My subsequent job was in Germany. It is a smaller country but a similar sort of diversity applies. People in London talk to Berlin the entire time, but they never go and talk to the chief ministerial equivalent in Stuttgart or Munich. That is a vital function that a modern Embassy can play, both in projecting and assessing. Young: That is all the more important in India since it has had coalition government at the centre and the local regional state parties have played such a big role in sustaining that. Arthur: Absolutely. Patrick (Chair): There are about 20 minutes before we move on to the questions, and I thought we might look at the role of the High Commission and UK-India relations in times of crisis. I guess that the best example of that is the period directly after the attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani-based terrorists in 2002. You were High Commissioner, Rob, and there was a huge about of international and UK diplomacy. Would you like to say something about that and the general question about the relationship with Pakistan? Young: I will go back a little further. The relationship with the United States— not really our business this afternoon but important nonetheless—changed during the 1990s. It is important to recall that at the time of the crisis between India and Pakistan, which stemmed from the attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, America had already played a considerable role in defusing an India-Pakistan crisis over the Pakistani occupation of the Kargil Heights in 1999. The relationship between India and Pakistan on the issue of terrorism had changed, although the Indians remained sceptical about whether the Americans would be willing to confront Musharraf71 over support for cross-border terrorism. As you know, the attack on the Indian Parliament led to the Indian army being mobilised on a scale that had not been seen since the Indo-Chinese war of 1962. At the time, however, there was practically no dialogue between the Indian and Pakistan Governments. It had been patchy since the Agra Summit and there were no back channels in regular use. India needed third-party help, therefore, despite all the ideological worries that it had held in the past about such help over Kashmir. That became all the more evident when India was seen not to have an exit strategy from its military mobilisation. Straight after the attack on the Parliament, the UK managed to insert itself with the US as an interlocutor with Pakistan. I think that was the first time that India had accepted such a role for the UK since independence. The Americans, of course, carried the most clout, but I think that the Indians were glad to have a second opinion on the issue, and a second voice speaking in Islamabad. I found myself spending most of my time between December 2001 and May-June 2002 working on this issue and in almost daily contact with the Indian National Security Adviser,72 the Ministers for Defence73 and for Foreign Affairs74 and so on. There were also visits from the Prime Minister, Jack Straw the Foreign Secretary75, David Manning76 the No. 10 Private Secretary dealing with 71
Pervez Musharraf, Pakistani leader (in various capacities), 1999-2008. Brajesh Mishra, National Security Advisor, 1998-2004. 73 George Fernandes, Minister for Defence, 2001-4. 74 Jaswant Singh, Minister for External Affairs, 1998-2002. 75 Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary, 2001-6. 72
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