VI. US Competition with Iran: The Gulf States
AHCFIN
March 16, 2012
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Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) attempted a coup. In 1996, Iranianbacked Hezbollah in Bahrain attempted another coup. During the course of 2011, Iran repeatedly stated that Bahrain’s crackdown on protestors was unjustified, that foreign interference was unacceptable, and the Bahraini government should listen to the demands of its people. Tensions were at its highest when Iran sent a flotilla of students, clerics and activists, to Bahrain to show solidarity with the protestors – though it was eventually turned around. Iranian-linked Iraqi politician Ahmed Chalabi also proposed sending a flotilla and has attempted to pressure Manama.77 Bahrain responded by accusing Iran of attempting to penetrate the Gulf, establish an Iranian-modeled Shi’ite political vision, and calling for Arab support in confronting Tehran. Shaikh Khalid stated in November 2011, "Gulf countries should not have to stand alone facing Iran, (other) Arab countries must be responsible, and Arab public must pay attention to Iran's dangers, which come under a thousand guises. The threat is grave."78
Outside Investigation Puts Much of the Blame on the government The Bahraini government made serious mistakes during the initial uprisings and failed to compromise quickly and effectively when compromise was most possible. It later admitted to using excessive force against protestors ahead of a human rights report investigating the March crackdown commissioned by the Bahraini government. However, the largest opposition group, al-Wefaq, dismissed the concession, saying the problem was “systematic.” The report also addressed the Bahraini leadership’s claim that Iran was involved in the February and March protests. Among these claims was alleged contact and consultation by the Iranian Embassy with opposition parties, contact between opposition parties and Hezbollah in Lebanon, and media (and social media) manipulation by Tehran. Cherif Bassiouni, the Egyptian-born jurist hired to head the investigation, contradicted the regime’s claim that brutality was not systematic. The report also states that the Bahraini Interior’s accounts of self-defense were false. For instance, the report concluded that police forces used shotguns at close range as a first resort against fleeing protestors.79 However, the report also concluded that no GCC-JSF forces participated in operations involving confrontations with Bahraini civilians, and found no evidence suggesting Iran was linked to the incidents in February and March.80
Elections and Quasi Reform So far, attempts to solve the problem have largely failed. An election in September 2011 to replace the 18 representatives of the main Shi’ite party – the Wifaq – who have walked out after serious violence began – ended in a boycotted election with little turnout and that elected more Sunnis that Shi’ites. The King established a National Commission to react to the findings and recommendations of the Bassiouni report in late November 2011, chaired by Shura Council speaker Ali al-Salih (a Shiite), established a human rights body, and took additional steps between November and February. Katzman reports that these include,81