Thomas Paine
This suggestion that obstacles actually present important possibilities for victory surfaces again in the third and fourth installments of The Crisis. In the third pamphlet, published on April 19, 1777 (exactly one year after the Battle of Lexington, which signaled the beginning of the confl ict), Paine compels his readers to reflect on the course that the war has taken thus far and learn from the experiences, both positive and negative. He implores his fellow patriots to recall the arguments in support of independence in order to maintain their clarity of purpose. Crisis IV, published soon after the stinging defeats at Fort Ticonderoga and Brandywine, adopts a more austere tone, as Paine writes, “Those who expect to reap the blessings of freedom, must, like men, undergo the fatigues of supporting it” (229). Paine also notes that Americans should take heart, for many British victories have revealed themselves to be catastrophic failures over time. The year 1778 saw three installments of The Crisis. In the fourth issue, published on March 21, Paine mocks Howe, noting that although the general merits a monument for his infamy, it would have to differ from traditional memorials; ultimately, he suggests that Howe be preserved as the pharaohs were, but embalmed with tar and adorned with feathers. He then reasons that Howe’s conquests are trivial when compared with the vast expanse of America and further reassures his countrymen that the English army is in its last throes. Finally, he compares the republican project to that of Greece, arguing that America has far surpassed its predecessor in the scope of this new democracy. The fi fth pamphlet, published on October 20, is addressed “To the Earl of Carlisle, General Clinton, and William Eden, Esq., British Commissioners at New York,” who were sent to quell the chaos in the colonies. Congress responded that it would only consent to peace if Britain recognized America’s independence, but the king scoffed at this idea, replying that “farther concession is a joke” (261). Again, Paine indicates that the subsequent proclamations are “tedious and unmeaning” (262) and stresses that the revolutionaries do not seek
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violence, but will retaliate if the king acts on his threats. Published only a month later on November 20, the fi fth pamphlet is addressed “To the People of England,” whose lack of anger about the war Paine attributed to the deceptions of Parliament and the enormous distance between the countries, which makes the horrors of the confl ict difficult to grasp. Appealing to the national honor and the pragmatism of English subjects, Paine urges the British public to entreat their government to end the war, as it is causing both fi nancial and moral damage. The eighth pamphlet was published in March 1780, five years after the beginning of the hostilities. Again addressing the people of England, Paine speaks about the “wanton cruelty” of the British in America (294) and asks the English to imagine how they would respond if the situation were reversed. He urges the British to liberate themselves from their insular prejudices and put an end to the war before any more damage is done to either nation. On May 12, the British captured Charleston, South Carolina, issuing the Americans one of the worst defeats in the war. The Continental Army was already so bedraggled and lacking in provisions that the baron von Steuben had dubbed the American troops sans-culottes (no pants). In response, Paine contributed his entire life savings to the military and on June 9 published Crisis IX, an appeal to the states to support the federal government, warning of the fi nancial penalties they would confront were they to become subjects of England once again. He argues that the United States will not be conquered piecemeal and that defeats such as this one only rouse more passion for the American cause. This pamphlet was followed by a supernumerary Crisis paper titled “The Extraordinary Crisis” and dated October 6, 1780, in which Paine defends the taxes being levied on the American public in support of the war. Since the rebellion was largely in response to British taxation, fi nancing the war becomes a delicate issue. Printing more currency was often proposed as a quick solution, but, as Paine notes, this practice led to rampant inflation. Ultimately, Paine demonstrates through various calculations that the taxes in