The Development of Philippine political parties by Filipiniana Online

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THE DEVELOPME NT OF

PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES DAPEN LIANG, Ph. D.

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1939-

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FOREWORD BY JOSEPH RALSTON HAYl)EN, Ph.D., LL.D.

Profess@r of Political Science The University of Michigan Vice-G0vernoF of the Philippine Islands, 1933-1935. Nowhere else in print is there as complete an'd a1,1th0ritative an account_of the development of Philippine poiitical parti'es as this scholarly study by Dr. Dapen Liang. · SkilfuHy utilizing a wide variety of primary s@Mrnes as well as the contributions orother writers upon the suh,Ject, Dr. Lia:11g has produced a description of this imp@l't:ant phase of the great PhilipJ;>ine experiment that sholllid rank wi,t h the standal'd works upon the party systems 0£ the w0rld. The personality of. the author adds inteFest and significance to this useful achievement. A native of the island of Hainan, DF. Liang topped a modern .educati@n in CTo.ina by graduate study in the University of Miehiga,n and at New York University, receiving his - doctorate at the latter institution. In every chapter his work Thears evidemce that it is the product of an acute, i,n qai,Fing an<li omjeetive mind, well trained in the technique of rn©dern scholarship. Indeed, the volume's analysis 0f tl:1.e imp@rta:nt situations, forces, personalities ' and trem<lls of Phi1lippine party poHtics is so complete and S© keen as t © suggest that' an able sch@lar writing from adeCiJ:aate cfoeumentary somces may achieve as true an 5

FOREWORD

understanding of political phenomena as one who studies them on the ground. Perhaps Dr. Liang's perception of certain realities in the politics of the young neighbor of his own ancient country is heightened by the kinship that underlies the diverse cultures of all Orientals. Not that all students of Philippi'ne affairs will agree with the interpFetations and conclusions presented in this book. Indeed, there is sharp disagreement among the Filipinos them.selves concerning many of the political episodes of the past forty years; and no one can give a scientifically demonstrable interpretation of any complicated Jl)Olitical situation such, for example, as existed during the memorable "leadership" contest between Quezon and Osme:fia in 1922. However, Dr. Liang has based his story and his conclusion~ upon the contemporary utterances of the chi'ef actors in the Philippine drama supplemented by party platforms, manifestos and campaign -documents and checked by the editorial comments, news stories, and other political literature of the time. His facts am.d his opinions are clearly differentiated. The former will not be easy to refute. The latter are of interest, whether one agrees with them or not. Concerni:ro.g the importance of the subject c,f this yolume, there can be little difference of opinion. Although, as the author points out, the development of Philippine political parties has been greatly influenced by factors arising out of the dependent status of the Philippines, yet in their parties the Filipinos have expressed their own political personalities more completely than in any other aspect of their government. In this field they have been the most nearly free from external control and the furthest removed frnm foreign influence. Philippine . parties, therefore, are odi peculiar importance t0 one who would understand Philippine affairs. On the other hand, this discerning study of the party system that has

F'OREWC>RiD

devel@pe<it whi'le the Filipinos were a dependent people is of significam:e to al'l st udents of colonial government. By sh@win,g litow the forces @f nationalism and colonialism have operatecl. in the f)a•r ty politics of this Malayan <ilependen<sy, Dr. Liang has coatributed to an understaad,r ag of the politicail development of aU colonies. One tieaso:m fo11 his suc0ess in doing 01is is that he has beert aili>le t@ in,teFl')Fet political events in the Philippines in terms of pa,r ty p@litics in other modern states. ALtfu@.u g'h thei:e are @ccasional stylistic peculiarities in this 1:>e)Ok that will suggest to the initiated that the author is Chinese, these expressi0as, in the opinion of the writer, d0 aot loweF t1ie liiteFary quality of the work. Dr. Liang's style is always clear and 11.is background of Chinese curture oftero. gives to his observations a pungency and aptness t1i.at are aot frequently f@und in scholarly writing. W1i.tm he states, for example, that "As an opposition, the :Partido D-e.'YMerata was a victim of the political eiimate in a cdepemdent country," he is writing n0t only as a shrnw€l student of politics but also as a competent literary ci:aftsFlilan.. Such skirll seldom just c0mes to a writer and in Dr. Lian.g's case it is the product not only of long study an€! l)>Ea<stice _in tne WFiiting 0£ English, but of extensive experienee i,n translating standard EnglisJ:i works into Chinese. ]it~ form as well as in substance, therefore, this v0ttune i's an encouraging example of the valuable eoro.,tFiErnfioro.s that internati©na,l scholarship may make t0 w0rl€1 ouitl!lre. Americans and Filipinos especially shotttld be grateful t@ this Chinese scholar for the tfu.0r0ugh and l)>enetrating study that he has made of an imp0r.tant phase of their joint adventure in nation , 1Jmi,lcd1ng. JOSEPH RALSTON HAYDEN.

PREFACE The Philippines is in area 7,000 square miles larger than Great B.ritaim. Im the course of the last thirty years, she has made great strides on the path of democracy. To-day, she is obviously the most democratic country in the Ori'ent. My purp@se in the pr~sent treatise is, therefore, to present a picture of Philippine democracy from the standpoint of party experiment. I have tried, in the following pages, to take an independent, impartial, and realistic view of the actual working of the Philippine system of party. Upon completion of the present volume, I wish to express my profound gratitude to Professor Edward C. Smiti11 for his emlightenmemt on t:bte practical approach in the study 0f Jilarfy politics. T@ my old teacher, former Vice-Governor Joseph Ralston Hayden I owe an especial deli>t of gratitude for introducing me to the subject of study and benefiting me with a number of authoritative comments, without which the present manuscript would have been less accurate. To Professor Rinehart J. Swenson, Professor W. F. WHloughby, Dr. Victor S. Clark, former Governor-General W. F. Forbes, Resident C0mmissi0ner Quintin Paredes, and Justice Antonio Villa-Real of the PhilipJl)ine Sapreme Court, I wish here a:lso to ex]Dress my grateful appreciation of their advice and informaHon. For aid i'n securing materials I am indebted to four leading institutions: the Library of Congress, the New .York: Public Library, the Bureau of Insular Affairs of the 8

PREFACE

United States War Department and the Offi ce of the Resfol.cm.t C@mmissioner from the Philippines, Washington, D.C. Finally, I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Mrs. Louise L. Dong, whose inestimable ser vice has helped much to expediteÂˇ the publicat ion of the ma nuscript. DAPEN LIANG.

Chungking, 1939.

CONTEN'FS Page

FoREWÂ©Rlil by Prof. J. Ralst0n Hayden . . PREFACE

5 8

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

13 CHAPTER II

SEORET SOCIETIES A. The Libe-r al Movement .. B . Free Masonry C. Jose Rizal and La Liga Filipina D. The Katipunan and the Revolution

20 26 31

OHAPTER III PC>U1'ICAL p ARWl'ES !PRIOR 'FO THE HARRISON ,:\DMINISTRATION A. The Federal Party : Its Background and_Formation B. The Federal Party: Its Spread and Supremacy . . C. The Origin of Partido Nacionalista . . D. The Forrnati6n of the Partido Nacional Progresista E. The Nacionalistas and the Assembly

50 62

70 75 80

CHAPTER IV POLITICAL PARTIES DURING 'FHE HARRI,SON ADMINISTRATION A . The Origin 0f the Partido Democrata B . The Enlarged Sphere of Party Activities After the Enactment 0f the Jones Law C. 1'he Coundl of State and Party Leaders}!ip D. The Economic Crisis and the Nacionalista Regime 11

96 103 116 127

CONTENTS.-(Continued)

Page

CHAPTER V POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE

Woon

ADMINISTRATION

'Fhe Split of the Partido Nacionalista over the Question of Leadership . . B. The Cabinet Crisis

154

Partido Nacionalista-Consolidado and the Democrata Role as Opposition

164

The United Front

178

135

CHAPTER VI

p ARTIES

AND POLITICS SINCE

1927

A. The Restoration of Party Government

188

B. Dissolution of the Partido Democrata

200

Quezon and Osmefia in Their Second Struggle for Leadership . . 208 D. Parties and Politics on the Eve of the Establishment of the Commonwealth 223 E. The Minor Groups 249 C.

CRAFTER VII 259

CoNCLU'SION .â&#x20AC;¢

BlilBLIOGRAPHY

267

INDEX

279

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

la modern democracies a distinctive feature which nobody can fail to recognize is that of government by warty. Afth011gh party as a political device is of comparatively recent growth, it has now become reputable and almost 1u1,i versal. One can safely assert that government without parties is absolutism and rulers without opposition may be despots. Students of history and politics must acknowledge that most of the liberties and rights we now enjoy are in fact the very records achieved by pairties in c0nflict. It is obvious that parties are indispensabl e to any representati ve government . In other words, democracy without parties is a w0rd without meaning, at:J.d the _electorate would be an unorganized mass of people. Parties are not only inevitable, but in fact tb.e driving force in the democracy. They are ceasing or have ceased to be invisible government. 1 In some countries p0lli tieal parties have been converted into corporations in public law. As the constitution does not prohifuit such legislation and party managemen t is of such vital importance to the government and state, the law 011gb.t to take care of it. In Italy the Fascist Party has beea incorporated into the State. Article XII of the amendments of 1929 even goes as far as to provide that the Fascist Grand Council shall be cons1,1lted on all questions having a constitution al character. 2 Iri the Third 1 Cf. Elihu Root's address on the "Invisible Government" before the New York Constitutional Convention of 1915, in R ecord of the Co11stit1'tio11al - Convention of the State of New York, 1915, Vol. III, pp. 3387-3390. 2 See British ~11d Foreign State Papers, Vol. 130, p. 829.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

Reich the National Socialist German Worker's Party has by law become the embodiment of the state idea, and is inseparably integrated with the government. 3 To-day, payment to members of parliament has .become almost universal and party competence has accordingly been promoted. l'hirty years ago the Canadian legislators had fully appreciated party services, and a law was passed to authorize a salary of ministerial rank paid annually to the leader of the opposition. 4 In England the acknowledged part played by the party is enormous. "So far as Parliament is concerned," said A. Lawrence Lowell, "the machinery of party and of government are not merely in accord; they are one and the same thing." 5 Without party the English system of government would immediately become a set of disc@m1ected agencies, still beautiful in their outward showing, hut nevertheless anworkable. In France the extra-parliamentary action of the political parties has seemingly set a precedent of great significance. The French cabinet has, on several occasions, had to resign, not because of the party opposition within parliament, but that outside of it. In 1925 the Radical Socialist Congress at Nice attacked the financial policy of Painleve's Government. A few days later the Government resigned before the Chambers met. Again in November, 1928, the Radical Socialist Congress at Aagers forbade the four Radicalist-Socialist Ministers to remaia in Poi,ncare's Minist11y of National Union. The Ministers resigned and Poincare soon submitted to the 8 Cf. James K. Pollock and Harlow Heneman, The Hitler Decrees (Ann Arbor, 1934), pp. 34 et seq. 4 The leader of opposition at Ottawa is paid $7,000 by the country in addition to the sessional allowance of $2,500 given to all members of Parliament. Rev. Stat. Canada, 1906, C. 10, Ss. 37-39. 5 A. Lawrence Lowell, The Government of England (New York, 1908), Vol. I, p. 44'4.

I.NTRODUCTION

President 0£ the Rel')l:l!blic the collective resignation of his eabinet.6 In the United States the Constitution has definitely set off the powers of government against one another by a system of checks and balances, but by reason @f party organization, the story has sometimes beeA di:ffeFent :lirom what was originally intended. Besides the breakdown of the electoral college, the separation of powers which formed the essence of the AmeFican Constitution has at times actually been modifi.ed. 7 In a word, political parties have long been a cardinal factor of ffoxibility in the Am erican constitutfo:m.al system. Tfue significance of party development in major dernocFaeies to-day is obvious, and huge litera ture has been accumulated abm1t it. We know very lit tle about · party development in the dependent countries. Students of politics often took an attitude of indifference t owards political insti,tuti@ns in the minor democracies. They failed t0 realize that there are many things we sh ould learn and yet cannot learn except from outside the major countries. The present study of Philippine party development attempts to familiarize us with the type of prnmlen:is confro:m,t ing a dependent country in the practice 0'£ 0em0cracy. We· know that wherever there is a political or civic community there is a party feeling.8 Party feelin g can not find expression in a country where the freedom of theught and of speech are not recognized. In other w0rds, )!)arty feeling can hardly express itself in a 6 See Lindsay Rogers, "Ministerial Instability in France," Pol. Sc i. Q,,ar., Mar.ch, 1931; Robert Valeur, "The Most Delicate Job in the W orld," N ew York Times Maga:Jfoe, December 10, 1933. 7 For an admirable description of the role played by parties in the United States government, see M. Ostrogorski, Dem ocracy and Party Sysl,em i,, the U,uted States (New York, 1906), pp. 380 et seq. 8 Henr.y Maine, Po/ml~r Govemment (London, 1897) , p. 31.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

country where the government is not essentially democratic in form. But democratic government as President Woodrow Wilson said, "is not a thing that can be given to any people, because it is a form of character and not a form of constitution. No people can be given the self-control of maturity. Only a long apprenticeship of obedience can secure them the precious possession, a 9 thing no more to be bought than given." Since temperaments can not be copied, and political institutions are necessarily conditioned by temperaments , the question here follows: What has been responsible for the practice @f dem@cracy or party government in the Philippines durfng the American occupation? If one admits that democratic institutions have proved to be workable in the Philippines, he must also admit that the Filipino temperaments are at least not incompatible with the system 0ÂŁ government they now practice. To know whether 01Âˇ not the Filipino people are fit for democracy, we must know that the Filipinos are thornughly fon<il. (')f compromise. 10 "They avoid trouble, and will submit to tyranny long after an American would have rebelled." 11 In human relationships the Filipino is personal to an extent anknown in Ang-lo-Saxon countries.12 This must have been in large measure responsible for the type of democracy found in the Philippines. One rnast know that among the early Filipinos many had already lived under a rudimentary form of democratic il'illstitutions. A subject migmt serve his ruler only so far as the ruler was worthy of his service. If the ruler failed 9 W00drow Wi16on, Constitutio11al Government in the U11ited States (New York, 1921), p. 52. 10 A. L. Kroeber, Peoples of the Philippines (N e,v York, 1919), pp. 148-149. 11 Frank e. Laubach, The People of the Philippi11es (New York, 1925), p. xiii. 12 Dean C. Worcester and Ralston Hayden, The Philippines Past and Present (New Y 0r,k, 1930), pp. 783-784.

INTROD'C'JCTION

t0 govern with jl!lstice, the people had tl!ie right to disecmti1111!1e tlii.eir l0yalty. lt was their custon1 to desert the imm<:>ral rl!liler a1110: t,l0€k to the one w.ho, by his craft, €0UFage or m©Fa[ li>ower, rnse ,to SUJ!lremacy. This is what Francisco Coli,111 calJed a sort of tacit election, by which they <rnuld, in effect, ehoose one and desert the 01ihet. 18 A1,tra0ugh dem@eratic institutions had been J!lracticed il'l s01me part @f the islands during the pre-Spanish period, l;>e€ause @f tae smal,l area and population of each incleli>el'ldel'lt l_,l@Iitical IJl,n it )!)arty organization was totally arose111t. First, tfu.e tmequal clistribution of property, e@111sidered lily Jarnes Madison as the "most common and <.twrali>le source" of party, did not exist.14 Second, the mai,a need @f the people then was none other than J!lf©tection fr@m the atta<sk of their neighboring barangays. 1i'he frequent inter-tri:bcl)l quarrels and conflicts in which they engaged must have contributed much to the interl1lal narmom.y of each political unit. The political dimate was, however, not favoµrable to the growth of 18 M!iguel de Loar-ca wrote as follows : "Thus the timaguas lived in seeurity, and free to pass from the service of one chief to that of another, wheneve• they so desi,e, and without any obstacle being placed in their way. See his "Relation of the Filipinas Islands," in Emma Blair and James A. Robe,tson, compilers, The Pi,ilippi11e Islands (Cleveland, 1903-1909), Vol. XL, pp. 343 et seq. In the southe,n Pl\ilippines, kingship was indeed a popular institution and proper,ly so ,eeognized. Gur-i0usly enough, even a slave there could say "no" to the Icing in what he disliked. In other words, the king's power eould e:><tend only so far as his subjects did not otherwise forbid. See "Natives ot the S0uthern Islands,'' Ibid., p. 155 . .Among the Moros, when laws were to be enacted and ordinances to be issued, the lord, in aecordance with the established procedure, summoned a!I di.iefs of his village to consider the measu,es proposed. If the chiefs all ag:,eed upon them, then a public ccier (Usalahoean), took a bell and went thoough the wliole village, announeing the laws which had been made. If the pe0ple replied favorably, the laws soon beeome effective. See Ibid. pp.

17.6-177.

lildward M. Sait,_ A111erica11 Parties a11d Elect·io11s (New Yock, 1927), pp. 15:1-152. Cf,. Maoc1mo M. Kalaw, Self-Govern111e11t i11 the Philippin-es ,New York, !919~, p. 172. 1'

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

party institutions. In other words, their party feelings must have been expressed through inter-unit conflicts. After the arrival of the Spaniards, a different era began. The system of government became extremely centralized. The Filipinos were completely excluded from office, except the lÂŠw and menial positions. Learning was discouraged if not prohibited. 15 The friars were the virtual rulers in the islands. Their hostility to teaching the natives in Spanish was almost impossible to oveFcome. The attitude which they took was on the theory that, the less the Filipinos learned, the better it was for them. In pursuance cf this policy, the reading of books not approved by friars was often a ground for derortation, and the writing of them a capital offence. 16 The absen~e of freedom of thought and of speech has made the expression of party feelimg utterly impossible, save through extraordinary means. But here the "iron law" of action and reacti@n governs. The more they sup]i>Fessed the weople, the greater would be the force of counterbalaJJ.\ce. Therefore, we may say that the formation of the secret societies, or rev@lutionary parties as tfuey were prnpe,rly called, ll>rought aboÂľt the downfall @f the Spanish regime, and were, as we shall see later, of the Spamiards' own ereation. IDming the Americaro. regime indlividl!tal rigfuts were grnduaMy extended to the Filipino people in Anglo-Saxoh fashion. With the t@lerance of freedom of speech and pi-ess, 17 the party feeling o:ir t:he natives s0on found expression. The Americans realized, as M. Ostrogorski said, that "iro.ward liberty cannot assert itself in public life without outward liberty, as the one without the other 16 J,ames A. JLeRoy, "'the Fs-iars in the 'Philippines," Pol. Sci. Quar., Detember, 1903. Cf. Austin Craig, Editor, Rizal's li'o/itical Writings (Manila, 1933), pp. 143-144. 16 LeRoy, "The Friars in the :Philippines," lac. cit. 17 Fer an unpleasant criticism of the Filipines against the Civil Government under William H. Taft, see La Vanguarclia, March 9, 1!110.

INTRODUCTION

canmot keep the commonwealth aJiive." 18 In this respect, the Americans have <done much to awaken the intellectual freedom and cultivate the sense of individual responsibility of the natives in the field of self-government. The political climate was then favourable to the growth of party institutions. As a matter of consequence, the Federal ÂĽ>arty f4,r st came into being and several others soon followe<d. Tliie rise of constitutional parties in the Philippines under American supervision has enabled the Filipinos to practice the arts of self-government. Democracy in the Philippines had then begun to march as the field of party activities became wider. In fact, the hist0ry 0f Phi,Iippine democracy and party development are one and the same thing. It is no exaggeration to say that the charters of liberty such as the Jones Act of 1916, Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act of 1933, and Tydings-McDuffie Act . of 1934 are the achievements of the Partido

Nacionalista.

The ooservatio1;1,,s above are the preliminaries. With these presented we shall in the subsequent chapters endeavour to discuss and observe, first, what type of party institutions have been implanted in a dependent country, the Philippi11es l secomd, how much has been the influence of the Filipino temperaments upon the practice of party government; an<d above all, what has been the main factor of determining the character of Philippine political parties im the last thirty years. 18

M. Ostrogorski, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 730.

CHAPTER II SECRET SOCIETIES

The Liberal Movement

The state of things, under the Spanish regime, was indeed more serious than it appeared to be. The spirit of discontent, which was intensified and widespread, served to faster in the bosoms of many Filipinos an idea of emancipatio n. 1 Up to the middle of the nineteenth century the Filipinos were practically isolated from the life and thought of the modern world, yet the democratic spirit at work in Europe, especially in the struggle for constitution alism in Spain, did not fail to seize tht Philippines. Spain in the last century had several times triumphed in liberal movements. But in each case, before the liberals had time to establish their power, it was wrested 2 from them by reactionary forces. In response to the the liberal movecountry, poli,tieal events in the mother under way. getting gradually was Philippines the in ment Whenever there was persecution in Spain some liberals ' 1 "Mafta's Report," in R Blair and J. A. Robertson, The Philippi11e Islands (Cleveland, 1903-1909), Vol. LII, pp. 95-96. 2 "The Constitution of Cadiz of 1812 was lost by 1814 thFOugh the per,fidy of Ferdinand VIL After being imposed again in 1820, it was destroyed in the same way, but with the , help of the French, in 1823. The Estatuto Real, granted freely by the New Queen Regent, Maria Christina, in 1834, was oligarchic rather than democratic, corresponding to the French Constitution of 1830, but it lasted until 1837, when a New Constitution was drafted. The end of this came with the dissolution of the Cortes in 1846, and autocracy again triumphed until the Revolution of 1868 and the declaration of the first Republic." H. R. G. Greaves, The Span.i.sh Constitution (London, 1933), p. 13. Cf. Marques de Lema, Spai11 Since 1815 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1921), pp. 5 et seq.

SECRET SOCIETIES

chose to make their escap>e t0 the islancls to work more or less openly £or reforms in the government. Th er e was also a small knot of liberals who voluntarily came from the South American nations which had already won their independcmce from Spain. 8 The pL·esence of these groups in the islanlll.s served to re-enforce the Filipinos in their struggle fol!' democracy. In the year 1837, the Filipinos w ere no longer represented in the Spanish Cortes; the parliamentary life of the Filipi•nos had thus come to an end.4 This marked the beginnin.g of a period, extending to the close of the Span.ish clomination, lll.11,r ing which the islands w ere to be g0vernelll. by special laws. 6 To the Filipinos the new arrangement was an. extremely serious blow. The Filipino leaders, however, were still pinning their hope to the con.stitutional safeguard of their personal liberty, a nd equality with the Spaniards. Therefore, efforts to revive the right 0f representation were made, and much eloquence was expended in proposing constitutional amendments. 6 But all these failed to win the ear of Madrid. In 1868, when Queen Isabella II of Spain was deposed, following the triumph oii liberalism over aristocracy and ecelesiasticism,1 in Spai'l~, there was inaugurateiil a new era for the Philippines. As a consequence, a liberal Governor-General-La Torre-was sent to the Filipinos. The Governor-General was in truth a brave and thorough Ferdinand Blumentritt, The Philippfoes (Chicago, 1900) , pp. 39-40. See "Representation of 1'ilipinas in Cortes,'' Appendix to Blair and Rober.tson, op. cit., Vol., LI, p. 280. 6 Cmstis of the Philippine lslai,ds, 1903 (Washington, D. C., 1905) , Vol. I, p. 362. Maximo Kalaw, The Develop111e11t of Philippiu e Politics, (Manila, 1926), p. 23. 6 Amendments granting parliamentary representation to the Philippines were presented in the Cortes in 1869, and again in 1890. See George A. Malcolm, The Co1'stitutional Law of the Philippine Islan ds (Rochester, 1920') , pp. 128-129, 3

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIP:S

democrat. 7 He endeavoured toÂˇ revolutionize the Spanish colonial policy by directing the Filipinos in promotion of their own welfare, and by encouraging them to be attached to Spain. During this brief period, GovernorGeneral La Torre was trying in various ways not only to tolerate individual equality and the idea of religious freedom, but he also did what he could to implant them, despite the disgust of the Spanish population and opposition of the friars. 8 In fact, the Filipinos were never before so encouraged and delighted during the whole period of Spanish rule, as they were under GovernorGeneral La Torre. Upon the celebration of the Spanish liberal constitution of 1869, processions in honour of liberty were frequently held in various parts of the country. 9 But when liberalism began to take its seat, reactionary forces soon knocked at the door. Political wind changed and the collapse of the feeble republic followed. N0w Governor-General La Torre had to go, though he might not have been willing. In 1871 Rafael de Izquierdo was sent to take the reins of the Philippine government. He was a narrow-minded, prejudiced, and unspeakably @bstinate general. The new GovernorGeneral, in keeping with his temperament wa-s opposed bitterly to any free institution. He clearly declared that I

Soon after arrival, he dispensed with the formality and petty pomp with which his predecessors had surrounded themselves. He also dismissed the escort of halberdiers, with their medieval uniforms and weapons, which had served the Governor-Generals since 1581. He often walked about the streets of the capital in civilian dothes wearing a straw hat. See Barrows, Âˇ op. cit., p. 278. s Cen~us of the Philippine Isla11ds, 1903, Vol. I, p. 375. 9 To celebrate this happy event, many prominent officials and citizens of the liberal govemment were participating in a liberal parade of July 12, 1869. Another parade headed b;y Father Burgos and Tavera was to take place on September 21, 1869. After the parade started there appeared a prominent lady who wore a red ribbon, on which were inscribed the following slogans: "Long Live the Sove,eign People, Long Live Liberty and Long Live Governor La Torre." This evenf remained forever in the memory of the Filipinos. See Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 29-30. Cf. Frank Charles Laubach, The People of the Philippines (New York, 1925), pp. 95-96. 7

.SFJCRET SOCIETIES

his views were di,1:IeFent fr@m those 0£ La Torre. His inUention was t© goveFn the people "with a crncifiix in one nand aro,d a s:w©11d in Hie <Dther.mo 'Dhere1,1po11, what La T<D11Fe nacd jast c;l0ne was to be undone. 'Fne presemce 0£ de lzquiercfo as heacl of the Phiilippine g@;vern.ment marked the renewal oii the Spanisl'i repr,~ssivse policy. The young FiHpino intellectuals, who could: not breathe with any degree of £reed0m, in the eiireu.mstances felt it advisable to leave the coanmry for the sake ,0£ se(mrity.11 Tfue $aez Canal, opened in 1869, fuad shortened the ro1,1,t e t0 EuiroJ))e. Witn this improvememt im cornmunicatiom, we.JI-to-do Filipinos were then more eager to send their s@ns t0 Eur0pe, where they could acquire higher education. Tfuese young men during their stay in :Eu,ireipean universities oecame imbaed with modern poli1tical ideas in which they saw the contrast between the cdemocFacy Oil the c@ntinent amd the absolutism which reigmed i,m tfueir home lami. 12 Henceforth, liberalism began to evidem.ce 'rn0re decidecf tendencies i:n the islands. The 011<lfer of thi,ngs, which so malily condemned, was imposs-~Tule of maintenance, because of the social changes whicn the times Iliad Tur@1,1ghit. Since tlile restorati@n of 1871 - at , Madrid, tb.e Spataiards na<d anrom.g @ther irepressive measures degraded the ¥i1'ipi.n0 p11iests t@ a s0mewhat men.ial position in 10 "His first official act was to prohibit the founding of a school of arts and • trades, which was being organized through the efforts and funds eontr,illuted by prominent -Filipinos, but tbe founding of which did not tally with the views of the Monastic 0r.ders, 'l'he Governor believed that the establishment of the ne,v sehool was merely a pretext for the organization of a political dub, and lie not only did not allow it to be opened but made a public statement accusing the ~iHpinos who had charge of the movement." €:eiisus of the Philippine Isla11ds, 1903, Vol. I, p. 376, 11 'l'liis Glass was very small. It included a few families of the populous towns; Most of them were either, Chinese or Spanish mestizos, See Barrows,

op. ell., p. 2Z7.

12 "Repe,.r,t of Seoretar,y ·of Wa~ on the ·Philippines,'' S. D.oc. No. 200, 60th C:ong., 1st ·sess.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

relation to the friars, in the parishes. The seculars, or rather the Filipino priests 13 were highly disgusted under the new domination. Secularization of parishes had been one of the slogans heralded by the Filipinos ever since Simon de Anda, the de facto Governor-General of 1762. LeRoy, in his Bibliographical Notes remarked that, "umder the emeouragement of the 1868 rnvolution in Spain, these demands grew apace from 1868 to 1872, and became interlaced with strictly political demands, ttntil finally we may regard the cause of the Filipino clergy as a part of the campaign for:_ Filipino nationalism." 14 This campaign, in the opinion of former Governor-General Forbes, was a prelude to the mutiny of January 20, 1872, in Cavite. 16 The. mutiny was very significant in Filipino history, for never before had the Filipinos been so arottsed to national consciousness. The execution of Dr. Jose Burgos, Father Mariano Gomez and Father Jacinto Zamora, was in effect drawing the hearts of' a hitherto divided and motley people to unite about their martyred ia The European priests who came to the islands were practically all members of some ecclesiastical order, such as the Order of St. Augustine, St. :Elominic, St. Francis, etc. They were all called friars, and those who did not belong to any order called themselves seculars. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 24. Cf. S. Doc. No. 112, 56th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 23-44.

Blair and Robertson, op. cit., Vol. LU, p. 167. W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands (Boston, 1928), Vol. I, p. SO. From other sournes we learned that it was probably due to the dissatisfaction and discontent of the native wod<men in the Cavite arsenal, together with the policy of General Izquierdo to abolish the privileges of the workmen in Cavite arsenal and in the barracks of the artillery and enginee-r corps. Fnom time immemorial such workmen had been exempt frnm payment of the tribute tax and from obligation to work certain days each year on public improvements. The new Governor-General's policy to abolish these privileges was w:ithout a doubt a source of anger which led to the mutiny of Cavite. For a further detail of the mutiny, see Ce11sus of the Philippine Isl1111ds, 1903, V0I. I, pp. 376-379; "Jager's Travels in the Philippines," in Austin Craig, The Philippines and the Filipinos of Yesterday (Manila, 1934), p. 504; and "Le Roy's Bibliographical Notes,'' in Blair and Robertson, op. cit., Vol. LII, pp. 169-171. 14

SECRET S©CJ•ETl•ES

dergymen,16 alilcl theiF cleportem accomplices. The subse~uenrt history o'E the !Fi:lipi•lil©S was in vari0us ways o<l>u:nd u~ w·i,t h these exi[es. 1a They were mostly Spanish mestiz<l>s, wh@, t h@u~h b@rn in t he Philippines, had their relatiwes i1n SpIDin. iit was, taerefore, more natural for t he,m f@ seek the fi,r st opp0rtunity to escape to their old m<l>ther. e01;u.11try, where they were t© 0rganize i111it0 clulos thr©l!lgih. wl,J.iol.ii t© car.y ©lil theiir ca1npaign for liberal referrns. 18 li'i>if.fe,Fent pa,,J?ers were issued and secretly circulate@ Tuy the C0mm,iiHee 0£ Propaganda. Under the edit©rshiii.;> o~ Loi.;>ez }aero.a and Marcelo H. del Pilar, the 'for tmig'h tly rev iew, La $olidaridad, 19 of Madrid, was the mGst motew@Fthy. Faice t0 £ace wirth a pro-friar or antiHroerat 0rgan, La P0iitioa de Espana en Filipinas, La po.Lidam4a<J; was very ably adiVocating the following tretQFl'lilS: 1. The arooliti0n of the military form of g@¥,ernment, a:nd tfue establishment @f civil governmemt i,n whicb: the arbiitrary powers of the Govem0rG~:nera•l wml!lm be limited by a cGnstitution; 2. 'The i.;>r©liectiGn 0£ the rights and liberties 01 th§ Filipi•nQ pe@ple; 16 'Fl\e friars were reported to have paid a large sum of money for eondeqmation of tl\ose who were, during the La Torre regime, so outspoken in their denunGiation of the friars. See Letter f-ro111 Secretary of War (Washington, 1901 ) , p. 80. 1q These in<duded Don Joaquin Pardo de Tavera, father of the eminent scholar Dr. T. H . Pardo de Tavera, !'>on Antonio Regidor,, Don Pedro Carr,illo, !Don Jose Basa and Don Maximo Molo Paterno, fatl\er of Pedro Faterho, et al. See Laubach, op. cit., p. 98. · 1s 'Fhe inerease 0£ Filipino students' studies abroad was one of the eauses for the enl\aneement of the popular discontent, as the families of these students were made the objects of espionage. See Census of the Philippine lslanils, 1903, 'Vol. ], p. 380. 19 Jaena, a Visayan, edited eighteen numbers of it at Barcelona up to Octoller, 3'1, 1889, when de! Pilar took char-ge of it, tr-ansfe.red it to Madrin and published it · there as a footnig!,tly till 1895. See LeRoy's Bibliographical Noles, loc. cit., p. 176. For- a good aecount of Del Pilar's life, see Teo<lor,o ,M, ·Kalaw's Domme,Jlos de la Biblioteca N acioua/ de F1lipinas (Manila; 1930), pp. 1-83.

DEVELOPMEN T OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

Representa tion of the Philippines in the of Spain; The establishme nt of a merit system under the offices should be filled; 5. The expulsion of the friars, or the return of the parishes to secula,r priests. 20 These new tendencies were stining the feelings of the Filipinos with increasing .intensity. They ( the leadei;s) were thinking of the Filipinos in terms of a nation now, and not as a people without a community of desires. 'fhe nationalisti c fire was there. To destroy it was futile; to kindle it required statesmen of skill, but n@t those without ade<gjuate haman understand ing; as Rizal once wrote, " ... the Philippines will remain Spam.ism., if t1iey enter upon tm.e life of law and civilization, if the rights of their inhabitants are respected, if the otheF dghts due them are granted, if the liberal policy of the governmen t is carried out without trickery or meanness, without subterfuge or false interpretations."2-1 3. Cortes 4. which

Free Mas0nry

The fo1cce of lifueralism, which had struggled for re£0rm €luring the eighties, was the Filipino nationalism at the start. Hence the governmemt often resorted to mea:surns of repJJ,essi®n; the Fili pin@ intellectuals abroad, natural'ly felt themselves the leaders in a grnat cause on behalf @m theit- ~®untry. 'ThereuJ.ilon, these young men, behifld many closed doors, were zealously organizing themselves in,to masomk lodges. 20 Victoriano D. Diamonon, The Deve'lopment Philippine ,fsl'ands (Iowa City, 1920), p. 119. Cf. for Freedom, pp. 310-311. Teodoro M. Kalaw, La ,p. 9. 21 "The Philippines a Century Hence," in (Manila, 1933), ed. by Austin Craig, p. 146.

of Self-Government in the Craig, The Filipinos' Fight Revoluaio11 (Manila, 1924), Rizal's Political Writings

SECRET SOCIETIES

With the cooperati011 of a few Spanish liberals, the Filipin0 patriots in Ma<!lrid founded a society in 1888 known as Asociaci@n Hispano-Filipina (Spanish-Filipino AssociatioF1). It was at the outset intended as a nonpartisan ·organizatic;m, with a view to reform of the existing" conditi011s; sl!l.ch as: to make the Filipi Ro a free rnaa; t{') trams:£0rm the slave iF1to a citizen; to grant to Fil.iJ.i>inos, wfu0 had · for oeF1turies bieeF1 so unhapJ!)y, the privileges and rights of a Spanish citizen; to transform an oppressed co!{')ny iF1to a rich and flourishing province 0.f Spain; t@ reform J.ilrisons a,nd the courts of justice; to establish a registry of deeds; to construct roads and railways; and to reform the tariff and public administration.22 In the hope of attaining these objects the ass0ciation organized, within itself, the Political Section, tlrn Literary Section and the Sporting Section, in the charge 0£ Marcelo H. de! Pilar, Mariano Ponce, and Tomas Arej@la resJ!)ecti,vely. 28 IDuri,n g the year 1889, under the leadership of Graciano L0pez Jaena, the first Masonic Lodge, cot;nposed 0f Fil,ipinos iFl SJ.i>ain was formed as Revolucion lodge iFl Barcelm,a. b the following year, another lodge was established in Madrid and given the name of Solidaridad Filipina. 24 All the Filipinos who belonged to the Revoltucion, which was afterwards dissolved, became members of the lodge Solidaridad Filipina. With the encouragem:en,t and hdp of Don Miguel M0rayta, president of the Asociacion Hispano-Filipina, and other SJ.i>anish symJ.ilathizers, the Filipino patriots in Spai:n were afterwards aifule to petiti<!m the Spanish Cortes OFI several 0ccasi0ns for the restoratien of 22

E... H. Fernandez, A Brief Histor,y of the Pl,ilif>Pines (Boston, 1919), (Manila, 1914), Vol. I,

' p. 236. Veyra and Ponce, Efe111erides Filipiuas , p. 39. 28

Ibid. Blair and Robertson, op. cit., Vol. LIi, p. 183,

DEVELOPMENT OF' PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

Philippine representation , 26 though the effort was of no avail. From the experience of Masonic orders abroad, del Pilar and his followers came to realize that the campaigns must be extended into the islands. Upon the making of this decision, Pedro Serrano Kalaw was sent, 26 with powers from Gran Oriente Espanol, to organize brnnch lodges in the islands. The first Filipino l@dge in the Philippines was called Niiad and was organized in 1891.27 The symbol and ritual asecl amoflg the Masons appealed strongly to the NFlifl!tt©red 11atives and the masonic orders sprang wp like mushrnoms throughout the islands. According to the gemeral belief, the number of l@dges was actually i11crnasecl to about @me hunclrnd and eigfoty up to the year 1893.28 Nila,d lodge, though directed by the Gran Oriente Espanol from Spain, was however, supreme over all 10dges in the islands. The campaign that the Masons conducted had already caused considerable uneasiness on the part 0·£ the friars JilaFtkuilarly. 26 The petition was presented in 1895 by Emilio Jurroy, a representative of the C0~tes, Veyra and Ponee, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 185. Cf. St. Clair, The Katipm1an, pp. 14-15. The Grand Lodge 0f Spain in 1890 urged all Masons in Spain to persuade their representatives in the Cortes to work in favour of restoration of parliamentary representation of the Philippines. See M. M. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 42. 26 'Fhe preamble of the constitution of the Grand Lodge reads as follows : "In the Philippines where dericalism has made the people its victim, brutalizing the inhabitants, we must o,ganize a eouncil of the order which will free ~hem from the y0ke and safeguard them t0wards p,ogress and civilization, defeating those who are onl;:,' the spectres of the past and who carry with t hem ignorance, fanaticism and superstition." See T. M. Kalaw, La Masone,·ia Filipina., p. 23. 27 It was probable that the first masonic lodge in the islands was established in 1856 with the name of Primera L,iz Filipitia. The lodge was known to be exclusively for Spaniards with the purposes of mutual p,otection and closer union . among themselves. They did not exert much influence 0n the political life of the Filipinos. T. M. Kalaw, La Masoneria Filipina, p. 199; Laubach, op. cit., p. 99. 28 Blount, op. cit., p. 71 ; St. Clair, op. cit., p. 75.

SECRET SOCIETIES

lt w:as eu,rcrent amtmg tfae Spa.taiarcds that the Masons were separ.atists, a<1lva,m0ecd radicals or anti-clericals. fi'riars 0£!:en dea0u,mced the mas0nic activities as a movement cl.ireeted t0wards tb.e dowaialil of the Catholic Omrch. 1i:he FiJ.ipirn0 Masons, ac<wrding to the friars, wern adiv@cati,mg that "religi0tas are 110 more than the philos@pnfos 0£ men 0f talent, whfah the people have adopted." Neither law, prnperty, mor religion can be used t© deprive tiiie people of their rights. They are three i,nfam@us enemies, 0£ which religiorn ought to be the 01bject of consfatat amd morctal attacks. Onee religi011 is cfostroyed, law and pr0perty wo11ld surely follow. They might, mp0n the eommon ruins, regenerate society on a Masonic basis, and establish a government similar in foFm to that 0£ the earlier period of the first French ltepMbli<;:. 29 JBut whetherc 0r not the accusation was justiffi:ed stiJil remains a question. From another source, we liarned tftat fnemas0nry was established in order to give the Filiipi,rn@s sch0ols wh,ich would teach them standanils @f social ,CO!ilduct irn harmony ·with pub>Lic · spirit. 80 Acc@ntiag t@ de! Pilar, Masonry was merely an itastrumeat 0£ 1><:1,pwlar education. In a letter81 to a Mas0nie k,dg€, he deelaJJed that what the Fili,pi.nos needed was a habit 0f respect :foi- a11thori,ty. Again, "Masonry," in the 0pin,i0n of Te0doro Kalaw, "was nothing less at that time than a campaign for liberty."82 llil ]$\91, there was a most urnfortunate split between ,Riza] a:mm de! Fi.Jar. 'Fhe qparrel betweern the two was inr f.aiet a seri©ms lblow to the whole moven1,ent. There seemed, as we learta fr0m Rizal's owa words, to be some h0stiJe cri1iicism in La Solidaridad against him. In his Ietter t@ de! l?ilar, Rizal cdeclared that: 29 Bo

St. (1;lai•, op. ait., pp. 70-71. M. M. Nof.ton, B1<ilders of a Na.lion (Manila, 1915), p. SI. Kalaw, l.a Maso11eria PiUpina,, p. 102. Ibid., p. 97.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

"You will probably consider me oversensitive, and Ji colilfess I am. But when one has shown only good-will, affeetiorn and self-sacrifice t0 one's friends and in return meets with recriminations and attacks, believe me, one ought to change one's conduct and modify one's wa:y 0£ working." 33 Riza:l was for a: 'time very 1,1111popular with certain irresponsible compatriots who were careless of their conduet in spe,n ding the propaganda funds on some items whick ji)rovecil to be u.nnecessary. 34 Rizal then ceased to write for La Solidaridad after he learned from del Pilar that the paper was merely a private, not a national, enterprise. 36 The big two were practically irreconcilable. After tae incident was kmiwn in Manila, there resulted a serioa s falling off 0f subscriptfol1ils for the paper. 36 Scarcely any funds could be raised in the islands for fiimamciro.g mel ;F>i.laF's activities in Sl!)aim, which was partly owing t @the drastic measures taken by the government against the Masonic elements. The movement subsequently did not prosper. la 1~95 tbi,e rnigJ.iJJ @,£ terr @r began i.n the i.slanms, many Masons were Jailed, @tners deported or executed. Del · Pilar and his followers were convinced by this fact that peae<di1,1l methods were of mo avail and other means sh.0a[fj}, o!f lileeessity, roe tried. '.Mie a,md ~@nee, tfuereup01:i, 33 Rizal's letter to de! Pilar, October 7, 1891 in «:raig's Rizal's :Political W ritings, pp. 309-314. 84 l <bid., p. 307. 86 "For more than a year- rn wrete for, the fo. tnightly, so fomg as I • believed it to be an organ of the Filipinos, and with this belief I neither wished nor, tried to find out why or how it existed. I thought it a 11atio11al enterprise and suffered with resignation the seere€y which the review observed toward me respecting its myste.ries. Now that you tell me that iJ1.. a Solidaridad is a private e,1terprise, you will r-eadily understand that I eannot work under these conditions-for a private e11terp,·ise. I wouldn't know whom I was serving, nor how I was serving: them, nor how acceptable were my serviGes. Her,e is. my r,easonundoubtedlf you have already guessed it." lb,id., pp. 309-310. 86 Ibid., p. 307.

SECRET SOCIETIES

decided to come home and appeal to the masses of th eir eountrymen. 87 Bl!lt through y,ears of hard work in Spain, del Pilar had overtaxed himself and he was at that time already very ill with tuberculosis. On his way back to the !Phirlippirnes, the grand and tireless patr iot di ed on July 4, 1896, before the revolution w hich broke out that same year. 88

Jose Rizal and La Liga Filipifna

While the Masonic movement was on the wane, Rizal begarn to play his most astonishing role on the stage of Philippine politics. By profession he was a doctor ; he was also well-versed in several other fi elds of learning. He was furought up in a famil y which had a tedious and costly lawsuit with a Monastic Order. 89 He became m:ited in his chilmhood as a n intellectual prodigy. At the ageÂˇ of twenty-one (1882) Rizal w ent to Europe, where he 1rnmaim.ed until 1888. He was so enthusiastic that he suggested in some club meetings in Madrid, that an effective means of propaganda would be a book, presenting the truth ahc;rnt Philippine conditions. But the idea was severely criticised and few agreed to it. As w e lea rn ÂŁm m his hiograpber, Rizal was disg usted with this trifling and dropped the affair, nor did he ever again seem to take any very enthusiastic interest in such popular movernents. 40 B1,1t later he had come across in Madrid a copy of Eugene Sue's "The Wandering Jew" which, as 37 Del Pilar, apparently, lost faith in the ideals of "assimilation," of Spanish-Filipino unity, which he had set forth in glowing phrases in 1888 and _1889. He _h ad also, apparently, become convinced that the upper class F1hpmos, especially the . most wealthy and prominent, were too lukewarm or too prone to temporize for safety's sake, that the time had come to make . the cause more distinctly one of the people as a whole. Laubaeh, op. c,t., p. 99. 38 "lLeRoy's Bibliographical Notes," lac. cit,, pp. 177-178. 39 .Alustin Craig, L i11eage, Life a>1d Labors of Jose Rizal (Manila, 1913),

p. 37. 40

Ibid., p. 121.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

he entered in his diary, af.fected him p@werfully, "not to tears but with a tr;emendous sympathy for the unfortunates that made him willing t© risk everything in their behalf." 41 The !Dook suggested. to Rizal that a similar one to expose the inner li:fie, the arrogance, and desf)otism 0£ the friars i.n their relations with the Fiiipin0s, w0uM celi'taiinly serve well to amuse Spain. 42 To these intents and pl!lrposes, he !Degan to gather stories from his companions and noted down his rece1lections of his yoNth. Finally he succeeded in publishing two censotri@as, satirical novels, Noli me tange>re in 1887 and El filibuster.ism@ in 1891.48 The a:ppeal of these two nl1rvels quickly raised 1i!i.m ia pepular esteem in nis native esi-rcles. Not l@ng after the pl!lmlication of his fi..rst novel, Rizal rdNrned t0 his home · t@wn where he led a party to IJ])Uestieim tfue legality 0£ the D0wriniesan Ordetr's p@ssession 0f a la,rg;e tract 0f agricultural land. He requested the Or<der to show its legal title deeds, mut was met with a c©ntemp,tu@us rdusal. At that tirne the Governor- , General was a liberal, who, despite the strong pressure of the Orrcffetr, willingly assl.!lred Rizal's pers@nal safety, amcl asked a y;ou,n g S,]))a®ish Lieutenamt J@se Taviel de · Amd,r ada to serve as llizal's bodyguard. 44

In Fefuruary, 1888, prudence dictated Rizal's return to E1:1rope. While on the way he observed witn keen 4l

J,bid., p. '122.

€:e11sus of the Philippine Islands, 1903, Val. I, p. 379.

4S LeRo,y's Bibliographical Notes, lac. cit., Vol. LII, p. 179. During his stay in Germany where he spent much of his time, putting the finishing touehes to what he previously, had written of his novel and there he wrote the latter half 0f Noli me ta11gere. In spite of being "among companions of soeialistic tendencies, his belieii in and layalty to the monarchical rule of his count•~ were yet unshaken by the influence of such environment." John Foreman, 'Fhe Philippiiie lsla11ds (ll.ondon, 1906), p. 381. 44

Craig, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

SECRET SOCIETI•E S

il'lterest lihe ccmcliti0111s that exis-t ed in va,ri0us c01:mtries.'6 He Feaohe<!I ~pain ia Al!lgt,t•st, 1890 to j0i111 de! Pilar and others im their [li)t:@pa:,ga,FJ.da activities, though sad expeFience separatecl the two a:fiterwavcls. 46 As time passed anm sin ce the sit1,1a:tion at h@me seemed so grave, he s;i.ide<ll again for tlii.e islaFJ.<lls. While en route back, in H emgk0ng, Rizal wrote to <de! :Pilar in the following laFJ,gitlage: "] t is aFJ. a,r ticle of faith with many of our e011n,tlry,men that we are or will be more 1,1seful almi> ad than in ou,r 0wn land. When they prove to me that a sick ma.Fl is more q_u>ickly cured by keeping tn:e d0ct0r an.d the medicine far away from him then iL share their belief. Cavour used to say that one <ilid a0t sawe the f <1:therland outside of, but w ithin, it. ]i myself have encountered violent opposition to my veturn." 47 lllef.©Fe lea:ving for the islands he was urged by fFienms a:'l'ld velatives n©t to take the risk. 48 With fully g0od: iat entr0ns, Rizal sailed 'for home knowing fuJ>l well what he ham t0 :facrn. Me left two t0uching letters in H0FJ.gk0ng, one t !i) his family and the other to the Fili].))i111os, t0 li>.e OJllel'l€d a:fiter his death. 49 46 In 1890 he witnessed perhaps ,vith envy the growing prosperity of Japan, but the idea of anne"ation to that country was never tasteful to him, a5 he feared the jJ a1l_anese might prove to be rather harsh masters. See For.eman, op. cit., p. 382. 46 47

Supra, pp. 19-20. Letter. of J.une 15, 1892, in Craig, Rizal's Poli/.ical Writings, p. 313.

48 ifi!e chedshed the idea of tr.ansfer,r.ing a large colony of his countrymen to the distFict in Bomeo offered him by the British North Borneo Company,. 'i!1her.e they would be under the safe flag of England. Rizal never had, l\owever, any intention of renouncing his Philippine allegiance, for. tile natur.alization of Filipinos abroad was strongly distasteful to him. 1.aubach, oJ,. cit., p. 102. Graig, Lfoeage, .Mfe and Labors of Jose Rizal,

p. 176.

\ t

49 For, the texts of these letters, see <Eraig, Rizal's Life and Mi1'or Writing« ~Manila, 1927), pp. lhl.9, 133-135.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHIMPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

Uporn ai.:rival in Maniia i,n July, 1292, Rizal l@st no ti.me im caHi-mg a meeting of the lllrominent arid patriotic FiliJ,liMs. In tlni.s gathering, he talked i.nspiririg.Iy of :matic;:a1al solidarity, 0ÂŁ soGial redi@rm, and @f the rights of Hile Filip.iinos, by .i.atu.ra1 law. 60 He api;,ealed to his iisterievsH that H1ilile has c@me !lfcn:- aFlited. aietion. After several meetirogs a-n@eF lo.is leadevshiw La Liga Filipina 62 Gr 'fliie F'hili.,wi;>ine fueagUJe was ccnilstittatecl. @Fl the night of Ju1y 3, 1s,2, itil the hoNse @f a Chir,i,ese half-caste, on CaUe l!'laya, No. 176, 'Tg>lild@. The h1hall>,i tants there had aftcerwarlils ereetec;l a: m@lill!lmero.t in froro.f of the li10use as a m,em@,ria.I o:F that hi:storic lilig<ht. 53 Âˇ L0J luiJga F i lipina, i,111 ltiza:t's @w11! word.is, was a s@dety @f a frate<rmal character. Its olDjects were known t@ The as !lfoH@ws :

t 2. 3. 60

T e0dor,o Kalaw, 1-a :Revolucio11 Filipina, p. 10. F r,aneo,

68 The m0nument was er,eeted 0n Deeember JO, 1903, 0n a site gi,v en by '!Fim0te0 Pae~ a memller, of the 1-iga. @n the m0nument is the follow.ing in6edpti0n: Remember. Facing this site and at liouse No. 170 -l laya St., iE>r.. Rizal and otner.s faunded and inaugurated 0n the night of July 3, 1892, ithe T.,iga Filipina, a na,ti0na~ see-r.et s0dety, with the assistanee and approval ot tlie fol10w,i ng gentlemen: . .. . " See EllaiF and R0berts0n, op. cit., V 0I. Mm, pp. 225-220.

SECRE!l' SOCIETIES

41.

Enc0u1Jagem ent of i.nstructfoa, agricul,ture, and c0m,m e-r ee. S. $-t udy and aJDJDiication of reforms.64 Tliie eo:astitat ion 0& tlrn Liga drafted by Rizal was a@O]Dted on thil't rnem@rable night. It was riot a very short d@ctuil.en,t. In aecordance with its prov1s10ns, those who j@i,ne~ the £,i;ga were required to make a pledge f©r admission. 66 ]if the admission was granted he then took a s0lernn 0ath be:fore a human skull and signed the document wi,t h his own li>lood obtained by making an incisi0n in e~ther Gme of his arms. The skull symbolized death, and t o eaeh initiate it meant that he should, if neecd: be, give his l,i fe in the Liga's behalf. Every member wa:s sw@rn t@ the duty of disseminating propaganda thrnN•g'.h every rnea:ns p0ssili>le. He must, among other <tlt11ties, 0bserve strictly self-denial and blind obedience to his su,~eri@rs. 66 64 'llhe te,ot of the l.iga' s constitution was printed partly in both Spanish and 'Fagalog at London by the London Printing Press. The text in full .has lieen translated into English and pdnted in Blair and Robertson, op. cit., Vol. Mm, pp. 217-224. Cf. Diamonon, op. cit., pp. 121-122. 66 The text of member.ship pledge is as follows : "Nul)lber--To--Of-I--Of--years of age, of--state, profession--, as a chosen son of Filipinos, decla,e under formal oath that I know ancl entirely understand tl\e ends aimed at by the Liga Filipilla, whose text appears on the back of the p•esent pledge. 'Dherefor.e I submit myself, and at my own accord petition the Ghief--of this province, to admit me as a member and coworker- in tl\e same, and for that proofs may be demanded of me, in testimony oli my . sincere adhesion I" Blair and Robertson, op. cit., Vol. LU, p. 224. . 66 Members of the Liga must observe also the following precepts which Rizal prepa, ed : Don't gamble. Don't be a dr.unkard. Don' t break the laws. Elon't lie eruel in any way. J;lon't be a rabid partisan. Don't be merely a £atilt-finder. Don't put your.self in the way of humiliation. Don't treat anyone with haugl\tiness or contempt. Don't condemn any man without first hearing his side. E>on't forget those that although worthy have come to want. :t>on't abandon the poor- man that has r.ight on his side. Don't fail tl\ose witl\out means that show application and ability. Don1t a ssociate with immo,al per.sons or with persons of bad habits. Don't overlook the value of your- countr-y of new machinery and industries. Don't cease at any time to wor-1< for. the prosperity and welfare of our native land. Diamonon, op. cit., pp. 212-222; Russell, op. cit., pp. 244-245.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHIU:PPINE POUTICAL PARTIES

Tm.e Liga, accordililg to its es.tatutos, was governed

by a SNprnme Col!lncil cGJmposed of a 01ief, a Fiscal, a Treasurer, a Secretary and otheir c@uncill(i)FS. In each prnvinee there was a l?F@vincial Council which comprised tfu•e same ty]De Qdi fuli1ctionaries aNd a e@mparatively small 1%1Jlililber of <so1,1aciH0rs. Uncler each f>r0vincial C@11mei1 thei:e weFe as mamy FGJ)J>t,1[ar Couuils as th~re were flil!ltmber oif pueblos (:)1" towms im that prnvince. Each P®JDl!llair C@l!lncil was (:)•ligariized i Fl the same folitin as was the Fvovimcial Comiacil. AH if'roviTJ.cial Chiefs were also memli> e,i:s @f the Sajilreme C@tmcit jMst as all Fopular Ch.ids were members o.£ the F'rGJ-viricial Council iri their r,es,peet,i ve jDr@v.ims:es. 57 1

5~ Regulati0ns 0£ the Liga in Ri:zal's handwriting may be found in Cnaig:, T..i,ieage, Life and E.abors of, Jose Rizal, p. 19[. Cf. Diaz's statement , in St. Clair, op. cit., pp. 29-32. 58 Foreman, op. cit., pp. 24, 383. Census of fhe Philip;pine l:slands, t903, 'V0!. l, p. 383.

SECRET SOCIETIES

Ji)atriotic camjpaigns 0ÂŁ educati<m.69 Upon this ground Rizal was a,rrested and soon dep0rted to Dapitan without even a tr-iaU 0 The exile of Rizail was in truth a deathblow to the root of the Liga!s existence. Following this sad event, a grand assembly of its prominent leaders was urgently called to decide on an immediate course of action. After many heated discussions, the IAga agreed to be dissolve@. This took place only a few days after the Liga was inaugurated. But as a political organization, its living memory remained. We find that early in 1893, th110ugh the initiative of Domingo Franco, AildFes Eon.Hacio and Âˇ 0thers, the IAga was again established. 61 But because the principles it advocated failed to satisfy its radical members, the IAga was finally dissolved after a lingering secret existence of a few months. 62

JJ.

The Katipurian and the Revolution

The arrest of Rizal, and the deportation of many others, had sunk deep into the memory of the Filipinos, as symboUc of the Si;ianish reign. It was because of this sad event that W;ieral Filipinos had become discouraged an.d faint-hearted. B0nifacio, a leading member of the Liga Filipina, thereupon, took steps to call together Ladislao Diwa, Teodoro Plata and 0thers at Tondo, a 69 _Craig, R,izal's Life a11d Minor Writi11gs, p. 136. The detailed charges made against Rizal, see Gaceta de Ma11ila, July 7, 1892. 60 Lettevs ot Ildefonso Laurel to Rizal, dated Manila, September 3, 1892. For Govemor-General Despujol's decree of Rizal's deportation, see Gaceta de Ma11ila, July 7, 1892. Cf. Epifanio de los Santos, "Andres Bonifacio," The Philippine Review (January and February, 1918), Vol. III, Nos. 1-2. 61 Mabini, "La Revoludon,'' Documwtos de la Biblioteca Nacion.al de Filipinas (Manila, 1931), compiled by T. Kalaw, No. 5 de la serie, pp. 296.-297. 62. :Pbiil.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

suburb of Manila, where they founded the famous society known as the Katipunan, 68 on July 7th, 1892. Being a political society, the Katipunan was evidently "not masonic, as the friars asserted, only copying some of the masonic formulae; but it was a natural and logical outgrowth of the smothering of what had been a legitimate rnovernent for the expression of the Filipino reform sero.timent." 64 According to Bonifacio, the Katipunan was organized with the purpose of uniting the Filipinos in sentiment, thought, and action, so that they might acquire the strength necessary to crush the evil that was afflicting the Filipino people. 65 The appearance of ' the Katipunan was undoubtedly the triumph of a new movement which repudiated the evolutionary methods of conservative elements under Rizal. Forbes-Lindsay was right in. his observation that "out of the freernas.on.s grew a number of independent societies, each was more radica:l than i:ts predecessors, culminating in the Katipunan." 66 Looking into the elements that composed this organization, its radical advocacy was only aÂˇ logical consequence. Its founder, Bonifacio himself, was very low in the social strata,67 and 68 Katipunan is a Tagalog word meaning a league or an association. The Spanish "Katipuneros" and the English word "Katipunize" are undoubtedly derived from it and with the same meaning. The complete title of the Katipunan in Tagalog is Kataastaasan Kagala11ggala11g Katipu11an ng mga A11ak 11g Bayan (Jfighest and Most Respectable Association of the Sons of the People). Its symbol has been popularly known as K. K. K. SeeÂˇ Artigas, Andres Bowifacio y el Kati.punan (Manila, 1911), pp. 22-23; Epifanio de los Santos, "Andres B0nifaeio," The Philippine Review, January and Febnuary, Vol. HI, Nos. 1-2, p. 38. Ci:/. Teodoro Kalaw, La R~volucion Filipina, n. p. 10, S. Doc. No. 331, Part 1, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 366-367. 64 "lLeRoy's Bibliographical Notes," loc. cit., p. 131; "The Friar Memorial of 1898,'' loc. cit., p. 241. 65 "Bonifacio, What the Filipinos Should Know," The Philippine Review, January and February, 1918, Vol. III, Nos. 1-2, p. 39. 66 Charles Forbes-Lindsay, The Philippfoes (Philadelphia, 1916), p. 162. 67 We learn from his best biographer that Bonifacio was not favoured by fortune and compelled to earn a living as a messenger of Fleming & Co., and then entered the employ of Fressekk & Co., where he served when the events of 1896 occurred. He had hardly any education, except self-education. See de los Santos, op. cit., p. 35.

SECRET SOClE'llIES

the 11est @!£ the members 0r katipwnerw, with the excel')ti@a 0f Eronili@ jf acint@, the "brain truster" of JB0nifaei0, b.aF!tUy ar,iy011e had a university education. MeFl of wealtl.\J. were 'aipproache0. also, but none agree0. to j0in. 68 ]n :fact, there was among the katipuneros a st!'0ng Fesen&ment against the wealithy, t1ie upper-class Fili:l')i•n@s, the l;n1cled Jllre>prietors, as well as against the friaF iamcl:foirds and the w1i@le fabric of government and society Festing on tlaern. 69 The Katipunan was, there~ :fore, i,n tfue true sense of tlae worm, a plebeian organiza1 ti@n. lit was JDernaps clue to1this that some writers have gone so tar as to Jllass their opit4ion tha t the Katipunan was a socialistic 0rgami,z ati0n 0f the French Revolutionary ty.l')e. 70 Iti was true that Bomifaeio gathered his ideas of r-N@cle.r n 11etlioi"m from reacling some treaties on the ,-F Femela R<woh1ticm amd ~as imbued with a notion that t liJie rnethoms 0f tfue mob im Paris were those best adapted tio seet!!r-e ameli0rati0n for tlae Filipinos; but from Bomi!liacio's @wn p0litical writings, we can hardly find anything at al'l to sh0w that his were socialistic ideas. On acco1,m1t @f the To.ahitual exaggeration of rabid Spanish writers, stucd(mts are often confused as to the r eal adv ocacy of tlae Katipunan. To kri.ow it with some accuracy, we shall, of :rneeessity, turn to tfuose early p@liti(rnl writi,mgs 0£ fuotfu Jacinto and Bonifacio for guidance. After examinfog them, the writer ventures li~re t@ repoFt them. as follows:

1. Iulustrious vir'tue and noble 'f)rinciple of men. li.<1 Jaei,n,t0's Cartilla, he said, "Life which is not 68

"Testimony of Dr. Valenzuela," given in Retana's Arcl,ivo del Biblio- ·

filo Filipino €Manila, 1897), Vol. !Plil, p. 226. 69 "LeRoy's Bibliographical Notes,'' loc. cit., p. 185. 10 Roches-Lindsay commented in this connection that the Katipunan's purpose was to "redeem the Bhilippines from their tyrants, the friars, and to tound a <Conimunistic Republie." See his book, The Philippines, p. 162.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

consecrated to a lofty and just purpose is like a tree which easts no shadow-a poisonous weed." 2. Equality of man. The kati'puneros accepted the principle "that all men are equal, be the colour of their skim black or white. Ome may be superi@r to ain@ther in wisd@m, l@@ks, or wealth, b11t tlo.ey are equal as lilllen." 3. To defend the oppr,e.ssed and fight the 0ppressor. 4. Respect for women. They held that although mam must guide w©man be should not think of her as a tlo.ing which serves merely to pass the ti.me, but as a helper, as a partner in the happiness of l:ifo. Man slo.ould respect her in her weakness and tlo.ink onl.y oi the motlo.er who brought him int@ the woFld alild took care of lo.im in chil<tlhood. S. BrotheP1i<J0d @f rrwinkind. "Real saintliness <>®nsis1is im fudm,g d liaritalMe, in loving one's iliell@wmen, amcl! ill adj,a sting one's every word, action and meed t @right and reason." 71 Obviously no r,efor,m could be ob1rained s©- long as the Spanish policy of retrogression remained. One, ther,efore, could be almost certain as to the real intent1on of :ffionifacio aTid his followers. It seemed reas@nable tp suppose that those who were illitiated i111to 'the Katip11nan frnm 1894 on, if m0t £mm tTo.e out set, underst00d full well that t hey were t® stand 111@t mer,,ely for 1.1ev0h1.ti@n but fo,,r i.,n<depero.delilee as weiV 2 JBy means @i.li this seoessioni.st 7•l !T'a einto's Cartilla ~Pr.imer,) is given in Artigas, op. cit., pp. l&-20. Bonifacio's "Deealogue," "What the Filipinos Should Know," "Love oii the Country," r.eprinted in de los Santos, op. cit., pp. 38-41. The story is told that Bonifaeio had prepared a similar one also ealled Decalogue but finally withdrew it himself and recognized Jacinto's Cartilla as the r.epresentative tl'eatise on the doctrines of the Katipunan. Ibid., Cf. "'.L'he Katipunan of the Philippines," Am. Mo. Rev., September, 1901, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, p. 154. 72 John Taylor, Philippine Insurgent Records, Vol. II, Exhibit Ha 74.FZ. These unpublished documents ar.e kept in the Bu,eau of Insular Affairs, Washington, D.C., Cf,. Retana, op, cit., Vol. III, p. 154.

SECRET SOCIETJES

oli>ject, national,ism was greatly f©mented. Thus, we find that Bonifacio zealously talked of the Filipino glory of the past, ai;id appealed to his people in the fashion of Mazzini "Love y0ur t,t,:nl.appy country!" "Arise now to save your country!" "Strike a blow to save your country!" "The last drop of your blood you must offer !"73 These were 1i.is favourite slogans w ith which . he effectively captured the mind of his people. The organization of the Katipunan was very analogous to trhat of the Liga Filipina. There were esseF1tially three distinct control councils, namely, the Supreme Council, the Provincial Council, and the Popular Council. Each hacl its own functionaries such as a president, a fiscal, a secretary, and an interventor. The central control of the Katipunan resided in the Supreme Council. Sometimes two councils were formed in a single province. In such case that province itself constitutecl two Katipunan provinces. A popular council might have sometimes under its control several sections, and each section might in turn divide into sub-sections, if need fue. 74 In 1892, soon after the birth of the Katipunan, those elected to the Supreme Council were Deodato Arellano, thti wresidelil't; AF1dres Bonifacio, the interventor ; Ladislao Diwa, the fiscal; Teodoro Plata, the secretary; and Shortly after, the Valentin Diaz, the treasurer. 73 "Love of Country," loc. cit., pp. 40-41. In an article written jointly by Bonifacio and Dr. Valenzuela, reads in part : " . . . We raise our heads long accustomed to bow low, and summon up all our strength boldly to tell tl\em 'the Spaniards' that the expression 'Mother Spain' is but a piece of adulation . . . that ·they are nothing but a race that robs, a people that fattens on what is not its own; that there is another people 'the F ilipino' tired of that which gives it neither strength nor life, and that these is no longer any hope eoccept in ouv forces and means of defense." Retana, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 136. 74 Ibid., p. 2H. T. Kalaw, La Revolucio11 Filipi>ia, p. 14 ; "The Katipunan of the PhiliP.pines," loc. cit., p. 346. Castillo y Jimenez, El Katipunan o el Filibwsteris11,o e11 Filipinos ~Mad•rid, 1897~, pp. 108-111.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

Supreme Council was reorganized, with Ramon Basa as r president, Bonifacio as fiscal, Santiago as secretary, Moliaa: as treasurer and five other eouncillors. But later, on aecount o!li his weak character, want of initiative, and difference of opinion with Bonifacio, Basa resigned the office as president in 1894. Thereupon B0nifacio succee<le~ as the new president. In 1896 the Saprerne Ceuncil was for the fourth time reorganized and J3oni:facio remained presicient75 with his prestige , greatly iro.creased. Katipunan, he the into initiate<!! was person a When had to go through certain ceremonies of solemn and terrifying character. Me was, as reqaired, led into a dimly lighted l'OOFn, where he would fiind on the wall the following words: "If you have streNgth ancl valour, you can proeeed. If what has brnagh,t you hither is on,ly curiosity, retire. If y(j)u earn not control your p>assions, retire; never siha.bl the <d01Hs 0:li tme S0v,ereig!lil a:!lild Vero.erable ' Ass@ciation of the Sons o;f the Pe@ple be opened t0 y@u."76 Altter l:iii,s eourage was teste<il, t'he initiate then proceeded to a ta:lDle oa whklll were a: h,umaFl skull, a loadeC: revolver, a short native sword (lDolo), and a p>aper witl: several questions the iFlitiafe had to answer. 77 The 76 The rest 0f the members 0ÂŁ the fourth SupFeme Council were as follows : Emilio Jacinto, secretary; Pio Valenzuela, fiscal; and Vicente Molina, t r,easurer. See T. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 14. Cf. Diamonon, op. cit., pp. 12+125. 76 Maximo KalaW,, op. cit., p. 73. 77 Âˇ The questions to be answered wer.e: (1) In what state did the Spaniards find the 'Filipino people at the time of the conquest? (2) In what state are they today? ( 3) Wliat future do they have? 'I'he initiate was supposed to answer with contempt against Spain. !lbid., pp. 73-74. "'The Katipunan I of the Philippines," loc. eit., p. 346.

SECRET SOCIETIES

procedure e@ro.dilltdecd with a s0lemn oath78 signed with bl0e>d tialkenc !tir-om t he ealilcdidate's 0wn arm. Thus, he was fo11m,a lly aclrnittecl as a member of the Katipunan. "Dhe Kati]_ilt!l.1lila~1 l!lmfer :ffi0I1ifacio's leadership marked a new eira 0f its expa•nsion. He ably organized the first several sl!lb>mdinate <Wl!lNdls in the suburbs of Manila, and afterwar<il.s s1,1ceee<il.ecl in establishing in the nearby provi«iees s1,1ch as Cavite, Batangas, Morang, Laguna, and :B1,1laeam, mamy s1,1bor<il.inate councils with remarkable rapidity. By fhe middle of 1896, before the revolution, tlrnre wel.'e estimated to have been from 123,000 to 400,00(i) members 0.f the Kati,punan.79 Sin<se his organization had been so well established, am<d was so much in the confidence of the people, i80nifaei0 imcreas1ngly believed that the time to strike 1was meali' at ham<d, and every day he longed for the active iassistanee 0£ Rizal, who had ever since 1892 been an exile in Ua]_ilitan. 80 With such an · intent and purpose, he sent D11. Valenzl!lela 81 as an emissary to confer with Rizal. 'fhe emissary laid be:liore Rizal the plans for coup d'etat, 1

78 "I decJar,e that on account of my entrance into the K. K. K. of the A. N. B. [ ha,ve sworn a solemn oath in my native pueblo. and in the presence of a superior of the Junta of the Katipunan, to do away with everything that is possible and even with that which is to me most dear and appreciated in this life, and to defend the cause to victory or to death. l'\nd in truth of this I swear also to be obedient in everything and to i ollow the fight wher.ever I ain led. And in pr.oaf of what I have said I place my true name with the blood of my veins at the foot of this declaration." See St. Clair, op. cit., pp. 259-260. 79 Charles W . Elliott, The Philipflines (Indianapolis, 1916) , p. 191. For differept estimates, see Forbes-Lindsay, op. cit., p. 162 ; de los Reyes, La Religion de! Katipunan, p. 45. 80 $1<'flra, p. 26. 81 !Dr. Valenzuela was considered one of the two best learned men among the Katipuneros. 'Me was initiated to the Katipunan in 1895, and soon

Decame P.rominent as Bonifacio's m0st ind'ispensable co-worker. In visiting Rizal, V:alen«uela d'isguised himselii and took w,ith him a blind man, p'resumably to seek Rizal for, an operation. This ruse enabled him to consult Rizal ,vith fair tr.eedom. See Craig, Lineage, Life and Labors of Jose Rizal, p. 224,

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

hoping to receive the exile's assistance. But much to Valemzuela's sarprise, the plan was utterly rejected by Rizal @m the gro1md tlil.at the Fili,1>in0s were not as yet ready for self-govenurnmt. 82 When Bonifacio received the report that Rizal was 0f aa a,iverse opinion regardimg the whole plan, he deci<de€l to go @n' wi,t h wliiat h€ oi:-igimaliy intended and forget the exile. When the news of di:ff erence between Rizal and ~onifacio leaked out, a falling away in Kati88 punaFI! rneli1ilhiership was one of tlie bad C(/>msequences. However,, tlie idea 0£ immediate revolt was dominant , 84 among the Katipuneros in spite of Rizal's warning. Katipunan the in This senti,m ent was well expressed 0rg-am, Kalayaan (Uberty),85 .and s@on calJlile to characterize the entire mov~memt. In other words, the plans for revolt were ready, but for the right moment they ma\!! t @wait. lEairly in Jiu]y, ]896, FU1'11©UF became ourrent among Spanish circles that a secret society was prepared for a revolt. This excited the government officials consideralbly. Imvestigati©Fl int@ tTo.e souroe 0f tme rumour was lJlila@e, fuUJ,t mo trace whatever c01,d d 1l>e foumd antil August 19th. Om that night a girl papil of the Augu,stinian CoHege toled her MG>ther Sa]i>eFi0r the secrets of tine Kati:pm.11am wmich she learned little by little from her ornther 'feodoaro Par,tino, a follower of :IB0Hifacio; The news was quickly carried to Father G.il. As a result the lith@graphiG storo.e, the by-laws of the Kati,p unan in

82 Rizal cited "the Spanish Republics in South America, with their altemating revolutions and despotisms as a warning against embarking on a change of government for which the people weFe not prepared." In Rizal's opinion, edueation was first necessary, and geneFal enlightenment the only Foad to pr.ogress. See Cr.aig, op. cit., p. 225. Cf. Russell, The Hero ' of the FiUpinos, pp,. 276-277. 83 Craig, op. c-1t., p. 225. 84 'Russell, The CJutlook for the Philippines (!New York, 1922) , pp. 101-102. 85 De los Santos, "Amdres Bonifacio," loc. cit., p. 41. 'Phe r,eview's first number was issued in Januar,y, 1896, but suspended the following issue.

SECRET sociETIES

Tagalog, and 0theF cloeumeRts dealing with the coRspiracy t:tsed lily tlile Katipulner,os were d,iscovered, along with many @ther things. 86 The ii;icident caused many arrests. Bonifaei0 and hi_s lieUttei;ianfs were warned in time to make ~heir es«aJile to Cal0ocan, where they raised an army and farom Augi,ist 23rd on many battles were fought,8 7 thougfu the fir,st big engagemeNt did not start until August 30th, wfuen a large force was led by Bonifacio himseH in an attempt to capture the powder magazine at Sai;i JmaN clel M0rate, l'l.ear Manila. 88 The revolution was ON amGt a state @f war was proclaimed by GovernorGeneval BlaRco through0m.t many provinces. 89 Tfue Govern0r-General was a liberal. He stroi;igly fav@u11e0. JilOlicies of attraction rather than repression. 90 [ t was he, who in gooa intent liberated Rizal on July 28, 1896. With his permissiol'l Rizal was to sail for Spain l!_ea,FiR:g letters 0£ reoommel'ldation from the Governor1.:reReral.91 Th-is tolerance cam.sed stormy protests from the friars and the Spaniards, who could not allow Rizal, whom they m.ated so much, to escape with his life. Press11re was pm.t m.!_l)on the Governor-GeReral, who afterwards yiel<ile<.d. to tfue fatefol re<'J.11.est. A cable was then sent to S]ilain, whi'ch iRfluenced the miHister ·of war, who suceeed:ed in fuaving Rizal ordered back t0 Manila as a prisoner. 92 They• acc1iisec;l Rizal of being a leader of the 86 lbiil., "LeRoy's Bibliographical Notes," loc. cit., pp. 187-188; Fecnandez, Ifistory of lhe Philippines, pp. 243-244; T. M. Ka-law, The Philippi,ie Revqlutio11, pp. 17-18. • 87 'Faylor, op. cit., Vol. I, 27 FZ; The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, October 27, 1900. BB Taylor, op. cit., Vol. I, 27 FZ. 89 Manila, Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Laguna, Cavite, and Batangas: 90 See his official eircular of October 11, 1896 to the executive officials of the provinces and distFicts. The tex{ is given in T. Kalaw 1s La Revolucioti Filipin·a, pp. 19-20. 91 Report of the Philippine Commission, 1899-1900, Vol. Ir, p. 401.° For e text o, Bianco's letter of reeommendation, see Foreman, op. cit., p. 38i 92

Ibid.

DEVELO PMENT OF PHILIPP INE POLITIC AL PARTIES

Katipun an which gave rise to the revoluti on. But in organiz apoint of fact, Rizal had nothing to do witm. the 93 Howev er, tion nor anythin g tG> do with the revoluti on. Rizal was t<:> meet Flis death on Decemb er . 30, 1890, sevemteem days after Govern or-Gene ral Bl?,nco was 94 replace d by Genera l P@lavieja, who had f)reviously won a bloody reputat ion in Cuba. The execNti on d Rizal gave.m ach c@1!1rage to those fa<si,mg tl:ile Spaniar ds in tlile battle. Dl!le to their strong resistan ce many hard tasks had been created for the new Govern or-Gene ral. 95 But a detailed a:ccount of the war 1 evemts does not mueh concern us in the presemt study. Among the revolut ionary leaders um.happy events had developed. Becaus e of his military qualitie s, Don Emilio Aguinal!!lo, 96 Municip al CaJ!)taim. of Kawit, quickly raiseci hiFf!â&#x20AC;˘seH t o J!lFOmi:n.er,iee. Renee Cavite was the center of the rebelliom., they iater establis hed there tw<:> provincial co1!1ncils, one in Magda:lo, amd the other in Magdiw ang~ umder the Katipt.t,n an. Of the :former, Aguina ldo wa~ elected Captai.n -Genera l, and of the latter, Bonifac io was in suprem e control. Aguina ldo was nomina lOy still a membe r of the iKatipunan, bt.t,t h.i:s iii.1ltem.tion to ~,r eak frorn the organiz ation had long become evident . Evem. as early on as Octobe r 31, 1896, about nine weeks after the revoluti 9 brnke out, Aguina ldo himself iss1,1ed a liFlani'festo ~ in which he J!lrop@sed a rnvolat ionary govesrnm.emt to be establis hed, repu1blican in form. message t o his 93 See Rizal's last letter to his bFother, and his last pp fellow-~ountrymen compiled in R fral's Politi cal Writi11gs, ed. lly Craig, 369-37.5. Editorial, The Manila Times, January 2, 1916. 248. Just two weeks 94 CFaig, Lineage, Life and Labors of Jose Rizal, p. shot a,f ter the execution of Rizal, a dozen other members of the Liga were p. 387 on the Luneta, a fashionable promenad e in Manila. Foreman, op . cit., p. 42. 95 [)e los Santos, "Andres Bonifacio, " loc. cit., in 1894. Fernandez , 96 Aguinaldo was initiated into the Katipunan Sess. 'P-Iistorr; of the Philippines, p. 246; S. Doc. No. 331, 57th Cong., 1st p. 2024. 1926), p. 28. Cf. T, 97 Fernandez , 1lhe Philippine Repu/;llic (New YoFk, Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

SECRET SOCIETIES

Since the heti@ie mattle 0ff :February i7, 1897, the Spanish foFces 0ccupied sucrnssively more towns belonging t© tfu.e Mag.dal@ C:01.,1ncil, the members @f which were inclined ti© j@iin tfu.@se 0£ Magdiwang Cot,tncil, in defense of the pF@vi1J1ce ~f Cavite. Fi@r this purpose, the Fev0luti0nary leaders held a meeting in San Francisco de Mala:b0n, MaFch 22, rn97, on the · initiative of Jacinto L1.,1mb11eras. The meefo1g .was at first presided over by Lumfulieras, li>1.,1t wl'ien the <']_ttestion of the establishment @fa rev:@ht,ti@nary government was brought Mp, he yielded tfu.e presiding chaiF t© 130Bifacio, to whom the Magdiwang :facti0n akeady paid but little rnspect, though he himself was still the sl!lpreme head of the Katipunan. 98 Im: the meeHng 1Bonifacio declared from his presiding cn01iF that ii.ii as mucfu as the meeting was in favour of a .genera.I 11e@rgan,i zation of th.e revolutionary forces, he was , viriU.ing 1i0 end@rse the idea, I')rovided that the will of the a1aj011ity wemld be respected. As the resolution of the re@rganizatiol'l was adopted, the assembly elected , A:g1,1inald0, :President, Mariano Trias, Vice-President, ~o,nifaci@, Director of the Department of the Interior, AFt,emi@ )Zicarte, Captain-General, a,nd EmiJ.io Riego de 1Dios, Di,r ect0r of War. Among these officials, Eonifacio's p@m~ etenee was iornmeiu.iately questioned. This attitude, itaken ID:Y s0rne @f the Maigdiwang faction, only added new [at t© the fire. Thereupon, B@ni.facio left the assembly h,nd decla1"ed that as !he head of the Katipunan, he refused ~ 11ec0gni'ze the validity of the e.lection, 99 @n the grnund Hiat tile 1"eal wiU 0£ the majority had not been complied wi,th. 'iFfue enmi,ty between the tw© :factions was practical'ly .irree@m.ciilali>le. Pers0na;l jealousy wa!? the root of all the a_«!@; l'mt tfue iss1.,1e in dispt,t•t e ml!lst not be overl@oked.

,·· fS · • 99

i1'

itle los Santes, "A:ndres Bonifacio," loc. cit., p. 42. See Boni:liac,io's letter to Emilio JaGinto, on April 24, 1897. The text ull given in /fbiii., pp. 44-46.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

Whether the revolutionists should be controlled by the Katipum.an which already existed, or by a new government to be forlilll:ed? Tm.os·e @f the Magdala faction took the view that since the Katipunan was organized with the main purpose to obtain freedom of the country, therefore, the Katili>unan sihialil conti,nue to rnle until the aforesaid @bjeet was secwred. Those of the Magdiwang faction were of the adverse opinioa that the Katipunan was but a secret society. Since the revolution had already hegun, tne o,rgam.izati@n shotdd cease to ex~st. 100 From an account of Bonifacio's wife, 101 it seemed that an effort was made to compromise the two factions, but that Fesulted omly in am. armed c<imflict in which Bonifacio was wounded, aad bro11ght to Magdiwang f©r frial. H{/ was sentenced to be shot by the court-martial appointea by Aguinaldo. · The senteace was afterwards commute(11 to life impris0r,iment. Bue th@ epoch-making prisoner was killed im. his attempt to escape:, 102 it was said. The premature <leath of ]3bnifacio, following the establishment of the Revolutionary Government, marked a: coln1plete end @f the Katipunan. Wow the Katipunan und~r Bonifacio was gone. It did not win the battle, but it did raise an army. After the '[!)ass.iirg oif Bonifaeio, Aguinalde naturnlly became the sole leader, unchalleriged as to autm.ority, and the solar center of all the stars. 108 He continued fighting the Spaniards until the signing c.>f tm.e Treaty of Biac-na.104 By thrs Bat0 whiem. took jola:ce Olil December 14, 1397. 100 Ibid., pp. 51-54; James A. LeRoy, The Americaiis in the Philipf,,me.r (New Yo_rk, 19_14), :Val. I, pp. 118-119. !0'l 'ifext given in de los Santos, "Andr-es Boni(acio," loc. cit,, pp. 4'?-49. 102 Ibid., pp. ·5 et seq. Cf. Jose V. Clarin, General Ag1,iiialdo a,,o Philippine Politics (Manila, 1928), pp. 39-4'4. 103 S. Doc. No. 66, 55th Cong., 1st Sess. 104 "'Fhe Treaty of Biac-na-Bato," The Philippine Review, Noveinbe. 1 !90'1.

SECRi/iJ'JJ SOCIE'JJlI!lS

d0cumer,1;t Agailfla!ldo antd his imimecliate associates were t@ leave !the lslar1cls. ln F€tarn, Spain was to grant a gelil.era:l arnlil.esty, tw> intrnclace ceFtcbi:n reforms,1°6 and to pay $800,©©0 i,n sil~er. Witht this moliley Aguinaldo and his ass0ci<ates Sc!iiled for Hongkong, where they stayed l!lliltil after the d0wnbl'l of the Sii>anish regime, which was brol.!lgM ab0ut by ltlte s-quadrnn of Admiral Dewey on May ls·t , t8§lg_106 Jln summary, we may reiterate that the seeret s@eieties @F re¥@lati0rtary parti'es of the Phiil ippines were, in th.'€ <e:l0sing period of the Spanish regime, a distinct fem"e tna1t arnse atter the mutiny of 1872. It was their vario1,1s activities that ena1D1'ed the Filipino people to learn t he m@dem spirit 0£ associations ·and standards of social con<dact. We 11111;1st n@te here also that never before the y:ea,r 1892 hacd aay Filipino leader seriously enter!tai1~ed tihe i/llea oil' (Cseparati@n," but oro.ly that of "reform." The arr.est @f Rizal fail that eventfol year marked a radi_cal change i•Fl the enti11e movemero.t. The movement was no .l0F1geu engiBeer,ecl e:xdusively by the intellectual and conservative 'fiew, bu,t by t_he 1;1ntut@red and radical many. ' Th e rise 0,£ the Katipu,n an was, i11 truth, an expression of , the l@weu classes in the growth 0f the Filipi110 national \e@lilS.ci@us-ness, which, born ?n the seventies, was schooled ilil the eigm.ties an<il graduated i,11 the nineties. What r0le thi•s y0M,11g grnd1;1clite was to play in the development of ,tl.'J.e Pnimp>lll~Be @arty poli,tics, ~ve shall see later. 106 @over.no,-(i.ener.a1 Primo d-e Rivera agreed to: (!) The e:><pulsion of the religious 0,ders. (2) Philippine representation in the Spanish Cortes. ~3) 11he equal treatment of Filipinos and Spaniards in the application of justke. ~,!) 'llhe employ,ment of Filipinos in the high posts of the govern, ment ser-viGe. (5) The liberty of the press, and the right to form associa-· tions. See Fe,nandez, A Brief 'H-istory' of the Philippi,ies, p. 251. 106 A11tobiography of George Dewey (New York, 1913), p. 222. H . Doc, No. 3, SStl'i Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 68.

CHAPTER

:fOJ..,ITICAL PARTIES PRl©R TO THE HARRISON ADMINISTRATION

The Federal Party: Its Baekground and Formation

A\liter the de:>wm:fall @.f the SJ_i}at1isln regime, Agui111aldo 'b>eli:eved that the Americans would facilitate Philippine 1 i,111dependence and recognize his g0vernment at Ma,lolos. But he soom discovered his mistake, when on January 4, f899 the 'liaim0us i,nstruetioFI! 0£ iPresicl.~mt McKinley to General Elwell S. Otis2 becalilil@ known, that American 8 sovereignty must b>e unconditionaUy rerngnized. Negotiations were arranged between Gtmeral 'Oti's and the imsu,rgemts bl!lt they soo,n fa,iled. 4 Neither side was willimg to accept the proposal of the other. "The tension 1' Report of the Philippine Commissio,~, 1899-1900, Vol. H, p. 300; H. Doc., No. 3, SBth Cong., 1st Sess., pp. lil-117. Aguinaldo established his Dicta:t0rial G0vernment 0n May 24th, 1898; on June 23rd of that same year it was changed into a Revolutionary Government, and January 23rd, 1899, the Philippine Republic was constituted at Malolos. Cong. Digest, May, 1931, p,. 134; George A. Maleolm, The Co11stit1<tio11al Law of Pile Phil'ippilles (Manila, 1926), see Chapter X on the Malol0s Ci:onstitution. 2 Military GoveFnor 0£ the Philippines. s H. Doc., No. 2, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. II, pp. 77-79. "Now, after paying twenty millions for the islands, we must establish our authority by force against the veFy wishes of the pe0ple whom we sought to benefit." See A"tob·iogra'f,hy of George I!Jewe,y (New ¥oFk, [9'13), p. 285. 4 The first series of conferences was held kom January 9th to 29th, 1899. For details 0£ these conferences, see S. Doc., No. 331, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 2709 et seq. It was said that General Otis Fefused to recognize the existence of the Filipino goveFnment and tFeated th,p Filipino delegates meFely; as those of Aguinaldo's. On the otheF hand, the Filipinos Fefused to accept the American s0vereignty on the ground that the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States was made on a basis which did not exist, for the Philippine sovereignty rested directly upon the people, who had not been consulted on the matter. lbid.

PQLITICA!L PARTIES PRIOR TO THE H-ARRPSON ADMTN.

betweei:i. lifue Americai,FJ!s aF10. Fi,liF)in@s was strained to its utm0st," sai<il James LeR0y, "with no active influence at w0rck t@ ease i,t at ai:i.y p@int." 6 Ffa1aMy, the rupture took Ji>la€e 0n Febntali'y 4th, 1g99, at Sai:i. Juan del Monte, a smbu,rb> 0ifi Manila, an<d soon spread like wildfire. 6 IDwF~Hg t:Tue w:ar, a:liter laFge casualties were reported, Mab>imi, the•Fl premier of the Fili,pino government, appealed t0 the 11Jniued States .First Philippine Commission, on &!Ji>ril Wtlh., [8'99, with aFI expression of the Filipin0s' ,a esil'e far peace. 7 In Ji>Ursuance with the Presidential ,instru<sti@n, tfue C@nu H·ssion was sent to i1westigate, and 1t0 0ear AmeFi€an good-will, but not to make peace, much '1ess to alter the temporary government instituted by the ll'.fn.i-tes States rnili,taFy arnthorities, which should continue 4ntiI CoRg;l'ess ot1ierwise decided. 8

I J)l.

James 'LeRoy, The Amer,icans .j,i the Philippines (Boston, 1914), Vol. II,

( s /·bid., Vol. l<l, p. 5. 7 The first Commission, headed by President Schurman of Cornell IDniver.sity, was sent to the islands in 1899 to secure information as to the J,oisting conditions. , Tl\e following is Mabini's letter in par.t: "It feels itself weak before the a\dvance of the Amer-ican troops, whose valor- it admires, and in view of tllie super-ior.ity of their organization, discipline, fighting mater.ial, and other r~sources, does not feel humiliated in soliciting peace, invoking the generous .sentiments of the Gover.nment of the North America,i people, worthily 1 epresented. by the Commission, and the sacred interests of l\umanity. But tl\e Pl\ilippine government, fully comdnced that it has not provoked war, and that it has only employed its aoms in defense of the integrity of ~ts native land!, asks for a suspension of hostilities and a general armistke /in aU the archipelago for the shor-t time of three months, in order to ,enable it to consult tl\e opinions of the people concerning the government 1 ,ivhicl\ would be most ad,vantageous, and tl\e intervention in it whkh should be gi,ven to the North Amer.ican Government~ and to appoint an extraordinary t o!ll!!:!ission ,,dth full powers to act in the name of the Philippine people. i Tl\e warfare of tl\is unfor.tunate country and the triumph of the governing par,ty, in the United States of Amer.ica depend upon the prompt establishment of peace. We confess ourselves weak, but we still possess resources-above aU, the unfalter.ing r.esolution to prolong the war- for an indefini,te space of time i,f tl\e unde"talhlng to dominate us by force is persisted in. In laying liefor.e the Commission ,the preceding statements l believe that E inte•pret tl\e sentiments of. my president and his government and those of the !Philippine people." S. fJoc., No. 208, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 69, J Re'flont of the Philie,pine Commission, 1899-1900, Vol. I, pp. 3-5.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

Mabini s@nt Colonel Arguelles as an emissary to interview the C0mmission in the hope of obtaining "peace with 1,wnour".9 'fhe colenel's effort was made to ask General Otis, through the Commission, for an armistice. This, the Commission explained, presented difficulties. In a,ddition to its proclamation of April 4th, 1899,10 the CoJ:ililmission descri,lDed to the colonel "the pu•r pose and feeling of America toward the Philippin@ people, and the liberal character of government which might be expected in the A11chipelago." 11 After this view was reported to the insttrgent government, Colonel Arguelles returned for the second time with another emissa,ry. 1z Tke com- ' missioners, in their new interviews with the emissaries,' pointed out that tke Philippine people were· not yet capable of seH-government. The colonel seemed to hav~ agreed with the Commission, and expressed his acceptance of the American sovereignty. His view, however, :wa~ tmauthorized. For this reaiscm, 1ie was accttsecd oy th~ insurgent leaders of being an Americanista, imbtrnd with American ideas. As a result, it was said, the colenel was later expelled from t1ie army ancl sentenced t0 imprison/ • ment for twelve years. 18 I

For Mabini's letter of May 1, 1899, presented to the Commission, se~ S. Doc., No. 138, 56th Cong., 1st Sess., Exhibit III; the same may be foun~ in Report of the Philippi"e Commissio", 1899-1900, Vol. I, pp. 1·87-188. Cf I New · York Daily Tribune, October 2, 1899. 10 Report of the Philippine Coi1111tissio11, 1899-1900, Vol. I, pp. 3-5. \ 11 Ibid. 12 The Commission, at this time, further, explained that the s0vereignt~ of tl\e islands, which had already been settled by the 'Freaty of Paris, was \, beyond the realm of profitable discussion. Ibid. 13 Colonel Arguelles was accused by General Luna in particular. According ) t0 LeRoy, he was condemned to death on May 24th, 1899, and thereafter, kept under Gene-rat Luna's jurisdicti0n. "A revolver, was twice sent to him, ) with the suggestion that he kill himsel£ before the expiration 0 £ a, certain period. He did not do so, a,;id the implied threat was not carried out. After Luna's sudden death, Arguelles was set free and his sentence annulled by Aguinaldo, though with several weeks' delay for the observance of formalities." LeRoy, op. cit., Vol. II., pp. 92 et 84-86. Cf. Report of the. Philippine Co,mmissio11, 1899-1900, Vol. T, p. 9. 9

POLITICAL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

On ace01mli @£ C0l0nel Arguelles' i1rn1bility to bring about peace with honour, Mabini then sent Sefior Gracio Gonzaga, Sehor Barretto, General de! Pilar, and Captain Zialcita t0 interview the Commission in the latter part of May. Many <questions were discussed, but no tangible r esult was 0rought about, as the emissaries emphatically declared that it would l'>e impossibl~ for the insurgent army t0 lay down their arms before anything could be negotiated. 14 The repeated failure of Mabini's effort to obtain an aFmistice caused a crisis at Malolos which split the insl!lrgent leaders into two factions. The "irreconcilables" were headed by Mal;iini and the " pacifists" were led by Paterno. The former were vigorous in their policy, which implied continued resistance, until a " peace with recognition of Phi,Jippine independence" could be obtained. The latter endeavored to secur e peace by "worthy alilcl hon01!1rable means" and to work for a~1 autonomc;ms form of government similar to that of Canada. 16 In the midst of the conflict between the two factions, the Filipino assembly was called into session. 16 In its eagerness for peace, the assembly unanimously aclopted a resolution to the effect that an· understanding with GemeFal Otis must be reached upon the basis of the auton@my 0ffered by the Commission, and requested u Ibid., p. 10. 16 See a letter of Mabini, in Taylor, Insurgm t Records, Vol. IV, E xhibit ,7,21, 5-1-52 GR., Paterno's address given in S . Doc., No. 331, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 1966-69. Cf. Leandro H . Fernandez, TJ,e Philippine Republic (New Yor-k, 1926~, pp. 155-158; Ne w York Daily T rib1111e, April 30, 1899. 16 According to the Constitution of the Philippine Republic, the legislature was a unicameral body, oflicialiy known as the "Assembly o f Representatives." The executive ·body was headed by a president who was elected by the Assembly, to which the cabinet was responsible. The judicial body was under the direction of a president of the Supreme Court of Justice, appointed by the Assembly in concurrence with the president of the Republic and his cabinet. A full text of the Constitution is given in the Report of tire Philippi11e Co11.,nissio1>, 1899-1900, Vol. I, Exhibit lV.

DEVELOPMENT QF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIE:S

AguinaM.0 t0 liel))lace the Mabini ca,binet .with one which coulGl inswfare the c0mtidence of the Arnericam authorities. 17 Ag,ainalefo, in l!iarmeny wit!JI the Assernfuly, quickly asked Faterno to fo11rn a 11:ew cafuinet18 with the task of hri,mging ab<'Jut ]!)@aee. 'fhere1i1w0n a peace committee headed fuy 13uencamin@ wqJs awpointe<fl t© prneeeci to Mamiila1, fuat fueeause of tme sud<llem, i111te11vention @f G@neral :ILuua, it so0m b.roke up. 19 [m ord@r t0 avoid ill-feeling atil<l@ag· the insllirgents, tme g0vernm€l>nt al))p@imted another C©lil<lrnittee whiicn succeeded in conforring with the Ameliieam au,t m0rities im Manila. 'Fmey asked for an ~wmistice, in order to eF1afu1e the imsurgent g0vernment to · coflsail t the pop1da:r will as to the c0urse @f po]icy it s%.ould ,follow. Om tne other hand, the Ameri'ean Commission cogently fan.sistecl that fne Filipi•Fl0 trnops -sh0uld sttrrnn@eli as, a eoF1ol. iti©n t0 Jileaee. TTo.is, Fatermo and his cabinet c@l!lld m0t comply wiith, knowing that tl!ie army imem w@uld li>,i tter,ly ol!>ject. 20 'fli!e coro.sistent refusal 0n tn:e part 0t the Am@rican a:utli!0rities to make any JDeaee witlh0ut Filipino su'ornis,si0m, served to convince the instt1rgent g@vernment rn LeR0y, op. cit., V0l. H, pp. 89 el ,seq. All'>er,t's testimonf pefore the Philippine Commission, May 30, 1899, in tl'i.e Report of the Phil,ppine , C ommi~sio", 1'899-1900, V:ol. II, pp. 127 et seq,. 18 The new cabinet was composed 0f Fedr.0 A. Patemo, FFesident; 'Felipe illh1eMamin0, Foreign Affairs; S. de las Alas, Inter.ioF; :Marian0 Trias, War and !Navy; r.lugo Ilagan, TFeasuiw; A.. Vela,Fae, Educafi0n ; Maximo M. \ Fa,t ern0, Communications and Public W0rles; and il1.e0n Ma. @iuer,l!ero, Industry, Agr.icultur-e and Commerce. 'ray.lor, op. cit., V0l. IV, · Exhibit 654, 23 GR. Cf. Testimony of Alber.t, in R,eport of the PMlippine C 01mnissio1>, 1899-1900, V 01. ]I, pp. 127 et seq. 19 @ener.al ibuna first sent a telegFam to stop the J0urney of the Filipino peace delegates and then arrested them. He accused them 0£ treason and ' sentenced some to imprisonment and 0ther-s t0 death. The delegates had been solemnly auth0rized by the Assembly, Fr,esiqent, and tl\e cabinet. The general's ar,bitraFy intervention ar.oused man,y c0mplaints against him. Ibid., pp. 127-129. Mabini1s lettevs in this e0nnection are qu0ted in Maximo M. Ka'1aw, The Eevelopmmt of PhiUppiwe Polities (Manila, 1926}, p. 197. 211 Report of tlie ,Philippine Com111issi<i11 1 1'899-1900, Vol. H, p. 128 et seq. $ . JJoc., No. 138, 56th Cong., 1st Ses~., p. 135.

POLITICAL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

that amy 'fmrtker attem]Dt to l.ilegotiate would be of no avail. This led to the revival of the former policy of war. In his proclamation cm June 2, 1899, Paterno strongly urged his people to continue the resistance in a hope that William J. Bryan, who had promised to declare Philippine independence, might be elected president. 21 In planning .for this, . tfiey moved their capital farther north , as the American troops irresistibly advanced, and on November 12, they decided t0 condt1ct their war in guerrilla fashion. 'fhis meant a JDrolonged fight. One of the insurgent generals declared that the Filipinos could maintain a state of war inaefinitely. A Filipino soldier could be sustained on just a handfal of rice daily, and a pair of linen trousers. They could, however, keep American troops occupied for years. 22 They fot1ght mo pitched battles, yet their numerous surprise attacks gave the American troops eMugh to worry aoout. Durit1g the ]Deriod of guerrilla warfare, strong sentiment was aro11sed among the natives in favour of a reversed policy. After years 0f disorder and confusion, the natives were impatient. They realizecl the futility of struggli.ng against forces far superior. Among the wealthy class particuilarly many were anxious for peace in order to be relieved of the trierarchy. What their flag 23 The Taft was t0 be perhaps mattered very little. !Commission was right in its remark, at the time, that "a great maj@rity of the people long for peace and are enti.ely willing to accept the establishment of a govern21

The full text 0ÂŁ the proclamation is quoted in Maximo M. Kalaw.

op. cit., pp. 199-200. For a comment on the relationship between Bryan and the- Philippine insurgent leaders, see Report of Liellt. General C ammaudillg Ar1"fll, Vol. l, Pt. IV, pp. 120-122. Cf. Worcester and Hayden, The Philipp;,,es, Past and Presmt â&#x201A;ŹNew York, 1930), Chapter X. 22 New York Daily Tribune, October 2, 1899. 23 New York Tin,es, October 7, 1899; S . Doc., No. 56th Congress, 1st -

Sess,, p. 62; William M. Taft, "Political Parties in the Philippines," A1111. Am. Aead. Pol. & Soc. Sci., September, 1902, pp. 307-312.

DEVELOPMEN T OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

24 This /Jlent under the supremacy of the United States." was evern more trne when many of the insargent chieftains were captured and many 0tners voluntarily :,urremdere<d. Soen afterward, when Malolos and Tarlac ife11 into the hands of the American fornes, and the re-election of President McKinley became known, a group of conservativ e leaders t0ok notice of the opportune moment that a political party might wisely be organized to c@op>erate with t1le American authorities iN establishin 5 l))eace. Thereupon, Messrs. Buencamino , Fahie, Ner, Roxas, Artacho, 'irirnna, Daro.eel, Fl@res, Rosario, and Reyes started on their avowed task of drawing up a pilatfo,rrn, whic1i was the,n submitted t@ the consideratio n of Don Florentino Torres, Don Cayetano Arellano, Dr.' 25 Trinidad iH. Paudo de Tavera, and Dr. Frank Bourns. 281, 1.i'he document was unanimousl y accepted by thern. According to Bue!'lcamino, the documel'lt was then submitted to the Commission, at a gero.eral meeting presided over by Mr. Taft on December 12, and they again 27 It was said the discussed it on December 16, ~900. platform was, at the suggestion of the Commission, sligh;t ly changed. On December 23rd, a meeting was convoked at No. 36 Calle de Villalobos, Ql!liapo. It was jilliesided over by Florentino _T orres and attended lily some 125 pro-

:a$

24 See its report, 1900-1903, p. 17. The Second Commission known the Taft Commission was appointed on April 7, 1900 to continue and per.feet the organizing and establishing of the civil government already commenced by the military authorities. 25 Dr. Bourns was the only American member of the Federal Party. He was first the manager of a timber company there, and then was appointed as a ,nember of the Ta,ft Commission. Irle had been in The !Philippines twice â&#x20AC;˘prior, to 1898 on Zoological collecting trips with Elean C. Worcester,, and r.eturned as a medical officer (volunteer~. 0ÂŁ the American Army. See S. Do.c., No. 331, 57th C0ngress, 1st Sess., pp. 3l9-3?0. 26 Felipe Buencamino, "The Feder-al P arty of the Philippines," Report of War Dept., 1901, Pt. IV, Exhibit B. 27 1bid., Florentino Torres, "Origin and F0rmation of the Federal Party," . Ibid., Exnibit C.

POLITICAL PARTIES PRIOR fl'C> TH'E HARRISON AIDMTN.

American upper-class Filipinos. At this meeting, a direct0.ate of seven members and a Council of GovernMessrs. memt of twemty-five members were created.28 T. H . Pardo 0.e Tavei;a, Cayetano S. Arellano, Frank S. Bourns, Florentino Torres, Ambrosio Flores, Jose Ner, and Tomas G. de! Rosario were elected to the directorate, a:nd AFsenio . Cruz Merrera, Felipe Buencamino, . and others, to the Council. Among other things, a manifesto was read and an elaborate platform was adopted at the n eeting.29 'Dhe Federal Party thus came into existence ¾ 1bder the presidency of Dr. Tavera, a Filipino of brilliant 1attainments and of European culture. The platform they adopted was particula rly worthy \ 0f Fl©te. ilt0r the "prelimimary period," they advocated 1that puli>lic tranquillity must be well established before individual rights and liberties could be obtained. The rec0gnition of the sovereignty of the United States, in their opinion, coald introduce a liberal, democratic, and representative government. On the question of church and state, they preferred a complete separa tion between the two. In harmony with President McKinley's well1 kriown "enliightened promise," 30 the Federa,ls cherished t he ideal of local autonomy as it exists ih the United States, and "provincial or departmental government su bject @Rly to the high inspection of the central g0¥emm,emt." It was also the aim of the party to obtain "the passage of a law which will require children of both 28 Ibid.; Report of t!,e Philipp;,., Co111111issio11, 1900-1903, p. 131; S. Doc., No. 200, 60th Cong., I.st Sess., pp. 15-17. 29 Buencamino, "'Fhe Federal Party 0£ the Philippines," lac. cit.; Maximo . M. Kalaw, op. cit., p. 270; Daniel R. Williams' letter of J anuary 5, 1901, in his Od:)lssey of the Pl,i/ippi11e Commission (Chicago, 1913), pp. 122-131; New York Times, January 29, 1901. 80 President McKinley's instruction to the Commission, Report of the Philippfoe Com111issio11, 1899-1900, Vol. I, pp. 185-186; Ne w York Times Apr.ii 30, 1899. "Political Activity Among the Filipinos," The Pi,i/ippine R ev .'. December, 1901, . V~l. II, No. 2.

DEVELOPMEN T OF PHILIPPLNE POLITICAL PARTIES

sexes to be educated in puTulic or private schools." 31 The merit system in public service was equally stressed. For the "constitutio nal period," they heid that: 1. The PhiliJi>pine . people shall have five reJl>resentatives in the Congress @f the Union, and said representati ves shall reside in Washington . 2. A Chamber of Representa tives eleded by • ballot in the same manner in which members of cotitmcil and rrnay0rs or awaldes are chosen, said representati ves to be pr@portionate in number to thf ,. qualified v0 ters of eaelrr province or departmcrn.ct. · 3. A Senate composed of members, one-half of , whom shall be elected my t1ie mayors or alcaldes @f 1 towns, according to a law which shall be enacted. for the purpose, and the other half appointed by the governoi:-g eneral. The Chamber and Senate shall\ compose the territorial Congress. . 4. A Governor-G eneral app>©inted fuy His Excellency, the President of the United States; department governors a]_Dp0fot ed Tuy the Govem0rGeneral with the approval of the governmen t at Washingtom.; and p11ovimcial g @velino:rs aiso appointed by the Governor-G eneral, with the advice apd consent/ of the Senate. The Govern©r-General shall havtf secretaries as the law may {ill'Ovide. He may veto a bill under the conditions provideci in the Federal Constitutio n for tne Presidentia l veto. 5. The territory of the Philiwpine Islands may be considered one of the States of the Uni.@n, bat t)1ey shall never be ceded in whole or in part by the 82 United States to any foreign power. Sl 'Dhe text, "Platfarm of the Federal Party," may . be found in Repo,st \ of War Dept., 1901, Vol. I, pt. ]V, pp. 122 et seq. Report of Insular Affairs I , Committee, No. 2158, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 269. 1 82 Report ot W a·r Vept., [901, Vol. I, pt. IV, pp, 122 et seq. Cf. The Par,ty's "Message to the (,'ongress of the United States of America," November / 9, 1901. A copy is available in the New York Public Libr.ary.

POUTieAL l?AR'PI•ES PRWR, ·T© THE HARRISON ADM'.PN.

TI:ie cd@©l!lm en,t was ia it s essence a constitutional Jvroposal.88 lts ar<!lv0ca,cy f@ r peace was widely approved, bl!li1i tl,rn i<deal @d' state110od ~resented a rather doubtful q11~sti0n. GeNeral MaicA:th11r; successor_ . of . General 1 \°tis, arncd Mr. Taft, il?res1dent of the Ph1'hpp111e Commiissi@n, a,,)Dparently <!lid n<'>t regard it with fa vo11r,84 tliio11gn tneir :relati<'>ns with the Federals were most cordial. E>r. 'fa'V'era aNd his foll owers were t aking the sta teno0d issue with a sin cere and spleNdid m a nifestaiHon of entlii,1!1.siasm. U :(!)©fl many occasions, they declared tha t ,~ti wowld l;ie more h©Nournble and dignified for the Phili)D:(!)ines t o oe a state o:li t he American Union than to remai111 ir.JJ the category- @f a colonial possessfon.86 In a<!l"®caiting this, ,the ~ed{!rals were aot without opposition, ars they ,v,rnre fuit'terly <!lenol!lnced lily the insurgent leaders as tr.ai1i@rs to be arrested and shot, and their propert y c@n,fiscat e<il.86 88 Buencamino wrote: "The joint fruits of Messrs. F ahie, Ner, Roxas, J.1,rtacho, TiFona, IDancel, Flores, Rosario, Modesto Reyes, and myself resulted in the drnfting of a platform. 'I drew the document up, bearing in mind the proclamations ot the Fir-st Commission, over whicli Schurman presided, my confenences with <1ieneral MacArthur, the declarations of the present Civil Commission, the Constit1Jtion of the United States, the message of President McKinley ta Cangress, dated in Washington, December 6; 1899, the plat foFm · of the Republican and Democratic parties presented in conventions of July and September- last, the Philippine constitution approved in the Congress of .Maiolo• Cnot the constitution drawn up by Mabini) , and my political studies upon the subject of the Philippine problems." R eport of W ar Dept., 1901, Pt. IV; Ei:x;hibit B. 84 Hearings on the Philippine., before the Committee of Insular AffaiFs, . J;I. R. ~Washington, 1902)., in pamphlet form, pp. 4-5 ; S. Doe., No. 200, 60th <Gong., 1st Sess., pp. 14-15. · 85 Pl. R. Rept., No. 2'158, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 300. BG <lln MaFGh 22, 1901', an order was issued by an insurgent military commandeF to tlie local officer.s of the insurgent province of Tayabas, that . any agent of the FedeFal Party who attempted to obtain signatures of the· residents, and all peFsons ~ o weFe inclined to the Feder.al P arty, should be shot upon being anFested, withaut .legal procedUFe. "Any local o.fficer who .toler-ated the existence of the committees of the F ederal Parey in his jurisdietion, being able to avoid the same, will be tried, and in c~se he is found g:uilty, will be disctharged from his duty and will also be s~ot , as a t r-a;ror to his country." 'll'he te" t quoted is irom Worcester and H ayden, op. cit., pp. 237-238. Fa r- an account of General Luna's cruelty to Buencamino's relatives, see [al. R. Rept., No. 587, 57th Gong., 1st Sess., p. 233.

DEVEE;QP-MENT OF :PHIL'I:PPiNE :POLITICA'I,, PARTIES

There was a ~ittl,e rcelief for the Federals a:fo:er the <saptu•Fe 0£ General Aguinaldo, wi1id1 t<:)0k wlace on March 23, 19CH.87 Of coarse, tro.e general's attitude was soon to fuecome c@rodliatory. On April 19, 1901, he issued a ma:roifesto addrnssing this countr-ymero on the advisability of a complete terni!.i,r,iati@N of h0s;tiliities as ,a prere(i(uisit@ to the welfaFe 0f the cotuiltry. He farther remarked that . "The country had deeslared t1flmistakably in ilfavour of peace, so let it be. 'Fhern has been enong-1:i fulood, enough tears, and ero.ough desofation. This wish · carn10t fue icrnored loy the m€n s-till iro. arms i f' . b tl:.Jey are animated by flQJ other desire tharo. to serv this _ro.oble people whiGh has th1Jts cfoarly manifestec its will. So d@ I r€swect tfuis will, now that it is kri@wn to

us.

"After ma.tu.re delrb€raliic)lil., T r,esolutely Jl)FOclaim to the world that iii eann0t refa.tse to heed the voice oii a peoJi)le loro.ging £011 peace, ri@r tliie lamero.tatioNs 0£ thousands of faNililies yearniro.g t(') see their dear ones enjoying the liberty ancl the promised gerrnwsity of the great AmeriGan mat ioro.. ' "By ackroo,wLedging aro.d a:eceptililg th~ sovereignty of the Uroited Stat<.~s th,rot11ghout the! ero.ltirn ArGhipel-ago, as ~ now d(') witr,i01,1t any rceservaltion whats@ev€r, I Thelieve that ID a:in serving yoa, m,y rnuntrymen. May ha:p>jiliness be ,thiim@." 88 'IB'his cleclaratiori 0£ Gemei:-al Ag1,1iaald@ mid n@t lead t\o i,lililime€liate gero.,er,al surrender; tho1,1gh it servet;l to weaken I

37 Aguinaldo was captured by means · of a f,use in the t0wn of Falanan on the isolated coast of Isabela, and brought baek to Manila, where he tooR the oath oI allegianee t0 the lJnited States on April 19, 1901. It was alleged that his attitude was laFgely a result of the Federals' persuasion. By the end 'Of June 0£ that same year, MaJ,v ar and Ludlan were the only generals 0£ any stFength who had not Been forced to surFender. Leandro H. Fernandez, A. Brief History of, fhe 'Philippines (Bost0n, i919), p.- 272. ss 'ill'he text is r,epdnted in 'Fhe Outlook, April 27, 190[, p. 931. 'Fhe same may be found in WoFees.ter and !Nayden, op. cit., p. 220.

Cr.

POLITICAL PARTIES PRIOR TO 'llHE HARRISON ADMTN.

the moral force of the insurgents and to strengthen the Federals ia their desire for annexation to the American Union. 1'J.ie Federals then believed that the time was ripe for them to take a decided measure in order to carry out their high-so1mding programme of sta tehood. For this pUrJ:il©Se a geaernl convention of the party was called i~} the ea,rly j1lart of No;vember, 1901. It was alleged that wheN the 'iJ.>Uestion of annexatioa was brought up for discussion, Paterno and other nationalists, who joined the party me!iely because of their interests in the peace plank, now expressed their disapproval of the Federal petition for annexation on the ground that the Philippines had their own distinct interests, which would be better served by an autonomous government like that of Canada. 89 The measure, however, was carried through with a majority of the convention. On Noyember 9, the historic petition was s<mit t© tJ.ie United States Congress declaring, in part, . that: ''1.Fr@m the mass @f data whici.1J. the Federal P arty has had before it, and seriously and formally considered, it is clear1y deduced that the intention of the Americans and Filipinos is to constitutionally join the Phil>ippines to America in such a way that the former may never be separated from the latter, nor the latter disunited from the former. "Im order to form a more perfect union, establish Justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the · common defense, promote the general. welfare, and secure ti.1J.e blessings of liberty are the principles in wJ.ikn the [')ol,icy sfu@uld me folil0wed in the Philippines sfro1J1.1ld be i,m.spi-!ied without the loss of a moment. ('Ih effect the colonial system involves the principles of differe.nce of citizenship, inequal~ty of right and other consequent abuses and injusti1.es, all 39 "Consular Report on Philippine Affairs," S. Doc., No. 62, 55th Cong., 3rd Sess., pt. 1, pp. 336-338. Cf. Maximo Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 281-282.

DEVELOPMEN T OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

of which Wâ&#x201A;Ź Filipinos suffered under the Spanish Governmen t, an.cl for this re~son we Feject everything which tends toward a colony. "Federatiom. or annexation wottld settle all these difficulties by concentrati ng the interest of the fi<i1ip>ino people upon education and labour, the most efficient meam.s for bri'n ging about a promit uplifting. " 40

The Federal Party: Its Spread and Supremacy {

The sentiment of the people, which gave rise to the Federal Party, was still widely telt im the islands.41 Because of this fact, when the Federals set farth their platform as an appeal, it was received with popular acclamation , and the natives joined in by thousands. To Everywhere they found a crowd of sympathize rs. use Charles Elliott's phrase, "the party included in its membership substantiall y all od: the men of first importance in the islands." 42 It spread throughout the Archipelago with the rapidity of lightning. It was said that the Federal committees were organized in praicticrnlly all of the Christian Filipino towns. In 1901 many comIililittees were foFmed with the luelp of both civil and military authorities.43 According to the report of the secretary of the party, there, sixty-three committees w :re organized in January, one hundred and twenty-two in Febrnary, eighty-six in March, and twelve in April. At 40 "Memorial to the Congress of the United States.'' loc. cit. 1ihe same ma'.)' be found in S. Doc., No. 187, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 R eport of the P/iilippitr-e Co1111nissio11, 1900-1903, p. 17. S. Doc., No. 331, pt. 1, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 60. 42 The Pl,ilippin.es, lo the End of the Commissio11 Government (fodiana:._ polis, 1917), pp. 409-410. 48 R epo rt of the Ph-ilippine Commissio11, 1900-1903, p. 131; S . Doc., No. 331, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. Cf. War D ept. A1111. Report, 1901, pt. 5, pp. 201, 276 el 422.

POLITICAL PARTIES P.f.1,IOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

1!hat time th.ere were aetua,1,Jy mÂŠFe than 200,000 persons affil'iated with. th.is ~aFty.44 As Mr. Daniel Williams, Secretary to the Taft Commission, said, the party's service in pacifying the Islands was inestimable. 46 Its tireless peace-making efforts r~sulted in the s1urender of fourteen generals, twentyejght c0l0nei's, twenty rnajors, six chiefs of guerrillas, f{)rty-six eaptains, one hundred and six lieutenants, two thousand six hundred and forty soldiers, and 4,440 cannon, guns and revolvers. 46 Mrs. William H. Taft was right iro. her remark that, " The peace movement was grea.tly assisted by the activities of the Federal Party, a strong political orgap.ization, pledged to the acceptance of American control and American politics." 47 The Federal Party, at the time, was apparently the most p0pular political organization the Filipinos had ever devised. Perhaps the celebration, under its auspices, on Washi,ngton's tii,r thday, the 22nd 0f February, 1901, would seFve as am illustration of its influence on the populace. Many thousands of Filipinos enthusiastically marched to the place where a speakers' stand had been erected for the celebration of the day. They listened in re~pectfol sileace to the words of both- the American Cornrnissfoaers aad leaders of the Federal Party. The occasion very well marked a new era of "mutual .l"'

â&#x20AC;˘ F ederal

Party (Manila, 1901), see table in the back of the booklet. Williams, The Odysse11 of the Philippi11e Cammissio,i, p. 237. 4 6 See the appendix to the booklet " Federal Party". 4 7 Melen 'M. '!'aft, Recollectio11s of Full Y ears (New York, 1914), p. 148: "However,, r was soon convinced of the real influence of the party and the sincerity of its members, not only on account of the rapidity of its growth in the provinces, but also by the more significant fact of the surrender of ar.ms, subsequently, by many Nationalists who, after acknowledging the sovereignty of the United States, identified themselves with us, declaring that they were giving up the armed struggle by reason of powerful influences eocercised over them by the Federal Party." For Dr. Tavera's letter to ('ienecal MacArthur of May 4, 1901, see Report of Lieut. General C 011u11a11dfag Anny, Vol. I, pt. IV, 1901, pp. 114-116. 44

DEVELOP.M!ENT OF · PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

toleration" and "sympathetic understanding," as Mrs. Taft chose to term it. 48 Since the Commissi0n's hard task now was to institute municipal and provincial government througho11-t the Islands, an extensive trip was therefore planned with this in view. 49 Dr. Pa11do de Iavera, President of the Federal Party, Sefior Felix M. Roxas, corresporo.dent of the party,'s only organ-La De.m ocraci~and other leaders of the Federal Party were invited to go "in order that 01ey might give the CommissioFl in:formati0F1 ancl advice and also, explain in some meast:tre to their o-wn compatriots the intentions of the American Government."60 Everywhere they were received with enthusiasm in most splero.<ilid fashion. 61 :En this extensive trip, Dr. Tavera tirelessly ex~ended his eloquence in He persuading the people to support his party. In a ii:ivariably said the right thiro.g in the right way. series of presentations to the ' natives, fue stressed the point that "the Federal Party was continuing the insurrection, but by legal rather than by forcible means; that they were coro.tencliro.g f©r the same rights as those set out by the Malolos Congress-the liberty of the Helen Taft, op. cit., pp. 149-150. January, 1901, the Commission adopted the municipal code and the provincial laws, and in February, began the task of 0rganizing those provinces which were deemed prepared for civil government. This work was 1 not completed until August. Report of the Philippine Commission 1900-1903, pp. 131 et seq. 60 iHelen Taft, op cit., p. 159. 61 Mrs. Taft was one of the ladies wh0 accompanied the Commission on this trip. She later wrote: "Our first stop was at Lucena in tlie Province of Tayabas. We arrived the•e in the late afternoon so we had to lie at anchor until next morning, but while the daylight lasted we gazed eagerly at the, shore through ou, field glasses and we,e astonished t0 see the cro,~ds of Filipinos not only lining the beach but wading in throngs out into the bay as far as they safely could. It was as if they had decided to walk out to meet us. And the town was decorated, decorated mag,. \ficently. 'Fhere were bamboo arches a-flutter with flags and flags flying everywhere, to say nothing 0£ bunting and palm leaves and myriads of ga,y paper streamefs." Ibid., p. 160. 48

[rt

POLITIC.Al. PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

individual." He explained to his listeners "that independence did not mean liberty; that with independence the Filipinos would simply change the despotism of Spain for a democratic tyranny, as bad or worse." 62 By these UJtterances, he succeeded in winning a great deal of aipplause foF tne ideals of his party. ]n making an effort to promote peace and order, Dr. Tavera p.ml the rest of his party increasingly enjoyed the confidence of Hie American authorities. Appointments to public offices in the several branches of civil administratkm up to 1907, were almost completely limited to the Federals. "In Âˇthe appointment of natives," said Mr. Taft, "the fact that a man was a member of the Federal Piarty was -always a good recommendation for him for appointment, for the mason that we regarded this Federal Party as oae of the great elements in bringing about ~acificatiÂŠn, and if a maa was in the Federal Party it was fairly good evidence that he was interested in the goivernment which we were establishing, and would do as well as he could." 63 Many Filipinos of political ambition were, therefore, wining to be affiliated with the Federal Party. Dr. Tavera and other prominent Federals such as Sefiores Legarda and Luzuriaga had, since September, 1901, been added to the Civil Commission as local rnembers. 64 To further the occupation of public offices, some of the leaders 0f the Federal Party even threatened the Government that the Federal Party would be

Williams, op. cit., pp. 237-238 . S. Doc., No. 331, pt. 1, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 67; Forbes, op. cit., Ve,!. I, pp. 144-145. 64 Senor Legarda greatly aided General Otis and all the American authorities by his suggestions, and Senor Luzuriaga was the first governor of the island of N egros, and most active in preventing the insurrection from gaining any foothold in that important island. See Report of tlie P/,ilippine Commission 1900-1903, pp. 140-141 ; Mrs. Taft, op. cit., p. 159. 62

. 63

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE- POLITICAL PARTIES

dissolved ualessÂˇ certain P:ederals, who bad recently been removed from judicial posts were re-appointed. 55 In addition to the substantial governmeat offices given to the Filipinos by appointment, the Feclerals were able to wim. practically all of the local electioas, including Âˇ the gulDern.ato-r ial electiom.s, pFior to the year 1907. 66 fo trne elections. for wrnvincial go;verno11s held i.n Feb>ruary, 1906, only five out of twenty-mine elected govern@rs were not affiliated with the party. The Federals were in every sense the party in power. Their opinions wern alwa)liS duly taken into account by the American authorities. This was, perhaps, the advantage of being the only organized political party in existence; they enjoyed t he backing of the American authorities. 57 The supremacy of the Federals, however, was not altogether without challenge by the Filipinos of i,1atiom.alis,t ic tendem.cies. A Partid<:> Nacio'YIX1)lista wa~ fou.nded im 1901 with an ultimate aim of independence. Messrs. Pascual H. Peblete and Santiag@ Aiva11ez wer~ elected presidents, Andres Villanueva, vice-president, andeighteen others as secretaries. 68 In 1902 the party was reorganized with Dom.inador Gomez as president and1 Manuel Artiaga as secretary. It was at this time that Gomez also organized his famou.s Union Obrera 0r Labor Union for which he had three times b>een f>re>secuted. The party was, of course, not regarded with favou.r by 55 Upon the advice of the more rational members of the party, as well as aer.tain American authorities, the matter was finally drnpped. See New York Daily Tribune, June 5, 1901. 56 S . Doc., No. 331, pt. 1, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 330. 57 Report of the Philippine Commission, 1906, pt. 1, p. 41. 68 Macario Sakay, AuFelio Tolentino, Modesto Santiago, Cecilio Apostol, Alejandro Santiago, Cenon Nicdao, Agueda de! Rosario, Domingo Moriones, Jose Palma, Lope K . Santos, Pantaleon 'l'orres, Salustiano Cruz, Nicolas Rivera, Francisco Carreon, Briccio Pantas, Valentino Diaz, Aurelio Santos, Valentin Solis. See Maximo Kalaw, op . . cit., p. 286. For a number of reasons for the existence of the P-artido Nacionalista, see The Philippine Rev., March, 1902, Vol. II, No. 5, pp. 181-182.

POLITICAL PARTlES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

Governor-General Taft, 69 since as Maximo Kalaw explains, five of its original signers had been in jail. 60 On D>ecember 5, that same year, Dr. Gomez and Poblete made their last plea to Governor-General Taft for a possible recognition of the party, but the governor-general h1sisted th.at tb.ey sh@l!lld take an interest in agriculture iastead of politics. 61 Just about two months and a half before GovernorGeneral Taft's definite refusal to recognize the existence of the Partido N<JJCiO'flalista, a group of Filipino int ellectuals under the leadership of Sergio Osmefia and Rafael Palma, 62 unwilling to share the Federals' ideal of permanent acceptance of American sovereignty, called upon Governor-General Taft and asked for approval of a party to be kFlown as the Partido Derrwcrata. In p're:,enting the matter, they stressed the fact that the ~sl!lal basis for poJ,Jular government consisted- of two 0pp0si-F1g pa.ties so as to eF1able the people to express wider opinions on public policy. The pla tform which they adopted was to ask for autonomy and later, declarâ&#x20AC;˘a tion of independence. 63 Both the Commission and Governor-General Taft disappi:oved of . the program, fearing that it would consolidate the bad elements and cause a possible revolution. The platform was then modified so that indepentdence might be secured through lawful means, but still the attitude of the authorities

69 Mr.. Taft was inaugurated Civil Governor on July 4, 1901, relieving the Military Governor, Major General Arthur MacArthur. While be was Âˇ governor, Taft remained a member of the Philippine Commission. He was in, the office until 1904 when be was called back to head the War Department at W ashington. See Barrows, op. ait., pp. 282 et 303. Go Op. cit., p. 287. 61 fbid. Cf. Report of the . Philippine Co,nmission, pt. III, 1903, pp. 40-41. 62 Other prominent leaders were Jose Maria de la Vina, Justo Lukban, Leon Ma. Guerrero, Alber.to Barretto, Fernando Ma. Guerrero, Enrique Mendiola, Isabelo de los Reyes, and Joaquin Lona. See Forbes, op, cit~ Vol. II, pp. 103-104. \ 68 Ibid., pp. 102-104.

JJEVEL;OPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

remained ttl!lehangecl. A;J\'ter three umsaccessfal reqaests, the Commi1ttee oa <Drgamizatioa finaHy advised the G@,verno11-General that they had <focidecl t@ disband tb.e party £@r t1J.,e time l.:>e,irng, since they rnul<d n@t, tl1.nder the s1i11spici0t:1 of tfue a1i1th0rities, ea,Fry out tfueir activities. 64 b the yeai,F 0& ~~04, a1110tlleF gr<:>tt[P of !Fil,iwino J_Datriots le~ ~y Gregorio AgliJ.i)aiy, 65 a Hfacl ]j)Fiest, 0Fganized .t hemselves into a i')arty wfuicTo. they refoi;recd to as the Rellmbl,,icam iFarty ©f the Philippililes. 'Fhis pai;ty, als<l>, .fua<il! a pr@graliFl for achievi,mg irndepelil<llence. On Aug;u.st ~. 1905, through its organ; El Grito del l'ue'blo, ,a rnamifesto was issl!let!l alil<d c0mpfaimts were made agaimst w:hiat they caiUed "the anbeara!Me taxes", and asking f:o r a drastic red.ucti<l>n of governm,erat exl_Dero.ditme. 'fhe d@cumemt was sigm.ed fuy '.13,ish©]ll Ag]i1.1>ay as Fresidemt, and a mmllml@eF of · lawyeFs, jDl/iysieians, ex-c@k>lil:els a111d d ,_ -gem.erals an<ff SUJilfHiJr.ters. ilin [9(DtiJ, the ;party again declairecl. that: "We desire the Americami.s to 'h>e our alli@s alildl dirnetors; tf.i.at t,he spitrit oif .AFm.erica sitiaH I.lie ti.lie spirit~ of oar c©nstituti@J.il, laws, 0ur ~<i}l!leati0m, an<il irsistructi0n, and the cawital which shaU assist us to; undertake pu:bHc works and exploit ©UF natural riches; IDmt we are @[i)p<l>S€d f@ the sale @!E lamcl:s amcli mililes t© pers.ons who a1.1e l!l©t Fiilif)iN@s, €SJ_i)eeiaUy id tracts of more trnan five httE@recd aci;es." 66 [twas sai<d that Agl,i]l)ay inte,m<ll.e<d t.0 make his ]Jarty, a bra,rnc1J. 0£ tbie ReliJ11Micalil PaFty @f tfue Unite<d Stat€S,

The Manila Times, Mar.ch 23, 1904. Cf,. Rafael Pa,lma, @ur Campajg11 for Jndepe11de1>,ce (Manila, 1923), p. 20. · 65 An Apostate Catholic pr,iest who !\.ad been Chapla,i n-&eneral of the Filip,no army and had iiounded a nationalist Philippine €:hur,ch. 'Fen years P\ff0• to the end of the Spanish regime, Aglipay was gene-r aUi liked by his ecdesiastica!l super,,ior,s, who entrusted him with impo•tant matters. Afte;- fhe Amer.ican r.ule was inaugur.ated, he lost theit' confidence: ~n Match, 189!l, l\e issued a mani.fest0 attact.ing both the Spanish Ar.cl'ibishop 0ii Manila and / the .&me~ican author,ities. 66 Jbid., p. ms. ~· 64

POLITICAL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN,

in a hope that he might be able to secure the approval of the American authorities; but in this he failed 1 and his 'f)arty like ©thers soon went out of existence.~7 For obvious reasons, no Philippine political party with an independence plank, was ever allowed to be organized prior to the year 1906. The Federal Party, as well as the Conservative Party and the Liberal P arty, which we shall presently discuss, were the only ones that -h ad not been prohibited by the authorities. In the early pa rt of 1901, when peace and order had not as yet been well establ,ished, a small knot of Filipinos, or rather Spanish mestizos, 68 formed the Conservative Party and presented a pro_gram to which Mr. T aft, then President of 'the Civil Commission, showed no opposition, since the party was to maintain perfect peace, ha rmony, and They insisted fqrever "close the doors of rebellion." 69 that peace was essential before anything could be done. According to Dr. Tavera, the party was in deep sympathy with Spain. In oth<:;r words, they wanted to conserve the Spanish customs and to praise the superi ority of the Spanish race. The party, however, was not politically significant in. a practical sense. To quote Mr. Taft, "If the Pwrtido Conservador were the only element in the lsi tuation there, that law would never have been put on the stah1te books, for the reason that the Partido C\!m,servador never had bl!lt SO members and never could get more than that." 70 Ka/aw, op. cit., p. 291. Leaders 0£ the Conservative Party were Enrique Barrera, Francisco Ort!igas, Macario Adriatico, Gregorio Singian, Eusebio Orense el al. See Kalaw, op. cit., p. 273. Cf. S. Doc., No. 331, pt. 1, 57th Cong., 1st Sess~ pp. 66-67. 69 For a full text of the platform of the Partido Conservador, see Rept. Ueut. Ge,.eral Co1111na,.di,ig Army, 1901, pt. II, pp. 123-125. Cf. N,ew York Daily · T ribmte, March 1, 1901. 70 S . Doc., No. 331, pt. 1, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 83. 67

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

The Partido Liberal was organiz@d in October, 1902, chie:fil.y on the initiative of Don Pedro A. Paterno,71 a familiar figure in Philippine politics since the downfall of the Spanish regime. In presenting the matter to Governor-General Taft, Paterno ex]i>lained that the party was to establish a resp0nsible self-government with the object of building up the Filipino nationality: According to Maximo Kala w, the Governor-Geaeral seemed to like the idea; for the program was completely silent regarding independence. Shortly a:liter, Paterno and his followers seriously believed that to form a nation by means cjf evolutioro. was a long and di£.fictiH process, if not utterly impossible. They finally decided in December of that same year to reorganize under the name of the Partido lndependista, which they did; but the new party had only an ephemeral life. 72 • The repeated and c@mplete fail1:1rn of the mationalis'ts to organize and the ephemeral fife of others orice organized, had further created for the Federal Party a most favorable condition under which it was alone entrusted with the government affairs by the American authorities. Its supremacy lasted thrnugh the critica.l . period of Philippine nationalism.

The Origin of the Partido Nacionalista

The suppression of insurrection and the restoratic;-n 0f peace throughout the archipelago had already been declared complete in ]906. The Arneriean autro.orities tro.en became tolerant in their attitude toward the 1

71 Other leaders were Aguedo Valadra, Julian Gerona of the Executive Committee, and Hugo Ylagan, Maximo Paterno, Jacinto Limjap, Manuel S'ityar, and Ceferino de Leon of the Advisory Committee. See Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 285-286. 72 !'bid. Cf. A long letter of Joaquin V. ¥. · Fo~tich, dated September 7, 1906, to Erving Winslow, Secretary of the Anti-lmpe~ialist League, Boston. It is an unpublished letter being kept in the New York Public Library under the heading of Ordway's Papers.

POLITIC.AL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

The activities of the variol!ls nationalist groups. President o:f the United States, upon the recommendation of · the Plailil!>pine Commission on March 28, 1905, immediately issued an Executive Order calling for a general election to be held for the establishment of the Philippiiile Assembly, in 1907.73 Pri011 t0 the general election for delegates to the assembly, the Filipino nationalists were again busy in trying to organize themselves into parties for the political campaign. They seemed to have embraced the cause of indell>e!!ldence, but in most cases they neglected to consider any plan by which their ideal could be realized. In 1905, they he1d a meeting, hoping to form a political party, but no program could be agreed upon between the conservatives and radicals. Messrs. Osmefia, Barretto, 79 . On September 11, 1902, the Philippine Commission certified to tho j:'resident that : "The recently existing insurrection of the Philippine I slands had ceased and a condition of general and complete peace has been established therein; . . . the Commission recommends to the President of the United States that he order a census of the Philippine I slands to be taken by the Philippine Commission." Cmsus of t/,e Philippine Islands, 1903 (Washington, 1905) , Vol. I, p. 12. "That two years after the completion and publication of the census, in case such condition of general and complete peace with recognition of tho authority of the United States shall have continued in the territory of said Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes and such facts ~hall have been certified to tile President by the Philippine Commission, th.President upon being satisfied thereof shall direct said Commission to call, fnd the Commission shall call, a general election for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the people of said territory in the Philippine I'slands, which shall be known as the Philippine Assembly. After said assembly shall have convened and organized, all the legislative power he··etofore conferred on the Philippine Commission in all that part of said Isl;mds not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian trilles shall be vested in ! a legislature consisting of two houses-The Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly." U. S. Stat. L. Vol. 32, pt. 2, p. 1772. Cf. H. R ept. No. 1540, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 318. For opinions of pro-and-con on an early establishment of the Philippine Assembly see Rept. of the Philippine Commissio11, 1907, pt. I, p. 224; Ellliott, ?Jhe Fhilippine;,, t~. th~ end of the Co111missio11 Governmrnt, pp. 12 et seq.; ~ames 1.eRoy, Ph,l,ppme Problem After Ten Years' E:,:perience"; P~oceedi11gs of the American Political Science Association (Fifth Annual Meeting); Pee. 28-31, 1908, S. Doc. No. 331, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, pp. 333-335.

E>EV1!!LOPMEN'li' OF 'PHlUPPlNE POLITICAL PARTIES

Lakh>an, Hiustre, \TiNa, Ledesma, and other raclicals irnsiste<d GN a platfoFrn o:li "imme·d iate inclepenclence"; wfu.ile the conservativ,es sach 'as Agoncil.lo, Velarde, Pat@rro.Q, del Pan, A]Dacihfo, am<d rnany others widely d ,i sagireed. A new committee was tllrn!il aJD]D©iNtecl to drnft a New pla:t:li©rm. iW:owever, it was a,gaiil'l dis1 a]DJ.il'i;;@v ed fuy tTo.e majority of th@se pFe·semt. The JJadicat s ha@ <decided to go ON and iA J an,a ary, il~06, they sacceedecl Li- rn forming a party kn@wn as tfue Partid0 lndependista. The JDairty had the ohject of securing i,m m.ediate i1:1c.iJ:e1:oenclieNce dior tl'ie Phi1iJDJDin<.~ Islancl:s im order that they ' liNight eoflstitnte a sovernign nati@n, free arnd in, cleji>eNcl.ent, obtaiNiag, thro1,1,gh the go@cd @fWice o'f , the ~ niteGl S,tates @if America, allil i.,Nrternati<1mal tFeaty to estaIDlis,h and gaarant ee Hi!.@ peF]D@htai nentraJ,ity: of the JslaNds. 74 Besides the F'artid@ lrvdependiJsta., theire were two @ther parties-the Partid0 Urgentista and the C(J(ffl,ite de "la, Dnion Nacional=enthusiasitiealiy oirgam,ize<l in th~ same year by the partisans ©f nati:emalistic te,n<d!eneies. 'ili'fue latter was a lititie moire comseirva:tive tliJ.am: ti.le :li©Fl;tler, tA0agh tm.e one fua<il alm@st the same e1reed as t he 0ther. Jit was for this reasam tfuat maay (j)f them held tlua:t irn Q.l'@er to have aay str@r,ig apJileal t@ the eleet-@i:aite in tihe c@ming eleetion, they sl.i!.@1,1[cl iiJ.iJ.@rge th©lllil!se,l ves arncl bring1 afu©u.t a sir,igle nationalist party. 'Fhis they so0n a,ceor.r1plish@cl. and resulted ~n a fasi'Gm an<der the name 0£ Partido 1:Jni0n Naeionalist-a. 'fliJ.e suecess om tibuis fusiH left .in tn.e ]_l)0[itical arema omly tw© mati@maL,i st · waFti!es-t~e · 7~ Letter of Alberto Barr..e tto dated at Manila, December 18, 1906, address~d. to Sergio Osmeii.a, quoted in MaJ<imo Kalaw, op. cit., p. 30L [b.ette.r 0£ the Organization Committee of the lndependen€e Pa·rty dated at Mantia, Marnh 28, 1906, to Mr. S€hurman, F r.esident of the iFi!ipino Pr.ogr.ess Assodation, iNe,W, York, in Ordwa,/s Pape-rs. li'or a des€r.iption of the position of the ffidepend·ence Pantys, see .!Joaquin Forcti€l'i'.s letter to Erving Winslow, dated SeptemBer 7, 1906, ibid,

POLITICAL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

P'artid@ l!ndependista and tne Partido Union Nacionair,sta.15 The two parties were in fact not much different in th'eir platform, except that the Unionistas favored "early independence by self-help," while the Independistas cilled for "immediate independence with foreign asâ&#x20AC;˘sistance." Opinioms of the principal leaders of both parties, nowever, were to a considerable extent favourable to fusion. It was on January 17, 1907, that the principal leadeFs of both parties were called together to consider a pc)ssible union of the two. 76 Negotiations were frequently held until March 12, 1907, when a meeting was c~lled at No. 194 Lacoste Street, Manila, where they ÂŁo1.md a united nationalist party known as the Partido Nacionalista. 77 Attendants of this meeting were Messrs. Jose de la Vina, Framcisco Liongson, Macario Adriatico, and Vicente Miranda as representatives of the Partido ]tl>dependista, and Rafael Palma, Galicano Apacible, Leon Ma. G1J1errero, amd Rafael del Pan, representing the Rartido Union Nacionalista. Messrs. Barretto and Lukb~n, with 26 votes each, were elected to the presidency, Macario Adriatico was elected secretary, and Jose Vales ,t reasurer. To the council, Messrs. Sergio Osmefia, 1amuel L. Quezom, Teoaolio Sandiko, Isauro Gabaldon, a.Pd Fernamdo Ma. G1,1erreFO were elected. This fusion was fi0.ally appFOved on April 7th by the respective conventions of the two component parties. 78 Thus, the Pc'trtido Nacionalista began its career as a champion of 1f, S. IJoc., No, 200, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 42 el seq. Forbes, op. cit., Vol.t II, pp. 105~106. Montano D. Nazario, "Philippine Political Parties, . 1900-1933,'' The Philippines Herald Year Book, September 23, 1933. 76 El Renaci1niento, January 18, 1907. 7q The manner in which the two parties worked together during the election in Cavite led t!Je leaders . to believe that they could best gain their endS' by working together. See The Manila Times, April 8, 1907. Cf. Private Me1norandum of David J. Doherty, Ordway's Papers. 7 8 El Renacimiento, January 18, 1907. Cf. Nazario, "Philippine Political Parties, J.900-1933,'' lac. cit.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

I •

Philippine independence with the following platform 'in , b,rief: · (1) The attaimment o;f the immediate iro.depenrlence of the Philippine Islands to constitute it a fr ee and sovereign nation under a democratic governme11t, without prejl!ldice to the adoption in dl!le time of a11y f©rm of guarantee which wonld !De convenient to 1:Jhe interests of the Filipino people and suitable to the circumstances. (2) Like other cultured peoples of the world, the Filif)ino peof)le have assimilated many elements of culturn without losing thereby their typic;al characteristics, and it is for this reason that they believe themselves caf)able o:li maintaining a decent and orderly government such as is required !Dy their collective interests .and their relationshif) with othf!r nations. (3) 'Fhe dismembernrnnt of aro.y p0Ftic1m of our territory, as it was described in the Trnaty of Pari!5, is a challenge to our nati<:mal integrity, and the Partido Nacionali.sta will consider it its duty to oppose any such intent or pmp0se and t0 w@rk for the conservation of the entire territory for ourselves and our descendants. ( 4) Th.e f)ea:ce, order, prng,ress and Jaappiaess of a people can be happily realized only through se!fgovernment, for nobody knows the needs of a country better than its own people, @r can better ) apply to them the most adeql!late remedy. ( 5) The party will work coro.stantly :for ~the attainment of the aspirati@ns of the country by peaceful means within the pale 0f law, struggling for everything that would redemnd to its benefit even after the country is free and independent. 79 79 El Rrnacimiento, Ma~ch 16, 1907. For Rafael de! Pan's explanation of ,t he pr-ineiples of the Partido N acionalista, see the Manila T-imes, July 30 I ' 1907.

POLITICAL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

, This program was obviously not approved by all members of the party. "If the blindness of the dissenters continues," sa;id Mr. Rafael del Pan, "they will form a new party, a thing I shall regret very much but which I think is much preferable to the internal strife we are now ha~ing.mo

The Formation of the Partido Nacional Progresista

The Federal Party, from which the Partido Progre·sista derived, had no doubt the cream and the flower of plutocracy and the country's aristocracy of talent. Its origiBal popuilarity, however, was not due to the principles for which it stood, but rather on account of its aim of peace an.cl order. As a writer once remarked, many joined the Federals' ranks merely because of fear. 81 Therefor@, the quicker pea.ce and order were established, the sooner would the party's popularity decline. It must be noticed that the sentiment of the people hlad ·changed. Tfuey Bow talked of "government by Filipinos," and "immediate independence." In the midst of this foeling, the Federals' program of annexation to the American Union could not, of course, be regarded with favour. In 1904, whelil an Honorary Commission, composed mostly of members of the Federal Party, was sent to th@ St. Louis Exposition, 82 the Federals discovered that very fow Americans had ever entertained the idea of admitting the Philippines as a state of the Union. The diff~rences in race, customs, civilization, and distance clearly the great obstacles. 83 ,vere ,,

:~!.

! \

;.~!\he Federal Pa~y Popular in Your Vicinity?" Tl,e Philippine Rev., Mar.ch, 1902, pp. 179-181. 82 Tlie members of the commission were forty-three in number. For details see Brief Biography of the Members of the Honorary Board of Fili/1,ino Commissioners to the 1.o,.isiana P11rchase Exposition (Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1904). BS Palma, op. cit., pp. 21-22. Report of the Philippine Commission, 1907, · Ft. U, p. 306; S. Boe., No. 331, 57th Cong., 1st H. Rept. No. 1115, 63rd <1:ov_/-' 2nd Sess., p. 4.

DEVELOPMEN T OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

It was for this reason, Dr. Tavera declared in 1905 before a Congression al party of visitors that the Federa:ls' ideal was losing pÂŠpularity with the Americans as well as with the Filipinos. In spite 0f this fact, he still insisted that the original annexation Ji>lank shol!tld be retained. Early in 1905 a general conventi0n of the Federal Party was called upon to censider a possible change of the program. "The grand old doctor" proposed to the c@,Nvention that the United States shm1ld, at any evctit, consult the will of the Filipino people before any legislation on the futl!tre status of the Islands could be passed. This proposal, however, was defeated, and in its stead a platform looking for ultimate independen ce at some future date was voted for by everyone but the â&#x20AC;˘old doctor. 84 The new plank of the Federal Party was devoid 'of interest to the populace. Its efforts for propaganda were 111ot in any way active. The Parti,do Nacionalista hro(d four newspapers , while the Federnl Party had only two, El Ti&mpo and La Democracia. 'Fhe Federal Party naturally was hopelessly overshadow ed by the Nacione,liJs.t(fJ,S, in opposition. Sim:e t1ieiF platform 1iad been changed to aim at ultim~te independenc e, the Federals in the latter part of 1906 even considered the wroposition of merging themselves wit1i the Nacionalistas. . T_h rough Governor-G eneral Smith, t hey consulted Mr. Taft, tl,1.en Secretary of W ar, by cafule, that the Union Nacionalistas were willing to make union witm. the Federals on the oasis that the Federals join them in asking Congress to dechi.re its ultimate purpose with reference to the Phil\ippines. Governor-G eneral Smith's adlvi:ce was tm.at tMey ought not to have any petition presented at tm.at particular m@ment, and Secretary Taft's @l:>jeeti0,n fo their proposed union with the Nacionalista was particularly strong. 84 Tavera's statement quoted in Maximo Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 292-t93. \ , Cf. Report of the Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. III, p. 275.

POLITICAL J?ARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

The Federa[s then deci<!led to have the whole plan dropped. 85 As we haye seen, the Federals, during the regime of Governor-Gene ral Taft,. were highly patronized in public offices. The Governor-Gene ral, as a matter of policy, never forgot the Federals whenever an office w as to be filled by appointment. He believed that since there were many of the ablest and most conservative Filipinos in the Federal Party, it would be m1wise not to use this nucl eus to form and maintain a political party that r epresented 86 But this conservatism on the issue of independence. p0licy_of preference was not in any way pursued by his successor, Luke E. Wright. The governor-gener al adopted the principle that appointment should be made 01ily on the basis of personal mer it, regardless of political af.filiatioNs. This principle was carefull y followed by James Smith and other subsequent governor-gener als and, as 4ovei-nor-Gene ral Forbes said, "none returned to the original policy of almost exclusive patronage of the party which by platform proclaimed adherence to the An'lerican regiff.!e. It would have been a grave injustice to many of the ablest and best of the young Filipinos, who honestly believecl in the tenets of the Partido.Nacionalista of which they wer e members, had they bee!il excluded from government positions on account of their belief. And, conversely, the government would have been deJl)rived of the services of just the type of young Filipino. it wanted." 87 This policy was bitterly resented by the leaders of the Federal Party, and it was ped1aps "one of the contributory causes of the insidious cabal against Govern.or-Gene ral Wright," who in consequence, had to 85 Two cablegrams between Taft and Smith quoted in Maximo Kalaw, op. cit., pp. 292-293. 86 Report of the Philippine Commissio11, 1907, pt. III, pp. 274-275. 81 Forbes, op. cit., Vol. ltl, p. 109.

DEVELOPMENT OF PI,IiILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

be transferred to the position of Am1>assador to !Japan. 88 The situation even made it necessary to appoint Mr. Smith., a Roman Catholic, as go;vern0r-gene11al in o:i;der to give some color of harmony. The declining of the Federal Party, however, was uncheckable and the increase of the Nacionalista p@pularity seemed t 0 !De merely a matter of course. In other words, the fall of one was just as rapid as the rise of the other. Now the date of the general election fot the Ass embly was app roaching and the sentiment of t he people had become increasingly nationalistic. If the Federal Party maintained its status quo it was certain to be defeated. Knowing this full well, in January, 1.907, SOlil'l ~ six months before the general election, they held a convention in Manila to decide the fate of the party. After heated discussions, resolutions were adopted to repudiate further the 0ld Federalist ideals, and to decla re themsdves in favour of making the Philipwimes an independent nation by gradual and progressive acquisition of governmental control until the people should become fitted fuy education and prnctice, antler Arneriean sovereignty, to enjoy and maintain their c0mplete independence. 89 The Federal Party, which dominated Philippine politics in the pre-Assembly period, was by this time considered an organization of the past. Yielding to the stress of the times, the January convention resolved to corwert the Party into the Partid,o N&eional Progrffsista, generally k11J.own as the Progrnss~ve P arrty. 'U]_l)on the close., of the party convention on January 11, 1907, Senor 88 Ibid., p. 108. As the conflict between Governo, -General Wright and the F ederals became worse, Sefior Cruz !Herrera, P resident of the Federal Party, tendered his resignation as alcalde on September 15, 1906. in spite of his friendly r elations with the governor-general, Sefior Cruz Herrera severely censured the Wright administration before the Taft Party for ill-advised policy. See Th e JIil a1'ila T i.m es, July 11, 1907. S. Doc. 89 t?.e port of the Philippine Co111111issio1v, 1907, pt. I m, p. 275. No. 200, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 44. Cf. The Manila Times, July 30, 1907.

POLITICAL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON A DMTN.

Cruz Her-11era, p11esident @f the party, issued a manifesto which read as £ollows: "At the convention of our party which came to a close yesterday, it was unanimously r esolved that · the - legendary and glorious title of 'F ederal' be changed to that of Nati0nal Progressive Party. "Tl!l order to avoid errol!leous interpretations, it , becomes necessary to announce that the chang e a bove referred to is made solely in response to cm1stant and r epeated requests from a pprecia t ive adherents, principally from the provinces, w ho consiclere€l it unwise, am.d a misnomer to continu e using the world 'Federal' after our political group h ad adopted independence as the ultima t e end. "It would seem opportune to stat e that the National Progressive Party, the faithful follow ing of th€ brillia•nt tra<ditions of the F ederal Party, will continue to be inspired by the pr inciples a nd procedure set forth in ~he manifesto of Aug ust, 1905, and explained recently by this same convention. In Philippine politics the National Prog r essive Party will continue to fulfill the same mission as that carried out until now by the Federal Party, that of •constitmtin.g in the Philippines in due time an inde'pendent democratic government, previously having ·mplanted the Roosevelt plan as an experimental edium which has been most conducive to demontrate the capacity of the Filipino people." 90

/This change was highly significant in itself. It mal!ked an actual triumph of Filipino nationalism, which was iRcreasingly irresistible in the subsequent politics of 1--1 e islands. However, the calling for increasing autd:110my and eventual independence was but an expre~sion o:li the sentiments of the conservative element s. 90

The Manila T imes, January 14, 1907. The same in Spanish may be

fow,d in El Renacimimto, January 14, 1907.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

The Nacionalistas and the Assembly

The demand for autonomy, which had already peen v0iced, now became more pressing as a political issue. 1'he general election of 1907 for the Philippine Assembly was the first ti.me i.n history that a Ji>eople of the M 4 lay race .had exercised the riglii.,t of s11ffrage. The executive order of President Theod@re Roosevelt calling a general election iin 1907 was of course a statesmanlike measure. 91 iUpon the President's instruction, the Philippine Commission, on January 9th, passed the election law which provided that those provinces, riot inhafuited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes were to be divided into 78 assembly districts, each province was to constitute at least one district, and the more populated to be dividecl into more districts in the ratio of one to evetry 90,000 i,nlii.abitants. According t@ thi:s apporti.0ning there were 8~ delegates, two of whom rep!'eSeRted the city of Manila, which was .1.onsidered a province within the meaning of the law. 92 - ___,/ The Filipinos, as a whole, are qu.ite su.-sceptible to emotional and sentimental appeals. Their interest in politics had been demonstrated to be as keen as anyone could imagine. There was an air of excitement during the election campaign everyw;here in the Islands. In 1907 the contest fuetween the Progresistas amd the Nacionaiistas was a heated Âˇ one. Tne Progre<istas were late in t1J.e fielcl, liiut after they were im, they f !ught most vigorously. 95 Tlii.e central issue was "in&pender,ice". Accordingly, the Progresistas took tlii.e !l>@sition fully and flatly that the Filipinos were not as yet fit for immediate independence and complete self-government, which must necessarily be the result and not ~ the 91 92 98

Report of the Philippine Commission, 1907, pt. I, pp. 5-6. Ibid., Cf. The Manila Times, January 9, 1907. S. Doc., No. 200, 60th eongress, 1st Sess., p. 42.

POLITICAE. PARTIES PRfOR TO ['H'E HA>RRISON ADMTN.

anteceden t 0£ the im,proveme-n t o:£ agriculture , industry, c.wmmerce and education. In thei,r utterances before the electorate, they aamitted that independe nce was the prime goal of the Filipinos, but at any rate it must come with complete safety. 9' This advocacy, as we have seen, was <iJ.u,i,te c©ntrai:y to that of the NacionalJistas, who insisted that immediate independe nce was an urgent poJ.itical necessity. Knowin.g well the psycholog y of the people, the Nacionalistas took advantage of being opl!>0sed to tke governmen.t. They accused the Progr,esistas in office as extravaga nt and burdensom e to the people. This, in itself, was an effective way of winning the sympathy and support of the people, who had long heen taught to regard the governme nt as an entity 95 separate from the people, taxing and persecutin g them. We have seen that the· Partido Naciona!Jista was a fusion @f several groups-; its difficulty, therefore, rested in the fact that internal discord was at any time possible . . Tke lime b>etween the · old time lndependi stas and the Unionistas was mot as yet destroyed. The former The following is a programme of the Progresistas in poster: "The National Progresista Party asks for your support' on election day because it stands for : good roads, clean government, adjustment of tariff, wider public education, adequate commercial laws, enforcement of sanitary laws, fostering of commercial interests, abolition of prison labour competition, legislative support to boost Manila, more substantial recognition of police and fire departments, retirement and pensions for insular civil service. "We do not want electrically urgent or immediate independence, but will willingly wait ·until Uncle Sam sees fit to grant it." See The Ma,.ila Times, July 29, 1907. Cf. J.bid., July 30, 1907. Report of the Philippine (;0111111ission, 1907, Pt. IH, pp. 306-307. S. Doc., No. 200, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 The N acio,.alista Party stood for the following programme during the election, as was told by Mr. Rafael de! Ban: 1. In the economic li[)e: More economy in public expenditure, more adequate dist.ibution of taxation, the suppression of the government competition against the industries that private initiative maintains, the betterment of the means of communication. 2. [r. judicial matters : Codifiaation of the laws in force, the abolition of the death penalty, and the improvement iri criminal procedure. 94

DEVELOPMEN'P OF PHILIPPINE POLITTCAL PARTIES

already felt discontented by reason of some disadvantages t:hat they suffered in the party. 96 Mr. Rafael del Pan was right in his remark that the Independistas and the Unionistas were not yet well joined d11e to the material lack of time. 97 There were other reasons, h@wever, that might have contributed to this. First, the intrigue of others to cause a SJ:l)lit am@ng the Nacionavistas; and secondly, the desire of a group of Nacionalistas so-called Racistas was to see that omly Filipino faces (Malays) should be seated in the Assembly. 98 But in spite of all these difficulties, the Partido Nacionalista carried on their campaign successfally. One might ask as . to what extent the Filipino politicians had actuall.y em.joyed freedom in their first election campaign, 1907. It must be noticed that Governor-Gen eral Smith, in his inauguration address of September 20, 1906, did pr@mise that "l'>olitieal parties will be protected in their right t0 peacefully assemble, - and persons duly elected to office will, if otherwise qualified, be seated regardless of tbeir political bias, and prejudice or convicti0ns." 99 This promise was, in geaeral, very well observed b11t owing to over-enthasias m on the part of some NacionalistO;S in their advocacy of 3. Matters in the interest of the •mountain r-aces: To · protect them against shameful exhibitions, and to promote their general we! fare. 4. Independence question: To demand immediate r-elease from the United See The States, allowing the Filipinos to assume complete independence. Manila· Times, July 30, 1907. Cf. Ibid., April 1, July 1, 2, 1907. Elliott, The Philippines to the End of Commission Governmellt (Indianapolis, 1917, pp. 411-412). 96 . The Manila Times, July 30, 1907, !J7 98

Ibid. Ibid.

99 For the full text of the G0vernor-General's address, see Elihu Root, U.S. Documents Relating to the Fhilippine Islands, Vol. CLXXXIII, pp. 143156.

P@LI'FICAL PA,R'1'l'E/S PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADM'FN.

immediate ~ndepemfonce, emTharrassment was not altogether aThsent. 100 The electi0m: t@ok place on July 30, 1907. It was reported that the total number 0f votes registered for the electi@R was il.04/966. Of. these voters 98,251 actually paFticipated. The!'e wern 34,277 votes cast for the Nacionalistas as against 24,234 for the Progresistas. 'fhe i:esu,bt of the contest for seats in the Assembly was am @ve1Jwfuelmfo1g vict0ry f©r the Nacionalistas, who eaptuJJecl fifty-nine 017 seventy-two per cent. of the seats in the .Assern,bly, as against sixteen, or twenty per cent. whid1 bel0nge4 to the Progresistas, and the remaining fiv:e, @17 eight J,Jel7 cent. for the independents. 101 From this electie>n we learn that the political sentiment of the pe0ple was i-nte17esting,l y d,ivided in a geographical sense. The maj@l7ity 0£ tlJte c1mtral towns . were, as reported, 100 Sinforoso Ponce, a Nationalist campaign speaker, was reported to have said that "The mother of all Filipinos of colour is already pr-ostrated in her veins because she is continually undermined by her enemy, which, even though great and powerful, has riever been satisfied with the drinking of the blood of the poorest. In order, to save the Philippines from thi's position, in order that she may be able to struggle against her great and powerful enemy that is possessed of war and cannons of steel and crafty men, it is necessary that all Fiilipinos of eol0ur unite ; it is necessary to form a solid and compact mass that will know !\ow to protect ,vith clenched fists. The union among Filipinos, the union of all tl\e sons of a common country, will cause an agitation in the ner.ves of its enemies. Even though America is great, she cannot prevail against a united Philippines. We should elect a leader who will guide us and will know h0w to conduct us in the decisive struggle against the nation which declar.es itself a liberator. but is nothing more than a wretch, that is only anxious to drink the blood of its vktims." Mr. Ponce, though wholly denied the speech, was immediately subject to investigation, through which the Govem0r-@ener.al clear.ly pointed out to him that "everybody is free to express his political opiflions so long as he does not violate the law of the land." "During this campaim," the Governor-Gener.al continued, "there have been two COIJ.!plaints that ha'le been brought to me, one against you a1id the otheraga-inst Mr.. Stangl, for breach of the law." The Gover.nor-General further · declar.ed that ' 1under no circumstances will the gover.nment permit language which is intended and designed to incite the people to violence." See The MaH-ila Times, July 20, 1907. 101 Data born cRe~o•t oft tlse 1?1iili~pille Commissio", 1907, pt. I, pp. 49-S0; S. Doc., N0. 200, 60th ·C:ong., ist Sess., p. 45; Nazario, "Philippine Political Panties, 1900-1933," loc. Git.; Forbes, op. cit., Vol. lI, pp. 107-108.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

obviously in support of the Nacionalistas; those of the Pacific coast were in support of the Progresistas; while those of the island of -Marinduque, the China Sea coast and the old districts of Pdnci:pe and Infanta were generally independent of both the Nacionalistas and the

Pro gresistas .102 As al,i;eady stateâ&#x201A;Ź!, gen~11al sentiment was in support of the Nacionalistas. Strange as it may seem, even the American residents in Manila, for the most part, east their ballots for the Naciona!ti,sta candidates as against the Progresista.s. Explanations for this were various. The Progresistas related that the motive of the American voters was to make the first Assembly radical in order to cause an immediate failure. The personal p0pularity of the Nacionalista candidates, Messrs. Gotnez and Guerrero, amor,ig the American residents, was, perhaps, tl,ie more reas@nable ancl less political explanati0m in this connection.103 The Assembly, however, as I have indicated, was predominantly Nationalist. It was to fue a school in the arts of government and a medium for the expression of Filipino opinion in their own affairs. By coincidence, the Assembly was inaugurated on October the sixteenth, 1907, on the anniversary of the first meeting of the Virginia House of Burgesses of 1619. The occasion was of historic importance. Mr. Taf t , then Secretary of War, made his journey to Manila for the sole purpose of presiding at the inaugural ceremony. The Assembly contained a aurnbei; of Filipinos who had been prominent figures in Philip]Dine politics daring and 102 ' R eport of the Philippine Commission, 1908, pt. 1, pp. 644 et seq. Manila and Cebu were the strongest in support of the N aci011alistas and Palawan and Samar were the weakest. By province, the Progresistas received their largest votes from Albay and Ilocos Sur, but the smallesf from Batangas and Samar. See Ibid., 1907, pt. I, p. 50. 103 There was another explanation to the effect that the American voters decided to vote for Messrs. Gomez and Guerrero on the understanding that thÂˇe latter, if elected, would thraugh their influence, appoint certain Americans. to some administrative posts. See The Manila Times, July 29, August 5, 1907.

POLITICAL PART.JES PRIOR TO THE HARRrnON ADM'PN,

after the rev0lution of 1896. Typical of these figures were Don Pedro Paterno, negotiator of the pact of Biak-na-batÂŠ in 1896; Don Felipe Agoncillo and Don Tomas Arejola, active rep_resentatives of the Malolos ,government in foreign countries; others as Don Aguedo Velarde, Don Leon Ma. Guerrero, and Don Alberto iBa1rrntt0, alil 0ÂŁ wh.01111 had previously been men of great respoRsibilities. 10' They were generally considered as the grand old gentlemen 0f the right bench in the Assernbly. Of the left, there were the young Nationa!,i sts l!lnder the leadership-of Sergio Osmefia and Manuel L. Quezon. The former was then the President and the latter the V,ic<;-President of the Parti,do Naciona.Us.t a by which the Assembly, was dominated. Mr. Osmefia was then a yol!lng man of hardly thirty, delicate in physique, polished in manners, prompt in decision and marked in abilily. At the age of twenty-five he had already been elected to the governorship of his native pr0vince of Cebu, where he had previously been editor of a newspaper, El Nuevo Dia. As a statesman, he has always been consistent in his convictions and great in c0urnge. 106 It was because of these rare qualities that Mr. Osmefia was unanimously chosen to the Speakership of the Assembly, which he uninterruptedly held until 1921. The present President of the Philippine Commonwealth, Mr. Manl!lel L. Quezon, was then floor leader of the Assembly. As such he achieved distinction. He was undoubtedly a man of great vigour and capacity. Before being elected to the Assembly he had already been governor of the province of Tayabas. He possessed aJI the necessary qualities of a great mass leader. His Actas d, la Comision de Filipinos, 104 Forbes, op. ait., V:ol. II, p. 135. 0ctulk e 16, 1907 a Febrero 1, 1908, pp. 36-37. Cf. The Manila Times, July 31, 1907. 106 Norton, op. it., pp. 138-152. Isabelo Caballero and M. de Gracia Concepcion, Quezon, T/,e Story of a Natio,. atid Its Foremost Statesman (Manila, 1935), pp. 85-89.

DEVELOPMENT <i>F' PHl!UP:PINE POLITICAL PARTIES

dramatic powers have perhaps fargely been resp<msible for 11.is present ioositriolil as the man of destimy of his C0Uliltry. 106 With the NMionalistas' overwhellililing majority in tTo.e Assembly un0.er these tw@ young and patriotic leaders, it was ahlil.ost certain that t1i.ey must uNavoidably in conflict wi,th the CciniJ<lmissiolil w1i.ich was composed @'li American and Pr0gresistq, members, as the upper c1J.amber. In the co1itrs€ of little more than five- years (from October 16, 1907, to the close of the special sessil'm, Febrnary 11, 19U), 211 out of 320 acts Ot'igirnat. fog ilil the Commission had b@elil <llisapprnved lDy the Assembly; and in the same ]>eri@d 343 ·out of 599 acts @riginating in thte Assemt>ly 11.ad been objected to l;iy the Comrnission.[07 The Nafionalist-oontrolled Assembly, aec0rdililg t© American writeFs, @biviemsly tFied to e!ililbarrass the American auth@rities b>y intFoillttcing biUs to reduce taxes, to p@stp@ne the time for the c0llectioa, and even to refase the ar,i.nuai appropnia,tion biil, though it knew full welr t1i.at m@ney was madly needed for Hie various constrn.ctilve purposes, 108 · .In pursuance 0f th.e act @f Congress passed on :J uiy 1!, 1902, the Ph.iliippine Legislature was empowered to elect two Resident Comrnissi@aers t@ the United States. 'f1iey were given seats on the floor of the House 0£ Representatives with ]>rivilege 0£ debate, but no vote. 109 During its il1augurai session, t1i.e i"To.,ilil\)Ji)ime Legislature chose the Honol!l•rable Beni,t o Legarda, a Progresista,

106 "I do not think that in all my exper-ience," remar-ked Sen;,tor George Parker, "I have ever come in eontaGt with any man in the politics of my time· 1in any Gounfry with anythiBg resembling the dramatic powers that he {!,f;!uezon~ had, whether before the publk in a large capacity, or in the various Fel'ations incident to private life." See FaFkeF's unpublished arlicle "'Fhe Trip to the Philippines," in Parker's Papers, New York Public Library. 107 Wornester and Hayden, op. cit., p. 548. Forbes, op. cit., Vol. H, pp. ll!0-141. li:f. "AmeriGa and the i"hilippines," in ~ound Table, l')ecember, 1924. 'Fhe Ma,iila Times, January 27, 1911. iOS "Ameriea and the Philippines," lac. cit.; WoFeestt'r and Hayden, op. cit., p. 549. 109 Res. 86, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess.

POL.ITICAL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON A DMTN.

and t1rn Bi0mcmra0le Pab1o Ocampo, a Nacionalista, to t1ie said p>osts at Wa:shington.110 In 1909 Mr. Qu ezon was elected to sm:ceed Mr. Ocampo, and Mr. Legarda was re-electecl. 'Fhe next election of Resident Commissioners t0ok p>lace in 1911. Mr. Quezon was again the Nacionalista camd,i da•te, and re-elected by the Assembly with the a);'lpr@cval of the Commission. Likew ise, M r. Legarcda was ren0minated by the Commission, but on ac(rnumt @f his freqmmt attacks on the issue of independence, the Nati@nalis,t Assembly refused its approval. This caused a serious ccmflict between the two bodies. It was, of c@urse, a party as well as a constitutional issue. The C@mmission, through Governor-General Forbes, who by virtue @f his office was also president of the Commission, ded arecl that: "The C0mmission was appointed by the Presi. cient 0f the United States. We represent in the Philippi,n e lslamds his p0licies and ideas and it is our duty t@ see that they are carried out. We, there:f©ve, in the electi0F1 0£ Resident Commissioners to the United States, have felt that the first and most important thing to be considered was that of getting somebody who was in entire harmony -with the views and the policy of the Administration out here, somebody wh0 had the personal confidence of the President and who, if possible, should be a personal friend of the President. We have not felt that it was necessary for such a person to belong to any p0liticaJ warty, whet1ier Progressist or Nationalist, but that it was important that he should properly repveseBt the Commission.mu no M,. Legarda was one of the founders of the Federal Party and a most prominent and successful business man in the islands. Mr. Ocampo was a man of pr,ese9ce and distiinet,ion. He took an active part in the ins urrection and was later- deported to the island of Guam by the military authorities in the days of the milital'o/ gover-nment. Among the N acio,.alistas he was recognized as one of the histor.ie figures. S . Doc., No. 200, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., Pll• 42-43. Ul "Election 0£ Resident Commissioners to· the United States," Philippine Asse1mb/y Doc. No. 25<h-A. 38, 2nd Leg., 1st Sess., p. 9.

DEVElf...OPMENT QF PIULIP:PINE POLITICAL PARTIES

To this statement, Speaker Osmeiia replied that since the Commission was merely a creature of the President of the United States, ft could oaly express the vyill and opini0n of the latter. On the other hand, if the Resident Commissioner were not a creature 0£ the Admiaistra1tion ©r <,1. rel!)rese1'1tative of the Commission, but the mout1J.piece and delegate of the Filipino people, then the Assembly could not withdraw its object• with@l!lt condemni,ng itself. However, it was impossible, according to Osmefia, for- tlae members @f t1ie Assem;b ly to give up their ideal that the Resident Commissioner in qu_estion must be a representative of 'the Filipino people and not of the Commission or Administration. rt was on this t1J.e0ry, tme Naci0nalistas mai:ntair:i.ed, that the Delegate nominated by the Commission should belong to the party of majority. The Resideat'. Commissi@ner as a representative was esser:i.ltially in political office. · "In all political :matters," continued Osmefia, "the political parties should at least be consulted. Either . the sphere of ;,i.ction that by right belongs to the political 'f)arties s1J.ould lDe recog-niied, @r they are superfluous and should be dissolved. N0 0ne, 11.owever, dou!:>ts that in a government such as ours the political parties are necessary." 112 Finally, t1ie Nacionalistas were of the opinion that a Resident Commissiomer s!.ml!lld at any event be a person of sufficiently proved Ji>Opl!llarity, w,ho being acceptable to the majority, would at the same time receive the full support of the mimority.m In trying to repudiate this the0ry and to a void the danger of having two delegates belonging to tlae Partido Nacionalista, the Commission maintaimed that if it was its duty "t0 fo>0k after the welfa11e @f aH the inlaab.iitants of the Islands, the great maj@rity of whom by_reas0n of their limited suffrage having no way of expressing their 112 llS

/Ibid., p. 26. Ibid.

POLITLCAL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN.

:[!)Olitical prderoel\lces. Mal\ly 0f those who do vote are llOt affiliated with any political party. Without doubt this is one of the reasons why Congress has provided for the Commission in legislative matters and in the designation of the Resident Commissioners, since otherwise the interests of such .persons might be overlooked." 114 The C@Jiltenticms of both sides were equally extreme. The result was a failure to elect successors, and Congress by the act 0f February 15, 1911, relieved the situation by providing that the preseNt Residimt Commissioners should hold office until their successors were duly elected and qua•lifiecd. 116 The conflict between the Commission and the Assembly was nevertheless still very serious. But the forces iN support of the Partido Nacionalista, which controlled the Assembly, had increasingly been restrengthimecd. The election of 1909, for instance, was a Nacionalista demonstration. The number of registered v©teFs was 208,850-alrnost twice as many as that of 1907. There were 192,975 svotes actually cast. Out of these 93,000 votes were in support of the Nacionalistas as against 38,588 which belonged to the Progresistas. Dms, the N acionalis.tas 1i.ad increased their _popular votes mol.'e thal\l @1'!_~ 1i.undred afl.d seventy per cent., while the Progresistas increased theirs only about seventy per cent. Of the delegates in the Assembly there were 62 Nacionalist(J)S as against 17 Progresistas and 2 independents.1116 Jt seemed that the Filipino voters were more iinteFested ir,i their !@cal than i,Jil their national affairs . . The prnvincial electioll of November 5, 1907, for instance, was in harmony with this observation. The total votes Ibid., ll• 33. Report of the Philippine Commissio11, 1911, p. 3. Ibid., [910, pp. 45-4','. For.bes, op. cit., 'Vol. II, p. 108. The Ma11ila 1/imes, November 3, 5, . 1909. 114

U6 H6

(

DEVELOPMENT <J>F PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

@£ tha:t election exceecl.ed tli10se at tlile Assembly eleetion (]907) by 69,525, OF more than 50 per ceat. 117 The ,ic@chet iac,ease 0f the registrafam in 1909 was, there'EQF~, perfectly logical, siace the electiem.s @if the Assembly ~elegates were held with tlrnse of tne ptrevincial governors amcl thiFd membeFs of the provincial boarcls. Despite _tfae i,n crease of · Ji)0pular participation, the electioro. of 1909, as re]_)J©Fted, was a spiritless @m.e. iNet much of em.thusiasm. in any f©rm was i':rn.di:cated. It was, peFhaJDS, like several liftle ripples, whieh left little or n© ef.fect upon the pool of politics. Tmis e011:ld partially be explaim.ed by the fact fhaf theFe was no mew issue capable of stirring th€ interest of the people. i[t migh,t also have neero. due to the importance 0£ material advancement as 1being realized !Dy the pe@ple. 118 The eleetioH was apparently a:a l!ln]_)JFeCe<foated viet0ry :for the Nae-ionalistas, i,n spite of a sehism caused by Dominador Gomez. 119 Now, the· questioa of the next 117 Of ·t he governors elected, 16 were Nacionalistas, 16 were Progresistas. Of the third members of the pr.ovincia! boards, 15 ~ere N aci.onalistas, 13 wer,e f!rogresistas, and 2 were of unknown par,ty affiliation. The total number or votes cast for the candidates of the N aci onalistas was 44,288 as , against 38,153 for those of the Progresistas. See Report of the Philippine Commission, 1908, pt. ], p. 87. Upon this record Mr-. Taft, then Secretary of War, tsommented that "the Nationalists' victor;y in the Assembly election should not be taken as an assurance that a permanent major-ity of the electors will continue to bvour immed'iate independence.'.:'" >~- Doc., No. 200, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 47. 118 Cf. The Manila Times, October 28, 1909.. lbi/J,., November 1, [ 909. 119 Gomez was a man of great, though misused, ability. As a bo;y he first studied in Manila, with a Jiur.ther and later course in Madr-id. In 1901 l\.e returned to Manila where he practiced medicine. Iti the foliowing year he became leader of the short-lived Nationalist Party. He was I eleeted to the first Philippine Assembl¥ from Manila, and in 1909 was again r,unning for re-election. This he sueceeded in winning, but was lateF declared disqud!ified and excluded from the Asseml:il;y. J ames A. Robertson, "The E,otr,aordina-ry Session of the Philippine lLeg,i slature," Amer. :Pol. '6c. Rev., Vol. IV, No. 4 (November, 1910). Aetas de la Asamblea Fili:pina, Aeta !No. 80, 2a. !Leg., la. Ses., Torno V], p. 130. !0uring the election eampaign 0£ 1909, he was bitter!¥ criticdzed for 1:ietFaying · his own party for having, thr.ough his personal influence, shifted man!)( votes to tlie Partido Progresista at the e,opense of Ped,ro Paterno, a Nationalist eand'idate. For. details about tliis incident, see Paterno's statement in The Manila T imes, November iO, 1909.

POLITIG:AL PARTIES PRIOR TO THE HARRISON ADMTN .

Speaker 0f the Assemli>ly was once more widely discuss ed. Mr. James 'there were several aspirants to the post. Library, Philippines the of Librarian then RobertsoB, commented: "Choice lay between Osmefia, the form er Speaker, Singson, and Ocampo, while some were so wi1ld as to suggest the na:me of Dr. Dominador Gomez. On the evening of the 27th, the first two were proclaimed by their followers. Felipe Agoncillo, of Batangas, who, it will be remembered, was the ambassador from the so-called Filipino Republic to the United States and Canada, managed the campaign of Ocampo. On the opening day, Osmefia, who had received the support of the government, received 55 votes, Singson, 15, Ocampo, who made the mistake of allying his forces with those of Gomez, 6, w1.iile three votes were scattered. Osmefia was 120 accordingly decl-;red elected." The new Assembly, in the words of Maximo Kalaw, "showed more radicalism, encouraged by the support it had from the people." 121 On the basis of ~ts popularity, the Partido Nacionaiista, under Osmefia's leadership, decided that the sentiments aBd aspirations 0ÂŁ the people must be adequately expressed. Whereupon, in the name of the Philippine Assembly, they instructed Mr. Quezon, then Re.sident Commissioner, to address the Congress of the United States that Congress "may grant complete and abs@lute independence to all territory known as the Philiprme Archipelag0, aBd request the President of the Âˇ United States to open negotiations with Japan, China, England, Germany, Russia, and France for the neutraliza120 Robertson, "The Extraordinary Session of the Philippine Legislature," loc. ci,., p. 529. Cf. The Manila Times, November 1, 5 et 23, 1909. 121 Op. cit., p. 317.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

ticon of sa:id Arehill'elago." 1~2 This was addressed to Congress on May 14, 1910. The Partido Progresista, realizing that it had lost much of popularity, quickly joined with the Partido Nacionalista in submitting, on September 1, 1910, a memorial to the Secretary of War, Mr. Jacob N. Dickinson, who was then visiting the Islands. In this historic. docurnero.,t they set forth the idea that a constitution or a fundamental law was necessary for the Filipino people in the immediate fut1.1re. The main point they stressed was that the Filipino people shoufol be given an elective senate and that the legislative control of this body and that of the Assembly should be extended to the territory occupied by the triibal peoples and Mohatnmedans. 123 Falling in line with this object, the Assembly, on December 5, adopted a joint resolution requesting the United States Congrnss to recognize the right and power of the Filipiro.0 people to pirepare and adopt a constitution of their own. 124 The resolution was, however, utterly rejected by the Commission on the ground that it did not seem capable of meeting the 122 Cong. Record, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6312. They held that this petition was strictly in accord with the policy of President Roosevelt, who, when Secretary of War, declared that : "When the people as a whole show themselves reasonably fit to conduct a popular self-government, maintaining law and orsder and offering equal protection of the laws and civil rights to rich and poor, and desire complete independence of the United States, they shall be given it." Ibid. 123 In addition to the joint memorial the Partido Nacionalista submitted to Secretary Dickinson, on the saine date, a separate memorandum in which the following points were mentioned: ( 1) Capacity demonst! ated by the Filipinos in the organization of a proper govemment. (2) The ,apa city of the Filipinos demonstrated during the American control. (3) Consideration of the reasons alleged against the granting of Âˇindependence. ( 4) Obstacles of indefinite retention to the independence of the Philippines. See "Memorial Politico del Partido N acionalista y Memorandum Conj unto de los ' Partidos Nacionalista y Progresista," Asamblea Filipina, Docs. Nos. 4581-a 1, Za Leg., Ira. Ses. 124 Aclas de la Asa111blea Filipina, Acta No. 42, 2a Leg., Ira. Ses., p. 71. Cf. Diario de S esiones de la Asamblea Filipina, 2a Leg., lra. Ses., V<il. VI, No. 3, p. 92.

PC>LI'J;[CA,l, PAR!I'IES PRl0R TO THE HA,R RISON ADMTN.

app110val 0f either the American 0r the Filipino people, but rather the eomtrary. 125 After tnat the relati0ns fuetween the Commiss_ion and the Assem,My were irreconcilable. One or the other had to g,ive way, sooner or later, if the government was to fue at al'I eflkieat. The Assembly, as regarded by the Filiwi,m0s, was the champion of their national indepenclemce, whi,le the C0mmissi0m was i:epresentative of the g@;vernimg power, . amd predominantly foreign in comp0siti0m. T1iis sitaatiom was most difficult. The qaestion here raised i.s which one of the two was to be restrni,ne<il.? T0 consider th~s qaestion, one must, of necessity, take mote of the results of the general election in 1912.125 As reported, the registration of voters showed the largest yet ree0rded. Out of 235,842 persons who voted. nearly 150,000 were· for Nacionalista candidates, while less Ith.an 38,00)0 were for the Progresistas. In the Assemfuly the Nacionalistas maintained their strength of 62 agaimst that of ~6 belonging to the Progresistas. Of the 31 provincial governors, 21 bel9nged to the N a<dona,listas and 5 to tne Progresistas. The Partido Naeionalista was afule t0 gain, in this election, more than 125 The r.esolution was presented to tl\e Commission on December 8, 1910, ·and was reported by a select committee on January 5, 1911, with a recommendatfon that the resolution be laid on the table. The report of the select c0mmittee was adopted almost unanimously. For the opinions eXipressed by various members of the Commission, see C omm1·ssion, Journal, 2d Leg. Spec. Sess., pp. 341-347. Cf. Report of the Philippine Commission, 1911, p. 17. 126 Tlhe election t0ok place on !June 4th. In 1909 it was held on the fast Tuesda\Y after the first Monday in November, but by act of Congress, approved Febr.uar,y 15, 1911, the ter.m of office of delegates to the Assembly was mail~ four yearp, beginning October 16, 1913, and the Legislature was given the Fight . to fi-x the date for the commencement of its annual sessions. The legislatur,e select<;d October. 16 as the date by Act No. 2045, •and as this made the former date for elections as the first Tuesday of June, 1912, and the same date every four-th year thereafter.. By the same act the' terms of office of elective pr.ovindal and municipal officers were made the same as these of the delegaJes." 'Re.por,t of the Philippine Commission, 1912, pp. 45-46.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

U1irty per cent, while t1ie Partido Progresista actually k1st ground. 127 Seeing the growing confidence of the people in the Nacionalistas the policy of the American authorities was obviously revised. The spir;it between the Commission a!Fl.d the Assembly was improved as the retaliatory and adverse votes fuecame fewer. 128 It was, moreover, the wisdom of Governor-General Forbes to cultivate, and remain in, good friendship with Mr. Osmefia, the majority leader and Speaker of the Assembly, in order to obtain legislative measu1res, which in his opir.1ion, were 111.ecessary to the health of his admiro.istration. Judge Charles B. Elliott was right when he remarked that "during the later years of the Forbes administration, legislation became largely a matter of private arrange129 ment between the Governor-General and the Speaker." This had f.inally caused repeate<il protests of the Progresistas, who though used to support the Am.eFican authorities, now charged SJ!>eaker Osmefia and floor leader Quezon and other leaders of the Partido Nacionalista, with being too friendly to the Americans and selling out to thern. 130 It is interesting to note that Mi-. Forbes as governor-general had neither been sympathetic with the Nacionalista programme, nor, like some of his predecessors, a friend of the Federal or Progresista leaders. 131 His new rapprochement with the Nacionalista leaders, perhaps, can best he explained as only a 1271 For election records, see Ibid., pp. 48-49. Cf. "The Last Election in the Philippines," The Filipi110 People, September, 1912. Forbes, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 108. 128 Cf. Quotation from Governor-General Forbes' Journal, V, 184-185, February 23, 1913, given in his The Philippine Islands, Vol. II, p. 141. 129 Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines: To the !End of the Cotntnissio11 Governmmt (Indianapolis, 1917), p. 125. 180 La Democracia, June 26 et July 16, 1912. 131 Kalaw, op. cit., p. 321.

POLITICAL PARTIES PRWR TO rr'HE ffARR!iSON ADMTN.

circumstantial re<'j;Uri•1"ememt, as we fuave jl!lst related. Governot'-Gen:eral W0r0es was essentially interested in mate)i"ial achievemtmts. in publ,ic utterances, he frequently eounseliled the !Fii!i,pim@ leaders to give more tfuough.t to 1:)l!lsiness and less to polities. It was obviously due t0 bis striikimg ali>i[ity and unceasing efforts that his '.f our years 0:fi admim.istration (1909-1913) were marked with high efficiency as weDI as with general prosperity. 182 F<t om the amalysis made im. this chapter, it may suffice to say tfuat the peri@cl fr0m1 1900 to 1906 was one in which nati@m.alism was S1!1J1>:[!1ressed. Parties of nati:0m.alis.tie teadencies were not allowed to organize, much less to take paFt im the workings of the government. As a res1<1lt, t he ,(i)Olicy of su,pf)ression produced a sitMati0n wfukh it origim.ally intended to avoid. Had Mrr. Taft, from the @l!ltset, fueen more liberal in his policy, the rais0ri d'etr,e ,of the Nati0nalist organization would , have been weakened, if n0t utterly removed. 'fhe ra]!lid fall 0£ the Federals, or Prngressives, was @bvi<!msly dl!le to lack of stremg leadership, for one thing, 1 and uncertainty of J!llatform, for the other. The I Nacionalistas, tml,i ke the Progresistas, suffering neither I @f these cfofec ~.,, nor in ger.1eral misjudging the · psycho1 10gy of the mass of the people, _had made themselves masters of the situati011J. Obviol!lsly em0ugh, the cause I of the more mili.tamt spiit:it, and of the increasing r J!l©pularity 0£ the Nacionalistas was also c0mtributed to I by the c0ntiRl!led c@nif.lict fuetw:eem. tfue Commission and I tfie Assenibly, wfuich characterized tfue f)erioc;l between l 1907 a,llJ.fil ,19]3. I

132 ln 1910, the area of eultivated land in Occidental Negros increased I about 50 per eent. Pokes for tobacco were raised, and imports and exports were stimulated. T:he total foreign tr.ade of the Philippines for 1912 was $104,869,816, of which 40 per ce_nt. was with the Nnited States, See Barrows, of,. cit., p. 342; Woreestcr, and Mayden, op, cit., pp, 289-290. \

CHAPTER IV POLITICAL PARTIES DURilNG . THE HARRISON ADMIN[STRA'.'FION

The Origin of the Partido Democrata

The Democratic accession to power ip. Washingtoi:i, 1913, marked, in the Philippines, the beginni'ng of a new era in which party development became of greater significance, as the field of self-government became liberally extended. Thi:t new Governor-General, Mr. Francis B. Harrison, in accordance with President Wilson's instructioNs, adoptecl the policy of rnling the Islands in. accordance with the advice of whid1ever Jilarty might be in power. In Ji>Facticing this avow@d pGlicy, Mr. Osmefia became virtually supreme, since he was then Speaker of the Assembly and at the same forrn leader of the majority party. This increasimg authority under Osmefia's command, increased the hostility of a small faction of the Partido Nacionalista led by TeodGre Sandiko. 1 They were the discontented and radical elements who had decicled to secede from the party. Thus, the Third Party movement was set on foot 1mder the name of the Partido Democrata Nacional. 'They charged that the Naci@nalistas headed by Osmefi.a :failed to r epresen.t the spirit of hue democracy. EverythiBg was s11bmitted to the 1 A member of General Aguinaldo's staff and a the insurrection. He was elected governor of Bulacan while the new party was being organized, manager of Factory. W. Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands II, pp. 113-114 ; The Manila Times, April 3, 1914.

well-known figure in Province in 1909, and the Katubusan Cigar (Boston, 1928) , Vol.

POLITICAL PAR'PIES DURING THE HARRISON ADMTN.

dictation odi a few pers0ns aad confabs of relatives The Partido who :fornmec;l tb.e Osmefia oligarchy. Nacionalista, according to Sandiko's followers, had not even in due form establ,ished any executive committee. Matters concerning the public weal were determined in secret caucas meetings. There was only a very personal or aut;0crntie go"lermneJiJ.t intolerant of any free and open discussion on questions of far-reaching social interests which the Nacionalistas used to settle at clubs or oth er places of social gathering. They further declared tha t: "The Nacionalista party, and its leaders, have been c;leaf to fraternal entreaties to desist from playi,n g the role of 'Mazarins' i,n politics, their conduct eausiBg the American imperialists _to assert that an independent government in the Philippines would be tantamount to the rule of a few at the expense of â&#x20AC;˘ the masses." 2 fa add,itfon to the charges mentioned, the Third Party men 0r tne Terceristas asserted that the ruling party, by intri-gues and prodigious promises of political reward, had made every reform demanded by the people a delusion. The numerous abuses on the part of the ruling party, said the Terceristas, were the ~auses which impelled them "to pbtll the weed up by their roots and forever t0 'break with. the party that has been recalcitrant to its trust." 3 In view of these, and many other abuses, the Tereeristas, after a general convention assembled on April 2, 1914, set up a platform which they claimed to have the forvent support of the l?eople, on the basis 0f liberty, democracy and progress. The document advocated the Initiative, referendum and recall so as to put into th.e hands of the people the power to dfrect occasionaMy national politics and to remove from office 2 Ibid.; Cf. Montano D. Nazario, "Philippine Political Parties, 1900-1936," T'he Ph' lip,pine Herald . Year Book, September 23, 1933. I TM Manila Tin1es, .Apr,il 3, 1914.,

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLI'J!ICAL PARTIES

such functionaries as had eeased to deserve the people's conffi.dence ;4 to abolish all forms of autocratic tutelage; a nd to establish mercaJli1tile and industrial h1dewendence i t0 open new markets for Philippine prnducts, and to protect -commerce, trade and agriculture. It also expressed the necessity of simplifying the ~xisting syst em of administrati0n, of giviRg greater a1J1thority to J!)rovincial governors, and of strengthening courts of justice so as t@ make them independent of politics and, most important of all, the attainment of political indeper;idence guaranteed by the most secure of gaarantees. 5 This document was signed by Teodore Sandiko and thirteen other prominent Filipino figures. 6 The party was thus on Apri,l 2, 1914, enteri,n g the a rena of politics. The Tagalog newspaper, Cons0lidacion, under the editorship of Pedro Gil, was perhaps the only organ that it J!)Ossessed. 7 The founding of the new ]!)ar ty in opposition t o the Nacionalistas was, indeed, a hapn event to fhe Partido Progresista, since the latter, from the beginning, had never been strong en0ugh to hold the rnling Jl)arty in 4 According to C onsolidacion, the measures were introduced with an immediate purpose of extirpating the Osmeiia oligarchy. See The Ma11ila T imes, May 29, 1916. 5 Ibid ., April 3, 1914. El Comercio, March 21, 1914. Tl\e programme was better presented - in The Manila Times, June 3, 1916. 6 Other sponsors of the Partido Democrata N acional were as follows : Crescencio V. Masigan, formerly delegate from Cagayan, was expelled from the third Assembly by the Osmeiia majority; GeneFal Juan 'c ailles, onee leader of revolutionary troops in Laguna and Cavite, who capitulated to General Summer and was appointed governor of 1.aguna by GovernorGeneral Taft; General Emiliano Riego de Dios; General F. Makabulus; Arsenio Cruz Herrera, who g ained prominence under the administration of Luke E. Wright, and later represented the province of Rizal in the Assembly; AHonso E. Mendoza, a budding young !Manila lawyer; Hug@ Sansano, delegate for Pangasinan ; Domingo Diaz, delegate for Ambos Camarines; Bernardo de! Mundo, delegate for Tayabas J Marcelo Cariaga!, delegate for Batangas ; Silverio Cecilio, delegate for Ambos Camarines, and Luis "M;orales, delegate for Tarlac. See The Manila Times, Apdl 3,- 1914. Cf. Co 11missio11 f 9urMI, Third Phili1>pine Legislatur-e, 2nd Sess., p, 11.

POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE HARRISON ADMTN.

cheek. Was there any other reason for the two minority groups to be allies? In answering this question, let us, for a moment, consider whether the p0licies respecti.vely advocated by them could be compatible. We have noted that the Te1·ceristas, on the issue of independence, were evea more radical than the Nacionalistas. 8 The Progresistas, though a t the outset favoring ultimate independence, were, in 1911, revi sing, and in the extraordinary convention of February 11, 1914, J"estating, their programme in the form of a resolution, urging the ,Congress of the United Sta tes to declare definitely the granting of independence for the Philippines, conserving the proper time and the integrity of its actual territory. They wanted independence with the · status of a protectorate under the United States "until the Filipino people acquire the necessary means to repel any foreign aggression." 9 0bvi<'msly enoaglii, both Prog1tesistas and Terceristas were in common agreement in voicing the desire of attaining irndependence, and in asking for some sort of guarantee. Roth were opposed not only to the majority party, but to Governor-Gene ral Harrison as well. The con.stant and exclusive consultation of the chief executive with tliie majority leacler Osmefia was, in fact, the most objectionable feature of the new regime. The common attacks on the government naturally brnught tliie Progresistas an.d Tereeristas closer together. There was some talk of a possible fusion, which they did not achieve until after the general election of 1916. We incl'icated ia tne preceding chapter that the Partido Progresista had never been a growing force in Philippine · C:t,. !Report of Govemor-Ge11eral, 1916, p. 285. The Ma11ila 'Fimes, April 25, 1917. 9 The resolution was ~igned by Manuel Bernabe, Secretary of the party. A text of it ma?f be found in The Filipino People, July 24, 1914. For comments on it, see New York Times, February 14, 15, 1914. 7

100

DEVELQPMli:NT OF PHIUPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

politics. The disadvantage was its being the descendant of tlirn Federals who delilounced the ideal @f independence. It was perhaps this fact which was res,p onsible :for the Progresistas' later stand for immediate independence. They knew full well that the policy of the new administration cou1ld ,in no way foe a benefiit to tiqem. They still hoped, however, that the people, at least a portion of the conservative Filipinos, might, in considerililg the glorious Federals, rally to theil" suppott. 10 But it so happened that the result of tfile election was far from fulfilling this hope. Of the 90 assemblymen, including mine appointed by the Governor-General to represent the non-Christian provinces, .. 75 belonged 1to the Naci0nalistas, 7 to the Pr,0gresistas, 2 t0 the Terceristas or the Democratas Nacionales, and 6 to the indepen .. dents. Of the 32 provincial g0vernors elected, only 3 were Progresistas, 7 were indepero.demts, tme rest wer,:e all Nacionalistas. 11 TFiis was the result of t he June election in 1916. After the enactment of thÂˇe Jones Law, which we shall presently discuss, the Philippine Commission, as such, ceased to exist and. iF1 its place an elected Senate was created. Of the 22 senators chosen by 12 special election in October of that year, all but one were Nacionalistas. One of the two appointed seF1ators, representing the 111on-Christian prnvinces, was also affiliated with the Partido Nacionalista." The overwhelming . Nacionalista victories ~f both tlrre June a111d October dectioFls were a serious blow to the parties in opposition. Both the Progresistas and Terceristas were disheartened and saw little or no prospect of success ahead. Worst of all was the ' fact that The Manila Times, May 15, 1916. Report of Govemor-Genera.1, 1916, p. 109. The Maaila Times, June 5, 1916. Cf. The tables given in Forbes, op. cit., Vol. H, pp. 118-119. . 12 Vicente Singson Encarnacion, formerly chief of the Progresista Party. See Directorio Oficial de/ S enado y de la Camara de Representa,1tes (Manila, . . 1917), pp. 83-84. 18 The other appointed Se'nator declared himself independe 1l. 10 11

POLITICAL PART[Ji)S DURING THE HA:RRiSON ADMTN.

101

b@th Sa11<atik0 a11cl Sum1,1l0ng, leaclers of their respective groups, had failed even to be elected. "It was not a mere failure to get a large number of votes," commented The Manila Times, "it was a complete rout, an overwhelmingj defeat." 14 What should they do then? To continue as they were, woulcl mean that their follow ers, so@mer oi; la,t er, would be absorbed by the Partido Nacionalista. This would inevitably tend to produce th e result whieh neither of the minority parties could accept. Fro view of this difficulty, Sandiko and Smulong quickly agreed upon a fusion of their respective grnups. A meeting was called on Sunday evening, April 22, 1917, f@r tfae purpose of discussing the policy and the principles for which they must stand. They seemed to be in perfect ,accord on practically every point propos ed. As a result 0£ this meeting, _a new party was form ed under the ·name of Partidd Democrata. The word "Nacional", at the suggestion of the Progre-sistas, was not used in order t© distinguish the new party from the Partido Democrata Nacional,' 5 which was being incorporated into it. The new party was controlled by a Board of Directors, 0f whkh S-andiko was president, Ruperto Mon,tinola, first vice-president, and Dr. Joaquin Quintos, second vice-president. Gregorio Perfecto was elected 16 secretary an@ GuiiUermo F. Ruiz elected· treasurer. offering the was adopted they One of the first resolutions of their services to the Governor-Gene ral in the World War, amd. tfue seroding o,£ a cablegram to President Wilson notifying him of the new party's existence, and assuring him of its loyalty. 17 October 7, 1916. The Manila T<mes, April 24, 1917. 16 Other members of · the board were as follows: Pedro Gil, Alfonso Mendoza1 Antonio Montenegro, Geronimo Santiago, Eulogio Rodriguez, and Domingo Antonio. See Nazario, "Philippine Political Parties, 1900-1933," lac ., cit., p, 120. Maximo M. Kalaw, The Dev elopment of Plii/ippi11e Politics (Manila, 1926), p. 359. 17 The Manila 1'imes, April 24, 1917. 14

102

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

"1'he fortnation 0£ the n.ew ]Darty," as a comrnen.tator put it, "was an important event in the :history 0f the Islands." 18 It was necessary for the minority grou.ps to have so consolidated their strength, in order to form a powerful opposition party, which is indispensable in any fom1 of democratic govermnent. The Democratas now medared that they :had been mandated uy Providence to rule the cl.estinies of the people, to check the abuses and . to correct the mistakes of the ruling power. Some Filipi'no observers ex1»ressed the opinion that the American fashion of two-party system was not taking root in the Islancls. There was not much to be said about the Democratas' principles, which were practically the same as those of the old Partido Democrata Nacional. The arguments which they p11esented were, in the main, as mentio,n ed above, to lead the piresent government to the 01Dservance of a true democratic regime. It was. i'n this spirit that they held a meeting in Manila on August 25, 1917, to cl.raw up a platform which reads as follows: "We advocate the public discussion of all matters affecting the entire community, we ask for a greater and more direct partici]Dation @f the people i'n the administration of ou.r pu@lic affairs, we combat dual positions and functions and the encroachment of politics upon the bench. · We demand an absolute separation of powers in the three principal branches of government. We want clear and honest suffrage, true au.t©m.omy of 0ur local governments and preference in the -filling of public posts to members of veterans of the revolution. We support · the economic development of the country, the promotion of 0u agrieu.lture, commerce a:nd i,md1,1st ry. W:e cal1 for econ0my a:m.d the approval of productive laws. Fi'nally we are in favour 1s

Ibid.

POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE HARRISON ADMTN.

103

of the establishment of ainy institution which would assist in developing our natural resources, of the protection of our proletariat class, of the founding of pension houses and of obligatory insurance. Can the party in power set forth its form of conduct and point to the principles it advocates, as we have done? No." 19

The Enlarged Sphe1Âˇe of Party Activities After the Enactment of the Jones Law

Soon after the establishment of the Philippine Assembly as a co0rdinate law-making body with the Commission, the two became constant in conflict. The reason was quite obvious. The -Commission as the upper chamber was appointed and controlled by Americans, while the Assembly as the lower chamber, was entirely a Filipino-elected body. The . system) as we have said, often imterrupted the wheels of government. It was a sad experie1:1ce. Once, the two chambers were unable to agree upon a budget for three years (1910-1913). 20 In view of these difficulties it was decided that some form of wider aYtonomy Âˇm ust be granted. 21 As early as in March, 1~12, Congressman Jones of Virginia, in response to the pressing need, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill providing for qualified independence in 1913, and 'complete independence in 1921.22 But the Democratic Party, then in power, did not in general regard the bill with favour. Hence; there was in 1914 introduced into the House of 19 La Nacion, September 29, 1917. The text may also be found in The Manila Times, June 15, 1?18. S . Doc., No. 242, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 21. 20 _ 21 Cf. Message of the Governor-General to the Legislature, Commissiou 1 ournal, 3rd Legislature, 4th Sess., p. 11; N.ew York Times, October 16, 1916. 2~ H. R. 22143, 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess.

104

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITiCAL PAR'J'IES

Representative s another bill which <did not mention any fixed date for independence, but merely stated in its preamble that independence would be granted as soon as 23 a stable government could be established in the Islands. October on House the The bill, as sl!lch, was passed in 14, 1914, but was afterwards rejected by the Senate. When sentiment in s11pport of a more radical measure was aroused in 1916, Senator Clarke of Arkansas introduced an amendment, which was to grant Philippine independence in not less than two and not more than four years, provided, however, that the President might at his own discretion extend the time to one year more, and if he deemed necessary, the matter might then again 24 It is be submitted to Congress for consideration. by passed was bill surprising to note that the amended Clarke the After House. the in defeated but the Senate, amendment met its Waterloo, the Jones Bill of 1914, with some modification, was finally apprnved on Aug11st 29, 26 1916, as the Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act. The passage of the aforesaid act was of Âˇhistoric significance. It was the most remarkable charter ever grnnted to a subject people. It may be interesting to note here how the two conflicting parties in the Islands received this legi's lation. We . have seen that the Nacionalistas had from the outset been asking for immediate independence. To this end, they were willing even to put party lines aside in endorsing the Jones Bill of 1912, which was to give the Filipinos cwmplete iBdependence in 1921. Âˇ Patriotism was unprecedented ly aroused thr:oughout the Islands in support .of this measure which was considered the best solufi@n of the Philippine Ibid., 18459, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. S. 381, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. New York Times, January 26, 1916. 26 For the text see United States Statutes at E.arge, Vol. XXXIX, pt. I, Ch. 416. 'The same may be found in George Malcolm's The Co11stitutio11al Law of the Philippine Isla11ds (Manila, 1926), Appendix D. 23

POLI'il'ICAL PARTIES DURING THE HA1RRISON ADMTN.

105

l'>rol;ilems. 26 The Partido Nacionalista, by the previous elect ions, had unqualifiedly been entrusted with the task 0,£ bringing abol!lt immediate jndependence. The law which was "absent of a fixed date for the granting of independence," declared Mr. Quezon, "will prove to be but the deatn sentence of the Partido Nacionalista." 27 A similar warning was given by Mr. Amzi. B. Kelley, who stated that on account of the date being uncertain, "the Jones Bill wil1I prove to be but the death shroud 0f the Partido Nacionaltista and on account of our scarcity of public men trained in the arts of government this will be exceedingly unfortunate, for so sure as the night follows the day they will go down in de:fieat and a new party will come forth promising to fix the date of independence."~ 8 ' I;t was posi,ible, as th·e Nacionalistas argued, that the absence of a fixed date for independence in the Jones Law, w@l!lld -li>e the ca:use of serious political agitation and public disturbaFlce. 29 However, the warning was mrmdy a matter of strategy. The Nacionalistas were accused by the opposition of being responsible for the defoat of the Clarke amendment. The defeat, they held, was due to lack of 111terest and enthusiasm· on the part of the Nacionalista leaders.30 26 "Political development is retarded because the political parties will not be divided upon the real issues that confront the people until the independence question is settled. If Congress were to make known its intention progressively to increase the amount of self-government granted to the Filipinos until a status approaching that of Dominion rule were attained, the agitation for immediate independence would probably cease and the Filipino political parties could tur.n their attention to the pressing problems that confront the Islands." S. P. Duggan, "The Future of the Philippines," Foreigll A ffairs, <:>ctober, 1926. 27 Mis speech in the House of Representatives, Appendix to C 011g. R ecord, 63rd <Eong., 2nd Sess., p. 1289. 2s I,bid., p. 15845. 29 Ibid., p. 15843.

Tlac Ma11ila Times, May 6, 1916.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

106

The Jones Law, though not exactly what the

Nacionalistas expected, was nevertheless the best they co1:1ld

obtain

the

circumstances.

truth,

the

Nacionalistas were not without satisfactioa. 31 In his cable to Mr. Quezon, then Resident Commissie>mer at Washington, Mr. Osmefia, leader of the Partido Nacionalista, callecl the law a "rare success" and an accomplishment of which Âˇ -all the Naci0nalistas were J>roud. In the same message he declared: "The letter and spirit of the Jones Bill are so evident and so self-explanatory of the generosity of the American peeple, of their thoughtful purpose to do justice to the Filipino people and of their earnest adherence to the ideals of liberty of the founders of their Republic that there can be no room for <doubt as to the final fate of the Islands. The gl@ry of having secured such a remarkable step fuelc_m gs to you in a great part, aF1d I therefore consider myself extremely happy to be able to convey to yGu from the innermGst of my heart, im the name of the Philippine Assembly and of the people it represents my most sincere congratulations upon the passage of the Jones Bill." 32 This act was in reality a definite triumph for Quezon as well as for the Partido Naciona,lista. After years of campaign work for indeJ>endence at Washington, ~uezon came home iFJ. September, 1916, witbi the gler-y Q;f a conquering hero. :He clearly stated tliiat ''Tbie ~Gnes Bill is a: step toward the final solution 0ÂŁ the JPhidipJ!)iFie J,>rnb1em, but a:t the same time it is a definite achievement im mamy respects." 38 31 "The leaders of all the native parties are privately opposed to the Clarke amendment," New York Times, February 12, 1916. 32 Isabelo P. Caballero and M. de Gracia Concepcion, Q11ezon, The Story of a Natioti and Its Foremost Statesman (Manila, 1935), p. 151. ~a Ibid., p. 153.

POLITICAL PART1ES DURING THE HARRISON ADMTN.

107

We have commented briefly on the origin of the Jones Law and the attitudes taken by the Filipino political parties. We may now endeavour to observe the expanse of the -field in which the party might have operated under the system provided by the Jones Law. Since popular, g,011ernment is what a party makes it, one may safely assume that "the party system is as likely to influence the Constitution as is the Constitution to influence the party system," as Professor Charles E. Merriam says, "they both are different sides of the same thing." 84 Since the people in the Philippines under the Jones Law were not given the right of electing their insular executive, therefore, to estimate the sphere of party activities, we must first examine how much the Philippine legislature had been popularized, how much power it had been gram.ted, and above all, how effectively the par.ties had actually 01,erated within the conditions establis1ied. For convenience, we shall now proceed to see first, how the PhiEppine upper chamber had become Filipinized. Since the establishment of the Assembly in 1907, as we have previously noted, the Commission no longer combined the legislative and executive functions. It was now merely the second chamber of the insular legislature. Its members being appointees of the President of the United States with the consent of the Senate, the Filipino voters could in no way control them. The sad experience of the Commission's constant conflict with the majority party in the Assembly, had convinced President Wilson. In October, 1913, he appointed a maj0rity of Filipinos in the Commission in order to "put under the control of the native citizens of the archipelago the essem.tial instruments of their life, their local instramentalities of government, their schools, all the U

p. 86.

The Writtc11 Con~titutio" â&#x20AC;˘aud the U11written Attitude (New York, 1931),

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common interests of their communitie s, and so by counsel and experience set up a governmen t which all the world will see to be suitable to the people whose affairs are under their own control." 86 This action of President Wi•l son was very significant in itself. It not only placed the legislative responsibili ty on the shoulders of the Filipino people, but changed' in a large measure, the sentiment of the Commission. There was NO longer aFly serious decl!dfock between the two chambers but rather harmony, which allowed the wheels 0£ governmen t to move smoothly. 36 'Fhe truth was thcl!t those newly appointed to the Commission were either members of the majority party or else eoro.ciliatory with that party. The protective wal,l which the Commission had built up against the Assembly was forever broken down. · The native tnajority in it was in sympathy with tfue invading force of the Partido Nacionalista which already dominated the Assembly. Under the Jones Law, the Philippine Legislature was composed of two houses: the Senate, which replaced the Commission, and the House of Representat ives, which took the place of the Assembly. Members oif both houses were popularly elected, save the Senators and Representat ives who te]l),reseNtecl the prnvinces inhabited by the non-Christi an people. The non-elective Senators and Representat ives wer e apJ!>ointed h>y the Governor-G eneral without the consent of the Senate and without restrictions as to· residence. There were two appointed members in the Senate and nim: in the House 1His message to Congress, Co1,g. Recot:d, 63r-d Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. I, Forbes, op. cit., Vol. I.I, p. 109. 86 The Manila Times, October 16, 1916. 'Fhis is indicated by the fact that in 1914 the Philippine Assembly appr-oved 72 per cent. of the measures originated in the Commission as against 30 per eent. in 1913. One hundred and one measur-es were enaeted into law in 1914 as against 69, 86, and 50. in the thr-ee years immediately preceding. See Rttort of th, Philippine Commission, 1914, pp. 12-13. 85

p. 45.

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109

of Representatives. 87 The elective Senators served for a term of six years, ome half of them retiring triennially. The electi¥e Representatives were chosen for three years. 'Fhere were twemty-four members in the Senate and ninety in the House of Representatives. 88 The Philii;>pine Legislature, by the provisions of the lil.ew law, was in many resJ!lects powerful. Dean Maximo Kalaw is right when he said, "The Philippine Government has becgme more of a government by legislature than any other government under the American flag." 89 The power @f a legis[ature, as of an executive, under a representative system, is, in effect, that of the majority party. In England, the power of the majority party in Parliament ( or rather the House of Commons) is obvioMsly mlilch greater tham its American counterpart in Congress. The recent' artifidal death of the N.R.A. was merely the result of the peculiar system of the American judicial review. 'This could never under any circumstances ha¥e nappemed in England, where the majority party, in a legal sense, could do everything, except make a man a woman and a woman a man, as Walter Bagehot once phrased it. In the Phiilippines, the Partido Nacionalista, as the record shows, had never, during the Harrison regime, failed or hesitated t0 utilize for party, as well as for publie purposes, the machiimery of govermi1ent that was imder its comtrol. Under the •J!lrovisi0ns of the Jones Law, the legislative control over the executive departments was n0 less significant. Under said law, the Philippine Legislature was given the power by appropriate legislati@n, to increase the number or abolish any 37 The United States Statutes at Large, Vol. XXXIX, pt. I, Chapter 416, Se~. 16. as lbiiJ., Sec. 17,. 89 Mai<imo M. Kalaw, Philippine Goveru1nmt Uuder the Jones Law (Manila,

1927), .P• 182.

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of the executive departments, or make such changes in the names and duties thereof as it may see fit, and to prosvicle foF the aJ!)po,i ntmeat and removal of the heads of the executive deJ3artments by the Governor-Gemeral. 40 The Nacionalista legislature did not wait long to make use of this power. In exercising its control over the executive depaFtments, the legislatuFe on November 8, 1916 enacted a law providing for six departments instead of four. These were the departments of Public Instruction, Fi,mance, }l!lstice, AgrieMhure and Natural Resources, Interi©r, and C@mrnerce and C@mmunicati©ns.41 "The use of this power," said Governor-General Harrison, "was the most important problem before the (legislative) b@dy." 42 'fo Filiji)inize the government services, two methods were used: first, by · statutory discrimination against foreigners to discourage them from occupying almost all of.fices that could be taken by the Filipinos themselves; second, by reducing salaries ©f the officials - al).d employees under the slogan of economy to further discourage foreigners from filling these positions. Students of Phili:p>pi'ne politics must remernlDer the famous legislation which required all the Secreta,ries, except the Secretary of :Public Instruction, who according to the Jones Law was also the Vice-GovernoF, to be citizens of the Phi[ippine Islandls and t@ liiave resided in the Islands eontimuously during the three years immeAgain, on. diately preceding their appointments. 43 December 14, 1917, a sp>ecific a:ct was li)assed to bring 40 The United States Stat1'tes at La.rge, Vol. XXXIX, pt. I, Chapter 416, Sec. 22. Cf. Francis B. Harrison, The Corner-Sto11 e of Philippiae Independence (New York, 1922), p. 202. 41 The old departments were the foterior, the Commerce and P0lice, the Finance and Justice, and the Public fostruction. Aet No. 2660 of the Philippine Legislature. See Revised Administrntive Code of the Phitippine lslai1ds of 1917 (Manila, 1926), p. 55. 42 Harrison, op. cit., p. 202. 4S Act No. 2666. See Revised Administrative Code of the Pl,ilippille Islands of 1917, Sec., 78.

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about a general reduction of the salaries of officials and employees on the basis of a Filipino personnel." It was essentially due t0 this nationalistic policy that the number of Americans in the insular service materially decreased. In the year of 1917, one thousand two hundred ar.J.d eighty-three Filipinos had received @riginal appointmeats. The Americans appointed from the United States were only 49, of whom 46 were teachers, 2 civil engineers and 1 veterinarian.4 6 In the !Year followillg, out of 1,829 original appointments as resuh of examination, only 14 or a little less than one per cet1t. were Americans, as compared with 32 in 1917 and 33 in 1916.46 It was not surprising that GovenorGeneral Harrison had, in his annual report to the War Del'Jartrnent iro. 1917, commented that " Filipinization 0f the service has proceeded more rapidly than was aaticipated." 47 AggressivÂˇely ero.ough, the Nationalist legislature, by an enactment of law had even required that "every appointment of the Governor-General except those of the appointive Senators and Re~resentatives, is subject to conformation by the Fm.ilippine Senate." 48 â&#x20AC;˘ This power of confirrnation _was obviously a vital force in the process of Filipinization. In fortherance of control over the

44 Report of the Governor-Gmeral of the PJ,ilippi,,e Isla,uls, 1917, p. 11, Act. No. 2668. For- the scale of salaries, see R evised Administrative Code of the Phi"lippine Islands of 1917, Sec. 265. Cf. Victoriano D. Diamonon, The Developnient of Self-Government i,, the Philippine Islands (Iowa City, 1920), p. 101. 46 Report of the Gove.rnor-General of the Philippine Islands, 1917, p. 11. 46 /'bid., 1918, p. 9. Cf. Harrison, op. cit., Ch. 6. The call of Amerieans to militar.y ser-vice might be of some effect. 47 Report of the Governor-General of the Philippifle Islands, 1917, p. 10. Cf. New York T imes, March 21, 26, 27, 1914. 48 Kalaw, Philippine Govemmmt U"der the Jo,.es Law, p. 38. Cf. Jones Law, Sec. 22. In suppor-ting tliis measure, Mr. \7:!uezon argued that "Were the GovernorGeneral of the Philippines to make his appointments without being subject to ~onfirmation by another branch of the government, he could easily equal the Czar of Russia." Ibid.

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execu1,tive, the Nationalist legislatme passed alilother law which provided that the Secretaries G>:f executive departments c01,d d be called up@n by either house of the legisla. ture to aNswer any question concerning their respective departments. When any secretary was called upon he was legally bound to appear for the aforesaid pmp0se. 49 Tais "elilcroacbm ent" uporo. the executiv e power had gone still further and required, by 1aw, that executive ofifi.cers, including the Governor-General, obtain the coNsent of the presiding officers of both houses of the legislature before performing certain functions. 50 Not only this, but the legislature on May 29, 1918, req_1,1ired, i,n like manner, th.e Secretary of War to 0btai,n th.e consent of . the presiding officers of both houses o:li the Philippine .Legislature respecting the terms on which certain bonds could be offered for sale. All these were for the pu.rpose of extendil.ilg self-government and of establishing the m ost effeetive party g@verro.me1ilt JDÂŽssi1Me. We have seen how the Nationalist legislature assumed control over the executive aFtd administrative officials. Its control, however, did not stop there. .A.s former Vice-Governor Ralston Hayden once said: " . . . the Nacionalista Party contrnlled th.e appointments, not only of executive ancl. aclimiro.istrative officials in the central government, bu.t of the judges of the courts of first instance and of all the justices of the peace throu.gh@ut the Archipâ&#x201A;Ź1ago. It likewise named the provincial fiscals, or prosecutil.ilg attorneys, wh@ long have ll>eeFJ: key mem iN Filipi'.m0 politics." 51 4 9 Appendix to Cong. Record, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 8850-8851. In -1919 Secretary of Finance Barretto was summoned before the House of Representatives to explain certain items in the budget. See The Manila Times, December 4, 1919. 50 Forbes, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 260. 51 Ralston Hayden, "The Philippines: An Experiment in 1l>emocracy," Atlantic Mo,ithly, March, 1926, pp. 403-417.

POLITICAL 1.?ART1ES DTffR:PN6 THE HARRISON ADMTN.

Tfu.e judkiail admi,nistration du,r ing the Harrison regime c;:a,_u sed numerous criiticisms. Since the Jones Law gave the legislature wide power particularly with n~g~d t<:> t1ie lower c.:@l!lrts @f t1ie ]slands, we can wel1 ' imagine tne possibilities for partisan influence which wen; 0pened a,J!). Twelve yeaFs ago Mr. D. R. Williams acC1:1sed t he Naci0nalista leaders Osmefia and Quezon of being dictators of "a-ppointments from auxiliary j,t:1sti0es ·@f the peace to SUJ!)reme justices. Every position in the service was card indexed, and distribution made aceording to standing in the party councils rather than fiitness for the particular employment." 62 The domination of the Partido Nacionalista was almost eomplete in every branch of the Philippine g0vernrnernt. Jit was so because of the aggressiveness of the Nacionalista leaders on one hand, and the liberal p@lky of G0ve-r n0r-General Harrison on the other. Had tne cnief e:x;ecutiv;e beea conservative in temperament, the story fr@m 1913 tq 1921 would have been different. Under tliie J0nes Law, tliiough t1ie Governo·r -General 62 ID. R. Williams, The U11ited States a11d the Philippines (New York, 1924), pp. [63-164.

"It became a practice of the Nacio11alista leaders to assign some particular judge in whom they had 'confidence' to try election-fraud cases in districts where the discretion of the Fegular incumbent was doubtful. Finally judge Bor,romeo, a Filipino o:£ chaFacter, refused to be used in this manner and studk to his post, his stand in the matter being sustained by the Philippine Supreme Court. The Philippine Legislature thereupon passed what is known as the 'Judiciary Lottery Law,' whereby at the end of every five years, judges drawing the same salary weFe required to exchange districts, the new assignment to be 'determined by lot', but in no ease to be that last occupied. 'Dhis Act was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court." Ibid., pp. 170-171. "The Legislature has passed laws tending to demoralise and introduce into the <Civil Service the infection of polities. For example, numerous exemptions from the requirements of the Civil Service and many provisions for tempo•ary employment." See R eport of the _ Special Mission to t/1e Philippines (Manila, 1!121), p. 13. The same text may be found in H. Doc. No. 325, 67:th Cong., 2nd Sess.

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61 was no longer a member of the Philippine Legislature, nevertheless, his power as chief executive was by no means weak. Section 21 0f t:he. said" law prnvid.ed that: "He shall have g eneral supervision a!'ld. control of all of the departments and bureaMs of the government in the Philippine Islands as far as is not irioonsi,steF1,t with the provisi@nis 0f this act, aF1d shall be commander-in-chie f of all locally created armed forces and militia. He is hereby · vested with the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit fines and :forfeitures, and veto any legislation enacted as herein provided." This pa~sage indicates full well that he could do as Governor-General of the f>hifippine Islands. With. the backing of the Washington Administration, which he usually had, he could kill every bill passed by the Philippine LegislatMre; he coMld co'llect taxes without annual approval of the legisl.atMre; he could make every criminal in the Islands a free man; he could in case of emergency declare a military dictat©rship; aad being responsible for the faithful executi0F1 of the laws 0f the Philippine Islands and of the Uaitecl States 0perative within t.he Philippine Islands, he could, if he deemed necessary, make every IDusiness man in the Islands al'l official. 54 But the fact is that political institMtion is oae thing and actual practice is quite an<i> tbier. Governor-General Harrison never did intend to be real ruler. H is avowed JDOliey was, in his own words, "t© give to the Filipino executives all possible opportunity to ex~rcise their own discretion, and even forced upon them responsibilities of

53 In his message to the Philippine Legislatur.e in October, 1916, G0vemorGeneral Harrison expressed that "it is with a feeling 0£ deep r.egr.et that I terminate my service as a legislator for the Philippines." For the text of the message, see The Manila T imes, October 16, 1916, or the Diario de Sesiot1es de la Camara de Representantes, Vol. X]j[, pp. 11-15. 64 Cf. Jones Law, Sec. 21.

POLITICAL PARTitES DURING THE HARRISON ADMTN.

115

de1sision amd action as frequently as possible." 66 The relatioro.ship between him and the Nacionalista leaders, as everyotae knew, was of a peculiar nature. He often .recognized Quezon as "King-maker," 66 and Osmefia his most responsible and confidential adviser. It was his custom to c0ns1:1lt freely, indeed, almost daily, with QuezoH aro.cl especialily with Osmefia, then Speaker of the House ancl leader of the Partido Nacionalista. They advised the Governor-General not only as to the qualifications of the Filipiro.os selected for appointment to office, but also as to general policies of administration. The Governor-General was almost in complete harmony wi,tb. the Nacionalista leaders. During his seven _years of a<ilmiHistratioH in the Islands, the Governor-General vetoed only five bills of the legislature. 67 Âˇ As we have said, the Governor-General undoubtedly intende<il to place large legislative power in the hands of the Filipiro.os. His American critics often thought of Tolm as a "p1,1ppet king" at the behest of Qu ezon and 0smefia, and of his acdministration as a series of "Roman orgies." 68 On acco1,1nt of his peculiar relationship with Harrison, op. cit., p. 209. "HaFdly twenty-four hours having elapsed since his disembarkation from the steamer, Govemor-General Harrison ascended the platform before a mixed audience of oveF 500 Americans and Filipinos and, with his arm around the neck of Manuel Quezon, the Filipino Commissioner to the United .States, ascribed to him full credit for his appointment by President Wilson to the office of Ciovernor-General." The Governor-General also made clear that his intention was "to substitute native help for American office holders in Government service just as rapidly as possible, and that it was the intention of the Democratic administration to grant full and complete independence to the Filipinos at no distant date." â&#x20AC;˘ This statement, as Mr. Robert Frothingham said, was like a bomb from an aeFoplane falling amid the later afternoon strollers on the crowded Luneta. Many of the Governor-General's listeners thought that he was "playing to the gallery." New York Times, November 10, 1915. 67 For the titles of the five bills, see Kalaw, Philippi11e Government Under the loues Law, p, 31. 6 8 Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p, 209 ; Williams, "General Wood and the Filipinos,'' World's Work, February, 192!1. 65

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tiqe Naei@IJ'l)(!J;lisfJa leaders, tTo.e Demoer:afJas 0u tne opr>ositio.UJ. party, c@mp1aineCif tFiat they ha.cl never been in any way oons1:1lted by tTo.e cfuief execati.ve. 'The abdicati@m. @f Jil0Wer h>y Gewern@r-G-em.era[ f.Iarris©m., aocorcling to t:n•e (l)l1)p0sitio,m. party, was a sn.ameftd negnect @11 duty w l)iich did great han®. to the Islancls and east a most deplorable stigma 1:1pom the h0m.©1:tr 0f tlhi:e gcrv,erm,ment tfuait he re]i>resented. 69 Tn.e Dem0cr&t(fl,S fo.r tiJ.itev acrnsed Gowernov-Generail Harris@m @<'£ lDeing a mere i,nstnmemt 01 the Partido Naci0nalista. l':he pardoniI'lg p@wer, as t:ro.ey said, had been Ji>ervevted for partisan pl!lrposes. 60 . Whether tn.ese chavges were trne o,r false, does rn0t c@neern us here. Nowever, a word ml!lst be added t@ t:he ef.fect that Mr. Harrisom, as a cl.en1<!lcrati.c G0vern0rGeneral whose IDOfoty was to gove,vrn with the a<llvi0e 0£ tfue maj0rity leaders, was ~l!l•ille iin li,me witfu tn.e clernocratic Ji>raicfke t b e world: @;ver. Hiis was an admiDis1:ration with a great vesj'lect fov a:1:11l0nomol!ls as wel1 as for party government.

The Council of 'State and P0;rty Leadership

Prior to t:he enforcement · o:li the Jones Law, Mv. Osmefia, as Speaker of the Assemfuly and hta:cl:er @f tfue J!>,artido Nacionalista, was c@nsfoierecl ro:ext im raak and im]'lortance to the G0,vernor-Gelileral. Me was iret@grni.z59 La Nacion, December 6, 1921; Will'iams, 1i'he United States and the ,PMlippines, p. 188. so "It happened, .. h0wever., that t ne numer0us c0md0tions v,ere o:£ the N acionalista party,, which, as indicated, d0minated the g0ver,qment. IR!esult, all of the persons thus convided through ex;pensi,ve c0urt pr.ocess, and whose punishment might have minimized fur.tl\er eleeti0n £rands, were par.d0ned by .:Wis Excellency, Govern0r-General !Harrison, , witnout nav.ing ser.vei:l a day of their prison sentenees." /bid., p. '165. An actual case that Mr. Mariano Manas, convkted "for embezzlement by tl\_e <r:ourt of First Instance 0f !i..aguna, was disqualified ii0r.e:ver, f.r.0m holding any publie office v,hile he was yet a Pr0gr.essi,ve. But n0 sooner did l\e aband0n this pasty and affiliated l\imselif with the N:acionalista 0r <Dsmeiia's party, then the Gover.nor-Gener.al immediate!:}" r.enabil'itated him, thus gi;ving him oppor.tunity t0 bec0me a pubtic funeti0nary." fFhe M.anila Times, ifune 23, '19'16.

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117

ed as tl:.ie highest inepr-,esenta tive and a,uthorized spokesrnaa of the Fiilipino pe0ple. As Governor- General Harrisoa said, "a decisi0n taken with his (Osmefia's ) approval was fairly sure to meet with the support of the Filipino official w@rld." 61 But with the passage of the Jones Law, difficulties soon arose. First, the chief executive under the mew law was too powerful. True, he could not appoint the secretaries of the executive departmen ts with0ut the eonsemt of the Philippine Senate. But as Maximo Kalaw said, thi's consent usually came as a matter of :form. 62 The result of this system would be, therefore, to reduce the secretaries of the executive del_i)airtments to mere agents of the Governor- General. As he was a foreigner and not appointed in any way by the Filipino people, this was contrary to the spirit of selfgovernmemt. Second,, under the new system, the legislature was composed of two houses, the Senate and the House 0ÂŁ Represent atives. Both were popularly elected. The difficulty laid in tl:.ie fact that neither the Senate nor the House of Represent atives alon_e could adequately represent the sentiment of the country. The Senate, under the presidency of Mr. Quezon, who had already acquired great imfluence, resented the -intervent ion of Speaker Osmefia, who although outside of its body gave responsibl e advice to the Governor- General upon executive nomination s. To this question, Mr. Osmefia replied that he advised the Governor- General on the executive nomimations Âˇnot in his eapacity as Speaker of the House but as leader of the party in power. The question, however, still remained unsettled. They were not as yet able to effect a unified arid . res)ilomsible leacle:rrshi)!) im the governme nt. The executive and legislative bodies still remained apart. The G0ver-n0r-General's cabinet eomposed of departmen t 61 62

Harrison, op. cit., p. 211: Kalaw, The Development of P/iilippfoe Politics, p. 374.

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secveta11ies couid not, in any efifeetive manner, respond to tae need. The :fact was that members of the legislature could not at th-e same time be members of the ÂŤabinet. Under these circumsta!rlces a0w coalcl the Nacionalista leaders make thie executive body more responsible to their controlled legislature? If the scope of selfgovernment was to be extended at all, this mast be clone, aHm a party lea<;lership outside of the legislative chambers must be firmly established. To do these, they felt that the important posts in the :Execative I>epartme!rlt should !De filled by responsible leaders. A movement was, therefon:, started even as early as in December, 1916, "to m ake the secretaryshiF> of the interior the position oi leadership of all tlrre three organs of government granted to thie Filipinos." 63 On the 22nd of that same month a eaucus of the Nacional1JSta mernfuers of the legislature was held and a resolutiem ad0ji>ted to thie effect that Mr. Osmefia should vacate the SJDeakership and join the cabinet as Secretary of the lntevi0r. 'f@ c;lo so, Mr. Osmefia as leader of the majority Ji)arty w@uld have, in a way, suffered a loss of Ji)ersonal prestige, 'for a Secretary 0f the Interior, like other Se<sretavies of the Cabinet, his dl!lties and powers were reguiatecl by the legislature @veF which he, if accepted the secretaryship>, could no fomger assume any effective control, except through party discipline. There w as, h@wever, some taLk of c@msidering the Secretary of the Intevior as J!>remier i,m the government, but jast how much power 0r discretion he mig1i.t be allowed to exevcise, no one coald tell. Moreover, Mr. Osrnefiia coald not ign0re tliie fact tihiat tlrre passage oi the J ones Law, wieh gave the Filipinos two elective cfuambe11s, was 00aplecJ. with a growing challenge t@ his leadevshi]) withi>n. as well as 63 H . Doc., No. 509, 67th Cong., 4th ÂŁess., pp. 24-25. Cf. Sergio Osmefia, ',he Constit1<tional Development of Philippine Autonomy (Manila, 1924), pp. 10 et seq.

POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE HARRISON ADMTN.

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without the Partido Nacionalista. The desire for a unified and undivided leadership, as voiced by the majority caucus, had also served to indicate clearly the rivalry between Osmefia and Quezon. It was at that time generally assumed that Mr. Osmefia would never consent to join the Cabinet, unless Mr.. Quezon, President of the Senate, also beearne a member of that body. Still, if Quez0n had j0ined the Cabiaet, he Âˇwould have had to play a role second to Osrnefia. Similarly, if Osmefia had gone to the Cabinet without Quezon, he would, in all probabiJi,ty, fear that QueZ<'m, as President of the Senate, might build a uncontrollable influence outside that body. 64 The issue was a real struggle for supremacy between Osmefia and Quezon, a political duel between the two leaders of the Partido Nacionalista. After giving full thought to this matter, Mr. Osmefia refused the Secretaryship of the Interior 65 offered him, since Mr. Quezon defiaitely preferred to remain outside the Cabinet. 'fhe ,struggle for supremacy was thus outwarcdly ended. 66 ,Thereupon, Mr. Osmefia on January 3, 1917, submitted t0 the caucus of the majority members of the legislature a long memorandum in which he stated that he was "entirely in accord with the_principle of a united and responsible leadership," but that under the "existing circumstances" he was of the opinion that the leadership should n0t be in the executive department. 67 As leader of the Partido Nacionalista, and a close student of constitutio-nal history, Osmefia finally found a solution to this problem. He proposed to Governor-General Tlie Manila Times Weekly, January 7, 1917. According to the Jones Law members of the legislature were not -allowed to take any position Greated by them. Therefore, no cabinet post was open to a member of Âˇ the legislature, _ except the Secretaryship of the Interior, whic~ was filled by Senator Palma after Osmeiia refused it. But subsequently all the eabinet posts, except the Secretaryship of the Public Instruction, if deemed necessary, could be filled by members of the legislature. 66 The Manila Times Weekly, January 7, 1917. 67 H. Doc., No. 509, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., pp. 24 et seq. 6'

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Harrison the plan of creating a counciJ of state, an extralegal body with which to bring about an effective policy of coordination. Thus he meant to establish !Dy party leadership "the center of gravity of Filipino participation in the government." 68 The Governor-Gei.eral V'{as ml!lch !JDleas~d with the suggestion brought before him. Aecorcdii.,gly, on Oetofuer 16, 1918, he issl!led an exeeative orqer which reads as foll 0ws: "A Council of State is hereby created to afol aml advise the Governorr-Gei.eral on matters of public importance, said Council to consist of such perscms as may be from time to time appointed and summoned by the Governor-General. There shall be a president and vice-president of the Coui.cil, the president exofficio being the, Governor-General amd the vicepresidei.t such member of the Coancil as may' be elected by the Couneil." 69 The Coui.cil of State s© createcl.70 was 1;:omposed of Speaker Osmefia od: the Mouse and Presiden,t Qttez©n of the Senate in addition to members of the Cabinet. Excepting the secretary of puh>lic instructi©n ( the vicegovernor), the latter were all appointed by the GovernorGeneral and theoretically they served at his will. The Governor-General was president of the Council, ex-officio, and Speaker Osmefia, upon the motion of Mr. Quezon, was unanimously electe<d its vice-president. As sach he became 0nce more uaiversally recognized as i.:es11><l> nsible Gsmelia, op. cit., p. 10. Cf~ NaFrison,_op. cit., pp. 2l0-2N. Governor-General's Exerntive Orders, 1918, No. 37. 70 In a sense, the Council was not a new creation. Ever since the establishI ment of civil government in the Islands, there had always been a group of Filipino leaders who served as advisers to the C1iovern0r-Generah For instance, during Governor-General Taft's administration, he was advised by three prominent Filipinos : Dr. Tavera, Messrs. Luzuriaga and LegaFda, the leaders of the only political party in existence-the Federal PaFty. The main difference was that these Federal leaders were not either directly or indirectly elected by the people. Cf. H. Doc., No. 509, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., p. 25. 68

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~21

lea,der 0:f the Fii~pinos and seeond man in government cirdes. 71 Since pFactically all the responsible leaders were membeFs @f tais Council, tile Cabinet was, therefore, almost completely c;rvershad0wed by it. The Council, like tlrn Cabinet, aefol weekly meetings in which more important matters were <discussed. The presence of both the [egislative an<d executive leaders in this Council gr,eatly contrihmte<d te the harmony of the component pa11ts of the government machinery. The peculiar exce1'lence of this arrangement placed all governing forces in a Tua,lanced union under the virtual control of Mr. Osmefia, wno was taen not only vice-president of the Council, S)!)eaker @f the predominant house of the legiislature, be1t also leader of the predominant party that captured 00th houses of the legislature. In these combirn~d pesitiC1rns, he served as the chief and responsible aaviser of the Gc;wernor-General who almost never governed, e:x;cept on tne aclvice of Osmefia. 72 The creation of tl1e Council of -State, as we have seen, was ofuviously Mr. Osmefia's way of effecting a unity of t1rn executive and legislative activities in order to estaMis'h a strong and responsible party -leadership in governlllilenrt:. ln his statement Mr. Osmefia related that: "It may not only av0id violent conflicts which rnig11J.t 0ccur between the executive and legislative b11anches 0f government, but to also enable tro.e people to fix the resp@nsibility for the conduct of administration of pufulic affairs. The Council of State has also the a<llvantage 0£ permitting the G0vernor-Genei:al t© l@0k te i,t for cou:nsel concerning local and interlilatii<;mal matters of v.ital importance to the country. 'fro.ere ca.:n be no CifUestio:n as to the usefulness of the 7! !Har.•ison, op cit., pp. 211-212. p. 6. Ibid., 1919, pp. 19-20. 72

Repor,t of the Governor-Ge11eral, 1918,

C.f. Kalaw, Philippine Government U,ider the Jo11es Law, pp. 30-31.

12-2

DEVELOPMENT OF PHFLH'PINlt POLITICAL FARTI-ES

Ccmncil @f Stat~, and the rnle which it plays im matters CG>l.'lcerning tme government gives t© the latter that Mnity 0f actioi;i wh,ich is at 0nce harmcmi@us, effective, and reS]i)Ol'lsible-an elernent so necessary al'ld essential to t1re regalar alild orderly cG>urse 0£ public aff airs.'' 78 'Fo use Go¥etrnQr-General Harrisolil's wor<!ls, "There is little doubt that what the Fili]llil.'los desired, was a res,poro.sihle ministry and a form of g@vernment ti~e ·that oif Canada, where the Govern@r-Genera[ is a mer e n.gt,trehead."74 T1lis was, of tmth, the idea ap@ru which Mr. Osrne:fia laid his great stress, for he tlu.ougnt that cafuinet rnsponsibility was, under tiiie circurnstanc-es, the only ]i)Ossible means of bringing abG>ut m@re complete autonomy. The J@mes Law, lu.@wever, did rn@t @pen a way for cafuinet governmeF1t. The life of t1le legislatMre was filxed at three years. [t coald n©t, in amy wi:se, die_ an early deatlu. or a late @ne. On the othet han<d, members Gf the Cabim.et could 111.ot :for tlu.e ti,rne be-ing be memfuers oif the legislatUFe. 75 Any exwressiern 0:li iack Qif c@nfii@'e111.ce or even the rejection of a Tuudget by the legislature w0uld not affect the resignation of the CalDiNet in t1i.e English sense. 76 With the creatio:Fl of the Cournci.11 0£ State t1Hm~ was a different story. 1'he Council, as alFeady n@ted, was composed of t1i.e rec@gnized execl!l_tive aml legislative leaders. Though the G@vernQt'-Genera,l was f>Fesicdent of tae Council, his positi:0111. was Father ti,tular irn character. 1i'he vice-presidelilt like tTo.e ]i)l'ernier was in Ji)FaJdice all 'is Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the :Philippines and the Haus~ Committee on Insular Affiairs (Washington, 1919), pp. 118-119. '!Fhe same, statement may be found in Cong. Recotrd, Appendix: to, 66th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 885L 74 Harrison, op. ci't., pp. 202-20$. 76 Supra, n, 65. 76 Malcolm, The Constitutional L-aw of the Jf'hiliP'fline Islands, p. 250. -Cr/,c Kalaw, Philippine Government Wnd'er the /J,ones !L{J,w, pp. 110-171.

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powerf1:1~ 'Fhe l'lersonality of Mr. Osmeiia also carried much weight. The Council was indeed the highest organ of the government. It was Osmeiia and Quezon who assumed control of it. · S~nce the two gentlemen were presiding officers 0:li their respective houses of the legislature, and at the sa•me time leamers of the party in power, tliJ.e relations 0etween the executive and the legislative bodies were then all very simple. It would not be too extreme to say that, through party discipline, both were to all intents and purposes one and the same thing. Although the Ccm mcil was not responsible to the legislature, it was strong;ly backem li>y the legislature. Those who controlled the legislature contrnlled the government. In a sense, this system could be regarded as an approximation to parliamentary governmen_t of the English type, in so far as that was possible under the Jones Law. We now see here, as we do elsewb.ere, that constitutional system even had li>een FaaicaUy moc;Jifiecl by party complexion.77 The Jones Law origfoally provided for the Filipinos a presidential :form of government, but it worked actually in the fashion of semi-cabinet responsibility. The initroduetioFI of a new budget system 78 had further put the iclea of "executive responsibility to parliamentary opi,ni0n" in good rep1:1te. Under the new system, the Co1mcil of State was eF1trusted with the task of preparing the 0udget, which if agreed upon in the Council must be presented, in -practice, by the Finance Sec-r etary to the legisla•tuve in person, and explained by him iF1 detail. 7n C;f. Report of Governor-General, 1919, pp. 19-20. Under the old system, there was no fixed responsibility for the preparation and submission of appropriation bills. Each bureau of th" government prepared its own estimates and sent the same to the legislature, through the executive secretary, without consideration of the needs of other bureaus. The executive secretary had neither power of revision nor of coordination about the budget. The result of this system was a costly bu~eaucraey and an unnecessary duplication in the work and activities of tho government. See ibid., p. 20. 78

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OH1e1.i depa11hnen,t setrefaries weve occasi0na1ly called hiefore 1ihe legislature., @r Cemmittees there0!li, to explain particuiar items. 79 UndeF this sys,tem. c,f g@v;ernrnent, if the ©J.!>li>@sitior,i pan,ty in tlil.e legislature was, hr any -chamoe,, powerfal en0ugh t0 effect a hostile act 0r· anytniFJ.g Uke a v01ie o:f flOFJ.-contidence against tlile gov:ernment, it was highly ~robable H1.at the Coumcil of Sta:te mi.gM be d hanged in <Wmpositiom. l'his was e¥em m@re true i£ the attitude o~ tlil.e legislature was st r0Rgly backed lily wublic semtiment. Ahholl'gh members @f the Outmcil were ted1.lil.lieally n0t .aewm1.table to the legislature, tlrreir obligatiem im a moral sense might cwmpel them to act as i!li they. were. 80 If this ever had happened in the !slangs, ]Darliarnemta11y or cabinet i:espomsible g@vernm@nt w0~1lG have been fairly well establishecd. The ©l')]!)Osirng pavty was, mowevev, t@© weak t© of.for an effective op]i>osition. They had omly eleven rnemhiers in the House and one i,n the Semate. 81 Wh@rn the a:rlDitrary rul@s of the House were fu eimg made, they had 'failed evem t© realize their sigro.ificance, and! did not v@iee a single protest against them. 'Fhe rules weFe veFy FJ.iluch to the 0pposition's disadvamtage, one @f them providimg that n0 interpellation cowl@ b@ made by a mem:b@r ©F grnl!lp of members, but must be made l!,y tbl.e H@use as a -wll!.@te. In other words, all inter]llellati@ms must be, Fl©t 0nly entered in order by the £peaker, ful!lt als© a[!i>.pr@vecl hy tl:'!.e House itself lDefore t1rey col!lfo} hie seNt rt© the executive secretaFy. 82 This was tamtam@NFJ:t t© a C©JiJ.1J.79 Ibid; Hearings Before the Senate f:om11,ittee on the Philippines and the House Committee on lllsular Affairs (Wasl'lingj:on, 19l9), pp. 118-119. Cf. Remarks of !Hon. Jaime C.. de Veyra, printed in Cong. 'Record, 06th €ong,, 1st Sess., p. 8851. 80 'Dhis view was held by Maxim0 Kalaw. See his PhiliUitie Governmmt Vnder the Jones Law, pp. 170-171. 81 S1ipra, pp. 94-95. 82 Maxim0 Kala,w, "The Rights of the @pp0siti00," 11he Manila Times. Aug. 7, 1918.

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plete denial of the Op]!>osition's right to an explanation of public policies. Moreover, the presiding officers of both houses had too great prerogatives. They were given, for instance, the power to name, in their r espective ho1:1ses, all chairmen of committees, to control the col.'lti111ge111t foncl.s, to aJ!l]!lOint members to w ork during recess of the legi.sla,tu,re, am,l to require, if necessa ry, the services of any other employee of the Philippine g@vermnent. 88 With the arbitrary rules and prerogafives of the presiding officers as weapons of the majority party, what chance then could the opposition have fo r activities in the legislature as the opposition? The extreme weakness of the Partido Democrata as the opposition and the unbroken domination of the Nacionalist(IjS servecl. to encourage Mr. Osmefia t o control further the government by concentra ting its powers in the Council of State. From 1919 to 1921, the Nacionalwta legislatl!l,re, 1:1ro.der the direction of Mr. Osrnefia, had cl.elegated to the Council many extraordinai;y powers, e.g., the power to intervene, by way of required approval, in the monopoly of rice; the issue of bonds for public works; the issue of temporary bank notes; and the cl.isbursement of public emergency funds; etc. 84 On reading a l,i st of these and similar powei;s delegated, 85 one would think the Council was almost omnipotent. This conc!;!ntration of powers caused much criticism, especially am@ng the Democratas. They maintained that the Council of State was nothing but a poli tical rnachiro.e of the Partido Nacionalista. It was .a mere crnati@n of the Governor-General by executive order and Âˇ 8S

Kalaw, Philippine Government U11der tlle l ones Law, pp. 140-141.

See Acts Nos. 2868, 2869 (1919); Act No. 2908 (1920); Act No. 2935 (1921) . 85

Forbes, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 264.

a26

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

001,1ild oe abolished in exactly the same way. 86 S1,1ch an extra-legal body could not oe j>U:stifie<ll in exercising·und11e control over the government. In reply to the criticism, the party in power held that the Council of State was merely an advisory body, and that the Governor-General h.ad the right to seek _advice from anybody he wished, especially £rom leaders of th.e lil1la:jcnrity );!arty. 1f so, replied the opposition, the Governor-General hacl too much power over the legislature. 87 This ce:mtroversy had helped much toward the understanding of the fundamental principles and difforences between the two opposing parties. The Democr,atas, om the basis of their platform adopted in 1917,88 had decidedly brought out two internal issues: First, the complete separation and independence of governmental powers. Second, the institutioF1 of the initiative, refereF1.dmm and recall. To the party in Ji)Ower, meither of these c@wld \;Je acceptable. To do the first was, in their opiF1ion, to . destroy the autonomous ( more complete) government which could be obtained only through unified leadership of government; to adopt the second, might in all p1.10bability cripple the intent 0£ their oojecticm to the first. 89 Upon the issue of independ.ence, as previously n0tecl, there was practically no line of dem.arcatioF1 to be <drawn between the Partido Nacionalista and the Partido Democrata, except that the latter beimg the opposition usually charged the former with abaro.doning the Inmediatista stand and ·unconditicil1ilaHy acceptimg tl.11e Jones Law. The op]!>ositi@n 0 11 the DemtHtratas i,n this respect, seemed little more radical tha:n the Report of the Governor-General (1920), p. 17; Harrison, op. cit., p. 213. Ibid. 88 Supra, pp. 66-67. 89 Kalaw, "Justice for the Opposition," The Manila Times, August 5, '1918; Kalaw, "Ideals of the Philippines,'.' Annals of the Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science (November, 1925), pp. 18-25. 86

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Nacionalistas. 90 Bu,t this difference was, however, of no real significance.

T'he Economic Crisis and the Nacionalista Regime

We Âˇhave seen that the Nacionalistas had been enjoying tke greatest c0nfideace 0f the people, and how successfal they had been in effecting a wider autonomy 0f government. However, these were but preliminaries. Knowing fa!il well that the economic factor was a necessaFy in,filiuenee l!lp@a tne state, the Nacionalista government had entered into certain lines of business usually left to the private initiative. In addition to the creation of a Public Utility Commission early in 1914, the Naeionalista g@vermment had, at the initiative of Governor-General Harrison, bought the Manila Railroad Comp,!ny in 1916 at the price of $4,000,000. The Governor-General in his message to the legislature highly adv@eate<d that the people of t1le Phili)ilpine Islands should 90 In 1918 at the end of the Great War, the question of Philippine independence once more became the subject of heated discussion. The two opposing parties offered two differe.n t plans for the solution of the independence question. The Partido I!Jemocrata preferred to present the qqestion directly at the Peace Conference, while the Partido Nacio,ialista was in favour of presenting the issue first to the lJnited States government. By concurrent resolution of November 7, 1918, the legislature created a Commission of Independence whose task was to consider and report to the legislature on the ways \Ind means of negotiating the independence of the Philippines, the external guarantees of that independence, and the organization of a constitutional and democr.atic internal government. The N acio,.alistas view of direct presentation of the question to the United States government prevailed, and on March 17, 1919, the legislature passed what is known as "The Declaration of Purposes," which officially stated the Filipino view of this vital question., Ibid., p. 18. For arguments of both sides, see Diario de Sesio,.es de la Camara de Represmta,ites, Vol. XIV, pp. 45-58. In principle, ?-S has already been mentioned, the two parties did not differ essentially, for the main article of faith of both was the advocacy of PhiJippine independence. A stor,y was told that Mr. Quezon, in June, 1919, was asked by an American senator, for, the difference between these parties, he gave a blunt definition of that difference to the discomfiture of Representative E. Tirona, leader of the Partido Democrata. See Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 226.

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own their greatest public utility. A railroad, for instance, he saicl, "is iro the very nature of things, a monopoly, and expe,r ience throughout the world affords cemvincirog arguments in favour of the ownership and control of such monopoly by the people th@mselves. Even if it be suggested that the management of a railroad company may perhaps be more profi.tabiy cor1dt1cted by private enterprise, which is by no means certain, corosidera tions of the highest ptt,blic poliÂŤy offset this. This railroad (Manila) discharges a public function; namely, the transportation of persons and of this function should be subject to the control of the public itself. The conduct ar1cl @i;>erntion of the Manila Railroad Comparoy enters, in one way or the other, into almost every detail of your economic growth, ar1d thus dii;ectly or indirectly affects and will continue indefinitely to af.fect the daily lives of the people of these Islands." 91 Since the purchase of 'the Manila Railroad, the government had launched moi;e widely i:roto business. H actually took under its management variot1s corporation enterprises, either as a majority stock owner or in possession of all the stock. The most conspicuous one.s were the Philippine Natior1al Bank, the Natioroa,l Develop92 From ment and the National Coal Companies. Governor-General Harnison's report we learned that: "All the cable and telegraph lines within the archipelago are ow:m.ed and OJ!)erate<d by the government as are also the Manila Metropolitan Water District, five Âˇ other water companies, three electric light companies, and aearly an the teleJDhone lines outside of Manila, the shipyard and marine railway 91 The Manila Times, January 11, 1916. For complete text see Diario de Sesiones de la Asamblea Filipina, Vol. XI, pp. 384-386. 92. Report of the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands (Manila, 1921), p. 23.

POLi'PlCA!.T;, p.A:,R TIES DURING 'PHE HARRISON ADMTN.

J29

at ]fa1gin~ers lsland, the arrastre plant on the piers, the insuilar ioe plant, many interisland and coastguai;<d steamers, aH the 1nunidpal piers, all the roads an<!li furi<dges i,rn tine lslamds, an<d the Bl!lreau of Supply, which <does tl;ie purchasing and furnishes the supplies :f0i; alll tfue Govern.meat entitles." 98 Wi.th all these eomrnei:cial enterprises, "the Philippine <Go;vsei;mmenit," as a Fiilipino scholar remarks, "is, relativ0Iy SJ.ileaking, 0me of the most socialistic governments in t ine worl<d." 94 So far as records show the e01:u1try hae been beaef.ited by the policy of government @waersh>ip as well as by tine great increase in price during the W @dd War. 'Fhe irosular wealth had thus evidently ~een i,nci:,eastid aro~ econ@mic life of the people improved. 95 Et was a j_i)erioc;l of unexa-mwled prosperity, as the ForbesW00d Rep0i;t im<illieated. Jt was under this :favo11rable condition that the gemeral eleeti@ns @f jJi1me, 1919, took J.illace. During the campaigra, the Nrwionalistas J.i)Ointed with pride to what they had aec0rn,pl,i sned in. tine government. They had i!>Fo11ght @ver a syrn.patlnetic Governor-Gen.era!, secured a wideF aiu-t0n@m@11,s law, and succeeded in Filipinizing the g0vemment sevvi1se, and above all, they had lifted the we0f)le frnm a valley of commercial dul,Iness to a height 0ÂŁ Tuusiness activity, etc. The opposition party on tne 0thei; 1rnnd, as us11al accused the Nacionalistas of being satisfil.e<d wi,t h the Jones Law which did not specify tl;ie da,t e 'li@r i,a<dependeace. In spite of the increase in g0;ve1:n.,m ent . ownersfu,i,p, the subject, however, hardly aJi!peared as am iss11e. 96 'fhe result of the general Report of, t/Je Governor-{;e,ieral, 1919, pp. 11-12. :f. P. :Apostol, "'Fhe Economic Policy of the Philippine Government," Studies i,i Soda/ Scimce, Vol. l, No. 1, p. 2. 9 5 See the statisties given in Report of the Special Missio" to t/Je Pl,ilippi"e lslanils (192,J), pp. 33-34; or The Natio,i, January 11, 1922, p. 51. 9 6 ~postol, "'};he Economic Policy of the Philippine Government," loc_ c.it., p. 32. 98 94

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dectioro.s was agail11 a:ro. O'lerwhelming victory f©r the

Nacionalistas, the party in power, for 35 out of 36 pro-

vincial governors, all but one member of the Senate, and 83 out of 90 seats in the H0use 0f Representative s, belonged to the Partido Nacionalista. The Partido Democruta secured only one member in the Senate, 4 in the House of Represero.tativ@s - and one provincial governor.97 The elections were orclerly and peaceful. There were, of course, some irregularities and violations of law, 98 but as Governor-Gen eral Harrison said, taking 99 the election as a whole, it was ereditable to the people. The election was h.ighly signifi.csant. First, it was the first election held under the enlarged suffrage provided by the Jones Law ;100 Second, it gave absolute approval for the adventlill"OMS enterprises of the Nacionalista government. Accordingly, celebrations were held in many quarters to celebrate the new victory of the party in power. But though the p(;)litical victory 97 The records show that there were 717,295 registered voters, of whom 672,122 or 92 per cent. of those registered, voted. For det<1iled data, see Report of the Governor-General (1919), p. 5; the Jetter of Jaime C. de Veyra, then Resident Commissioner from the Philippines, to New York Times, July 6, 1919 ; The Manila Times, June 4, 1919. 98 The main source of election frauds under the election law, was the requirement of preparing ballots by the inspectors 6f election for illiterate voters. These election officials, as General Wood commented, were often tools of the dominant parties. The part¥ in power, according to the same commentator, would thus intrench its position and make it very difficult for the people to dislodge it if they wanted to change. Report of the Special Missio11 to the Philippine Islands, 1921, p. 43. 99 Report of the Governor-Ge11eral (1919), p. 38. 100 "Every male person who is not a citizen or subject of a foreign power twenty-one years of age or over ( except insane and feeble-minded persons and those convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction of a g,rave offense after the thirteenth day of August, 1898~, who has been a resident of the Philippines for one year and of the municipality in which he had voted for six months next preceding the day of voting, and who can be included in · one of the following classes: (a) Those who under existing law are legal voters. and have exercised the right of suffrage. ~b) 'Fhose who own real property to the value of 500 pesos, or who annually pay 30 pesos or more of the established taxes. ( c) Those who are able to read and write either Spanish, English, or a native language." Sec. 15.

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had been gainem, the ees0nomic crisis was already on the way. The first sol!lrce of worry to the Nacionalista government in 1919 was the rice situation, perhaps the worst of its kind ever recorded in the Islands' history. The urgent need of rice in large quantities especia lly in the war afifected countries, coupled with the bad crop in Cochin-01ina and other Oriental rice producing countries, had resul,tea in the unprecedented rise in value of rice. In the Philippines, all necessary measures wer e taken by the Nacionalista government in a hope of helping the people in that rice emergency, w hich might in all prnbability cause ser ious public disturbances. 101 'Fhis situation haa inevitably forced the government to g0 even fo,r ther into business, along the lines of investing huge sum of money in the purchase of rice fo r sale to the publie. 102 .The dir ect effect of the " 1919 rice crisis" upon government finances caused great anxiety. On account of the smal1 quantity of rice imported into the Islands during the year, the government suffered a severe loss in import duties of PZ,504,656 as compared with those in 1918. 109 lt so hal')pened that the government which owned the Manila Railroad suffered a he~vy loss during the year 1919 due t o an unprecedented rainfall, resulting in disastrous flooas extending over a long period. 10' Because of these losses as well as the increased expenses of the government in its commercial and industrial aetivities, the expenditure for 1919 exceeded 'the revenue by P7,055,666. This led inevitably to an increase in vari@~s taxes. 106 101 "Second Annual Report of the Department of Commerce and Communications," incorporated in the R eport of the Govem or-General, 1919, See pp. 201 ct seq. 102 . Ibid., p. 202. 1os R eport of the Governor-General, 1919, pp. 15, 201-205. 104 Ibid., l'· 14. 106 f,biiJ., l'P• 14-15.

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DEVELOPMEN T OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

In the year 1920 came the darkest pages in the Islam.ds' ecom0mic history,. 'fhe gc;rvernment owned fuu.siness corporation s were practically all operatir,ig at a heavy loss. The worst of all was the failure of the Ph,iilippiae National Bank106 which lost appmx:imat ely $38,000,000.· This situation had badly ir,ivolved the Nacionalista government. The fact that the governmen t l.11ad not !been a0le to meet its obligations seriously impairnd its credit. After repeated requests from the Islamds, Cor,igress finally in 1921 exter,ided the debt limit of the Philippime go,v ernment from $15,00@,000 to $30,000,000 in otrder to ease the situation. 107 The causes of this crisis were ofuvious. In the first place, the Philippine National Bank, which heavily iro.vested governmen t furo.ds i.n su.gar cent.als aad @il mills, had lost a great deal due to the unforeseen close of the Great War, aro.d the sudden droJil ir,i if)rice of com.modi ties. In the second place, it was in some m.easu.re due to mismanage ment of the whole enterprises and the political interferemce by the party in power. Ctritics @f the governmen t had held the Nacionali.stas in contempt that too much politics were mixed with business ancl asserted that those placed in control were not chosen according to merh, but a<scordi,:ng to their stan€liro.g in For instance, President the Partido Nacionali.sta. Quezon of the Senate was also J!)resid<mt @:li the Manila Railroad Company; Mr. Dalmacio Costas, a prorninero.t Nacionalista, was direct@r of the Wational Coal Company; and Mr. Venancio Concepcion, another prorniro.ent Naqionali.sta, was appointed president of the Philippiro.e National Bartk:. ·'Fhe last named gentleman, tresignecl! iR 106 D. R. Williams, op. cit., pp. 150-160. For an exeellent aeo0unt of tge bank, see Prof. H . Parker Willis' article "The Philippine National Bank,'' The lour. of Pol. Econ., May, 1917, pp. 409-441. 107 Cong. Record, 67th Cong., 1st /,ess., pp. 3361-3364; Niew Yor,/i Times, June 27, 1921.

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133

i920, 108 was c0nvieted and semt to jail for making loans to corp@rations in which he himself had personal interests.109 Of ,course, this was a serious indictment against the Nacionalista regime. True to party practice, the Nacionalista leaders had never failed to keep party spirit alive through patronage as well as by any other possible meams. As a resufr of directing the government into business, they hacl extended the field of party activities on a large scale. It was generally known that the Nacionalista policy of government ownership. seemed to develop the natural res0urees of the ]slamls in the interests of the people. Political freedom, as Quezon once remarked, should be worked out side by sid·e with economic progress.no In other words, democracy without relative economic equality is a word without much meaning. Judging from this stamdpoint, the Nacionalista policy of government ownership was only a natural step 111 the realization o:fi their independence tenet. This survey of the period from 1913 to 1921 shows a marked increase in party activities. Heretofore, the object of party (majority) attack was in the most cases the Governor-General in the Commission · ( upper chamber). After 1913, the Democratic Administration at W a.shingt.on had a]Dpeinted a sympathetic GovernorGeneral and a Filipino majority in the Commission. Thu~, the traditional conflict closed, but the injection of politics into the administration began. The legislation 108 See his letter of resignation to Governor-General Harrison in The Manila Times, November 19, 1920. Cf. D. R. Williams, "General Wood and· the Filipinos,n World's Work February, 1924, p. 368; Kalaw, The Develop11r.ent of J>J,ilippine Politics, p. 406. l09 l'bid? The New York Times, June Zl, 1921. Cf. Apostol, "The Economic Folicy of the Philippine Government," loc. cit., pp. 51-53. HO Manuel L. Quezon and Camilo Osias, Governor-General Wood aud thL 'Filipino Cattse (Manila, 1924), p. 199.

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of this period definitdy indicated a rapid march of PhilipJDine nationalism.m It was also imterestirng to mote that tl!ie Derrwcratas who formerly supported the administration n<:>w changed side with the Nacionalistas against the administration. From 1916 orn we began to see more clearly in th @Philippin es how party and constitution had influenG@d each other. The Philippine government, as provided by the Jones Law, was definit ely presidentialÂˇ in form, but through party politics it becarori.e a semi-cabimet government in practice. On the other hand, the same law which gave the Filipinos two elected chambers under two presiding officers, had badly shaken the unified leadership of the Partido Nacionalista. Had the Jones Law provided for a unicameral system instead, the question of leadership might have not arisen. Or, had there been a strong party in opposition, the struggle within the majority party itself might have been av0ided. But so weak was the Partido Democrata that it became unable to play any significant role as opposition. The most difficult problem faced by Speaker Osmefia, the leader of the majority party, was to manage the Qt:tezon faction within his own party rather than to deal with the opposition outside. 111

Cf. Rep ort of the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands (1921),

. pp, 43-44.

CHAPTER V POLITICAL PARTIES DURING Woon's ADMINISTRATION

The. Split of the Partido Nacionalista Over the Question of Leadership

A constantly growing political party with little or no check fr<Dm without is doomed, in all probability, to meet with trnuble from within. In the Philippines, as we have seen, the Partido Nacionalista ever since 1907 hac;l held an unbroken monopoly of political power. But its overlarge majority was its weakness. It is extremely interesting, as we shall note in this chapter, to see why a party wi,t h such a majority failed to hold itself together, and how the change of leadership came about. It was said that the rivalry between Osmefia and Quezon had already arisen as early as 1909, when Quezon was to be sent as resident commissioner to Washington. A biogr,apher of Quezon observed that: Âˇ " . . . when the Assembly convened in 1909, Quezon had the job in the bag. Wishing to maintain his supremacy in the political field, Osmefia naturally was opposed to sending his brilliant colleague tÂŠ the Unitec;l States-just in case Congress or the President might grant concessions, as they eventually did in 1913 and again in 1916. He foresaw the danger, and wanted his first lieutenant and p0tential arch-enemy at home where he could keep a watchful eye over him. 135

136

'FJEVELOP-ME'NT OF J"f.IILll?PINE POLITICAL PARTIES

"But astute Qaez@n had g@me ar@tmd to the varioas assemblymea and elil>listed tlrnk s-t:t]il]l)©rt. Whelil the matter cami;: up before the hcn.ise ilil il.909, Quezon was anaiaimous1y chosen one (!)f the two resident commissioners, This yvas J.!iis :ffi.Fst deviation from the wishes of the Jl)arty head, a mild fo FerUlillil.er of the famous bFeak elevelil yea,Fs later, wh€lil N€ finally cd.ethirnned Seifor Os,rnefi:a frnm polftical lea@eFship in the Philippim€s." 1 This account may be trne, but as far as records show, Ol'l.e may safely assert t1iat up to il.916, @r beforn the enforcement of the Jones Law, Osmefia' s leacle1:sluip in Pfuiilippine p0litics :hi.ad never been dis]!>ute<d. 2 We have :found that Quezolil, li>e:lior€ beifilg ci'los€n presfolent @f the Sefilate, often p~blicly recognized Os,meiiia as his political · saperior. Up@n one occasion he addFess.e d the America,n House of Re]llresentatives in the fo UowiliJ.,g w@Fcls: " . . . in SJ]>eakililg of t1iese lea<de11s ( of t1ie PTu,i lippines) I can not refrain fFOJ)))l mentioN,ililg ~y name the foremost of t1iem all, the Jl)aJtFiot ic, t.he imil,ustrious, the brilliafilt man to w1iorn more than to anyone else the Nacionalista lParty owes its suoeess, Speaker Osmefia of the Assem~1y." 3 After 1916, the relationsfui]l) hetweelil tfue two men, however, was differelilf. Bdir,ig presi<ilelilt @:ll td.1@ Selilat€, Qaezon immediately acdopted the 0J]>imi@l.il tb:iat liie sH@uld @utrank the speaker of the House of Re1,Drnsemtativ;es, @n the ground that he was :[llresident 0£ the higher cfuarnlber. :l!lil hrs addFess ©f ac<>e11>tance, llie S]!>©ke @& practically lil@thililg but the JDOJDMlar charaieteli alild: import ance of the Carlos Quirino, "@ttezon, Man of Destiny ~Manila, l.935), pp. 31-32. C'f,,. Ralston Hayden, "The United Sfates and the Philippines," Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. -Sci. Am1ah (Novembe•, l.925), pp. 38-39. 3 Cong. Record, 63rd Cong., 2nd £ess., p. 1289. 1

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137

Senate. 4 This was the germ of struggle for supremacy which later on split the party, The problem arose again im 1919, wnen the Council 0f State was discussing a possible g0vernment subsidy to an essential private industry. Upon this questi0n Quezon's opinion was in conflict with that of Osmefia. According to former Governor-General Harrison, then president of the Council, the majority opinion was clearly with Quezon. When the final motien was about to be put on the matter, Osmefia broke in with the statement that he would resign if the motion was carried contrary to his wishes. The meeting was, therefore, adjourned. 6 Osmefia's action was explained by his belief that a vote adverse to his expressed opinion wou1d mean Glestructi0n of his responsible leadership. In the year of 1920, the inability of the Nacionaiista government to prevent Congress from passing the Coastwise-Law which would reduce the Philippines to greater econemic dependence on the United States,6 and the Presidential elections which brought the Republican Party back into power, had, in some degree, added to the dissatisfaction of certain Nac,ionalistas as well as members of the oppositi0n. However, though there may have been ill-feeling between the two factions of the Partid,o 4 Diario de Sesio11es del S e11ado de Filipinas (1916), Vol. I, pp. 3-4. A stor-y was told that while Quezon was in Washington, he cabled Speaker Osmefia in 1916, to run for the Senate. Quezon believed that in the long run, the Senate w_ouid be the more influential body. But Speaker Osmeiia did not have the same opinion. He thought that the House must be the place for leadership, for members of the lower house have a shorter tenure of office, and therefore, are more accurate barometer of the country's sentiment. Cf. Maximo Kalaw, Philipp,,., Govemnie11t U11der tile loHes Law (Manila, 1927), pp. 319-320; Quirino, op. cit., p. 44. 6 Francis B. Harrison, The Cor11ersto11e of Philipp,,., IndependeHce (New York, 1922), pp. 214-215. 6 That law gave the President of the United States the authority to require the Cla<rying of all trades between the Philippines and the United States in American ships to the exclusion of any other ship. See S. 2681, H . R. 7195, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. Cf. Speaker Osmefia's speech in The M a11ila Times, July 21, 1920.

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N(l;cionwlista, the strnggle was all ttnder cover ttntil 1921. In that eventful year, the Judiciary Reorganization Bill, which was introduced and passed in tl,le Senate, became Âˇ an immediate cause of their first open clash. Th@ Senate under the presidency of Quezon was attempting to adjudicate by legislation, and to transfer judges from 0me district to another at the pleasure of the executive. The bill as formulated was, however, not viewed with favour by Speaker Osmefia and the majority. of the House of Representatives. In other words, the House was recommending that such control be placed in the bi.ands of the Supreme Court, which would serve in a democracy as " the guarantee of the minority" and "the protecting power of the whole government." 7 The Senate, through its president, declared that the people must have_faith in the men that made their laws, otherwise, it would be wrong to clamo1,1r for the extension of popular government. "If yott love to be ruled fuy mel!l appointed by a foreign sovereign power," continued Presid.e nt Quezon, "you tie yourselves to slavery." 8 This was an expression of lack of faith in the Supreme Court as it was constituted under the provisions of the Jones Âˇ Law.9 There were three Nacionalista conveations held almost successively from 1920 to 1921. The first, held in July, 1920, was called merely to voice a protest against the Coastwise Law which, as already noted, if put into practice would curtail the automomy of the Islands, and would impose an indirect tax UJ!>On tlu.e Fili]i>in0 Ji>e0ple without the consent of their legislature. ln his address before the convention, Mr. Osmefia, as president of the party, declared that: 7 8 9

Philippines Free Press, January 22, 1911, p. H. I bid., January 8, 1921. Secs. 26-27.

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139

"H this law is against the rights and interests 0f tlais c©.ttF)tFy and wiH kill 0uF independer,rce, it is but £tting and ti,m ely far the Gran Nacionalista Party to . c0me t0 the defense of the people. This party 11ias always st0od by the people, and despite the temptati@n 0f power and prestige, its stand r,emains u,nshakien, irt: remains faithhil to the people. "We are Toeing cha11ged with t>eing governmental. 'the foct is that we are g0vernmental and antigov.eFiilmeR,t al. 'N@ 0ne should forget that we once raised the banner 0f the opposition and fought hard t0 win our battles, and if we are in power, it is thrn11gh tlirn supreme will of the people. And we a.rn goi,n g t0 stay where we are tiJI the people decrees 0therwise. "We are govern~ental wh<m we support any measu,. e wfuich t0 our judgment will further the initerestis 0if tine pe@ple; we aFe anti-governmental when we fight arny measure which to our judgment - wiH fue detrimental t 0 the interests of the people. ".We held this conventi@n to ratify the ideas of OUF party. Oar )!)arty 11emains faithfal to the people t0day as it was t>e£ore." 10 'fhe ©@nven.ti0n showed n0 sign of internal dissension, though theFe was t Fou!Dle ahead. In January, 1921, am@ther eom-venti@n was hel<d. 'I'he relations between Osmefia amd Q1il!ez@n, <1111,Fjng that time, were, though stFaine<ll en011g;h t0 cause them to face each 0ther in a 11eal t>attle,, yet, as the- 1!'-hilJippines Free Press repo~ted, ii tiheFe were n0 b>rnken heads, the claws were sheathed and 0nly J!)Urrs were heard, and much to everyone's suFprise, the heral<decl' schism even devel0ped into a -regalar fowe feast with Q11ezon tel'li,mg how much he admiFed Osmef.ia an<d Osme:fia telliing how much he !.O

Tile Manila :J'imes, 1uly 21, 1,920.

Janua•y 29, 1921.

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DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

thought of Quezon. In his response to Chairmaa Palma's opening address, which touched upon the rumour of a pro0able division within the party, Quezon cledared in the convention that t1ie .old time rumour of division between the speaker and himself was a lie. He called the convention~s attention to the point that he did not aspire to t1ie position 0f Speaker ([)sme:fia as 1iead of the Partido Nacionalista; that ne did Bot have any ambition at all to hold any position of trust within the party. Following this remark, Osmefia told the convention that all he was at present he owed to the peop,le, who apparently had faith in him. He and Quezon instead of being enemies, were the best of friends, and would r,emain so. 12 Âˇ Obviously enough, Quezon and his :followers did not want, at this particular moment, to force separation from .the party. In the first place, he probably believed that the time was not yet ripe for his victory; a:FJ.<ll. in the second place, any dissension within the party in Ji)Ower would give a bad impression to the Wood-Forbes Mission, which was to investigate native conditions and to recommend whether the coumtry was ready ÂŁor imdepemdence. The coming of this famous commission had at that time, a great effect, indeed, upon the temporary truce not only am<mg the Nacionalistas themselves, but with the Democratas as well. 13 Philippines Free Press, January 29, 1921, p. 14. In view of the visit of the Wood-Forbes Mission, the Nacionalistas and Democratas both felt the need of pr.esent-ing a united front on the 12 13

question of independence. For the details discussed by leaders of both p_a rties, see letters between Sergio Osmefia and Emiliano Tirona in Tht' Matiila T imes, May 3, 1921. The memorials of both parties submitted to the said Mission read, in part, as follows : The Partido Nacionalista: "We believe that after its trip, the mission will have been convinced that the feelings of the Filipino _people are united now as in the days of the revolution, for the emancipation of the country. "It is needless to reproduce her.e the gr.ounds which the N acionalista Party has to insist on this petition. These grounds ar.e clear.ly specified in its original platform and in the decisions of its general conventions.

POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE WOOD ADMTN.

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In eoEsiclerati@n ÂŠf al:l these factors, Quezon allowed the coEve_ntioFl to encd in a great victory for Osmefia. The convention, after re-electing Osmefia as president and Quezo1'! as vice-president of the party, maintained that the head of the party must continue to be the respons~li>le leader i.n the government. At the same time, t1ie geFl,tiernan ili!!orn Cebu declared that he would never accept the office of presidency unless the office again carried with it that understanding. This decision was "We have affirmed and do affirm the capacity of the people for an independent life, not only in interior or domestic order but also in the international. We have affirmed and do affirm that since the glorious days of the revolution and during the long process of the test to which the people were and are subjected now, they have shown with deeds that they know how to make good use of freedom granted them, even in th~ most trying periods of their life. In this last test to which they aro now subjected since the approval of the Jones Law, with the responsibilitieâ&#x20AC;˘ placed practically in Filipino hands. We affirm that the entire people have shown that they possess that degree of self-control, abnegation and mature judgment and that knowledge in the exercise of their private and collec. tive duties, which are more than sufficient for the orderly practice in life and democracy in a free nation. "Finally, we affirm that the present conditions in the country conclusively show that the conditions imposed by the Jones Law as a prerequisite to independen~e, have been more than fulfilled, and we submit, therefore, with as much respect as confidence, that the time has come for America to redeem her pledge so solemnly given." See T1'e Ma11ila Times Weekly, September 11, 1921. The Partido Democrata: "I. To ask as is hereby asked of the Honorable Wood and Forbes that in sending their report to the President and Congress of the United States, t hey express that it is the desire and the aspiration of the Filipino people to live freely and independently; and Congress of the United States the immediate recognition of the political independence of the people of the Philippine Islands under such conditions as the representatives of the constituent Philippine Assembly which may be called for that purpose, and the representatives of the American people may agree upon and stipulate in the interest and mutual benefit of the Philippines and the United States. 2. To ask as is hereby asked the Honorable Wood and Forbes to negotiate with the President of the United States for the admittance in the coming international conference on disarmament, of the Philippine resident commissioners, so that in that meeting the interests of the Filipino people may be duly represented. 3. To ask as is hereby asked the Honorable Wood and Forbes to transmit to the President and Congress of the United States the feeling of gratitude 0ÂŁ the Filipino people toward the people of the United States for- thei, wor.k in the Philippines, which work the Democrata Party hopes will lead without failure to the r-e-establishment of the Philippine Republic." Ibid.

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DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

obviou,s ly far from satisfactory t0 Quezon and his :followers in the Senate. 14 The next question to he settled in the conveation was the adoption of a platform. As everyone was aware, the platform of the Partido Nacionalista at that time was the same old document drafted in 1907. 0ÂŁ necessity, th~ convention could not pass this without giving the matter adequate consideration. Upon this question, Quezon, as chairman of the platform committee, insisted that the program must be general, leaving the detailed measures for social and economic development of the Islands to be adopted durin-g the next convention. It was on this condition the Nacionaiista convention of early 1921, adopted the following platform: 1. "We sustain that the e0nditions required by the Jones Law for the granting of independence now exist. 2. "We ratify the organization of tlrre independence commission and approve the sending of missions to the United Sta:-tes to work for a more eordial and friendly relation with that country. 3. "We reiterate that we have in the Philippines an internal Âˇ government responsible to the people . . 4. "We consider that the passage of laws by the Congress of the United States which tend to infringe upon the J!_Owers grantem fuy her, through the Jones Law, to the Philippi'ne Legislature, as a step backward which should not in any way be committed. 5. "We consider an act improper and not conducive to goocl government for t1le exec1;1tive t(J) dis14 Cf. Maximo Kalaw, The Development of Philippine Politics (Manila, 1926) , p. 408; Quirino, op. cit., p . 48.

POUTICAI1 PA:'R'PI•ES DfJ,13,iNG THE WOOD ADMTN.

I I

, '

11egalid tfue wisfues @f t h e pe@ple expressed t hl'@ugh t fu €ir che>sem 11epresentatives. 6. "W € c0msi,li€r th€ retanling o.f t he gra ntimg 0£ P h>i,Hppip.e imdep€ndeE.ee as incom patible with tlirn nati@E.ai h@n@1: @f America beca use of her s0'1el'lrn wo11d to grant us that independence." 15 'ffue o@!'lveE.t i@n was acl!j01,1,rned with the r,eal issues 1,1rncl€ci,fod. 1i'he pla tfo rm_ tlms aclof)ted was incomplete airnd tl!i.€ <[Ues,t i@n of l€a<fo11ship actually umsettled. One c0ul<il. easily see n0w t1rn seri01,1s troubles tha t were waiting. W illem tifue frmdings of t he Wood-Forbes Mission li>€eam e kn@wn alil.d the NaGionalista convention was again i•n S€ssi@n late il'I. 1921, tTu.e pF€sident of the Sena te cdev•eFly seized the moment to l!>egin his vigorous attacks agai,n st tfue lea<!IeFsfu,ip @£ Sp€aker Osmefia. He charged tke fatter with toeing t @@ reactionary, ana with having ti@ero. rnsp@Rsifule fo11 d 1e depl@rable state of things during Marr.is0n's i.regime. 1 'fh e maje>r, issue, @ver whhd'1 the t wo factions battled, was w1rntl!ier @F R©t party lead€rship in government is a<!Ivisalole. Q1,1ez@lil a1nd his £@1'1€>wers in the Senate ma:in.tained t hat th.eFe w als no liJ.eed for party -leadership at t h.at tim€ in jfTu.e F hi-1,ip.p i,n e g @vernment. fo a press con£eFem.ee, the p11esicdent of the S <2nate declared that he was a1os0l,wtely 0pp0sed to pa rty leadershi,l'l i,fl governu,Hmt, becaJt,ise h e loeLi@ved t l!i.at "i,t is conducive to @ligai.re1hy or a1,1,t@crncy and there£0re is um.democratic. $0 <deep is my c@nvietion in this res,p ect ," he continued t © Fem adt, " that weFe l electecl! leade11 I wo1,1Jd just have t© t1,1,m ,it d@wm. flatly." 16 jiuclgiRg from this l'lremise, ,the [plres,i<il'tmt @£ t h e $e,m.ate uml@ulli tedly disliked the parl'iam emtary s;y.stem 0£ g@vemmel'l.t, whiela Jae so peculiarly 15

16 '

'143

Philippines Free Press, Februa,w 5, 1921, p. 27. T,l,e Ma,.ila Times, !lleeember, 18, 1921.

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DEV,E LOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

thought, would lead to umdemocratic practice. He was afraid that "if the powers were vested in a leader, be he the president or premier, he might bernme autocratic, and should they be placed in the hands of the legislative bodies, they would constitute an oJigarchy. Should a disagreement arise between the leader and the law-making bodies, the leader might be replaced by another or dissolve the parliament or a certain clique composed of powerfol rnem rnight from time to time decide upon different leaders, so that in either case, there would always be uncertainty and instability in the government." 17 Speaker Osmefia, on the other hand, took the view that any political organism, however small, should have a leader to direct its policy and affairs. This was, according to the speaker, particularly true of the Partido Nacionali.sta. He thought of party leadership i111 the government as absolutely necessary, though no law in the Islands, nor anywhere else so provided. In 1ii:s own words, the speaker declared: "We want to have such leadership in the government to serve as a connecting link between the different branches of the government avrnl the legislature and incidentally the people. Virtually T am de facto leader of the ruling party in the government at present. I have been tacitly considered as such. I want it now to be defined and put squarely tG> the people. Under the present condition, I am held responsible and even blamed for anything that happens or may happen in the government." 18 The difference im principle between Qutzom and Osmefia was increasingly acute. The one believed in the absolute necessity of a responsible leadership in the 17

Ibid.

ts Ibid.

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145

government, while the other flatly repudiated the idea. In his famous letteF to Speaker Osmeiia, the president of the Senate accused the former of being almost a kaiser in the government. He said: "Since the government of the Philippines was establishe<il by vi,rtl!le of the provisions of the Jones Law tlii.e meJ!lilbers 0£ bi@th houses of the legislature as we;JJ as the Nacionalista members of the cabinet permi,t ted that y0u control and direct legislation in our cou,F1try on 0ne hand, and the administration of public affairs on tfue other. It may be said that practically all measures which received your approval were transformed into laws and no law could be approved without your consent. The department secretaries, individually and collectively, guided their course of actiol!l under your inspiratiol!l, and l!l0tfui,n g that was agaiRst your opinion was eveF performed by tfuem. Recommendations on appoi,111tmeF1t by them to tfue Governor-General were made upon your colil.sent. Your veto in these cases was final and definite. The majority of the Senate with the exception of its president was not aware of these recommendations before they w·ere submitted to the G0vernor-General. However, it was pretended that each and everyone of these appointments was t© be confi,r rned by the Senate, as in fact they all were. "When. the pe@ple became aware of the situati0n., pufu1ict opini0n. c@ndemn.ed such procedure and the Nacionalista senators moved by the influence of tfuat opinion showed themselves hesitant more than ever in c0ntiRuing to tolerate it. I believe that I am n.ot revealin.g a secret if I add that even from some representatives protests were heard. At least the cries of consci<mce and of reason asserted them-

146

1)EVEL<5!PMEN'T OF' PHl'LIP-f!lNE POLITICAL PilRTIFJS

selves andl t he day came when lileitTo.er the disciplilile · 0f J!)arty spi:ri,t lll.or tTo.e str©lll,g boncds 0f c0rnJ!>alilimilsni]j) and. long friendshil) weF·e ('}Hugh to paci:fiy the Naeienalista sero.at@Fs who mecided t© act illl the fotu,r;e tmmeF tiile gui<iling J!)rinciw1e that, they bei,mg fae ones res]i>Olllsi1ble fue:fore the [li)e@:p>le for the acts of the Senate, i;liJ,ey w0Nid Fesist ev;ery att@,m[li)t om · . tne part 0:f an 01,1.tsideF to wrest fr@m them their legiislative :li1,1.,m:ctic;rns, as i,llJ. 1l'h e ease of a:pp0intmemts."'19 f(iJpcm receijDt of this 1etiter, SJ!)eaker Osrnefia immediately iss1,1.ed a lromg statement in wlilich l'l.e r,latly called tfue charges unfo1,1.nded. 20 The SJ!)eaker dearly ex]i>lai:ned tmat the role of a leadesF aad m@t llieesm rightly l!lrnclerstood by the opJ!>osition faction. A kacder, as tae sweaker remarked, was t0 dlireet lil.©t t @d0m,i rnate, t0 g;mime n@t t© dictate, t0 a:dsvise hut 1wt to corm:naNfil. Nis p0siti(i)n, as presid<mt 0f the Par,tido Naei<malista,, mad fueen mei;-ely that 0f united and resp·0 nsi1b1e diirecti@n oif the il.Wi!HqoiH tdements im the g0;yeFF1,r nent. 'Bo d@ @therwise, w0l!llcd nave been irncompati!Dle witn t1re der,r,10ci;atic forlilil @£ government. S]i>eak:er Osmefia fl!lrtbieli' stated Hilat his direction in the go-vernmo.eNt coul~ n@t Tue a:ills0i1,1.te rnctir arhitrary, since he I.Tui-rnself wais essen,tial'ly rew,Fesesntatirve in ca]i)acity. As St!H,h, he was e@msliamtly swTu9ect t© the control of the Partido Naei@rn&Zixsta wi.tlhim ar.r<d withMt the legislature on the one hancd, and t@ tfue ]i)W@l-ic Ol)lini@m @f the col!lnttry Ofl the 0t1i:er. M0re0veF, he, as vespom:s,iible leaser, lilcl!d t© fue c@nsistelilt ©lil au ©eeasi©FJ.S witfu the, free and law:iiutl ex;ercise @if p1,1.1Tulic fa,ro:ctions as pF®vi<ded fuy law. [n brief, fuis 1ea<lleFs-hiJll, as he c@ro.tiro.1,1.e<d t@exJ!)lain, aimed to co@rcd:i aate tTo:e clifJi@relillti l\),r:ancililes @£' the govermnelil,t in ©Feder to 0fuifai:n a um,i ted aro.d ef.mcieFlit! 19 The letter dated December 23, 1,921. For its f.ufl text see 1'he Manila Times, December 24, 1921. 20 Jibid., IDeeember 25, 1921.

POLITICAL PARTIES DURING THE WOOD ADMTN.

147

action. He dfol not clestroy the democratic organization, but tried to secu.Fe its existence by cooperation and not by dispersien, by OFder and not by anarchy. 21 In tbe midst ef the conflict over the question of leaclersfii:[!), SpeakeF Osmefia made a sensational move in the Hou.se o!li Representatives t0 abdicate the political preFogaitives, wbi.ieh had been heFetofore conferred upon him. His pro)!l@sal was to transfer these prerogatives to a committee, ancl to leave himself merely a presiding officer. In the couFse of his speech on this occasion, he ])Ointecl out that, he, as speaker of the house, had always recognized the right of even the humblest member to speak aFld Flever attempted to do otherwise. He said, in conclusion, that "we must strengthen our government and see to it that all sources of friction are done away with so that the machinery ·may run smoothly. We must arrange ou.r h@me. The dev,elopment we have attained is st1cbi. that i,t Fequ.i,Fes new changes without affecting the stabili,ty 0£ our gpvemment." 22 The speaker's resolution was very significant; in fact, it must be considered as a revolution in a sense similar to that in the American House of Representa~ives in 1911. Members of the majoFity and especially those of the minority were strongly in SU:[!>port of the speaker's resolution for readjustment of the House . .When Presiclent Quezon of the Senate was iaformed of Speaker Osmefia's Fes0lu.tion in the House, he quickly annoulilced that the fight was over, and that the theory of ©Fle man leadersh•ip had been abaFldoned. The president of the Seaate, f.@1'10wing the example 0f Speaker Osmefi.a, als0 gave ui;i his i;irerogatives in favour of a Senate committee si;iecially created. He further declared that we 21 22

Ibid'.

See his speech in Diario de Sesio11es de la Camara de Represeiita11tes ([921-1922), 'l'omo XVII, pp. 465-469. Cf. The Ma,.ila Times, December 20, 1921.

l!48

DEVEL0PM1ENT ©F f'HT'M~PINE P-@LITieM, :PA!RTliES

©@ulm Fl©w. att,<md t® die ii:msimtss @!ti leg,islati@a aFJ<d! the 1i)aramol!l1:1t questioro. @:f iFJdepeBcilero.©e. 23 £h1,t Speakerr Gsmefia, oro. the @ther 1iancd, isstrnd a statement that the :filgfut was n@t yet O'Ver. :F'he i;i11oposed rreadj11stmero.,t ia the f.li0l!lse hacd n@tl.ii,iag t® dlo with the @l!les,ti0ro. 0~ leadershi•Jl) in g@:verlillmeat. "The qwesti©n fuef©re us," sa,icd the speaker, "is simply 0ro.e of 0rgamiz;ati0ro.. 'fifue ]Diam rs t0 fi,ro.cl: S®11J.ile mo:earns wfuereli>y tf1,e iFiiijl)in@s in the g0vernmemt may harm@nize aetioa iro.. the :face o:ti circwmsifaro.ces S© that their aicttl!la1ii0n ma,y tl>e · effi.ci em t. " 24 H is imteresti,n g Ii© F10te tlb.at the (i)smef.ia-Qaez;0ro. eol.1ltroversy had actNally divided the legislatl!lre i,rnto twe> h@stile ca11l.ilps. The rnaJ0rity rnemfuers @if fl;ie M®ase were stFGngly &ehiNd their speaker as against tTu@se of the SeBate. The former mai.ntai,ro.ed that iii was esseIDtial amd alDsolutely necessary for NFliitecl a,et ion 0.f aH eiel.lN ents 0£ the Jl)arty in pi@wer that a resJ,>@ro.si1iJle leaciler shol!llcl be 11et:0gro.izecd. S@ strong was t fue a li"ititu<!le e>'t the iH@l!lse that it had, in s@rne measure, iro.,iilaero.ced the Sero.ate to give l!t•JD their tirst Ji>F®IiJ0siti@ro.. 'ili'fue lartter, i,ms jjead 0£ bei,n g @pposed to al.1ly lea<ilersil;ii]D in tfue g;@vernment, NOW rec@gmized the ro.eecl. for it. iEfo:weveir, the leadei.:-shi,pi they JilF©iposed was t0 h>e e@lleetive aro.d 1rnt lllIDi]Dersonal. They argued that tfue existence @f a single resporo.silhle leader in tfue gover,nmero.,t w0u·ld, in e@roseG!l!lenee, lead t!© the conceNtration 0f I.DOWeFs. liro. harlil1lony wi,t h the s;pirit 0£ cd!ernocraey, the leaders'hi]il sh011ld !De v,ested in _a b0<ity elected oy the JililaJj©liities of ooth how.ses i•Fl which all different elements o.f the rnling r>arty woulcd be ©l!l1ly represero.,t ed. 26 'The diffei.:-enee was great. 1fhe Ul.ili1

Ibid. /.bid. 'Fhe senators proposed that the body take over the leadership which was composed 0£ fou~ members of the Senate, four members of the House and the Nacio11alisla members of the cabinet. 1'he chairman of the body was to be designated at each meeting of it. The plan was flatly rejected by the House. :/Ibid. 2a 24 26

POLI'lll<t:AL PAR!l'I•ES f>lil•R ftN G T.HE WOOD AE>MTN.

149

personat.ism and C(i)llectivism were still extremely u1urecon.ciied. The Nacionalista convention, whose purpose was to settle the leadership question, was again adjournecl26 with0at tangifule result, except the approving of several prin.ci1ples 27 i,Fl ad<iLition t(i) the platform Tfue relmtions1i,i,p between t1ie previoasly adopte<d. speaker amcl tJhe jilresi<deFlt 0:fi tl1e Senate was increasingly straine<il, an.d n.otfuin.g ireailly rn1,1l<il stop a break. The lea<deirship @f $l')eaker Osmefia had now little or n@ effect in the l!l.p{iler chamh>er. During the latter part of October, 1921, the $en.ate was already bold enough, withol!l.t con.sulti,n.g $peakeir Osmefia, to appoint a committee to confer with the Governor-General on matters ©f a,ppointment. Again, on December 21, the Senate, eontrary to usual practice, failed to act upon the Hot1se app11opriation. bil1l oef©ire adjoNrning for t1ie Christmas holiday,s. 28 These tw0 incicde111ts were taken by Speaker Osmef.ia as a fin.ail c!Jiall,len.g,e 1io fu,is aat1I0rity as presideRt of tl'ie ll'wr.t"i!d@ /Niaeio,M lisfo,. 'ili'he S{ileaker, therel!l.,p@n, immediat0ly ten.dei;ed 1iis resignations frnm both 'the vicepresidency @f· t1ie C0ancil ©I State an.d the leadership of the Par,tido Nacionalista, on the same grouncl that as a result of a fundamental reform cartied out in the House of Representatives, 1ie had already cease<d to be not @nly the leader of the majoFity therein but also that of th~ party in.side or @l!ltsicle the government. 1n his letter to Presiden.,t Que21on @f the Senate, Speaker Osmefia On December 20, 1921. 'Fo grant gceater !Mal autonomy to provinces and municipalities; to revise the tar-iff and tlie sysfem of taocation in the OOslands; to p.rotect the inaependenoe of eivil ser-vice cutes ,from politfos and nepotism; and to guaFantee non-par.tisan nature ot ilie jutlidar,y. 1'he Manila Times, IIDecembeF 20, 1921. 28 'L'he president of the Senate declar.ed that the senators must have more time to study the appFopr-iation bill, but members of the House ei<plainetl that copies of the llill had long llefore been distributed to all membeFs of the legislature even before it was. tal<en up and approved by the House; if the Senate wanted to pass it immediately after its approval by the House, it could have done so. Ibid., December 23, 1921. 26

!1.50

1i>EVELOVMENll' ©F 'li'RffLI>PPl'NE PQUTl<CA'L P:ARrEIES

·cl'ecla1.1e~ ffua t a hholilgih b e fua <lt a h-eady 1.1 elim;p ,1is1rnd t:he fea iil.ersi.li,~ 0f mot h the .lllart y aaa t he g <!wermm<m t, · "tlile gl.iea t ,watlloversy @ver the p,r~mciwle tlilat t here sfuould be am@ng t fu e Nacfo!fl;aliJstas i,111 the govem.m en t a lil@ite@i aad resJ901\lsi10lle ieacle1.1 sifuip SID as to ke€p up the necessary rnhesi©m am@ng tfuem a1ijct their wo1.1 k may h>e ef.fective, relilila:fo;rs the isslile. The fu mclam,1e1iJ.tai <iJ!lilestiom r emains 11msettied a:m<ll on acc©t,m t of t h e itJJterests, lil©t @mly @ if the N0Jcionali slas l'l1ilt @£ t he w lil0le c@u,mt ry which wants to ins11,r e an a m wle ancl' ef.fective p,@ptillar i,ntervemti@ro. iin tTu.e g \)Vernment, itt sh01dcl !De s@lved iro. a complete and final £@rm." 29 The actioro. 0f Sp,eaker Osme:na was- ro.0 s11r pdse to a l.ilyone. He h ad, througlil all his ptil.b~ic Wfe, fueen · a champion of t h e system 0f a 11nitecl' a md r esp@nsible lea dership,. Once t lilat system was <destF@y@cl, he ao longer seeme@ to believe that t h e struggle for i,a dependeuioe <Wl!l.ld c@m e t @ a Sl!1.@cessft.tl 00.ro.dl!lsion. Wit h tears in h is eyes he said @n one 01.scasi0n that the (;J_l!tarrel would, iro. all prolDa b,i:liAry,, lit!lj])t l!liFe t h e party amd bring disaster fo the C©l!l•n try. 80 When the t w @ lliacti@rns weve Feady f©r a n J))t ttlie, t fue Nacionalista loyalists, in view of t fue 11mfiavol!lrable policy of the Repl!lfulicaa Admi,mistl.iation, a4'1 d tfue £ea, t hat the Democratas m igM take a<dvantage @f t he Jlll."esent <quarrel, im mediately starte<d a rn0vemeat for t fue selecti0ID. of a Col!rncil of Tem fuopi,ID.g t o ease the diffeveuces of the two iea <ders. 'ffue scfueme was CJIUickly agr ee& upon Toy both. The Gol!lncii was c0mp0seGI: @f m embers of h>oth h01:1ses @f t he legisiatt,w e, @1.!lt whea the SeID.ate's president f©l!l.nd tiha:t mernbe1.1s 0£ tne C01i1ncii wel.ie practically all Osrnefia's :foll@wers, he immediately 29 'fhe letter dated December 21, 1921. For its foll text see The Manila Times, December 22, 1921. ao Phi/ippines Free Press, IDecember 24, 1921, p. 3.

POM'.Pl<i:Â£ RAJIR'iPIES !1Dli1R'1!N.Cli '.P.f.liE WOOD ADMTiN.

t he

Philippines liree if.'ress, !Tanuar.i1 21, !.-922, p. 8.

i5l

tfue

il/52

DEVEL@i!'M!ENT OF :PH'J!UP:P1NE POLITICAL Ji>ARTI'EJS

returned to power, but I am sure that if tke qm~stion i's put squarely to the people as an iss1,1e iin the coming ~I.ectioas, tke vo,ters 0.£ tke olG!. g,enerati0A a:ro.€1 tl,i.e 33 young men of to-day will Sl!lJ!lJ!)Ort th@m." It was evident that a break i:ro. the Partido Nacionalista was natural a:ro.d ilil lil.O way av0idabl€. For n0 two lead@rs maintaining two whoily com.ifilicting principles could remain undivided. Obviously enough, the idea of forming a new party must have been well entertained. It was @n January 12, 1922, that a huge crow@of stud@nts, wh© tollowir-1g a speech of tne Senate president, sent their representatives to :meet their idol at his Pasay reside:ro.ce, wkere they discussed the formation 0f a new party. Tkis event \Vas foHowecl lDy a formal agreement of twelve senatoFs and sevelil. repi;esentatives who joined the secession movement. The news had practically thrown Speaker Osmefia alild his followers imto a panic. The speake·F, lwwev@r, did not like to see a break of the Partido NacioMlista. He was willing and showing every desire to offer Quezon the leadership of the party or amything else he and his followers wamted so lolilg as they remaii,a ed vyitf.iin the party; but Quezon obdurately went ahead with his original programme. 34 Thus, on February 17, that same year, the much-talked party klil.OWlil as the Partido Nacionalista-Colectivista was orgamized with Q11ez0n as president, Senator Arroyo as first vice-presidemt, and General Pantaleon del Rosario of Ceb1,1 as second vicepresident. 86 'It was at tkis time Quezon. Jilron.ounced 1iis famous motto that "My loyalty to my party ends wheFe :my 88· 84

The Manila T in.es, December 23, 1921. Nagedorn, op . cit., Vol. II, p. 411; Philippines Ft'ee Pness, !Februa,y

18, 1922, p. 8. 86 It was said that they had the support of some solid personalities like General Aguinaldo, Don Teodoro Yangeo, and Dr. Pardo de Tavera. See Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 213.

POLI1lle'AL PARTJJiJS D!JiRIN:G TH•E W@C>Ii> A®MTN.

~53

loyal,ty to my country 1,iegins."36 ln attacking the g;rand old Ji>arty, he <declaFe<li d1at "the Nacionalista Party is not t'he pe@Ji>le. We l;i~Iie-y;e iFI a government of 0pinioF1, a true g@veFnfil.eFlt by the ]i>eople by means of a voluntary ex]i>ression of the sovereign will of the people. We do not waF1t a g0veFmmelil,t that solves vital questions without the coa,F1t11y's kFlowle<d,ge 0£ h ow or wheFI the so1utioa was made." 87 This contention was extremely popular with the yoanger generation which was progressively incliF1ecl. In the SJ.ilirit 0£' their pr,oposed democracy, the NacionalisfJa-C0lectivistas iFI iFebniary, 1921, adopted the £©Bowing pla t 'liorm: 1. To establ~sh a government of law and principle, lmit m©t of meF1; 2. 'ifo eoRduet a g:0vern_melil,t by d,i scussion, and mot by secret "ca1J1c1J1s" or by imposition; 3. To ad0pt a policy of preparation in our national ancl international !He; 41. 'ifo maiF1,t ain Hie Eatiomal s@l,iclarit y of the peo]i>le and to Ji>reserve the natioEal integrity of the Filipino aFchipelago; S. To c0ncl1J1ct tke government ancl the people of the Phiili]i>pine ] slancls i,~ a steady progress aFl<ill g0od limffer afolFlg social, moral, economic, in· tellect1J1al, and poUtical lines; 6. T0 obtai,Fl a real amd, tme government of, re]i>FeseF1tative dem0cracy, against tyranny, oligar chy or a1J1tocracy. 88 In line with s01J1F1cl government, the formation of the new .J.ilarty, whi<>:1t e<emikl ]i>lay a,m effec tive -role of OJi>Ji>OSiti©E, was, ati aF1y 11a1ie, a great blessing fo tke eotmtry. It is worthy 0ii Fl@te that when the SJi>lit of the Partido !lbid., p. 215. \ Ibid, 8B Translation of the Spanish text £..om f'hilippi1'es Free Press, Feb, ua,y, 25, 1922, p. 29. .Cf. 11:aballeFo and Conce~cion, op. cit., pp. 215-216; W . Cameron Forbes, The Philippine Islands (Boston, 1928), Vol. N, p. 116. 86

154

DEVELOPMENT OF f!HIUPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

Nacionalista was under way, Vice-Governor Yeater foterestingly remarked that "there must be one single, responsible party in power which must meet with effective opposition to make it (the government) economic and efficient." He even: went so far as to sc1ggest that: "It is the muty @if the Filipino leacders to prncctre . a cleavage in thie Nacionalti,sta Party-a split be. tweeB conservative and liberal: the former led by Mr. Osmefia, with a following of the com.servative, property-holding elements in the population; and the latter by Mr. Quezon, with a following of the younger and more radical dements." 39 The split of the Nacional;istas, as previously referred to, was undoufutedly a natural result of their having too large a majority on one hand, and lack of strong 0pp.osition on the @ther. 40 The p0Htical marriage of Osmefia and Quezon was now sadly drssolvecal. The whole cou-r se was in fa~t determined by the law of nature, which knows no happy union of two ecqually strong personalities. Osmefia had unquestionably the stronger hold on the party leaders who disliked internal schism; while Quezon, who suffered an undeniable defeat within the party, had the support of the rising generation. To which one of the two favour would turn was, un.der the circumstances, to be deeided at the polls.

The Cabinet Crisis

Shortly 0ef0re an.d after the close of the Harrison regime, the question of leadership, which we have just discussed, dominated practically the whole political arena 89 'the statement was made in his speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in Manila. See Philippi1'es Free Press, October 22, 1931, p. 11. 40 Speaker Osmefia in his speech before the party convention in early 1922, declared that the threatened split in the party was not due to any fundamental differences but was inspired by intrigue on the part of the Democratas and other opposifionists. See Ibid., February 18, 1922, p. 8.

POLITICAL , PARTLES 'll>l:/lR:ltNG THIE WOGE> ADl'{ITN.

155

of the Isl'ancfa. Duiring this peri@d, that is before the general election.s of 1922, the Republican GovernorGemeira:I, Le@na:vd W@0d, though fueing notoriously a: strong-headed figure, had carefully kept himself aloof from the eontl7oversy. The atmosphere which he at first created in the gov.ernment at Manila in no way added to the suggestion of a su-bse<l}uem,t p@litieal strife. For the new chief executive, as his biographer clescribes, "was fond of the Fil1ipino people and they were fond @f him. The legislators lik€d him; even the leaders wfu0 foa:recl him a:rn;l 1,1esentecl his determination, admirecl him; Aguimalclo amd numerous others were his devoted friends. The meetings of the Council 0£ State were harmonious excef)t when the National Baink was u-ndler d,isc1,1ssi0ns." 41 We may safely assert that before the middle of 1922, General Wood as chief executive hacl never been in any serio1,1s quarrel with the Fi1lipino leaclers or politicos. The budget :li@F l~23 was aptJroved ·by tfu.e legislature practically as ·lile proposed it. ln short, the relationship betweem the G@vernor-Gemeral and the Filipino leaders was eviclemced, at fii.,r st, br a mut1,1al expression of wiUingness t0 e©operalle. 42 After the June electi@ns in 1922, the situation became somewhat di:f.ferent. Th.ere were in the field three contemd!ing tJartiies o.f appr@ocimately e(oJ_mal stnmg;th.. 43 'il"he Colectivistas, ha:d a smaH majority im the SeB.ate and a plurality in the House of Representatives, but had the Hagedorn, op, cit., Vol. ll, p. 425. Jliid., pp. 421, 425--426. 43 In the House of Representatives, according to the certificates of candidacy, 23 of those who were elected were C oleclivistas, 24 N acionalistas, 26 Democratas, and 10 Independents. After the ele~tion this was ch~nged to 33 Coleotivistas, 22 Nacio11alistas, and 25 Democratas. In the Senate the l.i:olectivistas had 14 members, the Nacionalistas 6, anti the Democ.-at~s 4. 'l'hefe weoe 685,000 votes cast out of total male voting population o, 2,061,000. See Repo,t of ihe Governor-General 1922 pp. 68-70 · Kalaw ' ' 329'. Philippine Government &nder the Jones Law, 41

156

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILI!PP1NE POLITICAL. PARTlES

Nacionalistas and the Democratas combined their forces, the Colectivistas would have been helpless. The latter, therefore, cou,ld not ge_t themselves fo,1t0 the saddle wit hout the co0peratfom of one 0f tl'ie otheF paFties. The subsequent developmen_ts, resulting from the elections, were extremely siglilificaHt in the Islamds' political lbâ&#x20AC;˘ist0ry. fo the fiFst JDlaiee, t1i.e i,mcPease<d ji)ÂŠwer <2Jt the Democratas formed t1i.e basis of Governor-General Wood's argument for a coalition cabinet, representing the three parties, 0n the gro1'1.nd that it was the mandate of t1i.e people as expressed fuy baiHot. On the otker hand, Quezon declared that since the Partido Colectivista was the largest of the three it must be given the right to form a cabinet without the participation of the Gthers. The difference was sharp. BMt the Go;,,,ernor-General, with the view of avoiding a rupture, finally yielded the 44 Ji>Oint to maintaining the balance of party govemment. ]in the second plaice, the eleeti0111 0f ~922 was a repudiation of Osmefia's long leadership. His decision to run for the Senate was not without significance. He might have assMmed that if his Ji>arty again wom the favour of the coumtry, he wotdd confinMe to h@ld his leadership as presi<ilent of the Sen.ate imstead of as speaker of the House. 46 Were this not the case, his action. then. could li>e explained as meFely a choice of retreat. However, since the electi0n. had sen.t li>oth Quezon and Osmefi.a to the Senate and because of the triumph of "Collectivism" over "Unipersonalism," the gentleman. fr@m CelDu, the SMji)reme leader sin.ce 1907, had to make way for his former lieutenant who now Cf. H agedorn, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 426 ; Philippines Free Press, October H 21, 1922, p. 16. i6 It was said that due to Quezon's tactics in carrying his fight into Osmeiia's own constituency, the latter's popularity suffered. In order to avoid the risk of a possible defeat, Osmefia decided to be a candidate for senatorship, as he was popular all over the province of Cebu. See Quirino, op. cit., p. 50.

l?OLIT111tA.J. 1 JJlARTI·ES E>liliRitNG. Ul!UE W:@0D AIDM<TN.

~57

46 Ro:x:as was bor,n in [apiz, 1892. Me necei;ved his LL.13. fr-om the Uni;vensity o'> the Philippines and w.as aclmitted to the 'Bar in 1915. /\f.ter. thnee yea,r,s as private seor,etany o:£ Oliief ff ustice (c:,.yelan9 .A:rellano o:£ the Philippine Supreme e;our-t, he began the practice of law in Manila' and at the same time was pnofessor, of tl\e Fhilippine !'caw School. He enter.ed public life in 1918 as a membeF o:£ the ;M!unieipal C1:oundl of his home town. A year later, he was elected governo• of the pro:,,ince o:£ Capiz. .A:s sucli he remained in sewke until 192i. f!:fi. 'Rhilip-pines F~ee P.-ess, Novemlier 4, 1922, p. 4; Direolorio (Xficial de la Camara de Represmtantes ~Manila, 1923'~, pp. 63-67.

158

DEVELOPM ENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

method ©f governme nt in the Islands was already defined in the Jones Law and would be continued without modification. He also said that the departme nt secretarie s were chosen oy the Governor- General to whom they must be respomsibile. He would, unde11 no circumsta nces, tolerate any considerat ion that the departmen t secretarie s were reSJil©nsible to the legislat.1.re. The American form of governme nt "would be adhered to," he added, "and the British root ad0>pted." 48 After this pronounce ment, the Governor- General immediate ly sent for President Que2lon and Speaker Roxas and told them that the de]i)artment secretarie s were members of his official family and that the Senate president should no longer think of calling them into . conferenc e without the Governor- General's knowledge . In this c@nnection we find General Wood entered in his Dia,ry4 9 the following account: "I said, 'Mr. Quezon, I un:derstan d th.at you intimated to the secretarie s that I had been guilty of eu,r taili,n g their rights and privileges ;' etc. a:n€1 so on. Mr. Quezon at once began to explain and protest, bat in suostance declared that he felt that the politics of the governme nt should be dictated by the legislature as embodiied in definite laws and Acts of that body. "I told him that the governorgeneral was sworn to carry out the laws, fuut laws were not generally referred to as embodyin g policies, and that the governorgeneral had a very iornportaat part t0 play in the policy." This was a note of sharp cdiscordance. But in outward appearanc e harmony still reigned. It might be explained that General W 00d was then considerin g 48

Hagedorn, o'f,. cit., Vol. II, pp. 421-422. November 9, 1922.

:PeJLLTICAL li'A!RTJ.U@ E>llTRLNG, fJlH!E WOOD AIDMTN.

159

Fet11,rn.ing home to ass11me the presidency of Petmsylvan.i a Un~veFsi,ty; this, tl:iere'fon:1 e, led Q11ez0n. mnd his associates to bel,ieve that tliJ.e general's rule would be brief. Why not let him carry home aN the good will possible? In view 0ÂŁ this policy tihe sudden decision @f the general t0 remain in the Islands acted as a bomb in the silence of the Filipi1J;J.@ ]il@li,tieail ci,r cle. 1'he attit11de of the native politie0s changed. 60 'Ji'he Governor-Ge neral apparently felt t1iat l:i,is,- was a iinission of rehabilitation . There were eleven milii@n people under a government which was t0 stabi,lize the econo~nic life of the com1try. In other words, the G0vernor-Ge neral's prerogatives , whid1 had been surrendered by his predecessor, must be rest0red, am;l tl:ie ins1.dar g0.vernment must be drawn 011,t of busifless, in true Republican fashion .. iil.ll. J11 ly, ]923, there came a seri011s clash between the Gov,ernor-Ge neral amd the Fi Lipino leaders over the famous C@nley Case. As the story runs, Roy Conley, an Americam &mpl@yec.J! @n the Maniila police force, incurred the enmity- of certain prominent politicos, and, a:s a result, ;vari011s charges were bFomgliJ..t against miim. The Governor-Ge neral, at the req11est of the mayor and the secretary of interi0r, suspended Conley frnm serviee. 'Tfue d1aFges we11e then ifiile<d in tlile court, which after a prolonged trial, :found tha,t the charges were not sustainecl ancl dismissec.J! 1ikem. iIB11,t l.ll.Ot l@ng afaerwaFd similar charges were again bro11gltt against Conley, and the sarne -couFt, 0n rn@tioa @f the pi;0see11ting att0rney, agai,n dismiâ&#x20AC;˘s sed the case. 'TTue mayor and the secretary then went to General Wood demanding that they be allowed rli0 14@1C!t ai hearil.ll.g on tliJ.e G0nley case dfrectily. Th,is was refosed. The Govem@r-General, however, promised to order ain admin,i strative investigati@n, 1:lie fes1,1lt @f wlaich was a i:ecommenda tion that Conley liie reinstated. When the rec0mni.enmati@n was referrem to the secretary 0:E 1

Plagedom, op. cit., Vol. H, pp. 422-425.

160

IYEVELC!PMENT OF PHILIPPINE Pe.>LITICAL PARTIES

the i,mteJJi@r with an instrncti@a t @ carrry it into effect, the secrnta11y referrecd tme rnaHer 'fi<D the may0r, theR resigned. Siiilililarly, the mayor sabmiHed his resignati@n, in :(ilrotest, upon receipt of the instructions from the secretary of the interior. Finally, Conley, was reinstated U:[i)On the orcl.er o:fi tfu.e G@vernor-GeHernl and was Jilermittecd to Feti:re frnrn duty at lii.,is own Fe<iJ.uest. 61 'fhe Filipin0 politicos felt that the G0vemor-Generai had arbitrarily intervened in a rnatter 0f purely domestic nature. In protest, Quezon called on General Wood and pointed 01i1t that the latter had eneroached upon the authority of the legislature to whieh alone the departmeFlt secretaries were reSâ&#x20AC;˘:(il@nsible. iilil a fou,r fu0ur conference with the Governor-General on the veranda of MalacanaHg, Quezon contendecl that nothing but the doctrine of the subservience of the executive branch to the legislature was proper. 62 In other words, the Senate :(ilresident resentecl. G0vernor-General Wood's overria,i ng the secretaries, violating the law, aHC!l geme,r ai11ly rnr,ini111g wild in the departments. On the otker fu.and, GovernorGeneral Wood began his argument with the statement that: "the great difficulty was that he (Ql!l.ezon) was tJJying to exercise authority whicm was n@t vested i~ him; iFl other words, he was tJJying t0 assume eontrol of the government; that he was oonstaNtly S'P)UJJred on by men who were appealing to him, appealing to his vani_ty, asking :fior his assistaNce, and he was listening to unfounded c0rnplaints, making declaraReport of the Governor-Gmerdl, 1923, pp. 38-40. While the conference was on, one of General Wood's aides, Gordon Johnston, asked: "Mr. Quezon, are you talking about Conley or are you talking about parliamentary government?" "I don't give a God-damn about Conley." "I thought not. Then you are just wasting the gene,alls time and your own. You know as well as I that the gene,al can't change the form of government of the Philippines. We are all operating under the Jones Law. H you want to change that law, the place for you to go is the Congress of the United State~." Hagedorn, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 429. 61

lbid., pp. 4~'1,=432.

!li62

DEV:E'LOPM'EN'I! ©F- PH•Il1,IPPJJN•E POLITlC½!L 'li'ARTIES

step and Cl!lrtailment 0f Fili~inei auton0my guaranteed by the Organic Aet amd enj0y,ed by th@ Filipino people O@l!ltinm>Usly since tfue operatim'l 0:fi tlire Jomes Law." For these reasons, they foum<!l themselves unable to assume any resJ_Donsibility while the Governor-General imsisted upon hrs depi0rahle J.D0ii~y. 64 In re]!>ly, the Governor-G@neral stated most emphatically that the resignation en masse was obvi@usly "an organized preconcerted attack by the Filipino secretaries 0£ departmemts ·and! legi,sfative members of t.h e council of state upon the authority of the GovernorGeneral under the organic act and as the representative of the sovereign power ~ of the United States." He stated that the charges by tifue Filipino 1eaders were statements withol!lt the slightest foulildation, and that the issues raised by them were UFJ.st1pported by evidence 66 al!ld unworthy of the attemtion 0£ serious-minded people. Much to the sl!lrJ_Drise of tae Fir!i,p ino lea,~ers tfuei,r resignation was accepted by ·the Governor-Gemeral. The political excitement which ensued was unprecedented in the Islands' history. As the presemt writer sees it, however, an explanation of the whole controversy falls under three categories: First, there was obviously a conflicting interpretation of the Jones Law, if mot a contradiction withirn the ]aw itself 0,r , m0re JDroperly, between the preamble and the body of the law. On the Filipino side, it was deemed that the organic act should lie construed as a document to give the country the largest possifule rneasl!l.Fe of a11tonomy. General Wood, on the other hand, took a strict interpretation of the law 64 The letter, dated July 17, 1923, was signed by President Quezon of the Senate; Speaker Roxas of the !House; Jose !P. Laurel, sectetary of the interior; Jose Santos, secretary of Justiee; Albe~to Barretto, secretary of finance; Salvador Laguda, secretary of commerce and communications; Rafael Coopus, secretary of agriculture and national resources. For its full text, see Report of the Governor-General, 1923, p. 35. 66 J;/Jid., pp. 35-36.

POLIT,ICAE. PARTI·E S DUiRitNG TH1E WOOD ADMTN.

163

elaimi,ro.,g l:'ii,m.seif as !'e]llFesero.,tatiiVe 0f the soveveign ],}©wer. iFffie was concerned particulady with Sections 19 and 21 0f the Jones Law which granted him, as GovernorGeneral, supreme executive power; such as, general supervisi@n and control 0f all the departments and burea1:1s of tihe government, and tfu.e right to veto iegi,sla:ti<lm. i£f tfu.ese l!)©wers oe e:xiercised and applied to measures of p1:1rely domestic concern, the Filipino leaders argued, then the legislafrve power of the Filipino people, as granted my the Jones Law, would be nullified. 66 Second, there was a difference of policy between the D0m0«ratic ancl Rel')ublican administrations. The :former, a:s represero.ted ID!)' Harrison whose liberalism had resultecl. in a large rneasu,r e of a,l!ltonornous government, operated 0n a party basrs. Through eig.ht long years of :Democratic rnle, the Naci@nalistas were permitted to ca:rry 11mt a pr@gram ,that savored 0f state socialism. The FiLi,pinos went uro.m@ufutedlly ccmtero.t with the existing state 0& affairs. But wi,t h Gero.eFal W 00d as a Rep1:1bl,ican 67 Govern0r-General, th@l'e began a "backwaFd movement." Constitutional usages heretofore establi-shed along parliamentary lines were to tie abandoned and the government to be drawro. Ol!lit of biusiness. 68 Pursuance of tro.is policy wo1:1!d, as i,m<ileed i,t clid, leacd to inevitable reduction in the autoro.omy a:l1rea:dy enj0yed. T11fird, no . student @f Philippine politics of this partirnlat period c@uld fail to n@te the weight of personalities in this c0ntF0versy. General Wood, being 66 See li>ean Bocollo's pamphlet, Gmeral Wood a11d tlie Law (Manila, 1923), pp. tS-16; Quezon and Osias, Gouemor-ge11era.l Wood a11d tlie Filipfao Ca1,se \Manila, 1924), passim; isi. R. Williams, "General Wood and the Filipinos,'' World's Work, February, 1924, p. 366; Graham Stuart, "L'administr-ation americaine aux Philippines," Revue des Sciences Politiques. January-Mar-ch, 1924, p. 230. 67 Ralston Hayden, "The Philippines: An Experiment in Democracy," A tlnu.tic Mlonthl~, March, 1926, p. 411. 68 Cf,. (i;overnor- General's inauguration speech in Philippines Free Press, Octobe• 22, [921, pp. 4-5.

a s@l<dli@,r, ilbllew liHk @.r n<:>thimg afu@titt [?0litics arnC!I! imueh foss ai®ol!l·t jDaFty g@;vernmeN,t. ilif he ham, as Semator <G@@rg;e Parker Femarkecli, he liliJ:igTo:t To:av@ &eelil pFesident 0dr tTo.e ili.!Jin,ited States. 59 By Jilli0d!essiom IJ.4,e was train@d ~@ lo@ striet bi@H1 i,N givi,n g amcl takiNg <1mfors. 0Nce the li>atldie was ®N 1ie was N©t tTo.e @ne t® il!1etreat. As t@ WresfoleN,t Qu@ZJ@N, his fu@t-l!J.ead@Gm,ess als0 was rn@t withowt calll.s@ &011 irrit,tati@n. 60 We learm tfuat General W @©el pla1&ecli the blam@ @,FJ. ilf'rnsi~em,t Qlll.eZJ©n as 1>eiAg "ca19afule @f rnising m,@.re heli1 @11 <'f@iFJ..g more g<:>@<il! t han any @tfter malil iN tlii.e Fhili,]Dpines." 61

Partid0 N,(!1,Ci@nalista C0ns0lidad0 a'llii the Democrata Rele as Ow0siti0rn,

Mavi,mg seem To.ow the £at hacd got i,Fllro the fiire, we shall} m@w discuss the far-reacl;i,i,fl,g ·effects 0f tfue crisis om t1ie subs@CiplleFJJt Gl.eveloJilmernt of JilaFty p>@li!tics i,m tbe IslaNds. We have n@ted that tfu.e sp>iit @r the Partid@ Nacion(J}lista was m©re o:f a l!)@FS©Nal cl!ue[ t!bia,m @f a <4if.ference iN p:rirnci1]i>1es. It is trl!le tlliat &eill011e the electi0n of ~922, t1l@11e was a m0vemeNt t0wand1 the d!lll.sion of the C0lecti1Jistas arncl! the fi)em@cr:wtas, blll.t because odi tfue latt er's stam<d for ali>0ti.ti@,1J1 @~ the Coam1&il <:>f Stat@, this effort rnever slll.ccee<de@!. S0@n aft er tl;ie election, the CoZectivistas f0Nnd tlitei,:r forces were Not Slll.fi:tiicienfly stvong t0 retaim c@mtv<:>i 0£ tfue legislatl!l111e. !F0r tea cl.ays N@irtl:ii:er Jila:rty in the Moase cotitl~ get a maj0vity t© enah>le them to eleet a SJileakec lt was tfu.e most IDi,tter 00.mtest fo.il tfu.e fuisi!ory @di the H@1ll.se. Tifue NacionalisfJas l')Nt 1,1,p Mo,rri,ano /f,esws Cuenoo as tliiei•F eanmidate, the Coleeti1Jistl'1!s Jil1l11l up Manuel Roxas, and ffue Democratas f)lJlt l!l]) ClaF© M. Reeto. Each tJarty 69 See George !PaFke•'s letter in reply to Walter R0bb1 dated January 27, '1926, in f.'arker-'s :Papers, available in the 'New Yo~k 'Public 'Library. 60 Cf, !QuiFino, op, cit., p, 52. 6-l L. Wood, Diar:JI, August, 8, 1923. Nagedom, op, cit. Vol. H, p. 435.

P(i)LITICAL PARTIES DURING !XHE WOC>D Al)MTN.

165

rca:llied loyalily fueliind its candidate. Under the circumstances, s@m€ s@rt @:f coali,ti@Il had t@ be worked oat. Sine€ a fasion with the De.mocrat<1JS was politically UR.wise, the Colectivistas had no choice, but to approach the Nacionalistas opmly anGl frankly for help. Osmefia peFhaps knew w€11 that his former lieutenant would caU 62 On the other "at tl:'ie gat€s oifl the parental home." hand, he also realized that he had only a minority in the Senat e. In @rdeF t@ share i,n the power of that body respecting toF1finnation of appoiatment , the gentleman :f.rorn Cebu simiilaFly hacft FIO alternat-:ive. As the foremost leader of the Nacionalistas, he could not in any way 6 combine farce with th€ Democratas. s Even if he did, in the Senate. rn1F1ority the Tois v@tes W©l!ll<;l still! fue in This sagaci@as leader, cleverly seized . the occasion to eo0p€rnte with his 0!Gi friends, the Colectivistas. They final'ly reacheGl aF1 agFeement and elected the Colectivista candidate, Manuel Roxas, as speaker of the House, and a NaeionaJlista as ehairrna,n @f the H0use Steering Cornmittee.64 "As a eo!lsecquence of this situation of depende!lcy 011 the U.wiper.scnialista votes in the House of Representati ves," said Quez0n, "I have to yield to the SeF1at0r from Cefuu, in great part, the most importa!lt 62

Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 232, fn. The following is a statement written by Nicasio Osmefia, son of the foremost leader. "One night my father received a visit from two very well known Democrata leaders. I remember that another Democrata leader stayed in the car and waited for his two companions. Later I learned what tliat eonferenee meant and the significance 0£ its result. The Democratas offered father the votes of their senators to eleet him president of the Senate in exchange for the votes of the Orthodox Nacionalistas in the lower house in favor 0£ the leader of the minority party, Repnesentative Recto, who was their candidate for speaker. Father turned down the proposition, although he was made to understand that was his opportunity to wr.eak vengeance on Quezon. Father stood firm in his decision. 'He is a man who is wr.iting his own histor.y,' a fr,;iend told me in commen,t ing on the matter. Fatl\er would not ally himself with his natural opponents, the Democratas, and he advised the Orthodox Nacionalistas to vote for Roxas." See ""I:he Hiuman Side of Sergio Osmefia,'.' Philippines Free P-ress, September 24, 1927, pp. 6 and 26-27. 64 Ibid., October 28, 1922, p. 8. 63

166

DEVELJOPMENT OF Pf.IIM'PPI•NE POLITICAL PARTT-ES

pi-@rogative of a: JDOlitkian iro. [!>Ower, ' which is t(1) 0btairo. appointlnemts for his men." 65 In their · agreenrnnt, the two parties declared that there wotdd be mutual and d©se co0JDeratioro. betw@en t1i.em im the fature iro. view of t1i.e common principles for which they stood. 66 Although t1i.e amicable rapprochement between the Naci0naJiJstas . airnl C@leetivistas wais clue in part to, first, the actual expediency of insuring a working ma90rity in the legislature, and second, the thi:;eat 0f rthe inci-eaised JDOwe11 of the De,m0crat&s, l'levertf.idess the main force which brought Quezon and Osmefia still closer was the common. fear @f the "backward" pol,icy practiced by General Wood. After the beginning 0f the political storm, both the Nacionalistas and Colectivistas further realized the absohtte necessity of bringing about a reunion of their forces, if the fight was to oe effective. Vvith these intents and purposes, a convention. of the _ tw@ J:1>arties met in Al!tgust, 1923. '1.Fhe historic gaithei-ing declared, in part, that: "the moment has come for the un.iol'l of the Nacionalista and Co~ectivista pai11ties, 1io be made effective and permanen,t and to this end they pledge to. see th.at the l.ilati0na[ committees of both parties will call their resJDective national conven.tion.s on the same date to discuss ancl determine the basis of a if)Olitical organizat:ioro. wherein tb.ose who are members of the Nacionalista and Colectivista parties shall be united to continue, under the san.1e flag, the 67 :r,ro-independemoe lahors of iPhilip]l)ine naitiona.lism." In April, 1924, another joint convention was called a,nd the rel!lnion of the two parties 'became a reality under the title of Par,tid0 Naci0nalista Cowsoiid'ado. Quezon 66

66 67

Caballero and Concepcion, op. cii., p. 232. The Philippines Herald, August 10, 1923. Ibid.

POMT1(;;./fci& PA!R'.PbES @TsliH!NG THE iW@@D A1JM'FN.

,J,he Mianila Times, Apvil 6, 192l!.

[67

1168

DEVEb®PMEN!f' ©F 'PHlLIPP,ltliE POLITICAL PARTIES

off rtl:ile sy,stem as tilli.ey c@ntri!li>wte<!l t@waF<il better harm0r,iy lDetweero. Ji)arty al!lth@·r ities amcd g0verro.me,m,t al ageHdes. 'flluis :liorm @,f @rgalilizati@n was prnet icaliy tTo:e same as ~hat @d' the g11a®GI @fol Par,tid@ N,(!J,ci;@nalist(!J, amm als@ oill th@ Partido Demoer,('lta, th@l!lgh tfu@ latter was eoro.sieforecl! m@re dern@crntie for two ofuvi0lll s r,ea:s@ro.s: first, the s·lii@rter terlilils @.f ]i)a11ty @firo.eeris, 69 alilcl see@nd, tlhe m,tt®idy,al ass@rnblies were efu(l)S@lil lil©ll fuy @elegates h>mt !Dy llfue rnmk am<d fihai lililernl!Je11s @di t fu,@ j_i)arty r,esid,ing ii;i the mlllnkipafo:i:es. Siilrrce the :forrnatioi;i of tf.ie ParUd0 N(!J,cionalista C'onsoli:dado, in the maiH, was a natu11al 01,1tc0me @f the ;p@l,i ticai s,t 0rm IDetweei;i GeHerni Wo@@ and tiae Filipin0 1-ea<fters, th@reU.•lil4©lil c@nvernti@n @f A,pri.il 5, i924, acdo]l)ted a platform which was daiefily a jDrngram (!)I war against Gelileral W @@cl 'Fhe <lf@el!l.ment; reaas, iFJJ pa•Ft, as :li©-H0ws: "We canm@.t eithe11 0onceive why, havi,ro:g r,eache<l this stage. o.f self-g@vernrnemt, a g@vern@r-gernei;a[, trampling upo:n iaws and: grantee Fights, pretends t® ign@,re the acl.vioe amcil! a1,1th@rity (:)[ tlae F ilipir.ios t0 go-vern llheir, C::@um,t 11y, a.ro.c!le,r, t1ieir sole resl)l@lilsibili•t y. Slllch a g@vem,rnero:t ro.ot Olilly Gontravenes a law ]i)asse<d h>y t he ll:'Tmi,t ecl Sitates C@mgress, li)l!l.t is also a filagran,t deviatioH ilir@m its [P@liey 0if emanei]l)atiom. It is lililami£est1y a ®eSjD©tie 11egirne wfuicfu does r,10t cdeserve, a,m,Less i,t is eaanged, the fuearr,ty cooperati0n @,£ any p@litiea:l pai;ty tlhall prndiesses fove odi eol!l.ntry. ]t is a sfua:mefa1 Thaekward step im th.e hl!tmaH,itar,ian missi©m which tfue' U.nite<ll Staites laas h>een carryi$1g on im the Philiprpimes ar.id an unequiv0ca[ sign that the f@rees of imlLJeFialisrn haive r,etl!lrned t0 rnenaee 1 with its aggressive co,me1,1piseernee this coveted lamd. 1

69 The lflemocratas elected theis officess once in every two years, while tl\e Colectivistas elected theirs in every three yeass. Cf. George 'Makolm and Maximo Kalaw., P.hilippi11e Govem111e1>t (Beston, 19132), revised ed., pp. 270-274.

WÂ©C>ll> AYE>MT,N.

169

170

DEVELOPMENT OF P-HIUP-PINE POLITICAL PARTIES

Reeto. The latter was the only Democrata member of the special mission. But before the arnival of the mission, the political atmosphere in Washi,11gton was already Ynfavo1i1rable to Hie Filipino politieos. The administiration, as is the l!lsual aoraetice, adopited the dediero.siive attitl!lde t@ward Goverrn:,irGeneFal Wood. In hi,s :famous Letter 0£ :Ferornary 21, 1924, to Speaker Roxas, Preside11t Coolidge clearly pointed out that: "The Government of the United States has foll confidence in the ability, good intentions, fairness, and sincerity of the present Governor-Ge11eral. It is convinced that he has intended to act and has acted within the sc0pe of his proper and constitutional authority. Thus convinced, it is determined to sustain him; and its purpose' will be t0 emcourage the broadest and m0st i11tellig,ent c@©]Deration ©if the Hlipino JDeople in this policy. Looking at the whole situation :fairly and impartially, one can not lDut feel that if the Filipino people cannot cooperate in the support and encouragement of as good an administration as has been afforded under Governor-General Wood, their failure will be rather a testimony oif unpreparedness for the full obligations of citizenship t1J.an an evidence of _patriotic eagerness to advance thei,r country. I aliN convinee~ that G@vern0r-General Wood has at no time roeen 0tl!J.er than a hard-woFkiag, painstakiag, and <sonscieatio1;1s adrniro.istrator. I have found no evideace that he had exceeded his proper authority or ,t hat he has acted with any other than the purpose of best serving the real interest of the Filipino people." 72 72 C 011g. R ecord, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3618-3619. The same text may be found in Report of the Govcmor-Ge11cral, 1923, p. 47.

POLITICAL PARTIJ!lS DURING 'IIHE WOOD ADMTN.

171

This hist0ric declaration served to convince Quezon and Osmefia that further effort to press the anti-Wood campaign would be fruitless in view of the determination of the administratfom t0 support tlie Governor-General. Instead, they <!le;votecl themselves to obtaining the passage of tfue bill already h1tro<!l,uced78 by Congressman Louis W. Fairfielm, of ]!ildialila, Gh.ai,rman 0£ th.e Insular Affairs Comr.nittee. 'it'J!J.e Fairfield Bill provided for the holding of a colilstitutional convention by which a constiitution for the "C@mmonwealith of the Philippines" was to be adoptem. 'Fhe constitution should then be ratified by the people and approved by the President of the _U nited States. The executive power was to be vested in a Filipin0 Governor-General, the legislative power vested in a legislature composed of a senate and a house of re:PJresentatives, and the judicial power vested in one SUFJFe!illl.e cou,r t. There w0uld be a «otnmissioner app0inte€l! my the pFesi<!lent with the conser,it of the Uni.ted States Senate. 'fhe c0mmissi0ner as such would represernt the 1Presi<!lemt 0f tlie United States, to whom Tue would submit official reJ!lorts on the conditions in- the Islan.cls, and w0tdm perform sach additional duties as might hie delegate<!! to him from time to time by the Presidernt. The latter could, at any time as hd deemed neeessary, take over and operate at the expense of the commoawealth, any executive or administrative f1unction of the government. The irnde]!>endence of the cdµimonwealth, which the bill prnvime<!l, would be recognized by th.e Uit!lited States twemty years after its inaag;uration.74 As Quezn meclared h>e'f01.1e the c0r,igressional- com_mi<ttee, tTo.e biilil as suGTo: w@al!il me -qua:lifieaily a:coeptable t© the. FiJ.i,pirnos alill!l w0ulcl!, in. effect, end all agitation f©r ir,ide]!>enmemce, since it specifically provided for ind~pen73 'Fhe measure was introduced on Apr,il 23, 1924. See H. R. 8856, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. Ibid.

DEVELOPME'N'P OF Ji!HILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

clence in twemty yeaFS. 75 But much to his surprise, sentimero.t at home was evidently Op]!>Osed to the fuill . .Aro.d the leader of this opposition was nome other than the historic figt,1.rn, General Aguinaldo. The most @bjecti@nable .feature of the bill, as indicated i.n most organs @f Filipino p1!1101ic OJ!111mi0m, was that rthe J!leri.@d l[)rececl.i.mg imGl!el!)endero.ee was t@o loro.g. The hiilll was, t here~0re, lost at h0me im Sf)i•t e of Ql!l!e2l@ID.'s e:fffort to ar01,1se pl!lblie semtiment in its fa:vouor. Im view 0£ this situation, Quezon then macle a clever move and assured the Secretary of War that if the administratioro. end@rsed the Fairfield Bill the Fhilippiro.e Legislature would do so, The Secretary of Wa:r, however, turned the argument back to Quezon, stating that if the Philippine Legislature :fiirst endorsed the measure the a<!1rniro.istratioro. would make its efforts to get it passecl. 76 Bat the pres,i dential campaigro. was them antler way in the U1;iited States, and the Congress to whiefu tke biiJII was !l)reserntle@! [ateF exp,ired without taking am.y cl.efinite actiom.. Having accomplished F1othiag, except for some contribution to congressi<mal oratory during their few months stay in the United States, Ql!tezon and his associates of the mission firo.ally decided that a trip to Europe was necessary. As head of the missioro., Quezon apparently was particularly anxious to get something to Turing home. At Geneva, he attempted to secure repre. sentatio:Fl i,n the Leag1ite of Nations, l.iJl!1t because 0£ the :fact that the United! Stat es was not a memlDer 0£ that 0rgaro.izati0n, the effart so@n J!>Fo;vecl fati.Je. 71 75 Hearings on Philippine l..oaal Autonomy, Committee on Insular Affairs, H . R., 68th Cong., ist Sess., pp. 132-133. Cf. Norbert l.yons, "Filipino Leaders' Split on Independence Issue," Current History (March, 1925), p. 868. 76 Lyons, "Filipino Leaders' Split on Independence Issue," loc. cit., pp. 868-869. 77 Ibid.

POLlTICAL PARTIES ®1:TR1NG TfME WQGD ADMTN.

!1.73

It is interesting to l'lote that shortly after the return of the miiss-ic;ll'l, the role played biy the Democrata floor' leader, RepuesentatiV1e Rect@, was one which had no parallel il'l the history 0f the opposition. Recto himself being a member of the returned mission, had closely watched the a;ctivities 0f the majority members in the United Sta,tes. At his request, tl!le mission submitted a report, sig;n@d by Quezon, Osmefia, and Roxas, to be read before the Indepeadence . Commission of the legislature. T'he repout was a lengthy one. It maintaiaed th.at the missioa declined to accef)t the Fai,r field Bill and protested g.t Washington against the approval by the American Government of Governor-General Woool's admil'listratioa ia the :PhiJ.ippines. 78 Immediately after lihe rcerwrt was read the minority floor leader vigornusly dcmounced the report, declarrng that what the mission actually had done was just the opposite. It had sa,p ported the biltl and in vari0us ways promised t0 OOG>l'Jerat:e with G@¥ern@u-General W oocl: This dramatic declaratiol'l biy tl!le gentleman of the opposition created a sensation in the imaginatiofl of the people. The padiamentary mission 0£ indep@ndence hac;I. been sent prima;rilly t0 discredit the Gov,ern0r-Geaernl and also to ui;ge a0s0lute, immediate and complete independence: Represeatative Recto began his accusation by prnsel'lting two letters whicd, Governor-General Wood received from tfue wau c,lepai;tmeat. 'Ffue first letter showed tfuat Qaezon, accoml'Janied by Osmefia and Roxas, came to the Burna'l!l of Insular Affairs on May 17, 1924, with the sta;t@meat that: "'Ii£ tliie seeueta;ry 0£ war or the President could obtain £mm tfue leaaers of rnngress assurances that the Fairfield bill wo1:1ld be apl'Jroved, he and the 0ther members of tfu.e mission w01.dd SUJ!>]i)Ort i,t openly here and iliJJ the Iisia:acils. H the lea!ilers 0f rnagress were 78

Philippines Free Press, November 22, 1924, p. 6.

174

F>EVELOPMENT OF PHIUPPJNE POLITICAL PARTIES

of the 0piniom that the bill wo1!1.ld not pass, then he wcmld ask t1ie secretary 0f war to write a letter worded similarly as th.e one 1ierei,m attached and <llated May 17, w1iich he would make confidero.tial use of in the Philippines wit1i a view of oota,i ning, if such is possible, a resolution of the legislature indorsing the Fair ffi.eld !Dill, and t1ien 1ie would retb1rm later to obtain from congress in its coming session, the ap>Jilroval of the ssi,id bill with the ai.cl of the admini,s tra tion.m 9 'fhe gentlemam o,'lf t he opp@siti@n t1iem t00k the majority leaders to task for their agreement to cooperate with the Govern@r-Ge1.o1ernl. He den@umcecl the majority leaders for having conferred with the secretary of war to take up the issue with Governor-G eneral Wood without consulting the minority. As a Fesult (Quezom and the other majority leaders promised the administrati on that tney would res1!1.me the JDOlicy <'>:li co@Jileration with the Governor-G eneral and forget the old controversy . At tbiis particular jum.cture, the FFJ.im@rity filoor leader wemt 0111 t 0 quote- from a letter <'>f General McIntyre to Govern0rGeneral Wood dated J1!1.ly 14, 1924, as follows: "You will be interested to know that both of thelilil (Quezom. amd Osm.eiia) assl!lred me ancl the secretary of war that they would cooperate with you as so@n as they get there for the sake 0f public good. They are now convinced! that ha1imony in governmemt is necessary, if the good of t1ieir people is to be served. 'The admin,i stration told t1iem that mo graÂťt of more a1!1.tonomy would be considered unless they show an attitucle of c@operation. With t1iese positive assurances of support, I hope you can better serve the in,terest of t1ie Filipino people by com79 Ibid., p. 11. 'T'he same text may also be found in Lyons, "Filipino Leaders' Split on Independence Issue,'' loc. cit., pp. 871-872.

P©U'J!IC:A:L PARTJES DURING THE WOOD ADMTN.

175

@.f

the

stFl!l.lsliive leg~slati@lil lsiands." 80

alil~

de.,,elopment

A,Jl these charges of doul!>le-dealing seriously emba-rrasseql the majority leaders. Although the three accused leaders, Ql!l.€z@t:1, Osmefia and Roxas all rose to their te€f at:1d vig@r,011sly <den,iecl the charges, their arg;11ments, as i;iresented, were resetijtful rather than comvincing. 81 By m.€a!1}S @f party discipline, however, the Il1)ajority rnport was adopted en fx>to in spite of the most sensatio1fal attack ever launched_ by the party in oi;i,p0sitiom. The Democratas at this particular momeHt wei,e birly active !i,n tihe r@le they wern ,playing in politics. 'Ffue 'fiam@l!l.s Recto rni;i@rt on the thfrd parliamentary · rmss10n was utterly rejected, but considering the unprece<d€ntecl embarrassment to the ,majority leaders, the <d0c11ment l:J.ad, in some measure, served to increase the Democrata i,nfluemi;:e. iJ!t wa:s r,ia:fl!l.,r al a,H<il f11l!l.ite l@gieal tm.at, beimg me1ili).bers oii the opl))Qsiti@m, tne Democratas had <definitely to take sides witm. Governor-@eneral Woocl during the latter's Moreover, the contr@versy with the majori,t y leaders. theory an<d system whicm. tm.e Governor-General represented were, im large measure, m.armoniol!l.s with the ©Ut @ii ]!)e'YYIX!)cr,;ata icil'eals; Sl!l.Clli as, t© d,raiw g@v,etrnmen,t 1 l!>usi,n ess, ancill t@ abolis!ii tfue coaneil of state in order 1l@ mai11tain the principle Gt separation of powerJ, and so ·fortm.. N@w with the Nacionalista Consolidados on one side amI the Democraf!as in supp@rt of the Gov€rnOFGeneral @n tm.e 0theF, 82 we shal,l see what the pe@pfe had t@ say al!l@udi l'he si,tuati0t:1. ~n tfue 1,ig;h,t @iii i,t s s•igniificance, Philippines P.ree Press, November 22, 1924, p. 11. I For the statements of Quezon, Osmefia and Roxas in reply, see Ibid., Bocobo Jorge and p. 14. Cf. Tlie rema"ks of Deans Ma,oimo M. Kalaw given in Philippines Free Press, November 29, 1924, p. 15. 82 Is. Wood, [j)iar!)I, Febr.uacy 13, 1923; See Camilo 0sias' speech, "'l1be il'!istor.ie !National ~ssue,'' iq CJ:luezon and @sias, op. cit., pp. 183-1-90. 80

176

®E'I/Ef,;©1/!M'ENT ©P' li'Fl!IMPPI1NiE :PQ)I;,1TICAL PARTIES

tifu.e ger,rernl e[ecti@n @f Wune, il:925 was @ro.e oif tfue m@st e:x;cdti.1Fig evero.ts @£ its ki~C!l @ro. ree@rcl. 11i'lfue campaign, in g1enerai, fuegai,r,i widiJ. tfue ]fai,irfiei<ll 1IBi1U as an i-ml_l)0rtaa,t issl!le. 'irhe p@in,t cdehated was Fl®t whetheir the Thill @1lLg11lt tl@ lhe al_ll]>rovel!l, ®Mt wfuetfuer tiJrue imrnj@,1.dfy [:eaGlers hacd al€tmaHy SU[lllpGrted tfue hill !d,111,img f&eiir stay i,r,i tTue United States iro. tl.iJ.e sm,liliJ.itm:e11 @f ili,24. The i.ssae @hw•i.01,1.sly gai,ro.ed aro. imitial am:vaTrliliage foir the Bem@eratas wl.li@ wfaced tiheiir ©]))JD®liliero.ts 0ro. tfue cle;llensi.ve. Tl;iey cfuairgeGI. tihat the N..a:eionfLZista C0rvs0lidad@ 1eaclers ioia€1' pi.;;<:>m,ised t@ :hi.ave G@,vern.@r-Geme11al W0@(i] rem@vecl, li>•a t it1st,eaid l!fue res1t1lt was aetuaHy an aJDGl@gy to hi.liliJ. ;83 that the party in ]))@wer hacl, tliu%mgh w.ndertaikiro.g lousiness enterprises, c@st tliJ.e I oom1try mi.[llioro.s 0£ l_l)es@s foTu i.Ftree0l1lera,fuie loss; tfuat Q1,1ezon and mi.s ass@ciaites To.ad n@ eoF1crete plam fer cafllyi,r,rg @rr aID indeJDeIDoforo.oe campaigID in the i\lJimited States; tliJ.at t:hi.ey haol £ai.lectl t® l_l)r@vide TeliliJ.e@ires for l!l!te maay ]Dressing nati<:>na[ iJ.i>F©blem1s; ancll s© :fi@i-tfu. 8~ On t!.>J.e otfuer liJ.amm, the Naei@nalista Co,ws@&wfld@s aieel!l·secl the /Jemoeratas of :hi.elpi,mg G@:vernG,r -Gen,ernl \iV:00cl in t:hi.e imperialistic mo¥eliliJ.elilt t0 ct11rtai1l Phi1li)1)piine amt0n0my. 'fliJ.ey declarie«ll. that iid! the l_l)e<:>p1e v@tecl. £@ti lJe.mocratfL candidates they ;v@te<d l!© <di!sgira€e their 0@1,1.nb-y. 86 It FliJ.l!lst roe rememfue11ecl that fu@tfu: J))airrties were, at least t@ omtward appearances, <deliliJ.a.n ding afusoimte, immecdiatie a:nlll co11F1.p>l@be i.@d!el_llendemee. 'Flile C!ti,:fiferenee w.as that @ne aice1t1seo tliJ.e otliJ.er 0~ 1adhng si.liJ.eerity. 'FliJ.e electiGns, as many predicted, were a eilear-cmt vict@ry !f@r tTo.e Ra,r,tid0 Naci@rn0Jlista, C@ns0'tidad0, w1i:ick captured 64 seats i,n the H@use anGf 13 in l!fue Senate, w:J.liile tfue Partido fJemocrata won ornly 22 seats in tfue House and 83 See GeneFal iFFank McIntyre's letter from tl\e waF depa,,t ment to Governor-General Wood·, dated ifuly 14, 1924. The text ma,y, be found in PMlippi11es Free Press, November 22, 1924, p. IL 84 J?he Pbilippi11es Herdld, Mareh 23, Ma?/' 16, 20, 22, 29, 1925. 85 lbid., May 28, 1925; J;>:Jiilip'f,illes F~ee Press, January 24, 1925, p. I.

POLITIII:AL Ji?AR'PLES DlJilUNG THE WO0D ADMTN.

177

8 in the Senate. 86 After the elections, the Democrata forces were strengthenea in the legislature by help from tw@ senators and s0me @f representatives appointed by G@vernor-General W @©d to represent the Moros and tribal pe@ples. 87 'fhe elections of 1925 which gave the Nacionalista Cemsolidados a maJ0rity in both houses of the legislature seFved to ind<icate the popular approval88 of the nati@Flalistic policy 0£ n@n-cooperation with the The NacionaZista victory was Governor-General. @bviously a logical resu.lt of the Quezon-Osmefia reunion which had been brought about as a Fesult of the cabinet crisis. Bu.t the DemocTatas, despite the unexpected defeat of their president, Ruperto Montinola, governor of Iloilo, ha:d n0t, howeveF, made a bad showing in the elections. They l@st in fact 0nly three seats in the 'House, but they gaiF1e<il. four in the Semate. 89 Moreover, as Professor iRalstion ]fay;deF1 0TuseFv;ed: "<JiFI a F1UF11be1< @f l')F0vi,F1ces the Dem0cratas lost by ver;y narrnw margins, the dosemess oif the votes ind,icatimg that i-FI those districts their stl'ength was almost equal to that of their victorious opponents. "The figur;es, moreover, do not tell the whole story of the Democrata rise im influence. In both 1922 and 192.'ii this party . carried the metropolitan districts of Manila and Cebu, the two largest cities in the Philippines, by: safe majorities for lboth its local a.ro.d insular ti<skiets. iln a num0er 0f othei:n0table cases it was vi<stori0u.s in more advanced 86 'Re'/}ort of t/£e Governor-General, 1925, pp. 254-255; Norliei;t Lyons, "11lie Nationalist Victory in tlie Philippine !Elections," Current \ History, September, 1925 ; P/£iliUi11es Fr,ee Press, June 6, 1925, pp. 8 and 51. 1 8i Forbes, op. cit., Vol. I[, p. 1111. 88 In 1925, there wer,e 931,467 registered voters, 84 per cent. of which n~mber actually east their, votes. See The Statistical Bulletin of t!£e Philipp,ne Is/a,.ds (Bureau of Commerce and Industry, 1927), p. 8. 8 9 Supra, n. 43.

a111d lhente11 €cl!weat@d <il.list11iets w fu€rn t~e e0~1ilrn0n. j_i)@Ol_!)l@ are 11efatively £1r€€ £rem c@€11<;:iofl amcl Gtmer iml')r©fleF iro.,fil.,ue1iwe. 1i'l:iJ.eF€ thws s@em Ii© l,,e g0@d gr01mds f@F lhelieving t ifua t the Demc,Jcr.0;t(!J,S aim i.n tfue ie[d to s,tay am~ H1at tfuey ai1c€ sl:i.,@mg @ro.@Ngh t0 pe,r:6@11rn tfue illld~SJiHtmsa!Me £uro.eti@,ro.s @if a:lil ©l')liJOsiti0it 11>arty, 0,r to taike @v@,r tlm,€ g;@vem,m,emt sh@uld ma90,r i,1ty gv@Wl') l@s@ lflrre rnro.fii.Cll'enc@ oil' till€ ]D@@pfo." 90

':/!he United !Fr.@nt

Now the eleetions weFe <trneF, li>ut a new pro.ase @f the erisis was yet I!© co1Jm.1e. 'FliJJe 11ero.ewal @ti: tfue ReJ_Dm11Dlican .A.drninisitration ilil 1924 was a Lready givit:ig grounds for tfuis foar. '.Up0lil ffu,e ba:sis @£ the Rel_!)l!lbliean r>la!ttfonm. ai@@l_!)tecl. th.at same year, tTo.e majority. leailil.ers im the itslan.cl.s saw no 11>r@S•J_i)ec1l for ai,my aicti@m t@wa,cd f'1i,i[i]i>Ji)•i•Fl e al!lt©nGmy. 91 They were, rn0re©i\T.eF, iro.Sstreas,i ngly consei@bl.s 0,£ the ret11ogressioro. that co,ro.til!l,ll!ecl. T he vet0 l_!)©wer @if th@ Governor-Gene.a:~ wais stil1l fu eimg eX!eessirvely exercised ;92 th€ aro.mual al_!)]_D110w,riati@ro. of @ne miUi@ro. pesos 90' "The Philippines: An !Expedment in Democraey," Alt/antic Mo11thly, March, 1926, pp. 416-417. 91 See R,p,.blican Campaign T,ex,t-Book, 1924, p. 391. 92 After the break Between the Gover-nor-GeneFa,1 and the Filipino politicos, :w:e found the foll0wing vet0 neco•ds: iF,r om Oct0ber 16, 1'923 to February 8, 1924, the Philippine Legislature passed 84 bills, 0ut 0f which 31 were vetoed ; in the 1924-1925 session of the ]Legislature, 24 out 0il 72 bills passed we•e vetoed; and in 1925-1926 sessi0n, the leg,islatuce passed 122 bills, out of these 4<1 wer-e v:etoed. See i?.cJ,o~t of Hie (i;overnor-Ge.ieml, 1923, p. 31; Report of t7ie Gover1>or-Ge11eral, 1925, p. 27; Rerp ort of the 6overnor-Ge1teral, 1926, p. 23. fo his annual mess~ge to the secretaFy of waF in 1926, Gover-norGeneral Wood e:x;plained that in 1925-1926 sessi0n 0nly H hills wer-e Feceived by, him befoFe adj0ur-nment of the legislature. 'Fhe Fest weFe received from 4 to 28 days af,ter adjournment. 'Ehe GoYe-• nor-Generail focther explained that "Whe law gives the G0vernoF-General thi•ty days after adjournment in which to act on bills. Had the bills been Fecei¥ed beiiore adj 0urnment, the defects in a numlier of them might have been c0rrected' and a veto av0ided, but after adjournment theFe is of couFse no opportunity for conference or return oii the bills to the legislatuFe for. confe,ence 0r correction of defectis." See the text of the message in Philippines Free P ress, September 25, 1926, pp. 34-35.

POU'P,1€:A,fl, !PAR.TIES 1ilU!RDN® THE WOOD ADMTN.

179

forr the indepenclenee fund, a practice ever since 1916, had already been disall!owed in 1924 by the insular auditor at tfue a <lliviee 0di tfue aH01mey gimeral of the United States. The grounds on which the mling was based were that membership on the Commission of Independence for which the al1Jpropriati<m was made, was outside the prnvi,n ce 0f the legislature, ancl, therefore, in accordance witli the J0nes Law, it could be placed only "directly under th@ Governor-General or within one of the departments 1mder the supervision and control of the GovernorG@n©ral ;" that the stand,i,n g annual .appropriation could n0t be c<msi<d@red as necessary for the support of the legislature and therefore it must be directly under the auth@rity of the Go¥ernor-Gen@ral or of an executive • de!1Jartmero.t under his ccmtrol; a11<il that since the approp.iati<m was not macle in accordance with the Jones Law, the audiitor could not pass in auclit any further payment from this fund. 93 'Fhe cl,isaH@wa11ce 0di tlae annual appropriation for the independ@rn;e fund was a seriou.s t>low to any political campaign for Philippine independence upon which plank t>0t[1i political parties i,m the Islands founded their existence. Neit-1ier the IJemeeratas nor the N acionalista Consolidades <sould h@pe to hold any political power, unless they carried on a campaign for independence, whi<sh they could not do withou.t provid,i ng means thereii©r. 'Fhis a<stiom 0£ the Republican Adrni.n~stiration, tlrnrefore, meant a denial of power to the politica l parties. The Demecratas, although having a traditional friendship wi,tla tlae Repu.biiean Governor-General, could not umle. the eireu.mstam:ies fail to take steps for selfde:fonse. The Filipin0 politicos realized that this was a nati0nal crisis, not a party issue. They felt that the Filipinos mu.st not be diivided in their common strb.ggle, i:l! the nati0nal :IIreecl:orn was t0 ~e secured at all. 'Fhe 93

Report of the Govemor-creneral, 1924, pp. 27-33.

DEVELOPMENT OF PHTUPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

ineffectiveness in the conduct of the indep>endence campaign in the past, they ' fuelieved, was mainly clue to a lack of unity of, and understanding between, the two major political parties i:n t he Islands. They urgecl. that ai'l Filipinos feel equally responsible, and, regai;cl.less 0f party lines or religiol!ls <il,if.feremees, everybody shoNid take activ.e part iFl t he <ll.ediense @f the "mati0mat i.cdeat" With this avowed and Sl!l.Jf)reme J!)ttFpose, tl:.J.e lea<!lers94 of both the Nacionalista C0ns0Zidados aJ.1J.d t:he Derrnocratas, as a result of a joinit committee conference, held January 6, 1926, agreed to form a united front upon the following terms: 1. To create a Nationa,l Supreme Council which shall be c@mposed of ten members, five Nacionalistas aBd five De-mocrat<1,s, eight of whom, at least, shall be members of the legislature. This coumcil shall have the high command of Fili]Dirw ]>Ol,iey in everything comcerni-ng the iNcl.epemdience cam'Ji)aigJ.11, i,n alil matters that may af.fect t Tu.e relations betweea the United States amd tTu.e JPhi1li!i>JDines, and in. the administration @f the interests of the country at large .... 2. The supreme council shall organize a commission which shall permanently reside in the United States and which shall not be dissolved until independence of the Philippines is obtaililecl. OBe haif of the members @f this commission shalff !De appointed by the Sl!ll)lreme CÂŠ1111ileil om rec0m1'11emdati0n of the Democratic Party pers0lilS m@t aÂŁfiliatecl with either Ji>arty being eligifule i@ membership om t1lis e@mmissiom. 94 Of the Partido N acio11alista C011solidado were Senate President Manuel L. Quezon, Speaker Manuel Roxas, Representative Benigno S. Aquino, Senator Hermenegildo Villanueva and ex-Mayor Justo Lukban; and ot the Democrata Party were ex-Governor Ruperto '.Montinola of Iloilo, Senator J.uan Sumulong, Representative Claro M. Recto, ex-Representative Vicente Sotto, and Senator Emiliano T. Tirona. See The Manila Times, January 7, 1926.

POL1:Vfll::½L rPAiRW..liES Dfll'R.1N@ ll'H>E iW00Jll A:IJMTIN..

~81

'ili'il.11ali tfue,Ji'e sfualil be eleeted fu,y the legislatu.Fe a Democrata resident commissio ner as soon as a vaeaney @ecu.,Fs, in 0Fder, that in the future tlle Filipin0 people may be represente d in the Congress @f tne 1Jnited Sta,t es fuy c0mm,i ssioners elected aRcl recommen ded by the Nacionalista and Democrata parties @f the iF>hili,ppines. 4. Any appeal to the Filipino people for contrifubltfom foF the in<liel')encdence campaign shall be made .by and in behalf of the SUflreme council, which sTu.aU e:x;eFei,s e cemtrol and super:v.ision of tlle collecti@n, cblstody and disfuursements of such funds. 5. The prese0.t covenant shall apply to all tne purposes sought in it after its approval by the directorates to tlle Nacionalista and Democrata parties." 96 'iFhe :formaticm 0£ tl\e unitecd front dedicated to the cause o:f i0.dependenee was, Ji)erhaps, the most significant event i,n th@ history 01 the Philippine political parties. T1ie c0alition pact was tbien approved by both parties witlloblt diifficulty, thoug1:i d<isseF1ting Ol')inions were not The Nati0nal Supreme Council entirely afusent. was, aecor-cd,iRg to the agreement , composed of ten memfuers 96 under tlile r,iresidency of Quezon. Many expressed the feaF that the 1s0aJ!ition wouil d result in dictatorshi p of 0me man or a small group of men under 97 The National Supreme tbie i0.filuemce of 0ne man. 3.

may 96 See J?hilippi1'es F1'ce Press, .J anuary [6, 1926, p. 44. The same be found in The Nation, March 10, 1926, pp, 266-267. In the course of negotiation for the coalition, the Democra.ta Directo,ate pr.oposed 19 points in wl\ich the abolition of the council of state and the boa,d of control was mentioned, liut the N acionalista C01'solidados had sidestepped the issue, See The NI anila Times, January 10, 1926. 96 Jose Avelino, Secretary; and other members : Manuel Roxas, Emiliano -i:. Tiropa, Sergio Osmei\a, Benigno S. Aquino, Claro M. Rectb, Juan Sumulong, Ruperto Nfontinola and Filemon Perez. See Kalaw, Phi,lippine Govemmrnt U•n.der the Jones Law, p, 336. 97 See The Mianila Times, February 19, 1926. Cf. Report of the GovernorGe.neral, 1926, p. 3.

!1.82

DEVEb0PMENT 0F PH•IUPli'I'NJ!J PObITlCAL PARTIES 1

Council, acc©rding to Quezon, was, however, neither a fasi©n @f the two parties nor the disa!l))JD@a1.1ance @f i!)ai.:ty li,n·es.- Its essence, as be adcled, was tl'i@ w0rk of ho.th parties for independence. 98 On the other hand, GovernorGeneral Wood observed that: "The scope of the c©m@inati@n ind,ucfod net merely questions pertaining to the so-crn1Iled 'national issue' but to all matters of local concern.. The dominant purpose @f this combinati@n was to preserve th@ existing ]ll01 itieal leacdershi19 !Dy }]>lacing iFL the hands of these 10 men the cdireet cG>ntFeil of all political matters, including nominatim1s for practically all elective 0ffices and a d@teFmination of legislative JllOlicies." 99 From 1926 to 1927, shortly before and following the formation of the National Suprnme Council, t1:iere again came a long chai,n 0f r@.t110gressi@lils.'-00 The m@st im1

98 Philippines Free Press, February 26, 1927. Cf. Quezon and Osias, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 99 Report of the Governor-Genet:al, 1926, p. 3. 100 There was again a growing inter.est in the United States in revtving the question of the extension of the United States Coastwise 'Law to· the Philippines at the beginning of 1926. The law, if extended, would have reduced the Philippines to even greater economic dependence on the United States. See S11pra, " · 6; The Ma11ila Times, January iO, 1926. 'Fhe Bacon Bill, which threatened dismemberment of the ar.chipelago by segregating Mindanao and Sulu, was being discussed in {;ongress. See Forbes, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 120; see Speaker Roxas' speech in Philippines Fre~ Press, July 3, 1926, pp. 26-27. The Plebiscite Bill prov,iding for a p1ebiseite by the Filipino people on the question of independence wa-s vetoed J',y Governor.-Geneca<l Wood and again by President Coolidge. For the veto messages of both the President and the Governor-General, see Report of the Gover11or-Ge11eral, 1927, pp. 64-72. The President's message may also be found in Philippi11es Free Press, May 14, 1927. President Coolidge in J,une, 1927, proposed that the Bureau of Insular Affairs should be transferred £rom the war department to the department of interior. This move was viewed by the Filipino leaders as one more step in consolidatmg the United States and the Philippines into a permanent political union. See Philippines Free Press, July 2, 1927. Cf. S. Doc., 180, 69th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 9.

:POLI/J'IC:Al1 f'~J:l,'Pf'ES flr!TrR1NG TUE WQ@D A!DM'PN.

1,83

J!)C>rtant 0f an was the a0oliti0Fl of the Board of Contrnl, whkh we shaU J!)FeseFl<tly discuss. The 0oard, as we have seeFl, wais eirea:ted by the iPhHipJ!)ine Legislature in January, 192'1. an<il consisted of the Governor-G,meral, the president of the Senate and speaker of the House of ReJ!)reseF1,tatiwes. 'FTuese three w,ere given the votiFlg poweir of all the stock ©f the National Bank owned and 101 cont110lled by the gower1!ment of the Philippine Islands. abolish to intend first at not did obvioasly, General Wo@@, the b0aii;d; th@agfu fue was c@nvi,F1ced_ of its unconstitutioFlaHty. TC> him the fact that his was the minority membersJ:i.ip of the .b@ard seriously impaired his positioR as Cfoverm>r-GeReral :for he could never obtain the conse14•t @iii the two iF,il,i,J!)ino mernfuers to the policy of rehabili,taticm which. he determined to carry out. To the FiliJ!)ino leaders, on the otJ:i.er hand, acceptance of the Go;vern0r-GeE1erai's policy woaild mean subjection to AmericaFl capital.1°2 All efforts toward amicable agireemeRt proved futile. Tl'ie Governor-General, acting upon the @l\)i,n ions lie had: sought and received from the judge aclv@cate geBe,r ai 0f the aiirmy. and the att0rney general 0£ tJ:i.e Unite!d States, issaed on Novemher 9, , 1926, an executive order declatring that the duties and p@wers heretofore exercised fuy the board of control should from now 00 be exereise<il s0tely by the Govern@:u-Gene,r al J!)\1,FSUaFl,t ii© the executive poweir veste!d in him 0y tHe 1ones Law. 10s This action of the G0vernor-Gefleral was challeFlge<il. 'Fhe case, thereap@Fl, was al\)J!)ealed and brougfut Tuell0ire the SuJ!)ireme ·Ccmrt @f the Phili,pJ!)ine ]slancls, which by a six to three decision upheld tne legafjty of Re'f>oet of the Governor-General, 1926, p. 27. C,t. The Nation, !Decemoeo 1, 1926, p. 551. 103 For the text of the Executive Order (No. 37), see Report of the Governor-General, 1,926, p. 36. Cf. Lit. Digest, November 27, 1926, p. 14. 101.

102

!184

®EV,EL.OP-MiE:NT ®F ~HLLI,PP.IN;E POMTICAiL PARTIES

fae ae1ii@1il of tire G@vem0r-Ge.flernl. 104 Fi1ilally, the case came 1:'ieru0re Hre S•u preme Col!ltrt 01£ the UR,ite& Sta.lies t!>y wl.iiiel:ii the if?h,i1li1pi]Di•1ile t ri:IDl!lnal' s mecisi@1il was sustained. ro 5 De~eat in iegal battle pr@ve€1 a disaster t(l) the ooa]iti0n, wlh1icla had bee1il seFi@l!ls[y Tual!lclica;p]De<d! ever s,i1ilee the date @if its existemce. ili1il tlire mrst pla@e, the iltewNlDlfaam Adlililim,istrati@m i,1il Washoi,1ilgto1il was t©o reacti@nary t0 give tlae Fiilipi,mo lea:<ilers any lii@l'>e 0£ aclvamee t0ward autem0lilily; im tliJ.e se©o1ild plaee, tl'1e11e weve m©t sl!lffi.dcmt meams for carryimg om an elf.fe1stive cam,1ll>a,i gn simee the i,ndewenclence faro.cl. had 1Dee1il disallowed by the i,msular au<!lit o.r, as ah,eacdy nobea. fo the liglat of tfu.is sitNati@n, the rnam afong wliJ.,ich Que20n, leader 0£ the c@ali,ti0m, l'.ravelled was t:10 10Nger strewn with roses IDuit m.Hecd with thorns. With~lill his @wn. party he fommd a grow~1ilg sem,tfom1,em,t ag;ainst the €oali<tion, led lily Senator Osmeia wTu@ liJ.acd 1ilever meea emtht:tsiastic a'IDOl!lt it, th01ag,Iil Csmeiiia lll,imsel£ was a m1emfuer @f it. IV1 diact, · tfue gemtlemam £110m Cebu, on tlfie matt er of {!)©liey, f01md To.,r.mself ag;ailill i,m decidecd anci sf.J.ari;i d'isagreemcmt witih tTo.e presidemt 0:li tTo.e Senate. Osmeiia deelared that simce the crisis ro:© l@nger e:xciste<d, c0orperaci@rn, sThot,tld revi¥e; Qnzom r,eJ,Dlietil that the situat i@n was still m@st critical a1il«ll the e0aJici0n sll10ulc;l conf04 The five American justices voted in the majority with Justke Romualdez €Filipin0), while the thr.ee Filipino justices dissented, holding that the government e0rporations were in a wa,y pr.ivate c0mpan-ies, and ther.efore the legislatur.e c0uld mal<e what provisions it wished as to how: the government st0el< sh0uld be voted. 11he majority opinion written by j[ustiee !Malc0lm contending that the <'i0vernor.-Gener.al's power sh0uld be commensur.ate with his resp0nsibility. CCongr.ess never intended that the Governor-General should be saddled with the nesp0nsibility of administering the g0ver.nment and of executing the laws but should be shor.n of the p0wer to do so. See Report of the Governor-/i;;eneral, 1927, pp. 25-61. Springer, et at. vs. government of the l"hil'ippine Islands, 2-77 U.S. 189. Cf. Ph-il,ippmes Free ~ ~ess, April 9, 1927, pp. 32-35. 105 R,eport of the Governor-General, 1928, p. 6. Cf. Worcester and Hayden, op. cit., pp. 763-i64.

62; The Manila 'Fdmes, tl\at ''Whate-ves Senatoâ&#x20AC;˘

J!86

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

fo1<1g1tt a IDattle,1° 9 and a-s a umited fr0111t it was r-10t well united. This was due perhaps to the lack of Jilarty discipline on one hand, and to local politics J;i@ing to© much imvolved witro. the "mati©nal issue" ON th@ otber. The state of things, however, remained the same uro.til after the death of Governor-Gene ral Wood, which took place in August, 1927, s,ho,r tly after he had returned t© tfue United States. 110 The period under Governor-Gen@ral ' Wood was the most eve,Htft!l[ in the history of Phili)ilpi,n e Jil©liti.cs. The Jones Law, which gave the Filipinos two elected Chambers under two J_Dresid-ing officers, s110ok the unified leadership of the Nacionalistas, co:ntinuecl. in :force and was a potential factor in determining the course of party developmemt. The rise of Qttezon to s1<1pre:maey was, uncl.er these circumstances, a result of the bicameral system. And the controversy between Governor-Gen eral Wood aNd tfue FiLipino leaders was again, im no smal>I measure, -due to the conflicting interpretations of the Jones Law. Obvic:msly en01<1gro., General Wood's pur@ose was t0 check the rapid growth of Philippine nati0nalism, but in fact, he helped considerably in arousing it. Twice the Filipino factions qt!larrelled seriously ar-1.d twioe the Governor-Gen eral rendered his service to unite and consolidate them. The Quezon-Ostnei ia reunion of 1924 and the tmited front of 1926 were, however, the immediate results of the threat arising from the Governor-Gen eral's policy of retr0gressio11. Each of these cases was significant in itself. Had General Wood shown a coaciliatory 109 The National Supreme Council had only, through Quezon and Rozas, decided to continue performing the duties ot the board of control in defiance of the famous executive order No. 37, and through the fodependence Commission of the Legislature, lodged a protest to voice the grievances against the Governor-General. For the joint letter of Quezon and Roxas to General Wo0d, dated November 16, 1926, see Philippi,ies Free Press, November 20, 1926, p. 25, and for the list of grievances see pp. 32-33 and 36-37. 110 Cf. Hagedorn, op. cit., 1/P· 480-481.

l81

P©~lTIC:A!L, PAR'JII:E S E>li11U1N@ 'IIHE W0OD AE>MTNi.

atti,tud:e tewa!1.1' ® the Fil1iroil.ll(!) leaders, the NacionaZista 11e1.mion might Tuave Theen delayed, and the Parti,do /Jemocrata mig1i,t have ha<il an opportunity to build itself mp as al.ll elf.Ie©ti;ve (!)]!)IO@sitfom. iFielfowi,folg the geF1eFai electi0F1 of i922, there arose the possili>ility of developing a system 0f well-balanced political parties. The Demoetaias s·eeme<il t0 haive teen suecessfuil in assmrning the r@le of @proositi@n. But just in the midst of their heate<il quarrel with the majori,ty party, the retrogressive threat, . w'Jii.ich haeli forotig!!l,t ab0u,t the Nacionalista reunion, was agai,Fl dern@nstratem. As a result, both the Nacionalistas am<il Democratas agreed to form a united front in common Gle!fiense (!):ti iPfail,i~ roitiie au1t@n@my. The 1mited front was an interesting political experimen.t i1F1 Philippine democracy. Its formation again i,F1€J:ieatecil the a<!1vai,F10e @,£ !Phi'1i1~roine nati@naJ.ism, but t1ie effects which it brol!lght were somewhat unfortunate. WheFl the party Hnes had become temporarily relaxed, party Gl,i sei1rol,i ne s@em li>roke d@:wm. As a restaff pers0mal p@litics, which hac;l previGusly characterized the native p@liticaii :(ilarties, again fuecame dominamt.

CHAPTER VI PARTIES AND POLITICS

SINeE 1927

The Rest0ration of Party Government

We have 1:mwi0asly see,n h©w the tw© com.,fli.cting theories of government had been practiced in t:he Philippi,m.es. Uncder Hanris©n's regime, the g0;vernment was in the main, modeled on the European system, while during the admim.is.trati.on of General W 00d, the American system was imitated. Mr. Harrison was imbued with Wilsonian ideals of self-determim.ation. He thoaght of democracy as a government resting om.ly U]i)On the consent of the governed, and of sel:li-governmem.t as a matter of practice and not of theory. In line with this ideal, fue established a governmem.t iro. whi.eh the majority party was responsible for tfue results of the admiro.istrati©ro.. Rut this, as has been shown in the preceding cha]i>ter, was not altogether viewe<il with favonr Thy his saccessor, General Leonard Wood. The gtmeral himself was . not a party man by J.l)l'Ofession ©r oy insfi.net. Moreewer, he cl.id not believe in government by party and much less in cali>inet govemrnemt in the Isfan<!ls. tJN the basis ©f a strict interpretati on of the Jones Law, we have seen that this was a government in tii,m e 0£ erisi:s amd mot a party in government . AfteF the tdeatllt @f Ge-mernt W 00d, tlile Ji>Olitical atmosphere was changeci somewhat. The Hon. Eugene A. Gilmore, tl;ien aeting Goverm>r-GeNeral, had already been paving the way for cooperation between the execu-

1aa

P-.Alfl.,f:PES A/Ni[) P-@M'FWS SI,Nlf;E 1927

i 89

WIJJ.en l!fu.e a{!l{!lOi,m,tmen,t r@f

190

DEV:ELOPM'ENT <iJF P-HIU'?PINE POLITICAL PARTIES

ment. This they inte:nd to offer the new G@vernoFGeneral upon his arrival in February. They are telling the people that Quezon has the assuran.c:e tla.at sl!lch a progralill witl be acceptable to Pn;isident Coolidge a:nd Sti,mso:t1. "If the Presi@!ent aml Stimson naii] this lie, the oligarchy wiill the:n refuse t@ 'c001_i)eFate' with the new Governor-Gemeral. · 'They wil'l give as their excuse t he false c:harge that the h@me Gover:nmen.t has mrnken faith."• Unfortunately, while general feeling was steadily advancing toward cooperation and harmony, stories to the contrary were being circulated. 6 This, he>wever, did not seriously impair the ·buena voluntad of both Americams and Filipinos already under cultivatio:t1. 7 Upon his arrival on March 1, 1928, Governor-Gen.era] Stimso:t1 a cddressed the Fili[i>i:n@s as "feMow-ce>uatryr,r,rna" i.,m. a spirit of "sympathetic ar,icl. patiem.t c@o]i)e•ratiom.." 8 His utterance was imJi>ressive ar,icd he qMietdy am.@! €J:lfkkly won the confidence of the Ji)eople, in spite of his previ0usly expressed viewpoint i:n which he To.ad higTo.ly praised General Wood's policies. 9 After assuming the governor-generalship, Col. Stimson soon took steps toward a revival of party government. When the appointive sem.ators and rewresem.tatives, as wa,s the custom, tendered their Fesignations to 0 The Washington Herald, Ilecember 20, 1927. 'Ji1he same text may be found in Cong. R ecord, 70th Cong., !st Sess., p. 916. 6 Cf. The remarks in tl\e American House of 'RepFesentatives, Cong. Record, 70th Cong., !st Sess. pp. 916-917. 7 Ibid. 8 Inaugural Address of Governor-General Henry L. Sti1i1so>1, (Manila, 1928), p. 3. The same text may be found in Co11g. Reoord, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 10394-10396. 9 See his articles : "Future Philippine Policy Under the Jones Act," Foreig" Affairs, April, 1927, pp. 459-471; and "First Hand Impressions of the Philippine Problem," Saturday Evming Post, March 19, 1927. Cf. Philippi1'es Free Press, September 18, 1926, p. 39.

PARTIES AN"J!) P©LITICS SIJ:vCE 1927

191

the n.ew G@;v:ern.0r-@ene11al, Hrny c0Nficlently h0pe<d that the latter w@tdd ask them t0 remain. Much to thei,r surprise1 the 11es,ignati0ns were accepted. To replace these senat@rs, the G@vernor-General, as a matter of expediency, appointed s0me loyal Nacionalista followers of the leacilers ir,i p0wer. 10 'Fhis step b@re fruit and helped effectively in esta,blisTuing a c0i;<d,iail relati0nship between the chief executive an<d the majority in the legislature . . G-0>vern0.r -General s ·timson apparently was a great advocate of responsible cabinet government for the Philippines. Me wrote in 1927 that government on the basi,s @if party res'[!)onsit:>H,i ty was advisable 1.mder the J0nes ili,,aw, whiclil, in his opini0n, c01.dd be made "a bri<dge by which we can pass gradually from a rigidly supervised system of government to one aepend,i,ng more an<d more upon responsibility to politieal parties a1'1.cl pufulic ophuion, and I fuelieve fa rther that tiiie system ti.ms developed under it w0uld be safer a,ncl more e£ficien.t in execution than tlae suggested methods of an American 'Resident Commissioner' @r 'Adviser' supposedly gui<ding a Fi.Lipino G@vernor." 11 Bei,n g l0ya•l t0 th,is ideal, the G0v,ern0r-GeneFal, unlik e General Wood, ad0pted a poUcy of non-interference with the decisi0ns of department secretaries and officials under him, "unless they have been guilty 0f some misconclact or neglect <deserving of grave reprehension 1.0 lliihe G0v.ernor-Genera1' was politely cciticised on the score tl\at his appointments of the eleven senators and representatives to represent the non-CShristian provinces in the legislature had not met the unqualified approval of impartial political observer-s. See Isabelo P . Caballero and 'M. de Gracia Concepcion, Quez o11, The Story of a Natio11 a11d Us Foremost Statesma", (Manila, 1935) pp. 283-284. 11 Henr-y I.. Stimson, "Future Philippine Policy Under the Jones Act,n loc. cit., p. 47.0:

192

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

or even removal from offi.ce.m2 His refusal to interfere with the famous Cornejo Case18 . was a Jilroof of this attitude. In such manner, Governor-General Stimson farther fostered a favourable impression in, Philippine political circles, beca·u se his · Ji>Olicy J>aved the way for re-ex]!)aro.sion of party inf.h1ence npon members of the cafu,iro.et. H sho1,1ld be noted that simce July, f923, the !Philippine government had proceeded withont any regular members of the cabinet except the Vice-Governor and the secretary of the iHterior. The ot11er executive departments were carried on by undersecretaries aeting as heads. Under the circumstances, the executive branch of the government, though still carrying on its ordinary functions, found its cooperative relations with the legislature quite restricted. Such a state of affairs, if further c0mtimued, woul.d seriously UN.do the wolik 0f thte past and rnake a l!)Olitical. filasco 0:f the i.ns1,d ar g0vernment.14 Realizing this danger, Governor-General Stimson was anxious to reinstitute in the nearest li)Ossible future a semi-parliamentary form of government. . Fortunately, the general election was apprnaching. This not only gave the new Governor-General the occasion to observe, at first hand, the political issues, but 12 See the text of Governor-General Stimson's letter to Mr. Miguel R. Comejo dated April 7, 1928 in Philippines Free Press, April 14, 1928, p. 32. The same text may be found in Report of the Governor-General, 1928, p. 31. 13 1n the barrio of Malibay, Pasay, were the pubtic lands, formerly a poction of the M£Kinley military reservation, which had been transferred to the civil government. But a number 0f tenants on the land refused to bid for the plots which they had been occupy,ing and now were in danger of being ousted. The controversy arose out of a sale of the land conducted by the Bureau of Lands. Mr. Miguel R. Cornejo in behalf of the tenants was strongly opposed to the procedure taken by the Bureau, and kept sending telegrams to the Governor-General asking him to interfere. Philippines Free Press, April 14, 1928, p. 32. Cf. Kalaw, "Governor Stimson in the Philippines," loc. cit., pp. 374-375. 14 Report of the Governor-Gmeral, 1928, p. 1. Cf. Philippi»es Free Press, July 14, 1928, p. 30.

[93

the

ml!l,t iny among 'fhe former resident c0mm,issi0ro.e,F aGeasecl! ti.lie Nacionalista J,eacler;; @f treason t©

Demoer.atas 1\.a<!l eai·J]>tU>r@€Ji @ro.tiY 4 seats as agai14st afuimt 20 melHgiFI,g t@ tllie Nacionalista Consolidadfos. 'f o the '.W;0l!lse 0f ~ei')Fes@ro.tativ@s, 01!1,t 0£ 94 mem0ers, 71 wern 16 !IDean C. Wo,cester and Ralston Hayden, 'Fhe Philippi11es, Past a11d ~rese11t {New y;or~ 1930~, p. 781. W<he 1Ma11ila Times, Ap,il 12, 1,928.

1194

©EiVEl!@PME:NrL' ©F PB,JP.,VPPl:N'E PDLI1'ICM. PARTIES

Naei@r1J0;li:sb0; C0ws0lid,ad0s as against 16 Democr(J;tas. 18 1'1.iJiis sli.@wecl that tfu.e seatim,eat @f the 00l!l.ro.try was strnr,i,g for the policy ocli C<!>GJDerati®J;J.. UJD0ro. the basis 0:f the r.iew <dectiom, t¥ie Eightll Legislattitre, after f e-electi•Hg Qw.ez0n p11esident of the $e.m.ate -an<d R0xas SJDeak!@·F @£ the M@ase, Jilassed the fam0us Befo iEiH wh,i «h al!l.th0rized an aJN<lil!l!lal apJilFOJilriati@n of JD250,00G €$~25,000} 'fi@r the empl©yment therewitm by the Goverro.or-Gemtral 0£ technical advis011s and civiliaN a ssistants wh0se tl!l.•Flet i@n was t0 Sl!lJDply the G@iVernor-Genernl with the ir,ifor1111ati0111 c0ncenrrililg the administration of the g0vernment whieh was re<iJ_uired for the proper perfo11manoe @!E n. is dl!l.ties of sl!tpervision and con rnl. 19 This was aN expressiol'l of buerva voluntad · !Dy the legislature an@ a Necessary step t0war<d the (development of Filipiro.o admiro.istirati,ve aat@n@my. In liris own words, Governor-Genernl Stirns<:>m related that: "uro.€ler the orga111ie act tm.e G@vern@r-Geaera[ is personally respor,isible :for the suwervisi@ro. aro.cd c0nt.ol of the er,itire workings @£ t'me executive furnnch 0£ the government. :Hie, thereif@Fe, c@urM m@t :properly delegate a1At@ro.om0uts powers t® fuis €1-eJilartment 18 Philippfoes Free Press, J,une 9, 1928, pp. 25 et seq.; The Manila T,imcs, June 6, 1928. Ct. Directorio Qjjcial de la Camara de Representalltes, 8th Legis., 2nd Sess., pp. 6-8. The Democra fa Party was not only materially weakened in botih houses of the legislature, but also lost its six-year contr0l over- the City of Manila. 'EheFe were two main causes which bFought about fur-ther weakening of the opposition: (I) The people had long been tired of the fruitless nonco-opeFation for which the De111ocratas weFe practieally compelled t0 stand since the majority had strategieally chosen t0 pFomise cooperation. €2~ The personalities of the De1110Mala leader-s weFe badly overshadowed by those of MessFs. Quezon and Osmeiia dur-ing the coalition which died its natural death sho.rtly p;:eceding the election.

19 The bill was opposed by the 'fJe111ocratas headed by Senator Sumulong, 0n the gFound that it would give the Governor-General power to er-eet a "super-cabinet" of appointees not subject, to c0nfirmation l\y the Senate, which could take over the du6es of the Filipino department secretaries. See PhiUppines Free Press, August 11, 1928, · pp. 25 and 30.

P..~,RPl tES AWÂŽ PÂŠMfl!lC!:S Si/!NCE 1927

li95

iR,e.port of, the @.over-nor-Gener.al, 1928, p. 7. Cifi. iKalaw., "@ever,nev Stimson in tl,e Pfiitippines," loc. cit.) p. 37!1. 22 iibid., pp. 3:15-37,6. 28 T<'he 'ffr,ibtme ~Manila~, Septembev 1, 1928; ",Jfie Rutuve. of the Pfiitippines," f1.i'lipi110 N atdo", September,, 1929. 24 See W<he' Mianila 'F:imes, Jiuly 5, 1928. Cf,. Message of Governor-{;menal $timso1' to the Eight/, Philippine l.egislatune, ('Manila, 1928) pp. 3-4. 20 21

_liluty,, st.t!Jij@€t Ii@ the €®lil.Selil.t @.f the G@veFR©r-Genern1, of s·wl;,lil.ilit'titll:g t0 i.ro.t,erJ.i>dfa'ti.@ia Ui@re©m. 25 Wilim. tlli.,e a@©)Dti@n (') /f th@ l.'l.@€essary 1mfos of ]D·r ®c@<ltu.41@by tm.e legislature, l:!fue fourth alil.d' last ste]D tfuat fol'lGwecd! was tm.@ re-@stablis'fumelibt ®ill the. Cot.tm.<si,l of Stta:t€! Illy G-@vem®r-Gelil.eral Sti.rnson Dlil pt.tFSUalil.ce witfu tll1e i!Ex€!eutive On;l€!r No. UlD iW:blid1 reacds ais ,£©J1l0ws: "A C@t.tn.c,i1 0£ §tate iis To.erebiy _<s11eatecl' ~© a<ilvis€! the Gov@m(j)11-Gen@ta~ ON Sbl€N mat1le11s @'Ii pal:.ili.c _l\)Olicy as he Jililaiy ilir@m time 110 time lay b>e:liore it. J;Iie sfuail,I li>e tm.€! p,,resi<dirmg @fficer @:€ sudrr Cou1,1cil 0£ State, alilcl i.t small C(j)nsis,t 0f such ]DeFSGHS ais from time ti@ time maiy b>e ap)D@,imtecd! alil.cl! summG-He<d: by, him. U m.ti! otlu.erwise 0rderecl Illy nirn, it shaU c@nsist 0f the Frnsi<dent 0£ the Senate, the Speaker @f the if fouse of Representatirves, tl!t€! Majority Fl00r Leamer of tl!te Senate, the Ma:j0,r ity Fl@or JLea€l.er odI the Mouse of Rep,r eset1tatives, a"1ilcl! tfue Weads 0,£ tlrn six Executive Dep,arbm:ents." 26 Th€! cot.tficil s© cl.'eat ecl was tfue m@s,'t n@ttafole :featwre 1i11 t1ie fra:mewG11k @ill g@;veFmmeFJ.t NFJ.@er S,ti,r,nson's ad1111inistratio:a. In regar@ 't@ its c@mJi>0sitiolil., the iflch1.sion of the two maj@11i.1ty !lil.@@r leaiaers im the e01rncil, w a s given an a:<'foliti@11ai signif.ican€@ a:s i.t s soG~e @,f Fewresenta1ii(')lil becarn1e wideF. 27 b regarcl t® its fancti @m, it diffeFed stiN fut m.eF ':lirnm t1rn 001.mci1] creat ed under G0vemorGenernl Ha.n :ison i1il r~]g_ Tfue mew o@t.t®ci1, i.4'1. e@,r.ltraist to its predecessC>r, had! :aev,er s1i1.~e1.1 secled the ihrnctiotlJ.s of tfue cab~l.'l@t. "Om tfue c0mtra1.1y," said 'Prn£ess0r QairiFlG E. Aus,t ria, "aU ilil.Cllicati@n:s ]j>®ilil:I: t@ tfue ~er11Nal!l1

26 A cta~ del Senado de Fi{.pinas ! Manila, 1929 ~. ~0mo XUl, p. 33; Diorio de Sesiones, 8th li..eg., J.st Sess., pp. 404 cl seq. Cf. Report of the Gover11or.-Ge11eral, 1928, p. 7; Philippines F1'ee Press, September !, i928, p. 36. 26 E* erntive Or.de.Ys and J?,yoo/amations ~Manila, 1929~, p. 60. 'ifhe text is a!s0 given in Reporl of the Governor-Ge1'eral, 1928, p. 35. 27 Supr,a, p. 119.

P-lll!RTIES ANID f'0UTICS SINCE 1927

197

ence an<!i irnernasing i.tsefo1rness of the Cabinet." 28 Although tliere was no definite rule of demarcation as to the resJ!lective functions of the council and the cabinet, Governor-Gernerai Stirnsom: thought it advisable to separat e the fun cti@ns 0f the two. There seems to have beern a well-estafuiishecd Ftde tliat matters of _purely aclrnirnistr ative cfu,a racter welie to be laid before the cabinet, wliile those ocfi pu.blic Ji>Olicy were to be considered by the Cou.rnci'1 of State.29 J u.dged from this standpoint, GQ¥ernor-G@rneral Stimson should be given a place in _the hall of statesmarnship :for his success in establishing invaluable machil!J.ery for harmony and unity of the executive and legislative au.thorities, and still, at the same time, retaining the American theory of government k!!J.0wn as seJ!larati@n gf powers, He would have been 1mable t@ pu.,t parlfamentary form! of government into Jilra:etiee, hacl l,i@ not t1secd the Cou.l!J.cil of Sta te, an extralegal fu @<ily as a li>ricdge fr@m @ne form to the other. In sim ple words, lhis wa:s a reS•J!lOl!J.siMe eab>inet g @vernm<m.t in the el@thes 0£ a president ial system. GovernorGe!!J.eral Stimsol!J. To.as 0bviot1sly been a great \believer in parliamentary government of the British fashion. He stressed the convention rather than the law of the consti-tution. In li,is 0piiniGn, there was, unde:r the J!lrovisions of tlie Jones Law, sufficient flexibility for the working out of Phi1lippine a'l!ltonomy througli the development of a responsifule cabinet system w'hich, as he remarked, "will be both satisfactory to the natural Filipino cdesirn for su.eli admi,rnistrative au.tonomy and which, 28 "'Jibe Caoinet and <\:ouncil of State," Philippi,ie Soc. Sci. Re1J., · ' Novembe,-Decemlie,, 1929, p. 227. 29 " . • • Gover.no,F-<Eiener.al Har.r.ison permitted a number of statutes to be passed thereafter which transfecred the then council of state into an administrative body in which the Governor-General might be outvoted ·by the other: members," said Gover,nor-General Stimson, "my council of stat~ by its terms, was created as purely an adtVisory b0dy ; and public announ<~ement was made· by me that it would be continued as such." R eport of the Governor-General, i 928, p. 8. Cf. Austria, "The Cabinet and Council of State," lo a. cit., pp. 227-228.

198

DEVELOPMENT OF 'Pf.IILIPPINE POUTICAL PARTIES

at the same time, will preserve the safeguards against possible mistakes aad setbacks which may come in that process.- I believe that such a system worked out by the meth@d of a<!lmimistrative evolution under the jDresero.t la:w will be far mo,r e effideat, satisfact0ry, amid: sate than any whieh is Hkely t0 be attaimed tlilr01ag'h 1egi,slatiom l_l)assed fuy rom American Congress, wfuich necessarily is imperfectly informed as to Phi1lipph1e conditioms. It wm have the inevitafule advantage which is possessed in all human affairs by the method of gradual evolution by trial and error over any attempt to create at once and for all time a com]i)lete system of statute." 80 The achievememt of G0vernor-Gemeral Stimson in deciding the framework of Philippine government was extremely usefa1l amcl prnisewort hy. Sii.uJe the restorati0m 0f ]i)aJ,r t y gov;ernmemt tro:ere !fua:di been rnalikecd !fualimony and cordial cooperation Thetween the exeel!ltive and legislature. The use of the executive veto over fogislation had been reduced to a rninimum. 81 iBefore ti.na11y determining to veto any lDill, Governor-General Stimson always consulted with the majority leaders of the legisla~ ture through a meetiro.g 0f the Counc_il of State; ancl "the conferences thus held have," he said, "I believe, been pr@ductive of g;emeral acquiesoence amd satisfacti<i>m wit1i t1ie results obtaifil.ed." 82 Oro.e may, .therefore, reiterate, that party contrnl, untder normal okcl!lmstaro.ces, has beero. aro.cd wiU always Tue a :liÂŠree 0'li uro.ity and harm0ay i,n so R eport of the Gover11or-General, 1928, p. 9. 81 R eport of the Governor-General, 1929, p. 3.

Ibid., 1930, pp. 4-5. Ibid., 1931, p. 10. Cf. Quirino Austria, "The Stimson Budget Plan," Philippine Soc. S ci. Rev., September, 1929, p. 40. 32 Austria, "The Stimson Budget Plan," loc. cit., October, 1929, p. 93.

P!A!RTI•liJS AINID P©MTl<J:S S,zN,CliJ 1927

]99

g@vernmeF1t. The Stims©n budget plam might perhaps serve as a-Fl excel'l en,t illustration. . In this plan the G@:vern@r-Geneiral pw0p@sed th.at c©F1c_em..tration of poweF amd resp©FlsiJ;,ility in the hands of the executive be eHacted as this was requi,r ed for the initiation and control of th.e fi.namsial p@licies. The leg.islature must, therefore, not Tue alilowed t© increase tlile _bmdgetary estimates. 'T0 memfuers of tne legislatare this would mean a renunciation or cu,r tai1lment of their established powers. This soon caused a storm 0£ @pposi,ti@n among the major.i,t y members @f the legislature. Senate President Quezon, leader of the majority party, thereupon, quickly called a ea1,1cus meeting in which he frankly assured the majori,t y members th.at t he rec@gnized maJori,t i}" leaders and auth0rizec;f represeF1tatives of the legislature had duly been eoF1s1,1lted aml haGI° participated in ·the make up of the budget. Tlilis explanatiom. fur@ke down the oppositi©n.33 [n th.e same caucl!ls a res01at ioF1 was adopted explaining im. part that the system introduced by Govern©r-«Genei:-al Stimson with the approval of the Council ©di $talie, reg.a,r ds t@ mmlget makiFlg, was mot only in harmc.m.y with t1ie ]i)@licy @riginally adopted by the maj0rity or Partido Nacionalista Consolidado, but actua.Jly re0.0l!lbled legislative participatiom. in the pre', parn,ti©m of tr1ie l;m dget. 84 From the [!>Olitical standpoiF1•t , the administl:ati<:m 0! Govem0r-General Stimson was a jubilant success. His was a task s,p lendidly J;,egun aF1d abundantly accomJi)li:sliJ.ed. 'fTue 60v;em@r-Gem.e-r al @IDvi@usly knew Filipino p@l:i,t ieal metnoclsS well, anc;I iikewise 1,1nderstood the lLatin ancl OrieF1tal attitade t@wards 1,i£e. His departure in 1

El @ebate, August 23, 1929. El Deba~e, A:ugust 23, 1929. Cf. Austria, "The Stimson Budget Plan," /oc, cit., Oetober, 1929, p. 94. 38

200

®EVELOP-MEN,T ©Fl P-IHLXP.PlNiE P-OMTIGAL P-.ARTlES

llV@IJH;uaFy, reg:Fet. 35

l!l>29 was viewe<lli wi,th, alm©st

umiversal

Diss@luti@n @f the Par,tidi;o Derrwer.0;ta

Witla tme systeJilil 0m I_Dal'liamelil•tar,y gove11JJ1meat whielh. @volved u,F1der S,t i,rns@m/ s regime, it was alrn0st im~0ssi,IDie tfuat d ie ffJemocratas, s~nce tln.ey wer,e s0 weak, sl!i.01dd fue -J;Jermittecd! t0 share iN 'the p0li1ti<ta,l 1_Datr0F1age. Tl.lie 00,F1tiJJ1,ua:mce by Go-vemer,-GernernA Dwight F. Davis 0£ the Stimson i!1©1iey aFJ.d system @iii g©;vernm,emt 86 fuad, liN©l'ee>ver, p>iacecd: t!JJ:e Dem©cratas at a fortfuer disadvamt ag:e. The 0n[y h91_De tmey et1tertai,JJ1ecl, theFeffi@re, was a 1,9 0ss.ib,le gait1 in the next electi0n to take ]i>lace Olil June 2, lli931. 'Ffue ele<tti©lil was :lfo>ugfut ©ut on iss\iles largely lo<tal @F persoroal iFJ. lilatmre. The Derrwer01tas, f@F i,.r,rstaroce, a:tt atked the majori1ty leaders as @iigar cfus wllrom they fueled to mave l.ililisu:sed pwbli<t :liuncls :f@r p0]iti<tail fa:v@l'itism i,m the for_m of "]i)@rk li>ar:rel" 3l]i)JDFG]i)Fiati©lilS. 8~ 'Fhe latter, 85 C0lonel Stimson was called back t0 Washingt0n and assumed the office of secretary of state in Pr.esiaent Ho0"e•'s caoinet. He had spent nearly a year in the Philippines in wl\ich time, besides the re-establishment 0f ha,vmonious relationship between the executi:ve and the legfalatuFe OF the restoration 0£ tl\e par.ty go"e-rnment, the colonel had attempted the ec0nomic deve1opment of the Philippines. T his policy was Feflected paFticulaF,l;y in the libeFalization 0£ the land and c0Fpor,ati0n laws. See f'hil,i;ppines F·ree P ·ress, !Febr.uar,y 9, l929, p. 37. Cf. Quezon's r-emarks in New Y o·r k Times, February 7, 1929. 36 See Max,imo M. Kalaw, "Unparalleled &r.owth in Sel'f-Govemment," in Philip'f)i1'es Free Press, August 26, 1933, pp. 93 et , seq. Message of the Governor-Ge,n eral to the Eighth Philippi11e Legi~lature ~Manila, 1930), pp. 3-4. s~ Jose P . i)l,aurel, a prominent Nacionalista-Consolidado, dur,,ing his eleGtion campaign, even took a stand £0r both tl\e oligarchy and pork barrel appr.opr.iation, I,le said: ;,I am not sure whether the s,rstem of poF,k bar-rel has n0 mer.its at all. [t is, however., tl\e system adopted in many democratic countries. The ~ones Law provides that members 0£ the l0wer h0use shall be elected l\y districts. As long as this system of representation remains and as long as members of the legislature are n0t forbidden to introduce measures carrying a char-ge

PARTIES A!N'D POLITICS SINCE 1927

201

©n ti<re otl.lrer 1.iia:l!lcd!, cl'en@11noecil the £orrn.er as iFurnpaMe @f dlischargsiro.g the fanctions of opposit-ion. The result of tfu.e eleetiom. was again, as expected, an overwhelming vietory for M'i:e l')arty in p0we,r. 88 Th.e Demoeratas were able to mai<:e small! gains, since the quest of a strong oppositi@m was clearly manifest in the affairs of the I:slands. This hope, h.@wevei·, wais sfu.ort-Iived beca11se one Democrata senator and two representatives died soon afte-r tlie electi<!m and they were replaced by the Thus th~ majority memfuer:s iro. s,l')ecial electi@ns. Democrata strnngth was reduced. to three in the Senate 39 an<!l ten in th.e liliouse of Representatives . 1i'lii.e effects o:fi the eleeti@n were highly significant. The maj0rity party, on the basis of the pol')ular mandate, oro.<se m@re ero.u,ro.eiate<il tnat me.1nbers of the cabinet should be acc©Mntafule primairiiy t0 the wiitt of tlae majority l')arty in the legislature. Any Fi,lipiro.o member of the cabinet, wfu.o :failed to eng@y the colilfi<ience of the majority party, w011Id fue facecd! with 110 choice bu.,t to resign. This deon the public ·treasury, just so long will the pork barrel system exist. Members of the legislatur,e are pledged to seGure improvements for their r,espective constituendes. And as long as the popular success of a member oi the legislature is measured by the amount of improvements he secured for his district, so long will the system of pork barrel prevail." :As to oligarchy, Mir. 11aurel deG!ar.ed that "E do not believe that the world will ever get rid of oligarchs as long as men differ from one another in natural abilities, in mental and physical vigor. As there is pligarchy in business so there is oligarchy in politics." The Pliilippi11es H erald, May 1 30, 1,931. SB From the Partido Nadonalista Co11solidado 6 senators, 69 representatives, 30 pr,ovincial governors and 45 members of provincial boards were elected, as against 4 senators, 12 Fepr.esentatives, 8 provinGial governors, and i3 member.s oii pr,ovindal boards f.r.om the Partido Democrata. Complete statistics on the fiumber of voters registered and votes cast were not available for all pr.ovinces, but in 32 provinces and the city oii Manila ther.e were 1,149,596 voters registered for the election \of 1931, shewing an increase of. 19 pe• cent. over the number, of. cvoters r.egistered in these same d'ist,iuts in 1928. See 'Report of the Govemor-Gener'al, 1931, pp. 12, 92. For a complete election retum, see The Pliilippi1>es Herald, June s, 1931. 89 iNew ¥ork 'Fi,nes, !November 8, 1-931 .

202

!IDEV!E,I;,OPM!ENT OF- li'HILT'l?PINiE :P.OLLTW'AL PARTIES

da.:rati@m, as ex;I!Jla,i,mectl, was ma<lle lily reas@m of the faet tfuat drn eafuimet fuacl lately Tueem liJ.il•l!lcfu cl@sel' to the Gov,e,rn@r-Gero.e,ral tha,m t@ tlire legislatue. 40 Om the @tif.i.eF hamcl, :t@I' tfue FJemecratas the electi0n was FatheF umfort1J1na te. TheFe was, however, a maFked la<sk of ]i)arty zeal ev,em am@mg the leadeFs. Tlii,r ee of the :f@l!lF Dem0er<1;ta senatoFs reii1Jtsecl. to rum ,f©r re-ele<stion. M0re disc@urnging still, 5enat©F Sumulong wfuo did n0t preser,ut l!i.imself for re-electi0n, resig;r.1ecl as pFesidemt 0£ the Partid0 Dem0crata on tTo.e eve 0£ tFie electiG>n. 41 The imciclirnt so0m ir.1vitecd much tF0111.hle aro.d [e<;l. to the inevitah>le <des,t rnction of the ]i)aFty itseH. , After the reti,r nmen,t @f SNmuloRg, tfue (ij_il!lestion a m or.1g the Democrata,s was who slh@td<ll. bie chosen leader of the party. Knowing fl!lH well the iRsicle c©mJillicati0ns 0f the mi,n 0Fity party, Os,r nefia as a maj@rity leadeF and acting ji)residen,t @f the Seaate, seized t l:li.e occasi011 ti© ]i>lay a n10s,t imteFesting F©le i.n l!leter1.1J.11.,i n,i ng @n wh@m tm.e leaelership smol!lla fall. Am.01iJ..g t'l.J.e · m,i,r.10ri,ty leacl.ers, Semato,r s Claro M. :Re<st@ am<lt RN]l)ert0 M@ntin@la weFe then e<JJ:uaUy jl)0werfa1l fi.gNFes fuetweem whom the €hoice hacd to be made. S f.10rtly a:liter tlite ele€ti0n, Osmei:ia sen,t Senator Mon,ti.n@la a comgrn,tl!lfatoFy message i,n wro.ieh Jae stated: "My sin€€F•e li€lidtati@,n s for y0u,r electicno. Your emtFance in th€ 1egis[atue will give y@u an O)ilp@rtu.nity to analyze th€ l!)F@Mems ©li the country wi,th perfect kn0wled1ge @f facts and :from a:n elevated J9lain of res1]!)0nsilh>le aetl!lati@n. As ree@gmized leader @f tlrre 0pp0sition, yoa win have the right t0 exeroiise free:ly y@ur rnle as :ffi:scaliz€r, and win have the Figfu,t t@ i11sist that the majority party put New York Times, November 8, 1931. Mr. Sumulong tendered his resignation on tl\e ground of poor health. For the text of his letter of resignation, see The PMUppi>1es Herald, J,une 3, [931. Cf. Phdlip pi11es Free f'ress, July 4, !1931, p. 4. 40

4l.

PARTIES A!N~ POLITICS SINCE 1927

203

tl.,r@l!lg1k i1ts pv@gvarn @f m.a:i,n tai,ro.ing an efficieNt aro.d · hom~st adm>inistra..ti©ro.. 'To your Jl>redecessor in the Senate, Senator Suml!llong, whose patriotic services are rnc0gnized t>y all, means have been given to examiro.e the labors of the majority party, and the same 0pp0rtuni,t y w.iM be tendered you. "Witlii ol!l,v 00ng;ra,tl!llati0Ns accept our assurance tliiat we wiJll help y0u in every way possible to guide the opposition thrn_ugh noble paths of patriotism and resJl>onsi•t>ility." 42 This memorable message served to indicate, in the first place, the incai') at>i1ity of the Democratas to assume the mle @:ll 0pr,>0siti0ro. u,ro.1Jess the majority lea<ders offered them gui<dance. It was, therefore, taken by the Demo~ cr(l)ta leaders as an insult to their intelligence. In the second place, the message might be considered as an act of politica~ revenge. One would, perhaps, recall that duri,n g the iNaci@naLista s,pli,t in [922, Senato,r Recto was often acc1J1sed of naving a<dmed 0il t0 the fire of enmity between Quezon and Osmefia.48 This also explained why Osmefia worked against Recto's appointment as justice of the supreme court while Quezon was in fact heart and semi for the distingl!lished Democrata lea:der. 44 Fr@rn tlile staro.dp@int 0f the majori,t y pattty, many may have 1ih01!1ght the message of Osmefia a m\ost sagacious m @ve iro. politics. F0r, insi<de the Partido Democrata itself, tl:iere ha<d been forces working against the 'fhe proposed leadership of Senator Mcmtinola. 45 strategy @f Osmefia, umfor the circumstances, would serve t0 cal!lse a_S•Jl>lit withiro. the @Jl)j_i>0siti0N in ovder that the Fa'Y'tid@ N,o,eiorna!lista Oo'/'/JSolidado might feel a:ssl!lred of ccmtinuea! prep@ndevance in the realm of poli,tics. 42 48

« 45

Philippines Free Press, July 4, 1931, p. 4. Ibid., p. 68. 1'biiJ. I.bid., :July

193'1 , p. 26.

204

DEVELOPMEN T OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

It w@1,1ld be interesting to note what were the resJj>ectiv;e reacti@ns 0f fu©th M<ilro.1tiro.01a aim!: Recto following the famous message of Osmefia. Being recognized l>y the majority, leaders as head of the Partido Democ-nata, Montinola soon proposed a means of possible coop<eration fu€tween the two contending parties. In a most friendly manner, he expressed !!he opinion tnat: "There is no disagreemero.t as to the wish for immediate imclependence, fuut there is a disagreeme nt with regard to certain details of manner and procedure. "The majority party should initiate this study, with the assma:nc€ of the enth,1,1siastic s1,1pport and cooperation of the Partido Democrata which has never been chary of its assistaro.ce in things pertain46 ing to the early attainment of our liberty." On the other hand, Recto, who had @nce launched 7 a sensational attack on the majority party in 1924,' the of majority the again raised quite a stir by accusing practice of holding secret caucuses and c0mmittee meetimgs in the legislature. The famous senator boldly addressed his colleagues in the :folil owing words: "Secrecy is, indeed, the spirrnl colamn of your government . State secrets iro. the managemen t of funds of independenc e campaigns; state secrets in the aclmin,i stration @:ii the til.llaro.ces of g0vernment owned companies; state secrets in your negotiations with the sovereigro. wower all>o1,1t the future i;iolitical status of the Philil)pine Islands; state secrets in the discassion and apprnval o:ii legislative and administrative measures in the internal administrat ion of the governmen,t. 46 Rupento Montinola, "Where the Minority WiU Help," Philippines Free Press, July 4, 1931, p. 26. 47 Supra, pp. 178-179.

PARTIES ANID P(!)UfPICS S'IN<,;E :1927

205

"Wnem im ]~2@ y@t!! w:ante<ll to im.erease t@ several miH.ioms, throt!!gh legislation, the capital of the Phil,ip)!lim.e National :Bank, the opposition, which wanted to work inteliligently om. the matter, asked yol!l to reveal the financial co111.0.ition of the bank, or t0 J!lUMis'ti the re,port of the special investigator, Mr. C@ates. :But y01!1. re:fased our )!letition, taking refuge in tll.e mucn s@ught secret of state and, to avoid pani<., you gave assurances that the finances of the institution were going smo0thly, that it was far from going bankrnpt. It 11.appened afterwards that as a resuil t @f an a@rninistration which was as reckless as it was d:isliJ.ÂŠ111.est the bank lost the trifling sum of sevemty million )!les0s, if not more, affecting the cleposits of the pri,ncipal governments and even the gol<;t reserve fu,nd. Your state secrets carried the g0vernment to baRkruptcy, and to prev;~m.t the crisis you lila!Cl! ti@ circulate, iR open violation of our monetary laws, ')!}aioer bii11'1s which were 111.ot supported by siiver deposits, for they were rn.ere guarcJ,m.tees 011 bonds so that you could save y0urselves and the nation from completely failing." 48 Senat0r Recto was obviously very anxious to see in the Phili,ioioines, a strnng opposi,tion party which lite deemed 111.@cessa:ry iÂŁ 0.ernocraey was to march on. He soon ent@rtaiRecl the R@tion of dissolving the Partido Democrata in the hope that a stronger 0ppositi@n might be 0rganize0. iFl its pla<.e. 49 It seems to have been folly agree@ arn@m.g the targer 111.,t!lmber of the Democratas that the party, hacl. already @utlived its 11seifa1[111.ess. 'fhe majority ioarty, in e0F1tra:st to the DemocratC1Js 11.ad coF1tim1ally bieeFl overwhelmi,111.gly strong. 'fheiJi methods 0f party government, as a writer put it, were such that 48 49

Diario de_ Sesio11es de la :Legislat11ra Filipi11a, Vol. VI, num. 30, p. 249. Philippines Free Prsess, 0ctober 10, l931, p. 25.

206

D'E'li"Em<5>1i'MENT OF 'PHLLIPP1NE POLITICAL PARTIES

"the opposition hacl little @r no v@ke in the determ i111ation of p©licy, and meager p>olitical FewaFd. The appointment of am 0c€asi@nai repFesen.,t ative on an independence mission t0 the United States was usually the highest re€ognition accorded. J:>uliilic works apJ_Drnpriatioms 11.ave liieen maefe on a party basis, and districts indiscreet enough t0 elect a minority representative, have been forced to accept minimum of public imprnvements." 50 'fhe IJemocratas in (i)ct0ber, !93 [, held a matiom.al convention in which the qMestion of dissollcltion was discussed. The difference of opinion among the delegates was s0 sharp, that the conventiom, at the proposal of Senator A~ejo Mabanag, adopted a: resolMtion for compromise, t0 the extent that the party be given an opportunity until next January to gain new adherents and negotiate with other opposition p>arties or groups with a view to forming a new organization or a c0alition headed by the Democratas. 51 When the Democrata nationa,l convention again met 0n ]ianMary 31, 1932, t1J.1e tllelegattes, adite,F ama1yzi,m.g t1ie systematic failure of the party, clecided my a vote of SO to 11, to dissolve · the weak opposition, the Partulo Democrata, despite the strong objection of th:e delegates from Manila. 52 It should be noted that the dissolution of the party took place in the absem.ce of Senator Montinola and Representative Tirona, minority floor leaders of their respective chambers and mern0eFS 0£ the mew im.dependence mission then at Washington. Upon receipt 0f a message pertaining to the dissolution, Senator Montinola declared most emp>hatiealty that as a torrner p1·esident of

New Y ork Times, November 8, 1931. Philippines Free Press, October 10, 1931, p. 25. 52 New Y ork Times, February 1, 1932. Cf. The Philippi1ies Herald, January 18, 1932. 50 51

207

66 66

P/iilippfoes 1/iree ?ress, M:aâ&#x20AC;¢cli 21, 1931, p. 8.

208

DEVEL@'PMEN'P OF f'iHIM:P:PZNE IPOLlTfG:AYL 'PAR!l'IES

line with his intents and purposes, the l@ader refused to run for re-election. And, third, he chose tÂŠ rnsigm, 0n the eve of the general election, from the presidlency of the

Partido Democrata.

It is reasonahile to believe that these acts were systematically umdertakero. tÂŠ cdisc01mrage the 0pposition party already inca]i)a@le of performing its proper functions. Undoubtedly the sagacious Sefior Sl!lm11long must have .had good reason to antici)!late another split in the majorit y party. JMdge<11. in the Hght @iii this p@ssible, if not inevitable development, to destroy the weak, then, was to make way for a strong opposition. And, similarly, 1:1nder the circumstances, forming a str0ng 0p]i)osition, woul<11. mean am attempt to split the maj0d1ly ]i)arty. As expected, there came in 1933, a serious quarrel in the majority party over the Hawes-Ha-re-Cuttin g Bill. 57 The Democratas completed their task as a most realistic opposition following a mew aligN!m.ent wit h which we shall deal shortly. 1

Quezon and Osmena in Their Seeond Struggle for Leadership

By 1930 there seemed to !De a growimg reactionary force in the Un~ted States a:gaiinst Filipino mational asji)iration. Although President Hoover was then silent on the subject of Philippine independence, two secretaries of his cabinet were quite outspoken. Im his letter to SeF1ator Bingham, Se<rnetary Pa:lirick ). Hu11ley of the War Department wrote that: "No diminution of American control in the Islands, below that which may prol')erly be effected l!l.nder the present organic act, sh0ald ID.e brnugbt ab0ut while the responsibility incident to American sovereignty 57 George A. Malcolm, The Commonwealth of the Philippiiies (New Yor-k, 1936), pp. 214 et seq. "Parties and Politics,'' The Philippines Herald Year Boo/,, 19!34, pp. 35 et seq.

'.f.'ARTI•ES AND POLITICS SINCE 1927

209

in jihe Fl:iii,iiJ!)J!llnes c0ntim,1es; aml!l that it w01:1lcl be inexl_!)edient and ltaza!idous to attempt to anticipate futuFe developments by fixing any future date for ultimate indepen.clence." 68 Alm0st at the same time, Secretary of State Stimson decla1"ed that a miro.imum of thirty years would be re(iuir_ed t© train the !Fil,ipi,rios to staro.d on thek own feet. Tfu.e :foFmer Go:vernor-Gero.eral's opinfon_was that to grant inclep@ndence sooner, would be disastrous not only to the in,habitants of the Islaends, but to American interests as well. 69 fo the summer of 1930, President Hoover chose 1!0 app0ili)!t Nicfu.olas Roosevelt Vice-Governor of the Phi~i]!)piro.es. Among the Fi1li J!)inos this €aused a storm of protest. 60 Mr. R0osevelit had long been known -as an acrimc,mi0us critic of the Philippines. In his book em.titled The Philippines: A Treasure And a Problem, published in iJ.926, the criti€ statecl that the Malay race is in£eri0r, aro.c;] tl'le fllli,iti1pJ.ilin es are aei,tfu.er ready for nor anxi@us to To.aiVe api;iiied demo<sracy. Me thought of selfgovernment in the 'Philippin.es as a question not of a few years, bat @f a few generations. 61 Alth0ugh the Sen.ate, because of protests from both without aro.d within, refase<d to confirm the Roosevelt aJ.ilpoi,n tment, the <sh•a in 0f reacti0na11y devel0pment · had al!i-eacly caused e0nsicll:erable stir am@ng the Wi:li,piF10 62 patriots. FoUowing t1ie first indepenclence congress 1

68 S. Doc. No. 150, 71st <i:ong., 2nd Sess., p. 6. Cf. Philippi,r.es Free Press, 'May 24, 1930, p. 41. 69 Pl,ilippines Free Press, May 31, 1930, p. 48. 60 See Quezon's letter to President !Hoaver in protest of Mr. Roosevelt's appointment, in <i:arlos Qufoino, Quezon, Ma11 of, E>estiny ~Manila, 1935), p. 63. It ma;y also be found in Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., pp. 295-296. 61 See his book, Chapter IV., "Democracy vs. IDespotism." 62 This congress · was held for the purpose of convincing the United States that the Filipino people were deeply conscious of the responsibilities of nationhood and were prepared to assume them. H earfog before tfie House C01"1"ittee o" Insular A:/fairs, 71 Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 50-52. For details of the Independ'enee Cong,ess, see Proceedings of the First l,ndepe,,dence Congress , (fyl!anila, 1!130,.

210

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

heM in MaNi•la, aad enc@mraged l>~ the DeJ.il.ilocratic gaim in the United States Congre~s as a resl!llt o,:li tne election in N0vember, 1930,63 the Phili],)pine Legislatu,re sent a new independence mission t0 the United States, headed by Sena~or Osmefia and 5peaker Roxas, and accompanied by Re],)resentative Pedro Sal>id0, and Semators M0ntinola and Emiliano T. Tir@ro.a, majori.tty a:nd rn,i,nority f.lo©r leaders respectively. After nearly tw@ years 0f strenuous effort, the Osmeiia-Roxas Mission, late in t932, ohtained from Congress an independence law known as the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act. 64 The success of the Osrox ( ab>breviati0ro. for Osrro.eiia-R0xas} J.il.iliss,io1a in persuading Congress to ena:ct the law gramti,ro.g Fili,J,)forros g-reater autonomy, naturally became a subject 0£ paramount interest in the l0ng struggle for supremacy between the Quezon and Osrnefia factions. Quez0n must 1i.ave realized the daro.ger to 1i.is natioro.a,l leadership if Osrneiia were to retl!lrn as ai triwmpn.aro.t nati0nal 1i.ero. The government in Manila under tllie Quaquat ( abbreviaPhilippines F,·ee Press, November 8, 1930, p. 37. Some main provisions of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act were: 1. A trnnsition period of 10 years, during which the following limitations 9n duty-free imposts horn the Philippines into the United States will be in effect: 800,000 tens of crude sugar., 50,000 tons ef r.efined sugar, 200,000 tons of cocoanut oil and 3,000,000 pounds of cordage; 2. A quota of SO immig,ants a year is allowed the Philippines; 3. A graduated export tax (from S to 25 per cent.) on Philippine exports to the United States will commence the sixth year of the commonwealth, the proceeds being used to pay off Philippine government bonds; 4. The Philippine Legislature must appr.ove the independence bill and the Philippine people must approve the consti!,Ution 0£ the Phil'ippine commonwealth before either went info effect. See H. R. 7233, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. A complete text may also be found in the Philippines Free Press, January 21, 1933, pp. 32 et seq. The bill was vetoed by President Hoover on January 13, 1933. For his veto message see Co11g. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1759-1761. Cf. New Yori, Times, January 14, 1933; New Yori, Herald Tribu11e, :January 14, 1933. For details see Camilo Osias and Mauro Baradi, The Phi/i.ppi11e Charter of Libert,'I (Baltimore, [933~, passim. But Congress soon repassed the bill over the President's veto. See C011g. Record, 72nd Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1768-1769. 68 64

PAR!PIES A!NID f'@UTlQS SINCE 192'1

ti0n for Qt:rnzon, · Aquino aro.d Alas) faction obviously fa v:c;nued th@ return @f the Osrox Mission before the biM reached its fir.ial stage in Comgiress. This stand was taken on the ground that the ecoro.omic provisions in the biH were unjust, 1mfair, and dangerous, and that economic strangulation of the Islands would result inevitably before t'fue en<d 0£ t'fue transi,t i@n periom.66 In his cable messag e t<:> the mission at Washington, Quezo14 declared that: "It seems that there is no way of obtaining the passage @f a law tli.at _will give due consideration to tne rig'futts a nd inteirests of the Filipino people, and I am sure tli.at I am voicing the unanimous sentiment of our p<wple in urging you to press for immediate indeJDen<ilenee and ·if this is impossible in this session let their€ bie FI@ biil'l. "The D1m10cratic party is coming in.to power with :fiu,J,I control of the executiv€ aoo legislative depairtm.en,ts. It will have the power and responsibiiJ.ity 0f granting iro.dep€nde!ilee because it is committed to it and unless a bill acceptable to us can be passe<d this sessic:m we have nothing to lose and every ireas@n to To.ope t1i.at we will gain by postp0nernent 0£ aetion until next adrninistration." 66 In the meantime, an administrative reorganization was brought about in ManiiJa. The measure, as Quezon p0iate<il 0ut i,n a caia<stas meeting of the Nacionalista Corvsolidad0s, was veiry imp@rtant, and the missiolil, 0r a p<:>rtion of it was needed more at home than in the 66 Eady in November, 1932, the maJority caucus, under Quezon's leadership, d,a£ted instmctions to be sent to the <Jsrox mission, insisting that the mission should not accept anything providing for less than a 1,500,000 ton limitation on sugar exports to the United States, that a reciprocal tariff clause Ile included in any independence bill allowing the Philippines to tax Amer,kan imports, etc. See New York T imes, November 7, 1932, June 12, 1953. l?hili,pp,,.es Fr.ee Press, jfanuary 28, 1933, p. 4. 66 <Callallero and 11:oncepcion, op. cit., p. 303. Cf. Col. Roosevelt's review of P,of. Kir,k's l\ook, Philipp;,., fodepeiidence, New York Herald-Tribune, Jiune 14, 1936.

212

'IDEiV'ET,,@PMENT ®'F Ji!H l>bl•PPmE 9 0 :T;,ITlCA'L PARTIES

".fTo:e :rnas@m given was tTo.at m@st 0£ the im t~e U m,iite<ll $-tal:@s was i.,n th @ r.rn,'fm,r e of jDF®jDagamda, wa ernas iro. Ma!filita, fue a@4e<fl, "We lile@<il the mi.ssi@m m ernb> e,r s t@ ta~@ JDali't i,n t lhe Gfeiiberat i@ns @Ji the 1eg1slatu,F.e, amd to use thei,r irnifiln1e1<1<se aro.d ali>i.li.ty i@ 0ur r @@r gamizatioro. work." 67 As t0 the m @tive h>efui.n@ th,is ai<ll!l)))}i,ro.<istf1atiive re@rgalilizati@lil, tthe math,,e p@Ziticos' ©Jviniolils were (d:ivi<lli ecd. A«c©Fding t© _the Ql!leZ©lil :f action, th@ measure was l!lnd@rtakem si.m]Dly foi: li!fue sake of a@'ministrativ,@ @fffii<siieliley a ro.@i e0@n@rny; while the dl@~fo>wers 0£ Gsmeiiia imsis.t ecl! t Toat it was a Qu ezQmian sch eme t © gd rid! e>f S@FFl!e @;f their 1!>0:Ftiy m eliJJ i.,m the g,@vernmenf s@rvke. The ~aesti©n 0£ tTo.e rigfut and the wr<mg ®i[!li•n i@r,is ©lil t llie Fe@,r gan,izati@,Fl m easm.r e, 1l0wever, dfoes not C©J:ilcern us here. Wfua t we w ish t0 e&1phasize s© as t© give a sidetigRt ©lil tfue Qlltezolil-Osl)))}ef.l:a stn!lggle, is tb.at th ere weFe 21,823 «ivii seFvice em]_i>l©yees in T932; dlie Number in the year :following, 0,r aditer t he :re0rganiza1li@n was ef.feeted, drr@JDjDed t© 20,725; wMle im 1934!, it · i,n creas,ed agailil t 0 some 21,S@Q.68 T h e g rnwing crit icism by rtfue Qiu11;gu('JJl b eti®A of the Hawes-Hare-Cutting Act, cou[J;>~ed with its shaFJD refusal @'fi t fu e suggesti.0lil! that GG>Merlil@F~Gernerail TfueodoFe R ©@sevelt !De aske~ to 1,u ge a@.pir@val 0& t'fu.e !DiH by tne ilPFes'idelilt pendimg a c@m])lrom,is€, 69 hel!i>ed t0 ce>nvince fN rfheF the Osr:ox Missi0n that lll.il'efr w 0rk was J..ei,n g 11epudi.ated. hlstead o& listening t© tfue instructions fr0m M3)Nila, tfu e Missi©n ad©ll>tec;l i,t s ®'WliJJ 1') @licy o:f remaiNing i,lil Washingt@m alild w@rki.li1g foll tfue m ill which they tl>elievecll to h, e the loest @lo1iai.mab:1e ui. der the circl!limstarn.ces. 70 W @Jik

Caballero and Concepcion, o'/). •it., pp. 300-301. QuiFino, op. cit., pp. 72-73; Report of ihe Govem or-General, 1932-1933, pp. 12-13; 'IJ)iario de Sesio11es de la Legislah,ra Filipi11a, Vol. VII, Num, 14, pp. 13'1-139. 69 N ew York T vmes, IDeeember, 24, 1932. 70 Quir,ino, op. oit., p. 72; Caballere and C:oncepcion, op. cit., p. 303. 67

' PARTIES ANfi POLITIES SINCE 1927

213

At tlais stc11ge @£ tihe <il,issemsion IDetween tm.e Quaqual -an0! Osrox factioms, there arose in the legislaturn, an important movement which hastened the inevitable showdown. It must be noted that during the frequent ex;change of disagreeable messages between the Osrox Missi0n i,n W ashingtcrn, and the Quaqual faction in Man,ila, in ernal ilieud within tfue Partido Nacionalist0, Consolidado had been nourished. Late in December, iJ.93:2, tm.e Honorable - Francisco Varona, then majority flo0r 1€ader of the H@use _of Representatives, Joined by some .fifteen legislators, cabled the Osrox Mission, exJ!>ressing thei,r grnti,t ude for the work so splendidlly achie¥ed. 'f@ this the m,ission immediately dispatched a wairm reply. When t,liis incident took place, -there had al~eady !Deen started, via underground gossip, a tacit doubt 0f Quezon's legislative leadership. 71 In the meantime, Quezon decided to send Senator Benign0 Aquino, then acting majority flo0r leader of the Sei.ate, tG tm.e i\Jn,itecl. States, with instructions to fight against aprirnval by Congress of the Hawes-Hare-Cuttiog Bill. But much to Quezon's surprise, the distinguished senator, u,pon · his arrival in Washington, joined the mission iin indorsing irnstead of fig;hting the bill. 72 At tm.is particular j,t rnctme, Qmezon seemed to be conscioms of a 'FTue pl0t t0 bring ab0ut a d0wFJ.fal1! 0:f ¥tis leadership. complexion of thi,n gs, soon led to an explosion. rn the heat of temper, Quezon sent a long message attacking the Osr-ox Mission, 73 and at the same time, he refused any 71 C:aballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 306. 72 Philippines Free Pt:ess, November i2, 1932, p. 43. Soon a£ter he ar,ived at Washington, Senator Aquino €abled Senator Ouirino stating, "I wish to £omplain against psemature judgment. If you succeed in preventing Quezon from prematurely and unsuccessfully committing himself, we will .save the €Ountry." See Philippines Free Press, January 7, 1933, p. 27. Upon his return to the Islands, the senator criticised Quezon, and accused him of a "lack of true orientation and purposeful leadership in the programme of government." See New York Times, March 20, 1933. t., p. 307,. ~8 Caballero and . Concepcion, op. ci_

®EW'Ei/i,@PMEN'P GF PHl1UPPiNE POLIT,ICA,l, PART1'ES

further payment to th~m by the National City Bank of New York. 'fhe mission was thu.s plaeed. iro. an em@airrassim.g f><'JSi fioro.. 74 In an effort to bFing aboat conciliation, the mission extended an invitation. to Quezon to visit the United States and see the sitl!lation for himself. Wfuero. Quezon was on his way to the United States, he was joim.ed, in 76 Paris, by Osmefia, who hoped a compr@mise mi.ght be effected. It was said that after consulting members of tfue O.srr0x Mission, Ql!le2om <deelare<d! hi,ms@lf sati:sfied with "the work of the mission and the law for which they worked, and he was ready to recommem.d its approval to the Philippine Legislature." 76 Everyone was in high spirits; there seemed t0 @e Fl© sign @'f a ilfuh111e a<il'0 0n this question. But, all of a sudden, Quezon OF@ered a return of his entourage. In order to be different from the Os-nox Mission, he chose to have his party return by W,ay of Europe. 77 This sudden and ' spiectacular aeti@liI of the Senate president, was taken by the O.srox Mission as being far from propitious. ~ollowing Quezon's <departtwe i@r iEl!lFOi,>e, the Osrorx: Mission sailed for home @ver the Pacific. AH the while, prior to June, 1933, it had been understood that Quezon, OFl his word of honour, w0uld not impede or place any New York T imes, March 2S, 1933. Philippines F,ree Pr ess, April 22, 1933, p. 30. 76 Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 308. Cf. Osmei'ia's speech in the Senate given in the Philippines Free P,ress, July 29, 1933, pp. 38-39. 77 Caballero and Coneepcion, op. cit., p. 309. Just before Quezon left Washington, Senator Joseph Robinson of Avkansas told him that "By your own admission, I find that for 2S years you had been laboring for immediate independence, and that when you thought it might come, you ran away from it, and proposed independence after a period of 10 years. In conformity with your views, we have given you a ten-year independence law, and now you again want to run away £,rom it alleging that you want immediate independence. This game has been played onee too often. You have your independence law-take it in good faith or leave it, as you please, but if you decide to reject it, we promise nothing except to do by you as we believe you deserve." PhiUppines Free Press, ~uly 29, 1933, p. 39. 74

PARTI£S AN,D POI,,IfJJICS SINC£ 1927

215

00stacles ifl the patlfu of t'he missiom members to r,revemt thek gofaag t© the peoplt~ to explain the law to them witfuout preju0.ice to anybody. 78 Perhaps the excessively enthusiastic welcome given the mission was an important Both factor in tfue sul!Jse<iJ.uemt political development. 79 tlhe missions met in Hongkong and arrived in Manila together 0n June U, l933. 80 After the return of both missions, the country was all agog with excitement on the burning question of whether the Hawes-Hare-Cutting Act should be accepted. The fate of the Act was, however, imseparable fro·m the question of national lea,0.ership. H the Act were to be accepted, the change of leadershi,p im Osmefia's :favour would be ·imevitable. In view of this momentous issue, both facti0ns were busy strengthening their respective forces to fight the battle for supremacy. As the struggle went on, sweeping political realignment took pl'ace. Those in .favour of the Hawes-Ware-Cutting Act were colloq,uia.Jly styled as PTos umder the leadership @f Osmeiia, ancl those followimg Quezon against the Act were Antis. 81 The f©rmer Democratas now lost no time in taking sides with either Quezon or Osmefia. Party lines were once more broken. Then native politicos were lilO longer Feoogmized as Dem0cratas or N acionalista Corl!Solidados, Tout as Pros amd A.ntis in reference ,to the law. On .Tune 30th, Quezon in a speech, proposed that the Harae-Hawes-Cuttimg Act be submitted to the people, and in tfue same l!Jreath, he also stated that the legislature 78 Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 310. Cf. The cable message of Quaqual faetion to Osrox Mission, in The Philippines Ii erald, Marci\ 1, 1982. 79 In their warm reception to the returning mission, the people nailed Osmeiia as the leader. emerging supreme at the moment to guide his people and Roxas as the leader of a future Philippine Republic. Cf. Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 310. BO The Philippines Herald, June 12, '1933. Bl "Par,ties and Politics," The Philippi»cs Herald Year Book, September 29, 1934, p. 33. Cfi. Malcol!Jl, op. cit., pp. [22 et seq.

2[6

DEVELOPMEN T OF :PHILI'PPINE POLITICA'L PARTIES

This statement led v.wulcl reject the measure. 82 ;JR,el!),resentativ,;e Peclro Vera t<ll c@m.mero:t that "'Fhe Sero.ate president was sensing his p0litical dowro.faM and he always sp<llke as if he were the erntirn Fili])lino ![i>e0ple, 0r the em.tire Philippine Leg~siature. " 83 As the opening of the legislatt1re drew closer, attacks lll!lade by one side or the other became incFeasingly lDitter. 84 Quez0rn's @bjection J;r,i spite of some talk of compromise , t0 the law was stronger than ever. · Riis stalil@! was that the law "if acce]llte(i] !Dy 0111.r jDe©ple, reieases tm.e U:rnite<d S,tates from the solemn pledge, and, in its place, limits our impo,r tations irut© the lLfaitem States, doses tfue door of America to our compatriots , gives us :lior te:n years very limited autonomy, ancl., therea_fter, if then, a questionable independenc e." 85 When the Senate J!>resident leam@cl., throl!lgm. a stateme:nt by Osmefia, "that the Filipinos wh© aFe agai:nst the Jaw are afraid of independenc e and that they must leave the Philippines, " 86 he quickly asked wl!i.ether shi]Ds c0tLld be found to carry the millions of f©es of the law whom the 8 senator from Ceh>u woulenl ex]llatriate. i ()smeia so0n took Quezon to task. He challenged the latter to prove that the Hawes-Hare -Cl!ltti.ng Act was mot a true law for independenc e. As leader of the Pres, he imvited Quezon amd the other Antis•to a pufulic debate. He declared that: 82 Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 311; PhiHppit1es Free Press, j]uly 8, 1933, pp. 5 et seq. 88 Caballero and Concepcion, op. c-it., p. 311. 84 It was said that a non-partisan national advisory council should be appointed to determine the method of procedure in reacning a compromise on the independence question. The proposal had, however, met with very little response on either. side. New York Times, July 10, 1933. 86 86 87

Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 312. PhiHppi11es Free P.-ess, July 8, 1933, p. 35. New York Times, July 10, 1933.

PART1ES AN1EJ POLITICS S1NCE 1927

21:7

"ilili0f @me· li@as@Fll ©-F am@tlirnr, before we left Mam,illa, we had a FIDJuttrnl agreement tnat we would consider the act on a common grnm1d until it bec@mes acce]i)table. B1,1t hardily had we turned our back on Manila whem. Quez0m. broke his promise. "Mr. Q1,1ezom. has proclaimed his respect for cdem@cra:cy amc;l fu,is aJilprnv-al of a l'>lebiscite, but 1ie now is forcing the votim.g on tl:,ie law by the legislatuFe, coml'>httely ignoring the people and making use of his f>Ower. "When the leadership in power ignores the cdesi,f@, tliie feelim.g am.d t1ie rights of the people, the l'>eO)ill@ m1,1s1t demar.i\11 the Fetmrn of the ]i)Owers given the leaders who igm.ore their wishes." 88 The senator from Cebu .further challenged Quezon to resign with him ana fight out the issue, man to man. fa acceptam.0€ of this challenge, Quezon immediately issued a statem<frnt tkat : "Someone declared t1iat ne is ready to resign if I ais@ res,ign. My answer is this: On July 17, the legislatme will convene, and I am resigning a:s presic!lent of t1ie Senate. I also ask that Senator Osmefia should rnsigm. as president pro tempo.re of the Se,m.-ate, Spea~er R0;xas as s)ileaker of the W:01,1se, aad 'R,er,resem.tativ;e Sabido, as majority floor leader. Then we s1iall leave the legislature to•choose its owm. leadeFs." 89 Su,p)ilorters of ~1,1ezon were anxio1,1s, however, to thr@w the cluel int0 t1ie legislative hali, where they c0mmia,m<lle<d an o¥eFw1ielming majori,t y. 90 'fh.e issue 0£ Philfp{!foes 'Free Press, July 8, 1933, p. 34. Ibid., p. 35. New York Ti,iies, July 10, 1933. In a speech Quezon declared that 67 out of 97 representatives and 16 out of 24 senators were opposed to the Hare-Nawes-Cutting Act. See tl\e Philippines Free Press, July 8, 1933, p. 35. C,ft. Foste. Rhea !Dulles, "The Philippines and the Hare-MawesCutting Aet," For,eign 1?olic'i)I Reports, JJanuar-y 3, 1934, pp. 252-253. 88 89 90

2~8

DEVELOPMENT OF PHlLLPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

fogislative reorganization, as a means 0f attack upon the

Osrox faction was soon to be taken up in the apprnaching session. It had bieen clearly understo0d that the majority would elect Antis to all legislative offices, and il\:ill the independence law in whatever fasfu.im;i it deemed l.ilrnst expedient. The Antis, morecrve11, h.atd the situaHon very well in h.and. Soon a:Her tfu.e legislature met in session, Quezon characteristically tendered his 11esignation, both as president 0f the Senate, and leader of the Partido Nacionalista Consolidad0. He charged, in his resignation, that the legislative mission (Osrox) had ignored the instructions of the party and that charges hurled against him by the League for his acceptance of th.e Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act had n0t betrn disallowed by Senator Osmefia and Speaker Roxas. 91 However, the resign.ations @f Quezon, it was understood, were to be rejected. 92 Fol'lowimg lil.Otitication to him of the ti.rm decision of the majority caucl!ls in his favour, the march t0ward one-maa c0ntrol of the insular legislature was very rapid. He 0rde11ecl. his folfoiwers in tro.e legislature to proceed with a measure for drastic legislative reorganizafo~n. As a consequence of this measure, practically all the Pros were deposed. from legislative leadership. Osmefia lost his post as president pro tempore of the Seaate ;93 Rozas lost his as speaker of the House. 94 OtheF P.ros, such as majori>ty floor leader 91 Philippines Free Press, July 22, 1933, p. 27. For details about the 11.eague for the Acceptance of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, see The ,P,hilippines Herald, June S, 1933. 92 New Yark Times, July 20, 1933, By a smashing vote of 16 te S, the Senate renewed its confidence in Quezon as its president. See Philippines Free Press, August S, 1933, p. 4. 93 When the question of confidence in Osmeiia was put to vote, there were 15 to 2 votes against him. See Philippines Free Press, August 5, 1933, p. 4. 94 On July 20, Speaker Roxas called a caucus meeting in his office to a sk for a vote of confidence, which he failed to get. The vote taken was 49 to 29 against him. All the appointive representatives voted for Roxas, except Representative Jose Sanvictores, who did not vote. Ibid., July 22, 1933, p. 27; Ibid., July 29, 1933, p. 4. Cf. Malcolm, op. cit., p. 123.

P!A!RTT•ES

,My.Ji)

2~9

220

DEVELOPMENT OF PHIUPPINE POU1'ICAL PARTIES

ln fartherance o:fi his cat1Se, tToie leader @f thie Pros, a@cused tme leader of the .A!ntis of being an opporhmist, attempting to establish personal leadership through intrigue and secret machinations instead of responsible leadership in accordance with the c0nstitutional lilrocess. The Quezon scheme, according t@ the senator, airned to St!l)llpla])lt a responsihile party government fuy @ne against public opinion and contrary to the mandates @f the people. 99 On the other hand, Senator Jose Cla:rin, in defense of the Antis, explained that the change of leadership in the iegislatue was necessary under, the circumstances. He said: "How can Quezon maintain his prestige before the country and even before his own followers with such attacks against him and against his acts as leader- of the Filipino participation in tme government? It was necessary that tme priesident Ji)Fesent before the party and the legislature the question of confidence, to solve the dilemma of whether or not he ought to continue directing the political activities of the country. If he had to discontim1e, he @ught to do so in colla!Doria,t i:@n with men who cle> not make war on him in meetings and in ]!>t1hlic."'100 The legislative session was a stormy one. In addition to Âˇthe statement just cited, the Quezon faction the means given him by his office to attract followers and forti,fy his opposition to the law and the mission (Osrox). I do not pretend in the least to accuse any official of the executive branch or any members of the legislature, of having used improper methods to win proselytes, but it is my duty to read into the records of the Senate, that wherever the mission went it found a sort of terrorism, a situation for which I do not know who is responsible but which unfortunately exists. Also the belief exists, whether it be true or unfounded, that President Quezon is directly or indirectly responsible for such situation." See Philipfri11es Free Press, July 29, 1933, p. 39. 99 Ibid ., p. 38. Cf. Philippi11es Herald, July 31, '1933. 100 Philippfoes Free Press, August 5, 1933, p. 4.

1/!AR!l'lES A'JNil!) !P<JIL1T>ICS S1'N,CE 1927

22t

222

DEVELOPMEN T OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

The question was complicated . The Antis obviously did n0t like the iclea 0:li a plelD,iscite, but refosed t@ assame the responsibili ty for killing it. On the other hand, the Pros, Âˇ tFwugh earnestly requesting a pleloiscite, w@re none the less afraid of a possible shift of the responsibili ty for rejecting th@ law to the people, since the Antis had the sifl!lation well urnder control. The latter, in order to force the former to share in the responsibili ty for killing the ]_))lebiscite, strategieaHy irnsisted l!l]ilGn a two-questio n plebiscite: first, "Do you approve the Hare-Hawe sCl!ltting Act?" second, "Do y0u aesitce i,nde]Dendeace :for the Philippines ?" 104 A two-questio n plebiscite, so worded, would mean inevitable defeat of the measure. The alternative for the Pros was now whether the law was to be rejected by the people or by the legislature. To choose the lesser of the two evils, Osmefi.a then came to agreement with Quezon rnot to carry out thÂˇe plelDiscite. 106 Thus, the senator from Cebu wisely put the responsibili ty for rejecting the il1depenclence law squarely l!lpon the legislature rather than upon the people of the Philippines. Om. October 17, 1933, the Philippine Legislature, accordingly , through a concurrent resohttion, 106 went on record as declining to accept the Hare-Hawe s-Cutting Act. , Philippines Free ,Press, October 14, 1933, pp. 4 et seq. Ibid., October 21, 1933, pp. 4 et seq. CJ. Dulles, "The Philippines and the Hare-Hawes-Cu tting Act," loc. cit., pp. 252-253. 10'6 'Dhe reasons given were that "no agreement could be reached as to the form in which the same should be carried out, and in order to avoid the unnecessary expenses which the country will ineur in the holding of said plebiscite." See Philippines Free Press, Oetober 14, 1963, p. 40. 10'6 H. Doc. No. 209, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 2-3. A straw vote of the legislature conducted early in 1933 on the independence law, showed that 15 out of 22 Senators and 69 out of 96 representatives of the House favoured rejection of the law. See The Ma,iila Daily Bulletin, January 19, 1933. The actual votes on the law were 15 to 4 in the Senate and 53 to 22 in the House against aceeptance of the law. See Philippines Free Press, October 14, 1933, p. 40. 10'4

223,

'ffue rejection 0£ tifue im.dependenoe law was, however, a test of Quezom.'s 1mshakarole leadership in the Philippine democracy. The stniggle had served to offer an ample 0pportm1ity for a ge1,rnral realignment of the Filipi110 politicos.~07 It s!fi01,1fol be n@ted that even President · iRafael Palma a11d Deans Maxim0 J{alaw and :Jorge Eoe0b@ mfi tfue Uu1iveF'Sity of t1ie PhiH]!Jpines were seriously, involved in the co11tF0~7 eFsy. President Palma and'" Dean Kalaw were recog11ized as able defenders of the independeF1ce law, wni,le De?,n Bocobo sided with Quezon in reje.cting it. 108 Curie>ffsly enough; the famous General Aguinaldo, long a political foe of Quezon, was now even willing to forget the @Id differences and to-enga:ge himself fo political debate under the banner of the Antis. 109 Obvio1,1sly enough, the controversy of 1933 was foF Quezon, a defense @f the leadership he had assumed as succes,mr t@ Osmefia i11 1923. Had the Hare-HawesCutting Act been accepted as a charter of liberty by the [egislaituF,e OF the we@]_!Jie - @£ the [s!aF1ds, Osmeiia would have been honoured a,s the winF1er oif tfuat charter, which was far moFe generntls than the Jones Law had been. And once again;the rise of Osmefia to political s1,1premacy would fuave h>een i,11evitable. Quezon must -have realized that to accept the law was to recognize Osmefia's supremacy.

Parties and Politics On the Eve of the Establishment of the Commonwealth

'lD!iie iE-fare-Mawes-C , tti,n g Act re]_!Juc;l.iated by the !Phi,li)j))j)il'le ili..egislat1,1,Fe, fuad IDeeF1 seri011sly spli,ttiil'lg the 101 108

op. cit., p. 77. Pliilippi,.,s Pree Press, Febr, uary 18, 1933, p. 27. In the University

Cf. Quirino,

of the Philippines, the majority of the faculty and students were sympatheti« with the law. Quezon was asked to speak before the student body about the law; the invitation was not accepted. See Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 215. 100 Caballero and _Concepcion, op. cit., p. 215.

224

•

@EiVEU)PM'EN'F @F PHfJ;,1JPPlN1!J 'l!10MTfCf3,L PA!R!f'1ES

m aj@11ity,: ]))arty (i)£ ttrn Ltsgislatu.a:-e. The P11os an@ Antis col!lM, t he11e£@re, 11ig,llitly Tue called d\J.,il @ren ©iE tfue law, whi<s:ro. instead @f liidrog a m ena<s:e, fuacl actaal1ly stFengtfuened nm positi(i)r,i o,f Ql!l,@Z(i)lil ais Sl1]))Feme leader in tke !slarnds' :[)JOliticai cl0mai,m. :Bat, ao<s:t:1s@cl '@ffi fu eiro.g res[!l@msi:fule for tm.e as~assiro.ati0m @f tTue "clli:a11ter 0£ Hl!ierty," Ql!lez0,ro's Jl>G>Si,ti(i)lil was far ffirnnn e0m'f@rtaMe. 'ffue legislatl!lre, th011gm a Ql!lez@l'l c@rotroHe~ @rga:m,, ham to mace a ro.,ew ve11<!lict thr@l!lgh t he next eliecti0m a £ew m0rnths a:way. Tfue Osmeifa faetiJ@n, 1.m<!l@1!11h,te@ly, w@llldcl To:ave a grie<varo.oe t® place fuefore tlhe e,lect0rate. QueZ0ro. O(i)tJd d no,t , m0,11eove11, fa<s:e the weople had he £ai.J@d t0 get :fr@m C@nigress s0methi'mg !Detter t0 fl,Fesern,t t© tfuem. Witm tfuis o@rnsicleratioro. i,rn mi,rnd, 1te liJ.•l!l•i<s:kly cleeiclie~ t0 m.ea€1 a m,iissioro. to the Vni,t ed States in tme h@pe 0f 01D~aim.i,rng a: new arnd meeter laiw for ifl<dej_i)em<dence, !!lo · Early i41 :N0vemoer, [933, the rnissi0m sa,i]ecl for the 'ILJniite<!l States. lt was c0mp@se0: of Qaez0ro., Presiderot 0£ tne Sernate, Elpidio Qi!tirino, rnaj@rity tf.l.@0r leader Gf the Semate, and ~sa1ttr0 Gabald@ro, E@rm,er R.esiclernt C0mmissioner to Washl.i,mglf0rn. 'Fhe missi@rn was completely ~l!tezoniam. Se,rnat011 O.smeia was i,rnelu<focl, iDut, as [eader 0£ t he Pros, he dedarned t0 make the trip.m TToe m ission Fea:cl.rnd Wa:shi,rngt@rn ea,rly i,m IDeoem®eF. U wa:s givefu an excepti0na1ly <wlcl l'ece~ti0m esl_')ecialiy am@mg ~he C0ngressi@mal ieadercs, wh0 were disp,leaseGl at the J.cejection odi tfue Hare-fliawes-Cuttimg Act. Many in the W asm.i,rigt0rn circle tm@ugM of PliJ.ili,p,pime iimlepern;lemce as a long cl@sed issl!le, al'l€1! thali C@rngress would rnot reeonside,r tb.e sl!l1fuj e<s:t 'li@r s@rne years t@ 00Jil.1l,e. Quezon was nG d@uTht very mudh. <llisaww0irntecl. 'Ffuis was why Ro!lcas said, at the time, that "[if Que2i0ro. c0mes biack with any 110 Philippines F-nee P.ress, October 21, 1933, pp. 4 et seq. N,ew York T.imes, Novemoe•r 5, 1,936. lltl Malcolm, op. cit., p. 124-125; Philippines Fnee Press, 0ctaber 21,

f933, p. 40.

PA'RTI1ES AND 'POMTICS SI1NC,E l92Z

225

kind of all indeJ!lend0Rc@ law, I shall march at the head of th@ paFad@ which shall meet him at Pier 7. I shall kiss h,is To.amcls, a,ntd l shat! l')le<!lge h,i,rn saipJ!l<:>rt.Jlm! lt is int@resting to n©te the role played by the Pros at this particular juncture. Kn@wing that the invitation extencle<il t0 hi,m by the £enate )?resident was a partisan m@vct,1,is Osnrnifa irnrn@c;l,iately an<il wisely declared that: "I will accept the invitation of the president of !'he Senat@ to joiR him in a new mission to America .1or@vicdecd he signs am agreement with me before we leav@ that in the event President Roosevelt says a law granting immediate, complete, and absolute incdeJ?endence is npt obtainable, that he, 'Q uezon, will rec0mm,emcd accep.t ance of the H-H-C act right away Tuy the l@g-isla ture." 114 _ After this prop<:>sal was refused by Quezon, Osmefia then suggested a tw<:>~man mission to submit the Phi.JiJ?pi,me ~1,1esti0m to ar'li>itrati©n by :President Roosevelt. To this pFop@sal, Qaezon quickly agreed, but many members of the minority were not eager to support the iclea. 'Dhey were quite <determined that the Antis, or majority, wh@ nacd killecd the law, must alone . li>e responsible far- any new legislation. 116 In the meantime, Resident Commissioner- Osias, a recognized leader of the Pros, sai!le<il foF W a:shingt@n with the cdefini,te pM,rJ?@Se to discredit the Quez©n missi©Fl. On one occasio~, he declared, "I l,ike nothing better than to expose the Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 360. Obviously enougb, Quezon must ha,ve wanted Osmeiia to share with him the responsibility for any action which might be forthcoming while the mission was in Washington. And finally, he did not want to leave behind him a man who might win over some of his followers in his absence. Cf.. Philippines 1'.r.ee Press, October 21, 1933, p. 40. U2

113

114

/'bid.

116

Philippines Free P,·ess, G>ctober 21, 1933, p. 40.

226

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL '.PARTIES

assassinatioJ:il of the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Law m Washington." 1'16 The residet1t commissioRer w; sted no time i,n lining up his friet1ds in C0ngrses for 0bst.rnctionist measures. He had also organized. Fili]Dino mass meetiRgs i,J:il the s~cticms Reaw Washington, whern "fue vilifiecl, eha:stised, accusecd,. and 1at111p0@ne€] the enemies o~ the e@l!lliltry aRcl tl:ie m1milere11s of its li1berty."m 0sias'- activities im. W asa imgt0n ;w ere n0t wit h©l!lt effect. S.oori aft er he presented the case in Comgress, S enator Tydings, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Insular Affairs., resolved in a meeting, that the HareHa.wes~Cutting law would be amended omly to. extend the time for its acceptamce from January 17, 1934, and no other changes would be considered.118 At the time wl:ien Q1ttezon was bein g rebl!lffed ia Wash,imgton, the Pros assembled a c0m.velilti0n i,J:il Manifa which voted entfa1:1siastieally t © seci:ede £r0m t fu e Pa,r:tido Nacionalista Consolidado and la1,1111.cfued a new 0pposition km.own as the Partido Pro-lnd.ependeneia Nacionalista. In the convention, Quezon and his fellow Antis were bitterly accused of "a0and0ning the independelilce campaign by refusing to accept the Hare-Hawes-Ctlttit1g Law." In addition t o working for revival of the H areHawes-Cutting Law, the new party declared that its ado]_j>ted program was "to l)lrotest . agaiRst waste 0m pl!lblic iliuncls, s,t rive to rnaint_aiJ:il fia ai:i_cial st ability iH g0venu nernt ar,id ass1:1re alil e£ficiemt alild h.oRest admi,Ristra:ti@n, k:ee]D imrviolate £reeclom ,of speech am!I O]Di,n,i0n, oppose alily attempt 1'16 Caballero and Concepcion, op. T ra11s-Pacific, December 14, 1933, p. 20, 1933; Co,ig. Record, 73rd Cong., 117 Caballero and Con~epcion, op. 118 Ib id. , p. 354

cit., p. 350, Ct. Osias' speech in The ~4. Cf. New Y o,·k T imes, December 2nd Sess., pp. 639-640. cit., p. 352.

227

228

lJJEVELQPM,EN.T OF P-HIUPPLN,E POUTICAL PARTIES

t0 adecquately revomsider it. President Roosevelt's proposal was favowrably received by C@rJ.gress, and t1ie a,lil\lem<Jl@<ll lDiM, known as the 'fydimgs-McDmfif.ie Act, was pass@d in the form desired by the President, in March, 1934. 123 The passage of the law was, in effect, a new lease of life for Quezon's leadershiJ.D. However, the Pros asserted t:biat it was the saime old Harn-iI-fawes-'Ct1tting Act, while the Antis argued that it was a differemt and better law. 124 With thie TyG!ings-McDufifie law in his [lllOCket, Quezoro: returned once more a hero. The law was accepted by tfae Quezon controlled legislature on May 1, 1934, the 36th anniversary of America's arrival in the Islands. 125 The Qt<tezom faction now daimeC!l M1ait 'it hacl. @btaiaed a better charter, while the followers of Senator Osmefi.a argued that they were, in fact, responsible for the law. Both sides of the argument were presented to the people. The gemeral election: took pl aice om Julile 5, 1934. !It was a 128 H . R. 8573, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Perhaps the most important change in the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was in section 10 which Âˇ provided that "the President of the United States shall by pr.oclamation withdr.aw and surr,ender all right of possession, super.vision, j,ur,isdiction, c0ntr,ol or sovereignty then existing and exercised by the United States in and over the territory and people of the Philippine Islands, including all military and other reservations of the Government of the United States in the Philippines." However, the President of the United Stat.es may retain all its naval bases and fueling stations. This, however, seems to be a facesa,v ing amendment. Although military bases will not be maintained in the Islands after independenGe has been established, the question of naval bases is left to future negotiation. This would mean that the United States will have the right to maintain naval bases in the Islands so long as the two governments continue to disagree on the subj eGt. Cf. ''The independence situation in Washington," Progress, pp. 6 and 10. 124 Malcolm, op. cit., p. 127. After the 'fydings-Md)uffie Bill was passed by Congress, Quezon told his friends in Washington, "I am very happy. l got everything I wanted here." But as a Filipino writer ably put it, "If Mr. Quezon had merely wanted to get enough ammunition to knock Sergio Osmeiia, Manuel Roxas and Camilo Osias into a cocked hat, then he has gotten everJthing he wanted. But history w,ill record that the victor.y of their hero is a pyrrhic victory of the people of the Philippine lslands. One more such victory and we are undone." James G. Wingo, "The M-T-Handed Quezon,'' Philippines Free Press, April 28, 1934, p. 4. 125 Report of the Governor-Grneral, 1934, p. 1; H. Doc. No. 400, 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 1-2.

PARTlES AN,D PObITICS SlNCE 1927

229

men,wtraMe election, fa r it was the firo.al verdict of the pe@Ji)le 0fol the tduel bet ween Quezon a nd Osmefia. The electi@n again was an overwhelmimg victory for Quez0n. Of the l 1 sero.atorial seats, only three were captured by tJfue :Pros; and odi tiie 89> seats in the I-fomse of Represero.tatives, the :Pros won 0nly 19 and the Sakdalistas won 3. Tfu.e lihree 'Sakdalista members later all became Antis. After the election, t h.ere were 6 Pros as against 17 Antis iro. the Sero.ate, aro.d 19 Pros as against 70 Antis in the House of Refresenta tives. In the p0sts of provincial governors the Antis won · even a greater victory. They 126 Quezon was W0fol M out of 4g gubernat0ria l seats. re-electetd president of the Senate and· Quintin Paredes 127 00ntimtetd as speaker,@£ tfu.e House of ReJ,resenlati ves. The most notable feature of the election was the fu.a,ro.ds@me gain of t he defunct Partido Democrata, now divided into Antis and Pros. 'fhe form~r Democrata head, Senor Jl!lan Sumuloro.g, who declined to run for t1'len !re-ele-€ti0n i>l'l l!9lU , was n@w elected. 1'l'le legislat1,1re 128 This had about 20 pure and unalloyed Democratas. [!)Fesented a rather peculiar phen0menon , that is "united they lost antd •dissolv ed tfuey gained." After tl'le general electioro., there came the Jilroblem of calling a constitutiona l coro.vention foF the purpose of forml!llating a constitbttion for the government of the . J?fuiliJi>JDine C@1Nm0hwea l~l'l. 'Fhie electiom o:li delega tes to the Conventi0m was first fixed for Jupe 26, but for s@me 11eas0m, was [!>0StjDOned t0 July rn. The munroer ,0£ delegates to roe elected was limited to .two hundrec\l amd 126 Ji.eon ([;. &uinto, "!Phe 193~ GeneFal Elections," The Philippfoes H '"ali!. Y ear Book, 19,34, p. 33. Figures on the election Feturns, · see Philippines loc cit., Free P•ess, Ju.n e 16, 1934, pp. 34-3~. Cf. "Parties and Politics," . .

127 Diario i!.e S eciones de la Legislatt1ra Fili'pfoa, Vol. JX, Num. I, pp. 2-13. Philippi>ies F,ee Press, July 21, 1934, p. 40. New York Times, :June • 6, 1934. fbia., June 7, 1934." 128 See Philippines 11.-ee Press, J,une 23,, 1934, p. 10.

230

DEVELOPMENT OF PHIUPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

two. The eleeti0n laat1dly ar@used the interest (')iii the v0ters. Take Mamila, for example, 0ttt of 7i,OOO qaalified voters, there were only about 28,000 who went to the JllOl'ls. Tllaroughcmt the PniHpp,imes @,iiJ.ly ahout 40 per eemt of the <qualified voters took the trouble to cast tlaeir ballots. There were two major reasoris for this. First, th@ decti011 t<iiok plarn only abol!lt a momfl.\ after the gerieral election; and second, the leaders of the two major parties, Quezori and Osmefia were not candidates for d@ctiom. And 0tfuer leading politic@s, similarly, meclined t0 participate in the election. The election was conducted i,m a less partisam manner than 1,1s11ally was the case. However, the majority of the delegates elected, were members of the majority party. There were, as the figures disclose, about 120 Antis as agai0st :fiew@r diam 60 Pros. The rest of the delegates were independerit. 129 The constitutional conventi@n assembled on July 30 in tne hall of the House of Re).!lresentatives. Cl!llÂˇi0usly eno11gh, the highest officers elected by the delegates were exclusively members- of the defonct Partido Democrata. Semator Oaro M. iR!ect0 was electe<ll presi<ilent; Senator Ruperto Montinola, first vice-presiderit; and ex-Senator Teodoro Sandiko, second vice-president. 180 ln ass11ming presidency of tfue convention, Senator Recto declared that "The e0nstit1,1tion must . . . be the work of the people and not of a party so that the !People will love and mefend it allC!t those who g;cwern will respect and obey it." 181 It was the general belief of the Filipino public that there had been a mh1im1,1m of partisanship in the convention. But, accordimg to Delegate Rafael Palma, this was only partially true. 129 "Instituting the Philippine Commonwealth," The PhiUppin.es Herald Year Book, 1934, p. 27. 130 See "Instituting the Philippine Commonwealth," lac. cit., Cf. Philippi11es Free Press, August 4, 1934, p. 4; Report of the Govemor-Gmeral, i934, p. I. 181 Philippines Free Press, February 9, 1935, p. 4.

PARTitES AN-D POLITIC:S · SINCE 1nr

231

It. his celebrated a-rticle, "The Convention from Within," Senor Palma, as a min@rity delegate, wrote in part as foll@ws: "As a matter of fact, throughout the whole life of the Conv@nti©m., the exiis tence of majority and rorninori,t y parties was spoken of. From the very beginn-img @di the C@nv;e111·tio111, t0.0se representing the maj@rity [lj)arty he!Gt several caucuses. Just :what happened insidt>- the fou walls where they met, never became known to the public. It is reasonable to assam,~, however, ·that at those secret meetings, the majority agreed to organize itself in order to counteract amy opposLtion that the minority might offer; but as the ,minority never conceived to present a systematic 0pposition, the majority could not have the e0.a111ce t0 make use of its numerical force i1o1 the deliiberaticms of the oomvention. It c;an, therefore, be truly said ,t hat ttJ.e relative lack of partisansn,i.p wa,s n©t dl!l.e t©. the lac;k of design 0n the part 10£ the maj@rity, fuu.,t ratlrnr to the wise and c0nservative · attiitude 0£ the min0ri,ty.ms 2 What we are interested in here is how did the majority party acrua..lly control the Convention as it desired. In · the same article as that cited above, Delegate Palma further informs us that the selecition 0f the president of the convention was made on partisan eo11113iderations. H the convention had enjoyed absolute freedom and the wil,l of the political leaders had not been made to J!)Fevai,l~ he remarked, the resttlt might have been di[f.Ferent. ifhe· maj©1iity )!)arty seeme<!l to have l!)Fea,,rrcl)nged t© l!)eFmit 0111ly 0ne 13.omi111at i0n at the ti,m e 0£ 011ga111izati0111, aMh0ugb ti,iere was achtaHy more t,h an ome nomination 'for tfue presidemcy o.f tne coBvention.183 182 133

Philippine Soc. Sci. Rev., July, 1935, p. 145. "The Convention foom Within," Philippi>le Soc. Sci. Rev., July, 1935,

p. 148.

232

DEVELOPMENT OF Rf.lf,Lff'PJNE . POUTICAL PARTIES

'fhe11e fua:cd fueem c0mplai,n fs 0f un£ai 11 methods elilil@l0yerJ agai,ro. st tlue min0ritiy delegates. ift was said ffuat t11e resQluti0n @f De1egate Cami[0 Osias 0n tThe scope 0£ tfue prnposed c0nstitw.ti0n was simJ!)ly laid om tfue table wit110w.t furt1ier actioro., i,n spite of tne fact that th·ere · was t1ien no other w11essi.ng matter be:iiore the <wNven,tiom. "Th.is actioN," saitd Delegat e iPa:lma, "was imterpFeted fQ meaN that the l!]la;jority cle<slimed to appi.;0ve 1d.1e prnject beca,t,tse it was presemiled fuy a minority m,ember.;' 134 Boweve1.1, t1ie c@nver.il:iem was mot free frnm paFtisa:ro 1s0msi<de11atiQro.. The 1W1a,j0rity <delegates held H1eir cal!leuses a1'l.d s© did the rnili10rity. This, peFha,ps, gave gHt!Hilds ,for Delegate Tomas C@n:liesor's remark that, "lt is very lamero.ta!Dle indeed that at this crucial h0ur, the hydra 0£ politics 1ias raised its multiple heads preparatory to destJJoy tfl e digmity and high ~Hrposes 0£ th.e Natioro.al Coflstituent Assembly 1

,,135

Si,mce the Partido P11(:)-[ndependenda Nacion(J)lista To.ad, from the outset, ' been t00 weak to 0,f fer aro.y effective opposition, one coul€l easily see the J!)Fob1ern that the majority had to face. The tt[<!J.iealthy faetor f@li the Antis was tfuat theili majQrity was t00 large. Once agaim this gave rise t'0 two :facti0ns with.i11 t1ie r:amks of the majority, after tfue orga:lil'izati0n of tl.J.e rnmvero.tiom. T@ make t1ie rnaUer worse, the minority in the conv:ention ha:cl. of.fered little or FlO 0pposition, but instead had co0perntecl t0 the fa,!Jest extem,t.1'86 jl!1.st as expected, the fam@l!ls Lopez Bloc was form@cl arnomg the majority membe11s t0 criticise 01'>e111y many decisicms Qf the 184

ibid.

136

Philippi1'es F-ree Press, August 4, 1934, p. 4.

186

([bid., February 9, 1935, p. 4.

140

Philippines Free 'Pr,es,, Felir.uary 9, 1935, p. 4. Cf,. "Par.ties and Folltics," loc. cit., pp, 35-37.

233

234

"T1ie @aJMger 0f misuniGJ)l is m@ greaJfer tham the peril @if h>acl g@ve,m m elilt. 1'1ie 'tayo-tay@' prnetiees m,u st !De av-(l)icle<!l at alll e0sts. A c0urnm0nwealth g0ver,mment 0r a P ruiH1J!lJ>ine rel')l!lli>lie witifu. IDut 0ne p@l,itkal ji>ady existing will he mnh>afaro.oecl, [il®Sitively l@]!Jsided, and willll r,i.@t fa11mish the real test to tl:.ie Ji<illiJ!lin0s' caJ!laeity 'fo11 self-rn11e. . . :"'14'1 Withi,rn tl:ie ranks oif tl.ue mim0rity, leaid,ir1g memlher s cl,i<ll rn@t samcti@rn t1ie i@ea @iii a p0ssi1Tu1e fl!ls,i@m w ith tl.ile maj0rity. S,imi:l a:1;Jy, few £01l0we11s @if Qwez@n really elilterfai>med the iaea @iii li>rimging abHt a 1.1 elltmi@n wi,tk t1ie li1ilinority. They encle<il t1ie £msi@n rum0t).1.1 s · fuy Mile formal 011garnizatioN of t1ie Partid0 Nacw'Y1X!JJ.liJst0; :J!Jr3m0c:rata tomp0sed (l)f 00th N(!J)cionaiista ancl' Dr3m@crrata Antis. On Aagmst rn, i'!>M, they held a e0r1vero.ti0m 1>y which Ql!lec©Fl wa:s eleeted pFesiaero.t; Quintiro. IPa:i·ecl:es, fij,rst vite-presidero.,t; Ma:1.1iam0 Wesus Cllleme0, seo@md viee-J!lresidernt ; and Jaam S.wrnl!lloro.g, thin;l vieej))residemt .142 [Iii. the same e©,lil.vemit i(i)Fl, tfuey aJd@pte<d a ria1lmei: elaoornte J!llat£0Frn whose saJ.ient J;)Oin,t s weFe as £olfows: t. 'fo work t0 sh©Ften Mile tFamsiitti@r1 period of ~Q yeaFs as · J!lF©vide<!l im the 'fycliim,gs-MeiIDu.f.fie Law, er otl:ierwise woxik :li@i: amenclimelilts to lessen the l,ia,Fds1i,i!(!ls e,mtaifo<il 1,iy, eeomom,ic aajl!tstmemts and rec0astrncti@r1. 141

142

Jbid., p. J6. PhiliP'Pines Fr.ee Press, August 2S, 1984, p.

36.

P:ARTIES AND f'OMTICS SINCE 1927

235

2. 'Fo c00rqinate the work of the different ageNcies ©t the g0ven1[,l,le0.t and of private enterprise in 0rdeic ta.at the couptry 1nay be made as selfsufificient as possible. 3. 'fg reorgaNize t1i.e lPhilippine educatioBal system with a view to turning out citizens as well fitted ii@r tfu.e •eoimtry's agricuil,tl!tral and industrial needs, as possible. 4. To undertake a revision of the country's tax system and to simplify the structure of - the g0¥ernment so that a reduction in personal and ·publie expemses whenever necessary, may be · realized. S. 'ifo rnairo.tiairo. jumicial independenc e free from · politieail interference. 6. T,o gra,ro.t provi@cial and municipal government a larger measure of political and ~dministrati ve autonomy. 7. 'F0 work to tne end ti>iat the N0n-Christia n tribes shall eventually exercise their right to local al!ttonomy as well as take part in the natioro.al affairs:143 The formal 0rgaro.izatic,:m 0£ the Parti<lo Nacionalista lJemocrata, lecd by (Quez©n om one ·side, and the Partido F'rro-Independencia Democrata led by Osmefia on the . other, was, to aU @utwarl!f ap)!learnro.ces, a ha]!Jpy meveloprnent in Philippine cdemocracy. Many may have thought an early fosi@0. oili tfu.e Ql!tez@n anm Osmefia factions was, @ro. the whole, impossiole. However, politics and logic @ften (disagree. Sfu.@rtly after tne Partido Naeionalista Democrrata was formally brought into being, a strong movement for 143 For a complete text of the platform _0£ the Partido Nacionalista De111ocrata, see The Philippines H erald Year Book, 1934, pp. 37-38. Cf. Phi'lip'f)ines 'Fre_f 1:'ress, A>ug. 25, 1934, p. 36; New York Ti111es, August 19, 1934.

236

DEVELJOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

a: Quez@n-Osmefi.a cgaJliti©FJ., was on foot. Political 10,i tterness seemed to 'lilave been forgi@ttelil. l''lilere was no <doubt as to Quezon's sincerity eoncernililg a, possible e0ali.tion. He must have been seriously conscious of the problems that the country had yet to face. The growth of fear for the future was an attack on the two-party ' system which mamy were a:lilxious to see im the Islands. L ate im [934, Quezon seemed t© have beem advised by Mr. Harry B. Hawes, that the Philippimes needed harmonious relations · among all parties if they were going to survive the ordeal of this most crucial per.iod odi its history. 144 Sh©rtly afterwanl, the Senate president surpdsed the l))Ublic b~ a:tten<!ling Roxas' h>irthday pavty, uninvited, and there he met face to face ·many of his leading opponents, including Senat©r Osmefia, former Senator Aquino, Senor Tirona, Delegate Osias, et al. It is interesting to note that almost immediately after this imcident, former Speaker Roxas categorically i.m.dorsed the e@alition rnovemeat. ]n a state1;neAt he declared that: "All political leaders irrespective of their political parties . . . should join together in working for the early establishment and success o:fi the commonwealth governmem.t. The gemeral puh>lic should be sounded m.vst bie:lioFe emtering into any coalition of parties inasmuch as mo :formal prnposal has bee!'l submitted to the minority party in con~ection with the coalition movement." 146 By this time, Don Miguel Unson, former secretary @f finaflce, was enthusiastically leading a group of im.Glepemdent citi2Jens w&o were amxieus fo effect the coalitiom of the two political parties during U1e first year of the Philippine commonwealth.146 Following this, a resolution was adopted by the League of Provincial 144 146 146

Cf. The Philippines Herald, January, 3, 1935, Thr f'hii,ippi11es Herald, January 4, l935. Joid., January· 3, 1955.

237

G@iverm@rrs, wis:0d01iming the eam<iLidaey @iii fu0t ro. <Q1,1e2J_©l!l al!l<il Osmeiia :li@r the tw@ highest offices im the commomweaflth governmemt. 147 Partisan spirit was then perhaps, at i,ts l@west. Even cauouses of the t wo m ajor pa rties durimg the latter part of the convention, occasionally met joil!l,tly:.148 'Fhe lil1lesti@n @m <s@al,i,tion ea1,1sed, however, a gr,eat deal !ilf wublie disoussion. Of)ini@ms opposed to the plan als0 fot,tlild expression, especially among the members of the defunct Partid,o Democ.rata. 149 The country was alimos.t divided into anti-coaliti@nists and pro-coalitionists. ~ erro.·a ps Hie m ost fuitter den1,1nciati'on of the plan w a s tro.alr ©iii $ emat0r S1,1mufomg, wh0 had lomg beeu1 kn0wn a s the champion 0£ tro.e 0ppositi@n. Tro.e senator, as already noted, Thad once led an opposition and been instrumental in diss0lving tihat opf><:>sition. His strategy t o destroy the ome ·ha<il, iin fact, beem responsible for tb..e creation of the @thet . He l@vecl. 0f>f>©siti@n i1.1 clemocracy anol was a lways rea<ily t @ <ileme1.1m it. Setaat @r $11m,1,1l0mg tier ev e<il that the @ppositi0n party formed fuy Osmefia should be maintained and that " i,t is an inescapable nati0nal duty to prevent the disappearance of the presel!lt Osmefia minority.m 5o In his maRifesto against the p110posed ooa1iti0n, the senat@r sai<il that " any r e1,1,mion @£ the 'fiolfowerrs of Quezon :md Osmefia-caJll it :fo1si@n, 00aliti0n, co@peration 0 ~ C01iljulileti©lil-,WOU1d mean the rest@ratiom, inexct,i:sa;fule from all angles, of the feared and detested oligarchy. Suefu a reunion w0uld un<ilo a transcemdentaJl p01i1tical r,,dorm, -ffimvidel!ltially Gr ac<sidemtal-ly effected tl!ir@agJ;r 01,w @wn disselil•sioms @ver Eia i-e-HawesC1,1t ting 'Law. ~t w01!lld 1!10t represent a pr@grnssive 147 148 149

160

Caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 395. ,J'he Philippines Merald, January 15, 1935. Ibid., January 26, 1935. Jlhilip'f,ines Free F~ess, May, M, 1935, p. 30.

238

BEVELOPMENT OF PHIUPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

advance, but a notoriously iretrogressive move; it wow.Id be a step backward, contrary to the general interest, and esp>ecially destructive of the future of a sane and genuine democraey in this counlry." 151 Jim ;pite of the stormy O:(!)IJlOSiti0ro., the e(i)aiitiqm rn0vement advamced rapicbly. 'fine nrm attitw.des 011 b0th Quezom and Osmefia had l@mg been km.own. 'Bd0re he headed a new missioro., inel,uc;ling Reeto amd ]foxas, to present tfue constitw.tion 162 to President Roosevelt for si<gnature, in March, 19JS, Quezon declai,-ed in a: majority caucus meeting that unless Osmefia ran with him on tfue same ticket, he would refuse to run for pi,-esidency of the commonwealth. A similar statement from Osmefia also gained currency that unless the proposed coalition materialized, the senator from Cebu wowld also withciraw his candidacy for vice-presi<ilemcy amd f@rever retire from polities. 163 This was a real threat. Every Fili'pino must Tuave km.own ti.lat i,ro. sw.ch a eritieal and crucia1 period of his country, the guicling hands of both Quezon and Osmeifa wer;e absolutely ancl im~eratively indispensable. In the same way, Quezon and Osmefia themselves realized that each need the assistamce of the other. One could safely assert that with Osmefia's comservatism, coolheadedness, systematic efficiency and infinite capacity for detail, and with Quezon's fighting courage, executive abi1ity and magnetic leadership, there should be a more widespread ÂŁeeling (i)f security among the f>eople. 151 In the same document, Senator Sumulong warned his fellow-eounlrymen that, "In the event the projected eoalition is carried out, and all or nearly all the elements which now compose the majority and the minority adhere to the new political combination, the only alternative the country will have, if it later desires a change of policy, will be communism or sakdalism." Ibid., May 4, 1935, pp. 22-23. 152 The convention completed its task in producing the Constitution, in February, 1935, after 7 months of labour. 158 Philippi11es Free Press, June 1, 1935, p. 30.

PARTIES ANV POLI'PlCS SJNCE 1927

239

]t was, jileFb.aji>S, wi,t h this ©@nsiderati@Fl tfuat pr@F)©Sals were su l;nn,i,ute<ll oy municipal counci,ls, c1v1c 0rganizati0ns and leaders of business men and so forth, to. the di,r ectorates o:f the two major p@litical parties that a coaliti@n be formed to indorse the candidates for presfolency and viee-pr;esidency t@ insure the cooperation @if al~ the vital ioroes 0if the nation dl[,ring the first and tryi.ng years 0:li the eonulil@nwealth. The two major parties, thereupon, fueld their respective national conventions on June 15th, and determined that it was necessary to decide upon the f>lan -for coalition and make their nominations :li@r presiclential candidates. The coalition Jl)lan was ajll.pF'oved ®Y !Dotl:,i parties, and Quezon ame ®smefia were, aeeord,ingly, norninatecl for the presideney and vice~presideney @f the comrnonwealth. 164 Onee t1'te constitution had been signed by President Roosevelt, tne document was su~mitted tq the Filipino Jileople in a f)lebiscite 0n May i4, 1935. In this plebiscite !!he ili-il,ipii,n@ w@mem. partiic~patrecl, alth0ugh tl:,iey were d,i sfranchised by the constitution. 166 The r'esult of the ]\)lebiscite was overwhelmim.gly :fop ratification of the c0nstituti@n. 166 - Curiously enough, the popular participa1

Pliilippi11es W11ee Press, !June 22, 1935, pp. 4-5. Manila lJaily Bulleu11, June 17, 1935. [,bid., June 18, 1935. 166 'iDhe iPhilippine ].egislatuoe enfranchised women, effective J ,;,,ua!)' 1, 1935. Subsequently, the convention drew up the Commonwealth Co~stitution in whfoh a clause · was incl'uded providing that permanent women's suffrage could be attained only by an affirmative vote on suffrage of at least 300,000 women within two years after the establishment of the Commonwealtli. See New York 'Fi,nes, April 29, 1935; P/iilippfoes Free Pre.rs, May 4, 1935. In , the plebiscite of 1935, there wete appoox-imately 200,000 women who had .egisteoed and qualified to vote. 'L'hey practically all voted foo the constitution. P liil<'/!Pines Free Press, Nt!a,y 18, 1935, p. 23. : Foo an l\istoFical account on women's suffrage in the Philippines, see Co,ig. RecoriJ, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 16434; Report of tlie GovernorGe11eral; 1919, p. 5; Conrado Bonitez, "The New Philippine Constitution," Paa,fic Affairs, December, 1935, pp. 428 et seq . 166 'Dhere were 1,213,000 votes cast for and 45,000 against the constitu• tion. For an offidal list 0£ the pleliisdte vote, see Philippines Free Press, Miay 25, 1935, p. 23. 154

240

DEVELOPMENT 01!' PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

ti0>,r,i i1n 1lfure j_i)l,elh,i seite was smalil er Hrnn in a regllllar election, despite tlrre a<!lcl!iti0n @di the w0me,n 's v0>tes. Perhaps the fear of national insecurity was a major facter in determining the outcome. Ia the nolil-Cmristian .J>FOvinces, the people, who, for tme first time were givea fine :francmise, did not vote eathusiasticaHy, far the eonstihttion and iro.dej_i)en~ero.ee. A si,m i:br attitude- was taken -by those of the lilOrthern regions, nearest the exp>anding empire of J a paF1. 167 Four months after the plebiscite, came the -conm10nweaHh election, which was to tal<ie J_Dlace cm September ~7tm. Im a<d<d,itiom tÂŽ tme Quez01iJ.-Osm1eia c0aHtioro., theFe were two newly created political parties in the fiield. The first we shall discuss mere was the National Soeialist Party under the leadership of General Aguinaldo. The famous general had not beea active in politics for over 30 years, though me occasionally voiced his opiniolil. In tine cab,i net crisis o:li 1923, he sided! witfu Geaeral Wood against the Nacionalista Ieaders. Daring ]934, over time issue of Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act, the GeID.eral joined forces with Quezon against Osmefia. After tme law was amended ulilder the title of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, me turned. the tables on Qaezon, delil@Ul'lciID.g tme new law for failing to give tme Pnilipp>ines immediate amd c@rnplete independence. The new Rapprochement between Quezon and Osmefia was for political reasons, mighly distasteful to the general. As head of the Veteranos de la Rev0lusion, Geroernl Aguinaldo on tlrre eve of the commonweahbl election, amswernd the caB @di 'ID.is followers and admirers and ann0anoed his candicfacy for ]_])residency of the commonwealth. He wasted much time ilil fil'lding a suitable running mate. Finally, the former Supreme Co1.:1rt Justice, Raymundo Melliza, emerged from his retirement to fill the general's need. Therefore, the former justice, a eandidate for the viee-presidency of the 157

New York Times, May 28, 1935; Malcolm, op. cit., p. 145.

241

comm0nwealfh on the same tick€t with the general, beca,me the s•t aRdard l;iearers 0f the National SociaI.ist t>arty,.15s Jin his campaign, G1meral Aguinaldo first Ul'ged a change to a new leadership, 0r in other words, the s11fustit11,t i0n 0f his 0wn leadership for Quezon's. ~he gel'J.e,r ail deelar elil: that Tue eo11ld not igR@re the voice Q,f th011sands of his countrymen "wh@ are at priisent in the clutches of hunger and misery, an<ll wfu.ose _laments awakeR not the pity of tTu0se wTu@ are iR p0wer. Wfuile they a,r e enjoying the delig;hts 0f the feast, tfu.ey should remember the underd0gs to whom not even crumbs are left." 159 His w:as a prng;ram for s0cial and f)Oli,t ical justice. He asked for immediate and a1fus0lute independence, or at least, a shorte:aing of the transiti@n period to three years, as ll.e had onee prop0sed to Senator Millard E. Tydings. ;we wished t0 see in tfue Fhiii•f)pines, the practice @f true fuim:0lniaR dem0craey, the establishment of a, government o:fi the peoflle, by the people, · and for the people-a ,g0vernmeRt _th.at is l0ved, esteemed and respected by the Jile©f)le and gives eCoJ!md j11stice for aill.160 Next came the f)roclamat;i0n of the aged Bish@p Grng@ric Aglipay. 1'he holy man, who had been 61 founder of the defanct Republican Party in 1905,1 now In · pcl(rty. that 0f th r reb>i, · a t l!l• ab@ g brin, t@ stef)s t00k aRn@um::ing hi,s caRcliiclacy £or presidency @f the c<pmmonwealth, with. N0rberto Nabong (an obscure citizen of Ma•:aHa) as his runniRg 1:1ate, the aged bishop presented 168

P.hilippfoes Free P.ress, Miay 18, 1,935, p. 8. }bid., June 1, 1935, pp. 30-31. 159 <caballero and Concepcion, op. cit., p. 418. 160 P.hilippfoes Free Press, jf.une 1, 1935, p. 30. For. a complete text of the pla!for,m 0£ the National Socialist Farty, see :M"anila Dail,JI B11llctin, j une 3, 1935. 161 Supra, p. _59.

242

®EViELOP.lvZJE.NT OF fi'fil1LIPPI'NE POLITICAL PARTIES

the following program for the p0litical amd economic regeneration 0£ the l?hilij_i>pines: ]. 'Fo sect!lre the iro.depem<d@nee that wiM make the FiHpino people hap>py; 2. To elevate the living standards 0f the laboring and farming classes throl!lgh decent safaFi.es, generous aid to the unemp>loyed, the sick, the aged and invalid, and to call 1,1pon those who shall be designated by labor and farm ass0ciations to particip>ate in the dir;;ectiom of a li1berai anm clem@cratie g0veFm,rne1'lt; 3. To distribute land and all necessary facilities b@longing to the co1,1ntry's domain, to those in need; 4. To create new ind:l!lstries and to Filipinize them, giving s11fficiemt eremit and sabsidy at Feasonable rates of interest, to manufacturers and merdiJ.ants who need them and who reall;y deserve such aid; 5. To stamd :li©r afus0l11t,e ee0mom;y im a[IJ Ii.mes by eliminating superfluol!ls expenditures, red,ucimg high salaries, but assuring an eq1,1able return to e\'eryone in accordance with his merit; 6. To aFraF1ge F©F failil imvestigartion of aU the s@urces of natiomal wealth and the development of mines; and to see that Tagalog be one of the official laF1guages of the FilipiFtes. 162 In spite of the hist0ric figures, like General Aguinald9 and Bishop Aglipay, head of the Independent Church of the Philippines, QuezoFl's conficlenee was unshaken, and._ his vict@ry was a f@reg@me e©t'ldusi@m. IDta,ril'lg his presidential campaign, the dramatic leader seemed to shine as champion of capitalistic democracy. In a speech, he said; "I shaU 1Jl]i>Tuo1d the · dem0cratie priF1ciple l!lmderlying the institutions that it establishes. I am 162 P.hilippi>les Free Press, July 6, 1935, pp. 34-35. Cf. Caballero and Concepci0n, op. cit., p. 421.

FAR.TIES AND POLITIES SINCE 1927

243

0Jll]il0Secl tl@ a di!ctatiorsh~p . . . iDeFnocracy can only survive if those at tliie hel,m of tl:\.e government believe in the J!)eople's right to rule and have faith in their inherent capacity to decide rightly important public questions. "I wiU hold inviolate - and will defend to the utm@st the incl,ivi<!Lual rights and li,b erties. I sl:\.al'l safegi,tard free speech, the freedom of the press, and the equality of the man before the law however poor or ignorant. iJ: shall insure for every citizen of the Phi'1ippines, from Luzon to Mindanao and Sulu, the right to w@rship G0d as his own conscience dietates . . . "l am against communism. I am a firm believer in the institution of private property. I contend, however, that whenever property rights come in conflict! with human rights, the former should yield 163 t0 the latter." 1!'he program whicli was Fe]l)resentecl IDy the coalitionists to the people was comparatively comprehensive. They maintained the folilowing principles: ( 1) To establ-ish an economical, simple, aad efficient government; (2) 'to maintain am independent civil service ,; (3) 1'0 ium]i)lamt <l)l!l a<;lefi!uate system 0£ puMic instruction to develop m0ra'1 cfuaracter, J!leFsoaal discipl~ne, and , vocational efficiency; ( 4) To maiatain the ·, present cUFrency system ia all its integrity and to allow no ch.ange that will affect its vah1e; ( 5) To revise the present system of taxation, using the best techaical advice availabl'e; (6} 'F0 mainfaim judicial independence wi,th0ut £ear (')f :fav@u1r to the rich and l!)OOF al,i ke; (7) To ad0pt a ,policy or welcoming outside cali)ital, especially Ameriean capital, t0 help in the development of the country; (g) To apply for admissi0m to the League of Nations and bring 163 Cal\aller.o and Concepcion, op. cit., pp, 422 et seq.

2~4

E>EVELOPMENT OF iBHILIPPINE POI;,ITICAI!. PARTIES

abou,t the r,ieg;@tiati®m of a ilililMltila:teral treaty for tfue neutralizatiom 0f the F>fuilippiaes; and (9} T0 provide :for acleqaate military pre.J!>aredn.ess for nati@aal defence. 164 The eampaigm was a thtree cornered fig1M. Altfu@ugh there stoG>d against the Quezoa-Osmef ia ticket two venerable fuistorical figares, however, the forces behind Quez0a at1cd Osme:f.ia were practically in.e©n.,t esta[Me. Tn the first place, Quezon ancl Osmefia were relatively y@u'11!.ger candidates who commanded greater conftdence of t11e yoaager geaetrafi@a, and successfa11ly captured the imaginatiG>n of the masses. In tfue seconcl place, tfuere were well-organized party machimes, with practically tfue whole force of the government befu,i ad tnem. On the @Hier hand, both Aguinaldo and Aglipay had never serioas1y engaged in politics u.nti,l the eve o,£ the commonwealtfu election. Their respective parties were organized solely to serve their purposes in that election. M0reover, the ru,n ni.ng mates 0f h>@th Agwiaald0 and Aglipay were relatively unknown in aational polities. 'Fh.e relative weakness of the opp@sitioa caadidates served 11>rimarily to_ reflect tlae atttraetiv-ero.ess 0tfi Quez0n and Osmefia who were colourful in appeal and practical in method. The election took place ©Fl September ]7, ]935. [t was a conclusive victory for Quezon and Osmefia. To be exact, as caadidate for presidency, Ql!lezon received 694,546 votes as against ]79,402 for Ag11oinalcl© and 148,44i For vice-presidency , Osmefia received for Agli.J!)ay. 81 l,l38 v0tes as a:gai,a st 71,040 for Melliza and 51,590 for Naoong. 165 1'he larger number 0£ votes received by Osmefia coU1ld be explained by the tremendous popalarity 164 See speech of Manuel Quezon in accepting his nomination for presidency of the Philippine Commonwealth, appendix to f1laug11ral Address of Quezon ~Manila, 1935). Cf. Quirino, Quezon, Ma11 of Desti11y, p. 81; Ma11ila Daily Bulleti11, June 17, 1935. 165 Philippilles Free Press, September 28, 1935, p. 36, The same figures may be found in Ma11ila Daily B111/et11', September 19, 1935.

PARTPES AND POLITICS SINCE 1927

245

@f the gentleman fr0m Cebu on the one hand, and the relati:ve weakness o:ti h,is 0pJil@nents 0n the other. As a resuJ.t of the same election, the coalitionists likewise assumed comJDlete control of the National 166 Assembly. Out of ninety-eight seats of the assembly 64 were won by aclherenits of the Qttezon wing and 19 by tThose o'f the Osmefia wing o:ti the coalition. The rest, ~0nsisting of half a d@z<m seats, were occupied by 167 S11ch a commem,h ers 0m i,ncleFJenclent a£fi,l iati0n. all probahility in would Assembly National the 0f positi0n he . a menace to the coro.~tinued existence of the coalition since "it had practicaHy no opposition from without. C11,r iously enough, the commonwea lth election was to10t mar~ed by a neavy v0te. Out of approximate ly l,600,(00('.) registered v0ters, only slightly over a million actually. ca:s,t thei,r ball@ts. 168 This might have been due t0 the fact that independenc e was no 19.nger a political iss1:1e, and, at the same time, Quezofl and Osmefia, the two most 011tstaro.di,n g leaders, were then no longer politieal rivals. 'Fhese may be the main factors responsible for the lessenedl inte11est @:ti the Jile©)Dle in the last election. The Oimm@nwea lth of the Philippines was inat.1.guated on N0vem10ei; 15, t935. This memorable and m@mefltous event marked '.the M.Jtimate trilumpn of !Phil~Jilwi,n e ro.ational,ism. Vice-)Dresident J0hro. N, Garner, Secretary 0£ Warr Geoirge H . Dern and mall).y other , American di,gnita11ies were there to witness the birth of i!lae r,iati0n. - Man11el IL Q11ez0m and Sergio Osmefia became first Jilresident aro.cl first vice-presidet lt of tifue 00mm0nweaith. Former G0vemor-Ge neral Frank 166 11he National Assembly, accor.ding to the commonwealth constitution, sliall consist of not mor,e than one hundred and twenty members chosen ever.ii' tlir.ee years. Until an appootionment shall be mad'e, tl\e National Assembly will consist of ninety-eight membecs. See Ar.t. VI, Sec. I. 167 For. the complete election records, see Philippities Free Press, Septem' . ber 28, 1965, pp. 30 et seq. l68 I.bid. Cf.._ Editor.ials, P.hilippi,,e Magazine, Octolier, 1935, p. 479.

246

JiJEV'E:fu@?MEN'li' OF' IPlWUPPtNE !l"O'UT1CAL PARTIES

Ml!lqpfuy, wJ.li.o sucoe@tile<d! G@werrn@,r -General ~G0sevelt in. ill 933, was na:imecd fuigfu comlililissi.@n.er, Feip»esernting t1ie 'Prnsidemt @f the i\l.%n,i ted Statcts ilili the iF'To.ir~jili,nes. 169 It! i.s imtere;;tin.g to lil@te ff.rat shortiy after Qu@zon 1!@.@k @ :fim.ee as presirle1ilit @if tlile C©l1illJlil®1'.lW€aUliJ., the <i_t1,1estion @f l!l1mim.ecl ieaJ(/forsfuip agai,m ams€. Aee@,rcli,iID.g to r'resideN,t Ql!lezoB.'s owl!l @rgaliJ., 'li'ifiJe P,hilip'[Yines Flewriui,, thctr,e sh011ld Fl© l©nger To:ave h>eem aJl.11:y divisi@liJ.S of leadership, siHe tfue exctcMtive li!a<d akcta€l.y b>cten i!F'i1i.p,iitilizecl:. IDl!lrimg tfue wre-coronmonweaLtfu 1;>e11i@d, as that ji>aJjDer p@,i nted out, leadersfui,p was givem t@ tfue legis'lat@rs to dlu.irtl1J.er the tiarticipati@n ocfi t l.l!!e Fili,]il.im0s ia the g@vem,r,roemt. 'This was p@litica[ ex]i>erliemcy an~ 1i101t a fo.rndamemtal [i)rirnci.rple. 'The I@gislat0rs lilill!lst mot, there:fore, 00nsi.der iea<dersh~rp an imhereliJ.t right @f tfu.eir of.fice.m Tfuis p@ilnt of view was origit1.arly prctserntecl Ii@ Sefi@r Q,ai,t'li:in Parncdes as ar.i fmducemem,t :for him Ii@ dr®Jil his contest for the speakersliii,p anct acee]i>t the wost 0£ resident o@mm.issi@B.er t@ Washililgtom:. :Presider,1:jj Quez®lil iro. hfo letteir M diormer 1

169 Former High Commissioner Murph!)' has been ver.y popular with the Filipinos. While as Governor-Genera,!, · his liberalism was in hatmony with the practice of. par.ty gover.nment in the Fhilippines. It was said that during Governor.-General Murphy's administration, the executive and legislati"e br.anches of government eame mor.e dose!!)' together than they had evec been since the days oii Flar.rison. Elefor.e appointing his cabinet in [934, the @ov.er.nor,@eneral held many con.fer.enees with Pr.esident ~uezon, ~hen Senate president, and the appointees were all suppor.ted by the ma,j or.ity party. His selection of cabinet members was highly pr.aised; ev.en minority members of the legislature voiced no objection. As high commissioner, his authority in the eommonwealth government was more impor-tant than generally presumed to be.

Message of Govemor-General F1·ank Mm-ph91 to the Ninth Philippine f:..e,gislature ~Manila, 1933), pp. 4-5. For. a r,eview 0£ Governor-Genernl Murphy on political pr0gr.ess under the American regime, see Diario de Sesiones de la Legislatura Pilipina, Vol. X, N,um. 52, ,pp. 240-259. Philippines Free Press, !)'uly 28, 1934, pp. 30-31. !,bid., August 4, 1934, p. 8; Ibid., October 5, 1935, p. 2. !For his veto recor.d in 1934, see, Ibid., December 15, 1934, p. 36. C;/1. "Status oii T!J.S. in Fhilippines Fixed in 0r.dinance Added to Constitution," New York Times, Nov.ember 15, 1935. [bid., November 16, 1935; Time, November 25, 1935, pp. 15 and 170 New Y or,k Times, December 29, 1935.

rn.

'PAR'JII1ES ANi'.D _;pOLITICS SLN:€-E 1297

247

Speakier Parecles, clearly stated that the speaker of the Nati@mal -Assem,lllly wol!lJd hie me11ely a presidimg officer,, a;mcll., tliere'fo11e, the @0St 0!ffliered icri-sl!l•f.ficient 01'J JDOrtunity for, the talents of 1iliie farmer speaker. 171 After Senor Paredes finally decided t0 decline the offer of the speakership, the @£Ik e was @fliered to Senor Framcisco Enage at President (Qaezo1,J/s behest. B~t the offer was also decline@ by Sen@r Enage.172 . In t1ie meantime, b@th wings of the coalition took uncler consideration the possibility of indorsing Ma nuel R@xais :fo r the SJDeal.llers1i,i,i,i. iB.l!lt <!l,urimg the col!lrse @f t he fight, ·President Quezon twice <il.elayed the calling of the special session. Finally, Assemblyman C-il Montilla of Occiclemtal Negrns,1~3 was umanimously selected to fit into t he new scheme @iii g@¥ern,m enit. After the speakier ha:d llleem chos en, Sefior Parn<il.es declared 0n the· floo r that: "J eal0us of our prerogahves, we wil-1 not permit oar p0wers to oe usur]Ded by other -branches of the _g@vernim©mti. At t liie sa:me t i,m e, we s1J.01ll'ld be ca;reiul that w e do not overstep the Limits of four own i,iowers. Only thr0ugh cooi,ieration can the three bra:nche-s of the government function smoothly. ilin<il. ei,ien.demti in @u,r views and in the exernise of 01:1r rights, we shal1l cooi,iernte wiith the executive as much as we shall be able to help him conduct his aclministration successfuUy. 174 · 'fhis was a1.11 aMe cldemse @:f Legislative in t (\grity of t1ie Natioma[ Assembly. 'fhe former speaker obviously 171 See \'Q uezon's letter to I'aredes, dated October 24, 1935 in a booklet entitled -Presidrnt Quezon's (!) ff.e r of, the R eside/It li:om111issio11crship to Speake~ Paredes a11d the Reply Thereto ~p<ivately pr.inted) . 172 Manila Daily Bulletin, September 20, 1935. Ibid., September 'O, 193,. 173 The speaker. is a sugar, magnate of his own province. Before assuming the speakeFsl\ip, he had lieen prominent both as pFovineial governor and senator. h is geneFally oelie-.ed that tl\e present speaker has lost the \aspects o'f! a politician than anyone of his predeeessors had. i74 Pliilippfoes Free Press, Novemoer 30, 1935, p. 23.

2!!18

WE:VE:t..QPMENi'I! OF f'IiJIM!?PitNE P<!JLITL€:AL P.:AR'E1ES

"1i'JJrn o@aHti@n will €1\imima,t e the r@S[!)®nsili>i1liities 0! th!.€ majeFity party t© the i(!)eG[!)le i.w1 RilaJMier;s 0£ fog~s,lati@n aro.cl will d@ away em.,tiFely wi,tlil ©iflW©Siiti©n aro.l!f witlol th!.€ @1Jtty of the mim@ri-ty [i)aJ F'ty towards aJ!fl fa11teliligel'l.t nsealizati0m s@ ess€m.•ti!al t© th€ e@FJ:tin,t1aro:ae @£ a cdem@crntie 'f orm @di g@,vernme!flt. ~t would in efffoct e1imil!late JDaFti€s i.,m tb.€ Ass~mh>ly and ema@1Jtrage tihi.e f@rma,ti@m @ifi mloli:s 'fodi,FJ.g ro.@ lleS[i)©m.s,ili>i1Jity; ti© amy@ne., wi11ih a:11 its atte111di111g eviils." 176 · 1i'hi.e (ijjl!lesti@111 i.m dis1:1>1Jt•te i.s cleep>ly co11111ecte<!l n@t eRiy witioi the c@arse @,f p>ality, l'io'lie, IDut the e@Fl!s!li,twti@l!lai C!level@~rnemt of tlii.e Phiil,i,pp>iRes as wel!l. b 'hi-is 1reply t© :f@rme•F Sp>eake11 1Pa:Fecles, Fresi<!felil!t Qaez@1il Stated taat: 1

176 !FaFedes' lett~r to Quezon dated 'November 3, t9!JS, in Presidenl Q}uezon's <D1Jier of the Resident Commissionership to 'Speaker l?aredes anil The Rep~ 'if,hereto. Ln the same letter to (j:)ueZ0n, PaFedes also pointed out that the "aoalition will malce it impossible to caFFY out the letter- and spiF,it of the constitution which pFoyides for a Fepresentation 0£ each pa~ty in the selection of the @ommission of Eleotions, Appointments and Impeachment, and whiah in so doing has laid down the bases to be followed in the or,ganization 0£ the Assembly." To this cha,ge Quezon Feplied that the purpose of the constitution is to give the politiaal parties propoFtional Fepresentation in these Commissions. 11here is nothing in that document that prahibits these parties from entering into a aoaliti0n foF the punpose 0£ carF}'ing into execution the coalition p,0gvam adopted to insure the safety and well-being of the nation. See ©uezon's letter to Par.edes dated November 6, 19!35. 'J'he letter, i9 typewritten pages in total, was inspeeted l,y the present writer in the office 0£ the 'Resident <Commissioner fr.om the Philippines at Washingt0n, D.C.

E. 'Fike Mi1T,(i)r· <Jrroups

176

~uezon's letJer to Paredes dated ~ o;v:ember- 6, 1935.

249

250

E>EVEif..,OPMEN'J' OF Pf.1'1f,.,1PP1NE 'FOLITXCAL PARTI,ES

"It cannot li>e demied that the people of the Fhi1ippimes are <dissatisfied with the established J!l·a rties, tf.rn iN'aticmalist amtlt th€ n@w dissolved Democratic parties, which do mot seem to meet the needs of the new generation. That is one of the reasoms why the Democratic Patty has gone ol!lt of existence. 'iJi'he Nationalist Party, which 11emains the majority and is apparently strongly entremched, also seems to be losing its popularity among the rank and :Me of the people. The reas@a is nol: far to seek. The party <sonsists @f older men, mostly over fifty years of age, who do not seem to have a sympathetic uncderstanding of the younger generati@m which is becomimg increasimgly i,Fl.1lportant .as a political amcl economic factor in th·e Islands. Their ideas and views are conservative. They have failed to keep 177 pace with the progress of the world." The mew party is, a'.ppaoo-ently, am ou.tgrowti-l @f the Filipino Federation of America178 in the sense that leaders of one were the leaders of the other. In other words, as Mr. Momcado omce saicl, "the men who Iii.ave been res]')onsible for the organizatiom o:li the Partido Modernista have long been members of the Federation and have played the leading rnle im the activities of that M@Feo:ver, tlii.e if'ar-tid0 and tbe older institutiom. 179 Federation have many icleals and objects in com,mon." True to their name, the Modernistas had included in their il_i)]atform the development oif flatu.ral oo-esources by modern methods; modern agricultural facilities for farmers; encouragement o:li modern city plannimg and building; 177 Hilariop. Camino Moncado, America, Philippines and Orient (New Y0rk, 1932), p. 199. Cf. "Value 0£ l."a,ty Opposition," Filipino Nation, September-October, 1932. 178 Moncado, op. cit., p. 200. For an account of the nature and growth of the Filipino Federation of America by Mr. Moncado, see H ear,ngs before the House Committee on Insular Affairs, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 127-134. i79

Moncado, of,. cit., pp. 200-201.

25!.

252

DEVELOP.MENT OF J!!HJ.LIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

in September, 1933, 0rou.ght int0 being an organization known as the "New Youth Party of the Philippines." TJu.e party was organizecl primarily to furnish. the you.th 0f tae_ land the greatest possible opportunity 0f selfex~ression, by means of impartial criticism, as insurance for a clean and honest government. Its aims are social, eeon0mic Âˇ and echtca tional im prnvement; responsifule participation of, g0od-will, and ultimat e unity of an Fi1l,ipino yolllths regardless of religion, cu.st0m and dialeet. 184 Accordiro.g to Mr. Ernesto R. Rodrigues, leader of the movement, any Filipino citizen, young man or woman, betweero. the ages of 15 and 35 is eligible to membership of the party. 186 It is, to all intents and purposes, a civic organization, though the word "party" was adopted. After the "New Yol!l.th Party" had spruro.g int0 the fonelight, another gr@up was organized in J aro.uary, 1934, u.-ncler the name @f the "Yeung iPhi.lippiro.es." lit s eriginal i<lea was t ÂŽ form a nati0n-wi<de society after the pattern of the Black Shirts of Italy. Bttt this idea was soon abandoned by its organizers, on the ground that the Filipinos have a strong fear of aro.ything Fascist. Accordingly, they decided to organize themselves into a national civic federation with a program whose aim was to enable the Filipino yoath, men and women of liberal tendencies, to take a vigilant attitl!l.de towards p11blic questions confroro.ting the cou.mtry, aro.cl ccmtribute, in a hm.nble way, to the forml!l.latioro. of a vigorous, militant pltlblie opi1.11,i:oro.. In other w0rds, they pledged themselves t @ the m aiatenance @f a democratie amcd homest government i-n preioaratiom for indeioendemce. 186 184 Ernesto R. Rodrigues, "Aims of the New Youth Party,'' Phili1'Pit1e.r Free Press, February 3, 1934; Philippines Herald, January 29, 1934. 186 Rodrigues, "Aims of the New Youth Party," Loe. cit. 186 See the manifesto of the "Young Philippines,'' in the Philippines Herald, January 8, 1934. Cf. Arturo M. Tolentino, "Aims of the Young Philippines,'' Philippines Free Press, February 3, 1934.

PARTIES A!N® f'()l,,l'J!ICS Sf1NCE l927

253

It is inteFesth1g to R<:>te that the "Young Philippines" was spons0rnd fuy Represe!ilit ative Manuel Roxas and U.lliJ.0.@F tlii.e lea<ileFslmip @di :foirrneir Senat0r Jiose JD. JLau.rel. Other p110minent Pros, namely, Dr. Rafael Palma a!ild :Dean Maximo M. Kalaw, are also affiliated with the @Fga11ization. 'fhe "Y(i)Ulilg Philippines" like the "New ¥01,1mfu if>airty" ar;e a0m1p0sec;l m0stly of colllege students in the Islands. In the interest 6Jf U!ility in the patriotic movement prnposals were made to fuse the two. During theiir discassi@!il o:fi a il>asis for union, the "New Youth JPaF.l'.y" raiseiil one 0Tu9ecfi(i)lil t(i) t1ie "Youlilg Phi1liippines," namely, t1iat the latter was dornililated by politicians. It was later explained that the affiliation of some politicos with tihe "Y@u.-ng P1iilippines" had been 'accidental. lit C(i)u.l~ n0t fue hel,ped, as they fu.Fther explaimed, if these rnelil happeme<d to e,n tertain the same ideas of a clean governmemt as the youth movement. Both •groups then agreed that a union 0£ you.1th in the patriotic movement was !)lecessary t© ,fosteF il>ett e,r g@vern,menrt in the Ph,irHppines.'-87 As a political force, however, the movement has been a ,f ailure. Jin the electiom of 1934, the greatest surprise was the showimg maiile by a: mew grou.,p @f extremists knowm as Sakda,listas, wfuo w@n t1iree representatives t<:> the legislature, a provincial governor, ·and a number of muni_dpal offi.cials.m 'F:hey were orgal'lizec;l int(i) a p<:>litical. Rarty in ru936l under tTo.e leade.rshi1p @f rlenigno Rarn@s. 189 The word "sakdal," which they ad(i)pted, means, in the 'Fagal<:>g lamgu.age, " t © accuse." The party bitterly clem@u.m.ced tl!ie g@vernrnemt for i,ts wastefu..1 clisposition 0f t:fue Ru.Mic rn0ney, 1mfai,rr taxatiom of tfue J!l©OF in. the in187 188 1.89

New Yorli Times, January 20, 1934. :Fhilippi11es Free Pr.ess,. June 16, 1934, pp. 34-35. Seiior Ramos . at one t1me was employed in the Senate l\y President Quezon and later discharged from the service. See Quezon's statement in New York T,i,nes, May 3, 1935.

ter@st @df the ri(d;i. ]ts p>r@gram adv0cates immediate i1:1d@ll1@111deaee for th@ Pl.iiiliilJJll'i!m<ts; ab@liti@n @f the cediula ittax and 1cevisiQlil. 0li land taxes ; re<ill1.1ctiQJn 0f salaries of b.igLJi[y ·wai@ 0ffieiails; formati@n @f ar,r army @!ii SOQ,000 mern for Rati@ro.al defero.se, aJliJ.(il the encouag:ement o!ii usi,mg the native diaLects. 190 The SakdaliJstas, fuowever, are mGJt C@mm wro.ists. F>Gssi,bly, they flil.iglu.t lDe regairmed as ai mild typ>e G·£ S@ciailists. 'fl!J.eir May IDay mprising in 1:935 was, for m@st Jl)art, aecol!l,nte€1 ifioF fuy flilieir activities a,m0>,rig the ign@rairo.,t aJlil@ dej_i)Fessed masses iro. the rnral sections anmmcl! Man,ila. Most 0fli the rebels were :farm@rs with grievamces. Tfuey were t0hd that the , C@mmonwealt[;i governmem1t will e@mti.ro.,ue the exl))Ioitati@.m of the cc;mro.try :for aro. im@emcn,i te peri@d fuy a ·selmsh @liga;,rchy s1.1pp0rted by Americam '.Bay0mets. 191 The S0;kdalista rnovememt was o1Dviowsly iro.si;>ired! b>y [!>©]itical ratfuer tna;n. eeon@mk l.ilil@ti¥@. 'fhe,i,r propl~biiscite and erhemernl r evolt was umdertal<ien with the main object of @efeati-!JJ.g the eonstit1.1ti;01,1 and jeoji)ardizi,m:g the birth 0f the Phitipl'J,i ne <C01111m0Nwealtl!J., in the hoJile tln.at they flil.igfut h,r ~ng ab>@ut ~mmedia,t e iro.de]D@ndence :for tln.e Pln.ilil))]llines a111d estaMisl!J. a vag;wely <defi:ro.ed soci!ali,s tk regime.rn 2 As we ti.ave stated, the Partido S(1Jkdmlis't0; is essentiaHy, a ehampiom of t he ir.1teresli om tl.i!.e farmers. fo the urbam sections o:f tm.e ]slaiflds, it is not tfue So,kdalis'tas hut the S@eialists or Commuro.,i sts wfuose inf.l,welil.ce is Malcolm, The Commonwealth o:J, the Philippi,.es, p. 282. Annual Report of fhe Chief of the Bureau of fosul'ar Af}a·irs (Washing.ton, ID.C., 1935~, p. 4; Samuel Weinman, "Behind the SakdaliJ'ta Uprising," The N at•ion, May 29, i935, pp. 625-626; Ralston lifayden, "The Philippines in 'Fransiti0n lirom the C0mmonwealtli to Independence," Foreign Affairs, ff uly, [936; Raymond Buell, "Philippines in 'irFansition Faced by A Sharp Revolt,'' New Vork Ti,mes, May 5, [935. Cf. "The Revolt in the Philippine fslands," 'Fhe China C.-itic, Ma,y 9, 1935; "Sakdalism Explodes," Phiiippi1'es F.-ee Press, ·pp. 2 et seq: 192 Owing to the absence 0£ Benign0 Ramos f.Fotn the Islands, the Partido Sak8.alista had in .'fune, 1935 pFoceeded to elect' Jose Timog president, Felieisimo Lanson viee-pFesident, Candencio V. Bent0sta secrefar:,:-, and l90

191

f'ARTI:ES ANliJ POLITlCS sme:E 1'927

255

in.c:rea:sing'lty felt. W ti mast, adm,i,t th.a:t the la:b0u,r m@vement h.acl an ea.Iy beginni11g in tfue Islands. Evem as early as ]902, the IDem0cratic Workrnen's Union had al,. eacly b>e,m 0:rga:11izecl. In th.at sarn,e year the union under the lea<dership <:>f Senor Isab>elo de las Reyes petitione<d th.e J:ns1,1lar G@vernment that "the iaw.s odf J>F@tectiom 0£ the working mam tie studied, ad@pted, and be brnught to the notice of the hon.@rable civil oom,missiGn, especially in regard to dwellings ~@r the wor'l\:men, accidents whilst at work, . aml a pr©tective law for women and children. A law sh@ailcl also fue passed for the b>e,t terment 0f the clomestic s©rvawt class wh.© are 116w practicalily in a state 0f semi-slavery." 198 ],n l!'Y\1@ trhe Fi!li,pi-110 wGrking elass had, undeF the ieadersnip of Mam,1~l Carl@s, organized the Socialist Par_ty 0f the Philippines which wa:s to endorse the candii<dacy @f Jisabd@ de t0s Reyes, Martin OcaN<1,pe Dominador G@mez et al in th.e general election of that yea,r. Besides urging betterment 0£ the livimg condi,tion of the w@rki,mg class, · the pa,rty a<d0pted: a primciple th.at poHtics 19 must be thrnwm a:si<de in electing the eity: cc!lllnci:lo:rs. ' the reveal Alth01:1gh no recored at present is avaii!ab>le to actual strength ot th.e S@cial,i st il!'a,r ty im _!:he iPhi,I:i,ppi11es, @ne migh.t safely assei:t that the party nas im recent Felino Cajucom tr,easurer.. Ft was understood that the offices are pr.o tem~ore, pending the r,etum of Ramos, See Manila liJaily B,<lletin, June 3, 1935. [n August, 1936, the Rartido Sakdalista was temporarily dissolved and said that it will be revived as soon as Ramos comes back to the Philippines f,rom· :Japan wl\ere he was r,epor.ted to be seeking moral or other suppott. See Ramos' letter to his followers in U"io" (Manila), September 1, 1936. For a go0d account of the Partido Sakdalista, see Salvador P . Lopez et al, "Fr.om Fa,r,ce to 'Fr.agedy, a History oii the Riise and Fall oii Salcdalism," ' in ff'he Philip~i»es J.1,erald, M!ay H, 1935. 19 3 -see a complete text oii the petition in The Mattila Tfoies, ,July 8, 1902. 194 JJ.he MatJ_ila Wimes Weekly, !T,une 4, 1916.

256

DEVELOPMENT OF PHIMPPINE LOLITICAL PARTIES

years rnaide a FaJJ!)i@ pF@gFess l!llildeF tfue able leaiclership of Attorney Pedro Aba:td SaNtos.195 However, the radicalism, which had beelil at work in China and Japan, did not fail to seize the Philippines. As early as 1924, cornml!lnism began to be noted there. Jlil that same y;ear wmelil the mrst c<im£erem.:e @f the Orieliltal transJ_;)ort wor,kers t00k place in Ca'aton, Chi,n a, Sefior Domingo , Ponce, thelil sl!lprerne ruler of the Legionarios del Trabajo, was a delegate from the Philippines. After the conference, Ponce retl!lrned to Manila w1iere he established a "secretariat" l!lmler the direction of the '['hird Internatiolilal oif Moscow. · In 1927 Mr. Tan Malacca:, a J a p>anese ext11eme rndicalist took r,efoge in Manila a:nd staye<d there long enough to make contacts with the Filipinos who were sympathetic with the communist cause. In the year foll owiNg, t hree Filipino Communist leaders went to Moscow and studied the techni€J:1!le of C0rnn1il!lnist J!l110]i>agamda a,nd tfu e w @rki:ngs of the Soviet Government. It is Fl©w rep011ted that the Phili,ppilile Proletariat Congress alo:ne has a membeFship of some 20,000. These are die-harcl Communists. To include the membership of other Communist-con.trolled orga:nizatiom.s, the tij_ gl!l•tce must be rn,i sed a.l_i)prnximately to 170,000. 196 In 1935, before the pleh>iscite on t fue constitution, the Communists held a convention known as the Kavipunan Ng Magbubukid, to discuss the rejection of the Philippine Constitution, the establishment of a Soviet Government in t he iPhilippines, and the prnparatio:n f or a natioN-wi<!le strike. 197 'Fhe Communists often create serious problem for the insular police. It was reported that "sec11et cells" were organized even within the constabulary forces. 198 Among the Comm1111ist PhUippi11es Free Press, ff une 1, 1935, p. 31. F . V . 'Futay, "How Red Are We?" Philippines Free Press, September 8, 1934, 197 Malcolm, op. cit. , p. 283, 198 Tutay, "H ow Red Are We ?" loc. cit, 195

196

PARTJES ANEJ 'POLIT-lCS SINCE '1297

257

lea<fors t@day, Cri,sant@ 'E;vang;elista, Em,ili@ Ma:ela,a and GMil'leF:!J'l© Capacd@cia <J.Fe peFhaps best known in the PhHi ppi,m~s. 199 We have seen that the minor parties, as described abocve, have n0t as yet played any significant role in Phi!Ji,ppi1rn p@litics. '¥hey made no effect on the realignmero.,t 0m tlrne major pa11ties. Tfueir appearance, foll0wing the i'1'lro.ess a,nd death @f the Partido Democ,rata, was an expressioro. 0£ the need for a party of opposi,tion. The present economic distress has helped such an expression. M. the presero.t agrarian <iliscontent is to continue and the lafu@u,r 1J1,rt111est meets wit h no l!)r◊mpt adjMstment, 200 b@th tFie Sakt:lx,J;listas and t fue Gomm,a nists wiH have an important i,@le to play . . The peri@cd from 1927 U:[i) to the birth of the Commonwealth was one that marked the rapid declining of the Partido fCJemocrra:ta. 'Fhe restoration of the semi-parliamero.tary g,0;vernment by G@ven@r-General Stimsoro. and @oro.t,i,ro.,maro.@e @f the same !fuy tfu.e Sl!l.IDSeCiJ!Ment acd,rniro.i,strati@ns hacd, 110wever, :[i>lacelll the Democr,atas at disadvantage. As an opposi,ti@n, the Demoeratas were al,r eady t@o weak. They had no political patronage and much less the party spirit. [t seemed that the Partido Democrata existecA 0ro.[y beca,use It hacdi exis,t ed. As James JBryoe @ro.ee s-aicl, " '!mhe mi1ltl Iii.as !been eoro.strueted aro.d its machiro.e11y g@es on turni,n g even when there is no gr'ist t© grind." 20'1 This was exactly the si,t uation at>oa,t the Partido Democ,rata before its demise in 1932. Hiowever, the disappearance of the Par.tido Democxa:ta immeaiately gave rise t;o the g;reater need 0£ a }bid. Cf. Ramon Torres, "Labor Problems and Labor Philippi,ie Ji'orun,, March, 1,936. Another article, "The Labor," by the same author as Secretary of Labor, Commo,iwealti, Advocate, Febr.uary, 1936: 261 James iBryce, The American Commonwealth (New ed., 'tot. !>I, p. 24. 199

2 00

Legislation," TT,e Government and appeared in TT,e York, 1914), 4th

258

DEV-E'fkOPM·E NT OF PHI,L,IPPINE PGLITICAL PARTIES

n.ew ®J!l]i)Gsil:iC>m. :ii31!lt 1il@fl.e of the aewly b0rn grnu.;ps was CaJDable (i)f assl!lming the role o'f @p]i)OSitiom. Tn.i•s was a great threat to the majority party. 'Fhe absence @f any opposition from withol!lt was sl!lre to meet its opposition from within. And so it happened in 1933 and not until ~935 whero. t he two coro.tendi0g facti@ro.s were coa~esced in. the fa@e 0f a 1ilat ional emergency foU@wimg the establishment of the Commonwealth.

CNAFTER VII CoNeLUSION

W ft Tua:v;e 00mpletecl tfu:e s1:1rvey of FJarty development im. the Phi1li p>pines, antll we shall here ftndeavour to presftnt the resul,ts of it. In a dftmocracy the party system is a dfttermini,ng factor 0f its success. The peculiar excell€m.ce of cllemocratic institutioJ.:J.s in Anglo-Saxon cou:rntries · is, im. la11g€ mea suirn, ®t:1€ to the existence of th€ twoparty systftm. Im. co:rntinftntal E1:1rope tfu.e m1:1ltiFJliciity of parties has com]l))iGatftd parliamentary democracy and conifusftcll the pubUc. It has in some c:;0untries given rise to a tftncllen_c y toward Fascist dictatorship. In tfu.e l?fu.ilippinfts, party and governmemt am, as we have seftJ.:J., always intftgratftd. It sfu0u1lcl ee Mted'.that, despite t l'i€ total aTuseneft @£ etffocfiwft OFJJ))@si,t i0n, tb.er·e have constantly beem two m ajor Jllarties in the fielcl since 1907. The :failuii:e of th€ oppositioJ.:J. party to oust the majority ]_\)arty from the government has been a matte-r 0f Gircumstamees. As a dependftnt coumtry the Philippin es 001:11<!1 n @t To.av,e @Fga-m,ize<il l))@litical parti!!S witho1,1,t re:for emc:;~ · t;o ma ti0naJ.ism. Im other w @rds, the m 0Fe fervicll'ly a party adv@Gates national independence, t·he greater would be its p0p1:1larity. This explainsthe short fifo 0f th€ Federal Party amcl the weakness of the Partido l'r0g:resista.1 AJiter t fue last named party eomfuinftd w ith t fu.€ Ter,eenstas and !b©l14ne<ll tlae J?ar,tido Demow ata im 1917, t1i.ere was mo l@ngftF any mark€@ dif.ferencft of tfu.e· inclepemcllemcft issuft between the OFJJ.\l©Sitft parties. Their canons ari as deep m ysteries to the stFanger as th€ divi1

Cf. Supra, I>P· 70-71. 259

260

ll>EV!E.fuOP!MENT OF 'PHI'LI:PPINE POL'I'FICAL PARTIES

si@Fl @f tlrn £c0ttish kirks. 'ifliie li>ewil<dermemt has a sim lpe 0rigim - 111ati0nal,i sm. iIBoth the Partido Naci@rvali;sfo., amd dim Partido Demo&ata were £0unded on @r f@ u the platform @f i,1110.e)ilendence. 'fl,rn c@rnmue,i ty 0.f caino,ms To.as in Fl0 small measure been respot1sible for tfae sys1iemati€: faiih1re of estaful~shing a tw©-)Darty system i,r.i th.e iPhii1ippines. '.ili'he Partid@ UacioriaJista 1J.as from tfue roegir.iming h>een imJDressing tm.e p€@ple as a patriotic force. 'fm.e Jit:ecl.e11al Par ty €:ommittecl s1,1.ieide fuy attempti,111,g t(1) suppn:ess it, t he Pr0gresist(1)8 fuarme<ll t1l.ernselves Tuy their rnikl attiitude afu@blt it. "lf'm.e Partido FJemocrata, thot1,g h1 a ehi ld o:li roatiomalism, came !100 late. 6n tm.e @ther 1J.ancl, tro.e c@ml'iieecd leadership of Qt!lezom and Osmefia was ]1irncticaHy inc@r1testafule. As fomg as there is 110 one who has a chai;:act er st1cong aHcl p@werfal enoblgh to challenge b@tm. Qllllezon -ancl Osraefia, the Nacionalista positi@n wrn ;pr obalDly r<HNai>m cd@miiflamt. il't is mo exaggeration, ther efore, t® say that many F iHpin@s joined t fu e Partid0 N(,J,eionalisfJa n@t fuecamse they believed the N,(,J,ei@naliJst(,J, JDrinci:ples, fu,t!lt fuecause they lii.iked either (Qwe2i@n @r Osrnefi.a @r fuoth. The )il@rso,n al element im Plaili@pine )ilarty politics is jDe£t,d iar t© am exten t t@ually u,mkmowm in Angle-Saxon c<mntries. Jin t0is resrect, tro.e Filijiliro.0, as f'r@!l;ess@r Ral·stGn Hayden sa-id, is "not otherwise, and wiH not so©',1<1 bec@m.e 0th.erwise -in the rnost vital 0£ his p@~itical adivities." 2 'fhe party system i,n the Phili,])lpi,ro.es has always I.Deem Festing Mpom ]!lerrsona1 relati0ns1Iip 0r l@yalt:y rnthe:r than meas11res ©r Jilrinci11>l@s. These are t1rn reailities d~termimi.ng the character e:>f dlieir p@1litical parties. iin 0ther words, Mile PhiJlippir.ie party institbltion is iRevitaf>ly a reflection @:f Fi:l ipino tem.pei;aments and att~t1,1.des towards life. 'They couild, if tm.ey would, CO[i>Y in faH the American i,nstituti@Rs, but the temperamer.i,ts necessary tor cai;ry2 Dean C. W:or.cester and Ralston Hayden, The Philippines Past and Present (New York, 1930), p. 783.

C©NCLUSION

261

ing @l!lt tliese imsti,t utiens a:re the things that cann0t li>e copiecd. Th~s also explains why the Anglo-Saxon twoparty system has failed to take root in the Philippines. Since the Anglo-5ax©n party system has definitely fai,l ed i,n the Philipp~nes, parl,iamentary government could n©t ha;,@ fueen very suecessful there. The Nacionalista c0rnt110t @iii the 1'egisfaturce has never · fueen brokem. The Democratas at n0 time exceeded 20 per cent. of the membersb.il') in the legislature. 8 Because of this fact not much charcacter ancd colour have been given to the orgamization and l')rnce<dure of the :Philippine Legislature, and mm:h. less t0 the legislati011 emacte<d by that body, sa¥e a :fow @ceasi@ns wben Ql!lezon _and Osmefia were seriously in cHflict. Thereforn, the real opposition in the Philippines has been from wi.thin rather than from without the majority party. It was the factional opposition from within that Sl')lit the Partido Nacionalista in l922 overc the question @:li leadershi,l'l, af.l<d again in 19341 ov,er M!ie iHiawes-Hare-<c:uitting Act. 'ili'he cfuange of the national leadership has never been the direct effect of the opposition from wiithout. The mineirity party might on ram occasi@ns embarrass the majority leaders, but they have nev,er gem@ bey@nd that. As an opposition, the Pa-ntid:@ fi)emocrata was a victim of the 1')0li,tica!l climate iiri a clel')emdent c0untry. il'ts demise in 1932 helpe'11 much to c@nvinee stl!ldents 0£ Philippine politics @f the :liu.ti.Jity of establishing a strong and effoctive @l')pos,iti0n pa,rcty, in tlie P:h.ilipl')ines under the circumstances. A!bti'i@l!lgh there al')peared im the field a nu'mlDer 0£ rrouin@r g;F@lll')S a:liteF the ~em,ise of the P,artido FJemoerata, n0t 0ne ©'Ii them ever exerted any healthy infll!ltrnce on 1?hi1lil')l')ine vo1itics because of the masons stated abeve. With t1ie exception @f the Communist Party, pra~tically 8 E. J. Bell, Future of t/ie Philippines, foterview :,,,;,,. Maj. Gen. Wood and @.thers ~0hkago, 1925), p. 13.

262

'IJYEiVEb01i'M'ENT OF 1i'l-IU,,1PPINE PAUPJCAL PARTIES

a[ll 11;To.@ mi•N@.r gr@1Jt<ps To.ave g@me €mt @di existemce, im S]!)ite o:f tfue eryimg meed fo,r a strn.mg @p,Jp@siti©m iom the Js[ands. Tais aas cal!lsetol ma,my iFiliJj!linos great a:ro.xiety. Tfuey <iledaFecl: that tfue Naei@naJlist0;s To.ave l»een i:o p0wer too ~@ng. They have been given l/lll!lmeF©l!ls !i)rivileges, like @0,r k ~anrnl legislatiom anm pa1:r,@m.age, and have [ie£1: lit1tle c1tam.ce ,for the miF10rity. ]if democracy is ~© eontiawe i,n the iPfuiJl,i]ilpi:ae~, this evi,l mtts1t be c@rrecte<ll by the fuU ]lliay @'t a tw@-jparty syst em. 4 'Fhius far, jadgimg ;l;v0l.ilil @X'Ji)erience, 1.va11ty d,i:etatorship> has m0t fueero. s•l!lccess£1d in tr1te ~ •fuiiiji>pitnes. Wher-1e'Ver a pa11ty telil<'!l@cil t@ward c0ncemtFati0a of JDOWeF trl!rnre was atways a: :ti@rce growing 'ti© t>lay 1:he wart @di c01i1oterll>mlance. fa a depemdemt c@H111.try party jD@wers a re foRi:ted. 'ffu@ majodty must, at ]east in <!m,twa1rd appearalilce, he r eSjD@nsifule t@ the JlH'>l:')l<liar wii~ o:lj the people ©fl @fle hand, aHGI sahJect to the saj'leFvisi@fl of tfue m©the,r ©©um.by @111 the @•tTu.eF. The rehali>i1itrat i@n J!l©licy of G0ivern:o·r -Gene11a1 W G@d was olwi@.us1y a: 11estr iction upi0n the c@mjDmimem.mary }Y@wer giJveA t<'> the Naci@f/ietlista foacl:ers ID:¥ G0v;ern.0F-General Ha11rison. Both Marrison am€! W00d ha@ lJieen };}ighly i:astimm.ero.tal ifl the Gtevtdoprnem.,t 0£ th@ 'party syste,m illl the Fh.il,i]Dpim.@s. The former, by av.0iding swJ9ervis01ry restrietiom. upon the majority fr0 l.ilill witlil:ou1t, acttaaHy hdfDed t@ breed thie facti0na~ ©JD•p@siti@m wit!Jli,ro. t1'le maj@rity i1lseH; while tfue latter Tuy e:x;erci.si,n,g t1te ]D@wer of strict se1pervisio1i1, il!llil.Jilrnceclem.teQUy unite<d t1ie Naeionalistas a111cl s1:1ili,s eqmently ev•elii f@rced tbe JJem@cr(J)tas to form a 1mitecl. fr0Rt with the majority i,fl their C@l.ililmon strnggle m@•r ft;eed@m. The puctice 0f party go'Vemment im a d@f)en<'ier-1t col!l•n:try, as showm Tuy the e~perieace in the P-hili]Dpi!!le_s, is Th@w!Jlel! t0 low@r tlae consti,te1tioflal position of the G<'>v.ern0r-GeBeral, if 1tfue wfueels of g@'Vernment are 4 See a joint statement by Benigno Aquine, Rafael !Palma and Maximo M. Kalaw, in The Philippi1>es Herald, June S, 1933.

263

6 Aeeooding to ilie estimate made 1n 1931, there ar.e i0:920(000 ÂŠhristians out o:6 ilie total population of l2,000;000. See 1?,eport of the GovernorGeueral, 193'1, p. 136.

Ct,. I!: o,ig, 'Record, 66ili 0ong., 1,~t Sess., p. 8856.

9 /ibid., 66th C0ng., 3Fd Sess., p. 436. 10 Cf,. 'Fhe Messages and 'Papers of Woodrow Wibso11 (New YoFK, 1924), Vol. M, p. 1220. 11 H . R e:p., No. 968, 73rd (:ong., 2nd Sess., p. 9.

Supr,a, p.

255.

CON€·1if!TSION

265

18 Therefore, the resto c@me emt ancil say this publicly." wiH has, at least J!)Opuiar t1ie pHsifuili,t y @f t1ie pQliticO's t@ outwaFd:ly, fue€J:il v;ery c@nsistent, though the party platt£orm was @ften used for climbing into fhe car rather tbm 'F©F rfol,i,ng ©J:il. In. observiag P1iilip!)ine !ilemocracy, one ~ould never :fiaii t;0 Fea:lise tifu.e signifiica,J:ilce 0.£ the mestizos (1ial£castes) class in the role of leadership. The pure Malays wa@ eomp@se 92 per ceJ:il,t. @f the whole populatioa hawe 14 The rarely achievecl any role of Flational prominence. M,day farmers or taos @O not begin any movement, i,astead, taey 0fuey thei,r Ji>Oli,t ical leaders in any OF®inary 16 Taeir habit of obediexi;iression of opinion at the polls. eaee fuas ©@J:illtF~bate<;l rn,1,1ch t© the stabi,l,i ty 0[ govern.meat iJ:il the ]slands. It is, therefore, more correct to say that !ilem.@<sFacy in the P1J.i,l ~ppiF1es has been, and still is, the g@vernmeJ:iltl 0£ all undeF tn.e leadership 0f the best. 'ifl'he type of clemocracy in the PnUippines has made lifi.e Ji)@1itical pa'l'ty a si,r nple af.faiF. 'Tae whole i;iarty p@litks of the Phi,l ippines in the last thirty years has 1ieeA centei_;i,f<lg arom>1cd the tw0 m@st 01,1tstaF1<ding figures, :P11esi<dent Quez(:)J:il alil'd Vice-Preside nt Osmefia. 'Fae tw© have li>een e011d,i al :lirieF1<ds af<ld great rivals. Twiee they have l:ieeJ:il 0peHly opJi>osed t0 ea<sh 0tae11, aJ:il(;} twice taey have cordially conciliated their differences. The present C0aliti0Ji] G0veFF1menit was actuaJlily decicded by b0th QuezoJ:il aad Osmefia in spi,t e 0f a stormy opposition by many pF@rniJ:ilent leaders. 16 1:he C@alid:ion ui\ider Presimeat Quezon and Vice-Preside a,t Osmefia is su~p@rted Df lS Cf. Her,mann Haged·o •n, Leonard Wood, A Biograph,y (New York, 1931), Vol. U, p. 4110. u C:ifj. ID. R. Williams, "Gene•al Wood and the Filipinos," World's Work, Febr.uar.y, 1924, p. 369. 15 f!:f. Henry b. Stimson, "Future Philippine Policy Under, the Jones i'i:et," Foreign Affairs, Apr.ii, 1927, p. 464. 16 Cfi. Supra, pp. 246-247.

266

DEVELOPM ENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

a eommom platform17 adopted on the eve of the Commonweallifu electien of ~935. Moreover , President Ql!lezon is all in all popular as w<dl as power.fol. As long as he a:nd Vice-if>r.esident Osmena remain in public life, there is no @Ossibility of a substantia l chang@ of party alignments in the Islands, though the Coalition. may face the :J?FObliem of bloc system or personal fi>Olitics, since there is no organized opposition in the National Assembly . !7

$upra, p. 253.

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268

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BIBI!.W6RA:1i'HY

269

H. R. 18459, 63r.d C,ongr,ess, 2nd Session. H. R. 7195, 66th Congress, 1st Session. H. R. 8856, 68th Congress, 1st Session. 'H. R. r233, 72nd Congress, 1st Session. H. R. 8573, 73r.d Congress, 2nd Session. Hieariilgs o" the Philippiiles before tlte Committee of lnsular Aljfairs, House of Representatives, 57th .Congress, 1st Session. - ~ ~ = - -.. Hearings bdore tlte Senote Committee 01t lite Phil·ippines a"d the Hio11se Committee o" .fosufor A•ffairs, 66th Congress, 1st Session. - - - - - -.. Heari1'gs 011 'Philipp;,., Local Autonomy, Committee on Insular. Affair,s House of Repr.esentatives, 68th Congress, 1st Session. -=- - - - -. Heariilgs o" the Pltilippines before the House Committee o" Insular Affairs, ilst Congress, 2nd Session. -=="""'=-"~--.. Hearings 011' the Philippfoes before the House Committee 011 lmsular A[fqirs, 72nd G:ongress, I-st Session. House Do«mwits, No. 3, 55th Congress, 3rd Session. H 011se Documents, No. 3, 55th Congress, 1st Session. Ho,ise Dowmmts, No. 2, 56th Congress, !st Session. House ,Documents, No. 325, 67th Congress, 2nd Session. Ho,ise Dowments, No. 509, 67th Congress, 4th Session. House Dowme,its, No. 209, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session. House Docume1'1S, No. 400, 74th Congr,ess, 2nd Session. M 011,e Report, No. 968, 73rd Cong,ess, 2nd Session. Mouse Resolutio"s, No. 86, 62nd Congress, !st · Session. Letter f,rom <Secr.etary of Uoar, GoYernment Pointing Qflice, Washingt0n, D. C., 1901. -e---e'"='e-- -.. "Report of the Wouse of, Representatives, No. 557, 57th Congress, 1st Session. - - ~ - - ~. Report of the f.louse of Represe11tat·ives, No. 2156, 57th Congress, 1st Session. =,,,-==---,. Report of the House of Represmtatives, No. 1540, 57th Congress, 1st Session. ~ - -- - ~.. Report oi the House of Representatives, No. 1115, 63rd Ci:ongress, 2nd Session. - -- - - -.. Report of the House of, Representatives, No. 968, 73rci . Congress, 2nd Session. - - -- - -.. Report of, Insular Affairs Committee, No. 2158, 57th Congress, 1st Session. - - ~ - - -.. Report of Lieute-nant-General Commandi11g Ar11>i)I, 1901, GoveFnment iPr-inting Office, Washington, D. C., 1901, 4 Parts. Repo,t o.f, T-Var 1:Jepa,tmmt, [901, Government iPr-inting Office, Washington, D. €:., Vol. I, Part Senate ll)ocuments, No. 66, S5th Congress, 1st Session. Senate fJoeumrnts, No. 62, 55th Congress, 3rd Session. S mate IJoa-umrnts, No. 138, 56th <Congress, 1st Session. Smale Dowmmts, Ne. 208, 56th Congress, 1st Session. S e11ate Doeuments, No. 200, 60th Congress, 1st Session. Se11ate Docume,its, No. 112, 56th Congress, 2nd Session.

~~----..

rv.

270

DEVEL.OPMENT OF' PHILIPPI-NE P0LITZCAL :PARTIES

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II.

Secondary Sources 1. BOOKS

Earrows; David P., History of the Philippines; rev. ed., The World Book Company, Yonkers-on-Hudson, 1925. Bell, E. P ., Editor, Future of the Philippines, The Chicago Daily News C0., Chicago, 1925. Elair, Emma, and Robects0n, James .A., EditoFs, The Philippine Isla11ds, [493-1898, Arthur H. Clar,k Co., Cleveland, 1903-1909, 55 vols. Blumentritt, Ferdinand, The Philippines (translation), Donolue Bros., Chicago, 1900. Boeobe, Jorge, General Wood a,id the Law, Eur,eau _of Printing, Manila, 1923. Bryce, J,ames, The American Commonwealth: 4th ed., 'Ji1he Maemillan Co., New, York, 1914, 2 vols. Âˇ Castillo y Jimenez, El Katip,111a11 o el Filibusteriamo en Filip i11as, de! Asilo de Huerfance de! S. C. de Jesus, Madrid,, 1897. Craig, Austin, The Filipinos' Fight for Freedom, Oriental Commercial Co., Manila, 1933. Craig, Austin, !Editor, 11he Philippi,ies and the Filipinos of Yesterday, Oriental ' Commernial Co., Manila, 1934. Craig, Austin, Editor,, Rizal's Political Writings, Ociental Commercial Co., Manila, 1933. Diamonon, Vietoriano ID., The Development of Self,-Government in the Philippine ls/ands, Unive-rsity of fawa, Iowa City, 1920. Elliott, Charles E., The Philippines: To the End of the Military Regime, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1916. - - - - - -., The Philippines: To the End of the Commission Government, The B0bbs-Merrill Co., Indianapolis, 1917. Fernandez, Leandro H., A Brief, History of the Philippines, Ginn & Co., Boston, 1919. Fernandez, The Philippine Republic, Columbia University Press, New York, 1926. Forbes, W. â&#x201A;Źamer,on, 'Fhe Philippine l,sltmds, Houghton Miffiin Company, B0ston, 1928, 2 vols.

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27'1

Forbes-'lsindsa,~, Ghaoles H. A, The Philippi11es U11der Spa11ish a,id AmeriGa11 Rules, 'lilhe !Ji, C. Winston Co., Philadelphia, 1906. Foreman, !John, The Pl,ilip'f,ine Islands, Kelly and Walsh, Ltd., London, 1906. Greaves, 'H. R. G., The Spa11isl, Constitution, The Hogarth Press, London, 1933. Harr.ison, Fra~cis B., The Corner-Stone of Philippine llldependence, The Century eo., New Yori<, 1922. Kalaw, :Maximo M., T.he Development of P/,ilippine Politics, Oriental Commercial Co., Manila, 1926. - ---ss=eeee=; Philippille (iovernment Under the Jones Law, Oriental Commercial Co., Manila, 1927. - ---"="=eeee=,, Self-Government in the PM!ippilles, The Century Co., New York, 1919. Kalaw, Teodore M., La Masoneria Filipi11a, Manila, 1920. - - -=--., The Philippine Revolution, Manila Book Co., Manila, 1925. ---~....,,.~., La Revolucion Filipino, Manila Book Co., Manila, 1924. Kroeber., P.i.. I.., Peopl'e of the Philippines, Amer.ican Museum of Natural History, New York, 1919. Laubach, Fr.ank C., The, People of the Philippines, George H. Doran Co., New Yock, 1925. Lema, Marques de, Spain Si,ice 1815, Cambridge University Press, 1921. LeRoy, James A., The Americans in the Pl,ilippines, the Houghton Mifllin Co., Boston, 1914, 2 vols. . Lowell, Lawrence, The Governmmt of E11gland, Macmillan Co., New Yor,k, 1908, 2 vols. Maine, iMenry, Popular Governme11t, J. Murray, London, 1887. Malcolm, George A., The Commonwealth of the Philippi11es, D. AppletonCentury Company, New Yor.k, 1936. - - - -==--, The Constitutiv11al Law of the Philippine Isla11ds, Together with Studies in the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law (Vol. I, Philippine Legal Series) , IJi'he l!,a wyers Cooperative Publishing Company, Rochester, 1920-lst ed.; 1926-2nd ed.; J.936-=Jr.d ed. Ma:lcolm, <1ieor,ge A., and Kala\\l, Ma,dmo M., Philippi,,e Government; rev. ed., 'D. C. Meath Co., Boston, 1932. Merriam, C;:harles E., The Writte,, Constitution and the Unwritten Attitude, R. R. Smith, Ine., New Yor,k, 1931. Moncado, Nilarion Camino, American, P/1ilippi11es a11d Orient, Fleming H. Revell Co., New Yor.k, 1932. Norton, M. M., Builders of a Natio11, E. C. McCullough & Co., :Manila, 1914. Osias, Camilo, and iBar.adi, Mauro, The Philippine Charter of Liberty, The foe(lch-Br,ay Pr.inting Co., Baltimor.e, 1933. Ostr.ogorslci, M., Democraay and Party System in the U,iited States, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1906. Palma, Rafael, 011r Campaign for independence, Bureau of Printing, Manila, 1923. Pollock, James K., and Heneman, Marlow J., The H,itler Decrees, @. Wahn, Ann Ar.bor., 1934. Quezon, Manuel ii\,., and Osias, Camilo, Governor-General Wood and the Filipino Cause, Manila Book Co., Manila, 1924.

2~2

Il)Eif/l!J'L.@PMEN:T (J)F 'PHIIrLI•PPlNE PQLMT!ICAL PARTrES

Qui~in0, <i:aPl0s, Quezon, Man of, Ele£tiwy, McCullough ifilrinting Ce., Manila, [935, Ro0sevelt, ·,!Nieh~las, The Philippi11.es: .A Treasure and a Problem, J. H. Sear.s & Co., New Y0cle, 1926. !Russell, <Charles E., The Me-r,o of t-he Jii'ilipi11os, 'DIie ~entury G:0., New Y 0rk, - 1923. ""'=ee=eeeee,ee.,;a;..;e,,,, The 0ittlook ifior fhe Philip.pities, 'i'he Century '1:0., New ¥ork, [922. Retana y, Gamb0a, Manuel, Arch.ivo del BibUofilo Filipino, Viuda de M. M-inuesa de los Rios, Madrid; 1897, 3 vols. !!ifaal, ff ose, The Reign of &reed, tr.anslated by Oharles :Eile-rbysl\ir.e, Fhilippine E dueati0n Co., Manila, 1912. see;eeeeeeee;a;s;'"=- , The Social Ca11-ee1·, translated !',y ([)l\ar,les E. Denbyshire, 2nd ed., Philippine Educati0n e o., Manila, 1926. Sait, :Edwar.d M., American Parties anil Eleotions, 'Fhe (Centur.y Co., New Y0FK, 1927. St. !'.)la,ir, Francis, The Kati-puna,;, 1Fip. "Amigos de! Pais," Falado 258, Manila, [902 . . 'Fa-ft, Welen !H., Recollections of Full Years, IDodd !Mead & Co., New ¥ork, [9M. Wildman, Edward, Aguinaldo, :11.othr.op !Publishing Ca., Bosten, 1901. 'Williams, E>aniel R. Odyssew of the Philir,pine Commission, A.. CC. McC!ur.g & €Jo., Chicago, l9t3. - -~~=.,,,, 'Dhe U11ited States and the P.hiUp-pines, Doubleday !Page & Co., Gar.den City, 1924. Wilson, Wo0dr.ow, Con·st-itutional Govemtnent in t-he l'Jnited States, Columbia Uni,ver.sity Press, New York, 1921. Woreester, iDean C., and Hayden, Ralston, The Philippines, Past and 1f'resent, 'il:he MacMillan Co., New ¥o•k; [930. 2.

hR,TICM:S AND !PAMP.HLETS

"Aguinaldo's Manifesto," The Outlook, Vol. 67, N0. 17, April 27, 1901. ":i&me,ica and the Pl'iilippines," Round Table, "Vol. XV, ,Eleeeml'>er, 1924. :f.tP,ostol, Jase F., Th-e Eeonomie Policy of Philippine Government: Ownership and Oper,ation of, //ililsiness, T!Jniversit,r 0f the Philippines, Manila, 1927 . .A,ustl'\ia, Quir,in0 !E., "The Cabinet ancl C0um,il 0f State," Philip1>ine So cial Sc-ienee Review, V:ll>l. 1, !N0s. 3-4, !Novemoer.-IDecemoer, '1929. ~ -e=aaase--, "11he Stimson Budget Plan," Philippine Social Science Review, Vol. I, !Na. 1, Septeml'>er, l929. Benitez, C0nrads, "'il:he New P hilippine Constitution," Paaific Affairs, ';loo!. VUI, Na. 4, li'leeember, 19:35. "Bonifaeio, What tl\e Filipinos Should Know," T<he PM1ippi11e Review, Val. [II, Nos. 1-2, tanuary and Februar.y, 1918. "Colonel 'I,homps0n's iPl\ilippine Rep0rt," (Full Text), Cmcrent History, Vol. XXV, N0. 5, Feornary, 1927. ]Dulles, Foster Rhea, "The Philippines and the 'Hate-Hawes-Cutting Act," [i/oreign Polfry Reports, Val. ~X, No. 22, January 3, 1934. Editorials: "Tl'ie Eleetion and the Wor.d 'Over.whelming'," F'hiUppine Magazine, Vol. XXXII, No. 10, Oet0ber, 1935.

BIBLIC>GRAPHY

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"Is the !Feder.al Par,cy Popular, in Your Vicinity?" The Philippine Review, Vol. 2, Ne. 5, 'Mar.eh, 1902. "Filipinos Launch New Politkal Party," Filipino N atiou, Vol. 8, No. 4, Febr,uary, 1932. "~he ~ utur,e of the l.'lhilippines," Filipino Nation, Vol. 5, No. 11, September, 1929. "GeQera,l Wood1s Hands United," Literary Digest, Vol. XCI; No. 9, November 21, 1926. "fleneral Wood Plays Mussolini," The Nation, Vol. CXXIII, No. 3204, .IDecember. 1, 1926. "General Wood's Report,'' 'Fhe Nation, Vol. CXIV, No. 2949, January 11, 1922. 6raham, Stuart, "~'administration americaine aux Philippines," Revue des Sciences Politiques, Vol. XLVH, Avril-Juin, 1924. Guggan, S. P ., "The Future ·of the Philippines,'' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 5, - No. 1, O0tober, 1926. 'Hayden, 'Ralston, "Tl\e United States and the Philippines,'' Annals of the American Acade,ny of l?olitical and Social Sciences, Vol. CXXII, November, 1925. Hayden, Ralston, "The Philippines: An E:xoperi_ment in Democracy," Atlantic Montl,ly_, Vol. [37, No. 3, March, 1926. Nayden, Ralston, "The Philippines in Transition from the Commonwealth to Independence,'' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 4, July, 1936. Kalaw, Ma,dmo M., "Ideals of the Philippines," Almals of t/,e American Academy of, Political and Social Sciences, Vol. CXXII, November, 1925 . ..,,,;;,,=a.,-"'"====',, "Governor Stimson in the Philippines,'' Foreig» Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 3, April, 1929. "1,'he Katipunan of the Philippines," Amer,ican Monthly Review, Vol. XXIV, Ne. 3, September, 1901. "'Fhe Last Election in the Philippines,'' T,l,e Filipi>lo People, Vol. 1, No. 1, September, 1912. LeRoy, James A., "The Friars in th~ Philippines," Political Sciences Quarterly, \fol. XV~H, No. 4, lDeeember, 1903. -=- - ~-, "I?hilippine Pr,oolem After Ten Years' Exper.ience,'' Proceedings of the America» Political Science Association (Fifth Annual Meeting~, December 28-31, 1908, The Waverly I?ress, Baltimore, 1909. Ly,ons, Nor.lier,t, "Filipino Leaders' Split on Independence Issue,'' Current History, Vol. XX], No. 6, March, 1925. ..,,.;,..;;;;a--aS==ee-=,, "The Nationalist Victory in the I?hilippine Elections,'' Current History, Vol. XXII, No. 6, September, 1925. "The Mocl'e,nista Par.ty,," Filipino Nation, Vol. 9, No. 3, January-February, 1933. "'Fhe New J,ones Bill,'' The Filipino People, Vol. 2, No. 11, July, 1914. ©sias, · Camilo, "I-Iawes Act Favored by Filipino (i)fficial,'' The Trans-Pacific, Vol. XX[, No. 50, Deeemlier 14, 1933. Osmena, Sergio, The Co1'stitt,tional Development of Philippine Autonomy, Bureau of Printing, Manila, [924. Palma, Rafael, "The Convention from Within,'' Philippine Political Science Review, Vol. VH, No. 3, j',uly, 1935.

274

DEVELOPMENT OF PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTIES

!Par,r,ish, Samuel L., "Set,f-G0ver,nment in the Tropics," The loumal of the National Institute of Social 'Sciences, Vol. ], 'No. 1, Deeember, 1915. "Politkal Activity Among the Filipinos," The Philippine Review, Vol. II, No. 2, DeGember, 1901. "'.Ji1he Philippines: Fir.ewor.ks and Fear," Time, Vol. XXVI, !No. 22, Nov.

25, 1935. "The Report in the P.I.," The Chfoa Critic, Vol. IX, No. 6, May 9, 1935. Reyes, Baldomero B :, "Philippine Elections kom Pr.e-Spanish to the Ptesent Times," 1'he Philippi,ie Social Science Review, V0I. II, Nos. 2, 3, 4, February-April, 1930. !Robertson, James A., "The Extraordinary Session of the Philippine Legislatur.e," American Politiaal Science Review, Vol. IV, No. 4, N0vember,

1910. - Rogers, Lindsay, "Ministerial fostability in France," Political Science Quarter/::,,, V0I. XLVI, No. 1, March, 1931. Santos, !Epifanio de los, ".Alndr,es B0ni.fado," The PhiUppine :Review, Vol. nr, !Nos. 1-2, January-February, 1918. Shelton, George R., "Filipino Capacity for Self-Government," North American Review, V0I. 199, N0. 1, January, 1914. Stimson, Henry L., "First Hand Empr,essions of the Philippine !Pr.oblem," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 199, No. 38, March 19, 1927. - - - - - -, "Future Philippine Policy Under the Jones Act," Foreign At/airs, Vol. 5, N0. 3, April, 1927. "The Treaty of Biac-na-Bato," The Philippine Review, Vol. II, No. 1, November, 1901. .Taft, William H., "Folitical Parties in the Pliilippines," A11nals of the Ame.rica11 Acadein!)I orf, Political and S,ocial Science, V.ol. XX, No. 2, September, 1902. Torres, Ramon, "The Government and 1.abor," The Commonwealth Advocate, Vol. 2, No. 1, February, 1936. - -=~---, "Labor, Proolems and l.ab0r Legislation," 'J'he Philippine Forum, Vol. 1, No. 4, MarGh, 1936. Valeur, Robert, "The Most Delicate Job in the Wor,ld,'' New York Times ' Magazine, December 10, 1933. "Value of Party Opposition,'' Filipino Nation, \fol. 8, N0. 10, SeptemberOctober, 1932. Voyra, Jaime C. de, and Ponee, M., Efemerides Filipillas, Vol. I, Manila,

1914.

Weinman, Samuel, "Behind the Sakdalista Uprising," The Nation, Vol. 140, No. 3647, May 29, 1935. William, Daniel R., "General Wood and the Filipinos," World's Work, Vol. XLVU, Febnuar,y., 1924. Willis, H. Parker, "The Philippine National Bank," The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 25, No. 5, May, 1917. "A United Rr.ont in the Philippines," The Nation, Vol. CXXII, No. 3166, Mar.ch 10, i926. Yap, Diosdado M., "The Modernista Party Calls," Filipino Nation, Vol. 8, No. 10, September-October, 1932.

B1BLIOGRW HY 3.

275

BIOGRM'H>IES

Brief Biography of the Members of tile Ho11orary Board of Filipino Commissioners to the :bo1,isiana Purol,ase Espositiou, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1904. Caballero, Isabelo, and (;racia Concepcion, M. de, Qnezon, The Story of a Natio11 and Its Foremost Statesman, The International Publishers, Manila, 1935. Gla,in, iJose 'V., Gmeral Aguinaldo and Philippine 'PoHtics, Fajardo Press, Manila, 1928. Craig, Austin, Lineage, 'Life and Labors of Jo11e Rizal, Philippine Education Co., Manila, 1913. ~ - ~~==--, Riaal's Life a11d Minor Writings, Philippine Education Co., Manila, 1927. Dewey, Geoâ&#x20AC;˘ge, Autobiograpily of George Dewey, Charles Scribner's Sons, Âˇ New York, 1913. Ragedor-n, Hermann, Leonard Wood, A Biogr.aphy, Harper & Brothe,s, New Yor-k, 1931, 2 vols.

NEWSPAPERS

The Brooklyn Dail:v Eagle, 1900. El C'o111ercio, 1914. El EJebate, 1929. La Democracia, 1912. Gae eta de M a11ila, 1892. Tile Manila T.imes, 1916-1927. Tile Manila Daily Bulleti11, 1933-1935. La Nacio11, 1917 and 1921. New York ;J:imes, 1899-1935. New York Daily Tribune, 1899 and 1901. New York Herald-Tribune, 1963 and 1936. The Philippiues Herald, 1923-1935. P.hili.ppilles Free Press, 1911-1936. . Progress, 1933. El Re11aoi111irnto, 1907. The Tribune (Manila), 1928. Tile Washington Herald, 1927. La Vanguarilia, 1910.

I ndex

INDEX Addatico, Macar,io, 73 Aglipay, Gr,egorio; 24, 68, 242, 244 Agoncillo, Filipe, 85, 91 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 46, 47, 50, 54, 60, 152, 155, 172, 223, 240, 241, 242, 244 Alas, S. de las, 54 Alunan, Rafael, 195 Alvarez, Santiago, 66 Amended bill, the, 104 American political par.ty, 15 Antis, ?15, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 232 Antonio, Domingo, 101 Apacible, Galicano, 73 Apostol, Cesilio, 66 Apostol, J. F., 129 Aquino, Benigno, 180, 181, 213, 236 Arejola, 'Fomas, 27, 85 Arellano, Cayetano S., 56, 57 A,eUano, Deodato, 41 Artiago, Manuel, 66 Assembly, the Philippine, 80, 84,

Bonitez, GJonr.ado, 239 Bourno, Frank S., 56, 57 Bryce, James, 257 Buencamino, Felipe, 54 Burgos, Jose, 24 Bureau of Insular Affairs, 173, 182 Bureau o,f Supply, 129 Caballero, Isabelo, 106 Cabinet, 119, 120, 121, 195 English Cabinet, 122 Caoinet Cr-isis of 1923, 240 Cabinet government, responsible, 124, 191, 197 Cabinet system 197 Cailles, Juan, 98 Cajucom, Felino, 255 Canadian Government, 122 Canadian political party, 14 Capadocia, Guellermo, 257 Caringal, Marcelo, 98 Carlos, Manuel, 255 Carreon, Francisco, 66 Carrillo, Pedro, 25 Cecilio, Silverio, 98 Check and balance,. 15 Civil service; 113 €lark amendment, 105 Coa,Htion Cabinet, 156 Coalition Government, 265 Coalition movement, 236, 237, 248 Coalition Pact, 181 Coa·lition plan, 239 Coalitionists, 245 Program of, 243-244 Coastwise Law, 137, 138, 139, 182 Colectivista, Partido see Partido CDolecti¥ista Collective resignation, 14 Collectivism, 156 Comite de la Union Nacional, 72 Commission First Philippine Commission, the, 51, of independence 127, 133, 173, 179 Philippine Commission, 71, 100, 103, 107, 108 Taft Commission, 55 Commission of iElections, Appointments and Impeachment, 248 Commonwealth of the Philippines, the Inauguration of the Nov. 15, 1935, 245

103, 107

11he conflict between the Assemly and the Commission, 86 Constituent of, 232 The elec,tion of the Assembly (see election~ 11he Nacionalistas and the Assembly, 80 The speaker of the Assembly, 85, 91, 124 Austria, Quirino E., 196 Autocratic government, 97 Autonomous law, 129. Avelino 0 Jose, 181 Bacon Bill, !82 Bagehot, Walter, 109 Balance of party government, 156 Barretto, Alberto, 67, 72, 73, 85, 112, 162 Basa, Jose, 25, 34 Basa, Raman, 42 Belo Bill, 194 Be.rnabe, Manuel, 99 Blanco, Governor-Genera,!, 45 Bloc, Lopez, 232, 233 Board of Control, 183 Board of Directors, 101 Bocobo, Jorge, 223 Bonifacio, Andres, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47 279

280

INDEX

Cammanweal!h, e'1ec-tian af, 240, 244, 245 Commanwealth government, 236 Communism, 243 Cammunists, 254, 256, 257 Communist party, 261 _ Concepcion, Venancio, 132 Confesor, Tomas, 232 Congress of the U.S.A., 99, 104, 132, 137, 168, 181 Conley Case, 159, 160, 161 Conley, Roy, 159 Constituent of Assembly, 232 Constitution, 107 and the Party, 13, 14, 15 for the Commonwealth of the Ph,ilippines, 1n the ,atificatian a,f the constitution of the Common,w eail th, 239 Constitutional Convention, 251 Constitutional System, 123 Convention, see Parties Convention, Extraordinary of 1914, 99 Coolidge, Calvin, 170, 182, 185, 190 Camejo Case; 192 Castas Dalmacio, 132 Âˇ Council Council of Government, 57 Supreme Council of La Liga 36 of Ka,t ipunan, 41 Provincial Council of La Liga, 36 of Kaitipunan, 41 Popular Council Council of La Liga, 36 of Kafipunan, 41 Subordinate council of Katipunan, 41 Council of State, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 137, 155, 196, 197, 198 President of the, 122 Vice-President of the, 122 Couneil of Ten, 150, 151 Coup d'etat, 43 Conservative Party, 69 Corpus, Ra.fael, 162 Cruz, Salustiano, 66 Cuenco, Mariano Jesus, 164, 234 Currency System, 243 IDavis, D. F., 200 De Anda, Simon, 24 De Andrada, Jose Taviel, 32 De Dios, Emilio Riego, 47, 98

De Gracia, M., 105 De Izquie,do, Rafael, 22 E>e la Vina, Jose Maria, 67 De Lean, Ceferino, 70 De Los Reyes, Isabelo, 67, 255 De Tavera, Joaquin Pardo, 25, 56, 57, 64 De Rivera, PFimo, Governorgener.al; 49 De Vey-ra, G. C., 124 Debt t.imit of the Philippine Government, 132 Del Mundo, Berna,do, 98 Del Pilar, Marcela H., 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33 Del Pan, Rafael, 73, 74 Del Rosario, Aguedo, 66, 152 !Del Rosaroi, Gene,al Pantaleon, 152 Del Rosario, Tomas G., 57 Democracy, 13, 16, 18, 19, 148, 243 Democratas, 102, 116, 126, 134, 150, 156, 175, 176, 178, 179, 193, 194, 200, 201, 215, 261, 262 Democrata Nacional, Partido, see Pavtido Dem'o cratie Naciona,[ Democrata, Partido, see Partido E>emocra-ta Democratic government, 16 Democratic form of government, 248 Democratic institutions in AngloSaxon countries, 259 Democra.bic Party ~U.S.A.), 103 Democratic Wo,kmen's Union, 255 Dern, George H ., 245 Despujol, governor-general, 36 Dewey, Geo,ge, 48 Diamonon, Victorians D., 111 Diaz Domingo, 98 Diaz, Valentin, 41, 66 Dickinson, Jacob N., 92 Dicta,torship, 243 Diwa, Ladislao, 37, ~I Duggan, S. P., 105 Election, Tacit election, 17 of Philippine Assembly of 1907, 71, 80, 83 of Philippine Assembly of 1909, 89 of PhHippine Assembly of 1912, 93 of Philippine Assembly of 1916, 99, 100

INDEX o,f Philippine Assembly 0£ 1925, 176 of Philippine P..ssemhly o, 1928, 193 o> l?hilippine Assembly oJ; 1931, 200-202 o> Pl\ilippine AssemJ>ly of 1934, 228-229, 253 Election 0£ Resident Commissioner.s, 86-87 pr.ovincial election of 1907, 90 0£ the CorrimoniWealth, 264, 266 Enage, Senor Francisco, 247 Encranacion , V:icente Singson, 100 Evangelista , Grisanto, 257 English Gabinet, 122 ~nglish Pa,r.Hamentar.y Government, 123 English Politica•l Fa,ty, 14 Equa'lity ot the man, 243 Executive department, )10, 118, 192 Fai•field Bill, 171, 1-72, 173, 174, 176 FairfieM, Louis W,, 17•1 Fascism, 252 Fascist IDictafor.ship, 259 Fascist ~rand Council, 13 Fasdst Par,,t y, 13 Federal Party, 18, 50-70, 1'20, 159, 260, 264 Its Bacl<gFound and Formation, 50-62 Its Spread and Supremacy, 62-70 The Federal Committee 0£, 62 General Convention of 1901, 61 of 1905, 96 of 1907, 78 FlatfoFm 0£, 57-58 Fropaganda of, 76 Relation with Progressive Party, 75, 78 Public Office and . F edesal pa-rty,

65, 7-7 Fer.n-andez, Ramon, 167 Filipino, Federation of Ame-r.ica, 250 Finance Secretary, 123 Fiscalizatio n, 248 Flores, Ambrosio, 57 Fo~be, Governor.-G enesal, 2:4, 77, 87-, 94, 95 F'orbes, W. e., 96 Forbes-Wo od Repor.t, 129 Franco, IDomingo, 37

281

Free Masonry, 26-31 F Fee Speech, 243 Freedom of 'Pr.ess, 18, 243 Freedom of Speech, 15, 18 Rr,eedom of 1Jhought, 15, 18 French Cabinet, 14 French Political party, 14 Frothingham , Robert, ll5 Fusion of Colectivista s and the li>emoccatas 164, 165 Gabaldon, Isaura, 73, 193, 224 Garner, John N., 245 '1ierona, Julian, 70 Gil, Pedro, 98, 101 Gilmore, E. A., 188, 195 Gomez, Martin Ocampe Dominador, 66, 84, 90, 255 Gonzaga, Grancio, 53 Governmen t, Autocratic Governmen t, 97 Cabinet Governmen t, 14, 124 Commonwe alth Governmen t, 236 Elemocratic Governmen t, 16 Nationalist Governmen t, 127, 132 Parliamenta ry Go\Sernment_, 123, 261 Responsible Governmen t, 197 Governmen t Ownership, 129, 133 Gran Oriente Espanol, 128 Guerrero, Fernando Ma, 67, 73 Guerr-ero, Leon Ma, 54, 67, 73, 85 Guevar.a, Pedr.o, [89 Harrison, Fr:anci s, B., 96, 99, 110, lll, 1'r13, ll4, ll6, 117, 120, 121, 127, 128, 130, 137, 163, 188, 196, 262 Har.e-Hawe s-Cutting Act of 193;!, 18 Har.e-Hawe s-(.;utting Bill, 208, 210, 212, 213, 215, 216, 218, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 237, \ 240, 261 Hawes, Harr,y B., 236 Hayden, Ralston, NZ, 177, 260 Herrera, Arsenio Cruz, 57, 79, 98 Hispano-F'il isina Asociasion, 27 Hoover, 1'Ierber.t, Pr.esiden t, 208, 209 !House of Commons, [09 House of Legislature, 123 House of Repr.esentat-ives, A,m erican, 103, 104, 136, 147

282

INDEX

:W:ouse 0£° Repr.esentative s, Fhilippine, 108, 109, 117, 124, 130, 193, !94 House Steering Committee, 165 Hurley, P. J., 208 Ilagan, H ugo, 54 Immigntion (E!ause, 221 Independen ce, Commiss ion, of, 127, 133, 173, 179 [ ndependent Gover.nment, .97' Independista, Partido, see Partido Independista ]ndivid,ual Liberties, [ 8, 243 Individual Righ ts, 243 Instit ution of -t he Initiative, -126 fo sular Convention of Partido Nacionalista Consolidad0, 167 Isab ella II of Spain, Queen, 21 Jacinto, Emilio, 39, 42 J aen·a , Graciano 'Lopez, 25, 27 Jolmston, Gordon, 160 Joint Canference of Naciona)istaConsolidados-D emocratas, 1926, 180 Jome-z, Mariano, 24 Jones Law, 18, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 117, 118, 119, 121, 123, 126, 129, 130, 134, 136, 138, 158, 162, 163, 179, 183, 186, 188, 191, 197, 223 Judicial Independence, 235, 243 J udicia,ry Lottery Law, 113 Judiciary Reorga,nization BiH, 138 Junoy, Emili'o, 28 Kalaw, Pedro Serrano, 28, 253 Katipuna-n Ng Magbubukid, 256 Katipunan and R evolution, 37-49 Character and Purpo se of, 38-40 Organiza,tion 0f, 41 Popular. Council of, 41 · Provincial Council of, 41 Subordinate Council, 43 Supreme Council of, 41 Kelley, Amzi B., 105 La Liga Filipina, 34, 35 Constitution 0f, 35-36 Dissolution of, 37 Organization o,f, 36 Popular Cauncil 0£, 36 Pr.ovincial Council of, 36 Supreme Council af, 36 La Torr.e, Governor-gener al, 21, 22, 23

Labour Union, see Union Abrera Land Distribution, 242 'Laur.el, Jose P., 162, 200, 201, 253 League of Na,tions, 172 Il,eague of Provinci:11! Governors,

237

L.e garda, Benito, 85 Legislative Power, 163 Liberal Mavement, 20-26 Liberal Party, 69-70 Liberty, 18 Limjap, Jacinto, 70 Lincolnian Democracy, 241 Liongon, Franc-isco, 73 Lower Chamber, 103 Lukban, Justo, 67, 73, 180 Lumbreras, Jacinto, 47 Luzuriaga, 120 Lyons, Norbert, 172 Mabanag, Alejo, 206, 207 Madan, Emilio, 257 Magdaia Faction, 48 Makabulus, F., 98 Magdiwang Faction, 47, 48 MacHrthur, Hrthur, General, 59 McIntyr e, General, 174 Malcolm, George, 104, 184 Ma-lacca, Tan, 256 Malay Farmers, 265 Manas, Mariano, 116 Masigan, C. V., 98 May Day Uprising of the Sakda-lista s 1935, 254 McKinley Military Reservation, 192 Mill'iza, Raymundo, 240, 244 Mendiola; Enrique, 67 Mendoza, Alfonso, E., 98, 101 Menian, Charles, E., 105 Military ilnd Naval Reservation, 221 Miranda, Vicente, 73 Minor Groups, 249 Minority Party, 249, 261 Modernista Platform, 250-251 Madernista, Partido, see Partido Modernista Molina, Vicente, 42 Moncado, Hilarion Camino, 249, 250, 251 Montenegro, Antonie, 101 Montilla, Gil, 247 Montinola, Ruperto, 101, 177, 180, 181, 185, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 210, 219

INDEX

Morayta, Miguel, 27 Mora,les Luis, 98 Mor.iones, Domingo, 66 Multilateral Treaty for the Neutra,l ization of the Philippines, 244 Municipal Committee, 167 Murphy, Frank, Governor-general, 246 Mutiny of 1872, 24, 49 Nabong, !Norbeto; 241, 242, 244 N acional iPr.ogr.esista, Par.tido, see Par.tido Nacional Progresista Nacionalista-Colectivista, Partido, see Partido Naciona:lista-Colectivista Nacionalista, Consolidado, Partido, ,see Partido Nacionalista, ·€on, solidado Nacionalista Government, 127, 132 Nacionalista Legis!M,ure, 110, 111, 112, 125 Nacionalista, Partid•o, see iPar.tido Nacionalista Nacionalista regime, 127 Nacionalistas, 99, 100, 104, 106, -125, 127, 129, 130, 132, 134, 156, 163, 262 National Assembly, 245, 247, 248, 266 National City Bank of New York, 214 National Constitu~nt Assemb-Jy, 232 Na,t ional C0rnvention, see €:on:vention National Defence, 244 N. RA., 109 Na,tionalism, 263 National Social Ciierman Worker Par.ty, 14 Na,tional Socialis,t Party, 240, 241 National Supr.eme Council, 180, 181, 182, 185 National Union, bl Nicaao Cenon, 66 Ner, Jose, 57 New Youth Par-ty o,f the Philip pines, 252 Nilad (Lodge), 28 Na-z ado, M. ID., 97 ©camp0, Pablo, 87, 91 Organie Act, 162 Oriental Transport Workers, Confer-ence oi the, 256

283

Osias, Camilo, 219, 225, 226, 228, 232, 236 Osmena, Ser.gio, 67, 73, 85, 88, 91, 96, 99, 107, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 134, 135, 136, 131, 138, 139, 141, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 156, 165, 166, 167, 169, 175, 181, 184, 189, 202, 203, 210, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 21-9, 221, 224, 225, 227, 228, 229, 230, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 260, 261, 266 Osrox Mission, 210; 211, 212, 213, 214, 218, 220 Otis, Elwell S., General, 50, 52 Palm, Jose, 66 Palma, Rafael, 67, 73, 119, 223, 230, 231, 232, 253 Pantas, Briccio, 66 Pared·es, Quintin, 219, 229, 234, 246, 247, 248 Parke,r, Geor.ge, 164 Parliament, 17 Pa-rliamentary System, 123, 143, 200 Parrish, Samuel L., 263 Partido Colecti<Vista, 156, 157, 164, 165 Part ido Dem0crata, 96, 101, 125, 126, 127, 130, 134, 176, 181, 187, 189, 203, 205, 229, 230, 237, 249, 257, 259, 260, 261, 264 IDisolution of the, 200, 206, 207 Fusion of eolectivistas and Democratas Parties, 164, 165 Meeting of Aug. 25, 1917, 102 National Convention of, Jan. 31, 1932, 206, Oct., 1931, 206 Pla-tfo= of, 67, 102-103 Partido Democrata Naciona,I, 96, 101 Partido Independista, 70, 72, 73, 126 Partido Modernista, 249, 250 iPartid0 NacionaHsta, 66, 83, 88, 91, 96, 97, 100, JOI, 105, 108, 109, 113, 115, 119, 126, 127, 130, 132, 135, 151, 153, 154, 181, 249, 260 Convention of July, 1920, 138 Convention of Jan. 1921, 139 Adjoumment of Nacionalista Gonvention, Dec, 20, 192·1, 149 ©rigin of, 70 Platform 74, 142-143

284

INDEX

Propaganda, 76 Program o,£, 1907, 81 Pa,ntido Nacianalista-Co leet ivi,sta, 152, 153 Convention of Aug. 1923, 166 «:onventian of Aprrl, 1924, 166, 167, 168 Fusion of Colectivista and 1:>emooratas Parties, 164, 165 Platform of, 153 Partida Nacionalista Consalidado, 166, 168, 175, 176, 177, 189, 193, 194, 199, 203, 213, 226 eonference af Nacionalista Consolidada-Demo crata, Jan. 6, · 1926, 180, [81 Platform of, 168-169 Partido Nacionalista Democra,ta, 234, 235 Conference between Demo era tic and Consolidated Parties, 180, 181 <Eonvention 0£ Aug, 18, 1934, 234 Convention of June 15th, 1935, 239 Platform af, 234-235 Partido Nacional Progresista, 75, 78, 79, 83, 98, 259, 264 Extrao rdinary Convention o.f, 1914, 99 Origin of, 78 Program of, 1907, 81 Relation with Federa,J Party, 75, 78 Pa,rtido P r-o-Independenc ia Nacion•a lista, 226, 232, 233 National Convention of, June 15, 1935, 239 Can vention of Pro-Indepencia !'.>emocr.ata, 1935, 239 Partido Sakdalista, 253, 254 Partido Union Nacionalista, 72, 73 Partido Urgentista, 72 Partino, Teodoro, 44 Partisan spivit, 237 Party, as a political device, 13 as invisible government, 13 and cabinet, 14 and constitution 13, 14, 15 and government, 13, 14, 15, 188 and parliamen,t, 14 and property, 17

and temperament, 16, 18 Party activities after the enactment of the Jones La,w, 103, 107 Pa,rty discipline, 187, 188 Party feeling, 15, 18 Party governmen,t, 188, 249 Bai!ance of, 156 Origin of, 249 Party responsibility, 191 Party system, 14, 15, 102, 107, 227, 259, 260, 261, 262 Paterno, Maximo M., 25, 54, 70 Paterno, Pedr.o A., 53, 54, 70 P erez, Filemon, 181, 195 Perfecto, Gregorio, 101, 227 Personal, politics, 187 Philippine Assembly, see Assembl,y Philippine autonomy, 185, 187 Philippine Autonomy Act, 104 Philippine Commission, 100, 103, 107, 108 Philippine Commonwealth , 229 Philippine Constitution, 171, 256 Philippine Educational System, 235 Philippine Government, 185 Philippine independence, 127 Philippine legislature, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113, 114, 117, 126, 172, 183, 199, 222, 239, 261, 264 PhiHppine National Bank, 128 132, 155, 183, 205 Philippine n;itionalism, 186, 245 Philippine party institution, 260 Philippine Profetariat Congress, 256 Philippine Supreme Court, 113 Plata, Teodoro, 37, 41, 85 Platform, see Parties Plebiscite, 222, 239, 240 Plebiscite Bill, 182 Poblete, Pascual H., 66 Polavieja, General, 46 Political and administrative autonomy, 235 Ponce, Domingo, 256 Ponce, Mariano, 27, 30 Ponce, Sinforoso, 83 Popular Council, see council Presiden Hal system, 197 Primera Luz Filipina, 28 Pro-coalitionist s, 237 Productive laws, 102 Progresitas, 99, 100, 260

IN,IDEX Progresista, Partido, see Partido Progresista Proletariat class, 103 N aeionalis ta, Pro-independencia Partido, see Partido Pro, independencia Property, 17, 243 Pros, 215, 218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 2,28, 229, 230 Provincial election, 0£ 1907, 90 P,ovineial government, 167 Public !a,w, 13 Public U tility Commission, 127 Quezon, Manuel L ., 73, 85, 87, 105, 106, 111, 113, 115, 117, 119, 120: 123, 127, 132, 133, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 143, 149, 152, 154, 156, 157, 159, 160, 162, 164, 166, 169, 171, 172, 174, 175, 180, 182, 184, 186, 189, 190, 194, 199, 203, 210, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 220, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 233, 237, 238, 239, 242, 246, 260, 261, 266 Quezon-Osmena coalition, 236, 240 Quezon-Osmena r eunion\ lr77, 186 ~uezon-©smena factions, fusion of, 235, 236 (]luintos, Joaquin, 101 Quirino, Ca,!os, 136 Qufdno, ])lpidio, 224 Ramos, Benigno, 253 Radicalism, 256 Recto, Cla•o M., 1~, 170, 173, 180, 181, 193, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 230,_ 238 Recto report, 175 Regidor, Antonio, 25 Republican Administration, 150, 178, 179.. 184 Republican Party, 68, 137, 241 Platform 0£, 68 Resignation en co,ps 0£ the 1'ilipino members, 161 iResponsible gove-r-nmen.t, 124 Restoration of party gov.ernment, 188 Revolueion (Lodge), 27 Ricarte, Artemio, 47 Rita!, Jose 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36, 45, 49 Rivera Nicolas, 66 Rodrigues, Ernesto R., 252 Rodriguez, Eulogio, 101

285

Romualdez, 184, 193 Roosevelt, Nicholas, 189, 209, 225, 228, 238, 239 Roosevelt, Theodore, 212 Roxas, Felix M., 64 Roxas, Manuel, 157, 162, 164, 165, 169, 170, 175, 180, 181, 194, 210, 217, 218, 224, 227, 228, 238, 247, 253 Ruiz, Guille-rmo F., 101 Sabido, Pedro, 210, 217, 219 Sarkay, Macario, 66 Sakdalista program, 254 Sakdalista, partido See partido Sakdalista Sakdalistas, 253, 254, 257 Sandiko, Theodore, 73, 96, 98, 101, 193, 230 Sansano, Hugo, 98 Santiago, Alejandro, 42, 66 Santiago, Geronimo, 101 Santiago, Modes to, 66 Santos, Aurelio, 66 Santos, Jo se, 162, 195 Sabto s, Lope K., 66 Santos, Pedro Abad, 256 Sanvicto,es., . Jose, 218 Secretar ies 0£ executive department s, 112 1 Secret caucus meetings, 97 Secretar y of War, 112 Secret Society, 18, 20-49 Self government, 96, 112, 188, 263 Semi-cabinet government, 134 Semi-cabinet responsibility, 123 Semi-parliamentary Government, 192, 257 Senate, Philippine, 108, 109, 111, 117, 124, 130, 136, 137, 149, 193, 194, 195 Separation of Powers, 15, 120, 126, 197 Sityar, Manuel, 70 Smith, Governor-General, 76, 82. Socia,!'i st Party of the Philippines, 255 Soeialistic Regime, 254 Socialist, 254 Solidaridad, Filipina, 27. Solis, Va.Jentin, 66 Sotlo Vicente, 180, 193 Soviet Government, 256, Soviet Government in the Philippines, 256

286 Speaker of the Assembly, 85, 91, 124 Stimson, H. L., 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 209, 257 S~imson Report, 197, 198 .Suffrage, 102 Sunulong, !fuan, 101, 180, 181, 189, 193, 202, 203, 207, 208, 229, 234, 237, 238 Supreme Council, see Council Supreme Court, U.S.A., 184 Supreme Court, Philippine, 138, 183 Taft Commission, 55 Ta.ft, Governor-Ge neral, 67, 69, 70, 98, 120 Taxation System, 243 '.Jle.rceristas, 97, 99, 100, Gonvention Qf 1914, 97-98 Meeting of 1917, 101 Theory of Party Government, 249 Third Internationa l of Moscow, 256 Third Party Movement, 96, 97 Thompson, Colonel Carmi A., 185 '.Firona, E ., 127, 180, 181, 206, 210, 236 Tolentino, Aurelio, 66 Tones, Florentino, 56, 57 Torres, Pantaleon, 66 Treaty of Biac-na-Bato , 48 'Treaty Âˇ of Paris, 74 Trias, Mariano, 47, 54 Tydings-McD uffie Act, 18, 228, 233, 234, 240 Tydings, Millard E., 226, 227, 241

Unicameral system, 134 Union !Nacionirlista, Partido, see Partido Union Nacionalista Union Obrera, 66 Unipersonali sm, 156 Urgentista, Partido, see Partido lirgentista United Front, 178, 181, 186, 187 Unson, Miguel, 195, 236 i(ffpper Chambe,r,, 103, 107 Valenzuela, Pio, 42, 43 Val-~s, Jose, 73 Varona, l<randsco, 213 Velarcle, Aguedo, 54, 70, 85 Ventura, Honorio, 195 Vera, Ped,o, 216 Vera, Vicente, 167 Veto records, 178 Villanueva, Andres, 66 Villanueva, Harmenegild o, 180 Vina, :Jose de la, 73 Washington Administrati on, 114 Williams, D. R., 63, 113 Wilson, Wood,ow, 16, 101, 107, 108 Wingo, James G., 228 Women's suffrage, 239 Wood, General, 130, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 163, 170, 173, 181, 183, 185, 186, 188, 262 'Wood-Forbe s Mission, 140, 143 7 Governor E., Luke V. right, general, 77, 98, 189 Yangco, Teod'o,o, 152 Ylagan, Hugo, 70 Ya,p, Diosdado M., 251 Zamora, Jacinto, 24