Harvard Asia Pacific Review 11.1

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imposing their own brand of Islamic justice on communithe country’s sliding into conservatism in the absence of conties. certed action. Conservatives promoting Sharia as a ‘local’ When looking at the results of the recent Indonesian identity and installing corrupt leaders can hijack the devoluelections, you could easily be deceived into thinking that tion of power form the center. Political parties are politicking public opinion puts the moderates ahead of the conservaIslam for their self-interested purposes at the expense of hutives in the battle of ideology. Indeed the Islamist parties man rights and pluralism for the people. The internal balance did not do well in the election. However this is a superfiof politics and religion must be struck. Indonesia’s ability to cial argument measuring only numbers. The real measure deal with this current challenge is key to its future success of Indonesia’s problem with conservatism is the more subtle and for its high-hoped ambition to bridge the Muslim and the and mainstream adoption of the religious agenda by all. It is Western world. not about PKS winning or losing, but the fact that everyone In the future Indonesia will be judged as either a success seems to be becoming more like PKS. Everyone is politicking story transitioning from a painful past to a progressive demoreligion to win. You don’t need a definitively Islamist party cratic and developed country, or as a country that has failed anymore if everyone is adopting an Islamist agenda. to transform after a dictatorship. This global age of identity Neither Muhammadiyah nor the and the rise of Asia has Indonesia on Nadhatul Ulama, two of the largest a precipice. The rhetoric of SBY inIndonesia’s ability to deal with moderate Muslim organizations in spires confidence that Indonesia will this current challenge is key to the country, has been brave enough proudly project a model of moderate to challenge the Islamic groups. For while advancing democracy its future success and for its high- Islam conservative Sharia to be implementand modernity at home. I hope that hoped ambition to bridge the ed, there does not need to be many he and others after him can continue to voice support for it. Conservatives build on positive developments Muslim and the Western world. to just need the voices to be loud in orboth internally and internationally der to pronounce it. By articulating to shape a world where the vision of their ideas assertively and repeatedly, conservative Islamist harmonious relations becomes real. groups drive the religious discourse of Indonesia today. Aguswandi, a post-conflict adviser and human rights advocate, is curEven though the country is in the hands of the moderrently a fellow of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at ate President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, this will not stop Harvard University.

Cooperation, Friction and Safeguarding: Australia and Indonesia’s Security Relationship Dale Stephens & Stefan Gruber At first glance, Australia and Indonesia are two seemingly disparate countries that - despite their close proximity ostensibly represent opposite poles on any meaningful sociocultural demographic measure. Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country, culturally situated within South East Asia with an enormous, mostly Javanese, population base of over 240 million people. Since declaring independence from the Netherlands in 1945, Indonesia went through many political struggles and changes, which seem to have somewhat eased off with the first free presidential elections in 2004. Conversely, Australia is a traditionally democratic, largely Christian country with a relatively small, mostly European, population of 22 million that is firmly entrenched within the western political, cultural and strategic defense framework. A former Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, H.E. Imron Cotan, has observed that the two countries are “absolutely different from one another, notably in terms of history, culture and political orientation.“1 Similarly, a former Australian Foreign Minister has stated that Australia and Indonesia are (metaphorically speaking) “half a world apart” and they “differ in language, culture, religion, history, ethnicity, population size and in political, legal and social systems.”2 Despite these differences, both Australia and Indonesia

are permanently entwined geographically. They are close physical neighbors and the management of their relationship is recognized on both sides as a critical strategic imperative. Australia has been involved in several military operations in Southeast Asia and is one of the driving economic and political forces in the region while Indonesia’s sheer size makes it a major player. It is impossible for both countries to make significant strategic decisions without affecting each other’s interests. Australia’s Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, stated in 2009 “that whatever challenges we face together in our region or the world at large, we in this country Australia have a first instinct, which is how do we work with Indonesia on this.”3 Historically, the relationship between both countries has been particularly fluid4 with dichotomous elements of great harmony and tension, co-operation and competition, selfless commitment and tacit low-intensity armed confrontation. Recent developments have shown that their security relationship and cooperation can be expected to become much closer in order to meet arising challenges for their national interests and Southeast Asia in general. The recently agreed “Treaty of Lombok” that seeks to establish a comprehensive and layered framework to the management of this issue marks SUBFEATURE | Cooperation, Friction, and Safeguarding 35


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