. David Einhorn, Greenlight Capital, “Private Profits and Socialized Risk,” speech at Grant’s Spring Investment Conference, April 8, 2008, p. 9. See also David Einhorn, “Accounting Ingenuity,” speech at Ira W. Sohn Investment Research Conference, May 21, 2008, pp. 3–4. 21. Nell Minow, interview by FCIC, September 13, 2010. 22. Nell Minow, testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Hearing on Lehman Brothers, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., October 6, 2008. 23. Kirsten J. Harlow, email to Timothy Geithner et al., “On-Site Primary Dealer Update: June 16,” June 16, 2008. 24. William Dudley, email to Timothy Geithner, Donald Kohn, and others, June 17, 2008. 25. Kirsten J. Harlow, email to Kevin D. Coffey, examining officer, FRBNY, et al., “On-Site Primary Dealer Update: June 19,” June 19, 2008. 26. Thomas Fontana, Citigroup, email to Christopher M. Foskett, Citigroup, et al., June 12, 2008. 27. Tim Clark, Federal Reserve, email to Kevin Coffey, Federal Reserve, et al., June 20, 2008. 28. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Primary Dealer Monitoring: Liquidity Stress Analysis,” June 25, 2008. 29. Based on chart in Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Developing Metrics for the Four Largest Securities Firms,” August 2008, p. 9. 30. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Primary Dealer Monitoring: Liquidity Stress Analysis,” June 25, 2008. 31. Karl Mocharko, assistant vice president and senior trader, Federated Investors, Inc., email to Gail Shanley, Federated Investors, Inc., et al., “Re: Federated SubCustodial Agreement—JPMC’s comments,” July 10, 2008; Charles Witek, Federated Investors, Inc., email to George V. Van Schaick, Lehman Brothers, et al., “FW: Federated SubCustodial Agreement—JPMC’s comments,” April 23, 2008. Despite the FRBNY’s observation, Federated did not fully terminate its repo relationships with Lehman. In fact, as of September 12, Federated’s repo exposure to Lehman was $2 billion, as reported in the Commission’s Market Risk Survey of money market mutual funds. 32. Patrick M. Parkinson, email to David Marshall, et al., July 11, 2008; David Marshall, email to Patrick M. Parkinson, July 11, 2008. 33. Valukas, 4:1497–98 (quoting Timothy Geithner); see also Bart McDade, president and chief operating officer, Lehman Brothers, interview by FCIC, April 16, 2010. 34. William Dudley, email to Geithner et al., “Re: Lehman Good Bank/Bad Bank idea discussed last night,” July 15, 2008. 35. Patrick M. Parkinson, email to Steven Shafran, Department of the Treasury, et al., “Fw: Gameplan and Status to Date,” August 19, 2008. 36. Patrick M. Parkinson, email to Steven Shafran, August 11, 2008. 37. Patrick M. Parkinson, email to Arthur Angulo, Theodore Lubke, Til Schuermann, and William Brodows, August 15, 2010. 38. William Brodows, email to Patrick Parkinson, August 15, 2008. 39. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 41. Parkinson, email to Steven Shafran, August 19, 2008. 42. Ibid. 43. Steven Shafran, email to Patrick M. Parkinson, August 28, 2008. 44. Patrick M. Parkinson, email to Theodore Lubke, September 5, 2008.
Notes to Chapter 18
615
45. Emil Cornejo, senior vice president, Department of the Treasury, Lehman Brothers, email to Janet Birney, senior vice president, Department of the Treasury, Lehman Brothers, et al., “JP Morgan Agenda forwarded for our review. FYI,” September 3, 2008. See Lehman Briefing Memorandum, September 4, 2008; JP Morgan Agenda, September 4, 2008. 46. Meg McConnell, FRBNY, email to Arthur Angulo et al., “Meeting tomorrow at 9:00,” September 8, 2008. 47. Ibid. 48. Patrick M. Parkinson, email to Steven Shafran, “Re: now I am on a conf call,” September 9, 2008. 49. Henry M. Paulson Jr., On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System (New York: Business Plus, 2010), p. 178; Rita C. Proctor, assistant to the chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, email to Donald L. Kohn et al., “This evening’s conference call will take place at 5 P.M. instead of 6 P.M.,” September 9, 2008. 50. Jim Wilkinson, email to Michele Davis, September 9, 2008. 51. Barry Zubrow, interview by FCIC, August 19, 2010. 52. Paul, Weiss, counsel to Steven Black, letter to FCIC, August 27, 2007, written responses to FCIC questions in email of August 26, 2007, p. 6. 53. John J. Hogan, JPMorgan Chase & Co., email to Steven D. Black, September 9, 2008, 7:07 P.M.; Steven Black, email to John Hogan, September 9, 2008, 8:24 P.M. See also Valukas, 4:1139, 1140 and n. 4204, and 1141. 54. Complaint, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., et al., against JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2010), pp. 14–15 (hereafter cited as Lehman Complaint). 55. Ibid. 56. Black responses, August 27, 2010, p. 6. 57. Matthew Rutherford, email to Tony Ryan, Department of the Treasury, et al., September 10, 2008. 58. Mark VanDerWeide, assistant general counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, email to Scott G. Alvarez, general counsel, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “lehman,” September 10, 2008. 59. Patricia Mosser, email to William Dudley et al., “thoughts on Lehman,” September 10, 2008. 60. See Michael Nelson, counsel and vice president, FRBNY, email to Christine Cumming, first vice president, FRBNY, et al., “revised Liquidation Consortium gameplan + questions,” September 10, 2008, (attaching game plan), 61. See Patrick M. Parkinson, email to Donald Kohn et al., “Fw: revised Liquidation Consortium gameplan + questions,” September 11, 2008 (attaching game plan). 62. Ibid.; Thomas Baxter, interview by FCIC, August 11, 2010. 63. Ken Lewis, interview by FCIC, October 22, 2010. 64. Susan McCabe, Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., email to William Dudley et al., “Hope you have the Radar screens on early this morning,” September 11, 2008. 65. Rita C. Proctor, email to Bernanke, “Fw: Financial Markets Conference Call 9/11/08,” September 11, 2008 (forwarding to Chairman Bernanke materials for the conference call). 66. Hayley Boesky, vice president, Markets Group, FRBNY, email to Meg McConnell et al., forwarding Louis Bacon, email to Hayley Boesky, “FW: Options for short-circuiting the market,” September 11, 2008, 10:46 A.M. 67. Email chain between Jamie McAndrews, Tobias Adrian, Patrick Parkinson and Jeff Stehm, subject : “Fw : Default Management Group 9 Sep 2008.doc,” September 11, 2008. 68. Hayley Boesky, email to Debby Perelmuter, senior vice president, FRBNY, et al., “Panic,” September 11, 2008. 69. Jane Buyers-Russo, managing director, JP Morgan, email to Paolo R. Tonucci, “Fw: Letter to Lehman,” Sept. 11, 2008, (attaching JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s September 11, 2008, Notice to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.). 70. Jane Buyers-Russo, email to Bryn Thomas, executive director, Broker Dealer Group, JPMorgan Chase & Co., et al., “Re: Lehman Brothers TriParty Collateral,” September 12, 2008. 71. Paolo R. Tonucci, interview by FCIC, August 6, 2010. 72. See Valukas, 4:1158–65, 1162 and n. 4304.
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Notes to Chapter 18
73. Lehman Complaint, pp. 22–23, paragraphs 68, 71. 74. Barry Zubrow, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 2: Lehman Brothers, September 1, 2010, p. 7. 75. Richard S. Fuld, interview by FCIC, August 24, 2010. 76. Lehman Complaint, p. 23, paragraph 70. 77. Jim Wilkinson, email to Abby Aderman, Russell Reynolds Associates, “Re: Paulson Statement on Treasury and FHFA Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers,” September 12, 2008. 78. Kevin M. Warsh, e-mail to J. Nellie Liang, senior associate director, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 12, 2008. 79. Valukas, 2:618. 80. Harvey R. Miller, interview by FCIC, August 5, 2010. 81. Tom Baxter, “Speaking notes: Financial Community Meeting,” attached to email from Helen Ayala, NYFRB, to Steven Shafron, Treasure, September 12, 2008. 82. Thomas C. Baxter, interview by FCIC, August 11, 2010. 83. H. Rodgin Cohen, interview by FCIC, August 5, 2010. 84. Parkinson, email to Kohn et al., September 11, 2008. 85. Financial Services Authority of the United Kingdom, “Statement of the Financial Services Authority” before the Lehman bankruptcy examiner, pp. 4–5, paragraph 23. 86. Paulson, On the Brink, p. 193. 87. Patrick M. Parkinson, email to Lucinda Brickler, senior vice president, payments policy, FRBNY, “Re: triparty repo thoughts for this weekend,” September 12, 2008. 88. Patrick M. Parkinson, interview by FCIC, August 24, 2010; see also Patrick M. Parkinson, email to Lucinda Brickler et al., “Re: another option we should present re triparty?” July 13, 2008. 89. John Thain, interview by FCIC, September 17, 2010. 90. Christopher Tsuboi, examiner, bank supervision/operational risk, FRBNY, email to Alejandro LaTorre, assistant vice president, Credit, Investment and Payment Risk Group, FRBNY, “memo re: Lehman’s inter-company default scenario,” September 13, 2008. 91. Scott Alvarez, email to Ben Bernanke et al., “Re: Fw: today at 7:00 p.m. w/Chairman Bernanke, Vice Chairman Kohn and Others,” September 13, 2008. 92. Scott Alvarez, email to Mark VanDerWeide, “Re: tri-party,” September 13, 2008. 93. Bart McDade, interview by FCIC, August 9, 2010. 94. Baxter, interview. 95. Paulson, On the Brink, p. 207. 96. Baxter, interview; Robert Diamond, interview by FCIC, November 15, 2010. 97. Paulson, On the Brink, pp. 212–13. 98. Financial Services Authority of the United Kingdom, “Statement of the Financial Services Authority” before the Lehman bankruptcy examiner, p. 9, paragraph 48. 99. Paulson, On the Brink, pp. 209–10. See also Baxter, interview. 100. Baxter, interview. 101. Jim Wilkinson, email to Jes Staley, September 14, 2008, 7:46 A.M. 102. Jim Wilkinson, email to Jes Staley, September 14, 2008, 9:00 A.M. 103. Paulson, On the Brink, p. 210. 104. Alistair Darling, quoted in United Kingdom Press Association, “Darling Vetoed Lehman Bros Takeover,” Belfast Telegraph, October 9, 2010. 105. H. Rodgin Cohen, interview by FCIC, August 5, 2010. 106. Bart McDade, interview by FCIC, August 9, 2010. 107. Alex Kirk, interview by FCIC, August 16, 2010; McDade, interview, August 9, 2010. 108. Baxter, interview. 109. Thomas C. Baxter, letter to FCIC, October 15, 2010, attaching Exhibit 6, James P. Bergin, email to William Dudley et al., “Bankruptcy,” September 14, 2008. See also Kirk, interview. 110. Ibid., attaching Exhibit 5, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., “Minutes of the Board of Directors, September 14, 2008,” p. 2. 111. Ibid., attaching Exhibits 2 and 8.
Notes to Chapter 19
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112. On September 15, 2008, LBI borrowed $28 billion from PDCF against $31.7 billion of collateral; on September 16, 2008, LBI borrowed $19.7 billion against $23 billion of collateral; and on September 17, 2008, LBI borrowed $20.4 billion against $23.3 billion of collateral. See Valukas, 4:1399 and nn. 5374–75. 113. Kirk, interview. 114. Miller, interview. 115. Kirk, interview. 116. Miller, interview. In his interview, Kirk told FCIC staff that he thought there were more than 1 million derivatives contracts. 117. McDade, interview, August 9, 2010. 118. Baxter, interview. 119. Harvey R. Miller, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 2: Lehman Brothers, September 1, 2010, p. 8. 120. Miller, interview. 121. Ibid. 122. Ibid. 123. Ben S. Bernanke, closed-door session with FCIC, November 17, 2009. 124. Ibid. 125. Henry M. Paulson Jr., written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 1: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, p. 55. 126. Miller, written testimony for the FCIC, September 1, 2010, p. 14. 127. Ibid., p. 18. 128. Ibid., pp. 6, 12–13, 15, 11, 15. 129. Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, September 2, 2010, transcript, p. 23. 130. Ben Bernanke, email to Kevin Warsh, member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 14, 2008. 131. Bernanke, testimony before the FCIC, September 2, 2010, p. 22. 132. Ibid., p. 24. 133. Ben Bernanke, “U.S. Financial Markets,” testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 23, 2008. 134. 12 U.S.C. § 343(A), as added by act of July 21, 1932 (47 Stat. 715); and amended by acts of August 23, 1935 (49 Stat. 714), December 19, 1991 (105 Stat. 2386), and July 21, 2010 (124 Stat. 2113). 135. Scott G. Alvarez et al., memorandum, “Authority of the Federal Reserve to provide extensions of credit in connection with a commercial paper funding facility (CPFF),” March 9, 2009, p. 7. 136. Fuld, written testimony for the FCIC, September 1, 2010, pp. 7, 6, 3. 137. Bernanke, closed-door session with FCIC. 138. Ben S. Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, letter to Phil Angelides, chairman of the FCIC, December 21, 2010. 139. Thain, interview. 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid. 142. Dimon, interview. 143. Scott G. Alvarez, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 1: Wachovia Corporation, September 1, 2010, transcript, p. 95. See also Baxter, letter to FCIC, October 15, 2010, p. 6.
Chapter 19 1. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, notes about AIG meeting, September 12, 2008. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. “AIG Commercial Paper Outstanding & Maturities—week of Sept 15th,” September 16, 2008, produced by JPMorgan. 5. American International Group, Inc., Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2008.
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Notes to Chapter 19
6. FRBNY, notes about AIG meeting. 7. Goldman Sachs International, Collateral Invoice (margin call) to AIG Financial Products Corp., July 27, 2007; data on collateral exposures and multisector CDOs supplied by AIG (see Timeline of Goldman Sachs/AIG collateral calls, pp. 50, 392, 404, available at the FCIC website at http://fcic.gov/ hearings/pdfs/2010–0701-AIG-Goldman-supporting-docs.pdf); FRBNY, notes about AIG meeting. 8. Alejandro LaTorre, email to Christine Cumming, Timothy Geithner, William Dudley, et al., “Update on AIG,” September 12, 2008. 9. FRBNY, notes about AIG meeting. 10. Mark Hutchings, interview by FCIC, June 22, 2010. 11. Eric Dinallo, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 2: Derivatives: Supervisors and Regulators, July 1, 2010, transcript, pp. 3,16. 12. Michael Moriarty, testimony before the Congressional Oversight Panel, Hearing on American International Group, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26, 2010, p. 4. 13. Dinallo, testimony before the FCIC, July 2, 2010, pp. 16–17. 14. FRBNY, notes about AIG meeting. 15. Ibid. 16. “Systemic Impact of AIG Bankruptcy,” attachment to FRBNY internal email from Alejandro LaTorre to Timothy Geithner, September 16, 2008. 17. FRBNY, internal memo about August 11, 2008, meeting with the AIG team of the Office of Thrift Supervision. 18. Ibid. 19. FRBNY, internal document about AIG, August 14, 2008. 20. Ibid. 21. Goldman Sachs, company update on AIG, August 18, 2008. 22. Ira Selig, email to Kevin Coffey, “Goldman Report on AIG,” August 18, 2008. 23. FRBNY, internal document about AIG, September 2, 2008. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid.; Goldman Sachs, company update on AIG, August 18, 2008. 26. FRBNY, notes about AIG meeting, September 12, 2008. 27. Ibid. 28. “AIG Commercial Paper Outstanding & Maturities—week of Sept 15th,” September 16, 2008. 29. FRBNY, notes about AIG meeting, September 12, 2008. 30. Hayley Boesky, email to Bill Dudley et al., “AIG panic,” September 12, 2008. 31. FRBNY, emails of September 12 and 13, 2008. 32. Thomas Baxter, interview by FCIC, April 30, 2010. 33. Robert Willumstad, interview by FCIC, November 15, 2010. 34. Patricia Mosser, email to Alejandro LaTorre et al., re: AIG/Board call, September 13, 2008, 12:54 P.M. 35. Patricia Mosser, email to Alejandro Latorre et al., September 13, 2008, 7:26 P.M. 36. FRBNY, internal memo about AIG, September 14, 2008. 37. Adam Ashcraft, email to Alejandro LaTorre et al., “AIG and the discount window,” September 14, 2008. 38. Alejandro LaTorre, email to Adam Ashcraft et al., September 14, 2008. 39. Ibid. 40. J. C. Flowers, interview by FCIC, October 7, 2010. 41. Robert Willumstad, interview by FCIC, November 15, 2010. 42. Ibid. 43. Goldman Sachs International, Collateral Invoice to AIG Financial Products Group, September 15, 2008. 44. Data supplied by AIG (Tab 31 of the AIG/Goldman Sachs collateral call timeline). 45. Baxter, interview. 46. See Sarah Dahlgren, FRBNY, interview by FCIC, April 30, 2010. 47. Ibid. 48. Alexander J. Psomas, email to NY Bank Sup AIG Monitoring and Analysis, September 15, 2005.
Notes to Chapter 20
619
49. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, letter to FCIC Chairman Phil Angelides, December 21, 2010. 50. Federal Reserve Board of Governors, press release, September 16, 2008. 51. Congressional Oversight Panel, “The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit Strategy,” June 10, 2010, p. 98. 52. Ibid., executive summary, pp. 1, 8. 53. Treasury spokesman Andrew Williams, quoted in Hugh Son, “AIG’s Rescue Had ‘Poisonous’ Effect, U.S. Panel Says (Update1),” Bloomberg, June 10, 2010. 54. Scott M. Polakoff, “American International Group’s Impact on the Global Economy: Before, during, and after Federal Intervention,” testimony before the. House Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 18, 2009. 55. John Reich, interview by FCIC, May 4, 2010. 56. Michael E. Finn, prepared testimony before the Congressional Oversight Panel, May 26, 2010. 57. C. K. Lee, interview by FCIC, April 28, 2010. See also Memorandum of Understanding between Scott M. Albinson, managing director, OTS, and Danièle Nouy, secrétaire général de la Commission Bancaire, April 11, 2005. 58. OTS, Memo to Commission Bancaire regarding its supervisory role, January 2005. 59. Reich, interview. 60. Joseph Gonzalez, interview by FCIC, May 7, 2010. 61. Ibid. 62. OTS, Targeted Review of AIG Financial Products Corp., July 13, 2007. 63. AIG/Goldman Sachs collateral call timeline, p. 50. 64. Brad Waring, interview by FCIC, May 7, 2010. 65. Reich, interview. 66. Ibid.
Chapter 20 1. John J. Mack, written testimony for the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 1: Financial Institution Representatives, January 13, 2010, p. 6. 2. Jamie Dimon, interview by FCIC, October 20, 2010. 3. Timothy Geithner, interview by FCIC, November 17, 2009. 4. Timothy Geithner, quoted by Robert Schmidt, “Geithner Slams Bonuses, Says Banks Would Have Failed (Update2),” Bloomberg, December 4, 2009. 5. Ben Bernanke, closed-door session with FCIC, November 17, 2009. 6. Specifically, the Fed broadened the PDCF to match the types of collateral that the two major clearing banks accepted in the tri-party repo system, including non-investment-grade securities and equities; previously, PDCF collateral had been limited to investment-grade debt securities. The Fed similarly broadened the TSLF to include all investment-grade debt securities; previously, TSLF collateral had been limited to Treasury securities, agency securities, and AAA-rated mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities. The Fed also increased both the frequency of TSLF auctions, to weekly instead of every two weeks, and their size. Federal Reserve Board press release, September 14, 2008. 7. On September 30, Goldman Sachs had a $15 billion balance in TSLF, and a $16.5 billion balance in PDCF. Federal Reserve Board, “Regulatory Reform: Usage of Federal Reserve Credit and Liquidity Facilities,” PDCF. 8. Lehman initially asserted that there were around 930,000 derivative transactions at the time of bankruptcy. See Debtors’ Motion for an Order pursuant to Sections 105 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code to Establish Procedures for the Settlement or Assumption and Assignment of Prepetition Derivatives Contracts, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al, No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2008), p. 4. See also Anton R. Valukas, Report of Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP), (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), March 11, 2010, 2:573. By November 13, 2008, a special facility to unwind derivatives trades with Lehman had successfully terminated most of the 930,000 derivative contracts. Nevertheless, in January 2009, Lehman’s counsel reported that 18,000 derivatives contracts had not been terminated. Moreover, there are massive unresolved claims relating to over-the-counter derivatives in the bankruptcy proceeding: as of May 2010, banks had filed more than $50 billion in claims for losses related to derivatives contracts with Lehman. See Debtors’ Motion for an Order pursuant to
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Notes to Chapter 20
Sections 105 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code to Establish Procedures for the Settlement or Assumption and Assignment of Prepetition Derivatives Contracts, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., No. 0813555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2008) [Docket No. 1498], p. 4; Debtors’ Motion for an Order Approving Consensual Assumption and Assignment of Prepetition Derivatives Contracts, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2009) [Docket No.2561], p. 3. 9. Money market fund holdings of all types of taxable commercial paper decreased from $671 billion at the end of August 2008 to $505 billion at the end of September (data provided by ICI/Crane to the FCIC). BNY Mellon, in its role as tri-party clearing bank, reported that Treasury-backed repos rose from $195 billion (13%) to $466 billion (27%) of its tri-party business between March 31 and December 31, 2008 (data provided by BNY Mellon to the FCIC). 10. Harvey Miller, interview by FCIC, August 5, 2010. 11. The Reserve Fund, Semi-annual report to shareholders, March 2006. 12. Complaint, SEC v. Reserve Management Company Inc., Resrv Partners Inc., Bruce Bent Sr., Bruce Bent II, and The Reserve Primary Fund (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2009), p. 12 (para. 35); “Fidelity, BlackRock, Dreyfus, Reserve Make Big Gains Past 12 Months,” Crane Data News Archives, September 12, 2008. 13. The Reserve Primary Fund management, interview by FCIC, March 25, 2010. 14. SEC Complaint against Reserve Management Company Inc., pp. 2, 18 (paras. 3, 59), p. 30 (para. 101); The Reserve, “The Primary Fund: Plan of Liquidation and Distribution of Assets,” December 3, 2008, p. 2. 15. SEC Complaint, pp. 26–33 (paras. 88–113); The Reserve, “The Primary Fund: Plan of Liquidation,” p. 2. 16. SEC Complaint, p. 35 (para. 121). The SEC notes that the Primary Fund likely broke the buck prior to 11:00 A.M. on September 16 because of the redemption requests and the valuation of Lehman’s debt; moreover, RMCI announced on November 26, 2008, that owing to an administrative error, its NAV should have been calculated as $0.99 between 11:00 A.M. and 4:00 P.M. on September 16 (pp. 34–33, paras. 119, 120). 17. Moody’s Investors Service articles, “Sponsor Support Key to Money Market Funds,” August 9, 2010, p. 4; “Moody’s Proposes New Money Market Fund Rating Methodology and Symbols,” September 7, 2010. 18. Patrick McCabe and Michael Palumbo, interview by FCIC, September 28, 2010. 19. Ibid. 20. Investment Company Institute, Historical Weekly Money Market Data. While nongovernment funds lost $434 billion during the period between September 10 and October 1, 2008, government funds—investing in Treasuries and GSE debt—increased by $357 billion during the same period. 21. McCabe and Palumbo, interview. 22. FCIC survey of money market mutual funds. Holdings for the five firms decreased from $58 billion to $29 billion from September 12, 2008, to September 19, 2008. See FCIC website for details. 23. Timothy Geithner, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 2: Perspective on the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 135. 24. McCabe and Palumbo, interview. 25. “Treasury Announces Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds,” Treasury Department press release, September 19, 2008. President George W. Bush approved the use of existing authorities by Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. to make available as necessary the assets of the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) for up to $50 billion to guarantee payments to support money market mutual funds. The original objective of the ESF, established by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, was to stabilize the value of the dollar in the depths of the Depression. It authorized the treasury secretary, with the approval of the president, to “deal in gold, foreign exchange, and other instruments of credit and securities” to promote international financial stability. 26. The program was called the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). 27. Neel Kashkari, interview by FCIC, November 2, 2010. 28. John Mack, interview by FCIC, November 2, 2010. 29. New York Federal Reserve, internal email, October 22, 2008, p. 2. 30. David Wong, email to Fed and SEC officials, September 15, 2008.
Notes to Chapter 20
621
31. Jonathan Stewart, FRBNY, internal email, September 17, 2008. 32. One year later, the Senior Supervisors Group—a cross-agency task force looking back on the causes of the financial crisis—would write, “Before the crisis [at the investment banks post-Lehman], many broker-dealers considered the prime brokerage business to be either a source of liquidity or a liquidity-neutral business. As a result, the magnitude and unprecedented severity of events in September– October 2008 were largely unanticipated.” Senior Supervisors Group, “Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008,” October 21, 2009, p. 9. 33. Jonathan Wood, Whitebox Advisors, interview by FCIC, August 11, 2010. 34. The FCIC surveyed hedge funds that survived the crisis. Those in the three largest quartiles ranked by size received investor redemption requests averaging 20% of their assets in the fourth quarter of 2008 (the first available redemption date after the Lehman bankruptcy). 35. IFSL Research, “Hedge Funds 2009,” April 2009. 36. David Wong, treasurer of Morgan Stanley, interview by FCIC, October 15, 2010. 37. Mack, interview. 38. Wong, interview. 39. Patrice Maher (Morgan Stanley), email to William Brodows (Federal Reserve BNY) et al., September 28, 2008, with data in an attachment. Hedge fund values are the Prime Brokerage Outflows (NY+International). 40. Wong, interview. 41. Matthew Eichner, internal email, September 16, 2008. 42. Angela Miknius, email to NY Bank Sup, September 18, 2008. 43. Amy G. White, internal NYFBR email, September 19, 2008. 44. Morgan Stanley, “Liquidity and Financing Activity: 08/28/08,” “Liquidity and Financing Activity: 09/18/08,” “Liquidity and Financing Activity: 10/03/08,” reports to the New York Federal Reserve. 45. Morgan Stanley Corporate Treasury, “Meeting with Federal Reserve: September 20, 2008,” attachment to Morgan Stanley email to NYFRB, September 20, 2008, including “Forward Forecast.” 46. Morgan Stanley Corporate Treasury, “Liquidity Landscape: 09/12–09/18/2008,” in attachment to Morgan Stanley email to NYFRB, September 20, 2008; Amy White, internal NYFRB emails, September 16 and 19, 2008. 47. Lloyd Blankfein, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 1: Financial Institution Representatives, January 13, 2010, transcript, pp. 34–35. 48. Bernanke, closed-door session. 49. Thomas Baxter, interview by FCIC, April 30, 2010. 50. The switch to bank holding company status required a simple charter change. Both Morgan and Goldman already owned banks that they had chartered as industrial loan companies, a type of bank that is allowed to accept FDIC-insured deposits without having any Fed supervision over the bank’s parent or other affiliated companies. 51. Federal Reserve, “Discount Window Payment System Risk: Getting Started,” last updated November 17, 2009. 52. Mack, interview. 53. Mack, interview. 54. Wong, interview. 55. Amy G. White, internal FRBNY email, September 19, 2008. 56. It should be borne in mind that lack of regulation of this market rendered it extremely opaque. Shortcomings in transparency, lack of reporting requirements, and limited data collection by third parties make it difficult to document and describe the various market trading problems that emerged during the crisis. 57. Michael Masters, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 1: Overview of Derivatives, June 30, 2010, transcript, p. 26. 58. Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation data provided to the FCIC. 59. “The Global OTC Derivatives Market at End-June 1998,” Bank of International Settlements press release, December 13, 1998; “OTC derivatives market activity in the second half of 2008,” Bank of International Settlements press release, May 9, 2009, p. 7.
622
Notes to Chapter 20
60. “Triennial and Regular OTC Derivatives Market Statistics,” Bank of International Settlements press release, November 16, 2010, p. 7. 61. Moody’s, “Moody’s downgrades WaMu Ratings; outlook negative,” September 11, 2008. 62. “OTS Fact Sheet on Washington Mutual Bank,” OTS 08–046A, September 25, 2008, p. 3. 63. Jamie Dimon, interview by FCIC, October 20, 2010. 64. Sheila Bair, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 2: session 2: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, September 2, 2010, exchange between Bair and Commissioner Douglas Holtz-Eakin, pp. 134, 149. 65. Scott Alvarez, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, Session 1: Wachovia Corporation, September 1, 2010, transcript, p. 84. 66. Kashkari, interview. 67. Greg Feldberg, “Wachovia Case Study,” presentation at LBO Supervision Conference, November 12–13, 2008, Atlanta, Georgia, p. 15. These rules, embodied in section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, limit the support that a depository institution can provide to related companies in the same corporate structure; they are aimed at protecting FDIC-insured depositors from activities that occur outside of the bank itself. Exemptions have the effect of funding affiliate, nonbank assets within the federal safety net of insured deposits; they create liquidity for the parent company and/or key affiliates (and reduce bank liquidity) during times of market stress. 68. Robert Steel, interview by FCIC, August 18, 2010. 69. Scott Alvarez, written testimony for the FDIC, September 1, 2010, p. 4. 70. Robert Steel, written testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, session 1: Wachovia Corporation, September 1, 2010, p. 2. 71. David Wilson, interview by FCIC, August 4, 2010. 72. Sheila Bair, interview by FCIC, August 18, 2010. 73. Richard Westerkamp, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, interview by FCIC, August 13, 2010. 74. Wachovia was unable to roll $1.1 billion of asset-backed commercial paper that Friday; James Wigand and Herbert Held, memo to the FDIC Board of Directors, September 29, 2008, p. 2. On brokered certificates of deposit, see Westerkamp, interview. 75. John Corston, acting deputy director, Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection, FDIC, written testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis, day 1, Session 1: Wachovia Corporation, September 1, 2010, p. 4. 76. Wilson, interview. 77. Rich Westerkamp, email to FCIC, November 2, 2010. Westerkamp said that the estimate of early redemption requests was based on a phone conversation with officials in Wachovia’s treasury department, describing their conversations with investors; the figures were never verified. 78. Bair, interview. 79. Robert Steel, interview by FCIC, August 18, 2010. 80. Bair, interview; Steel, interview; FDIC staff, interview by FCIC re Wachovia, July 16, 2010. 81. Alvarez, written testimony for the FCIC, September 1, 2010, p. 5. 82. Steel, interview. 83. Ibid. 84. Wigand and Held, memo to the FDIC board, September 29, 2008, pp. 2, 4–5. 85. Federal Reserve staff, memo to the Board of Governors, subject: “Considerations Regarding Invoking the Systemic Risk Exception for Wachovia Bank, NA,” September 28, 2008, p. 7. 86. John A. Beebe, Market Risk Team Leader, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, memo to Jennifer Burns, VP-LCBO, “Wachovia Large Funds Providers,” September 27, 2008, pp. 1–2. 87. Federal Reserve staff, memo to the Board of Governors, subject: “Considerations Regarding Invoking the Systemic Risk Exception for Wachovia Bank, NA,” September 28, 2008, p. 7. 88. Bair, interview; minutes of the telephonic meeting of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Board of Directors, September 29, 2008, p. 8.
Notes to Chapter 20
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89. Bair, interview. 90. FDIC memo to the FDIC Board of Directors, p. 8; Corston, written testimony for the FDIC, September 1, 2010, p. 10. 91. Specifically, under Wachovia’s proposal, the FDIC would provide credit protection on $200 billion of loans, while Wachovia would absorb the first $25 billion in losses and the FDIC would potentially incur losses on the balance of the $200 billion. To offset that risk, Wachovia proposed that the FDIC receive $10 billion in preferred stock and warrants on common shares (FDIC memo to the FDIC Board of Directors, p. 8). 92. The FDIC board has five members: the comptroller of the currency, the director of OTS, and three other members appointed by the president. In Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System from Crisis—and Themselves (New York: Viking, 2009), Andrew Ross Sorkin (p. 497) wrote that before the September 29, 2008, FDIC board meeting, New York Federal Reserve Governor Geithner and other officials had a conference call with Bair (Paulson recused himself) during which Geithner urged Bair to help Citigroup acquire Wachovia by guaranteeing some of its potential losses. Geithner argued that allowing the FDIC to take over Wachovia would have the effect of wiping out shareholders and bond holders, which, he was convinced, would only spook the markets. He was still furious with Bair for the way she had abruptly taken over Washington Mutual, which had had a deleterious effect on investor confidence. 93. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Board of Directors meeting, September 29, 2008, transcript, pp. 21–22. 94. Minutes of telephonic meeting of the FDIC board, September 29, 2008, p. 8. 95. Ibid.; the $34.6 billion figure is as of September 30, 2008 (FDIC staff, memo to the Board of Directors, subject: “Third Quarter 2008 CFO Report to the Board,” November 21, 2008, p. 1). 96. Minutes of telephonic meeting of the FDIC board, September 29, 2008, p. 8. 97. Bair, interview. 98. Steel, written testimony for the FCIC, September 1, 2010, p. 4. On the board’s vote and the agreement in principle, see Steel, interview; see also Affidavit of Robert K. Steel, dated October 5, 2008, filed in Wachovia Corp. v. Citigroup, Inc., Case No. 08-cv-085093-SAS (S.D.N.Y.), pp. 3–4 and exhibit A. 99. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, letter to FCIC Chairman Phil Angelides, December 21, 2010. 100. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, on behalf of Wells, letter to Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, November 17, 2008, p. 3. 101. Richard Kovacevich, interview by FCIC, August 24, 2010. 102. Bair, interview. 103. Steel, interview. 104. Bair, interview. In his interview, Treasury’s Kashkari told the FCIC that he disagreed. He felt that the highest priority was to transfer the risk of banks’ troubled assets from the financial system to the government. Citigroup’s FDIC-assisted acquisition would have removed potential losses on $270 billion of assets from the financial system by transferring those potential losses to the FDIC. 105. “Wells Fargo, Wachovia Agree to Merge: Creating Premier Coast-To-Coast Financial Services Franchise without Government Assistance,” Wells Fargo press release, October 3, 2008. 106. Rich Delmar, Treasury Office of the Inspector General, interview by FCIC, August 25, 2010; Rich Delmar, memorandum for Inspector General Eric M. Thorson, “Inquiry Regarding IRS Notice 2008-83,” September 3, 2009, pp. 3, 5, 11–12. 107. Richard Levy, interview by FCIC, August 19, 2010. 108. “Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Comprehensive Approach to Market Developments,” Treasury Department press release, September 19, 2008. 109. Senators Christopher J. Dodd and Richard C. Shelby, remarks before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government-Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks, and Other Financial Institutions, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 23, 2008, transcript, pp. 3, 6. 110. Secretary Henry Paulson, testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets, transcript, p. 37. 111. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, “Economic Outlook,” testimony before the Joint Economic Committee, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 24, 2008, transcript.
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112. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, The Future of Financial Services: Exploring Solutions for the Market Crisis, September 24, 2008, transcript, p. 48. 113. Mel Martinez, interview by FCIC, September 28, 2010. 114. The TARP legislation, drafted as the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, was coupled in Public Law 110-343 with several other vote-attracting acts, including the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, the Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008, the Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, and the Heartland and Hurricane Ike Disaster Relief Act of 2008. Congress originally said that the deposit insurance cap would revert to $100,000 at the beginning of 2010, but later extended the deadline through the end of 2013. 115. The quotation is part of the formal title of Public Law 110-343, of which the TARP legislation— officially named the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008—is a part. 116. “Board Announces Creation of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to Help Provide Liquidity to Term Funding Markets,” Federal Reserve Board press release, October 7, 2008. The CPFF complemented the Fed’s other commercial paper program, the AMLF, which was created shortly after the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck. While the AMLF targeted money market mutual funds, the CPFF aimed to create liquidity for qualified commercial paper issuers. 117. Federal Reserve Board, “Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF).” 118. Ken Lewis from Bank of America, Robert Kelly from BNY Mellon, Vikram Pandit from Citigroup, Lloyd Blankfein from Goldman, Jamie Dimon from JP Morgan, John Thain from Merrill, John Mack from Morgan Stanley, Ronald Logue from State Street, and Richard Kovacevich from Wells. 119. Paulson, testimony before the FCIC, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 70. Former assistant treasury secretary Phillip Swagel argued, “There is no authority in the United States to force a private institution to accept government capital” (“The Financial Crisis: An Inside View,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, conference draft, Spring 2009, pp. 33–34). 120. Henry Paulson, On The Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System (New York: Business Plus, 2010), p. 365. 121. Dimon, interview. 122. The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program consisted of two programs, the Temporary Debt Guarantee Program (TDGP) and the Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP). The TDGP at its highest point in May 2009 guaranteed $346 billion in outstanding senior debt; see “FDIC Announces Plan to Free Up Bank Liquidity,” FDIC press release, October 14, 2008. The TAGP guaranteed $834 billion in deposits at the end of 2009. 123. “Factsheet on Capital Purchase Program,” FinancialStability.gov, updated October 3, 2010. 124. “Remarks by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Financial Rescue Package and Economic Update,” Treasury Department press release, November 12, 2008. 125. Paulson, testimony before the FCIC, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 70. 126. U.S. Treasury Department Office of Financial Stability, “Troubled Asset Relief Program”; Transactions Report for Period Ending December 31, 2008: Capital Purchase Program;” “Factsheet on Capital Purchase Program.” 127. U.S. Treasury Department Office of Financial Stability, “Troubled Asset Relief Program: Transactions Report for Period Ending October 15, 2010: Capital Purchase Program.” 128. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, “Initial Report to the Congress,” February 6, 2009, p. 6. 129. Congressional Oversight Panel, “September Oversight Report: Assessing the TARP on the Eve of Its Expiration,” September 16, 2010, p. 27. 130. Office of Financial Stability, “Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two Year Retrospective,” October 2010, pp. 15, 51; AIG, “What AIG Owes the U.S. Government,” updated September 30, 2010. 131. Congressional Oversight Panel, “September Oversight Report,” p. 27; Office of Financial Stability, “Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two Year Retrospective,” p. 18; “Taxpayers Receive $10.5 Billion in Proceeds Today from Final Sale of Treasury Department Citigroup Common Stock,” Treasury Department press release, December 10, 2010.
Notes to Chapter 20
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132. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, “Quarterly Report to Congress,” October 26, 2010, table 2.1, p. 46 (obligation figures as of October 3, 2010, and expenditure figures as of September 30, 2010). 133. The money market funding is through the Asset-backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF); FCIC staff calculations. 134. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Regulatory Reform: Agency Mortgagebacked Securities (MBS) Purchase Program.” 135. The Fed had created the first Maiden Lane vehicle in March to take $29 billion in assets off the balance sheet of Bear Stearns, as described in chapter 15. See “AIG RMBS LLC Facility: Terms and Conditions,” December 16, 2008; “AIG Discloses Counterparties to CDS, GIA and Securities Lending Transactions,” AIG press release, March 15, 2009, Attachment D: Payments to AIG Securities Lending Counterparties. 136. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Maiden Lane III: Transaction Overview”; Federal Reserve and Treasury Department press release, November 10, 2008; “AIG CDO LLC Facility: Terms and Conditions,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York press release, December 3, 2008; FRBNY, “Maiden Lane Transactions.” $27.1 billion was paid to 16 counterparties and $2.5 billion was paid to AIGFP as an adjustment to reflect overcollateralization. 137. Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, “Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties,” SIGTARP-10-003, November 17, 2009, pp. 19–20. 138. Blankfein, testimony before the FCIC, January 13, 2010, transcript, pp. 90–93. 139. Data provided to Goldman Sachs to the FCIC. 140. David Viniar, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis, day 2, session 1: American International Group, Inc. and Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., July 1, 2010, transcript, p. 148. 141. Goldman Sachs, email to FCIC, July 15, 2010. 142. Ibid.; and data provided by Goldman Sachs to the FCIC. 143. SIGTARP, “Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties,” pp. 15–16, 18. The report said counterparties insisted on 100% coverage because (1) concessions “would mean giving away value and voluntarily taking a loss, in contravention of their fiduciary duty to their shareholders”; (2) they had a “reasonable expectation” that AIG would not default on further obligations, given the government assistance; (3) costs already incurred to protect against a possible AIG default “would be exacerbated if they were paid less than par value”; and (4) they were “contractually entitled” to receive the par value of the credit default swap contracts. 144. “In other words, the decision to acquire a controlling interest in one of the world’s most complex and most troubled corporations was done with almost no independent consideration of the terms of the transaction or the impact that those terms might have on the future of AIG” (ibid., p. 28). 145. Ibid., summary, p. 1. 146. Congressional Oversight Panel, “June Oversight Report: The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit Strategy,” June 10, 2010, pp. 10, 8. 147. Suzanne Kapner, “US Congressional Panel Attacks AIG Rescue,” Financial Times, June 10, 2010. 148. Baxter, interview. 149. Sarah Dahlgren, interview by FCIC, April 30, 2008. 150. SIGTARP, “Factors Affecting Efforts to Limit Payments to AIG Counterparties,” p. 29. 151. Timothy Geithner, quoted in Jody Shenn, Bob Ivry, and Alan Katz, “AIG 100-Cents Fed Deal Driven by France Belied by French Banks,” Bloomberg Businessweek, January 20, 2010. 152. E.g., Baxter, interview; Jim Mahoney, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, interview by FCIC, April 30, 2010; Michael Alix, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, interview by FCIC, April 30, 2010. 153. Dahlgren, interview. 154. Baxter, interview. 155. GAO, “Federal Financial Assistance: Preliminary Observations on Assistance Provided AIG,” GAO-09–4907 (Testimony: Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, House Committee on Financial Services), March 18, 2009, p. 2; Federal Reserve press release, September 16, 2008. 156. AIG, “What AIG Owes the US Government,” updated September 30, 2010.
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Notes to Chapter 20
157. Edward J. Kelly III, interview by FCIC, March 3, 2010. 158. Roger Cole, interview by FCIC, August 2, 2010. 159. Kelly, interview. 160. James R. Wigand and Herbert J. Held, memorandum to the FDIC Board of Directors, regarding recommendation for systemic risk determination for Citigroup, November 23, 2008, p. 5. 161. Kelly, interview. 162. Mark D. Richardson, email to John H. Corston, Jason C. Cave, et al., subject: “RE: CONFIDENTIAL—Citigroup—Deterioration of Stock Price and CDS Spreads,” November 20, 2008; Mark D. Richardson, email, to John H. Corston, Jason C. Cave, et al., subject: “11-21-08 Citi Liquidity call notes,” November 21, 2008. 163. Wigand and Held, November memo to the FDIC board regarding Citigroup, p. 5. 164. Bernanke, closed-door session. 165. Arthur J. Murton, email to John V. Thomas, Michael H. Krimminger, et al., subject: “RE: Proposed Conduit,” November 22, 2008; Michael H. Krimminger, email to Arthur J. Murton, John V. Thomas, et al., subject: “RE: Proposed Conduit,” November 22, 2008. 166. Vikram Pandit, testimony before the Congressional Oversight Panel, Citigroup and the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 4, 2010, transcript, p. 79. 167. Kelly, interview. 168. GAO, “Federal Deposit Insurance Act: Regulators’ Use of Systemic Risk Exception Raises Moral Hazard Concerns and Opportunities Exist to Clarify the Provision,” GAO-10–100 (Report to Congressional Committees), April 2010, p. 2. 169. Wigand and Held, memo to the FDIC board regarding Citigroup, pp. 9, 10. 170. Department of the Treasury response to Congressional Oversight Panel, Questions for the Record, p. 3, Citigroup and the Troubled Asset Relief Program, March 4, 2010, p. 44. “Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the FDIC on Citigroup,” joint press release, November 23, 2008. 171. “Joint Statement on Citigroup.” 172. In total, Citigroup received almost $40 billion in capital benefits from the November 2008 government assistance. Half of the capital benefits were from Treasury’s $20 billion TARP investment in Citigroup preferred stock; $16 billion of the capital benefits were derived from a change in the risk weighting of the ring-fenced assets. In addition, Citigroup issued Treasury and the FDIC $7 billion in preferred stock as payment for the guarantee on the ring fence; the result, after accounting for the insurance feature of the arrangement, was a $3.5 billion increase in capital for Citigroup. 173. Kelly, interview. 174. The warrants gave the government the right to buy 254 million shares at $10.61 a share; at the time, the stock was trading at $3.76 (Congressional Oversight Panel, “November Oversight Report: Guarantees and Contingent Payments in TARP and Related Programs,” November 6, 2009, pp. 18–19). 175. FDIC Board of Directors meeting, closed session, November 23, 2008, transcript, p. 14. 176. Ibid., pp. 27–28. 177. Office of Financial Stability, “Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two Year Retrospective,” October 2010, p. 30; “Taxpayers receive $10.5 billion in proceeds today from final sale of Treasury Department Citigroup common stock,” Treasury Department press release, December 10, 2010. 178. “Merrill Lynch Reports Third Quarter 2008 Net Loss from Continuing Operations of $5.1 Billion,” Merrill Lynch press release, October 16, 2008, p. 4; Merrill Lynch, 3Q 2008 Earnings Call transcript, October 16, 2008, p. 2. 179. Federal Reserve System, “Order Approving Bank of America Corporation Acquisition of a Savings Association and an Industrial Loan Company,” November 26, 2008, pp. 7, 9. To approve such a proposal, the Bank Holding Company Act requires the Fed to determine that a transaction “can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair competition.” 12 U.S.C. 1843(j)(2)(A). 180. Timothy J. Mayopoulous, former general counsel of Bank of America, written testimony before the House Oversight Committee, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a Federal Bailout? Part IV, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 17, 2009.
Notes to Chapter 20
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181. Ken Lewis, deposition In Re: Executive Compensation Investigation: Bank of America–Merrill Lynch, February 26, 2009, p. 9, available from House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did A Private Deal Turn into a Federal Bailout? 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 11, 2009. 182. Bank of America, 4Q 2008 Earnings Call transcript, January 16, 2009, p. 16. 183. Ibid., pp. 3, 10, 16. 184. John Thain, interview by FCIC, September 17, 2009. 185. Complaint, SEC v. Bank of America (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2010); Final Consent Judgment As to Defendant Bank of America (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2010). 186. Ken Lewis, interview by FCIC, October 22, 2010. 187. Lewis, deposition In Re: Executive Compensation Investigation: Bank of America—Merrill Lynch, pp. 34, 38; Henry Paulson, written testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a Federal Bailout? Part III, 111th Cong., 1st sess., July 16, 2009, p. 22. 188. Paulson, written testimony before the House Oversight Committee, July 16, 2009, p. 23 (quotation); Ben Bernanke, written testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a Federal Bailout? Part II, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 25, 2009, p. 18. 189. Lewis, interview. 190. Thain, interview 191. Paulson, written testimony before the House Oversight Committee, July 16, 2009, pp. 19, 25. 192. Chairman Ben Bernanke, email to General Counsel Scott Alvarez, “Re: Fw: BAC,” December 23, 2008, available from House Oversight Committee, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a Federal Bailout? Part II, June 25, 2009, p. 73; Representative Edolphus Towns, in ibid., p. 2. 193. Lewis, interview. 194. Minutes of a Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America Corporation, December 22, 2008, available in House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, June 11, 2009, p. 183. 195. Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Bank of America board, December 30, 2008, available in ibid., p. 188. 196. Lewis, interview. 197. See Department of the Treasury, Office of Financial Stability, “Troubled Assets Relief Program: Transactions Report, for Period Ending November 16, 2010,” November 18, 2010. In addition to drawing on these funds, it was also a “substantial user” of the Fed’s various liquidity programs. The holding company and its subsidiaries had already borrowed $55 billion through the Term Auction Facility. It had also borrowed $15 billion under the Fed’s Commercial Paper Funding Facility and $20 billion under the FDIC’s debt guarantee program. And newly acquired Merrill Lynch had borrowed another $21 billion from the Fed’s two Bear Stearns–era repo-support programs. Yet despite Bank of America’s recourse to these programs, the regulators worried that it would experience liquidity problems if the fourth-quarter earnings were weak. 198. The amount of FDIC-guaranteed debt that can be issued by each eligible entity, or its cap, is based on the amount of senior unsecured debt outstanding as of September 30, 2008. 199. FRB and OCC staff, memorandum to Rick Cox, FDIC, subject: “Bank of America Corporation (BAC) Funding Vulnerabilities and Implications for Other Financial Market Participants,” January 10, 2009, p. 2. 200. Sheila C. Bair, FDIC Chairman, written testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee on Domestic Policy, Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did a Private Deal Turn into a Federal Bailout? Part V, 110th Cong., 1st sess., December 11, 2009, p. 2. 201. FRB and OCC staff memo to Rick Cox, “Bank of America Corporation (BAC) Funding Vulnerabilities,” pp. 2, 4; Mitchell Glassman, Sandra Thompson, Arthur Murton, and John Thomas, memorandum to the FDIC Board of Directors, subject: Bank of America, etc., January 15, 2009, pp. 8, 9. 202. Bair, written testimony before the House Oversight Committee, December 11, 2009, p. 3.
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Notes to Chapter 21
203. Glassman et al., memo to the FDIC board, January 15, 2009, p. 3. They agreed to this 25/75 split because 25% of the assets for the ring fence were from depository institutions and 75% were not. See closed meeting of the FDIC Board of Directors, January 15, 2009, transcript, p. 18. 204. Closed meeting of the FDIC board, January 15, 2009, transcript, p. 24. According to the FDIC staff, “Liquidity pressure may increase to critical levels following the announcement of fourth quarter 2008 operating results that are significantly worse than market expectations. Market reaction to BAC’s operating results may have systemic consequences given the size of the institution and the volume of counterparty transactions involved. Without a systemic risk determination . . . significant market disruption may ensue as counterparties lose confidence in BAC’s ability to fund ongoing operations. . . . [Economic developments] point to a clear relationship between the financial market turmoil of recent months and impaired economic performance that could be expected to worsen further if BAC and its insured subsidiaries were allowed to failed. Such an event would significantly undermine business and consumer confidence.” Glassman et al., memo to the FDIC board, January 15, 2009, pp. 13–14.
Chapter 21 1. Brian Moynihan, written testimony for the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, day 1, session 1: Financial Institution Representatives, January 13, 2010, p. 1. 2. Clarence Williams, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Sacramento, session 4: Impact of the Financial Crisis on Sacramento Neighborhoods and Families, September 23, 2010, p. 8; and testimony before the FCIC, transcript, pp. 259–60. 3. Ed Lazear, interview by FCIC, November 10, 2010. 4. Jeannie McDermott, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Greater Bakersfield, session 6: Forum for Public Comment, September 7, 2010, transcript, pp. 211–13. 5. Marie Vasile, testimony before the FCIC, in ibid., transcript, pp. 244–51. 6. “National Delinquency Survey,” Mortgage Bankers Association, Fourth Quarter 2007, March 2008, p. 4; Third Quarter 2010, November 2010, p. 4. 7. CoreLogic, “U.S. Housing and Mortgage Trends: August 2010,” November 2010, p. 5. 8. Jeremy Aguero, principal analyst, Applied Analysis, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—State of Nevada, session 1: Economic Analysis of the Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada, September 8, 2010, p. 3. 9. Mauricio Soto, “How Is the Financial Crisis Affecting Retirement Savings?” Urban Institute, December 10, 2008, available at www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=901206. 10. Steven K. Paulson, “Auditors Say Colorado Pension Plan Recovering,” Associated Press, August 16, 2010. 11. Charles S. Johnson, “Montana Pension Funds Growing but Haven’t Made Up Losses,” The Billings Gazette, May 18, 2009. 12. The Conference Board news release, May 27, 2008. 13. The Conference Board news release, December 28, 2010. 14. Gregory D. Bynum, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— Greater Bakersfield, session 3: Residential and Community Real Estate, September 7, 2010, transcript, p. 102. 15. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October 2010 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Tightening Standards on Consumer Loans, Credit Cards, November 8, 2010. 16. American Bankruptcy Institute, “Annual Business and Non-business Filings by Year (1980–2009).” 17. Jeff Agosta, conference call with FCIC, February 25, 2010. 18. American Bankruptcy Institute, “Annual Business and Non-Business Filings by Year (1980– 2009).” 19. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 2007 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, August 13, 2007, p. 13. 20. Liz Moyer, “Revolver at the Heads,” Forbes, October 7, 2008. Gannett Corporation withdrew $1.2 billion, FairPoint Communications withdrew $200 million, and Duke Energy withdrew $1 billion. 21. Murillo Campello, John R. Graham, and Campbell R. Harvey, “The Real Effects of Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Financial Crisis,” Journal of Financial Economics 97 (2010): 476.
Notes to Chapter 21
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22. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 2009 Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, fourth-quarter 2008, p. 8. 23. Elizabeth Duke, governor, Federal Reserve Board, “Small Business Lending,” testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services and Committee on Small Business, February 26, 2010, p. 1. 24. National Federation of Independent Businesses, “NFIB Small Business Economic Trends,” December 2010, p. 12. 25. Ben Bernanke, “Restoring the Flow of Credit to Small Business,” speaking at the Federal Reserve Meeting Series: “Addressing the Financing Needs of Small Businesses,” Washington, DC, July 12, 2010. 26. C. R. “Rusty” Cloutier, past chairman, Independent Community Bankers of America, testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 3: Financial Crisis Impacts on the Economy, January 13, 2010, transcript, p. 194. 27. Federal Reserve Statistical Release, E.2 Survey of Terms of Business Lending, E.2 Chart Data: “Commercial and Industrial Loan Rates Spreads over Intended Federal Funds Rate, by Loan Size,” spread for all sizes. 28. William J. Dennis Jr., “Small Business Credit in a Deep Recession,” National Federation of Independent Businesses, February 2010, p. 18. 29. Jerry Jost, interview by FCIC, August 20, 2010. 30. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, April 2010. 31. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, July 2010. 32. Emily Maltby, “Small Biz Loan Failure Rate Hits 12%,” CNN Money, February 25, 2009; “SBA Losses Climb 154% in 2008,” Coleman Report (www.colemanpublishing.com/public/343.cfm). 33. Michael A. Neal, chairman and CEO, GE Capital, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 3: Institutions Participating in the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 242. 34. GE, 2008 Annual Report, p. 38. 35. Mark S. Barber, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Shadow Banking System, day 2, session 3: Institutions Participating in the Shadow Banking System, May 6, 2010, transcript, p. 263. 36. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics database, World Exports. 37. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, World Tables: Exports, World Exports. 38. Jane Levere, “Office Deals, 19 Months Apart, Show Market’s Move,” New York Times, August 10, 2010. 39. National Association of Realtors, Commercial Real Estate Quarterly Market Survey, December 2010, pp. 4, 5. 40. Brian Gordon, principal, Applied Analysis, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—State of Nevada, session 3: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Real Estate, September 8, 2010, transcript, p. 155. 41. Anton Troianovski, “High Hopes as Builders Bet on Skyscrapers,” Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2010. 42. Ibid.; Gregory Bynum, president, Gregory D. Bynum & Associates, Inc., testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Greater Bakersfield, session 3: Residential and Community Real Estate, September 7, 2010, transcript, pp. 77–80, 77–78. 43. Federal Deposit Insurance Commission, “Failed Bank List,” January 2, 2010. 44. February Oversight Report, “Commercial Real Estate Losses and the Risk to Financial Stability,” Congressional Oversight Panel, February 10, 2010, pp. 2, 41, 45. 45. TreppWire, “CMBS Delinquency Rate Nears 9%, Up 21 BPs in August after Leveling in July, Rate Now 8.92%” Monthly Delinquency Report, September 2010, p. 1. 46. Allen Kenney, “CRE Mortgage Default Rate to Double by 2010,” REIT.com, June 18, 2009. See also “Default Rates Reach 16-Year High,” Globe St., February 24, 2010. 47. Ibid. Green Street Advisors, “Commercial Property Values Gain More Than 30% from ‘09 Lows,” December 2, 2010, pp. 3, 1.
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48. “Moody’s/REAL Commercial Property Price Indices, December 2010,” Moody’s Investors Service Special Report, December 21, 2010; Moody’s Investors Service, “US Commercial Real Estate Prices Rise 1.3% in October,” December 20, 2010. 49. Congressional Oversight Panel, “Commercial Real Estate Losses,” February Oversight Report, February 10, 2010, pp. 2–3. 50. Dr. Kenneth T. Rosen, chairman, Fisher Center for Real Estate and Economics, University of California at Berkeley, slides in testimony before the FCIC, First Public Hearing of the FCIC, day 1, panel 3: Financial Crisis Impacts on the Economy, January 13, 2010. 51. Elizabeth McNichol, Phil Oliff, and Nicholas Johnson, “States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, December 16, 2010. 52. Bruce Wagstaff, Sacramento Countywide Services Agency, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, session 4: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Sacramento Neighborhoods and Families, September 23, 2010, transcript, p. 234. 53. Sujit CanagaRetna, interview by FCIC, November 18, 2010. 54. McNichol, Oliff, and Johnson, “States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact.” 55. “NCSL Fiscal Brief: Projected State Revenue Growth in FY 2011 and Beyond,” National Conference of State Legislatures, September 29, 2010, p. 1. 56. Ibid. 57. State of California, Legislative Analyst’s Office, “The 2011–12 Budget: California’s Fiscal Outlook.” 58. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, “Medicaid Enrollment: December 2009 Data Snapshot,” September 2010, pp. 1, 3. 59. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, “Hoping for Economic Recovery, Preparing for Health Reform: A Look at Medicaid Spending, Coverage and Policy Trends,” September 30, 2010, pp. 16, 25. 60. National League of Cities, “Recession’s Effects Intensify in Cities,” October 6, 2010. 61. Christopher W. Hoene and Michael A. Pagano, “City Fiscal Conditions in 2010,” National League of Cities, October 2010, p. 3. 62. Ibid., pp. 7, 2. 63. Alan S. Blinder and Mark Zandi, “How the Great Recession Was Brought to an End,” Moody’s Analytics, July 27, 2010, p. 1. 64. Donald L. Kohn, vice chairman, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, “The Federal Reserve’s Policy Actions during the Financial Crisis and Lessons for the Future,” speech at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, May 13, 2010. 65. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Financial Stability, “Troubled Asset Relief Program: Two Year Retrospective,” October 2010, p. 8. 66. Congressional Budget Office, “Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program,” November 2010. 67. White House Office of Management and Budget, FY2011 Budget Historical Tables, Section 1, Table 1.1—Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits (–):1789–2015, Total Budget Deficit. 68. FDIC, “Failed Bank List.” 69. “Quarterly Banking Profile: Third Quarter 2010,” FDIC Quarterly 4, no. 4 (2010): 4. 70. FDIC, “Quarterly Banking Profile: First Quarter 2009,” FDIC Quarterly 3, no. 2 (2009): 1, and “Quarterly Banking Profile: First Quarter 2010,” FDIC Quarterly 4, no. 2 (2010); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Profit and Balance Sheet Developments at U.S. Commercial Banks in 2009. 71. FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions, Income and Expense, All Commercial Banks—Assets more than $1B—National, Standard Report #1 (reports issued on 3/31/2010 and 3/31/2009). Profit is logged as “Net income attributable to bank.” 72. FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions, Income and Expense, All Commercial Banks—Assets less than $100M and Assets $100M to $1B; Standard Report #1 (reports issued on 3/31/2010 and 3/31/2009). Profit is logged as “Net income attributable to bank.” 73. “Wall Street Bonuses Rose Sharply in 2009,” New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli press release, February 23, 2010. 74. N.Y. State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli, “Economic Trends in New York State,” October 2010.
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Chapter 22 1. FCIC calculations based on estimates from Hope Now and Moodys.com. 2. Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey (the source for the rest of the delinquency and foreclosure rates in this chapter). 3. Julia Gordon, Center for Responsible Lending, “HAMP, Servicer Abuses, and Foreclosure Prevention Strategies,” testimony before the Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., October 27, 2010, pp. 5, 30; CRL testimony based on Rod Dubitsky, Larry Yang, Stevan Stevanovic, and Thomas Suehr, “Foreclosure Update: Over 8 Million Foreclosures Expected,” Credit Suisse (December 4, 2008), and Jan Hatzius and Michael A. Marschoun, “Home Prices and Credit Losses: Projections and Policy Options,” Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper (January 13, 2009), p. 16. 4. “RealtyTrac Year-End Report Shows Record 2.8 Million U.S. Properties with Foreclosure Filings in 2009—An Increase of 21 Percent from 2008 and 120 Percent from 2007,” RealtyTrac, January 14, 2010. 5. “Delinquencies and Loans in Foreclosure Decrease, but Foreclosure Starts Rise in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey,” MBA press release, November 18, 2010. 6. Mark Fleming, chief economist, CoreLogic, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, session 1: Overview of the Sacramento Housing and Mortgage Markets and the Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Region, September 23, 2010, transcript, p. 14. 7. FCIC staff estimates based on analysis of BlackBox data. 8. Laurie S. Goodman, senior managing director, Amherst Securities Group LP, written testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, The Private Sector and Government Response to the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis,” 111th Cong., 1st sess., December 8, 2009, p. 3. 9. The index declined from 200.4 in April 2006 to 136.6 in March 2009, a decline of 31.8%. 10. “New CoreLogic Data Shows Third Consecutive Quarterly Decline in Negative Equity,” CoreLogic Inc., December 13, 2010, p. 1; nationally, third-quarter figures were an improvement from 11.0 million residential properties—23%—in negative equity in the second quarter of 2010. 11. Jim Rokakis, treasurer of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, interview by FCIC, November 8, 2010. 12. Cuyahoga County experienced 13,943 foreclosure filings in 2006, 14,946 in 2007, 13,858 in 2008, and 14,171 in 2009. “Ohio County Foreclosure Filings (1995–2009): Cuyahoga County,” Policy Matters Ohio. 13. Rokakis, interview. 14. The United States Conference of Mayors, “Impact of the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis on Vacant and Abandoned Properties in Cities: A 77-City Survey,” June 2010, pp. 3–4. 15. Guy Cecala, prepared testimony for the Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., October 27, 2010, p. 2. 16. John Taylor, interview by FCIC, October 27, 2010. 17. Congressional Oversight Panel, “December Oversight Report: A Review of Treasury’s Foreclosure Prevention Programs,” December 14, 2010, pp. 4, 7, 18. 18. HOPE NOW, “Industry Extrapolations and Metrics (October 2010),” December 6, 2010, p. 3. 19. New Jersey HomeKeeper Program, New Jersey Housing and Mortgage Financing Agency, approved September 23, 2010. 20. Kirsten Keefe, presentation to the meeting of the Federal Reserve System’s Consumer Advisory Council, Washington, D.C., March 25, 2010, transcript, p. 34. 21. Diane E. Thompson, testimony to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., November 16, 2010, p. 3. 22. See, for example, National Consumer Law Center, “Why Servicers Foreclose When They Should Modify and Other Puzzles of Servicer Behavior,” October 2009.
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23. Joseph H. Evers, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, deputy comptroller for large bank supervision, written testimony before the Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., October 27, 2010, pp. 7–10. The OCC reported that mortgage servicers have modified 1,239,896 loans since early 2008. By the end of the second quarter of 2010, more than 26% of the modifications were seriously delinquent; 9% were in the process of foreclosure; and 4% had completed foreclosure. The OCC examined modified loans that were 60 or more days delinquent that were modified during the second quarter of 2009, to determine when after loan modification that serious delinquency recurred. At 12 months after modification, 43% of loans were delinquent by two or more months; at nine months after modification, 41% were in arrears; at six months, 34%; and at three months after a loan change, nearly 19% were delinquent. The OCC noted that more recent modifications have performed better than earlier modifications. 24. Julia Gordon, senior policy counsel, Center for Responsible Lending, written testimony before the Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., October 27, 2010, p. 11. 25. David J. Grais, partner with Grais & Ellsworth LLP, interview by FCIC, November 2, 2010. 26. Calculation by Laurie Goodman, senior managing director, Amherst Securities. See PowerPoint presentation to the Grais and Ellsworth LLP conference “Robosigners and Other Servicing Failures: Protecting the Rights of RMBS Investors,” October 27, 2010 (http://video.remotecounsel.com/ mediasite/Viewer/?peid=12e6411377a744b9a9f2eefd1093871c1d). 27. Grais, interview. 28. Goodman testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, December 8, 2009. 29. See Deposition of Jeffrey Stephan, GMAC Mortgage LLC v. Ann M. Neu a/k/a Ann Michelle Perez, No. 50 2008 CA040805XXXX MB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2009), pp. 7, 10. 30. See, for example, Dwayne Ransom Davis and Melisa Davis v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.; Bank of America, N.A.; BAC GP LLC; and BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 1:10-cv-01303-JMS-DML (S.D. Ind. October 19, 2010). 31. Congressional Oversight Panel, “November Oversight Report: Examining the Consequences of Mortgage Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure Mitigation,” November 16, 2010, p. 20. 32. See, e.g., Mortg. Elec. Registry Sys. v. Johnston, No. 420-6-09 Rdcv (Rutland Co. Vt. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2009), holding that MERS did not have standing to initiate foreclosure because the note and mortgage had been separated. 33. The Honorable F. Dana Winslow, written testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, Foreclosed Justice: Causes and Effects of the Foreclosure Crisis, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., December 2, 2010, pp. 2, 4. 34. Order, Objection to Claims of Citibank, N.A. 4-6-10, (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 20, 2010), p. 3. The order cites In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650 (S.D. Oh. 2007); In re Vargas, 396 B.R. 511, 520 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2008); Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009); LaSalle Bank v. Lamy, 824 N.Y.S.2d 769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). 35. Winslow, written testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary, pp. 2–3. 36. See John T. Kemp v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Case No. 08-18700-JHW (D. N.J.), pp. 7–8. 37. Grais, interview. 38. Adam J. Levitin, associate professor of law, Georgetown University Law Center, testimony to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., November 16, 2010, p. 20. 39. Congressional Oversight Panel, “November Oversight Report,” pp. 5, 7. 40. Katherine Porter, professor of law, University of Iowa College of Law, written testimony before the Congressional Oversight Panel for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), COP Hearing on TARP Foreclosure Mitigation Programs, October 27, 2010, p. 8. 41. Levitin, written testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, p. 20. 42. Erika Poethig, written testimony for the House Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, Impact of the Foreclosure Crisis on Public and Affordable Housing in the Twin Cities, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., January 23, 2010, p. 5.
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43. National Association for the Education of Homeless Children and Youth (NAEHCY) and First Focus, “A Critical Moment: Child and Youth Homelessness in Our Nation’s Schools,” July 2010, p. 2. In early 2010, NAEHCY and First Focus conducted a survey of 2,200 school districts. When they were asked the reasons for the increased enrollment of students experiencing homelessness, 62% cited the economic downturn, 40% attributed it to greater school and community awareness of homelessness, and 38% cited problems stemming from the foreclosure crisis. 44. Dr. Heath Morrison, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis— State of Nevada, session 4: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Public and Community Services, September 8, 2010, transcript, pp. 261–64. 45. Gail Burks, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—State of Nevada, session 3: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Nevada Real Estate, September 8, 2010, transcript, pp. 230–31. 46. Karen Mann, president and chief appraiser, Mann and Associates Real Estate Appraisers & Consultants, written testimony for the FCIC, Hearing on the Impact of the Financial Crisis—Sacramento, session 2: Mortgage Origination, Mortgage Fraud and Predatory Lending in the Sacramento Region, September 23, 2010, p. 12; oral testimony, p. 66. 47. Dawn Hunt, homeowner in Cape Coral, FL, interview by FCIC, December 20, 2010. 48. Zip code 33991, default, foreclosures and REO, S&P Global Data Solutions RMBS database, July 2010. 49. Hunt, interview.
INDEX
The index is available online at www.publicaffairsbooks.com/fcicindex.pdf