ISSN: 2151-0806
regime security in many post-colonial states are further complicated by two other factors that were either absent or very weak during the early stages of state-making in Europe and the United States, namely the demand for political participation by increasing numbers of politically mobilised people and the demand for a more equal economic distribution (Ayoob, 1995). Recent statistical findings support such a correlation between democratisation and armed conflicts, but with some important clarifications (Glickman, 1995; Joseph, 1999; Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). In particular, Ward and Gleditsch have shown that as states become more democratic they reduce their overall chances of being involved in wars with other states by approximately half (Ward and Gleditsch, 1998). However, rocky or especially rapid transitions or reversals are associated with an increased risk of war involvement. When it comes to civil wars, or intra-state wars, studies have found that in-between forms of governance, what is sometimes referred to as semi-democracies, that is, states that are neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic, are more prone to intra-state armed conflicts than are other states. These findings support the notion that changing the mode of governance, no matter the direction, clearly and strongly increases the probability of civil wars. However, such change alone does not explain the higher frequency of conflicts in semi-democracies, as the conflict propensity of semidemocracies does not seem to change over time. “Consolidated� semi-democracies, where no significant political change has occurred for some time, are still more conflict prone (Hegre, 2001). Indeed, Africa poses some of the most difficult and challenging questions in relation to state weakness, democratisation and political violence. The dynamics and outcome of the fourth wave of democratisation have raised questions that expose relatively unexplored theoretical frontiers. This is because empirical experiences of democratisation in most states in Africa would seem to be at odds with some of the assumptions and predictions found in mainstream theoretical works on democratic transitions and democratisation,. This is particularly true in relation to ideas about the legitimacy and capacity of the state itself and the ability of the current democratisation process to overcome and outlast pre-democratic structures of power (Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). Indeed, in many post-colonial states in Africa, the state entity itself is weak and lack legitimacy. This weakness is further often exacerbated by the lack of capabilities and resources that are required in order to overcome this structural weakness (O�Donnell and Phillipe, 1986). As a result of this deficiency, a large number of countries in Africa are either stuck in the democratic transition without moving towards consolidation or have already experienced a partial or complete reversal of the transition process. In some cases, such as Central African Republic, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Nigeria and Togo, the transition was accompanied with large-scale occurrences of political violence or the outbreak of intra-state armed conflict (Draman, 2003). In explaining this outcome, Herbeson argued that democracy sustainability in a state is related to its progress in areas of contestation in which the advancement of democracy competes with other interests and goals (Harbeson, 2000). Democratisation requires a radical shift in the nature of political power, something which is likely to be opposed by those that stand to loose from such political change. Progress towards democracy, therefore, is likely to be the outcome of conflict, power struggles, possibly even violence, and of non-democratic pacts among political organizations (Ottaway, 1997a).
Peace Studies Journal, Vol. 6, Issue 3, July 2013
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