Kent Political Almanac Special Issue by Kent Political Almanac

Kent Political Almanac ‘Europe in the World’ Special Issue

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ABOUT THE KENT POLITICAL ALMANAC The Kent Political Almanac was created to provide a platform for academic debate and peerreviewed publication opportunities for students in Politics and International Relations. This journal’s purpose is to showcase the School’s best undergraduate and postgraduate essays.

The initiative came from students of the School of Politics and International Relations, which led to the journal being launched in November 2013. All articles are peer-reviewed by both students and members of the School’s academic staff. We are proud to be an entirely student-led publication, supported from our School of Politics and IR at the University of Kent.

MANAGING EDITOR

ACADEMIC ADVISORS

Léo Wilkinson

Dr Ruth Blakeley

EDITORIAL BOARD Noémie Battini Afroditi-Maria Koulaxi Eugenie Megally Maëlle Poulin

Professor Elena Korosteleva Dr Ersun Kurtulus Professor Donna Lee Dr Neophytos Loizides

Professor Richard Sakwa Dr Harmonie Toros

Erik Lindner-Olsson Rebecca Walker

LAYOUT & DESIGN

April Yeung

Mehdi Abakarim Robert Small

ABOUT THE GLOBAL EUROPE CENTRE The Global Europe Centre (GEC) is a new interdisciplinary research centre, focusing on Europe, its member states, and its place in a changing world. The Centre brings together leading international academics from politics and international relations, economics, law, business, and European culture in order to explore the contemporary policy challenges to Europe and its nation states. Get in touch

The GEC team has a strong track record of engagement with policy makers

W: www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec

and informing decision making in London and in Brussels. Research is also

E: globaleuropecentre@kent.ac.uk

widely disseminated through publications, knowledge transfer workshops,

F: Global Europe Centre - University of Kent T: @GlobalEuropeCen

conferences and events. The Centre has a strong commitment to the creation of the next generation of ideas innovators and policy makers. The Centre also has a strong student voice, working across all levels and disciplines.

Kent Political Almanac School of Politics and International Relations Rutherford College University of Kent Canterbury Kent, CT2 7NX United Kingdom YOUR LOGO HERE

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Kent Political Almanac

Spring 2014 Issue 1

‘Europe in the World’ Special Issue WELCOME TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE This Spring issue of the of the Kent Political Almanac is special for two reasons: it is not only the journal’s first publication, but we also have been privileged to launch it jointly with the Global Europe Centre, University of Kent. We therefore decided to make this special issue focused on the theme of “Europe in the World”, in its first printed edition. The articles in this issue were submitted for publication by students in response to our call for papers in February 2014. We were delighted to have submissions from both undergraduate and postgraduate students, with authors representing different countries of Europe and beyond. Similarly, our editorial team was just as international: even though we all study at the University of Kent, we had editors originally from Sweden, Greece and France, but also from Hong Kong and Malta.

We would like to thank all of the authors who contributed to this first issue. All articles were then reviewed by members of staff from the School of Politics and International Relations, to whom we are very grateful to. Our special thanks go to the Global Europe Centre, and particularly to Professor Elena Korosteleva, whose support has been pivotal to the journal’s launch. We also would like to acknowledge the support of the European Parliament office in London, for helping us to

TABLE OF CONTENTS The English School of Thought ………………………….4 Europe in the financial turmoil………………………….16 Peace-building ‘from below’ in Kosovo………………………26 Power-Sharing, Minority Rights and Equal Citizenship in Nigeria and Mali…....…..38

publish this first edition. We hope that you will enjoy reading this very special issue of the Kent Political Almanac.

The EU’s International Role: A Normative Power in Theory or in Practice?...............50

Léo Wilkinson Managing Editor

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BY JOHANNA HANS This paper provides a critical assessment of the English School of Thought, also known as the International Society Approach. The English School is commonly associated with a group of British academics and political practitioners during the second half of the 20th century. Building upon the two dominant mainstream approaches of IR theory, the English school tries to harmonize both the theoretical axioms of realism as well as those of the liberal schools of thought. Despite its appeal as a via media between the two grand schools of IR, the English School finds itself on the periphery of International Relations theory and is lacking the wider recognition of the international academic community.

Critically engaging with the English School, this paper portrays how the International Society Approach synthesizes the mainstream IR theories into a single approach and discusses the potency and conceptual weaknesses of such an approach.

THE ENGLISH SCHOOL OF THOUGHT Introduction The international society approach, also referred to as the English School (ES) or Liberal Realism, is a particular strand of International Relations theory and is commonly associated with a group of academics of the British Committee and the International Relations Department of the London School of Economics during the second half of the 20th century. 1 Among its most prominent figures are the founding fathers Martin Wight and Charles Manning, as well as Wight’s student Hedley Bull but also contemporary theorists like Richard Little and Barry Buzan. The English School introduced the idea of an international society, a society of states, that, driven by shared values and interests, exists despite the condition of anarchy in the international arena.2 On this basis, the international society approach tries to harmonize both the theoretical axioms of realism as well as those of the liberal schools of thought. Despite its appeal as a via media between the two grand schools of IR, the English School finds itself on the periphery of International Relations theory and is not given much attention by scholars outside the United Kingdom.3 The missing recognition of the international academic community necessitates a critical engagement with the theoretical positions of the writers of the English School as well as their critics. It is the aim of this paper to discuss whether the international society approach is an adequate third way between realism and liberalism. In order to do so it must be asked to what extent the English School depicts the international society approach as a via media and whether it is convincing.

The paper is divided into three parts. In the first part this paper presents the core features of the international society approach and examines how attempts are made to synthesise the main

“In compliance with the liberalist tradition, English School scholars agree that institutions and norms matter and that the interdependence between states can create pacifying effects.”

Totten, Mark RM (2012): The English School of International Relations Theory: Heir Apparent or Illegitimate Pretender? Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Wiltshire. 2 Bull, Hedley (1966): On International Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.pp.75-76 3 Totten, p.1

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theoretical traditions of IR, realism, liberalism and rationalism, into one single approach.4 The second part will consider the potency and merits of the English School that are articulated by its advocates such as Robert Jackson.5 The last part will explore and evaluate the most dominant criticism, most prominently put forward by Roy Jones.6 This paper will conclude with a rather pessimistic view about the international society approach. It will be shown that the School’s greatest strength, the harmonization of all three IR traditions into one theory, is also its biggest weakness. By incorporating pluralistic theoretical stances, the English school looses its coherence and plausibility which ultimately calls into question the school‘s stand as an independent theory of International Relations. Due to the limited space available in this paper I will mostly concentrate on the writings of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull as two of the leading exponents of the international society approach.

“In the rationalist belief, states have mitigated the belligerent effects of the condition of anarchy by developing societal relations with one another which enable the development of principles of how to control the use of force.”

The English School as a Via Media The English School accommodates the theoretical stances of more than one world view. In his influential work International Theory: The Three Traditions (1991) Martin Wight identified three strands of international political thought and categorized them into Machiavellian realism, Grotian rationalism and Kantian revolutionism.7 Wight considers the realist tradition as a theory of conflict, war and power politics.8 Ascribing the realist school great explanatory strength in terms of accounting for power constellations in international politics, Wight adopts many of its core features. He agrees with realists that states are the key actors in the international state system which is characterized by the absence of a central authority.9 Although Wight and other English scholars accept the realist perception of an anarchical state system, the implications they attribute to it, are rather different. Instead of concluding a war of all against all in the Hobbesian sense, they rather agree with the Lockean idea that despite the lack of a common authority to enforce the law, human beings are able to 4

Due to the limited space available in this paper I will mostly concentrate on the writings of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull as two of the leading exponents of the international society approach. 5 Jackson, Robert (1996): Is there a Classical International Theory? In: Ashley, Richard [et al] [ed.]: International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 6 Jones, Roy E. (1981): The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure. In: Review of International Studies, Vol. 7, No 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 7 Wight, Martin (1991): International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester University Press, Leicester. 8 Totten, p.5 9 Wight, Martin (1986): Power Politics. Penguin, London. P.105

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behave reasonably towards one another due to a common set of interests.10 In this sense, the English School rather approximates the Kantian liberal vision of the international state system in which all communities, bound together by the same values and ideologies, can coexist peacefully without having to fear the use of force.11 In compliance with the liberalist tradition, English School scholars agree that institutions and norms matter and that the interdependence between states can create pacifying effects. 12 However, Wight and his followers abstain from the cosmopolitan idea of a world-state or even a Kantian federation and are highly sceptical that democratic ideas and institutions ultimately lead to a perpetual peace, as depicted by liberal peace scholars.13 Although the English School holds the view that anarchy and society can coexist, they do not disregard the hostilities between states. As could be seen, the English School takes into account the core presumptions of both realism and liberalism and presents them as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In addition to harmonizing the realist and liberalist tradition, the English school also draws heavily upon rationalist theory and incorporates its main assumptions into its own approach. The rationalist tradition has its origin in the writings of Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645) on international law. In the rationalist belief, states have mitigated the belligerent effects of the condition of anarchy by developing societal relations with one another which enable the development of principles of how to control the use of force.14 This way, the rationalist tradition captures the sociological axioms of realism as well as the normative stance of liberalism.15 Since rationalism recognises the respective strengths of realism and liberalism without directly challenging any of their core propositions, Wight views the rationalist tradition as a middle way between the two.16 This appeal of rationalism as a via media between realism and liberalism became the basis for Wightâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s concept of an international society. The international society approach is the central focus of the English School. ES scholars believe that there exists an international society among states that is more civilized and organized than realists suggest, but less idealistic and utopian than liberals would hope.17 In his work The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World 10

Wight(1991), p.13 Linklater, Andrew (2010): The English School Conception of International Society. Reflections on Western and non-Western Perspectives. In: Ritsumaiken Annual Review of International Studies, No. 9, p.2. International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto. 12 Jordan, Richard (2011): A Brief Case the English School. In: The Monitor, Special Edition 16, pp. 23. AIM Media Texas, McAllen. 13 Ibid, p.23 14 Suganami, Hidemi (2011): The English School, History and Theory. In: Ritsumeikan International Affairs, Vol. 9, p.34 Ritsumeikan University, Tokyo. 15 Totten, p.6 16 Ibid, p.1 17 Burchill, Scott [et al.] (2005): Theories of International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. p.85 11

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Politics, (1995) Hedley Bull defines the international society as follows: “Whereas a system of states emerges when two or more states have sufficient contact between them and exert enough impact upon one another so that their behaviour necessitates the calculation of the other, a society of states, on the other hand is ‚a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, [that] form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and share on the working of common institutions.”18 Since life, truth and property - according to the international society approach - are the primary goals of each society,19 states have agreed that they should work together to better secure the survival of the members of their society, to mutually respect sovereignty and property and to ensure that treaties and agreements are kept.20

“States have agreed that they should work together to better secure the survival of the members of their society, to mutually respect sovereignty and property and to ensure that treaties and agreements are kept.” The concept of the international society is a prime example of how the three traditions blend into each other. From a methodological point of view this synthesizing is seen by the pluralistic ‘levels of analysis’ that English School writers operate with. Advocates of the international society approach take account of the structural coercions of the international system at the systemic level while at the same time recognizing the impact of agents and processes within the society and analysing the importance of individuals and transnational groups at an individual level.21 This way the English School employs the units of analysis of each IR tradition.22 With regard to its epistemology, meaning the question how we know what we know, the international society approach is primarily interpretative.23 That is to say, it understands reality as it is perceived and experienced and sees everything and everyone as interconnected.24 However, due to the English School’s close links to realism and liberalism it also adopts a positivist approach towards 18

Bull, Hedley (1995): The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. 2nd Edition. Columbia University Press, New York.p.3 19 Ibid, p.5 20 Linklater, p.13 21 Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür (2005): The English School, International Relations, and Progress. In: International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No.2, p.184 The International Studies Association, Tucson. 22 Neo-realism concentrates especially on the systemic level and holds the view that the distribution of capabilities of states within the international system shapes international relations (see Waltz 1979: 90). Liberalism on the other hand emphasizes the superiority of individual human beings thus focusing on the individual level (see Badie 2011: 1434). Rationalists point to the societal relations between states and employ therefore meso-level analyses. 23 Totten, p.15 24 Israel, Roger R. (2005) Three Styles of Social Inquiry: Positivist, Interpretative and Critical Research. Metropolitan State University, Minnesota, USA.p,2

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science, which is especially apparent in the neo-versions of both realism and liberalism. Like neo-realist and neo-liberalists, ES scholars believe that an international society exists independently from the observer’s perception of it and that theories can be formulated and reviewed against the backdrop of physical observations from the political world.25 At the same time the international society approach also incorporates the ethical, normative dimension of classical liberalism by depicting a society of states where common norms and identity are regarded as two of the primary components. 26 Hence the ES features a multi-facetted epistemological nature. Also with regard to its ontology, that is the question of what is there that can be known about, the English School retains a rather pluralistic understanding of international relations. Although war is seen as an inevitable feature in international relations, it is claimed that it would be too one-sided to suppose that statesmen discard all ethical concerns and are exclusively preoccupied with power and conflict.27 Since states are constantly embedded into interactions and cooperation to achieve mutual interests, they have developed a form of international social consciousness.28 Hence, the international society 'thickens‘ where cooperation is greatest such as in the realm of international commerce or the agreements on basic human rights.29

“The most commonly cited criticism that has been targeted against ES writers is that of the lack of a common epistemology.” In the ES vision the order of this society is maintained through five institutions: diplomacy, international law, balance of power mechanisms, international institutions and commerce.30 The role of justice in the maintenance of the international society became one of the central and most disputed questions within the English School. Influenced by E.H. Carr’s question “order for whom?“.31 Bull concluded that justice ultimately contributes to order and hence to the maintenance of the international society.32 Other ES writers, however, hold the view that pursuing justice entails the danger of increasing conflict and violence (e.g. Robert Jackson). This tension between order and justice formed a starting point of an inner split of the English 25

Whyte, Alexander (2012): Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism: Born of the same approach? (Online) URL: http://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/11/neorealism-and-neoliberal-institutionalismborn-of-the-same-approach/. 26 Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.183 27 Ibid, p.183 28 Dunne, Timothy (1995): The Social Construction of International Society. In: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 379. Sage Publication, New York. 29 Totten, p10 30 Ibid, p.9 31 Carr, E.H. (1939): The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. Macmillan, London. 32 Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.187

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School into a pluralists and solidarist camp, who differ the most in their opinion on humanitarian interventions.33 To recapitulate, the international society approach features a methodological, epistemological and ontological plurality. By retaining close ties to the rationalist tradition, Wight and Bull therefore asserted that the international society approach stands between the realist and revolutionist thought.34 Andrew Linklater describes the international society approach as ‘more to international relations than the realist admits but less than the cosmopolitan desires’.35

Potency of the International Society Approach After having pointed out the key features of the English school, it is now imperative to critically assess the international society approach. According to Scott Burchill ‘the English School can claim to have passed the test of a good theory’ by successfully avoiding ‘the sterility of realism and the naivety of idealism‘.36 By incorporating elements of all three traditions of International Relations theory, the international society approach provides certain advantages: As a via media the English School enables a dialogue between the two opposite theories of realism and liberalism which would otherwise lack the ability to communicate with one another effectively.37 Apart from that, synthesizing the grand traditions into one approach provides for more explanatory variables, many of which one tradition - realism, liberalism or rationalism - taken by its own, would potentially turn a blind eye on. The English School thus enables theorists to employ a perspective from across the IR spectrum.38 Another central strength of the approach is that it is not exclusively concerned with theories of conflict but rather requires a twofold analysis of both war and peace and has a better account of change in international relations than other theories. While change in the realist tradition for instance only evolves through shifts in the distribution of capabilities 39 or the rise and fall of hegemonic powers,40 Wight and Bull believe that the course of international relations is primarily determined by the dynamics of the international society.41 Interaction and cooperation in international relations is according to ES scholars essentially shaped by common interests which are subject to change. The international society approach thus has greater explanatory power for dynamic phenomena such as globalisation or regional developments and provides an ideal framework for explaining 33

Unfortunately, a detailed examination of these two distinctive conceptions of the international society is beyond the scope and space of this paper. For further discussion see e.g. Wheeler 2000. 34 Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.175 35 Linklater, p108 36 Burchill, p.108 37 Little, Richard (2000): The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations. In: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 396. Sage Publications, New York. 38 Totten, p.5 39 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theories of International Politics. Addison-Wesley, Boton.p.90 40 Gilpin, Robert (1981): War and Change in International Politics. Cambridge University Press, New York. 41 Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.183

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progressive alliances of states.42

The persistence of war and conflict in international relations as well the existence of common rules and values (for example why else do we have international law and universally accepted legal principles like jus cogens?) and functioning common institutions (e.g. the regular exchange of diplomats) alongside with international and regional organizations (e.g. the European Union) and alliances (e.g. the War on Terror alliance), all give merit to the international society approach. By taking into account macro-, meso- and micro-linkages, the English School brings together the benefits of diversity for understanding IR as a whole.43

Conceptual Weaknesses and Lack of Plausibility As appealing as the synthesizing of the three IR traditions may sound, as much does it expose the international society approach at risk of becoming a ‘catch-all theory“. As Richard Little pointed out ‚the English School can look like a perfidious Albion, the balancer, ever willing to shift ground in order to be on the winning side of the argument‘.44 Having spent too much energy on trying to reconcile the apparently incompatible theoretical stances of the grand IR theories, the English School now lacks a clear and coherent stand as an academic enterprise of IR theory. The most commonly cited criticism that has been targeted against ES writers is that of the lack of a common epistemology. Wights’s proximity to historical and philosophical analysis in IR and Bull’s obvious rejection of behavioralism,45 compound with the retaining to positivism by most contemporary ES theorists,46 give credit to the claim that the English School lacks epistemological consistency. Apart from this, one of the principle ontological criticisms is that the essential question of what constitutes an international society, is far from being clear. Instead, there exist diverse and often incompatible perceptions within the School itself. Whereas Wight claimed that there must be at least some degree of cultural unity for states to form a society, 47 Buzan and Butterflied are rather doubtful whether a common culture is a necessary precondition for the development of an international society.48 Also Bull is careful enough to not speak of a common culture but rather of the existence of common interests which cause states to adopt norms, values and institutions which in 42

Ibid Totten, p.7 Little, p.396 45 Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, p.185 46 Totten, p.15 47 Wight, Martin (1977): System of States. Leicester University, Leicester. p.33 48 Buzan, Barry (1993): From International System to International Society. Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School. In: International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, p.333 MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 43 44

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turn lead to the creation of an international society. 49 Hence, with regard to the question of which requirements have to be fulfilled to form a society, the English School yet lacks a coherent answer. Another point of contestation centres on the importance of norms. Since norms play a significant role within the international society approach, it is almost surprising that the school devotes so little attention to how these norms are being formed. As constructivists have convincingly shown, all norms are socially constructed.50 Since societies differ deeply in their belief of individual liberties or entitlements, it is hard to imagine a society in which all members share the same norms and values. For example it is questionable whether Hungary and the Netherlands really do form a European international society, as proposed by Wight,51 because of their rather diverging emphasis on the basic right to freedom of speech.52 This point automatically leads to another central question, which has yet to be addressed by the English School. Although one central theme in the international society approach is that of membership it is rather unclear what full membership actually means. Who decides who belongs to the society and who does not? What are the requirements for becoming a member? In his critical pamphlet on the English School, Roy Jones almost sarcastically asked whether Nazi Germany and Great Britain belonged to the same international society: Both countries obviously engaged in the institution of war and even Nazi Germany did follow some of the rules of international law during its regime. 53 Therefore, strictly speaking, Nazi Germany and Great Britain would have both belonged to an international society according to the international society approach.54 Since English School scholars are seemingly unable to agree upon what constitutes an international society, one cannot hope for being able to determine who belongs to an international society and who is out.

Conclusion In the preceding sections, I presented the core features of the international society approach as a via media, alluded to the potential merits of such a synthesizing approach and exposed the central criticism towards the English School. As the critical assessment has shown, the international society approach’s greatest strength is also its Achilles heel. The English School draws its explanatory power from the 49

Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür, 183 Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy and What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. In: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 395. The IP Foundation, Cambridge (UK). 51 Ibid, p183 52 While Hungary passed a controversial media law which seriously restricted the freedom of press in Hungary in 2010, Holland highly values the right to freedom of speech which is portrayed in its high scores on the freedom of press index (see Reporters without Borders 2013). 53 Jones,p.4 54 Ibid 50

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interplay amongst the three IR traditions within one approach. This way the English school is able to capture and explain complex processes in international relations from different perspectives. The English School thus avoids the narrowness and reductionism to international relations which one theory, taken by its own, inevitably entails. However, by accommodating multi-theoretical stances, the English school suffers from an epistemological inconsistency and lacks a coherent point of view. As long as central presuppositions like the questions as to what constitutes an international society, how membership is defined and whether norms (as a central component of the international society) are endogenously or exogenously formed, are disputed within the English School itself, the English School cannot be considered as an adequate third way between realism and liberalism. As a consequence, the theoretically inconsistent and often conflicting conceptions of the international society undermine the English Schoolâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s stand as an independent discipline of International Relations theory and explain the lack of attention by the greater academic research community. Although recognising the potential of the ES as a middle way between the conflictcentric realism and idealistic liberalism, the English School has yet to develop greater ontological and epistemological clarity to keep its promise as a successful third alternative to understanding International Relations.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Badie, Bertrand [et al.] (2011): Liberalism in International Relations. In: Badie [et al.]: International Encyclopedia of Political Science. Sage, Los Angeles. Bull, Hedley (1966): On International Society. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. Bull, Hedley (1995): The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics. 2nd Edition. Columbia University Press, New York. Burchill, Scott [et al.] (2005): Theories of International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. Buzan, Barry (1993): From International System to International Society. Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School. In: International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 327-352. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Carr, E.H. (1939): The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. Macmillan, London. Devlen, Balkan/James, Patrick/Özdamar, Özgür (2005): The English School, International Relations, and Progress. In: International Studies Review, Vol. 7, No.2, pp. 171-197. The International Studies Association, Tucson.

Dunne, Timothy (1995): The Social Construction of International Society. In: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 379. Sage Publication, New York. Gilpin, Robert (1981): War and Change in International Politics. Cambridge University Press, New York. Israel, Roger R. (2005) Three Styles of Social Inquiry: Positivist, Interpretative and Critical Research. Metropolitan State University, Minnesota, USA. Jackson, Robert (1996): Is there a Classical International Theory? In: Ashley, Richard [et al] [ed.]: International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Jones, Roy E. (1981): The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure. In: Review of International Studies, Vol. 7, No 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Jordan, Richard (2011): A Brief Case the English School. In: The Monitor, Special Edition 16, pp. 22-31. AIM Media Texas, McAllen. Linklater, Andrew (2010): The English School Conception of International Society. Reflections on Western and non-Western Perspectives. In: Ritsumaiken Annual Review of International Studies, No. 9, pp. 1-13. International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto. Little, Richard (2000): The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations. In: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 395-422. Sage Publications, New York.

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Reports without Borders (2013): Freedom of Press Index 2013. (Online) URL: http://www.reporter-ohne-grenzen.de/ranglisten/rangliste-2013/ (Accessed January 14, 2014). Suganami, Hidemi (2011): The English School, History and Theory. In: Ritsumeikan International Affairs, Vol. 9, pp. 27-50. Ritsumeikan University, Tokyo. Totten, Mark RM (2012): The English School of International Relations Theory: Heir Apparent or Illegitimate Pretender? Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Wiltshire. Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): Theories of International Politics. AddisonWesley, Boston. Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy and What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics. In: International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 391 - 425. The IP Foundation, Cambridge (UK). Whyte, Alexander (2012): Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism: Born of the same approach? (Online) URL: http://www.eir.info/2012/06/11/neorealism-and-neoliberal-institutionalism-born-ofthe-same-approach/ (Accessed January 10, 2014). Wight, Martin (1977): System of States. Leicester University, Leicester. Wight, Martin (1986): Power Politics. Penguin, London. Wight, Martin (1991): International Theory: The Three Traditions. Leicester University Press, Leicester.

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BY PAULINE CHETAIL The global financial turmoil that started in 2008 has affected the European Union (EU)’s economy like never before. The common currency, the rules to coordinate European budgetary, and the economic policies have therefore been questioned and put under deep scrutiny. Nevertheless, such periods of doubt were far from a novelty for the Member States of the EU. The past global crises have always proved crucial for reshaping European integration. The aim of this paper is therefore twofold. First, to analyse the Member States’ direct response to the crisis in order to understand the choices that were made to react to global financial challenges. Second, this paper envisages different scenarios for the future of the EU, in the light of classic European integration theories.

EUROPE IN THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL: WHAT LESSONS AND PERSPECTIVES FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION? The European integration process has never been linear or steady. It has been fraught with periods of stagnation and questioning since the foundations of the European Communities. However, sudden developments and rapid progress have always followed the stages of inertia, often in a drastically shifting way. Scholars who have looked into this peculiar phenomenon have noted a correlation between crises of an economic nature and further advancements in the European integration. The 1980s are the prime example. The aftermath of the oil shocks was followed by the Single European Act (SEA), and the completion of the single market through the ‘1992 programme’, which eventually led to the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of the European Union (EU). This may suggest that the difficult context of the 1980s’ crisis triggered reforms of the European Communities after having stagnated for nearly a decade. The past experience of the EU can thus shed light on the multifaceted crisis that the EU is facing today. Since the global financial crash of 2008, the EU and its twenty-eight Member States have been experiencing gloomy days. In 2009, the EU banks’ losses were estimated at £16,3 trillion, whereas the EU global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) amounted to €12,5 trillion.1 These figures highlight the gigantic scope of the 2008 financial turmoil. Generated by the US subprime crunch, the crisis started with the collapse of the financial sector, the ‘decapitalisation’ and the illiquidity of the banking system.2 The European economy shrank from then on, leading to what the European Commission labelled the worst recession in European history since the Great Depression of the 1930s. 3 The EU itself was not hit by the crisis initially. Nonetheless, the Greek sovereign debt crisis, which started in the spring of 2010, sent the EU into a tailspin. Although the crisis first began in the US and concerned only the Member States’ national economies, it formed

“The crisis painfully and remarkably shed light on the interdependence of the European economies.”

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into a far-reaching crisis for the EU common market and its common currency. It painfully and remarkably shed light on the interdependence of the European economies, the imperfections of the economic governance in the EU, and the flaws of the European Monetary Union (EMU). Thus, the numerous breaches of the Stability and Growth Pact, the inconsiderate debts contracted by the Member States, as well as the lack of convergence of the national economies were in the commentators’ sights. For instance, Paul Krugman, famous for having always claimed the inherent contradictions of the single currency, wrote in 2011 that: “the architects of the euro, caught up in their project’s sweep and romance, chose to ignore the mundane difficulties a shared currency would predictably encounter — to ignore warnings, which were issued right from the beginning, that Europe lacked the institutions needed to make a common currency workable”.4 It is therefore legitimate to wonder how the crisis might change the EU, as it rattled the very foundations of the European

“The EU Member States sought conjectural and contra-cyclic measures through the intergovernmental method, and tried to co-ordinate their national responses.” integration. Commentators argue that the EU may not survive the crisis. This pessimistic scenario does not necessarily apply to the EU, for it has gone ‘too far to fail’. And as we will see, the EU response to the crisis did not make the integration backpedal. However, as the crisis catalysed the issues and contradictions of EU integration, there is an urgent need for reform that requires further discussion. There has been indeed a series of ‘mitigated meetings’ including Nice, the Laeken Conference, and the failed Constitution Treaty) followed by the difficult ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. . As Jürgen Habermas pointed out, “the experts seem to be in agreement on the diagnosis of the deeper reasons for the crisis: the European Union lacks the competences to bring about the necessary harmonisation of national economies whose levels of competitiveness are drifting drastically apart.”5 We will thus see to what extent the crisis spurred a rethinking of the EU, its institutions and its governance. First, we will briefly assess how the global financial crisis has changed the EU’s economic governance so far. Only then will we be able to draw out the meaning of possible changes for Europe’s future, through the prism of the main European integration theories. 4

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Lessons from the financial crisis: conjectural and structural reforms This first section of this study does not seek to analyse the consequences of the crisis for European integration as this will be carefully examined in a second phase. It only aims at observing the changes that have occurred so far, as well as the way they were instigated, in order to understand the framework in which the EU and its Member States are able to handle the storm. First of all, it is necessary to study the procedures that were put in place in the direct aftermath of the financial crisis, before heading towards the structural measures negotiated between the EU institutions and the Member States to overcome the sovereign debt crisis. Against all odds, there was a surprising co-operation between the European Member States to counter the expansion of the crisis, which just burst out in 2008, as they jointly sought solutions at the European level rather than withdrawing into themselves. The detractors of the EU, as well as the media, condemned the EU for being slow to react to the crisis, but it is necessary to rehabilitate the reality of the situation. Indeed, the Union lacked apparatus to deal with the immense shock experienced by the European economies. It was therefore predictable that the EU would not be able to take action quickly. Nonetheless, even without any provisions, the Member States indeed regrouped within the Eurogroup as off the Autumn 2008. They first sought conjectural and contra-cyclic measures through the intergovernmental method, and tried to co-ordinate their national responses. As Hodson and Quaglia pointed out, “this spirit of co-operation carried over (…). The heads of state and government agreed on a ‘line to take’ on international financial issues (…) and EU members of the G20 (…) joined by representatives of the Council Presidency and the ECB worked closely together to co-ordinate their positions”.6 The first real change coming out of the Member States’ co-ordination was the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) implemented in June 2010, so as to ensure the Member States in difficulties’ financial stability, as well as reassuring financial markets. Financed by the members of the Eurozone, the EFSF would be able to raise funds on the financial markets and provide affordable loans to the indebted Member States. 6

Dermot Hodson, and Lucia Quaglia, “European Perspectives on the Global Financial Crisis: Introduction”, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.47 n°5 (2009): 942-943.

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In the second half of 2010, structural responses started to come from the EU. This delay was largely due to the institutional sluggishness, which is inherent to the EU’s decisionmaking process, based on negotiation and compromise. The limits of the EFSF were quickly pointed out, and the need for further and deeper reforms of the EMU identified by the European Council. Therefore, a task force was created under the presidency of Herman van Rompuy. The purpose of this task force was to reflect on the economic governance of the EU. It presented its first reform proposals at the end of 2010.7 These proposals came down to three fundamental changes for the economic governance of the EU. First, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) was amended with the establishment of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), a consolidated and institutionalised version of the EFSF. Second, a set of regulations and directives called ‘Six-pack’ deepened and strengthened the Stability and Growth Pact. Besides, the most

“The crisis spurred the reinforcement of an integrated and coherent economic policy at the European level.” emblematic reform was the signature of a new treaty, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). The core proposal made in December 2011 was intensively negotiated in the European Council, and after no less than six revisions, which considerably weakened its original provisions, the TSCG was signed in March 2012.8 The idea behind the TSCG was to “foster

Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 186-187, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/eufor.358.0173. 8 Paul Craig, “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism”, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper n°47 (2012): 232-233.

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budgetary discipline through a fiscal compact, to strengthen the co-ordination of their [the Member States] economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area”.9 We can summarise the core provisions of the TSCG with two main evolutions for the EU and its Member States: a balanced-budget rule and an enhanced correction mechanism against the Member States in breach of the obligations underlying the TSCG.10 It is necessary to mention one last main ‘change’ provoked by the financial turmoil of 2008 and the widespread sov-

“The genuine drivers behind the anti-crisis measures, and, later on, behind the EU structural reform, were the Member States.” ereign debt crisis. The perception of the role of the European Central Bank (ECB), until then confined to the maintenance of price stability, was reconsidered and enhanced. As Jean-Claude Trichet put it, the ECB “has confirmed its capacity to take bold action to foster financing conditions and enhance its credit support to the euro area economy, while remaining fully aligned with its primary mandate of safeguarding medium-term price stability”.11

Looking towards the future through European integration theories: perspectives for the EU Now that the changes spurred by the financial crisis have been outlined, it is time to assess the potential implications these could have for the future of Europe. However, by adopting 9

Ibid., 233. Ibid., 235. Jean-Claude Trichet, “State of the Union: The Financial Crisis and the ECB’s Response between 2007 and 2009”, Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.48 Annual Review (2010): 7. 10 11

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such a prospective position, one has to be aware of the prism through which European integration is regarded, as such an analysis is inevitably subjective. Hence, the most satisfactory way to prospect the aftermath of the EU reforms seems to fall within the different theories on the European integration. That is why we will assess the meaning of the changes first through the neo-functionalist lenses, then through the liberal intergovernmental ones, and finally from a broader governance standpoint. The signature of the TSCG and the set of ancillary measures represent a major step towards more integration in the EU. Hence, we can argue that the crisis spurred the reinforcement of an integrated and coherent economic policy at the European level, and that there is every reason to believe further reforms will keep going on this track. This echoes the neofunctional approach of the European integration, first envisaged by Jean Monnet and theorised by Ernst Haas through the socalled ‘spill-over’ effect of sectorial integration. 12 Just like gears, the economic integration spurred the monetary integration in the 1990s. With the current crisis and the orientation taken by the reforms to overcome the crisis, the EU is heading towards fiscal and budgetary federalism, more integrated and convergent economic policies and eventually a greater role to play in supervising the Member States. So as to claim that the EU and its institutions will hold greater responsibilities and that the national budgetary policies will homogenise, we can rely on three major orientations of the anti-crisis measures. First, the national economic policies will most likely head towards more convergence and co-ordination. The crisis indeed provoked a raise of awareness of the interdependency of Member States’ economies, and spurred financial solidarity between the members of the Eurozone. As debated as it was, the creation of the ESM has been accepted like a necessity by all twenty-seven Member States. It is also likely to increase the bailed out Member States’ liability. Moreover, with the reinforced provisions of the TFEU and the TSCG, the Member States will be constrained to co-operate with each other and with the EU institutions. The correction mechanism clause of the TSCG, and the fact it will be enforced through the European Court of Justice, is very likely to be much more dissuasive than the previous Stability and Growth Pact. It will increase the EU’s power to oversee Member States’ policies, and thus increase Member States’ liability before the EU – something that was hardly imaginable before the crisis.

Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 189, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/ eufor.358.0173.

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Lastly, it seems likely that the importance of the typically supranational European institutions will drastically increase. Taking the example of the European Parliament, often depicted as powerless in the EU decision-making compared to the European Council or the Council of the EU, we can argue that it was granted with more attention than before. First, it played a central role in creating three supervising financial agencies in 2010.13 Second, Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, urged the MEPs to back the euro by addressing the Parliament for the first time in 2012, thus acknowledging its potential decisive role for the future of the EU.14 In sum, whether it is illustrated by the renewed interest of Member States for key-institutions of the EU, by the increase of liability of Member States before the EU, or by new provisions enhancing the EU’s competence, everything leads to think that the Union will be more integrated and prominent than ever before in the years to come. However, these prospects can be put into perspective if we have a close look at the competing approach of the European integration, namely liberal intergovernmentalism. Andrew Moravcsik built on earlier realist conceptions of the international relations that were applied to the European integration process. He places the Member States and their interests at the centre of his analysis, and claims that any progress in the integration process will come at the mercy of the Member State’s preferences. Moreover, he argues that despite the influence of the Community method developed in the EU decision-making, the intergovernmental method prevailed. Indeed, to some extent, if we consider how the reforms have been achieved, one must recognise the active role of Member States in the decision-making process. As Moravcsik stated, “today, European states retain far more control than Brussels”.15 First, as Lépine acknowledges and as it was shown in the first section, the genuine drivers behind the anti-crisis measures, and, later on, behind the EU structural reform, were the Member States. Typically, the intergovernmental institutions of the EU, such as the Eurogroup or the European Council, became the privileged EU apparatus for decision-making during the crisis and even after it was about reforming the EU.16 Second, the intergovernmental premise has been verified that the strongest Member States’ preferences have been decisive in shaping the future of Europe. As a matter of fact, the commentators have been underlining the crucial role of Germa13

Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 187, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/ eufor.358.0173. 14 “Debate with Angela Merkel”, BBC News, November 7th, 2012, accessed January 13th, 2013, http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/europe/newsid_9766000/9766850.stm. 15 Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe After the Crisis, How to Sustain a Common Currency”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 91 n°3 (2012): 68 16 Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 190, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/ eufor.358.0173.

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ny in influencing decision-making during the crisis. As Moravcsik points out, “Germany benefits greatly from the current system”,17 and its preferences and interests have been prominent in the establishment of budgetary discipline rules and the reject of certain measures enhancing the role of the ECB or mutualising the European debt, which shaped the reform of the EU. To a certain extent, the measures intending to reform the EU economic governance did not transfer sufficient power to the EU institutions. Taking the example of the ESM, one has to admit it has an intergovernmental character: it operates outside of the European budget and the decision-making procedure is unanimity. Furthermore, the financial help is guaranteed by the Member States individually and not jointly, and the ESM management will not be subject to any form of control by EU institutions.18 In light of the examples provided, it is necessary to consider the scenario forecasted by those who believe that the Member States are ‘obstinate’ and that they will be the central players in the future European integration. As Renaud Dehousse stated recently, this “raises the question whether the current strengthening of intergovernmentalism is a temporary situation or a structural change”.19 However, a third scenario can be envisaged for the future of the EU in the light of the recent changes in the economic governance of the Eurozone – that is, the development of new forms of governance in the Union. First, one can predict the incremental institutionalisation of a multi-speed Europe. Indeed, the signature of the TSCG and the treaty of Lisbon amendment to integrate the ESM in the Union’s provisions are prime examples of this evolution for the EU. As the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic refused to be part of the TSCG provisions as they were being drawn out, the Union found a way to accommodate all Member States preferences by allowing the UK and the Czech Republic not to be part of the TSCG. As straightforward as it may seem, this development has consequences for the EU, which is starting to legally build a two-speed Europe. As Jean-Claude Piris sums it up, a two-speed Europe “would consist 17

Andrew Moravcsik, “Europe After the Crisis, How to Sustain a Common Currency”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 91 n°3 (2012): 64. 18 Eulalia Rubio, “Quel budget Européen pour l’Après-Crise”, Regards croisés sur l’économie n°11 (2012): 145, accessed January 13, 2012, DOI: 10.3917/rce.011.0139. 19 Andrea Jancsó, “The dominance of intergovernmentalism in the economic crisis management of EU: Professor Renaud Dehousse's presentation at the Central European University”, South-East Europe International Relations Quarterly Vol.1 n°3 (2012): 1.

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in permitting some Member States, those that are willing and able, to cooperate at a faster pace than the other Member States”.20 Moreover, the TSCG, as it was signed, represents an overhaul of European integration as we know it. As it is distinct from Lisbon and did not use the enhanced cooperation provisions prescribed by the consolidated version of the Treaty, 21 we can forecast a genuine rethinking on the legitimacy of change in the EU. As Paul Craig justly mentions, “even though it has not been possible to attain unanimity, and even though the rules on enhanced co-operation have not been used, it is legitimate to attain the desired ends by a different route and EU institutions can be integral to such a project”.22 It is also justified to imagine that, in the light of the latest changes of the EU economic governance with the TSCG, a recasting of the EU institutions is around the corner. Indeed, the conferral of additional supervision, implementation and steering functions for the EU institutions might provoke a rethinking on the compatibility of those with the current powers and functions of the EU.

Conclusion In the light of the changes brought about to the EU in relation to the crisis, one could assert that European integration is experiencing a major turning point. Whether we believe the crisis urged more integration on a supranational level, brought the Member States back at the negotiations table, or provoked a rethinking of the EU’s current balance of powers and functions, no sufficient time has passed to tell with certainty to which extent the crisis will change the EU. Given that the EU is still grappling with the crisis, and the reforms that have been put in place may not have yielded necessary results, predicating the future proves hard and ungratifying in these circumstances. Overall, we cannot emphasise enough the overriding lesson of the crisis, which demonstrates the EU and its Member States’ political will to proceed with integration.23 Whatever shape the future Europe will eventually take, the crisis exhibited the capacity of the EU to ensure its co-ordination.

Jean-Claude Piris, “Fourth option: legally binding a two-speed Europe”, In The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU? (New-York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 121. 21 Paul Craig, “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism”, Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper n°47 (2012): 238. 22 Ibid., 238. 23 Frédéric Lépine, “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance économique”, L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 193, accessed January 13, 2013, DOI: 10.3917/ eufor.358.0173.

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BIBLOGRAPHY

Begg, Iain. “Regulation and Supervision of Financial Intermediaries in the EU: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis”. Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.47 n°5 (2009): 1107-1128. Craig, Paul. “The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism”. Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper n°47 (2012): 231-247. “Debate with Angela Merkel”. BBC News, November 7th, 2012. Accessed January 13th, 2013. http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/europe/ newsid_9766000/9766850.stm European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses. Edited by Paul van den Noord. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009. Habermas, Jürgen. The Crisis of the European Union, A Response. Translated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012. Hodson, Dermot, and Quaglia, Lucia. “European Perspectives on the Global Financial Crisis: Introduction”. Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.47 n°5 (2009): 939-953. Hosli, Madeleine O., van Demen, Adrian M. A., Widgrén, Mika, ed. Institutional Challenges in the European Union. London: Routledge, 2002. Jancsó, Andrea. “The dominance of intergovernmentalism in the economic crisis management of European Union: Professor Renaud Dehousse's presentation at the Central European University”. South-East Europe International Relations Quarterly Vol.1 n°3 (2012). Krugman, Paul. “Can Europe be Saved?”. New York Times, January 12, 2011. Accessed January 13, 2013. http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16Europe-t.html? pagewanted=all&_r=1&. Lépine, Frédéric. “L’union européenne dans la crise financière: À la recherche d’une gouvernance économique”. L’Europe en formation n°358 (2010): 173-193. Accessed January 13, 2013. DOI: 10.3917/ eufor.358.0173. Moravcsik, Andrew. “Europe After the Crisis, How to Sustain a Common Currency”. Foreign Affairs Vol. 91 n°3 (2012): 53-68. Piris, Jean-Claude. “Fourth option: legally binding a two-speed Europe”. In The Future of Europe: Towards a Two-Speed EU?, 121-142. New-York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. Quaglia, Lucia, Eastwood, Robert, and Holmes, Peter. “The Financial Turmoil and EU Policy Co-operation in 2008”. Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.47 Annual Review (2009): 63-87. Rubio, Eulalia. “Quel budget Européen pour l’Après-Crise”. Regards croisés sur l’économie n°11 (2012): 139-149. Accessed January 13, 2012. DOI: 10.3917/rce.011.0139. Trichet, Jean-Claude. “State of the Union: The Financial Crisis and the ECB’s Response between 2007 and 2009”. Journal of Common Market Studies Vol.48 Annual Review (2010): 7-19.

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BY DELPHINE GIRMA This paper argues that a community-based or ‘bottom-up’ approach to peacebuilding offers a more legitimate and effective alternative to the stalemate in Kosovo, characterized by a protracted underlying culture of mistrust and hatred between the Kosovo-Serb and the Kosovo-Albanian communities. A bottom-up approach comes to offset the shortcomings of the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) technocratic top-down peace model. The theoretical framework used in this analysis will rely essentially on John-Paul Lederach’s transformation orientated approach to societal reconciliation, a fundamental aspect of peace-building which has been hitherto overlooked by the UNMIK. While institutional consolidation, as part of the broader peace process, is by all means necessary in Kosovo, it is here argued that democratization of Kosovo by way of institutional consolidation alone fails to address the culture of mistrust still persistent in the country. Both the necessity of and the obstacles to local initiatives of building inter-communal trust as the foundation to sustainable peace are explored in this argument.

PEACE-BUILDING ‘FROM BELOW’ IN KOSOVO: HOW A COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH CAN ENHANCE THE UNMIK EXECUTIVE PEACE-BUILDING MODEL Introduction This paper explores societal reconciliation as a bottomup alternative to the United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo’s (UNMIK) offsets in dealing with the protracted culture of conflict in Kosovar civil society. The theoretical framework used in this analysis will rely essentially on John-Paul Lederach’s transformation orientated approach to societal reconciliation which places particular emphasis on the unique role of NGOs as ‘middle range actors’ in promoting local ownership of the peace process.1 This particular aspect of peace-building is firstly discussed through a critical analysis of the relationship between international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and local non-governmental organizations (LNGOs) under the UNMIK. Successful examples of initiatives at inter-communal reconciliation from both INGOs and LNGOs working in this domain in Kosovo will then be explored, by looking at current efforts made towards creating cross-ethnic networks and opportunities for direct contact from both sides. As Lederach argues, it is only via direct contact that sustained relationships can be formed and misperceptions corrected, addressing the issue of intercommunal mistrust.

Conceptualising societal building from below

reconciliation:

peace-

Kosovo provides an ideal example of a deeply divided society that can be analysed both on the horizontal and the vertical level. On the vertical level, the literature reveals a general

“As priority was given to top-down institutionalization under the UNMIK, within a specific model of peace based on democratic institutions and a market -driven economy, the underlying issue of social cohesion was overlooked. ”

John-Paul Lederach, Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997)

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consensus that the democratization process failed and that there is no solid democratic culture.2 A key factor of division in Kosovo is the sustained politicization of civil society. There are two civil societies, with the majority of Kosovo Serbs relying on parallel Serbian institutions, pursuing a policy of noncooperation with the new Kosovar institutions implemented under the UNMIK. The political scene continues to reflect the underlying ethnic divide of both communities, with Kosovo Serbs largely refusing to participate in Kosovar elections, and remains split between mono-ethnic parties.3 In addition to territorial and political divide, Kosovo is fragmented socially and psychologically. The UNMIK liberal peace model, widely equated with extensive state-building, effectively attempted to create a new Kosovar state without any strong basis of civic trust or democratic culture of peace.4 A fundamental reason behind the failed democratization of Kosovo is the absence of an inclusive notion of Kosovar citizenship. As priority was given to top-down institutionalization under the UNMIK, within a specific model of peace

“Temporal dilemmas deal with the underlying issue of peace-building, asking this vital question: should peace be a pre-condition for democracy, or democracy a pre-condition for peace? ” based on democratic institutions and a market-driven economy, the underlying issue of social cohesion was overlooked.5 There is very little cross-community interaction in Kosovo as the protracted culture of conflict and mistrust persist, reinforced by segregated education and healthcare systems and very few mixed communities.6 John-Paul Lederach’s transformation orientated approach towards conflict resolution defines peace-building as ‘a comprehensive term that encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcomes'.7 Lederach’s understanding of reconciliation within peace-building can be extended by the societal argument put forward by theorist David Beetham that democracy relies upon a democratic culture of tolerance and peace.8 In Beetham’s broader definition of democracy, institutions are derived from the creation of social norms and values. This theoretical approach to peace-building, with regards to Kosovo, falls under a larger central debate, best identified by Anna 2

Osin Tansey, Regime-Building:Democratization and International Administration: Democratization and International Administration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Roberto Belloni, "Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions" in From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peacebuilding, ed. Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 182-210 ; Roland Paris, “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice ’”, Review of international studies, 28 (2002) 3 Tansey, Regime-Building, 147-48. 4 Franks, Jason, and Oliver P. Richmond, "Coopting liberal peace-building untying the Gordian knot in Kosovo." Cooperation and Conflict 43, no. 1 (2008): 82. 5 Ibid, 92. 6 Shpend Kursani and Ilir Deda , “Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation in the Northern Part of Kosovo”, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Policy Paper Series (2012/03): 10. 7 Lederach, Building peace, 14. 8 Beetham, Democracy and human rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999)

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K. Jarstad as the temporal and horizontal dilemmas of war-todemocracy transition.9 Temporal dilemmas deal with the underlying issue of peace-building, asking this vital question: should peace be a pre-condition for democracy, or democracy a precondition for peace? Democratic institutions in Kosovo were introduced not merely before any agreement on the country’s legal status was reached, but, more importantly, without any societal reconciliation. The horizontal dilemma concerns the actors of the peace process and which groups of society it should include. In view of the bottom-up approach to peace-building, the reconciliation process should be essentially driven by local actors.10 The UN advocates national ownership and capacity building as necessary to the creation of sustainable peace with short-term, limited external assistance (Agenda for Peace 1992). Timothy Donais asserts that the UN defends a liberal vision of local ownership. In such vision local actors implement a global, predefined model of peacebuilding, as opposed to a communitarian understanding of local ownership in which the peacebuilding process must be defined and carried out by these same local actors. 11 Likewise, Severine Autesserre points out that the concept of ‘local ownership’ is now a ‘buzzword’ in international organizations, referring to ownership by the central government rather than such actors. It is asserted here that the local ownership within civil society was undermined under the UNMIK in terms of the unequal relationship between INGOs and LGOs.

Civil society under the UNMIK: A critical analysis The end of the 1999 NATO military intervention in Kosovo and the establishment of UNMIK saw the proliferation of LNGOs as sub-divisions of larger INGOs. It is in fact the ‘largest contingent of INGOs in the shortest time ever seen in a post-war setting’.12 In an insightful consideration of the international and local limits of peace-building in Kosovo, Ana Devic speaks of an ‘unequal’ and ‘instrumental’ partnership initiated from the very beginning of the UNMIK, not only between LNGOs and international actors 9

Jarstad and Sisk, From war to democracy, 23-5. Timothy Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes”, Peace & Change, 34 (2009): 6. 11 Severine Autesserre, The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 43. 12 By the end of 1999, just six months after the ending of armed conflict, there were 285 INGOs registered with the UN in Kosovo, compared with around a dozen two years previously and possibly 50 or so immediately prior to the NATO bombings of 1999 (Scott-Flynn 2000 cited in Bill Sterland, “Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies: The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo”, International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), Praxis Paper 9, (2006): 25. 10

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but also between LNGOs and the local political elite (i.e. the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG)). She reproves this imposition of a pre-defined peace model, led with disregard of local dynamics of interethnic cooperation prior to the military intervention, and criticizes the ethnic ‘un- mixing’ and outmigration trends following the intervention, and the striking neglect in the area of refugee return.13 Part of the UNMIK policy of decentralization was to encourage lobbying from LNGOs against the PISG, but this remains rare and little pressure is put on political elites on issues of multi-ethnic cooperation, minority returns and reintegration.14 Indeed, INGOs have reinforced legacies of the post-war Kosovo political culture which influenced the functioning of LNGOs characterized by mistrust of governmental and state structures, lack of inter-ethnic cooperation and fear of controversial advocacy, while failing to exploit its positive network of human resources.15 Concerning this uneven relationship between INGOs and LNGOs, a temporal dilemma of the peace-building process especially relevant to Kosovo, characterizing the pre-defined peace model condemned by Devic, is the institutional pressure put by international organizations to achieve short-term results. Such a trend is coupled with the lack of underlying structural projects and comprehensive understanding of how to ensure peace sustainability.16 Missions in postwar Kosovo are often limited to rather superficial, single events, including training workshops, lectures and seminars.17 The local NGO Me Dorë Në Zemër (MDNZ) insisted on the lack of sustainable projects which it attributed to both the critical economic situation and continued political instability. The challenge faced by LNGOs to achieve concrete short-term results with limited resources constraints them to accept this model of peace, leaving little space for alterative visions of peace and multi-ethnic cooperation for fear of political controversy or absence of funding. As a result, the majority of LNGOs focus on the same areas and employ the same methods. Priority is placed, for instance, on working with the Kosovar Youth through conversation workshops one of the mains areas of work of MDNZ. In fact, only 5% of NGOs registered in Kosovo put forward ethnic reconciliation as their defining goal. 18 Civil society has progressively been dominated by the agendas of INOGs, reflecting the lack of local cooperation and ownership. 19 Additionally, there is a danger of financial dependency where LNGOs become more accountable to INGOs than to the real recipients of aid in local communities. 20 International donors, although crucial, can thus limit local ownership. 13

Ana Devic, “Transnationalization of civil society in Kosovo: International and local limits of peace and multiculturalism”, Ethnopolitics, 5 (2006): 261. 14 Ibid, 34. 15 Monica Llamazares and Laina Reynolds Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, (University of Bradford :Department of Peace Studies; 2003), 25. 16 Belloni, "Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions", 184. 17 Shpend Kursani and Ilir Deda , “Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 26. 18 Ibid, 25. 19 Anne Holohan, Networks of democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005): 160. 20 Belloni, "Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions", 203.

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Similarly, Milja Kurki critically examines the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) aiming at promoting democracy ‘from below’ through the strengthening of civil society. Kurki analyses EIDHR’s work in light of the Foucauldian theoretical concept of neoliberal governmentality, describing the subtle exercise of control over the functioning of society disguised behind the normative ideal of freedom. 21 Although the EU democratic promotion is depoliticized, as to avoid normative and ideological debate over what kind of democracy should be promoted, it nonetheless promotes the model of a particular understanding of freedom and prosperity, based on the functioning of the liberal free market. The ultimate form of control manifests itself when the functioning of civil society is shaped by the rules of the liberal market, and when such rules are extended into all areas of society as a model of living. 22 The EIDHR’s emphasis on local ownership is thus paradoxical, as the idea of responsibility and independence is already conditioned by the EU’s governmental rationality. NGOs are expected to function as homo economicus and to follow the laws of competitions of the market to compete with other civil society actors for funding, in order to implement their ‘self-designed’ projects.23 Yet, as we have seen in the unequal relationships between INGOs and LNGOs, local initiatives are conditioned by the necessity of funding and therefore tend to prioritize short-term projects rather than longer-term structural changes. As Kurki high-

“The need to ‘de-ethnicise’ politics in Kosovo starts with the focus on alternative identities by giving people a new purpose and a new role within their community, where shared interests can be created.” lights, ‘capacity to democratize becomes, even if rather unintentionally, equated with capacity to obtain and manage funding’.24 This offers a reflection of the systematic issues of external peace -building in terms of the imposition of a particular vision of peace, which persists under the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EUR-Lex). Another systematic issue of peace-building is the rushed aspect of the ‘transition phase’ when INGOs withdraw from a post-war society.25 In Kosovo, the superficial handover of INGOs to LNGOs and lack of training were especially salient in the ‘emergency phase’ of the UNMIK, where international and local structures focused on providing post-war relief and social services. While INGOs relied on LNGOs from a practical point of 21

Milja Kurki, "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies." International Political Sociology 5 (2011): 325. 22 Ibid, 353. 23 Ibid, 359. 24 Kurki, "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion”, 361. 25 Belloni, "Civil society in war-to-democracy transitions", 184.

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view, not enough emphasis was put on the transferring of expertise and management skills.26 Consequently, there is still a lack of competent local staff within many local branches of INGOs as top management positions were essentially monopolized by international staff.27 In the second phase, priorities shifted to introducing municipal governing structures, civil society services, and large-scale infrastructure projects.28 This phase embodies the Western technocratic models of democratization via institution-building according to the liberal internationalist paradigm, overlooking social mechanisms for reconciliation.29 Indeed, the majority of external peace-building interventions “follow a do-

“One of the interviewed NGO activists stated that ‘it was very important to have in the report a written statement that there have been 25 Albanians and 25 Serbs and that they have done something together; no matter what, in order to receive adequate funding.” nor-driven, bureaucratic-institutional logic that conjures into existence a social field on which policies can be imposed by experts defined not by their local knowledge but by their grasp of institutional imperatives and pseudo-scientific models of society and social change.”30 The consolidation phase was thus undermined because there was arguably nothing to consolidate in terms of civic reconciliation. Success was measured by concrete achievements, such as rehabilitated infrastructures or return of refugees, but rarely expanded to the sustainability of these achievements. Civil society nowadays is greatly weakened in Kosovo, which is paradoxical considering the vast deployment of INGOs following the end of the conflict. It is weak for a large part be26

Llamazares and Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, 13. Kursani and Deda ,” Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 18. Llamazares and Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, 14. 29 Donais, “Empowerment or Imposition?”, 8. 30 Keith Krause and Oliver Jutersonke, “Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments,” Security Dialogue, (2005): 459 cited in Donais, Empowerment or Imposition?”, 9. 27 28

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cause of this unequal and artificial relationship with INGOs, which made it unsustainable once international structures under the UNMIK began to withdraw. While approximately 3, 000 NGOs are registered in Kosovo, only 500 of them are realistically operative. They remain predominantly small, single-donor and singleproject organisations, with an average staff size of around five. 31 The vast number of INGOs under the UNMIK and their established implementing partners are unevenly spread, clustered in large urban areas, and create competition for local stakeholders. This is the case not only between LNGOs, but mostly between INGOs and LNGOs. With the end of the UNMIK, a majority of LNGOs find themselves completely dependent on increasingly scarce shortterm funding. Youth and women’s groups comprise between 40% and 50% of all NGOs.32 A pragmatic approach to peace-building, dealing with everyday issues shared by both communities could be a way to render the peace process less exogenous, while directly involving the local population. The following section analyses successful examples of this community-based, bottom-up approach of inter-communal reconciliation.

Promoting social capital: beyond the ‘ethnic’ categorisation The developing of social capital within communities requires the identification of mutual interests outside ethnicity and politics. The case of Kosovo is the perfect example of how ethnic categorization can lead to such a political and social impasse. The ‘ethnic explanation’ is broken down if we understand it as a result of the basic human need for psychological security, stemming from the political and security realities of Kosovo. 33 The identification with one ethnic group can be seen as a reaction rather than a generalized determinant of individual behaviour. In light of this reasoning, it becomes clear that there will be no sustainable peace in Kosovo, or in any other deeply divided societies, as long other ethnic groups are perceived as a threat. The need to ‘de-ethnicise’ politics in Kosovo starts with the focus on alternative identities by giving people a new purpose and a new role within their community, where shared interests can be created.34 Arguably, UNMIK’s multi-ethnicity policy further externalized the peace process. This is essentially because UN31

Sterland, “Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies”, 32. Ibid, 26 Aidan, Hehir, “Autonomous province building: identification theory and the failure of UNMIK” , International peacekeeping, 13 (2006): 205-6 ; Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building: Lessons from recent cases." Security Dialogue 36 (2005): 299. 34 Simonsen, "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building”, 306. 32 33

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MIK aimed to build a ‘multi-ethnic Kosovo’ rather than facilitate the creation of a shared Kosovar identity. Although we lack the space to delve deeply into UNMIK’s policies, we must consider their influence in shaping how the Kosovo conflict came to be perceived by both the international community and the people of Kosovo. The notion of ‘multi-ethnicity’ in Kosovo has not been integrated within society, nor did it encourage the emergence of ‘a civic culture of ethnic tolerance and the rule of law’. 35 Rather, UNMIK’s multi-ethnicity policy arguably institutionalized ethnicity within the post-war Kosovo political system and further reinforced divisions, to the extent that ethnic identity became the defining social characteristic and the underling factor in the appropriation of power in politics. In the current Kosovar electoral system, for instance, any party must pre-register as an ethnically Serb or other minority party in order to benefit from overrepresentation.36 Furthermore, in a report analysing grassroots approaches to inter-ethnic reconciliation in northern Kosovo, it was underlined that too much pressure was put on LNGOs for ethnic cooperation by means of imposing ethnic quotas. One of the interviewed NGO activists stated that ‘it was very important to have in the report a written statement that there have been 25 Albanians and 25 Serbs and that they have done something together; no matter what, in order to receive adequate funding. 37 The creation of shared identities is a lengthy process which must take place at the grassroots level in order to be internalized. It is not realistic, therefore, to hold UNMIK entirely responsible for the lack of Kosovar citizenship. The mission can be criticized, however, for perpetuating what could be called an ‘ethnicity filter’ over the conflict, entrenching ethnicity as the main determinant of identity and indirectly undermining the civil reconciliation in both the short and the longer term. The need to ‘de-ethicise’ politics should apply to civil society.38 Assimilating ethnic identity with quotas in civil society can in fact further ingrain existing tensions.

Successful initiatives of societal reconciliation in Kosovo The identification of common interests will enable Kosovar citizens from both communities to realize that individual interests are not homogenous within each of the communities and may contradict with one another, while some interests can be shared across ethnic division.39 The poor economic situation 35

Jens Narten, "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Dynamics of External–Local Interaction in Kosovo under United Nations Administration.", Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2 (2008): 273. 37 Simonsen, "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building”, 302. 37 Kursani and Deda ,” Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 26. 38 Simonsen, "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building”, 299. 39 Ibid, 306.

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and high level of unemployment in Kosovo, which is the overall concern for both sides, can be used as the basis for finding common interest and developing “bridging social capital” between both communities.40 In line with Robert Putnam’s assertion that bridging social capital can engender human and financial capital, economic projects create direct contact and opportunities for building relationships during and after work.41 However, they tend to remain in the private sphere and have not yet had a significant impact on society or politics. Ashutosh Varshney has demonstrated the importance of every day forms of engagement

and building cross-communal networks.42 Varshney’s work, centred on India, shows that some cities are more likely to experience ethnic riots than others. In Kosovo, there was interestingly an increase of ethnic violence in areas where the return process was overlooked.43 Business is traditionally an arena of interethnic cooperation in Kosovo but suffered from conflict, years of distrust and violence, and displacement of population.44 ‘Building Peace by Business’ is a central theme to the work of the INGO Mercy Corps, which benefits from a long experience in Ko40

Kursani and Deda ,” Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation”, 26 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon and Schuster, 2000): 23. 42 Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnic conflict and civil society" World Politics 53 (2001). 43 Llamazares and Levy, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, 15. 44 “Lessons for Kosovo’s Next Transition: An International NGO’s Experience” Mercy Corps Discussion Paper, 2007, 8. 41

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sovo, being implemented there since 1993 (prior to the war). Mercy Corps has successfully encouraged inter-ethnic cooperation through business in the dairy industry. The creation of inter -ethnic business relations, combined with assistance towards helping Kosovars develop individual businesses or micro enterprises45 from a range of NGOs following a similar approach to that of Mercy Corps has considerably improved the reintegration of returnees, enhancing relational stability on a more personal level.46 This combined approach reflects a creative and yet practical way of addressing this salient issue in Kosovo, engaging local communities directly in the process. Another interesting example is the local NGO Community Building Mitrovica (CBM), which describes itself as an ‘interethnic grassroots organization that identifies, encourages and facilitates joint actions of citizens in the Mitrovica region in order to promote cooperation, coexistence and democratic values’.47 CBM, in an inclusive grassroots approach in line with Lederach’s psychological understanding of reconciliation, initiated a trust-building process between returning refugees and the local communities, via a series of meetings, counselling events and encouraged dialogues. This fruitful mediation process was in fact taken as an example by UNMIK officials, who asked CBM to present their work to them. NGOs have a key role in encouraging direct contact, eliminating the psychological barriers of mistrust and progressively help citizens from conflicting sides to identify common interests to the mixed-community as a whole. An effective way of achieving this is the creation of networks which will reinforce trust and provide space for sustained relationships.

Conclusion This paper has criticized the inherent paradox of the UNMIK: a model based on the diffusion of liberal democratic norms, but which prioritizes short-term institution building in a technocratic manner and which, in the end, remains superficial and lacks legitimacy among the local population. In line with Beetham’s assertion that democratic norms cannot be transplanted, nor peace can be imposed from above, it is argued that sustainable peace can only be created locally through socialization. The implementation of a democratic culture of peace should be combined with concrete social cohesion by bridging divisions and building ties between conflicting groups through shared interests.

See example of The Agency for Finance in Kosovo (AfK) Based on reports of Gauron (2004) and Schlemmer (2005) evaluation refugee return assistance programs in Kosovo in “Lessons for Kosovo’s Next Transition”, 8. 47 See Mission Statement on CBM Webpage in bibliography: 23. 46

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BIBLOGRAPHY

Autesserre, Severine. The trouble with the Congo: local violence and the failure of international peacebuilding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Beetham, David. Democracy and human rights, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999. Devic, Ana. “Transnationalization of civil society in Kosovo: International and local limits of peace and multiculturalism. Ethnopolitics, 5 (2006): 257-273. Donais, Timothy. “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes”, Peace & Change, 34 (2009): 3-26. Hehir, Aidan. “Autonomous province building: identification theory and the failure of UNMIK”. International peacekeeping, 13 (2006): 200-213. Holohan, Anne. Networks of democracy: Lessons from Kosovo for Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. Jarstad, Anna K. and Sisk,Timothy. From war to democracy: Dilemmas of peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Jason, Franks, and Richmond P. Oliver. "Coopting liberal peace-building untying the Gordian knot in Kosovo." Cooperation and Conflict 43 (2008): 81-103. Kurki, Milja. "Governmentality and EU Democracy Promotion: The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and the Construction of Democratic Civil Societies." International Political Sociology 5 (2011): 349-366. Lederach, John-Paul. Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. Narten, Jens. "Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Local Ownership: Dynamics of External–Local Interaction in Kosovo under United Nations Administration..” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 2 (2008): 369-390. Paris, Roland. “International peacebuilding and the ‘mission civilisatrice’ ”. Review of international studies, 28 (2002): 637-656. Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, Simon and Schuster, 2000. Simonsen, Sven Gunnar . "Addressing ethnic divisions in post-conflict institution-building: Lessons from recent cases." Security Dialogue 36 (2005): 297-318. Tansey, Osin. Regime-Building:Democratization and International Administration: Democratization and International Administration. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Varshney, Ashutosh. "Ethnic conflict and civil society" World Politics 53 (2001): 362-398.

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Online Documents

Kursani, Shpend and Deda, Ilir, “Grass-Root Approaches to Inter-ethnic Reconciliation in the Northern Part of Kosovo”, Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), Policy Paper Series (2012/03) available online on: http://www.kipred.org/advCms/documents/65788_Grassroots_approac hes_to_inter-ethnic_reconciliation_in_northern_Kosovo.pdf [Last accessed March 2014] Llamazares,Monica and Reynolds Levy, Laino, NGOs and peacebuilding in Kosovo, (University of Bradford : Department of Peace Studies; 2003). Available online on: http://www.centreforconflictresolution.org.uk. [Last accessed March 2014] Sterland, Bill, “Civil society capacity building in post-conflict societies: The experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo”, International NGO Training and Research Centre (INTRAC), Praxis Paper 9, (2006). available online on: http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/handle/123456789/21691 [Last accessed March 2014] “Lessons for Kosovo’s Next Transition: An International NGO’s Experience” Mercy Corps Discussion Paper, 2007, 8. available online on: http://www.mercycorps.org.uk/sites/default/files/file1170359339.pdf [Last accessed March 2014]

NGO Websites Community Building Mitrovica http://www.cbmitrovica.org/en/ [Last accessed March 2014] Mercy Corps Kosovo http://www.mercycorps.org/kosovo [Last accessed March 2014]

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BY DIANA FACCIO The principle of the right to self -determination has been restricted via the UN “Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” (1960) and granted solely to peoples living in colonised countries, disregarding their heterogeneity and the existence of diverse national groups within state boundaries. The absence of international norms of group-specific rights during the decolonisation period hindered the ability of Nigerian politicians to construct a federation providing equal representation, and equal citizenship to all individuals in the region. Analysis of two African countries in the immediate post-independence period, reveals how decolonisation, pursued according to European concepts of national selfdetermination and characterised by the absence of a discourse on minority rights, hindered the political and cultural rights of minorities. The case studies of Mali and Nigeria underline how powersharing was avoided both where the minority was numerous and united - the Tuareg, and where some minorities were represented within a federal structure- the Ibo and Yoruba. Although indigenous factors contributed to the disregard for the role of minorities in the political structure: the use of clientilism, the impact of international norms concerning the application of principles of self-determination and state inviolability, enshrined in the Organisation of African Unity Charter, severely limited the adoption of power-sharing agreements.

POWER-SHARING, MINORITY RIGHTS AND EQUAL CITIZENSHIP IN NIGERIA AND MALI The self-determination of colonial countries and the pursuit of national unity by African leaders The right to self-determination: “All peoples have the right to self-determination”,1 enshrined in the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), is a collective right expressed by a national group. Nonetheless the UN Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960) reveals a shift in the interpretation of ‘self-determination’ from a right claimed by a people, forming a more or less homogenous nation, to a principle applicable to all colonial countries and the people who inhabit them,2 thus disregarding the issue of minorities in ethnically diverse societies. Moreover, the notions of state sovereignty and inviolability which are part of the international law of states, further entrenched the colonial boundaries as the sole form of national self-determination in order for African states to be accepted on the international stage.3 In the attempt to create legitimacy for the postcolonial state in the eyes of their constituency, nationalist leaders underlined the need for cohesiveness and unity often based on the predominance of one ethnic group. In Mali, this took the form of a one-party state, Union Soudanaise- Rassemblement démocratique africaine (US-RDA),4 while in Nigeria the political strength of the Hausa-Fulani in the North persisted via the unequal federal structure inherited by colonialism.5 The attempt to create state legitimacy via national consciousness failed due to the imposition of unnatural boundaries, the absence of norms concerning minority rights and the mobilisation of political support via ethnic or regional loyalties on behalf of politicians.

“All peoples have the right to selfdetermination”

‘UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 19 December 1966 <http:// www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html> [accessed 1 December 2013] 2 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990), p. 75. 3 Cristopher Clapham, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge, 1996), p. 34. 4 Nicholas S. Hopkins, ‘Socialism and Social Change in Rural Mali’ in The Journal of Modern African Studies 7 (1969), p. 458 5 Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960-1966 (London, 1973), p. 41.

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The decolonisation of most African states, between 1957 and 1966, excluding the subsequent armed struggles in the Portuguese and settler colonies, was strongly influenced by the declining relevance of European states in the new post WWII international context and by a redefinition of the principle of selfdetermination whereby statehood could be achieved without the

“The attempt to create state legitimacy via national consciousness failed due to the imposition of unnatural boundaries, the absence of norms concerning minority rights and the mobilisation of political support” empirical prerequisites of “capable and civilised government”.6 The application of ‘self-determination’ to people living in colonial states overlooked the heterogeneity of ethnic and cultural groups within them, revealing the rejection of minority rights in human rights discourse. This, coupled with the support for the model of the nation-state by most African leaders,7 led to discriminatory policies targeting minorities. The federal structure of Nigeria in the immediate post-independence period, failed to secure equal representation and participation of minorities either via creation of states that coincided with an ethnic group or via their representation at the federal level in parliament.8 The unequal status of Nigerian citizens was particularly evident when an individual belonging to a certain ethnic group lived outside his region of origin, in this case his local citizenship rights were trumped.9 The unitary nation constructed in Mali by the US-RDA, after the failure of the federation with Senegal, sustained an assimilationist

“The application of ‘self-determination’ to people living in colonial states overlooked the heterogeneity of ethnic and cultural groups within them, revealing the rejection of minority rights in human rights discourse.”

Post and Vickers, Structure and Conflict Nigeria (London, 1973), p. 60. Solomon A. Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity in the post-colonial African state’ in South African Journal on Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 569. 8 Ali D. Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil. The political transformation of Nigeria, ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), p. 207. 9 Said Adejumobi, ‘Civil society and federalism in Nigeria’ in Regional and Federal Studies 14 (2004), p. 220. 7

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policy via the modernisation of socio-economic relations which was resisted by the Tuaregs.10 The absence of a federal structure or of Tuareg participation in government spurred the First Tuareg Rebellion (1963), also known as ‘Alfellaga’. The Tuareg attempt to obtain self-determination was not acknowledged as such also because of the inability to relate the concept to national groups living within a state, moreover support for colonial boundaries was expressed in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity: “to defend their sovereignty, [i.e. of the African states] their territorial integrity and independence”.11

Applying the European tradition of national self determination to multi-ethnic African states The principle of selfdetermination, advocated as the basis and legitimacy of states, is intrinsically linked to the historical development of the nation-state in Europe whereby the state represented the nation by expressing the “will of the people.”12 The support for self-determination by Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points, later to form the foundation of the League of Nations, justified also on theoretical grounds the demise of Europe’s last multi-national empires and the creation of nation-states. Nonetheless, the recognition that peoples’ self-determination arises from a common national aspiration was absent in the decolonisation era. The collective right to selfdetermination was perceived by the UN General Assembly in 1952 as “a prerequisite to the full enjoyment of all fundamental human rights”,13 which are an

“the UN supported the creation of multination states without advocating equal representation and participation of minorities in the political structure.”

Baz Lecocq, ‘Unemployed intellectuals in the Sahara: the ‘Teshumara’ Nationalist Movement and the Revolutions in Tuareg Society’ in International Review of Social History 49, (2004), p. 88. 11 OAU Charter, 25 May 1963 <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf > [accessed 26 November 2013] 12 Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 568. 13 Jackson, Quasi-states (Cambridge, 1990), p. 70.

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individual’s prerogatives. The denial of independence was thus portrayed as a violation of individuals’ human rights. By applying the notion of self-determination to colonial peoples who lacked a shared national conscience and by describing its fulfilment as a moral necessity, the UN supported the creation of multination states without advocating equal representation and participation of minorities in the political structure. This underlined the legitimacy of ethnically based parties who advocated national unity by monopolising political power like the US-RDA in Mali (1960-1968) and to a lesser extent the NPC in Nigeria (1960-1966). While some scholars such as Basil Davidson and Makau wa Mutua propose modifying colonial borders to reflect national groups,14 others, like Solomon A. Dersso, interpret power-sharing mechanisms as a safeguard for minorities.15

“Nigerian federalism, by maintaining the colonial tripartite division, perpetrated the domination of the three major ethnic groups, the HausaFulani in particular, the Ibo and the Yoruba ” The independence obtained by African states often lacked the empirical attributes previously considered prerequisites to statehood, this was underlined in the UN Declaration Granting Independence: “Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”16 Robert H. Jackson defines the sovereignty achieved by postcolonial African states as ‘negative’, because of their inability to deter a threat while being entitled to the right to non-intervention.17 Their legitimacy thus derived by a changing international perspective on the viability of colonies and the realisation that independence had to be fostered by legal recognition of the right of colonial territorial jurisdictions to self -determination,18 this insulated initially nationalist leaders from their electorate since independence had been negotiated with the former colonial powers rather than won by the people.

The right to self-determination which is affirmed collectively is an expression of the will of the majority which relegates the role of minorities within the state. In order to ensure equality for minorities within ‘multinational states’, Will Kymlicka suggests granting group specific rights. These take the form of: selfgovernment rights, granting autonomy to regionally defined communities, polyethnic rights, adopting policies that enable minorities to express their culture and special representation rights, reserving a number of seats in parliament for minorities 14

Clapham, Africa and the International System (Cambridge, 1996), p. 34, Basil Davidson, The black man’s burden. Africa and the curse of the nation-state (London, 1992), p. 206 and Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 583. 15 Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 586. 16 UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, 14 December 1960 <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/declaration.shtml> [accessed 29 November 2013] 17 Jackson, Quasi-states (Cambridge, 1990), p. 11. 18 Ibid., p. 5.

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or adopting proportional representation. 19 Kymlicka’s theory of minority rights reveals the compatibility of cultural rights with liberalism and the requirement of cultural autonomy for an individual’s right to freedom of expression and choice. 20 The recognition of the role of minority rights within plural societies developed gradually and was absent during the period of decolonisation, one of its first pronouncements was the Helsinki Final Act (1975) by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which underlined the right to ‘internal’ self-determination for minorities “all peoples always have the right…to determine… their internal and external political status”.21 Although the right to secession via internal self-determination is rejected by international law,22 since the mid-1970s an ethnic group’s right to autonomy was acknowledged. The recognition of rights to minorities was fully acknowledged in the 1990s and only gradually applied by African states, where the dominant discourse portrayed national unity as a prerequisite for development. This is particularly evident in one-party states like in the case of Mali. On the other hand, Nigerian federalism, by maintaining the colonial tripartite division, perpetrated the domination of the three major ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani in particular, the Ibo and the Yoruba to the detriment of weaker minorities. 23

Nigerian independence: disregard of minorities’ political claims and domination of the Hausa-Fulani The decision to maintain the colonial federal structure on the eve of Nigerian independence was dictated by administrative convenience rather than from a belief in the equality of the representation mechanism. The requests by minority groups for further creation of states was strongly rejected by the Wilink Commission in 1954 during the negotiations between Britain and Nigerian politicians which ended with the granting of independence. The basis for the rejection of minorities’ claims was the need for a simple administrative system, in the words of Sir James Robertson, the last British Governor General: “it seemed quite ridiculous to think of having separate states for some 200 tribal units both small and big”24 and the belief that minorities were safeguarded by “constitutional guarantees of individual rights”.25 This is revealing of the disregard for the role of cultural autonomy and expression as the basis for individual rights. The federal division of the country into three regions supported the rise of regionally based parties which led to oneparty dominance in regional government.26 The Northern Peo19

Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, 1995), p. 28. Ibid., p. 7. Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 586. 22 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, 1995), p. 27. 23 Post and Vickers, Structure and Conflict Nigeria (London, 1973), p. 40 and Senator F. J. Ellah, Nigeria and states creation. Based on the ‘Unfinished Motion’ (Port Harcourt, 1983), p. 3. 24 Ellah, Nigeria and states creation (Port Harcourt, 1983), p. 3. 25 Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil, ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), p. 202. 26 Post and Vickers, Structure and Conflict Nigeria (London, 1973), p. 43. 20 21

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ple’s Congress (NPC) governed in the North, where the HausaFulani were the dominant ethnic group, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in the East where the Ibo were a majority, while in the West, the Action Group (AG) did not obtain support from all Yorubas, indicating how class divisions challenged ethnic allegiance as the only basis for political loyalty.27 The upheavals in the Western region after the rigged 1965 elections which led to the 1966 military coup, were an attack against the corrupt political elite, Southerners supported the military viewed as a nationalist body able to rein ethnic particularism28. Although Nigerian ethnic cleavages were cross cut by class differences, the federal system supported mobilisation along ethnic lines in order for parties to obtain political control of a region, but this did not necessarily translate in power at the federal level. The coalition government was dictated by the NPC which would govern adopting a divide and rule policy in relation to the NCNC and the AG, this system antagonised supporters of the excluded political party.29 The coalition government led by the NPC and the NCNC, due to the weak mutual veto enshrined in the constitution, had the power to create a new state, the MidWest region, in 1963. This weakened the hold of the AG in the West, thus ending the possibility for political parties, such as the AG, to style as national representatives in order to build consensus via class rather than ethnic divisions. 30

The disregard of ethnicity as a principle for state creation during military rule in 1967 and later in 1976 denied minority groups ‘self-government rights’ thus excluding them from political decision-making. The proliferation of states was resented and resisted by the dominant ethnic groups who feared losing their political power, especially by the NPC in the North, “One North, One People, One Destiny”, who viewed its political predominance as a safeguard against the socially and economically more developed Southerners.31 The absence of selfgovernment as well as special representation rights in Nigeria was supposedly counter-balanced by the individual guarantees, concerning political, social and cultural rights, spelled out in the 1960 Nigerian constitution,32 nonetheless, the state is not a neutral institution and according to Kymlicka the guarantee provided by the judiciary is insufficient because legislation that affects the cultural freedom and autonomy of minorities is defined by the will of the majority in parliament.33 Moreover, the policies adopted to overcome the disadvantaged position of some 27

Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil, ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), p. 221. Himmelstrand, ‘Tribalism, nationalism, rank-Equilibration and Social Structure: A theoretical interpretation of some socio-political processes in Southern Nigeria’ in Journal of Peace Research 6 (1969), p. 92. 29 L. Adele Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Publius: the journal of federalism 15 (1985), p. 76. 30 Ibid., p. 75 and Himmelstrand, ‘Tribalism, nationalism, rank-Equilibration and Social Structure’ in Journal of Peace Research 6 (1969), p. 92. 31 Jonas Isawa Elaigwu, ‘Federalism and National Leadership in Nigeria’ in Publius: the journal of federalism 4 (1991), p. 128. 32 Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil, ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), p. 202 and Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Publius: the journal of federalism 15 (1985), p. 78. 33 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, 1995), p. 5. 28

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groups in society led to redistributive mechanisms favouring one ethnic group, the Hausa-Fulani over the others.34 Although section 27 of the Nigerian 1960 Constitution, ‘Freedom from discrimination’, rejects negative or positive discrimination policies “A citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, tribe, place of origin, religion or political opinion shall not…be subjected …to disabilities or restrictions…or be accorded…any privilege or advantage”35 it is later retracted in the following clause. Thus the consociation and federal mechanisms were weakened in the Nigerian constitution; segmental autonomy, the delegation of power to minorities,36 was unequal due to the affirmative action policies favouring the Hausa-Fulani to whom proportional representation was granted and easier access to federal posts and higher education, while the mutual veto for state creation was undermined by the requirement of a 2/3 majority. This, according to L. Adele Jinadu, favoured elites who manipulated and profited from these redistributive mechanisms.37

Federal mechanisms entrench regional-ethnic divisions without political representation: citizenship rights The granting of local citizenship rights via segmental autonomy created unequal status for the members of a certain ethnic group living outside their area of origin. This was caused by the application of local citizenship rights on the basis of lineage

“Ibos who were economically successful were denied their status by Yorubas who saw them as ethnically inferior.”

Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Publius: the journal of federalism 15 (1985), p. 74. 35 ‘The Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria’ 1 October 1960 <http://www.worldstatesmen.org/ nigeria_const1960.pdf> [accessed 29 November 2013] 36 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, 1977), p. 41. 37 Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria’, Publius: the journal of federalism 15 (1985), p. 74.

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ties to a specific ethnic group rather than on residence in a region.38 The Ibos living in the Western region, where the majority of the population is Yoruba, encountered obstacles to social mobility. Ibos who were economically successful were denied their status by Yorubas who saw them as ethnically inferior.39 The attempt by the Ibos to overcome this form of discrimination, which was a colonial legacy, was pursued either via support for an overarching national identity, by enhancing the social mobility of the group or via aggressive behaviour.40 This case of culturally specific rights reveals the dangers of applying them to citizenship, whereby an individuals’ claim to membership in a community can be delegitimised due to his cultural heritage. Minority rights are concerned with political representation and participation while membership in a state, in Africa, is based upon the common colonial legacy.

“We fight for our independence. We don’t want any of this Mali. The leaders…throw us in prison for no reason…”

Rejection of the principle of national autonomy by the Malian US-RDA hinders power-sharing agreements The denial of minority rights to the Tuaregs in Mali was enhanced by the need to underline national unity via allegiance to the party. The US-RDA promoted socialist modernising policies aimed at creating equality while ensuring development, in their vision the Tuareg had to participate in the modernisation of the country and in this way assimilate with the rest of the nation,41 this is emphasised in Article 1 of the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Mali: “One people, one purpose, one faith”. 42 This was strongly resisted by the Tuareg who viewed the government as representing the Mande nation, the ethnic group of southern Mali, and thus alien to their society and culture. The numerous uprisings of the Tuareg minority, the first motivated by the desire to achieve independence, the latter to obtain autonomy, 43 represent, from their historical and cultural standpoint, a continuous resistance to forms of colonisation which hinder their autonomy. Although the Tuareg resisted interference by the Malian government in their affairs, the socialist ideology supported by the US-RDA and the government attempt to delegitimise hierar-

Adejumobi, ‘Civil society and federalism in Nigeria’ in Regional and Federal Studies 14, (2004), p. 220. 39 Himmelstrand, ‘Tribalism, nationalism, rank-Equilibration and Social Structure’ in Journal of Peace Research 6 (1969), p. 84. 40 Ibid., p. 86. 41 Lecocq, Disputed desert decolonisation, competing nationalisms and Tuareg rebellions in Northern Mali (Leiden, 2010), p. 366. 42 Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity’ in South African Journal on Human Rights 24 (2008), p. 570. 43 Lecocq, ‘Unemployed intellectuals in the Sahara : the Teshumara Nationalist Movement’ in International Review of Social History 49 (2004), p. 89.

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chical clan structures by portraying chiefs as ‘feudal lords’, influenced a new wave of Tuareg intellectuals in the 1970s. 44 The ‘évolués’, who had received a Western education and the ‘ishumar’, who had experienced labour migration to North Africa, promoted equality and the diversification of the economy against the position of traditional leaders. 45 The absence of a federal structure or of adequate representation of the Tuareg hindered the possibility of political dialogue and identification of common beliefs between the new Tuareg intellectuals and the Malian socialist state. 46 ‘Alfellaga’, the Tuareg rebellion of 1963, whose political objective was independence, reflected the incompatibility of Tuareg cultural values with the Malian government dominated by the Mande ethnic group: “We fight for our independence. We don’t want any of this Mali. The leaders… throw us in prison for no reason…There is also the marriage act that does not conform to Muslim custom…We are against all the principles of the Party and the Government”.47 In the 1960s the proponents of independence articulated their demand without advocating statehood as the end result, thus revealing their desire for a large degree of autonomy via which their cultural distinctiveness could be maintained and promoted.48 Their articulation of self-government rights failed to muster foreign support, which the rebels themselves identified as a necessary condition for success. The unofficial aid obtained by French officials in Algeria and by some members of the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) never translated into an official alliance with the French or Algerian government.49 The Tuareg inability to portray their cause as a request for greater autonomy within a federal structure or for special representation rights safeguarding minorities hindered foreign support for the uprising. Nonetheless the claims of minority groups in postcolonial African states was not the major preoccupation of international organisations during the 1960s, as reflected in the UN Declaration Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; on the other hand, African leaders were concerned with maintaining the integrity of colonial territorial boundaries of the newly independent states and refused to devolve power to minorities for fear of state disaggregation. 44

Ibid., p. 105. Lecocq, ‘Unemployed intellectuals in the Sahara : the Teshumara Nationalist Movement’ in International Review of Social History 49 (2004), p. 92. 46 Ibid., p. 105. 47 Lecocq, Disputed decolonisation Tuareg rebellions (Leiden, 2010), p. 187. 48 Ibid., p. 189-190. 49 Ibid., p. 191. 45

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The decolonisation process and the absence of minorities The disregard for the role of minorities living in multination states in the international human rights paradigm, when the colonial powers relinquished their hold of African states, hindered the ability of minorities to channel their claims in a nondivisive fashion, as the 1963 Tuareg rebellion demonstrates. When claims were voiced within a federal framework, like in Nigeria, the recognition of cultural specificity was overlooked in state creation, on the basis of ‘administrative convenience’ and the predominance of the major ethnic groups perpetuated. 50 In both Mali and Nigeria, the need to maintain national unity in the precarious post-independence period together with the reliance on clientilistic relationships based on ethnic loyalties motivated nationalist leaders to downplay the relevance of ethnic differences by addressing them as forms of ‘tribalism’ which had to be eliminated in order to create a modern nation-state.51 The emphasis on colonial boundaries, which constrained minorities’ rights to self-determination, in the 1963 OAU Charter reflected the failure of the pan-Africanist ideology that envisioned a united Africa and the fear that postcolonial states might disintegrate. 52 The concomitant absence of cultural rights for minorities in the human rights discourse of the time inhibited an appreciation of the contradictions of applying the notion of selfdetermination to culturally diverse peoples and the realisation of the difficulties faced by postcolonial African states.

Ellah, Nigeria and states creation (Port Harcourt, 1983), p. 13. Lecocq, Disputed decolonisation Tuareg rebellions (Leiden, 2010), p. 15. Samuel M. Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: challenges of globalization, security and governance (London, 2008), p. 12. 51 52

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BIBLOGRAPHY

Said Adejumobi, ‘Civil society and federalism in Nigeria’ in Regional and Federal Studies 14 (2004), pp. 211-231. Cristopher Clapham, Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival (Cambridge, 1996) ‘The Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria’ 1 October 1960 <http:// www.worldstatesmen.org/nigeria_const1960.pdf> [accessed 29 November 2013] Basil Davidson, The black man’s burden. Africa and the curse of the nation-state (London, 1992) Solomon A. Dersso, ‘Constitutional accommodation of ethno-cultural diversity in the post-colonial African state’ in South African Journal on Human Rights 24 (2008), pp. 565-592. Jonas Isawa Elaigwu, ‘Federalism and National Leadership in Nigeria’ in Publius: the journal of federalism 4 (1991), pp. 125-144. Senator F. J. Ellah, Nigeria and states creation. Based on the ‘Unfinished Motion’ (Port Harcourt, 1983) Ulf Himmelstrand, ‘Tribalism, nationalism, rank-Equilibration and Social Structure: A theoretical interpretation of some socio-political processes in Southern Nigeria’ in Journal of Peace Research 6 (1969), pp. 81-103.

Nicholas S. Hopkins, ‘Socialism and Social Change in Rural Mali’ in The Journal of Modern African Studies 7 (1969), pp. 457-467. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, 1990) L. Adele Jinadu, ‘Federalism, the Consociational State and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria, Publius: the journal of federalism 15 (1985), pp. 71-100. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, 1995) Will Kymlicka, ‘National Cultural Autonomy and International Minority Rights Norms’ in Ethnopolitics 6 (2007), pp. 379-393.

Baz Lecocq, Disputed desert decolonisation, competing nationalisms and Tuareg rebellions in Northern Mali (Leiden, 2010) Baz Lecocq, ‘Unemployed intellectuals in the Sahara: the ‘Teshumara’ Nationalist Movement and the Revolutions in Tuareg Society’ in International Review of Social History 49, (2004), pp. 87-109. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven, 1977) Samuel M. Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: challenges of globalization, security and governance (London, 2008) OAU Charter, 25 May 1963 <http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ OAU_Charter_1963_0.pdf > [accessed 26 November 2013] Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960-1966 (London, 1973) ‘UN Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, 14 December 1960 <http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/

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declaration.shtml> [accessed 29 November 2013]

‘UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 19 December 1966 <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html> [accessed 1 December 2013] Ali D. Yahaya, ‘The creation of States’ in Soldiers and oil. The political transformation of Nigeria, ed. Keith Panter-Brick, (London, 1978), pp. 202-221.

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BY REBECCA DENNIS This paper engages with the debate surrounding the nature of the European Union’s role in international politics by presenting a systematic analysis of Ian Manners’ theory of Normative Power Europe. In order to evaluate whether one can truly conceptualise the EU as a normative power, this paper utilises Manners’ tripartite method of analysis, which, inspired by the three approaches to normative ethics, assesses the European Union’s principles, actions, and impacts. The analysis in this paper focuses on three policy areas: EU trade policy; the EU’s relations with its neighbours; and finally, the Common Security and Defence Policy. Using this method of analysis, it is possible ascertain a disconnect between what the EU says and what it does.

THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL ROLE: A NORMATIVE POWER IN THEORY OR PRACTICE? Introduction One of the most widely debated topics in European Politics is the discussion over the European Union’s (EU) role in international politics. Earlier debates centred around a distinction between civilian (see Duchene 1972, 1973) and military (see Bull 1982) power, but Ian Manners’ seminal 2002 article ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ 1 offered a new perspective. Manners focused on the EU’s “ideational impact” 2 in its role as a global norm setter. Since 2002, the theory of Normative Power Europe (NPE) has been debated and critiqued by countless scholars, including Manners himself. The aim of this paper is to investigate the claims made by Manners in the NPE theory through its application to a number of EU foreign policy areas. As the scope of this paper does not allow for an analysis of all policy areas, as would be ideal, three cases will be selected: trade policy, enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These cases have been chosen because they are simultaneously three of the most important and impactful areas of EU foreign policy and also because they offer different insights into the EU’s normative power.

Europe as a Normative Power Before the theory of Normative Power Europe can be used critically, it is important to fully understand the theory’s arguments and its evolution over the past 11 years. As aforementioned, the theory NPE centres around the EU’s “ideational impact” in international politics, or its “power over opinion”3. In terms of the European Union, there are two key aspects of the EU’s normative power: first, that the EU is a normative power purely by existing as a different type of actor in an international system of states, and secondly, that the EU is a normative power because it acts in a normative way, that is to say an ‘ethically good’ way.4 With reference to the first aspect, Manners explores what he calls the EU’s “normative difference” 1

Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies 40:2 (2002) 2 Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 283 3 Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 239 4 Ian Manners, “The Normative Ethics of the European Union,” International Affairs 84:1 (2008): 45

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in setting it apart from other global powers. Historical context, its nature as a hybrid polity and its political-legal constitution are identified as the key factors of EU normative difference. Historical context refers to the post-war situation in Europe that lead to a group of states committed to pooling their resources for mutual gain, while hybrid polity emphasises the hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance present in the EU which transcend the traditional Westphalian norm and the EU’s political-legal constitution describes an elite-driven, treaty-based legal order which explicitly states the values and principles of the Union.5 Manners argues that it is this normative difference which predisposes the EU to act in a normative way, 6 thereby identifying a causal link between the two aspects of normative power. If one accepts the conceptualisation of the EU as a normative power, the next question is- which norms? In his original 2002 article, Manners determined five core norms and four minor norms which constitute the EU’s “normative basis”; these are: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, followed by social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.7 Each of these norms is expressed in a variety of EU treaties or documentation, such as the Copenhagen membership criteria. Manners later developed these norms into nine substantive normative principles: sustainable peace, social freedom, consensual democracy, supranational rule of law, associative human rights, inclusive equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance.8 Each of these normative principles is explicitly expressed in the 2007 Reform Treaty. How, then, might one go about evaluating the EU’s normative power in international politics? Manners himself proposed a tripartite method of analysis which assesses the EU’s principles, actions and impact in terms of three approaches to normative ethics, bringing together the EU’s existential normative status and its ethical concerns.9 These three approaches to normative ethics are virtue ethics (i.e. emphasising virtues or character traits); deontological ethics (i.e. emphasising rules and actions); and finally, consequentialist ethics (i.e. emphasising the consequences and impact of actions). By taking into account all three aspects of normative power, one can effectively evaluate the EU’s normative power, from the principles that constitute it to the impact it has on world politics.

Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 240-1 Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 242 Manners, “Normative Power Europe,” 242-3 8 Manners, “Normative Ethics,” 47-55 9 Manners, “Normative Ethics,” 55-9. 6 7

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A Critical Analysis of Europe’s Normative Power The next section of this paper will apply Ian Manners’ tripartite method of analysis to three important areas of the European Union’s foreign policy – trade, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the Common Security and Defence Policy – in order to evaluate the theory of Normative Power Europe in practice.

The EU as a Normative Power In Trade? What, then, are the principles of EU trade policy? Kerremans and Orbie discuss the idea of “distributive justice” whereby Europeans believe that “all human beings are entitled to a minimum level of prosperity and economic security, irrespective of the outcomes of market-driven processes”.10 Manners refers to the promotion of the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Core Labour Standards (CLS) as a key aspect of normative trade policy in the EU11 (and as a legitimising force for EU power12). The principles of the CLS include “elimination of exploitative child labour, the prohibition on forced labour, nondiscrimination in employment, the freedom of association, and the right of collective bargaining”.13 Kerremans and Orbie do however emphasise that it is difficult to separate fairness concerns from those of self-interest.14 The expressed focus, though, is on fairness, labour standards, multilateralism and legitimacy. In terms of actions, the general consensus within EU trade policy literature is that the EU emphasises the use of positive conditionality over negative sanctions to achieve its normative aims, that there exists a network of institutionalised dialogue, and that the EU follows an incentive-based approach.15 Meunier and Nicolaïdis describe the EU as a ‘normative power through trade’ in reference to the way in which the EU uses trade

“there is no strong underlying pattern in terms of the motives for imposing sanctions; and finally, there are cases of so-called ‘intentional inconsistencies’ (that is to say, exemptions) where security and welfare interests are at stake .“ as a way to export standards and norms to its partners; bilaterally, on a region-to-region basis, and multilaterally.16 However, there are a number of conflicts and inconsistencies to be found in this policy area. Klaus Brummer, for example, examines the EU’s policy on economic sanctions and finds three important inconsistencies: first, a comparison of potential 10

Bart Kerremans and Jan Orbie, “The Social Dimension of European Union Trade Policies,” European Foreign Affairs Review 14:5 (2009): 638. 11 Ian Manners, “The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies: Reflections from a Normative Power Perspective,” European Foreign Affairs Review 14:5 (2009): 790. 12 Manners, “The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies,” 792. 13 Kerremans and Orbie, “The Social Dimension,” 639. 14 Kerremans and Orbie, “The Social Dimension,” 634. 15 Manners, “The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies,” 793. 16 Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power,” Journal of European Public Policy 13:6 (2006): 912-5.

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and actual targets of sanctions highlights a strong degree of ‘selectivity’ in EU practice; secondly, there is no strong underlying pattern in terms of the motives for imposing sanctions; and finally, there are cases of so-called ‘intentional inconsistencies’ (that is to say, exemptions) where security and welfare interests are at stake.17 Another example can be found in Orbie and Tortell’s examination into the beneficiaries of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP): participation in the GSP+ programme requires the “ratification and effective implementation” of the fundamental conventions of the ILO, and yet Orbie and Tortell’s analysis illustrates the lack of correlation between inclusion in the GSP+ and a country’s convention implementation record.18 Although the EU’s use of sanctions against GSP countries is consistent with ILO assessments and follows the EU’s commitment to incentive-based approaches, GSP+ incentives have been granted to many countries who have been heavily criticised by the ILO for not sufficiently implementing the conventions, thereby reflecting an inconsistent ‘follow through’ of its conditionality criteria and suggesting that other more selfinterest factors are likely at play.19 Meunier and Nicolaïdis identify a number of ways the EU’s professed principles conflict with each other in practice and result in inconsistencies and double-standards. For example, while the EU vows its commitment to international trade law, it maintains preferential trading relationships with particular countries, such as the ACP countries. 20 Another conflict arises between the EU’s “language of shared norms” and its use of ‘carrots and sticks’ to enforce these norms on its trading part-

Klaus Brummer, “Imposing Sanctions: The Not So ‘Normative Power Europe’,” European Foreign Affairs Review 14:5 (2009): 192-3. 18 Jan Orbie and Lisa Tortell, “The New GSP+ Beneficiaries: Ticking the Box or Truly Consistent with ILO Findings?” European Foreign Affairs Review 14:5 (2009): 664. 19 Orbie and Tortell, “The New GSP+ Beneficiaries,” 680. 20 Meunier and Nicolaidis, “Conflicted Trade Power,” 917.

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ners, highlighting the inherent issues with the idea of ‘conditionality’.21 Kerremans and Orbie summarise that “despite its normative ambitions, there seem to be clear limits in what the EU is able (and willing) to do”.22

“there have also been some inconsistencies in the application of the conditionality principle, most notably in the EU’s inability to suspend Tunisia from the ENP despite human rights violations.” The final part of the tripartite analysis requires an assessment of the impact of the EU’s trade policy. Generally speaking, this impact is extremely mixed in terms of its normative promotion.23 Kerremans and Orbie suggest that one way of measuring this impact is through the ratification and implementation of the ILO’s core conventions24 – indeed this research has been done by Orbie and Tortell, who concluded that the EU’s GSP+ scheme, although arguably encouraging the ratification of these conventions, has not led to an overall improvement in labour standards implementation in the GSP countries.25 Aside from labour standards, one could also consider the impact of the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), as Andy Storey has done (studying Africa in particular): Storey concludes that the programme of EPA appears guided by self-interest, could be accused of enforcing a neoliberal economic model on African states, and that this process could ultimately be harmful to the “developmental needs” of Africa.26 To conclude this section on trade policy, it can be seen that while the EU clearly fulfils its existential conceptualisation as a normative power, through its expressed trade principles and the methods it uses to diffuse them, there are a number of inconsistencies and negative impacts which serve to undermine its legitimacy as a normative actor.

“It is undeniable that, overall, EU enlargement has had numerous positive consequences for its new members. Entry to the European Union is credited as a major reason for the survival of a newly-established democracy in Southern and Eastern European states.” Normative Power Europe in the Neighbourhood? Enlargement is often seen as the crux of European normative power; indeed Haukkala calls enlargement the EU’s “main instrument of normative power”.27 However, with enlargement having slowed down considerably since the last big enlargement 21

Meunier and Nicolaidis, “Conflicted Trade Power,” 920. Kerremans and Orbie, “The Social Dimension,” 639. Manners, “The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policies,” 796. 24 Kerremans and Orbie, “The Social Dimension,” 641. 25 Orbie and Tortell, “The New GSP+ Beneficiaries,” 678. 26 Andy Storey, “Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and Africa,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24:3 (2006): 340-3. 27 Hiski Haukkala, “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 60:9 (2008): 1602. 22 23

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in 2004-7, it would be instructive to see how the NPE logic applies to the neighbourhood under the European Neighbourhood

Policy (ENP), which aims to bring “partners” closer to the EU through “greater co-operation”.28 The two processes will be considered in turn here as examples of the EU’s relations with its neighbours. In the case of enlargement, the normative discourse surrounding it has always been strong. The European Commission’s Enlargement Strategy 2012-2013 refers to enlargement’s contribution to peace, security and prosperity and emphasises the importance of the rule of law and democratic governance. 29 However, Thomas Diez, one of the most vocal critics of the normative power theory, has explored the tension between the expressed values of democracy and justice in enlargement policy, with specific regard to the accession of Turkey. 30 With reference to the actual operating of the enlargement policy, it is important to note that both enlargement and the ENP are built on the principle of ‘conditionality’ which, as discussed above in relation to trade policy, comes with several normative problems; Hyde-Price has even argued that the EU’s use of conditionality in its neighbourhood constitutes “collectively exercising hegemonic pow28

European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper COM(2004) 373,” (2004). 29 European Commission, “Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012-2013 COM(2012) 600,” (2012). 30 Thomas Diez, “Not Quite Sui Generis Enough: Interrogating European Values,” European Societies 14:4 (2012).

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er”.31 It is undeniable that, overall, EU enlargement has had numerous positive consequences for its new members. Entry to the European Union is credited as a major reason for the survival of a newly-established democracy in Southern and Eastern European states.32 However, there are also arguments to be made that

“Bailes draws an important distinction between ‘being good’ and ‘doing good’; the EU arguably fulfils the former (through the achievement of enduring European peace and its humanitarian objectives), while the latter is far more complex. “ the EU’s inflexible imposition of its own rules and structures can have a negative effect on new members; for example the import of Western capitalism in central and eastern Europe led in some cases (i.e. Hungary) to increased inequality.33 In the case of the normative principles of the ENP, the Commission based the policy on a “mutual commitment to common values”, including rule of law, good governance, and respect for human rights.34 While the EU has often faced accusations of acting in strategic selfinterest with regard to its relationships with its neighbours, rather than on normative concerns, Diez notes that the dichotomous distinction between interests and norms is false; the presence of interests does not preclude normative considerations. 35 Others have accused the EU of using normative discourse in relations with its neighbours in order to legitimise the use of imperial policies.36 As with enlargement above, the use of conditionality in the ENP poses the same normative concerns. Furthermore, there have also been some inconsistencies in the application of the conditionality principle, most notably in the EU’s inability to suspend Tunisia from the ENP despite human rights violations. 37 The ENP has been praised for its differentiated approach towards individual partners38 and the generosity of its material assistance39, and yet it suffers from one key problem when trying to ‘impose’ its values on its partners: legitimacy. Haukkala argues that normative power in the enlargement process is de31

Adrian Hyde-Price, “‘Normative’ Power Europe: A Realist Critique,” Journal of European Public Policy 13:2 (2006): 226. 32 Haukkala, “The EU as a Regional Normative Hegemon,” 1603. 33 Jan Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions: the EU’s Normative Power Discourse,” Journal of Political Ideologies 18:1 (2013): 48. 34 European Commission, “COM(2004)373,” 3. 35 Diez, “Not Quite Sui Generis Enough,” 525. 36 Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions.” 37 Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions,” 45. 38 Michelle Pace, “Norm Shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 20:4 (2007): 666. 39 Esther Barbé and Elisabeth Johansson-Nogués, “The EU as a Modest ‘Force for Good’?: the European Neighbourhood Policy,” International Affairs 84:1 (2008), 81.

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pendent on the prospect of membership for its legitimacy, thus the ENP, with its lack of membership prospects, is inherently normatively problematic.40 Similarly, Zielonka comments that the difference in membership prospect between, for example, central and eastern European countries previously and the Arab world today undermines the EU’s normative leverage over these Arab nations.41 Moreover, Zielonka argues that the EU’s normative agenda is not sufficiently universal in Arab states- particularly Islamist ones- and is thus often actively resisted.42 Due to this lack of legitimacy, the ENP’s success in projecting its normative power is limited, and comments about its ineffectiveness are

“Ultimately, it is hard to argue that the EU does not act under the best of intentions, and that it strongly sees itself as a normative and ethical actor .” common. For example, NGOs in many ENP partners do not believe the ENP contributes to democratisation in their country. 43 There are also some examples of negative impacts of ENP, such as the damaging effect of the restrictive EU visa regime in Georgia.44 Overall, the EU’s relations with its neighbours are expressly guided by its normative principles of peace and community, and while enlargement has been largely successful in promoting these ideals, the ENP has suffered from a lack of legitimacy which severely limited its normative power.

CSDP: Europe Beyond Normative Power? The existence of the CSDP is the most controversial aspect of EU foreign policy, from a normative perspective. Although the presence of military capabilities in the Union might suggest a move away from normative power, the expressed principles of the EU’s defence policy contradict the idea; “peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter” (TEU Article 42).45 These underlying principles of humanitarian action and respect for international law are developed into an explicit set of ‘suitable’ tasks, known as the Petersberg Tasks: humanitarian tasks, military assistance, conflict prevention, peace-keeping, crisis management and peace-making (TEU Article 43).46 Manners also identifies a further principle of the CSDP found in other EU statements, that of sustainable peace.47 Interestingly, the idea of sustainable peace and its em40

Haukkala, “The EU as a Regional Normative Hegemon,” 1606-8. Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions,” 47. Zielonka, “Europe’s New Civilising Missions,” 47. 43 Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, “The EU as a Modest ‘Force for Good’?” 91. 44 Barbé and Johansson-Nogués, “The EU as a Modest ‘Force for Good’? 90. 45 EUR-Lex, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union,” Official Journal of the European Union (2012) 46 EUR-Lex, “Treaty on European Union.” 47 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads,” Journal of European Public Policy 13:2 (2006): 186. 41 42

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phasis on long-term structural conflict prevention led to the EU’s use of conditionality in policies including trade and neighbourhood, as discussed above.48 The important question is whether these principles are adhered to in practice or whether we see inconsistencies similar to those in trade and neighbourhood policies. It is true that the majority of CSDP missions are civilian in nature – only three of ten completed missions and four of fourteen ongoing missions are military (EEAS 2013) – although Manners argues that the prioritisation of military structures and success undermines the normative power of these missions. 49 One can also question the selection of CSDP missions as a key normative evaluation: Bailes argues that missions were chosen due to factors such as limited risk, ease of consensus, strategic self-interest (e.g. the Balkans) and colonial heritage (e.g. the Congo) rather than pure normative concerns, while cases with the strongest humanitarian claims were not undertaken (Darfur, for example).50 This selectivity deeply undermines the EU’s normative claims. This lends weight to Hyde-Price’s argument, in his neo-realist critique of the CSDP, that the EU is merely a cache for the member states’ ‘secondorder concerns’ and thus an ethical foreign policy would only occur when it does not conflict with “core national interests”.51

Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,” 187. Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,” 190. Alyson J. K. Bailes, “The EU and a ‘Better World’: What Role for the European Security and Defence Policy?” International Affairs 84:1 (2008): 123-4. 51 Hyde-Price, “A Realist Critique,” 222-3. 49 50

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In terms of on-the-ground capacity, CSDP missions have suffered from a lack of resources and capability shortfalls.52 Finally, one must evaluate the normative consequences of CSDP missions. Bickerton et al state that “most” CSDP missions have had a “beneficial impact”, citing the large number of requests for EU interventions and the absence of explicit failure as indicators.53 However, ‘most’ is not ‘all’ and examples of the negative consequences of CSDP missions can be found, such as the EUFOR Althea mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it was suggested that the EU’s prioritisation of military goals over local capacity-building led to “dependency, helplessness and disillusionment”.54 One could also argue that the extremely limited scope of the majority of CSDP missions ensures short-term tangible ‘success’ at the expense of long-term impact.55 Overall, it is possible to conclude that the EU does not quite live up to its own normative goals for the CSDP. Bailes draws an important distinction between ‘being good’ 56 and ‘doing good’; the EU arguably fulfils the former (through the achievement of enduring European peace and its humanitarian objectives), while the latter is far more complex.

Conclusion This paper has attempted to diverge from the general practice of evaluating theories of the European Union’s role in international politics against each other, instead focusing on a systematic analysis of the EU’s normative power in practice, based on Manners’ own tripartite method. A common theme arises in all three policy areas studied; while the EU’s foreign policy objectives are clearly normative in character, when acting on these policies the EU’s normative power is characterised by inconsistency and selectivity, and the impact of NPE is mixed at best. In terms of further research, this analysis should be expanded to cover all areas of EU foreign policy in order to construct a fuller picture. The theory of Normative Power Europe remains a strong one, and should be commended at least for overcoming the false dichotomy of soft-hard civilian-military power. Ultimately, it is hard to argue that the EU does not act under the best of intentions, and that it strongly sees itself as a normative and ethical actor. Unfortunately, these good intentions do not always produce ‘good’ behaviour or outcomes.

Chris J. Bickerton, Bastien Irondelle and Anand Menon, “Security Co-Operation Beyond the Nation-State: The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 49:1 (2011): 5. 53 Bickerton et al, “Security Co-Operation Beyond the Nation-State,” 5. 54 Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,” 191. 55 Manners, “Normative Power Europe Reconsidered,” 190. 56 Bailes, “The EU and a ‘Better World’,” 121.

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BIBLOGRAPHY

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