The Political Objectives behind Construction of Ilisu Dam in Turkey and its Effects on Tigris River
by: MSc Payman Pasha
March 2016
Table of Contents
CHAPTER 1 ............................................................................................................................. 1 1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Tigris River ................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Dams in Kurdistan region of Iraq ............................................................................ 3 1.3 Turkish Dams ............................................................................................................. 4 CHAPTER 2 ............................................................................................................................. 5 2.1 Relationship between Kurdistan region, Iraqi government & their neighbors ...... 5 2.2 Dams and Politics in Turkey ........................................................................................ 8 2.2 The Kurdish Issue ......................................................................................................... 9 CHAPTER 3 ........................................................................................................................... 12 3. Risk evaluation of dams building ................................................................................ 12 3.1 Flow regime ................................................................................................................. 12 3.2 Water quality ............................................................................................................... 14 3.3 Human life .............................................................................................................................. 15 3.4 Biological systems (diversity) .............................................................................................. 16 3.5 Cultural structure of the region.................................................................................. 16
Conclusion & Recommendation ..................................................................................... 17 Reference List ................................................................................................................... 18
Chapter-1 1. Introduction This research has been conducted by personal interviews with number of politicians such as political consultant and director of official body for environment in KRG, and people who have suffered from water shortage in the region. These interviews have covered some issues about dams building and neighbours relationship among Turkey, Iraq and Kurdistan region to know how water is used as a weapon against each other. In addition, visiting Water Resources Department in Khanaqin that has provided information and data linked to Alwand river discharge when Iran cut the river through the previous years, to show how it impacted on human life and environment in the city. Using this case to compare and evaluate how people life will be after Ilisu dam construction and cutting Tigris river by Turkey.
1.1 Tigris River: If oil has been the key source of conflict in the 20th century, water is considered a main source of international conflict in the 21st century. In the Middle East region, Iraq is one of those riparian countries within basins of Tigris-Euphrates Rivers. The region is presently facing water shortage issues owing to climate changes and increase of people needs. Tigris river is considered the second-greatest river in western Asia. It is approximately (1850 -1862) km in length; only 21% of this length lies in Turkey (for nearby 400 km through Turkey before entering Iraq) and remainder lies in Iraq (roughly 1418-1318 km) [2], rising in the Taunus Mountains of Eastern Turkey. The key source for this river is Hazar Lake (elevation 1150 m above sea level), which is situated in the south eastern of Turkey [1].
There are eight main tributaries feed Tigris River from the left bank three of them in Turkey before arriving Iraq which are, Garzan, Batman and Botan and five in Iraq which are Khabur, Greater Zab (partly beginning in Turkey), lesser Zab, Diyala rivers and Uzaym [3] [21].
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Map-1: shows Tigris-Ephrates Rivers in Turkey, Syria and Iraq
In Iraq the tributaries flow down from Zagros Mountains the north east of Iraq and join to the chief river before Baghdad city [3]. According to previous studies; the range of mean annual flow of Tigris from Turkey before entering Iraq is from 20 to 23 km3 year−1. Through its passage in Iraq the river obtains from all of the above tributaries an additional quantity of water that reaches 25 to 29 km3 year−1 [4] [3]. However, at Mosul city the mean annual flow of Tigris River previous to 1984 was 22.2 km3 year−1 and declined to 17.7 km3 [3]. Further, the yearly hydrograph for Tigris River starts from October to September and the maximum mean monthly discharge occurs through April and the driest month is usually September [1]. Characteristics of Tigris River are given in (Table-1). Tigris River
Turkey
Iraq
Syria
Iran
Total
Discharge km3.year-1
33.5
6.8
0.0
11.2
51.5
Discharge (%)
65.0
13.2
0.0
21.8
100
Drainage area km2
45000
292000
1000
37000
375000
Drainage area (%)
12.0
54.0
0.2
33.80
100
River length (km)
400
1318
44
-
1862
River length (%)
21.0
77.0
2.0
-
100
Table-1: Shows characteristics of Tigris River basin (UNEP (2001) & Biedler (2004))
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In the modern history, Iraq was considered as a rich country in its water resources until 1970 due to presence of Tigris and Euphrates rivers. During the period (1990-2010) the annual flow of Tigris River entering Iraq has dramatically decreased because of main water impoundment schemes constructed such as number of dams, regulators and barrages that have been constructed on the rivers. Some continuous under construction on river in the neighbouring countries, such as Turkey [3]. The issue has become more serious due to a dry climatic period in Iraq.
In a prior decades Turkey and Syria began to build dams on the rivers; consequently, rivers flow decreased owing to water impounding of some new reservoirs [2]. This fact led the Iraqi Government to accelerate dam construction as much as they can from the planned hydrological projects. For this cause, 1970 to 1990 was the greatest period of the development of Iraq’s water systems. However, in 1990 the process stopped due to the first Gulf War and UN sanctions [2].
1.2 Dams in Kurdistan region of Iraq: Currently, there are eight dams in Kurdistan Region that have been accomplished and have water storage capacity, including Dokan, Darbandikhan and Harawa Dam in Suleimaniya Province, Bawashaswar and Hassan Kanoosh dams in Garmian, Hamomok in Erbil Province and Duhok and Kashkan Dams in Duhok Province.
The first large dam Dokan was constructed between 1954 and 1959 on the Lesser Zab River. It lies 60 kilometers northwest of Suleimaniya. The length of the dam wall is 260 m, the height is 116.5 m. The dam is 516 m above sea level, and irrigates an area of the lands around 11,690 km2. The capacity of dam is 6.8 billion cubic meters. ; Darbanidkhan is 3 billion cubic meters, Duhok 52 million cubic meters, and the total capacity of others 5 dams is 7 million cubic meter of water, roughly 1/864 of the capacity of Dokan Dam. The water source of Dokan Dam comes from the Smaller Zab and that of Darbandikhan comes from Sirwan River; however, the sources of Hamamok, Bawashaswar and Hassan Kanoosh are spring water and Duhok Dam water comes from rain, whilst Kashkan dam water receives from a seasonal river. Furthermore, others projects were constructed followed the
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mentioned dams for irrigation and power generation purposes as well as others are presently under construction, planned to be performed in the future to generate electricity. On the other hands, the processes of dams constructing and controlling water resources in the Region have started to storing of water, increasing underground water levels, irrigation, power, fishery and tourism, whilst in some places dams are used to prevent and control floods as well as providing drinking water [5].
1.3 Turkish Dams: Turkish Government started using water of Tigris and Euphrates Rivers through the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) in 1977 [2] [3]. The project comprises 22 multipurpose dams and 19 hydraulic power plants that irrigate an area of 17103 km2 with an aggregate storage capacity of 100 km3 which is three times more than the total capacity of Syrian and Iraq reservoirs [2] [3]. Eight of these dams are to be built on Tigris river, merely 3 were constructed (two in 1997 and one in 1998). It is stated that approximately 22.5 km3∙year−1 will consume by irrigation projects within GAP after completion [2] [6] [3].
Ilisu Dam is one of numerous dams in GAP project performed in the southeast of Anatolia. It is considered the largest dam project in Turkey’s pipeline at the present. This project was approved in the 1980s and initiated in August 5th, 2006 in the Kurdish part of Turkey. It is situated on Tigris River in South-East Anatolia, 65 km upstream of the Iraqi and Syrian border. Ilisu dam is presently the greatest hydropower project of Turkey. This dam with a height of 135m and length of 1820m create a reservoir with a surface area of 313km2 and maximum volume of 10.4 billion m3 [25]. Ilisu dam will reduce Tigris flow from Turkey into Iraq by 50%, and it will harm cultivation in the north and marshes in the south of Iraq [7]. Additionally, a reduction of Tigris river flow in Iraq is considered to be a national crisis and this will have critical negative consequences on environmental, health, industrial and economic development [6][8]. In view in the above, it became necessary to know the political goals behind constructing of dams including Ilisu dam in Turkey and evaluate how will be its effects on Tigris river.
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Chapter-2 2.1 Relationship between Kurdistan region, Iraqi government & their neighbours
Numbers of Iraqi cities completely depend on Kurdistan region for their water supplies. As it mentioned previously, Kurdistan region has four key rivers that include the Greater Zab, the Lesser Zab, Sirwan and Alwand. In addition, there are three main dams: Dukan, Darbandikhan and Dohuk. Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) officials have indirectly conveyed a message to Baghdad that the central Iraqi government should not base their longterm water and irrigation strategies on Kurdistan’s rivers and bodies of waters. Especially when compared with the rest of Iraq, Kurdistan region is the leading region when it comes to water resources for both drinking and irrigation. Apart from rivers and lakes that pour into Kurdistan region from East (Iranian) Kurdistan, the area is abundant with lakes and big streams. In Diyala province, from cities like Jalawla to Khalis and all the way up to Baghdad itself, their water sources-both for drinking and irrigation are supplied from Kurdistan region. Samara and Tikrit further south also rely heavily on Kurdistan for their water supply [9]. Political scientists see that it is very important that Kurdistan region deals with this issue in terms of channels and dams. It can use the water as a card to put pressure on Iraqi government by cutting water supplies if Baghdad continues to punish KRG economically, because 70% of Tigris water comes from Kurdistan region. Sarsam Shwani, an international relations expert (2014) stated that Iraqi government deals with Kurdistan region as a province instead of a federal region, although the constitution of Iraq states that Kurdistan has selfruling rights and is a federal and semi-autonomous region. He believes that Baghdad attempts to hold complete power and create a centralized government. Nevertheless, Hakim Sheikh Latif, former member of the Iraqi parliament disagrees with Shwani and indicated that countries do not react with their neighbours in such a way, then how come Kurdistan region does that against Iraqi government. He also stressed that Kurdistan region can resolve this matters with Iraqi government and a lack of policy perhaps leads to crisis for Kurdistan [9]. On the other hands, the Ministry of Water Resources Law No. 50 of 2008 can be considered as an important law presented by the Iraqi parliament since 2003. This is because it hands creating technical and legal framework for regulating Iraq’s national water resources to the federal government’s Ministry of Water Resources [10]. It has two significant implications;
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the first one is to fulfil the demands of article 110, No. 8 of the 2005 constitution and which states that “Planning policies relating to water sources from outside Iraq and guaranteeing the rate of water flow to Iraq and its just distribution inside Iraq in accordance with international laws and conventions” (Iraqi’s constitution of 2005, p.33) [11]. While the second one is the initiation of framework of new water governance assigned to this ministry, as article 2 of this law states that “sponsor Iraq rights in common international water and maintain communication and information exchange with riparian neighboring countries on river basins, in a manner to reach fair agreements to divide the quantity of water entering Iraq” [12]. Nevertheless, L. Merzan, political consultant in KRG, personal communication, March 17, 2016 stated that constitution of Iraq from its creation until today was written and published without application. Iraq did not have a permanent constitution but only provisional for nearly 80 years. An interim constitution changed several times according to the government and the party that ruled. Eventually in 2004, it was written and voted the permanent constitution, which enshrined a federal state but as in reality we see that this state does not exist and is not based on the principles and values of this Constitution to democratize and grow this Iraq. In fact, this Iraq divided into three parts: 1- The region of Kurdistan and the Kurdish territory in the provinces of Kirkuk, Ninawa and Diyala, now they are ruled by the KRG and its parliament. 2- The Shiite part of Iraq that is the south of Iraq territory and part of the centre, including Baghdad, ruled by a central Shiite government and a parliament. 3- The Sunni region of province of ANBAR, SALAHDDIN, AND PART of the Arab Suniit territory of the province of Ninawa, Kirkuk and Diyala (By now this area controlled by ISIS and former members of the army of Saddam Hussein).
The current reality of Iraq leads us to understand despite the existing constitution, these three states are independent and do not come back to the constitution, as we note the Iraqi government for three years does not send 17% of the budget of Kurdistan region as enshrined in the constitution and till now doing an economic war and implement an economic blockade against Kurdistan. Instead the parts of the provinces occupied and governed by ISIS regularly receive their share of the Iraqi budget. In addition to that the entire world saw the Kurdish 6
Peshmerga fighters fight ISIS in 1100 km of front and not received weapons and financial support from Baghdad government. Since the collapse of the new Iraqi army in June 2014, the Iraqi government set up militias AL HASHD AL SHAABI [Shiite matrix] which is doing a scorched earth and ethnic cleanings and sectarian against Sunni Arabs. The last example we saw them with the steal of the components of the refinery Beigi. This militia financed by the Baghdad government and supported by the Shiite clergy.
Another important point is sale of oil independently from both the Kurdish government that has recently signed an agreement with the government in Baghdad that allows and the fact that ISIS selling oil on the black market to Turkey as they were unmasked recently by Russian military. The last coke and recently is the application of duties on goods moving between Iraq and Kurdistan and the existences of two different tax rates between the two authorities gives us a clear picture of two different states. All above factors indicate the Iraqi constitution is sheet of which is never applied and in fact Iraq has been divided into three well-defined laws, institutions and different armies. The non-acceptance of this reality means that war continues and based on insecurity and instability area.
Moreover, Merzan added that, to have a fair solution, return peace, security to the area, UN and the Western allies revise the old treaty Sayks - Pico that is 100 years old and create a new Middle East order redesign the area according to its historical and present reality, in small ethnic and confessional states that can live in peace, security and stability. History has taught us strong states such as Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran with centralized systems are undesirable for stability, growth and security.
On the other hands, Iraqi lawmakers with the parliamentary Irrigation and Farming Committee in 2015 stated that Turkey uses water as a weapon against Iraq and violates international treaties regarding water supplies in Iraq; therefore, Iraq should use its commerce against them [24].
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2.2 Dams and Politics in Turkey Turkey is basing its claims on the sovereignty principle to control over the rivers within its borders, just like other natural resources. In the perspective of growing tensions, Turkey, Iraq and Syria held a crisis summit in Ankara in September 3rd, 2009 to discuss the issue regarding the situation, and to improve relations between the neighbours. Unfortunately, no breakthrough was accomplished. Iraq’s minister of water resources emphasized how his country is significantly affected by the draught and yet a request for more water was diplomatically turned down by his Turkish counterpart, Taner Yildiz. Mr Yildiz acknowledged the humanitarian crisis caused by the draught but he still prioritised his country’s water policies. The final outcome was Water flows to Turkey’s neighbours will not be increased [13]. According to an Uppsala Model UN scenario which is based on the history of the issue, there is an inherent risk of hostilities. The tension was at its highest when Iraq and Turkey were on a blink to a war after a failed attempt by an illegal organization from Iraq to explode one of Turkey’s dams. Iraq condemns the assault, but Turkey still blamed the Iraqi government for the attack, threatens to cut water supplies completely if Iraq does not act as what Turkey see responsible. The magnitude and flow of the rivers give Turkey upper hand to control them over his neighbours. Ongoing tensions are not new to the countries and political relations were always problematic, in 1990, when Iraq and Syria faced a serious decrease in water flow. Without Kuwait invasion, military conflict between the countries would have been almost certain. More than ever, Iraq is suffering from water-supply shortages and deadly internal conflicts. If this was not enough, Turkey commenced another round of dam construction in the area, primarily used to contain Kurdistan Workers Party activities. This involves turning dams into military means, and thus into potential objects of contention. The politicization of dam construction is well-known. The World Bank and IMF financed this environmentally destructive project for low-return! However, the targeted usage of such schemes for overtly political purposes in a political struggle represents a rather different and less common spatial intervention [13].
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2.3 The Kurdish Issue Supposedly GAP involving Ilisu dam was established in the region to utilize the natural recourses into energy, but the project turned into a key element in Turkish state’s tackling of the Kurdish issue. Turkey used its water resources as a trump card in dealing at a transitional level with the PKK. The Turkish strategy was to take advantage of its neighbours’ weakness. It deployed its water resources to political advantage. This has had come clear in 1987 when Turkey and Syria signed a double agreement. Whenever this issue is raised by the southern neighbours, Turkey insists on their cooperation to tackle and supress the Kurdish fighters. Another reason was the Regional Development Administration’s statement which claimed that the mountain Turks has turned into Kurds as a by-product of poverty. What is meant by this was PKK has gained support by the Kurds because of economic problems within the region. Thus, Turkey used its water resource in dealing with the Kurdish issue was at the level of economic development. Therefore, the logic went, develop the Kurdish region economically and Kurds will turn into Turks. This approach failed too; the attempts to modernize agriculture did not merely produce gains; it increased inequalities; and it also created salination problems resulting in a loss of livelihood and income [13]. Also, Turkish strategy vis-à-vis water and the southeast involve an element of cultural destruction. Several dams have been highly criticized for their negative impact on the cultural heritage of the Kurdish region and the population living there. Particularly notable is Ilisu Dam, planned to drown the ancient city of Hasankeyf and its surroundings. International NGOs have campaigned against the construction of the dam, criticizing the project for its negative social and cultural impact, including the forced displacement of villagers and the erasure of ancient culture in the Kurdish region. The dam would lead to a cultural cleansing of ancient history, which listed as one of the 100 Most Endangered Sites worldwide. This forced some countries to withdraw their export credit guarantees for the construction of this dam in June 2009, but Turkey determined to continue. The fourth and most recent development in Turkey’s strategy comprises the deployment of its water as a physical barrier against insurgent activity. On July 11, 2009, it was announced that eleven dams in the Hakkari and Sirnak provinces along the border with Iraq and Iran to be constructed, which already has started according to PKK spokesperson. These dams do not benefit agriculture or energy production, the sole purpose of making it difficult for PKK 9
guerrilla fighters to penetrate Turkey’s borders. According to Sevahir Bayındır, MP for the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), these dams will have a negative impact on the economy and ecology in the region. He referred to the plan as being born from a “dangerous mentality.” With the construction of dams as military objects, Turkey is exposing them as targets, too [13].
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Excerpt from the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997): It was stating that in: Article 5 “Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation 1. Countries should use water from international rivers in fair and reasonable ways. The goal is to make the best use of river water and to protect water quality and the river system itself. 2. Countries should work together on the use, development, and protection of river systems and their water (on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith, as stated in article 8). Article 6 Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization Utilization of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances, including: (a) The geography, hydrology, climate, and ecology of the region; (b) The social and economic needs of the countries involved; (c) The people who depend on the river system; (d) The effects of the use of rivers in one country on other countries; (e) Existing and potential uses of the river system; (f) Conservation, protection, and development of river systems and their costs; (g) Alternatives to planned or existing uses.
Article 7 Obligation not to cause significant harm 1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States. 2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States who causes such harm shall take all appropriate measures, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate such harm and to discuss the question of compensation� (United nations 1997, p. 4&5)[14].
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Chapter-3 3. Risks evaluation of dams building: Dams have number of positive and negative effects on environment. These effects can be classified according to different criteria as short term and long term impacts depending on climatic, cultural, social, hydraulic and archaeological status for the area. Regarding dams construction in Kurdistan, S. Mohammad, director of official body for Environment in KRG, personal communication, July 17, 2015 believes that dams construction have no a dangerous impact on environment but on the contrary it is very important plan for generating energy, controlling stream regime, irrigation purpose and to supply domestic and drinking water. However, big dams like Ilisu dam will have intense effects on environment and human life. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate some effects of dam construction.
3.1 Flow regime Construction and operation of dams building including Ilisu dam would significantly affect the hydrology of Tigris river. It would alter the seasonal flow pattern by capturing all large flood flows in spring and releasing them in autumn. Filling of Ilisu reservoir could create low flow conditions downstream in Iraq. Downstream water supply in Iraq could be significantly affected by both reduction in summer flows and deterioration in water quality. According to Issa et al. (2014) Iraq annually receives 70.92 km3 of water from Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, 45.4 km3 from Tigris Rivers. An amount of 27.36 km3 of Tigris river comes from its tributaries inside Iraq, whilst 18.04 km3 is supplied by Turkey. Water inflow is annually decreased by 0.1335 km3∙year−1 for Tigris. This implies that the annual proportion reduction of inflow rates for the two rivers is 0.294% (Table-2). Average annually inflow
River
m3.sec-1 Turkey
Average annual water reduction
km3
m3.sec-1
km3
Annual percentage Reduction %
572
18.04
1.448
0.04566
0.253
867.46
27.36
2.787
0.0879
0.3213
Tigris Tributries from Iraq&Iran
Table-2: Water availability and inflow reduction for Tigris River (Issa et al. 2014)
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Yearly Iraq consumes (63.05 km3) 88.89% of received water from the two rivers, where about 60.43% is from Tigris river. Water demand yearly increases by 1.002 km3, of which 0.5271 km3 is within Tigris basins. In 2020, the average water demand will increase to 42.844 km3∙year−1 for Tigris basin, whereas water availability will reduce to 63.46 km3∙year−1 (Table-3). This indicates that the total water shortage will be limited to 8.61 km3.
River Tigris
Kolars(1994)
Kliot (1994)
Altinbilek(1997)
Issa et al., (2014)
(Km3.year-1)
(Km3.year-1)
(Km3.year-1)
(Km3.year-1)
40.00
31.90
42.844
29.20
Table-3: Potential water demand on Tigris basin in Iraq for the period after 2020 (Issa et al. 2014)
Moreover, future reductions of Tigris river flows for irrigation plans within Turkey would further decrease these flows. For instance, Director of Water Resources Division in Khanaqin city stated that we have received from Iran annually up to 15 to 20 m3 per second of water, and every spring season discharge was as usual covered our needs, added that water level of Alwand did not reduce to the extent of drought just as we were suffering as a consequence of activities in Iran.
Alwand River (Khanaqin) flowing under old bridge in 2000
Same bridge in 2012 (Khanaqin)
Source:( http://www.kurdistanfoodsecurity.com/2012_08_01_archive.html)
Furthermore, B. Abdullah, personal Communication, December 27, 2015 provided us with some data of Alwand through 2008&2009 when Iran cut the river water in Khanaqin. In 2008, minimum rate of discharge for Alwand river was 0.02m3/sec, and maximum rate of river discharge was 23.85m3/sec in October when rain amount was approximately 78mm (Graph-1). Whilist in 2009, minimum rate of discharge was between 0.0-0.15m3/sec, and maximum rate was 7.29m3/sec in February when rain amount was around 17mm (Graph-2).
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30
discharge m3/second
25
20 15 discharge
10 5 0 0
-5
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Months
discharge m3/second
Graph-1: Shows discharge of Alwand River in 2008 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
discharge
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Months
Graph-2: Shows discharge of Alwand River in 2009 Iraqi experts claim that rainfall rate had not been below normal levels and filling new constructed dam by Turkey will be cutting off water flows of Tigris river, resulting draining and salination of the marshes in the south of Iraq [13]. 3.2 Water quality Water quality, such as salt, temperature of water and Oxygen distribution could be changed vertically as a result of reservoir formation [15] [16]. Discharges from the reservoir could be anoxic and probably to contain high rate of organic matter, nutrients and hydrogen sulphide (H2S). Consequently, eutrophication and pollution of the reservoir possibly create public health dangers for people eating fish caught or drinking water in the reservoir [17].
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3.3 Human life
In spite of the fact that dams are a significant objective for development; they are not easily acceptable for people whose have houses, agricultural areas and environment. Cutting off Alwand river by Iranian territory is a good example to show, because it has created a great disaster for people life in Khanaqin. The river was as a lifeblood of Khanaqin city and a main source for all agricultural activities. The drought of Alwand river has caused disturbance for people in the city. One of farmers in Khanaqin, personal communication, 6 August 2015 stated that I could not realize the tragedy, yes it was a tragedy for me and for people of the city, how to imagine that Alwand stopped its flow, this was as a disaster for the city. He confirmed that 38 thousand acres of agricultural land in Khanaqin was no longer suitable for agriculture because of the complete cessation of river water, accusing Iran for ignoring international laws that prevent water cut between countries. Additionally, H. Abbas, teacher in Khanaqin, mentioned that whenever I remember the days we used to play ball, and swim in Alwand river after game and listen to murmur of water falling from the cavities of the bridge, I feel tears pour from my eyes. However, others people in Khanaqin pointed that if the situation has continued so, drought could change farmland to desertification, and this could lead to increased dust and air pollution as germs and exposed green belt of the city into perdition. Besides, Director of Water Resources Department said that we had to provide 10m3/second to meet our needs, we have more than 30 villages in addition to Khanaqin centre and other villages, and we had 45 thousand acres of farmland at risk of drought and more than three thousand acres of orchards. Furthermore, dry Alwand river was influenced on groundwater levels in the areas of Khanaqin which started up to a depth of 3-5 meters. It is referenced the rate of drilling civil wells in Khanaqin rose to 60% during summer as a result of the drought that occurred to Alwand river. They added that dozens of surrounding villages began migration from its territory to the city, because there is nothing as an alternative to Alwand River. On the other hand, over the years, Syria and Iraq have filed many claims accusing Turkey of causing a shortage in water quantity. In South of Iraq, farmers face serious worries, driving numerous of agriculturalists to despair. In Diwaniyah province, Alewi al-Shimmari, a rice farmer, pointed that more than 50% of farmers’ families have left their villages and moved to the city owing to decrease in
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river level. Alewi al-Shimmari used to cultivate rice in his 35 hectare farm, yet he has reduced it to only 5 hectares due to drought. It is argued, pollution and high levels of salinity in the river could also lead to a severe decline in fishing which considers a significant source of food and livelihood [13].
3.4 Biological systems (diversity)
River systems are the area of earth’s highest biological variety, and also for most extreme human activities [18]. The flow regime is observed by numerous aquatic ecologists to be the main driver of river and floodplain wetland ecosystems. Flow is a main determinant of physical environment in streams, which is in turn, is a key cause of biotic composition [19]. Huge dams affect biological diversity by isolating species, fragmenting habitat, flooding land, interrupting the exchange of nutrients between ecosystems and cutting off migration routes, and alter the nature of a river’s estuary, where numerous of the world’s fish species spawn. Further, dam works as a barrier because it hinders a normal passing ways of territorial animals. Movement of upstream fish aiming feeding and ovulation is banned resulting fish population decreases considerably. Fishes also could be damaged while passing through turbines, pumps and floodgates of the high bodied dams [20].
3.5 Ilisu dam and cultural structure of the region Dams affect cultural, social and economic structure of the region significantly. It is forcing people, particularly people whose lands and domains remain under water, to migrate and negatively influence on their psychology. The ancient town of Hasankeyf and numerous nearby villages, mostly Kurds, will drown by Ilisu dam, displacing 78,000 people and wrecking their location, farms and homes on which their communities have depended for survival for the thousands of years. It will drown hundreds of archaeological heritage and other ancient sites. The dam will have a life of merely 50 to 70 years, so thousands of people would lose their livelihoods and homes, and an attractive and important place will be permanently destroyed. It will decrease the Kurdish population in the area and form refugees, and this would increase a threat of escalation in the conflict between the PKK and Turkish state. It has the possible to increase pressure between Turkey and its downstream neighbour Iraq [21].
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Conclusion & Recommendation Due to water policies of Turkey, and an unstable political state in the region, a great problem may occur between Turkey, Iraq and Syria. This problem could happen because of the background of many dams that constructed including Ilisu dam on Tigris River and a serious drought year in Iraq that declared in 2007. Turkey has not reached an agreement with its two southern neighbours, on sharing the water, principally because Turkey considers itself the owner of the water in Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Since water demand will be increased as a sequence of climate change, population growth and development factors of economy, the water issue should be involved to general agenda of negotiations with Southern Kurdistan, Baghdad and neighbour countries on peaceful base. Besides, all parties should identify how much water they share and demand to divide the flow due to differences in seasonal and year-on-year in rainfall and snow. Therefore, incessant cooperation and extended efforts are required in order to evaluate water flow and the demands of various parties over time then negotiate a feasible, fair and transparent distribution system.
Moreover, Iraq has more than one card to deal with Turkey. There are interests gradually increased with Turkey, which Iraq is considered as a golden opportunity in terms of oil and gas exports, the use of ports and a market for goods. Regarding to dams construction in Kurdistan region, KRG should deal with this issue according to the need and benefit derived from dams to conserve the peace and stability in the area because any individual action would result in instability of all regions. For this issue a developed plan to allocate water from a place to another is required by KRG and should depend on social and environmental change.
Environmental issues and precautions should be taken into account to reduce great hazards that can be caused by the dams. In addition to its very significant social benefits, it is essential to decrease the negative impacts of dams on environment regarding sustainable development and assurance of water resources for the present and future generations living within Tigris and Euphrates river basin. Finally, it should be emphasised on conserving not only the quantity of water but also the quality and the ecosystem in rivers
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[2]Al-Ansari, N.A. (2013). Management of Water Resources in Iraq: Perspectives and Prognoses. Journal of Engineering, 5, pp.667-684.
[3]Al-Ansari, N.A. and Knutsson, S. (2011). Toward Prudent Management of Water Resources in Iraq. Journal of AdvancedScience and Engineering Research, 1, 53-67.
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