U.S. and Iranian Strategic Competition pt 1 of 2

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nuclear weapons, was a long way from being able to produce nuclear weapons, following a series of failures that had set its program back by several years.68 Other Israeli officials – including Prime Minister Netanyahu – contradicted Dagan. Moreover, other Israeli intelligence officers since have been more nuanced. According to Haaretz reports on January 25, 2011, Israel’s head of military intelligence, Brigadier General Aviv Kochavi, testified to the same Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that, "The question is not when Iran will acquire the bomb, but how long until the leader decides to begin enriching (uranium) at 90 percent… Once such a decision is made, it would take "a year or two" to produce a nuclear warhead,” he said, adding that Iran would then need more time to develop an effective missile delivery system for it.69 Kochavi is reported to have said that it was unlikely that Iran, which currently enriched uranium to 20 percent, would start enriching it to the 90 percent level needed for a bomb because it would be in open breach of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, exposing it to harsher sanctions or even a U.S. or Israeli military strike. He said Iran was reluctant to do this at a time when the country was going through a period of "instability" and "religious tension." "At the moment, it's not in Iran's interest to move their program ahead," he told the committee. 70 These comments have come amid reports that Israel was involved in a plot to sabotage Iran's nuclear program through a destructive computer worm called Stuxnet, and might have been involved in the assassination of Iranian nuclear experts. It is also important to note that Israel – like the United States – has a long history of revising its threat perceptions and changing such estimates. As Haaretz noted on January 6, 2011,71 “The Israeli intelligence community’s assessments of Iran’s nuclear capability have changed during Dagan’s tenure,” the story noted. “In 2003, Israeli intelligence officials thought Iran would have its first bomb by 2007. In 2007, they thought it would be 2009, and a year later they put it at 2011. Now the date has moved to 2015. These adjustments were not the result of mistaken evaluations, but due to the difficulties Iran has encountered in advancing its program, largely because of the Mossad’s efforts…Dagan’s term centered around two main issues: the Iranian nuclear program; and the assassinations of Hezbollah and Hamas leaders and Iranian scientists, most if not all of which have been attributed to the Mossad.”

Lis, Jonathan. “Former Mossad chief: Nuclear Iran must not be neglected like North Korea.” Haaretz. January 17, 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/former-mossad-chief-nuclear-iranmust-not-be-neglected-like-north-korea-1.337569 68

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Jonathan Lis. “New MI chief: Iran could have nukes within two years.” Haaretz, Jan. 25 2010 http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/new-mi-chief-iran-could-have-nukes-within-two-years-1.339137 “Iran not working on bomb: Israel intelligence head.” AFP. January 25, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gShKfmWcoQ1ABBQ_DodMUUh61ckA 70

2011.

Melman, Yossi. “Outgoing Mossad chief: Iran won't have nuclear capability before 2015.” Haaretz. January 7, 2011. http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/outgoing-mossad-chief-iran-won-t-have-nuclearcapability-before-2015-1.335656 71

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