file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/me/Desktop/Book%20shelf/Quigley,%20Carroll%20-%20Tragedy%20and%20Hope.txt
Stalin; it was with the system, it was with Russia. The more completely total and irresponsible power is concentrated in one man's hands, the more frequently will a monster of sadism be produced. The very structure of Russian life drove Khrushchev, as it had driven Stalin, to concentrate all power in his own hands. Neither man could relax halfway to power for fear that someone else would continue on, seeking the peak of power. The basis of the whole system was fear and like all neurotic drives in a neurotic system, such fear could not be overcome even by achievement of total power. That is why it grows into paranoia as it did with Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, Paul I, Stalin and others. Page 1031 Having failed to block Khrushchev's economic plans, his rivals in the Presidium were reduced to a last resort, they had to get rid of the man himself. At a Presidium meeting on June 18, 1957, the motion was made to remove Khrushchev as the first party secretary. The discussion grew violent with Malenkov and Molotov attaching and Khrushchev defending himself. He was accused of practicing a "cult of personality" and of economic mismanagement. The vote was 7-4 against him with Mikoyan, Kirichenko and Suslov his only supporters. He was offered the reduced position of minister of agriculture. Page 1032 Khrushchev refused to accept the result, denying that the Presidium had the authority to remove a first secretary, and appealing to the Central Committee. The members of this larger group joined in the discussions as they arrived while Khrushchev's supporters sought to delay the vote until his men could come in from the provinces. Marshall Zhukov provided planes to bring in the more distant ones. The discussion became bitter when Zhukov threatened to produce evidence that Malenkov and Molotov had been deeply involved in the bloody purges of 1937. Madame Furtseva, an alternate member of the Presidium, filibustered with a speech for six hours. Eventually, there were 309 members present. When the vote was finally taken, Khrushchev's supporters voted for him solidly and his removal, already voted by the Presidium, was reversed. Khrushchev at once counterattacked. He moved and carried the expulsion from the Presidium of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov for "anti-party" activities. Then came the election of a new Presidium with fifteen full members instead than the previous eleven, and nine alternates instead of the previous six. This change was Khrushchev's most smashing personal victory and the most significant event in Russia's internal history. It led Khrushchev to a position of political power more complete than Stalin's had been although it was clear that Khrushchev would never be allowed to abuse his power the way Stalin had done. Page 1033 Khrushchev did not rest on his oars. During the summer of 1957, he made notable concessions to the peasants (ending compulsory deliveries from products of their personal plots), slammed down the lid on freedom of writers and artists, pushed vigorously both the "virgin lands" scheme and the decentralization of industry, and worked to curtail the growing autonomy of the armed forces and revived trade unions into the new regional economic councils. Page 1034 Russian objection to city-bombing or to strategic terror of the V-2 kind as ineffective and a waste of resources was undoubtedly sincere. The Soviet Union has no idea of being able to achieve military victory over the United States simply because they have no method of occupying the territory of the United States at any stage in a war. file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/me/Des...ey,%20Carroll%20-%20Tragedy%20and%20Hope.txt (100 of 129) [14/06/2005 11:42:40]