VI. US Competition with Iran: The Gulf States
AHCRev
March 1, 2012
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Saudi-Iranian Shi’ite Tensions Over the Pilgrimage and Bahrain Shi’ite issues also affect Saudi policy towards Iran and the region. Throughout the 1990s, at a time when relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia were characterized by surface amity and rapprochement, there were still annual disputes over the treatment of Shi’ites during the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. At least on some occasions, it seemed that Iran was deliberately provoking protests by its pilgrims and seeking to threaten Saudi Arabia’s status as custodian of the Muslim holy places. 41 This resulted in increased tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran as a result of quotas for Iranian pilgrims, their claims of mistreatment, and their agitation towards the Saudis. These tensions were heightened by the 1996 Al-Khobar towers incident in which US Air Force barracks were bombed, allegedly by members of an Iranian-trained Saudi Hezbollah.42 More recent, Saudi Arabia has joined the UAE in intervening in a struggle between Bahrain’s ruling Sunni royal family and elite and its large Shi’ite majority. This struggle is described in more detail later in this chapter, but Saudi Arabia has joined Bahraini officials in blaming Iran for much of the Sunni-Shi’ite tension and violence that has occurred since the spring of 2011. Saudi Arabia also sees Iran as a key cause of unrest in Yemen. Saudi Arabia feels the Iran has actively supports the Shi’ite Houthi tribal group in rebelling against the central government. This became a major issue during 2009-2010 where serious fighting broke out near the Saudi border area in what Yemen called “Operation Scorched Earth” that then led to serious fighting between Saudi and Houthi forces and a temporary Houthi occupation of Saudi territory.
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the Issue of Terrorism Saudi sources do not complain that Iran has provided arms or financial support for Saudi terrorists like Al-Qai’da in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), funded Shi’ite opposition movements, or encouraged violence in Saudi Arabia. There were some indicators of Saudi Shi’ite sabotage of ARAMCO facilities in the past, but none have been reported over the last decade. Iran must realize that it faces a common threat with the Gulf states and the US from violent Sunni extremist movements like Al-Qai’da. While the Saudi monarchy is the primary target of AQAP, all Gulf regimes -- including Iran -- face a serious threat from such extremist groups. The Saudi regime is targeted for its collusion with the West, while Iran is targeted by a range of Sunni movements due to its Shi’ite agenda. Indeed, the Sunni separatist group Jundullah in Baluchistan has corroborated with Al-Qai’da in its attacks on the Iranian regime. The few security agreements that Saudi Arabia and Iran have signed focus on combating smuggling and terrorist networks in the region. Even so, Iran has been willing to provide limited support to Sunni terrorist groups in Iraq and could provide support to AQAP in its bases in Yemen. Saudi-Iranian competition still plays out primarily in the form of Iranian support of Shi’ite extremists in Iraq, cooperation with Syria, and proxy warfare in Lebanon and Gaza.