Cordesman/Wilner, Iran & The Gulf Military Balance Rev 3
AHC 2/29/12
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Ground-Based Air Defenses Iran faces many of the same problems in its land-based air defense forces that it does in its air force. Figure III.7 shows that Iran has extensive surface-to-air missile assets, but most are obsolete or obsolescent. Iran’s systems are poorly netted, have significant gaps and problems in their radar and sensor coverage and modernization, and a number of its systems are vulnerable to electronic warfare. The Limits to Iran’s Surface-Based Air Defenses Iran did not have functioning, integrated land-based air defense system at the time the Shah fell. It had much of the sensors and command and control systems for a medium to high-altitude system, but not the software and technical support necessary to make the system function. It has since put together many of the elements of such a system using Russian, Chinese, US, European, and Iranian-designed and made equipment, but Iran does not have the design and manufacturing capability to create truly modern system, one that is immune to electronic warfare, and one that can function without become tactically vulnerable to anti-radiation weapons and other forms of active “suppression of enemy air defense” (SEAD) systems. Iran has a titular holding of 150 IHawk systems and claims to be able to produce its own missiles. It is not clear from unclassified sources how many of the improvements US has made to IHawk in its MSIP and other programs over the years have leaked into Iranian hands, although it is clear that Iran has conducted a major covert espionage and purchasing effort. This is particularly critical because the Hawk is a US-made system and one where the US has unique knowledge of its vulnerabilities over any given generation. While it can be a highly capable system if fully modernized, it has limits even then. As an uncertain mix of technical upgrades, it is far less capable. It is equally unclear how much Iran has modernized its various holdings of 45 SA-7 medium to high altitude, 10 SA-5 long-range medium to high altitude, and Chinese-supplied SA-2 clone systems. Certainly, these systems cannot be disregarded, and they have been modernized by other countries to some degree. These systems, however, are ancient in technology terms, and countermeasures to the basic design and a number of upgrades were developed by the time of the Vietnam War. Pop-up emitter and remote sensor tactics can help, but such systems are inherently far more vulnerable than IHawk, particularly when they are not part of a layered, integrated system with a low-altitude surface-to-air missile like the SA-3 and mobile systems of the SA-6 system and it many far more capable Russian successors. Iran has shown in its exercises that it has developed a netted mix of radars and linked them to its air force and surface-to-air missile units, but it is unclear how survivable and electronic warfareresistant these systems are. It has modernized its tactics and paid close attention to the lesson of the Vietnam War, Balkans conflict, Iraq War and other uses of land-based defenses. At best, however, Iran cannot compensate for the age and gaps in its systems, their lack of real-world missile defense capability, and having to create a patchwork system without the benefit of the technology base of a modern power, and the combat experience of states that have used such systems in the last decade. Moreover, at least some unclassified exercise reporting indicates that Iran lacks effective test and evaluation methods and has politicized its technology to the point it sometimes believes its own 40