file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/me/Desktop/Book%20shelf/Quigley,%20Carroll%20-%20Tragedy%20and%20Hope.txt
Alliance but Britain was reluctant and delayed the discussions to the great irritation of the Soviet leaders. To show its displeasure, the Soviet Union on May 3rd replaced Litvinov with Molotov as foreign minister. This would have been a warning, Litvinov knew the West and was favorable to democracy and to the Western Powers. As a Jew, he was anti-Hitler. Molotov was a contrast from every point of view. On May 19th, Chamberlain refused an alliance and pointed with satisfaction to "that great virile nation on the borders of Germany which under this agreement (of April 6th) is bound to give us all the aid and assistance it can." He was talking about Poland! Page 656 The members of the military mission took a slow ship (speed thirteen knots) and did not reach Moscow until August 11th. They were again negotiators of second rank. In London, according to rumor, neither side wanted an agreement. Considering Chamberlain's secret efforts to make a settlement with Germany, there is no reason to believe that he wanted an agreement with Russia. The Russians demanded an exact military commitment as to what forces would be used against Germany; they wanted guarantees whether the states concerned accepted or not; they wanted specific permission to fight across a territory such as Poland. These demands were flatly rejected by Poland on August 19th. On the same day, Russia signed a commercial treaty with Germany. Two days later, France ordered its negotiators to sign the right to cross Poland but Russia refused to accept this until Poland consented as well. Page 657 On Aug. 23, Ribbentrop and Molotov signed an agreement which provided that neither signer would take any aggressive action against the other signer or give any support to a third Power in such action. The secret protocol delimited spheres of interest in eastern Europe. The line followed the northern boundary of Lithuania and the Narew, Vistula, and San rivers in Poland and Germany gave Russia a free hand in Bessarabia. This agreement was greeted as a stunning surprise in the Entente countries. There was no reason why it should have been. The British begged the Poles and the Germans to negotiate; the Italians tried to arrange another four-Power conference; various outsiders issued public and private appeals for peace; secret emissaries flew back and forth between London and Germany. All this was in vain because Hitler was determined on war and his attention was devoted to manufacturing incidents to justify his approaching attack. Political prisoners were taken from concentration camps, dressed in German uniforms, and killed on the Polish frontier as "evidence" of Polish aggression. A fraudulent ultimatum with sixteen superficially reasonable demands on Poland was presented to the British ambassador when the time limit had elapsed. It was not presented to the Poles because the Polish ambassador in Berlin had been ordered by Beck not to accept any document from the Germans. Page 658 The German invasion of Poland at 4:45a.m. on September 1, 1939, did not end the negotiations to make peace, nor did the complete collapse of Polish resistance on September 16. Since these efforts were futile, little need be said of them except that France and Britain did not declare war on Germany until more than two days had elapsed. During this time, no ultimatums were sent to Germany. On September 3 at 9a.m., Britain presented an ultimatum which expired at 11a.m. In a similar fashion, France entered the war at 6p.m. on September 3. CHAPTER XIV: WORLD WAR II: THE TIDE OF AGGRESSION, 1939-1941 Page 661 The Second World War lasted exactly six years. It was fought on file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/me/Desk...ley,%20Carroll%20-%20Tragedy%20and%20Hope.txt (69 of 129) [14/06/2005 11:42:40]