Iran II: types and Levels of Competition
3/14/12
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global economic stability. Iranian efforts play out in OPEC, but are affected by Iran’s military power and capability to intimidate its neighbors or conduct asymmetric and conventional wars. It builds greater dependence on Iranian resources among a greater number of nations – preferably those with international leverage. Iran uses energy deals, its trading status and imports, and the politics of sanctions – claiming they are illegitimate and hurt the Iranian people, to counter the US in this aspect of competition. This not only involves major energy investors, but countries like Turkey where energy pipelines and gas imports are involved. The US counters by persuading other petroleum exporters to stabilize prices and supplies, using diplomatic channels to expose Iran and lobby for international pressure, and implementing unilateral sanctions. The US seeks to put pressure on Iran through international isolation. It has worked with Europe, Japan, South Korea and other major trading partners of Iran to limit their energy deals, while working with Russian and China to limit arms sales. The US has backed Russian fuel deals, including fuel swaps, and worked with the EU to offer Iran incentives as well as penalties. Iran has agreed to and recanted various agreements, but has shown greater willingness when agreements are made on its own terms, or with non-aligned nations. Iran has repeatedly asserted the peaceful intentions of its nuclear program and warned that the nuclear issue could lead to conflict and supply interruptions. The US has warned that military options remain on the table, while Israel and Iran periodically exchange threats. This aspect of US-Iranian competition involves conflicting interests within a number of major powers. China wants stable energy, is wary of breaching sovereignty, and supports a balance of power within the international community. Russia has similar interests, as do energy firms in countries like France. Russia, however, is not acting out of a need for Iran’s resources. Trade and broader efforts to limit US influence are influential factors. Both fear the instability brought by a nuclear Iran and from an attack to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities.
Arms control, Exports, and Imports A fine line separates direct military competition from competition in arms control, arms exports, and arms imports. Iran does, however, use arms exports as a key tool of influence through movements like Hizbollah, Hamas, and various Shi’ite militias in Iraq. It also works with other powers, from North Korea to Venezuela, in cooperating in military technology and arms production, and has been involved in complex missile and technology deals with Syria, North Korea, China, and Pakistan. At the same time, its network of proxy buyers smuggle arms and technology from Europe, the US, and other advanced suppliers. The US has sought to limit Iran’s arms imports and exports, particularly imports of advanced nuclear, missile, and other weapons technology like the S300/S400 ATBM/SAM system. It has attempted to make such limits part of UN sanctions on Iran and worked with a variety of countries in efforts to block arms sales and arms smuggling from the US and other powers. This has actively involved the US in negotiations with third parties like China, Russia, and Switzerland. This aspect of competition extends to arms control and particularly to the NNPT and operations of the IAEA, with the US pushing for tighter controls and Iran resisting on grounds of nationalism, sovereignty, rights to peaceful nuclear power, and unfair “monopolies” of nuclear power. Russia and China have voiced similar concerns at times. At the same time, Iran’s