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solving. However, at times it is important not to concentrate on the process in all sorts of activities, because to do so will interfere with the smooth execution of these activities. At the level of speech, stuttering will occur if one focuses on the process inappropriately. Tightrope walkers need to avoid focussing on aspects of what they are doing so as to stay on the rope. Process is also obscured in language use as we tend to take the meanings of words for granted. Second, there is a difficulty that is central for readers coming to any well-formed theory for the first time. Many groundbreaking theorists, it seems to me, develop a form of linguistic expression in order to be as precise as possible with their ground-breakingly novel ways of describing and explaining experience. As a student I remember struggling with John Dewey and Jean Piaget, and later as a young academic in Dublin I read and met Maturana. Each of these thinkers was concerned with similar topics and saying similar things but with very different forms of language that incorporated important theoretical insights. However, understanding and exploring these differences in forms of language is crucial to grasping the insights that are special to the theorist. While part of this paper on Maturana’s work refers to his constructivist epistemology and to other constructivist thinkers, I want to focus on some of the implications of his writings on epistemology for our relations with each other. This is because I have felt that this is a central recurring theme in his work and indeed one that has potential implications for conflict resolution at the interpersonal level and for the development of ecological responsibility at the level of society. Constructivism has varied meanings, so to be consistent I am following Piaget (1970) and present cognitive processes and products in constructivist terms as (1) developing systems that (2) seek to identify regularities in experience using existing ideas in an iterative manner; and where (3) these emerging regularities are constrained by intra-individual and perceived inter-individual consistencies that are central to two of the domains I am concerned with here. Then, following Ernst von Glasersfeld (1995), it is important to note that all cognitive products are constructions and are built from experience and cannot be compared with “reality;”
Constructivist Foundations
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rather their constraints are wholly dependent on internal comparisons with previously constructed ideas. Like von Glasersfeld in his article on Maturana (Glasersfeld 1991), I want to state that I am presenting my own interpretations in what follows. While this general account of how thinking works appears similar in different constructivist thinkers, including Maturana, there are the nuances I mentioned in the phrasing and emphasis of different writers. In addition, Maturana’s writing is often difficult when it is first read and for this reason I place his work in the context of other thinkers who have similarly constructivist theories. Dewey’s account of cognitive process was essentially one where thinking was described as a form of experiment. One plans an action to assess the result and this result informs about the adequacy of the planned action. The iterative nature of cognition in Dewey is very apparent and this type of circularity is also apparent in Maturana’s theory. At times Dewey (e.g., 1960) also expressed the radical idea that knowledge is always changing and that knowledge is assessed by the results of experiments rather than being matched with reality. In Piaget’s (1970) account of process, the emphasis is more biological: it is one of assimilation and accommodation under the guidance of an equilibration process. Some recent criticisms of this account in Piaget have their origins in the difficulties encountered in modelling this process. In such modelling it becomes difficult to decide which aspect of the problem to focus on (Mareschal & Westermann 2009). Humberto Maturana’s constructivist epistemology also is influenced by his biological background. In Maturana’s case the internal circularity of the reasoning is very much part of his style of writing and thinking. For example, in discussing how experience comes from “nowhere,” Maturana writes: “We do not usually realise that because we normally collapse the experience upon the explanation of the experience in the explanation of the experience” (1988: 27). In addition, Maturana (1997) emphasises that living systems are structuredetermined systems and learning has a secondary place. For example, “Living systems have a plastic structure, and the course that their structural changes follows while they stay alive is contingent to their own internal
dynamics of structural change modulated by the structural changes triggered in them by their interactions in the medium they exist as such” (Maturana 1997, part 1). So the emphasis here is principally on intra-individual consistencies even though we exist in the flow of recursive coordinations of language, which is naturally social. This quality of connection and interconnection is central to the theory and its implications. Importantly, both initial and later accounts of this theory refer to the ethical implications of the theory. I will focus on the iterative nature of knowing in Maturana, then move to his account of explanations and ways this prioritises the ethical implications of his constructivist epistemology. The ideas we have about individual identities, that is, both our own and that of others, are central to this discussion. So it is important to notice how the idea of self might be understood in a constructivist sense. Self is a conservation or a constant with some variation from time to time or according to changing context. Von Glasersfeld wrote about the self concept as a construction that “..resides in no place at all, but merely manifests itself in the continuity of our acts of differentiating and relating and in the intuitive certainty we have that our experience is truly ours” (Glasersfeld 1979: 113). Significantly, our perception of discontinuity in another person’s acts of continuity may lead to the immediate realisation that this other self is not the self we anticipated. How we consider self and other is vitally important in disagreements. In what follows I allude to the difficulties in changing ones’ view on different others and the important role of discussion in facilitating the emergence of awareness and respect.
Cognitive processes, mistakes, and different points of view Ethics often arises when people encounter different points of view or different accounts of experiences that are shared. Such differences invite discussion but the basis of discussion may or may not be respectful. In my view the ethical quality of the discussion depends on the extent that the hidden assumptions made in the accounts of thinking