Cordesman/Wilner, Iran & The Gulf Military Balance
AHC 6/3/12
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Possible US War Plans: Attacking, Delaying, Waiting Out There is no way to know the how US intelligence exports, military planners, and officials currently assess US strike options, or to predict the details of how these options will evolve in the future. Much will depend on the exact nature of the intelligence available at a given time, complex calculation about the vulnerability of given targets and the effectiveness of specific munitions, the urgency the US feels in acting and its willingness to take risks in targeting and striking, allied support and international attitudes, and where Iran’s programs stand at a given point in time If the US does choose to respond militarily, however, it has several major types of military and strategic options that are reflected in Figure IV.66 through Figure IV.71. Each of these options might have many of the following broad characteristics shown in each Figure, although it should be stressed that these are only rough outlines of such US options. They are not based on any inside knowledge of actual US war plans, and calculations. Those who argue strongly for and against such options should note, however, that there are many different ways in which the US could act. There are no rules or certainties that either say such attacks could not succeed or that they would.
Figure IV.66 reflects a potential scenario in which the US used limited “demonstrative” or “deterrent” strikes to coerce Iran into abandoning its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons without launching a full strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is unclear how Iran would respond to such action.
Figure IV.67 reflects a potential scenario in which the US used limited strikes to damage or destroy Iran’s largest and most important nuclear sites.
Figure IV.68 reflects a potential scenario in which the US engaged in major strikes on Iran’s CBRN and major missile targets.
Figure IV.69 reflects a potential scenario in which the US engaged in major attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, major missile assets, as well as “dual use” assets that contribute to Iran’s “technology base” such as universities.
Figure IV.70 reflects a potential scenario in which the US waited for Iran to provide proof of or a “smoking gun” that indicated nuclear proliferation to strike at the country’s facilities.
Figure IV.71 reflects a potential scenario in which the US would not attack Iran’s nuclear sites, but indicated nuclear targeting of Iran’s military and CBRN facilities and its cities. Other potential action could include deploying anti-ballistic missile and cruise missile defense and tacitly signaling a “green light” for Israeli nuclear retaliation or preemption, among others.
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