JCTS Vol 3 No 1 by CESRAN International

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Editor-in-Chief: Prof. Alpaslan Özerdem | Coventry University, UK Managing Editor: Laura Payne | Coventry University, UK Book Review Editor: Dr. Sung Yong Lee | Coventry University, UK Assistant Editors*: Mr. Richard Slade | Coventry University, UK Mr. Hüsrev Tabak | University of Manchester, UK

Editorial Board*: Prof. the Baroness Haleh Afshar | University of York, UK Prof. Bruce Baker | Coventry University, UK Dr. Richard Bowd | UNDP, Nepal Prof. Ntuda Ebodé | University of Yaounde II, Cameroon Prof. Scott Gates | PRIO, Norway Dr. Antonio Giustozzi | London School of Economics, UK Dr. Cathy Gormley-Heenan | University of Ulster, UK Prof. Paul Gready | University of York, UK Prof. Fen Hampson | Carleton University, Canada Prof. Mohammed Hamza | Lund University, Sweden Prof. Alice Hills |University of Leeds Dr. Maria Holt | University of Westminster, UK Prof. Alan Hunter | Coventry University, UK Dr. Tim Jacoby | University of Manchester, UK Dr. Khalid Khoser | Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland Dr. William Lume | South Bank University, UK Dr. Roger Mac Ginty | St Andrews' University, UK Mr. Rae McGrath | Save the Children UK Somalia Prof. Mansoob Murshed | ISS, The Netherlands Dr. Wale Osofisan | HelpAge International, UK Dr. Mark Pellling | King's College, UK Prof. Mike Pugh | University of Bradford, UK Mr. Gianni Rufini | Freelance Consultant, Italy Dr. Mark Sedra | Centre for Int. Governance Innovation, Canada Dr. Emanuele Sommario | Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Italy Dr. Hans Skotte | Trondheim University, Norway Dr. Arne Strand | CMI, Norway Dr. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh | University of Po, France Dr. Mandy Turner | University of Bradford, UK Prof. Roger Zetter | University of Oxford, UK Technology Advisor: Dr. G. Serdar Tombul | University of Sheffield, UK

The Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security is published on behalf of the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN) as bi-annual academic e-journal. The articles are brought into use via the website of CESRAN (www.cesran.org). CESRAN and the Editors of the Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security do not expect that readers of the review will sympathise with all the sentiments they find, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, which appears in the Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security. * The surnames are listed in alphabetical order.

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Vol.3 | No.1 | April 2013

INDEXING & ABSTRACTING

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EconLit

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Genamics JournalSeek

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Index Copernicus

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Index Islamicus

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Peace Palace Library

The Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) provides a platform to analyse conflict transformation as the processes for managing change in a non-violent way to produce equitable outcomes for all parties that are sustainable. Security is understood as encapsulating a wide range of human security concerns that can be tackled by both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures. Therefore, the Journal’s scope not only covers such security sector reform issues as restructuring security apparatus, reintegration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive remnants of war and cross-border management, but also the protection of human rights, justice, rule of law and governance.

Peer-reviewed | Academic journal By CESRAN (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis)

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Vol.3 | No.1 | April 2013

TABLE OF CONTENTS ARTICLES 5

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation: Philosophical and Conceptual Expansion of the Nature of Human Mind for Conflict Transformation By Dr. Juichiro Tanabe

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order By Rui Faro Saraiva

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine By Stan Starygin

BOOK REVIEWS 80

Sultan Barakat (Ed.) After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War Wookbeom Park Melanie Jacques Armed Conflict and Displacement: The Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons under International Humanitarian Law Daniel Ari Baker

Ghassan Khatib Palestinian Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: Consensus and Competition in the Palestinian Negotiating Team Alaa Tartir

James Cockayne and Adam Lupel (Eds.) Peace Operations and Organised Crime: Enemies or Allies? Richard Slade

Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey and Andrew Silke (Eds.) Terrorism and the Olympic Games: Major Event Security and Lessons for The Future Ian Brittain

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CENTRE

for STRATEGIC RESEARCH and ANALYSIS

CESRAN Int. is a think-tank specialising on international relations in general, and global peace, conflict and development related issues and challenges.

The main business objective/function is that we provide expertise at an international level to a wide range of policy making actors such as national governments and international organisations. CESRAN International with its provisions of academic and semi-academic publications, journals and a fully-functioning website has already become a focal point of expertise on strategic research and analysis with regards to global security and peace. The Centre is particularly unique in being able to bring together wide variety of expertise from different countries and academic disciplines.

The main activities that CESRAN International undertakes are providing consultancy services and advice to public and private enterprises, organising international conferences and publishing academic material.

Some of CESRAN International’s current publications are (www.cesran.org):

 Journal of Global Analysis (biannual, peer reviewed)  Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (biannual, peer reviewed)  Journal of Eurasian Politics and Society (biannual, peer reviewed)  Political Reflection Magazine (quarterly news-magazine)  CESRAN Paper Series  Turkey Focus Policy Brief  China Focus Network

April 2013

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Buddhism and Conflict Transformation: Philosophical and Conceptual Expansion of the Nature of Human Mind for Conflict Transformation By Dr. Juichiro Tanabe*

Abstract Since 1990’s peace research has witnessed the rise of conflict transformation as one of its key ideas. This paper examines how Buddhism can contribute to conflict transformation. In Particular, it analyses how Buddhist ideas of the human mind can complement contributions from Western peace/conflict analysis. One of the limitations facing contemporary conflict transformation is the underdevelopment of qualitative arguments of the potential of the individual mind to critique and transform socially/culturally constructed discourses and knowledge causing or protracting conflict, which, this paper suggests, can be complemented by Buddhist analysis of the mind. This papers proposition is that three concepts human mind – the conditioned mind, the unconditioned mind, and holistic mind – realizes an exploration of how an expanded view of mind can contribute to qualitatively enriching the discourse on peace for future conflict transformation enterprise. Key words: Conflict transformation, Buddhism, The conditioned mind, The unconditioned mind, Holistic mind. Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS) Coventry University Applied Research Office Jaguar Building, Room JAG10 Lower Gosford Street Coventry, CV1 5ED, UK  The author is a visiting research fellow of the CPRS at Coventry University, UK. He was awarded Ph.D of Conflict Resolution from the University of Bradford, UK in December 2010. His main research theme is how Western approaches to peace/conflict studies and Buddhist approaches can complement each other to expand the framework of peace research itself. He is the author of Buddhist philosophy of human mind for peace research (Conference paper), and Buddhism and Contemporary Western Conflict Resolution (Conference paper).

www.cesran.org

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Vol. 3 | No. 1 April 2013

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Introduction Since the1990’s peace research has witnessed the rise of conflict transformation as one of its key ideas. This paper explores how Buddhism can contribute to conflict transformation by examining how Buddhist ideas of the human mind can complement contributions from Western peace/conflict analysis. It might be odd to examine a complementary relationship between conflict transformation and Buddhist ideas of human mind. However, there is a small but growing body of academic literature on non-Western contributions to the conceptualization of peace and conflict.1 Further, as Ramsbotham et al argue, in contemporary peace research, various values and wisdom from around the globe should be appreciated and, if necessary, a complementary relationship between them needs to be explored to promote shared understanding of the virtue to address unjust social/global structures and achieve harmonious human relationships.2

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Therefore, the main goal of this paper is neither to show superiority of Buddhist ideas of human mind for peace and conflict analysis nor to replace basic ideas of conflict transformation with Buddhist ones. Rather, by proposing new ideas of human mind, it seeks to expand the purview of conflict transformation itself, which would enable us to build new theoretical perspective and even practical methods in the long run.

To this end, three sections form this paper. The first part critically examines the basic features of conflict transformation and uncovers problems facing contemporary conflict transformation enterprise. The paper especially critiques and problematizes the underdevelopment of qualitative arguments of the potential of the individual mind for conflict transformation. The second section expounds the Buddhist analysis of human mind and delves into its understanding of the dynamics of peace/conflict. Finally, the third section explores how an expanded view of human mind can contribute to qualitatively enriching the discourse on peace for future conflict transformation enterprise. Methodology The central aim of Buddhism founded by Gautama, the Buddha, who “was led to philosophizing by an intense longing for the eradication of suffering”3 is to examine and 1. For instance, Hershock Buddhism in the Public Sphere: Reorienting Global Interdependence and Loy Awareness Bound and Unbound are good examples. 2. Ramsbotham et al Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts (2nd edition). 3. Bhatt and Mehrotra, Buddhist Epistemology, 2.

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address the problem of suffering. Especially, it analyses and overcomes psychologicallyoriented suffering by means of the eradication of its cause based on the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths4. Furthermore, there are three schools of Buddhism – Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana – and each of them further has sub-schools that have respectively developed distinct teachings and cultures along with the shared objective, that is, the eradication of suffering. As it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyse all of those schools in detail and to take up all their teachings to examine their contributions to conflict transformation, the paper employs the teachings of Mahayana Buddhism for the discussion. However, though it embraces Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, this paper recognizes and appreciates other schools’ rich teachings and cultures. 1. Critical analysis of contemporary conflict transformation Basic ideas of conflict transformation Though it is almost impossible to have single definition of conflict transformation, Mitchell argues there is one key idea about which most would agree: conflict transformation copes with destructive conflicts beyond the cessation of violence, the attainment of compromised settlement or even the joint creation of an acceptable solution to the issue in conflict between adversaries, in other words, “beyond resolution”.5 It is not just the short-term business of getting people to the negotiating table nor of accomplishing a cease-fire, but encompasses tasks such as broader transformation, reconciliation and social transformation.6 In short, conflict transformation is “a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses, and if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict.”7

4. Yun explains the Four Noble Truths are a fundamental element of all Buddhist teachings and the core doctrinal framework of every school of Buddhism. According to Pereira and Tiso, the Four Noble Truths are “truths of pain, origin of pain, suppression of pain and the way to suppress pain” (1988: 172). The first noble truths states that from Buddhist perspectives, life is nothing but suffering and pain (Rahula). The second noble truth presents the cause of suffering (Rubin). Burton explains suffering is caused by craving, that is, a mental state that leads to attachment, which can be characterized as the tendency of mind to cling or stick to some specific objects or views (Rubin). The third noble truth states suffering caused by craving can be eliminated (Rubin) as it is a psychological and subjective phenomenon. In other words, since it is our responsibility, we can address it by ourselves. The fourth noble truth shows the way to overcome suffering and achieve serenity, which is called the noble eightfold path. It is: right view or understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration (Rahula). Regarding the detailed analysis of the Four Noble Truths, Rahula What the Buddha Taught and Yun From the Four Noble Truths to the Four Universal Vows would be helpful. 5. Mitchell “Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution. An Enquiry”, 2005. http://www.berghofhandbook.net/uploads/download/mitchell_handbook.pdf (Accessed 12 March 2011). 6. Lederach “Conflict Transformation in Protracted Internal Conflicts: The Case for a Comprehensive Framework”. 7. Miall “Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task”, 2004 http://www.berghof-handbook.net/ uploads/download/miall_handbook.pdf (Accessed 10 April 2011). 8. Mitchell “Conflict, Social Change and Conflict Resolution. An Enquiry”, 2005 http://www.berghofhandbook.net/uploads/download/mitchell_handbook.pdf (Accessed 12 March 2011).

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

The underlying assumption of conflict transformation is there is nothing sacrosanct about the status quo; rather, it starts with critiquing the existing system and assuming that it is crucial to construct new systems, structures, and relationships.8 It seeks to problematise the

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dominant social frameworks and aims to create alternatives that could transform the predominant social institutions and social meanings that are regarded as taken-for-granted ‘conflict transformation’ aims to transform the basis on which everyday life and meaning are constructed and practiced.9 Critique of social structure Jabri insists human conflict is “a social continuity sustained by deeply embedded discursive and institutional structures existent in patterned social systems.”10 The existing social structure is not something neutral or objective: rather it is framed by asymmetric power relations between the component actors in the social systems. Asymmetric power relations are embedded in a complex web of structural and material elements, which constructs the fabric of everyday life itself and causes conflict.11 As the deformed social structure derived from the asymmetric power relations between different groups is considered as a source of conflict, serious conflict must be recognized as being embedded in an unequal social, political and economic system that reflects prolonged exploitation backed by coercion.12

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

Therefore, approaches that ignore structural transformation would result in perpetuating the unequal status quo and prolonging and worsening the conflict.13 Structural transformation is a process of transforming relatively enduring asymmetric relationships between/among collectivities in a social structure to new sets of intergroup relations where all groups can enjoy more equal control over political-economic resources within the society.14 It promotes formal means of securing inclusiveness and respect for diversity in the political systems, institutions and the law.15 Thus, transformation of the asymmetric power relations in which some groups enjoy social and cultural privilege, greater access to political power, and economic privilege into more civic polity wherein diversity and equality can be guaranteed, is essential for sustainable peace and social stability.16

Critique of social identity and discourses Another central feature of conflict transformation is a critical examination of the relationship between social identity and discourses framing social reality. Since identity is “the medium which bridges the self-society nexus”17, through the construction of social identity, social reality is also formed.18 The construction of social identity encompasses the construction of shared memories, myths, symbolic orders and self-imagery that shape a constitutive part of the practical consciousness of situated individuals and they provide knowledgeable human agents with meaning in the daily encounters.19 Narratives and symbols function as frameworks of belief that legitimize and structure social institutions and practices by 9. Fetherston From Conflict Resolution to Transformative Peacebuilding: Reflections from Croatia Working Paper 4. 10. Jabri Discourses on violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered, 146. 11. Jeong “Structure” 12. Ibid. 13. Botes “Structural Transformation”. 14. Montiel “Toward a Psychology of Structural Peacebuilding” 15. Nathan “The four horsemen of the apocalypse: the structural causes of crisis and violence in Africa” 16. Wilmer The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in Former Yugoslavia. 17. Jabri Discourses on violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered, 125. 18. Rogers Social Psychology: Experimental and Critical Approaches 19. Jabri Discourses on violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered

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formulating the rules of interaction, setting the criteria for judgments that enable us to lead a collectively constructed life.20 However, the construction of identity generally accompanies active selection of particular modes of representation, whereby certain dominant social norms and symbolic orders influence the production of social identity.21 The construction of discourses of reality involves the exercise of power, that is, the domination by certain social groups.22 The emergence of certain dominant patterns of discourses comes to form asymmetric structures, wherein some particular interests of hegemonic groups are legitimized.23 Consequently, some social groups are privileged to make definitions or constructions of social meanings and the nature of social structures and institutions, which frame unequal social structures.24 In conflict, the formation of dominant patterns of discourse of social reality and identity causes unequal intergroup power relations, in which some particular interests of dominant groups are prioritized over the others and those that do not accord with the prevalent ones are marginalized as deviation from society.25

Thus, it becomes imperative to challenge the dominant discourses and power relations associated with them. The prevalent cultures defining conflictual and asymmetric intergroup relationships need to be critiqued and consciously revised by those who live in the social/ cultural settings.31 The transformation of a singular dominant social identity into diverse and multiple identities, which requires adversarial groups to perceive in-group and out-group in an interdependent and self-constituting relationships,32 must entail breaking the dominant discourses and asymmetric relations supporting strongly bounded dichotomy between inclusion and exclusion. Stated otherwise, critical thinking that understands reality as process

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

Baronov Conceptual Foundations of Social Research Methods. Jabri Discourses on violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered. Fetherson and Parkin “Transforming Violent Conflict: Contributions from Social Theory”. Jabri Discourses on violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered. Crossley Key Concepts in Critical Social Theory. Ibid. Jabri Discourses on violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered Jeong and Vayrynen “Identity Formation and Transformation” Neuman “Identity and the Outbreak of War” Jabri Discourses on violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered. Ibid. Nordstrom “Contested Identities/Essentially Contested Powers”. Jeong and Vayrynen “Identity Formation and Transformation”.

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

Furthermore, through the establishment of certain dominant discourses of reality, narrow and exclusionist social identities come to be formed.26 The networks of signs, symbols, or images embedded in social structures and institutions build a system of inclusion and exclusion,27 implicit in establishing a strict boundary between out-groups and in-groups.28 In a social world, particular ways are used to perceive and interpret others, as well as to present the self to others, and the multiple identities that individuals are supposed to possess come to be expressed in terms of one dominant identity in the process.29 The production of an exclusive modality of representation precludes other possibilities in discourses on reality and identity, which fixates the intergroup division and provides the in-groups with self-serving justification for violence and discrimination towards out-groups.30

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not as static entity needs to be developed.33 Such thinking should conscientize us leading to an understanding that the boundaries of identity, framed by certain discourses, are never fixed and can be reorganized with the construction of new meanings and perspectives.34 Problems with contemporary conflict transformation: deterministic nature of individual actors This paper argues that conflict transformation calls for the praxis of critical consciousness that challenges the existing social structures and discourses on reality framing social identity and intergroup relationships.35 However, Spears has found that in contemporary conflict transformation, there seems to be little work devoted to arguments on the potential of individual agent. Rather, much time has been spent in examining the power of social structures, languages and discourses.36 Consequently, individual agents have come to be considered easily as passive bearers of social structures and discourses.37 Contemporary conflict transformation, while emphasizing the importance and necessity of transforming socially constructed knowledge or discourse, has underdeveloped arguments of the potential of individual subjects. Since contemporary conflict transformation lacks an adequate theory or concept of individual agency as active and creative self, how the individual can critically challenge and eventually transform the existing conceptual thoughts or symbolic knowledge has been obscured.38

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

By leaving the analysis of the potential of individual agency underdeveloped and maintaining the binary relationship between structure/agency with the former prioritized over the latter, a deterministic nature of human agency remains un-addressed in conflict transformation enterprise. However, if conflict transformation seeks the critique and transformation of socially constructed knowledge or discourses, qualitative exploration of human agency needs to be made.39 How individual can be conceived as an active agent and direct of critique and transformation of knowledge must be analyzed.40

Since its beginning Buddhism has laid major emphasis on subjectivity and developed a critical analysis of human thoughts that build a meaningful reality.41 Our understanding of reality in terms of its contents is invariably mediated by the knowing mind and its perceptual and conceptual apparatus.42 In a Buddhist view, the object of investigation is consistently human beings, the aim of which is the realization of the mind-base for knowledge and the construction of knowledge.43 The purpose of Buddhist philosophy is “to know thyself in terms of understanding the structure of one’s own thinking process.”44 Critically examining the 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

Crotty The Foundations of Social Research: Meaning and perspective in the research process. Jeong and Vayrynen “Identity Formation and Transformation”. Dant Critical Social Theory: Culture, Society and Critique. Spears “Introduction”. Ibid. Best and Kellner Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations. Burr Social constructionism. Ibid. Sharma An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy (Vijnanavada and Madhyamika). Burton “Is Madhyamaka Buddhism Really the Middle Way?”, 2001 http:// www.westernbuddhistreview.com/vol3/madhyamaka.html (Accessed 15 April 2011). 43. Matsuo Ichi-no-ronri (The Logic of Unity: The Discovery of Zero and Emptiness in Prajnaparamita Thought). 44. Ibid.

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nature of one’s mind or the principles of epistemic function is a central theme of Buddhism: knowing, first of all, reality as a construct of the mind-base or mind-structure; secondly, reflecting its potential danger as the root cause of human suffering including conflict; and finally exploring how it can be addressed constitute the essence of Buddhist philosophy.45 The world is not a set of facts to be discovered, but a set of experiences to be interpreted and our interpretation relies on what perspectives and inner powers we bring to our experience.46 Accordingly, to make a constructive transformation of the world around us, first of all, we must make a constructive and positive transformation of our ways of knowing and thinking.47 Transformation is a process involving a change in our conscious beliefs and in the structure of underlying unconscious symbols that hold our world in place.48 Therefore, if we want to make a constructive critique and transformation of socially constructed discourses or symbolic knowledge, our socially/culturally-oriented ways of knowing and thinking need to be broken through. This is not the dismissal of socially or culturally-conditioned way of knowing and thinking; it should be acknowledged that a more expanded way of knowing and thinking needs to be explored and embodied somehow. As will be expounded later, Buddhism has developed critical analysis of the human mind in line with how conceptual thought construction affects us both negatively and positively and this systematic analysis can contribute to expanding the psychological dynamics of conflict transformation.

Arguably, the root of trouble lies in our propensity to absolutise any particular viewpoint as the universal and independent truth.50 When we indulge in a certain viewpoint or pattern of thought, we are disposed to project some fixed nature or attribute upon phenomena and objects.51 The mind “freezes or makes static the object of perception” 52 with fixed qualities and accordingly objects, and reality in general, come to be tied up with definitive views and treated as a fixed entity or substance.53 Once we have constructed our world with fixed attributes, we keep strong hold of those qualities as absolute or complete, over which we come to have greed, anger, or obsession.54 Though we tend to believe by projecting certain views upon the real, and thereby gain a sense of stability, actual conditions in the real world do not always accord with our projected 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

Ibid. Said et al “For the need for new thinking”. Ibid. Ibid. Ichimura “Contemporary Significance of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy”. Gomez “Proto-Madhyamika in the Pali Canon”. Murt The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of Madhyamika System Inada Nagarjuna: A Translation of his Mulamadhyamakakarika with an Introductory Essay, 24. Chang The Buddhist Teaching of Totality: The Philosophy of Hwa Yen Buddhism Suzuki Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra.

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

2. Buddhist analysis of the human mind Critique of conceptual thought construction From time immemorial, human beings have developed conceptual thought as the primary tool to make sense of the world of experiences in abstraction and to communicate them with fellow human beings.49 While acknowledging this, Buddhism also critiques the potential danger of conceptual thought as the root cause of trouble.

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views and with our intentions, which results in anger, hatred, or bewilderment.55 Furthermore, when we choose some particular thoughts, we tend to “claim completeness for the aspects that we have selected”56, which causes us to be dogmatic, exclusive of other views or thoughts. By indulging in a particular conceptual thought, we are imprisoned in our own world and unable to liberate ourselves from extremely narrow-minded viewpoint.57 Building a particular pattern of thought is essential in leading daily lives and engaging in intellectual enterprise. Nevertheless, such a selection, once fixed and absolutized, which manifests our deep clinging and attachment, becomes the very root cause of trouble.58 However, the upshot of the critique of conceptual thought is not rejection of the conceptual thought or certain pattern of thought itself.59 Rather, the main target is our tendency to become enmeshed in a specific conceptual position or particular pattern of thought and cling to it as absolute or complete.60 When we gain an insight into the nature of conceptual thought that constricts the purview of our thought, we can overcome the extreme adherence to any particular patter of thought or view. Dialectical contemplation on an insight into conceptual thought In a Buddhist view, dialectic is a self-conscious spiritual movement that entails a critique of conceptual thought.61 It is the consciousness of the total and interminable conflict in conceptual thought-construction of any kind that tries to absolutise itself and the consequent attempt to resolve the conflict by rising to a higher standpoint.62

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

The core of dialectical contemplation is the realization of the interdependent nature of conceptual thought of any kind framing our reality. Waldo claims that in a Buddhist view, “no concepts are immune from the dynamics process of interdependence in the sense that they refer to an absolute stratum of reality presupposed by all other concepts.” 63 Further, Kakol argues that “all views, when analyzed, imply their own negation, which means that they are logically dependent on opposing views that contradict them.”64

The inherent contradictory and interdependent nature of conceptual thought is expounded by Buddhist masters. For instance, Nagarjuna,65 states, “Without one there cannot be many and without many it is not possible to refer to one. Therefore, one and many arise dependently and such phenomena do not have sign of inherent existence.”66 Further, he argues, “Unity and multiplicity and past and future, etc., defilement and purification, correct 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

Murti The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of Madhyamika System. Ramanan Nagarjuna’s Philosophy As Presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sutra. Suzuki Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra. Chang The Buddhist Teaching of Totality: The Philosophy of Hwa Yen Buddhism Loy “Indra’s Postmodern Net”. Muller Innate Enlightenment and No-thought: A Response to the Critical Buddhist Position on Zen Murti The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of Madhyamika System. Ibid. Waldo “Nagarjuna and Analytic Philosophy (1)”, 288. Kakol “A general theory of worldviews based on Madhyamika and process philosophies”, 212. Nagarjuna is one of the most important Buddhist philosophers, who lived between the second and third century. According to Williams, he is called “the second Buddha” for his huge contribution to the development of Mahayana Buddhism. Regarding the details of Nagarjuna’s works and Madhyamaka philosophy, Williams’ Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundation (1989, 55-76) would be helpful. 66. Komito Nagarjuna’s “Seventy Stanzas”: A Buddhist Psychology of Emptiness, 80.

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and false – how can they exist per se?”67 These statements demonstrate the inherent interdependent nature of opposing concepts to make sense and unreality of their independent existence. The central approach of the Buddhist dialectic is to expose all views to “bi-negation.”68 Views are negated by the function of “reduction ad absurdum” and then opposing views that have arisen by the negation are also nullified in the same way.69 This bi-negation approach implies the fundamental contradiction and inconsistency of any form of conceptual thought: while one concept needs the other that opposes it, the latter needs the former to make sense. However, the former itself needs the latter, and eventually infinite regress continues without end, which leads us to realize the ultimate unreality to absolutize any form of conceptual thought as the independent truth. Some might think Buddhist dialectical contemplation seeks to abandon or cease thinking. However, Buddhism explicitly denies this. For instance, Asvagosha’s Awakening of Faith70 states, “We understand by the annihilation (of mind), not that of the mind itself, but its modes (only).”71 The Lankavatara-sutra72 states, “The goal of tranquilization (of mind) is to be reached not by suppressing all mind activity but getting rid of discrimination and attachments.”73 These show that Buddhist contemplative dialectic aims to achieve the condition of not being trapped in thoughts and not adhering to a certain habit or pattern of thought as the absolute truth or knowledge.74 The ultimate purpose is to achieve the function of our mind free from attachment to any form of thought even when we are engaged in it.75 By being transcendent of an attachment to any particular view or pattern of thought while perceiving its practical value in certain situation, our conceptualizing faculty, rather than being wiped out, functions well or even better than before as it no longer has to operate in a rigid, constricted and clinging mode in approaching our reality including peace and conflict.76

67. 68. 69. 70.

71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76.

Tola and Dragonetti On Voidness: A Study on Buddhist Nihilism, 128. Kakol “A general theory of worldviews based on Madhyamika and process philosophies”, 212. Ibid. Asvagosha is the philosopher of Buddhism. Suzuki assesses that Asvagosha is the first expounder of the Mahayana Buddhism and one of the deepest thinkers among the Buddhist patriarchs who engaged in a thorough and comprehensive analysis of human mind both as the root cause of suffering and as the source to overcome it. Regarding the details of the life and works of Asvaghosa, Suzuki Asvaghosha’s Discourse On the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana would be very helpful. Suzuki Asvaghosha’s Discourse on the Awakening of Faith In the Mahayana, 83. Suzuki states that Lankavatara Sutra is one of the main texts of Mahayana Buddhism and central to Zen school that is one of the important wings of Buddhism. He also argues the teachings presented in the text examine the nature or quality of mind, self-realization and the process for its attainment to achieve liberation from suffering. Put differently, it can be understood that Lankavatara Sutra engages in critical and constructive analysis of human mind that seeks to break through an erroneous understanding of mind and unveil its true nature so that we can achieve liberation from suffering and serenity that essentially arises from our own minds. Suzuki (2003) The Lankavatara Sutra: An Epitomized Version, 73. Muller Innate Enlightenment and No-thought: A Response to the Critical Buddhist Position on Zen Loy “Mu and Its Implications”. Muller Innate Enlightenment and No-thought: A Response to the Critical Buddhist Position on Zen

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Although a Buddhist critique of mind has been examined, the upshot is that we tend to be tied down or confined to certain social or cultural thought that conditions us that can cause suffering, and which in some cases, we can resolve through our own self-effort. The next

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section examines how the Buddhist critique of the mind can contribute to the study of human mind in peace and conflict analysis. 3. Applying Buddhist analysis of mind to peace/conflict dynamics The proposition of the conditioned mind and its analysis Firstly, the idea of “the conditioned mind” is proposed. The conditioned mind is characterized as mind shaped by the belief and forms of truth that are conventionally accepted as valid and effective in the practical matters of social cultural life-world.77 It is the mind framed by socially or culturally embedded assumptions, worldviews or habitual ways of interpretation that we hold in response to a given life-world.78 Through social and cultural conditionedness, we project certain pattern of conceptual categories upon reality and that make experiences conform to our systems of thought. 79 Any kind of collective circumstance moulds our minds to conform to certain norms and determines the appropriateness or acceptability of a given state of awareness or communication in the social and cultural settings.80 As collective entities, we become inevitably conditioned by socially or culturally constructed views or discourses. However, the conditioned mind itself can turn into a root cause of conflict and hamper harmonious human relationships.

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

Our conditioned state can become a root cause of conflict when it gets absolutized and clung to as such. Once we cling to conceptual or discursive thoughts socially or culturally conditioning us, this can result in fixating the real – objects, persons, or groups of people, events and so on – with some supposedly fixed attributes or qualities.81 Sedimented and habitual ways of seeing the real are formed to limit the objects, people, and other phenomena to a static essence with a fixed nature.82

The absolutization of our conditionedness with a fixed view of reality is connected to our eagerness for the establishment of sense of security and stable identity. According to Loy, security refers to “the conditions where we can live without care, where our life is not preoccupied with worrying about our life”83. This involves stabilizing ourselves by fixating the real with putatively immutable attributes: in our anxiety and quest for reassurance and security, we reify situations and things and cling to and manipulate those reified conditions.84 Put differently, the fragility of constructed views and identities is seen as a threat to security. As widely acknowledged, basic human needs, especially, socio-psychologically oriented needs such as identity, security, recognition and development85 are essential to peace and conflict

77. Wright “Language And Truth In Hua-Yen Buddhism”. 78. Gunnlaugson “Shedding Lights on the Underlying Forms of Transformative Learning Theory: Introducing Three Distinct Categories of Consciousness”. 79. McEvilley“Early Greek philosophy and Madhyamika”. 80. Goleman “Psychology, Reality, and Consciousness”. 81. Chang The Buddhist Teaching of Totality: The Philosophy of Hwa Yen Buddhism. 82. Lipman “The cittamatra and its Madhyamaka critique: some phenomenological reflections”. 83. Loy On the Nonduality of Good and Evil: Buddhist Reflections on the New Holy War, 8 2002 http:// www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/Mescellaneous/NonDuality_Good_amd_Evil.htm (Accessed 15 April 2011) 84. Mipham Introduction to the Middle Way 85. Burton Conflict: Resolution and Provention

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analysis. And at first glance, fixating objects and entities including us with supposedly permanent attributes is assumed to build stable sense of identity and security. However, as fixated view of identity become strong and extreme, they tend to be imagined to be absolute and exclusive of other identities or views of identity86, driving us toward extreme behaviors against those with different attributes of identity.87 An extremely egocentric view emerging from our social or cultural conditionedness is prone to make us easily criticize or attack those with different views of identities. The extreme attachment to our views can elapse into prejudice and polarity or negation of other views and ways of life and ultimately of people who are different from us. 88 Once the chosen view conditioning us has come to be seized as absolute, we tend to feel threat, fear, anger or hatred to those with different frames of reference, which can provide us with selfserving justification for violence, injustice or discrimination.89 Social or cultural conditionedness, though essential to make our lives meaningful, can cause us to exaggerate differences between peoples, create supposedly firm boundaries between ‘in-groups’ and ‘out-group’ and reify those into fixed and independent entities segregating one from another by imputing intrinsic and insurmountable differences.90 This critique of our social or cultural conditionedness argues that the upshot should not be to deny our conditioned nature. Rather, what needs to be considered is how we can address the force of mind tied down to specific frameworks of ideology, cultural values, religious dogma, ethnic or racial values.91

The unconditioned mind is characterized as a mind transcendental of an attachment to a particular conditioned state. And the attitude of the detachment is prescribed.93 To be detached from a given perspective is to refrain from being taken in or possessed by it to suspend the natural tendency to become conditioned by certain perspective position.94 In other words, the promotion of reflective self-awareness is at the centre of the proposition of the unconditioned mind. Once we become conditioned by a certain view, we tend to entertain that view and adhere to it as absolutely,95 which leads us to fall into dogmatism. Therefore, it is necessary to experience things or phenomena in a way that is free from our habitual grasping at them.96 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96.

Ramanan Nagarjuna’s Philosophy As Presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sutra. Der-lan Yeh “The Way to Peace: A Buddhist perspective” Ibid. Ibid. Waldron “Common Ground, Common Cause: Buddhism and Science on the Afflictions of Identity”. Ichimura “Contemporary Significance of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy”. Muller Innate Enlightenment and No-thought: A Response to the Critical Buddhist Position on Zen Laycock “Hui-Neng and the Transcendental Standpoint” Ibid. Murti The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of Madhyamika System. Ames “The Spiritual Significance of Emptiness in Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika”.

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

The proposition of the unconditioned mind Since the propensity of the mind to become socially or culturally conditioned becomes the root cause of conflict and violence, the need of methods to break the attachment must be sought,92 and here the concept of the unconditioned mind is proposed.

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There might be various approaches to de-condition the mind that becomes absolutized and which causes us indulge in extremely self-absorbed view. Further, it is very difficult to be deconditioned from social or cultural frameworks. However, once socially/culturally habituated thought becomes the root cause of conflict, we need to sharpen the ability to distance ourselves from such conditioned pattern of thought. Therefore, the skill of promoting reflective self-awareness empowers us to let habituated patterns of thought lay bare to our consciousness.97 The enhancement of self-reflection keeps us out of the extreme attachment to a particular conditioned state and serves to loosen the power of habits of thought and makes our mind more hospitable places for openness to differences, peaceful relationships and creativity.98 The proposition of holistic mind Applying the two ideas of human mind have been proposed and examined, it can be argued that human minds have both the conditioned and unconditioned natures and it is crucial to embody their interdependent relationship in our thinking and behaving and the concept of holistic mind is proposed. A holistic mind is defined as a mind that realizes the interdependent relationship between the conditioned state and the unconditioned state: it is the conditioned mind in the unconditioned or transcendental state in approaching the real.

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

Though becoming conditioned by conceptual thought is natural to us, Wade insightfully argues that it is fundamentally the dualistic nature of thought (right/wrong, good/bad, black/ while, to name a few) that divides the world into ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group.’99 Further, those in dualistic thought are informed by the principle of the excluded middle100 or ‘either-or’ stance.101 This logical stance prioritizes one over the other by enhancing dichotomous relationships between in-groups and out-groups, whereby an imbalanced attitude invested by extreme in-group ego interest and desire is favoured and promoted.102 Consequently, the subject, relying on the strong in-group consciousness, becomes the generative factor for creating discriminatory and oppositional relationship.103

Once we see the other as something disconnected from us, it becomes easier to propagate violence upon the other outside the boundary.104 In a dualistic logical and epistemological structure, we are prone to project negative qualities upon the outside groups and see such qualities as objectively belonging to them.105 This can promote self-righteousness leading to discriminatory attitudes and the perpetration of any kind of violence towards them. Further, the mind in dualistic state “swings from extreme to extreme; in its swinging to extremes, it clings to dead-ends”,106 whereby the values, ideas of one’s group are not viewed as one of 97. Claxton “Nirvana and Neuroscience: The self-liberating brain”. 98. Ibid. 99. Wade Changing of Mind: A Holonomic Theory of the Evolution of Consciousness 100.Fenner “Spiritual Inquiry in Buddhism”. 101.Nagatomo “The Logic of the Diamond Sutra: A is not A, therefore it is A”. 102.Ibid. 103.Ibid. 104.Hart et al “Introduction”. 105.Wilber The Spectrum of Consciousness 106.Ramanan Nagarjuna’s Philosophy As Presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sutra, 91.

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many alternatives, but the only right ones; other possibilities are dimly conceived or denied as wrong.107 The holistic mind empowers us to engage in sustained contemplation on insight into symbolic knowledge shaping dichotomous intergroup relations. The pinnacle is the realization of the essential dependent-originated nature of any conceptual or linguistic framework: any form of symbolic knowledge cannot be seen as existing outside the purview of interdependency.108 It does not mean total erasure of difference or demise of all distinctions into an all-frozen sameness, but advocates a reformulation of dualistic thinking. Realization of the interdependent nature of symbolic knowledge building dichotomy empowers us to transcend ‘either-or’ thought. What needs to be known is that dualistic thought, though important in some circumstances, is “only one product of the total functioning of the mind.” 109 The holistic mind enables us to effect a perspectival shift from the dualistic to nondualistic stance,110 wherein prima facie opposing views are not seen as fixed pair of opposites, but as interrelational constructs. Going beyond dualistic stance calls us to transcend any strongly ingrained habits of our thinking and participate in and play with opposing or even contradictory views. As Vaughan suggests, when we are liberated from the attachment to particular fixed view, it becomes possible to have multiple perspectives in viewing and approaching the real.111 The transcendence of fixed perspectives can enable us to overcome particular limited horizon of attitude and open up the infinite network of meaning that are not tied to any specific egocentric standpoints.112

Normally, once we become conditioned by certain thoughts, we tend to remain identified with those thoughts, beliefs and are kept imprisoned in the conditioned state,113 which constricts the purview of our thought. Therefore, the first step is to disidentify ourselves from the conditionedness, to make it conscious and to reflect on it.114 The aim of the contemplative disengagement is to create a space in mind for the development of an enlarged awareness, attentiveness to broader dimensions of how mind can work in the conditioned state.115 Contemplative self-critique cultivates our first-hand experience of the nature of social or cultural conditionedness of our thinking or knowing within a collective context, which helps 107.Wade Changing of Mind: A Holonomic Theory of the Evolution of Consciousness 108.Muller Innate Enlightenment and No-thought: A Response to the Critical Buddhist Position on Zen 109.Tart States of Consciousness, 28. 110.Nagatomo “The Logic of the Diamond Sutra: A is not A, therefore it is A”. 111.Vaughan “What is Spiritual Intelligence?”. 112.Blass “On the Possibility of Self-Transcendence: Philosophical Counseling, Zen, and the sychological Perspective”. 113.Welwood “Reflection and Presence”. 114.Ibid. 115.Wright Philosophical meditations on Zen Buddhism.

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

Holistic mind and peace This paper argues that in examining the holistic mind and discourse on peace, what should first be considered is the promotion of contemplative self-introspection as one of the essential tools to achieve lasting peace.

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us become less identified with our habits of mind and standpoint.116 Contemplative selfknowledge sharpens our capacity to simultaneously hold multiple perspectives and patterns of thought that depends on an awareness that embraces various perspectives, without adhering to any one of them,117 to approach the real. The integrative expansion of experiential range as a result of contemplative self-critique allows us to engage the world in a more extensive and inclusive manner.118 A key to conflict transformation is to go beyond ego or identity.119 It does not mean the denial of identity; rather, it refers to a qualitative transformation of viewing the nature of identity. Rather than seeing our identity as an independent and fixed existence, we need to effect a perspectival shift that understands it as the interdependent web of life with no any fixed nature.120 Realizing identity as an open and dynamic living system, existing within a larger interdependent ecosystem, can awaken us to an ultimate nondualistic relationship between the in-group and out-group,121 which enables us to recognize we cannot discriminate ourselves from the interrelational web of life without damaging both others and ourselves.122 Recognizing the interdependent nature of reality including human relations makes us aware that our own well-being and that of others’ are inseparable: without considering and acting to promote the peace of others’, our own peace is impossible.123 When an all-embracing and non-abiding perspective free from an extreme attachment to every vestige of selfcentredness is acknowledged and practiced somehow, the conditions for lasting peace can be built.

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

Arguably, dialogue, the need for which arises from the emerging acknowledgement that our changing reality requires a new global ethic and a new perception of one another,124 is essential to the transformation of violent relationship into harmonious and constructive one. However, the practice of authentic dialogue requires the openness to be challenged and transformed by encountering other viewpoints or values as well as the willingness and ability to engage in active listening to and understanding of them.125 So, expanding awareness to include a wider range of possibilities needs to be recognized and practiced. Touching diversity and difference marks “the emergence of complex and coordination-enriching interdependence.126

Human relationship entails “continuous, relationally-expanding and interdependentenhancing improvision”127, which allows us to experience difference as an opportunity for 116.Gunnlaugson “Shedding Lights on the Underlying Forms of Transformative Learning Theory: Introducing Three Distinct Categories of Consciousness”. 117.Hart et al “Introduction”. 118.Firman and Gila A Psychology of the Spirit. 119.Vaughan The Inward Arc: Healing in Psychotherapy and Spirituality. 120.Loy “Indra’s Postmodern Net”. 121.Rothberg “Buddhist responses to violence and war: Resources for a Socially Engaged Spiritality”. 122.Loy “Indra’s Postmodern Net”. 123.Vaughan The Inward Arc: Healing in Psychotherapy and Spirituality. 124.Said et al “For the need for new thinking”. 125.Ferrer, J. (2002) Revisioning Transpersonal Theory: A Participatory Vision of Human Spirituality 126.Though the works by Peter Hershock I used have not yet been published, I have got personal permission to employ Hershock’s ideas through communication with him. Here I wish to show my appreciation to his kindness to allow me to use his ideas. 127.Hershock, P. D. (forthcoming) Valuing Diversity: Buddhist Reflection on Realizing a More Equitable Global Future, 368.

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mutual insight and inspiration and to explore something new to all participants. Improvising, in this context a “lived, enacted performance of being different in the world” 128 can be understood as the ongoing development of new views and meanings from within things as they have come to be. Improvision is not the abandonment of values, worldviews or norms socially or culturally conditioning us. It is their meaningful revision and reorientation so that we can add new understandings or views to them according to dynamic and interdependent human interaction. Social or cultural conditionedness tends to persist without self-awareness and a conscious intention to change.129 It is not easy to be aware of conditionedness and to develop contemplative self-awareness to look into our conditioned nature. Nevertheless, practicing a deeper self-introspection and mindfulness over days, months, and even years, can empower us to recognize our conditioned nature and to be detached from it.130 Whilst difficult but not as impossible as it may sound, by integrating contemplative self-critique into daily life and raising the conscious awareness present in it for constant critique of conditionedness, the possibility of transcending a particular thought or belief system and approaching our lives from extensive and broader perspectives becomes a reality.131

Conclusion and research implications Clearly it is very difficult to employ contemplative self-awareness as a practical method for conflict transformation. Moreover, as Hershock cautiously critiques, the potential of the mind explored in this paper could not be applied by those without appropriate food, clothing and shelter or those without adequate access to political and economic activities and to social services such as basic education and health care.134 Satisfying basic human needs and transforming social and even global structures that create asymmetric relationships are essential to peace. Nevertheless, as Rothberg suggests, the tool of constant mindfulness and self-awareness as a basic means of transformation is important in helping to prevent a separation between the 128.Ibid. 129.Vaughan The Inward Arc: Healing in Psychotherapy and Spirituality. 130.Firman and Gila A Psychology of the Spirit. 131.Vaughan Awakening Intuition. 132.Francis From Pacification to Peacebuilding: A Call to Global Transformation. 133.Adarkar and Lee Keiser “The Buddha in the Classroom: Toward a Critical Spiritual Pedagogy”, 248. 134.Hershock “Diversity Matters: Buddhist Reflections on the Meaning of Difference”.

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

Since conflict transformation is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon in line with what it perceives to be complex and multi-dimensional causes of conflict and approaches to transform violent situation into harmonious one, it is absurd to assert the promotion of the power of mind as the only key to conflict transformation. However, at the same time, as Francis claims, “in human societies, minds and hearts are the main arena.” 132 Even social justice, though it is external social or structural phenomenon, recalls “the power of imagination and the importance of not limiting possibilities by current patterns and relationships.”133 Therefore, at the centre of the process of transformation should lie human agency that can employ various ways of knowing such as rational consideration, reflection, intuitive induction, creative imagination and so on to make a positive change.

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experiences of the participants in social action and the desired changes, and between the process of change and the intended results.135 Continuous and sustained engagement in reflective self-awareness will enable us to realise that attention can be redirected by our own will and effort, which can bring about the undoing of old habits of thoughts and patterns of behaviour.136 Though social or cultural constraints are always in place, an awakening to the particular forms of the given situation and a heightening of awareness and reflection of our basic situatedness is a big step toward the realisation of the potential and capacity of our own minds.137 Further, though contemplative self-reflection tends to be seen as a special activity located outside the domain of ordinary life, it can be more effectively practiced when it is the conscious awareness present in all human activity.138 Since every day we are creating our own subjective realities,139 every moment of our lives can be an opportunity to know the value of reflective self-awareness and the power of mind. Thus, although more research needs to be done, contemplative self-awareness has the potential to be incorporated into practical methodologies to achieve peace in the long run.

Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

As is widely acknowledged, social psychology has contributed to the development of the psychological dynamics of peace and conflict analysis. The complementary relationship between social psychology and the nature of the mind explored in this paper has interesting research implications for deepening an understanding of the psychological dynamics of peace/conflict. Bar-Tal argues that social psychology needs to learn to cooperate and open itself to knowledge and ideas of other disciplines, which enables us to learn different approaches that employ different concepts, frameworks, and data to examine the same phenomena.140 His comment also applies to Buddhist psychological discipline. Though some scholars, for example, McConnell have examined Buddhist psychology in peace research141, collaborative research relationships with other psychological disciplines have remained underdeveloped. For instance, social psychology has applied social identity theory, social categorization theory, contact hypothesis, and so on to analyse conflict dynamics and how antagonistic intergroup relationship can be transformed into peaceful and constructive one. Examining how holistic mind and contemplative self-awareness proposed here can complement those theories and methods would be an interesting research subject.

Through establishing a complementary relationship among different psychological disciplines is challenging or might seem too ambitious or idealistic, the foundational ethos of peace research is interdisciplinarity, whereby distinct intellectual enterprises are mutually appreciated for their values and potential contribution to promoting peace research.142 New perspectives, new theories, and novel empirical information, which are proposed by new philosophical frameworks, can enable us to see and understand how things can be different

135.Rothberg “Buddhist responses to violence and war: Resources for a Socially Engaged Spiritality”. 136.Vaughan The Inward Arc: Healing in Psychotherapy and Spirituality. 137.Wright Philosophical meditations on Zen Buddhism. 138.Ibid. 139.Vaughan Awakening Intuition. 140.Bar-Tal “Conclusion: To Open the Closet”. 141.For instance, McConnell Mindful Mediation: A Handbook for Buddhist Peacemakers 142.Der-lan Yeh (2006) “The Way to Peace: A Buddhist perspective”.

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Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

from the ways they first present themselves to us and explore how things could be different from the way they are.143 Therefore, even if it is initially on a philosophical and conceptual level, deepening our view of human mind should be an essential work to the development of peace research enterprise.

143.Calhoun (2000) â&#x20AC;&#x153;Social Theory and the Public Sphereâ&#x20AC;?.

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Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

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Ramanan, Venkata, Nagarjuna’s Philosophy As Presented in the Maha-Prajnaparamita-Sutra Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1978. Ramsbotham, Oliver., Woodhouse, Tom. and Miall, Hugh, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts (2nd edition) Cambridge, Polity, 2005. Rogers, Wendy, Stainton, Social Psychology: Experimental and Critical Approaches Maidenhead, Open University Press, 2003. Rothberg, Donald, “Buddhist responses to violence and war: Resources for a Socially Engaged Spiritality” Journal of Humanistic Psychology vol. 32, no. 4, 1992, pp. 41-75. Rubenstein, Richard, (1999) “Conflict Resolution and the Structural Sources of Conflict” in Jeong, H. W. (ed), Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process and Structure (pp. 173195). Ashgate: Aldershot. Rubin, Jeffrey B, “Close Encounters of a New Kind: Toward an Integration of Psychoanalysis and Buddhism”, Segall, Seth Robert, (ed), Encountering Buddhism: Western Psychology and Buddhist Teachings Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 2003. Said, Abdu'l-Aziz, Charles O. Lerche, and Nathan C. Funk, “For the need for new thinking” International Journal of Peace Studies vol. 11, no. 2, 2006, pp. 105-120. Sharma, T. R., An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy (Vijnanavada and Madhyamika) Delhi, Eastern Book Linkers, 1993. Spears, Russell, “Introduction”, Ibanez, Tomas, and Iniguez, Lupicinio, (eds), Critical Social Psychology London, SAGE, 1997. Suzuki, Daisetsu, Teitaro, Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra (One of the most important texts of Mahayana Buddhism, in which almost all its principal tenets are presented, including the teaching of Zen) Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1999. Suzuki, Daisetsu, Teitaro, Asvaghosha’s Discourse on the Awakening of Faith In the Mahayana Fremong, California, Asian Humanities Press, 2001. Suzuki, Daisetsu, Teitaro, The Lankavatara Sutra: An Epitomized Version Rhinebeck, New York, Monkfish Book Publishing Company, 2003. Tart, Charles, States of Consciousness Lincoln, NE, iUniverse, 2000. Tola, Fernando, and Dragonetti, Carmen, On Voidness: A Study on Buddhist Nihilism Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1995. Vaughan, Francis, Awakening Intuition New York, Doubleday, 1979. Vaughan, Francis, The Inward Arc: Healing in Psychotherapy and Spirituality Lincoln, iUniverse, 2000. Vaughan, Francis, “What is Spiritual Intelligence?” Journal of Humanistic Psychology vol. 42 no. 2, 2002, pp. 16-33. Wade, Jenny, Changing of Mind: A Holonomic Theory of the Evolution of Consciousness Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 1996. Waldo, Ives, “Nagarjuna and Analytic Philosophy (1)” Philosophy East and West vol. 25, no. 3, 1975, pp. 281-290. Waldron, William S, “Common Ground, Common Cause: Buddhism and Science on the Afflictions of Identity”, Wallace, Alan, (ed) Buddhism and Science: Breaking new ground New York, Columbia University Press, 2003. Welwood, John, “Reflection and Presence”, Hart, Tobin, Nelson, Peter L. and Puhakka, Kaisa, (eds), Transpersonal Knowing: Exploring the horizon of consciousness Albany, New

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Buddhism and Conflict Transformation:

York, State University of New York Press, 2000. Wilber, Ken, The Spectrum of Consciousness Wheaton, Illinois, Quest Books, 1993. Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations London, Routledge, 1989. Wilmer, Franke, The Social Construction of Man, the State, and War: Identity, Conflict, and Violence in Former Yugoslavia London, Routledge, 2002. Wright, Dale, “Language And Truth In Hua-Yen Buddhism” Journal of Chinese Philosophy vol. 13, no.1, 1986, pp. 21-47. Wright, Dale, Philosophical meditations on Zen Buddhism Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. Yun, Hsin, From the Four Noble Truths to the Four Universal Vow Hacienda Heights, California, Buddha's Light Publishing, 2002.

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Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order By Rui Faro Saraiva*

Abstract The formulation of Japanese foreign policy is facing new challenges that result from the current geopolitical dynamics within the international system. While observing the reemergence of ideological competition in international politics, between a new type of authoritarianism and liberal democracies, Japan is re-engaging with the concept of Human Security as a source of influence and attractiveness to others. Indeed, Japan has been a crucial actor in the development of the intellectual concept and the implementation of human security through the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, the Commission on Human Security, and the revision of its Official Development Assistance（ODA）charter to meet human security guidelines. This paper aims to explain the links between the concept of Human Security and Japanese Foreign Policy in the context of an emerging new global order and provides evidence of how incorporating human security into Japanese foreign policy seems to underline the differences between the political values of Japan and other countries in East Asia. Keywords: East Asia, Human Rights, Human Security, International Norms, Japanese Foreign Policy, Political Values, Soft Power Minoh-Shi Nishishoji 1-7-22 562-0003 Osaka, Japan E-mail: s-faro@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp www.cesran.org 

Rui Faro Saraiva, born in Lisbon, Portugal, is a PhD candidate at Osaka University (Japan) and a Japanese Government Scholar (MEXT Scholarship). Rui graduated cum laude in International Relations (Lusíada University of Lisbon, Portugal) and is M.A. in Political Science and International Relations (Nova University of Lisbon, Portugal). Currently he is also a Researcher with the Southern African Centre for Collaboration on Peace and Security (SACCPS) and the co-founding author of the Japan Foreign Policy Observatory (JFPO) website.

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Vol. 3| No. 1 April 2013

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Introduction After two periods of transition in the distribution of power in the international system bipolarity after 1945 and unipolarity after the Cold War - today we are facing a new period of power transition and diffusion into an increasing multipolar order. Differences in values and in the political regimes of actors are becoming more relevant. Asia, as a region, has seen growing economic, political or military power. In East Asia, Chinese economic growth is fuelling an increasing international acceptance or legitimization of authoritarian political regimes and conventionalist views about human rights. Japan can be seen to have conducted domestic and foreign policy both in consideration of its national interest and also through incorporating human-centred and peace-related principles as an important guiding concept to its foreign policy and development aid. Against this background this paper will consider contemporary structural changes and human security theory within foreign policy by using Japan as a case study. Specifically, the paper will focus on the links and interdependence between current global changes and challenges and how human security can be not only a tool to protect human dignity, but also acts as a guiding principle in Japanese foreign policy. The 21st century is witnessing the reformulation of state foreign policy agendas, underlining the centrality of Asia as the new geostrategic epicentre of international politics. The rebalancing of these agenda’s towards Asia, the “Asia pivot”, argues that many states believe that the centre of gravity for foreign policy - national security and economic interest - is shifting towards Asia, and therefore the strategies and priorities of states’ need to be adjusted accordingly. Asia is the most populous region, fastest growing economic area, and is expected to become the most vital region for the world economy in the future. Greater trade flows through the Asia-Pacific have reinforced security interests in the region, as have the major expansions of other regional military forces, the most evident case being China.1 Given this, a priority for the rest of the world is to focus on its policies in the Asia-Pacific region. A failure to do so could invite regional powers, particularly China, to shape the region in its own way. Nevertheless greater instability is rising as the region adjusts to a shifting distribution of power with the potential for regional conflicts. The Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands disputes, North Korea’s provocative behaviour, the rising military budgets in Asia, particularly China, along with other issues, are a reflection of the power shifts and tensions occurring in the region.

Mark E. Manyin (coord.), “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s Rebalancing Toward Asia”, CRS Report for the Congress, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf (Accessed 10 July 2012)

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Against this external environment, Japan’s position in the world today is also a result of challenging domestic conditions. Significant issues such as an aging population, declining birth rate, a debt-to-GDP ratio over 200 per cent, a political leadership issue and the development of the “sakoku syndrome” - a growing inward focus among many young Japanese. At the same time Japan is still widely respected as an influential regional and global power. However whilst Tokyo faces many challenges, there appears to be under-utilised dimensions of Japan’s national power and influence. Japan is still the world’s third-largest economy, and continues to have large economic potential that could be unleashed by reforms, innovation and competition. More gender equality and openness to immigration could add significantly to Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Moreover, Japan still has considerable soft power resources. Armitage argues that “…the country is rated among the top three countries in international respect and first in the world in terms of ‘national brand’. Therefore Japan seems not to be an insignificant country positioned in a quiet part of the world.” 3 In a time when scholars and policymakers have the tendency to undervalue Japan’s role within the international society in favour of other Asian actors it is both important and timely to make an assessment of the country’s role and influence in today’s world through its engagement with the Human Security concept. Human Security and Democracy Whilst the 21st century has witnessed the emergence and rising influence of authoritarian powers like China or Russia, offering a new alternative political model, many nations still live in an age rooted in the advancement of democracy. Since its birth in Ancient Greece more than 2500 years ago, democracy is now no longer an exclusivity of the developed Western countries. Rather it has become a global political trend, leading to the development of political ideals as well as political practices that have influenced the formulation of domestic and international public policies towards a more human-centred paradigm. Following World War II, since 1945, many institutions, regimes and treaties envisaged the protection of human rights as a priority leading to Universal Human Rights’ values and human -centred policies being integrated in domestic and foreign policies. However the contemporary emergence of new powers that have acquired normative capabilities - the ability to participate in the creation or change of international norms - and the rising importance of Asia, some of the regions actors have emphasized cultural and value

2. 3.

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

History argues that the rise of a new power can destabilize the international system and even lead to conflict. The emergence of new powers like China, India and Russia, along with the US pivot to Asia, underlines the rising importance of the Asia-Pacific region as the new geostrategic centre of international politics. Recently, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) anticipated that China will soon have the world’s largest economy, surpassing the US.2 These systemic changes are posing new challenges to the formulation and implementation of Japan’s foreign and security policies and may affect external perceptions of Japan’s role in contemporary international politics.

Bush III, “As Number One, China to Face Hour of Choice”, http://www.brookings.edu/ opinions/2011/0630_china_bush.aspx (Accessed 12 June 2011). Armitage et al., Joseph, The US-Japan Alliance - Anchoring Stability in Asia, 1.

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Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

differences between Asia and the West. Some Asian countries emphasize Asian values that are less supportive of freedom and more concerned with order and discipline than Western values. Claims of human rights in the areas of political and civil liberties are, therefore, less relevant in Asia than in the West. Countries like China, Singapore or Cambodia, benefit from the ‘Asian values’ paradigm which serve as a tool to accomplish their political objectives and justify their authoritarian regimes. Human Rights are often disregarded in these countries, as well as in other politically aligned Asian powers, e.g. North Korea and Russia. On the opposite ideological edge, it can be argued that liberal democracies are in tune with the idea of human rights and human-centred policies. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, security studies have developed to a more human-centred approach, taking into account a wide range of non-military threats, whether environmental or health related, as well as other fields like poverty, nationalism, terrorism, failed states and cyber-security. The development of the concept of human security focuses on the welfare of individuals facing this broad new range of threats. Current security policies still focus on threats to states and on traditional military capabilities. By contrast Human Security is about the security of individuals and communities rather than the security of states, and combines both human rights and human development. Human Security as a concept attached to international human rights law has become part of the foreign policy agenda of some influential actors’, as seen in the case of Japan, Canada and Norway. In fact, in a crescent multipolar world, where power is not concentrated in only one or two actors, foreign policy agendas are the subject of much theoretical and academic discussion. Therefore it seems crucial to analyse the development of the intellectual concept and the implementation of human security in the foreign policy agenda, taking Japan as a case study. Human Security as a concept attached to international human rights law has become part of the Japanese foreign policy agenda. Japan has been a crucial actor in the development of the intellectual concept and the implementation of human security through its financial support to the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, the establishment of the Commission on Human Security, and revision of its Official Development Assistance charter to meet human security guidelines. In addition, Tokyo is strengthening Japan-US ties and security alliance agreements as the cornerstone of its engagement in regional and global issues. This strategy is aimed at ensuring security through the reformulation of Japanese defence strategy by building new defence cooperation networks and planning new developments in areas such as space and cyber security. Tokyo is underlining this cooperation through multilateral fora in regional institutions like the ASEAN, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, East Asian Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC,4 and in global institutions like the United Nations, whilst continuing to address global issues through Official Development Assistance (ODA), Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding efforts.5 However this strategy faces a spectrum of obstacles. The rise of China and the economic success of its political regime are posing new regional and global challenges, not only for the 4.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN + China, Japan and Republic of Korea (ASEAN+3), ASEAN + Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and Republic of Korea (ASEAN+6), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Japan (MOFA), Diplomatic Bluebook 2012

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Given this, Japanese foreign policy can be seen as going through a process of reformulation and adaption to external and domestic challenges. Japan is now refocusing its public diplomacy strategy in Asia, minimizing security risks and maximizing economic growth opportunities within the region. The re-election of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister in December 2012, confirmed the impetus for Japanese foreign and security policy reforms. Abe demonstrated a more proactive rhetoric and engagement with challenges currently facing the country. Following Japan’s economic downturn, Abe developed a bold economic agenda centred on fiscal stimulus and monetary easing to combat deflation. Another important issue on Abe’s agenda has been to secure the inflow of raw materials and energy to feed manufacturing and consumer sectors. Abe plans to scrap the previous DPJ zero nuclear policy and reconsider the role of nuclear power in Japan’s future energy mix, whilst working at the same time to promote nuclear safety and non-proliferation. Furthermore bilateral cooperation with the United States on infrastructure development such as high-speed rail and LNG exports from both shale and Alaska’s North Slope were part of the 2013 Abe’s US visit.7 Reinforcing Japan’s political values seems to be a priority in Abe’s foreign policy. The newly elected Prime Minister referred in the 2013 New Year’s reflection speech to “looking down broadly over the world, we will boldly develop a strategic diplomacy rooted in the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, fundamental human rights, and the rule of law.”8 The context for this view comes in part through with the rising perception of China as a threat, partly as a result of the escalation of the Senkaku dispute and an increasing Chinese military budget. These factors have triggered Abe to promote a review of Japanese defence policy and the reinterpretation or change of the Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. According to its current interpretation, the Article 9 renounces war and prohibits Japan from maintaining war potential, thereby constraining the projection of Japan’s hard power resources. During the current period of reformulation of Japanese foreign and security policy, the concept of human security is set to play an important role in the affirmation of Japan’s 6. 7.

Carothers, “Reenergizing Democracy Promotion”, November 29, 2012, http:// carnegieendowment.org/globalten/?fa=50142 (Accessed 10 December 2012). Green et al., “Shinzo Abe comes to Washington”, http://csis.org/publication/shinzo-abe-comeswashington (Accessed 27 February 2013).

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

states like Japan but also for the survival of democracy. Indeed the international protection of human rights and human dignity may be threatened by the export of Beijing’s political regime into other regions. More broadly it can be argued that there has been a loss of democratic momentum, with the failure of the post orange revolution in Ukraine, the “authoritarianization” of Russia and Venezuela with Putin and Chávez, the dynamics of the Arab Spring, the breakdown in Mali and the relative loss of credibility of Europe and the US as global models. This along with the growing appeal in some parts of the world of China’s and Russia’s versions of “authoritarian capitalism” offers an alternative to the liberal democratic model for developing or transitional countries. Indeed, China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers are asserting international political influence in a way that works against the spread of democracy.6

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political values in the international arena, contributing to the country’s image and prestige within the international society. At the same time, human security can be an important tool for the implementation of Japan’s ODA strategy and may contribute to the definition of Japan’s engagement in international peace cooperation missions.

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

In the context of Shinzo Abe’s recent election, the LDP manifesto firmly stated that Japan will “actively promote human security such as eradication of poverty and refugee relief.” 9 Therefore Human Security seems to be destined to be part of Japan’s foreign policy agenda during the coming years and amid challenging domestic and external circumstances.

This paper aims at identifying the links between the concept of Human Security and the Japanese Foreign Policy in the context of an emerging new global order in the 21 st century, providing evidence of how incorporating human security into Japanese foreign policy seems to underline the differences between the political values of Japan and other countries in the East Asian region. This paper will now analyse how human security can be a new important political tool not only to serve Japan’s interests in this new international context but also to effectively protecting and promoting human dignity around the globe. The interdependence between Human Rights and Human Security Although many scholars detach human rights from human security, or criticize the relation between both, it is fundamental to recognize their interdependence in order to understand its use by Japan as a diplomatic tool in the current geopolitical context. The concept of human rights is relatively new and gained a more profound meaning after the World War II. It was only after the experience of the holocaust that the world decided to engage in codifying rules to protect human rights. The United Nations charter was the first step in showing that the rights of human beings were a matter of international concern, since the purpose of the United Nations was “To achieve international cooperation…in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction to race, sex, language or religion.”10 Published in 1948, the proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), is arguably the single most important document on international ethics and protection of Human Rights was set forward in the twentieth century. The moment of the adoption of the UDHR by the General Assembly of the United Nations may be remembered by future generations as the beginning of a new era in the history of mankind and in international law. However, this unprecedented development of human rights jurisprudence, continued through the second half of the 20th century. This favourable momentum must not fade and become an illusion for scholars or policymakers. While the humanization of international law has produced a movement of political significance, the positive realization of the most basic human rights has yet to be achieved. Despite the plethora of international conventions 8.

Abe, New Year’s Reflection by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 1st January 2013, http://www.kantei.go.jp/ foreign/96_abe/statement/201301/0101nentou_e.html (Accessed 08 January 2013). 9. LDP, “Policy Brochure from the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan” (Original in Japanese Language), http://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/seisaku_ichiban24.pdf (Accessed 08 December 2012). 10. UN, “United Nations Charter”, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (Accessed 20 May 2012).

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related to economic, social and cultural rights, there are still 1.2 billion people without access to clean water and 1.3 billion people living below the United Nations income poverty line. Moreover and notwithstanding the fact that there is an almost universal recognition of the rights of the child, millions of children remain illiterate, malnourished, and abused at a global level.11

“1) Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor. (…) 2) The components of human security are interdependent. 3) Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. (…) 4) Human security is people centred. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities, and whether they live in conflict or in peace.”12 The 1994 UNDP report developed the human security concept in relation to seven dimensions: personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security. The 1999 UNDP Human Development Report on Globalization returned to the theme of human security in the aftermath of the 1998 Asian crisis, advocating for deliberate actions to provide human security during economic crises, as well as to reduce other causes of human insecurity such as global crime, environmental degradation, and communication that threatens cultural diversity. It also called for a strengthening of the United Nations System, “Giving it greater coherence to respond to broader needs of human security”.13 Human Security has attracted the interest, approval and critique of scholars and policymakers, while various disciplines have contributed to the debate around its concept and application. The former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, during his address to world leaders at the General Assembly on 10 November 2001, stressed the strategic importance of human security and human rights to the fundamental objectives of the Organization: “The United Nations must place people at the centre of everything it does, for the eradication of extreme poverty, the struggle against HIV/AIDS, the prevention of deadly conflict and tackling the root causes of political violence, issues that threaten human security around the world. The common thread connecting all these issues is the need to respect fundamental human rights”.14

11. 12. 13. 14.

Hagerty, A Human Rights: An Agenda for the 21st century, 4-11. UNDP, Human Development Report, 22-23. UNDP, Human Development Report, 102-104. UN General Assembly, 56th Session Verbatim Record (A/56/PV44), 2-4.

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

In the early 1990s, the term Human Security was first popularized by the United Nations Development Program, as a way to link various humanitarian, economic, and social issues in order to alleviate human suffering and assure security. The 1994 UNDP report urged for a transition from “nuclear security” to “human security”, advocating a revolutionary approach based on four essential characteristics:

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A great influence in the evolution and understanding of the concept of human security came through the work published by the Commission on Human Security, chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, with financial support by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bank of Japan. The 2005 “Human Security Now” report stressed the complementarity of state and human security, its interdependence with human rights and the need to focus on implementing human security in Africa. “Human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf.”15

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

In the 2012 Secretary-General Report to the UN, a final definition about human security was set forward: “First, human security aims at ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of people in response to current and emerging threats. (…) Second, human security underscores the universality and interdependence of a set of freedoms that are fundamental to human life: freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity. (…) Third, human security is guided by the principles of the Charter and does not replace State security. (…) Fourth, since the causes and manifestations of human insecurity vary considerably across countries and communities, human security strengthens the development of solutions that are embedded in local realities and are based on national ownership. (…) Finally, human security provides a dynamic framework that links the three pillars of the United Nations system and promotes the establishment of synergies and partnerships that capitalize on the comparative advantages of a diverse network of stakeholders.”16 As it is evidenced in the second point of the report, the relationship between Human rights and Human Security seems to be complementary and indivisible. Indeed, security is the condition or feeling of safety, of being protected. International human rights norms define the meaning of human security. The UDHR and other human rights legal instruments are all meant to make human beings secure in freedom, in dignity, with equality, ensuring the protection of their basic human rights.17 Human security, as human rights, undertakes the same task in addressing a set of rights or freedoms that are unacceptable to ignore. One of the fundamental key characteristics of human security is that it speaks to the basic and universal set of human rights. Although both human security and human rights focus on violence and poverty, human rights includes a broader set of rights while human security serves more as a tool to liberate people from “fear” and from “want”. The identification, protection and promotion of this human-centred approach, based on the ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, is the aim of human security, but simultaneously is also part of human rights. The Cold War period emphasized the division 15. Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, 2. 16. UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General (A/66/763), 6. 17. Ramcharan, “Human rights and human security”, 40.

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between civil and political rights (identified with the US and its allies) and a second generation of economic social and cultural rights (which appealed to the USSR and its allies). Later there emerged a third and fourth generation of rights such as collective rights and the right to peace. The gaps and boundaries between these types of rights became deepened and reflected ideological priorities. In the post-Cold War period, an emerging urge to reunite different generations of rights can be observed. Human security consolidates this position because it re-introduces the “indivisibility” of different kinds of human rights, organically and holistically.

The key word for human security - ‘threat’ - is related to what human rights are not primarily concerned with, e.g. natural disasters, and it reaches towards threats from state and nonstate actors, thus not dividing between private and public spheres. Human security is about the basic needs people share in every part of the world, like access to food, shelter, health and education. These basic needs have over the decades been re-formulated and re-framed as human rights. Human rights are therefore part of human security, both concepts are interdependent and complementary: human rights provide the conceptual and normative foundation for human security; both are the basis for a life in dignity, wellbeing and security. A rights-based approach can also provide a useful framework for the promotion of human security. Human rights violations are often the root causes of conflict, insecurity and instability and in this sense is a central element of a threat-based approach to explain human security. The respect for human rights fosters harmonious social relations and thus inter-societal security, therefore indirectly promoting human security.19 Conciliating national interest with a human-centred paradigm The concept of human security represents a major paradigm shift around the question of security, debunking its Westphalian approach – the traditional state-centred conception of security – to concentrate on the security of people and local communities. The application of this concept ranged from a narrow term for prevention of violence to a broad comprehensive view that proposes development, human rights and traditional security all together. The usefulness of human security as paradigm shift depends on how it is incorporated in and implemented by states’ foreign policy agenda.20

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

When the conceptual focus is on the human being, and when unburdened by Cold War historical issues, both first and second-generation rights are fundamentally important. Nevertheless, the language of human rights influenced by the Cold War politics, still preserves the heritage of ideological bias. Because of its importance within the legal community, the term human rights carry a considerable amount of legal obligations. Therefore, the language of human security is sometimes more appealing as it can be used in social contexts where the language of human rights would meet entrenched opposition.18

18. Alkire, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security”, 37-40. 19. Oberleitner, “Human Security and Human Ritghts”, 14-23. 20. Tadjbakash et al., Human Security: Concepts and Implications, 9-10.

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Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

No “realist” seems to be a pure practitioner of Realpolitik and utterly unconcerned with ethics or ideology, as no “idealist” statesman has been totally unconcerned with power.21 European diplomatic history and the contributions of individuals such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Immanuel Kant, argues it is possible to identify a long philosophical struggle between the idea of a universal monarchy and balance of power. More recent authors who have analysed power and how those in power are concerned, or not, with ethical values, it is possible to establish new causal links that may provide answers on how to conciliate national interest with universal values as is the case of the concept of soft power, a term coined by Joseph Nye in the late 1990’s. According to the author, the soft power of a country rests on three main resources: its culture, its foreign policy legitimacy and its political values. Nye also believes that the values a government champions in its behaviour at home, in international institutions, and in foreign policy, for example promoting peace and human rights strongly affects the preferences of others. Governments can attract or repel others by influence and their own example.22

Indeed, soft power strategies in contemporary politics seem to be increasingly important. Countries that may be more attractive and gain soft power in the information age are those with multiple channels of communication that help to frame issues; whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms, e.g. liberalism, pluralism, human rights and human security. If the official policies of countries’, whether domestic or foreign, are consistent with democracy, human rights, openness and respect for others’ opinions, they will benefit from the trends of this new global information age, enhancing their level of attractiveness, and ultimately maximizing their power.23 Hans Tuch defined public diplomacy as the “process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies”.24 Whist public diplomacy is often portrayed as a one-way information flow, there is a new emerging approach that underlines the coordination of relations with the press, the use of social media and other more interactive means. Therefore a constructive dialogue with foreign audiences is a precondition for a successful foreign policy.25 This dialogue often addresses international norms and humancentred policies, like human rights and human security. Another concept of relevance and scope for contemporary public diplomacy is ‘nationbranding’. Although underlining the Westphalian paradigm, this concept may be important tin identifying why, from a strictly realist point of view, the idea of following a human-centred approach in international politics has its attractions. A nation’s ‘brand’ is defined as “the unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all of its target audiences”.26 Within the components of brand identity the ideas or values that each country advocates can be seen.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Pflanze in Cathan, Ethics and Statescraft - The Moral Dimension of International Affairs Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 11-13. Ibid, 31-32. Tuvh, Communicating With the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas, 3. Melissen in Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy, Soft Power in International Relations, 13. Dinnie, Nation Branding – Concepts, Issues, Practice, 15.

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In the aforementioned considerations it is possible to identify a clear relationship between pursuing national interest and implementing human-centred policies. The interplay between both can be mutually beneficial considering the interest of a particular political unit, and the broader interest of human beings regardless of their nationality. These links may also show the relevance of human-centred policies in a growing multipolar world, where the division, parcelling and segregation among people is underlined in favour of the Westphalian paradigm and the rule of sovereignty, but in which human rights and human security policies are fundamental to ensure or at least promote individual dignity and peace. Ultimately promoting human rights and the human security paradigm can be a win-win situation for policymakers. Japan, as country located in the geostrategic centre of international politics that has been incorporating human-centred values in its foreign policy identity and relations with external actors can be seen as an important case study of this phenomenon. Japanese foreign policy and human security in the context of an emerging new global order Many Japanese scholars and policymakers have found the soft power concept attractive and have started to apply it to Japan. In recent years this has resulted in a wide range of publications, conferences, and symposia on soft power and Japan. But there appear to be basically two schools of thought among those who have researched this issue. The first group believe that Japan needs to develop its soft power capabilities their argument is that Japan’s soft power needs to be strengthened in part to compensate for its modest hard power capabilities. The second group argue that Japan already possesses a substantial amount of soft power through both its traditional and modern based culture. Some adherents of this second view assert that the world is fascinated with “Cool Japan”, an expression that defines Japan’s fashion, anime, games, food, and various cultures that the Japanese take for granted and are being accepted as cool and trendy by foreigners.28 As a result of the ‘Cool Japan’ strategy, the country is in many respects an example of what it means to exercise soft power. Each side of the debate makes plausible arguments. However, adherents of the second view are often at risk of overemphasising the depth of the soft power concept. Even though anime movies are seen all over the world and manga is being read by youth in Asia and the West, this doesn’t necessarily mean that Japan is therefore more respected, trusted, or admired by others. Yet the fact remains that promoting human-centred values is one of the strategies available to Japan in order to give a universal character to its political values, leveraging a unique culture, which is often greatly admired internationally. Japan’s recent past and the rise of militarism during the Meiji era both impacted on Tokyo’s international prestige. Soft power resources were deeply affected, particularly in Asia, as a result of the Japanese colonization in the region. Since the post World War II period, Japan

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

Therefore the nation-brand manifestation of a country may be in harmony, for example with human rights, sustainable development and human security.27 Acknowledging the promotion of human-centred values as a tool to create a positive national image, while attempting to compete on the global stage, may give relative advantages to countries while communicating with foreign publics.

27. Ibid, 44. 28. Vide “Cool Japan”, http://www.nhk.or.jp/cooljapan/en/ (Accessed 10 March 2013)

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Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

has struggled to restore its image and reputation among neighbours. However history has often been politicized in the region, China and South Korea often criticize Japan initiatives based on historical issues, therefore affecting Japan’s soft power capabilities in East Asia. Human Security can serve as a tool to detach nationalism from the Japanese foreign policy rhetoric, potentially building a new perception about Japan in the region and paradoxically benefitting the Japanese national interest. The perception of Japan in a democratic, humanist and universal context, seems to be an important foreign policy strategy in a new regional and global context. The new emerging global order underlines the ideological competition between two political models - authoritarian capitalism versus democracy. In this new scenario, which finds its geopolitical centre in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan is stimulated to find new diplomatic tools to address the challenges it is facing today. Other concern of the international society and the ‘status quo’ powers, like Japan, is the growing normative power of China and other authoritarian Asian states. China’s preferred view of international relations is based on the view of a declining legitimacy of the ‘Western’ liberal global order.29 In terms of values, China underlines the importance of the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in the state’s internal affairs, as well as a conventionalist or cultural relativist approach concerning human rights related values. The resurgence of the 1990s acclaimed “Asian values” is re-emerging as a result of Asia’s rising. The most likely source for the ‘Asian values’ concept, a conventionalist view about human rights, is Singapore. The notion of Asian values underlines, among other principles, that only a strong and steady leadership can keep communal peace, and that an authoritarian government, providing firm policy direction and social stability, is a necessary condition for continued economic growth. Therefore, under the banner of Confucianism, this notion of authoritarian rule was brought into collision with modern human rights and practices.30 This model of development has recently been promoted in Africa through the ‘Beijing Consensus’ and the so-called ‘China Aid Strategy’, giving priority to the strengthening of state authority, central control, and social discipline, rather than to the development of democratic institutions. The ‘Asian values’ concept has already been challenged by Amartya Sen. The author underlined the impossibility of seeing Asia as a single unit, as it fosters diverse cultures, ethnic backgrounds and nationalities. Confucianism is misinterpreted and is not the single influence in the value-system of Asian countries. Buddhism and Hinduism have exerted a key role in this matter and cannot be ignored when analysing which value-systems influence Asian cultures and countries. Amartya Sen concluded: “The so-called Asian values that are invoked to justify authoritarianism are not especially Asian in any significant sense. Nor is it easy to see how they could be made into an Asian cause against the West, by the mere force of rhetoric. (…) The case for liberty and political rights turns ultimately on their basic importance and on their 29. Breslin, “The Soft Notion of China’s Soft Power”, February 2011, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/ default/files/public/Research/Asia/0211pp_breslin.pdf (Accessed 20 July 2012), 11-13. 30. De Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective, 2-3.

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instrumental role. This case is as strong in Asia as it is elsewhere. (…) Authoritarian readings of Asian values that are increasingly being championed in some quarters do not survive scrutiny. The thesis of a grand dichotomy between Asian values and European values adds little to our comprehension, and much to the confusion about the normative basis of freedom and democracy.”31

Against this background Japan is an important case study in enabling consideration of the problem of Asian values versus human rights in the context of an emerging new global order. Conceptual frameworks for understanding human rights in the contemporary Japanese lexicon are free from cultural relativism underlining its universal character. As has been seen, human security as a concept attached to international human rights legal framework has emerged as a clear part of the Japanese foreign policy agenda, and Japan has also been a crucial actor promoting the concept and its application internationally. Japan’s key political values are originally expressed in its present constitution: “We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honoured place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.”33 The preamble of the constitution clearly states the importance of human rights and human security for Japan. The main pillars of human security, freedom from fear and from want, are also enshrined in the Japanese constitution, and therefore must not be ignored in the formulation of domestic and international policies. Article 9 of the constitution underlines the country’s commitment to pacifism, unique to Japan in the context of the international society: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained”.34

31. Sen, Human Rights and Asian Values, 30-31. 32. Shin, Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia 33. Japan, “Constitution”, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution_and_government_of_japan/ constitution_e.html (Accessed 28 July 2012). 34. Ibid.

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

Given this, for those who may still claim a strong influence of Confucianism in Japanese society, it would be important to acknowledge the strong influence of Buddhism, Shinto and Taoist spiritual traditions in this country.32 Spiritual traditions like Buddhism are humancentred and promote critical thinking, in tune with democratic values.

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Article 11 also underlines the importance of Human Rights within the Japanese legal framework: “The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights”.35

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

Japan’s constitution clearly underlines the country’s commitment to a human-centred security paradigm that is reflected in its domestic and international policies. It is clear that Japan’s pursuit of the Human Security agenda is in part a consequence of the political values expressed in its constitution, not excluding its role as a useful tool to engage more effectively with the international community. It is also a consequence of the limitations presented by the Article 9 and related policies, which place restrictions on hard power assets and compel a commitment to pacifism, triggering Japan to focus on a strong and proactive ODA policy and increase its participation in international peace cooperation activities (peacekeeping and peacebuilding), particularly since 1992.

After the 1994 UNDP36 report shifted the international discourse on security issues, Japan was one of the countries to support the new conceptual framework around human security. In 1995, Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama triggered Japan’s engagement with the Human Security concept by referring to “human-centred social development”, in his speech at the UN World Summit for Social Development, in Copenhagen.37 But the key figure for the pursuit of human security was Obuchi Keizo, appointed Prime Minister of Japan in 1998. The first expression of adopting human security as a key concept took place after the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Several countries in Asia, including Japan, were severely hit by the negative impact of the crisis. Obuchi’s initial effort related to human security came when the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction was signed in December 1997, in Ottawa. Obuchi’s decision for Japan to join the international campaign against landmines became the starting point for his endeavour to promote human security.38 Speaking in Tokyo in December 1998 at the “Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow”, Obuchi used a new term ningen anzenhosho which in Japanese means human security.39 Later in a speech entitled “Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia” given on the occasion of the December 1998 Summit Meeting of ASEAN Plus Three, Obuchi stated his vision for Asia in the 21st century: “a century of peace and prosperity built on human dignity” and he also proposed the creation of a Human Security Fund at the United Nations.40 From this moment on, human security was incorporated in Japan’s foreign policy agenda and the Japanese government implemented numerous initiatives related to this concept. Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, Obuchi’s successor, saw human security as “the pillar 35. Ibid. 36. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 37. Murayama, “UN Speech at the UN World Summit for Social Development”, March 1995, http:// www.un.org/documents/ga/conf166/gov/950311074922.htm (Accessed 15 July 2012) 38. Edström, “Japan and Human Security – The Derailing of a Foreign Policy Vision”, 9-10. 39. Obuchi, “Speech at Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow”, December 1998, http:// www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/tomorrow/1obuchi.html (Accessed 10 July 2012). 40. Obuchi, “Speech entitled ‘Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia’ at the Institute for International Relations in Hanoi, Vietnam”, December 1998, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/ pmv9812/policyspeech.html (Accessed 15 July 2012).

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of Japanese diplomacy” and made a commitment to enhance the Trust Fund for Human Security by an additional contribution of 10 billion yen. Mori also announced the Japanese intention “to establish an international committee on human security with the participation of world renowned leaders of opinion”, which later became the Commission on Human Security.41

More recently Japan has reinforced its commitment to human rights and human security, as a result of new regional and global challenges and the need for Japan to underline its political values. The academic community in Japan and policymakers in Tokyo are also reengaging with the concept of Human Security and promoting it globally. In the 2011 Diplomatic Bluebook44, that commitment is clear: “Fully guaranteeing human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are universal values, contributes to the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous society in each country, and therefore to the peace and stability of the international community. (…) Japan has served as a member of the Human Rights Council since it was founded and has positively contributed to its activities. (…) Japan will strengthen its foreign policy in order to promote human rights in a comprehensive manner (…) To handle the global issues explained above, (…) Japan stresses the concept of human security (…) to resolve such issues, focusing on the lives and livelihoods of every human.”45 In 2011, the Japanese Government also underlined the focus on the “freedom from want” through the ODA strategy: “Japan has actively contributed to a variety of efforts by the international community based on the understanding that ensuring peace and prosperity of the international community upholds security and prosperity of Japan, and that ODA and other forms of international cooperation are important means to such ends. In working towards the achievement of the MDGs, Japan is advancing efforts particularly centred on the fields of health and education, based on the concept of human security.”46 In 2012, the Diplomatic Bluebook stressed the importance of the human security concept as a guideline for the implementation of Japanese international development and cooperation strategies: 41. Mori, “Statement at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations”, September 2000, http:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/summit2000/pmstate.html (Accessed 20 July 2012) 42. Diet is the conventional English name for the Japanese Parliament. In Japanese it is usually called “Kokkai” (National Assembly). 43. Edström, Ibid, p. 14. 44. Diplomatic Bluebook is an annual report on Japan's Foreign Policy and Activities published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 45. Japan (MOFA), Diplomatic Bluebook 2011, 20. 46. Ibid, 21.

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

In January 2003, a shift in Japan’s human security policy was announced when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi declared in his policy speech in the Diet42 that ODA will be implemented strategically in human security areas. The shift was implemented in August 2003 with a reform of Japan’s ODA policy. It made human security a matter of international development assistance, downgrading the concept from its previous central status as a Japanese foreign policy pillar. This new strategy was also intended to reform Japan’s ODA policy, based on the human security concept.43

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Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

“ODA can also be used to address security issues, for example by using it to improve the capability to maintain security of recipient countries. (…) Underlying all of these endeavors is the philosophy of ‘human security.’ The basic idea of human security is to focus on the individual human beings who face various problems, to strengthen their abilities so that they can solve their problems on their own. (…) It is based on the idea that all actors should take part in nation building (…) this concept of “all on board” is an idea shared by the concept of open and multilayered networks (…), and it can be said to be a fundamental concept in Japan’s foreign policy”.47 One of the main agencies in Tokyo responsible for applying the concept of human security through ODA is the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Since March 2004 and the implementation of the “First Phase of JICA’s Reform Plan” many projects have focused on the transition from reconstruction towards development through conflict-prevention in conflictaffected countries and areas, and/or the transition from reconstruction to development, with a risk-management perspective in disaster affected countries and areas. Both of these dimensions have human security as a main guiding concept, and since the March 2011 Earthquake, Japan has focused on sharing its experience in the areas of nuclear safety and disaster prevention. The JICA’s project implemented in Vietnam between September 2006 and August 2009 is a good example of using human security as a guiding concept for disaster prevention. The project “Enhancing Community Resilience and Livelihood Security to Cope with Natural Disasters in Central Vietnam” targeted people in the region who were exposed to chronic natural disasters, incorporated mechanisms for disaster prevention and risk management through a network of partnerships with NGOs, local and national governments, and education institutions, and followed a bottom-up approach to fostering participation and a sense of ownership among community member.48 Another of the main concerns of Japan has been to promote a common understanding of the Human Security concept through the United Nations. In 2005, the World Summit Outcome document endorsed the discussion about a final definition for Human Security: “We stress the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair. We recognize that all individuals, in particular vulnerable people, are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential. To this end, we commit ourselves to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly”.49 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) addressed in another section of the document, sets a clear line between Human Security and the R2P, and is in harmony with the Japanese vision of Human Security (in contrast with Canada and Norway that have an opposite view that underlines the inclusion of R2P). In April 2012, a common understanding on Human Security was stated in the UN Report of the Secretary-General, partially as a result of the Japanese diplomatic efforts at the United Nations.

47. Japan (MOFA), Diplomatic Bluebook 2012, 9. 48. JICA, JICA’s “Human Security” Approach, 5 49. UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1), 31.

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Japan’s international engagement with human security, whether through ODA, public diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, seems not to have been followed by a similar commitment at a domestic level. Nevertheless after the triple catastrophe of March 2011, an earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown, there is an increasing changing of perceptions about the meaning of human security. Whilst the initial trigger for human security came after the Asian economic crisis of 1997, disaster relief and reconstruction efforts are now on top of the agenda,. Several non-governmental initiatives are taking place in order to deepen the domestic engagement with the concept. The University of Tokyo created the ‘Human Security Forum’ in 2011, while the Mainichi Newspaper created the ‘Human Security for 15-year olds’. Simultaneously the Japanese government has decided to include Human Security in the textbooks of Junior and High School students. Therefore the international promotion of human security doesn’t exclude a domestic dimension, however to analyse this concept as a diplomatic tool its international dimension must be emphasized. Japan’s engagement with the international promotion and protection of human rights has also been part of the country’s strategy to improve its image and its level of global attractiveness. Japan ratified all the main conventions that regulate the protection of international human rights. Namely, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination (1965), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). In addition to the individual rights protected by the Japanese Constitution, these international human rights, if directly applicable, can be invoked before the courts in Japan.50 Japan has also actively participated in the UN Commission on Human Rights since 1982. Moreover it has also increased its contribution to the Voluntary Fund for Advisory Services and Technical Assistance, while providing about US$ 1 million every year to the UN Funds on human rights. This shows the strong commitment of Japan in the area of Human Rights which is also expressed through its ODA conditionality clause: “Guided by the belief that human rights are universal, Japan has expressed its concern for human rights violations, calling on countries of concern to improve their human rights situations. Japan pays full attention to the human rights situations and efforts for promoting democratization as proclaimed in the ODA Charter. When any improvement in human rights situations or any trace of democratization is recognized, Japan helps

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

The promotion and implementation of the Human Security concept in the Japanese foreign policy agenda is the result of Japan’s demand for a guiding concept that represents universal principles. It has become part of Japanese political values, to be promoted internationally, and is one dimension of Japan’s Soft Power. Secondly, Human Security also serves as the basis for the implementation of Japanese ODA.

50. Hayashi, Political Economy of Japan – Growth, Challenges and Prospects for a Well-Being Nation, 258259

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Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

these changes through aid. On the contrary, when the situation is clearly accusable, Japan reviews its ODA projects to the country concerned.”51

The Japanese foreign policy agenda demonstrates a clear commitment to the universality of Human Rights, therefore challenging the “Asian values” theory: “Japan has strongly supported UN activities in the human rights field, believing that all human rights are universal.”52 This belief was also reinforced with Japan’s candidature for the UN Human Rights Council: “The Human Rights Council is expected to play an important international role in the area of human rights. During its tenure as a Council member, Japan continued to attach importance in the conduct of diplomacy to universal values such as human rights and democracy. It has made positive contributions to the protection and promotion of human rights through such means as nation-building support and technical assistance.”53 Japan was also elected to serve again on the Council from 2013, with the aim of contributing further to improving human rights situations around the world. Furthermore commitments to human rights and human security have been in numerously referenced in the Joint Statements with the US, Japan’s key alliance: “Japan and the United States share a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, open societies, human rights, human security, and free and open markets, these values guide us in our joint efforts to address the challenges of our time.”54 This case study provides evidence of how incorporating human rights and human security into Japanese foreign policy illustrates the differences between the political values of Japan and other countries in Asia, namely China and North Korea, as well as Singapore (although a benign authoritarian regime), Cambodia, Myanmar, and other non-democratic countries. If there is the need for a division on the debate about human rights and human security, it could be based on the “Democracy versus Authoritarian Regimes” dichotomy. Conclusion In summary, Human Security has become part of Japan’s soft power strategy. It clarifies Japanese political values in the international society and it contributes to enhance the country’s sympathetic support and reputation.55 Japan’s political values are clearly aligned with the liberal democracies, despite the country having its own Asian cultural background. The formulation of Japanese foreign policy is clearly influenced by these values. The triangulation between human rights, human security and pacifism, gives Japanese foreign policy a unique character and an hybrid structure, mixing realist elements connected with the country’s national interest, and idealist elements related with human-centred principles. This not only benefits Japan’s reputation, image and level of attractiveness, but also, eventually, the international protection of human rights and promotion of liberal democratic values within the international society. 51. Japan (MOFA), “Human Rights”, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000_archive/human.html (Accessed 20 June 2012). 52. Japan (MOFA), “Human Rights”, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/index.html (Accessed 20 June 2012). 53. Yamane, “Statement by Mr. Ryuji Yamane Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan High-level Segment of the Human Rights Council”, February 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/ announce/svm/statement120228_2.html (Accessed 20 June 2012) 54. Japan et al., United States-Japan Joint Statement: A Shared Vision for the Future 55. Japanese Diplomat, Osaka, 27 July 2012, personal interview.

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Since the 1990’s, a new security paradigm, based on the notion of ensuring ‘freedom from fear ‘and ‘freedom from want’ for all human beings has attracted the interest, approval, and critique from scholars and policymakers. Human security became an important tool for both states and international organizations in developing and implementing more human-centred policies. The relationship between human rights and human security seems to be complementary and indivisible, and both concepts are fundamental to ensure the protection of human dignity in a changing world with a rapid global power shift, which will probably trigger increasing security challenges and threats. As the 21st century continues to witness the reformulation of states’ foreign policy agendas in a way that underlines the centrality of Asia in international politics, Japan’s early adoption of human security principles, and ongoing contribution to the global agenda in this area, assumes particular relevance. This is even more the case when considering the rising ideological tensions within the Asia region and beyond between democratic and authoritarian values in the context of an emerging new global order. Japanese political values, expressed in its fundamental legal text, the constitution, are clearly aligned with the international protection of universal human rights and with the promotion of human security. Indeed, Japan has been a crucial actor on the development of the intellectual concept and the implementation of human security through its financial support to the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security, the establishment of the Commission on Human Security, and the revision of its Official Development Assistance charter to meet human security guidelines. Since the renewal of its ODA charter in 2003, JICA has been one of the main agencies responsible for the practical application of the human security concept. Japan’s international cooperation targets poverty (freedom from want) and conflicts or disasters (freedom from fear). Simultaneously human security has been an important concept while engaging in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities, in line with the Article 9 and Japan’s commitment to pacifism. Japan’s political values are in harmony with the liberal democratic values. The formulation of Japanese foreign policy is therefore clearly influenced by a triangulation between human rights, human security and peace-related values, giving Japanese foreign policy a unique character and an hybrid structure and mixing realist elements connected with the country’s

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

Today’s global order is evolving into an “asymmetric multipolar” world. The United States’ hegemonic power still prevails, while other rising powers increasingly assume a fundamental role within the international system, therefore participating in the definition of norms and rules that may guide the relation between states in international politics. Among these emerging powers, non-democratic or authoritarian countries like China underline a set of values that far from considering a human-centred point of view actually relegate the international protection of human rights to a place of lesser relevance. At the same time, Asia is becoming the geostrategic centre of international politics, making it increasingly important to properly appreciate the role of middle powers like Japan in terms of defending the liberal and universal human-centred political values.

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national interest and idealist elements related with human-centred principles. This not only benefits Japanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s reputation, image and level of attractiveness, but also, eventually, the international protection of human rights and promotion of liberal democratic values within the international society.

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

The Japanese case study also provides evidence of a possible match and interrelation between national interest, human rights and human security policies. This interdependence can be mutually beneficial, from both a human-centred and westphalian perspective. Humancentred policies are still fundamental to ensure or at least promote, individual dignity and peace, whilst simultaneously satisfying the realist or nation-centred impulse through soft power or nation-branding strategies. Ultimately promoting human rights and the human security paradigm can be a win-win situation for nation-state policymakers, as humancentred policies may mutually protect individuals and benefit the national interest of states.

Japan is rediscovering the potential of promoting the human security agenda using this as a public diplomacy tool to simultaneously maximize its international prestige and reputation. Through promoting the human security concept, Japan continues to address and prioritize respect for human dignity. At the same time, the country advances this aspect of its foreign policy agenda within a context of some fairly unique constitutional constraints and historical issues, consolidating its position as a global and regional power while respecting its postWWII tradition of pacifism. This Underlines Japanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s democratic and human-centred values vis -Ă -vis a rising authoritarian China, bestows on Tokyo a fundamental role to play in the emerging new global order.

Bibliography Abe, Shinzo, New Year’s Reflection by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 1st January 2013, http:// www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/statement/201301/0101nentou_e.html (Accessed 08 January 2013). Alkire, Sabina, “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security,” Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, Working Paper #2, 2002 Armitage, Richard L. and Nye, Joseph, The US-Japan Alliance - Anchoring Stability in Asia, Washington, CSIS, 2012 Breslin, Shaun, “The Soft Notion of China’s Soft Power”, Chatham House - Asia Programme Paper: ASP PP 2011/03, February 2011, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/ default/files/public/Research/Asia/0211pp_breslin.pdf (Accessed 20 July 2012) Bush III, Richard C., “As Number One, China to Face Hour of Choice”, http:// www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0630_china_bush.aspx (Accessed 12 June 2011) Carothers, Thomas, “Reenergizing Democracy Promotion”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 29, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/ globalten/?fa=50142 (Accessed 10 December 2012) Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now, New York: CHS, 2003 De Bary, William Theodore, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1998 Dinnie, Keith, Nation Branding – Concepts, Issues, Practice, Oxford, Elsevier, 2009 Edström, Bert, “Japan and Human Security – The Derailing of a Foreign Policy Vision”, Asia Paper – Institute for Security & Development Policy, March 2011 Green, Michael J. et. al., “Shinzo Abe comes to Washington”, http://csis.org/publication/ shinzo-abe-comes-washington (Accessed 27 February 2013) Hagerty, Angela, A Human Rights: An Agenda for the 21st century, London, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1999 Hayashi, Toshihiko, Political Economy of Japan – Growth, Challenges and Prospects for a WellBeing Nation, Tokyo, The Society for the Promotion of The Open University of Japan, 2010 Japan, Constitution, May 3, 1947, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (Accessed 28 July 2012) Japan (MOFA), Diplomatic Bluebook 2011, Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 2011 Japan (MOFA), Diplomatic Bluebook 2012, Tokyo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, 2012 Japan (MOFA), “Human Rights”, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000_archive/ human.html (Accessed 20 June 2012) Japan (MOFA), “Human Rights”, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/index.html (Accessed 20 June 2012) Japan and US, United States-Japan Joint Statement: A Shared Vision for the Future, April 30, 2012 LDP, “Policy Brochure from the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan” (Original in Japanese Language), http://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/seisaku_ichiban24.pdf (Accessed 08 December 2012) Manyin, Mark E. (coord.), “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s Rebalancing Toward Asia”, CRS Report for the Congress, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Japanese Foreign Policy and Human Security in the Context of an Emerging New Global Order

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R42448.pdf (Accessed 10 July 2012) Melissen, Jan, “The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice”, Melissen. Jan (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy, Soft Power in International Relations, Basingtoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007 Mori, Yoshiro, “Statement at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations”, 7 September 2000, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/summit2000/pmstate.html (Accessed 20 July 2012) Murayama, Tomiichi, “UN Speech at the UN World Summit for Social Development”, March 1995, Copenhagen, http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf166/ gov/950311074922.html (Accessed 15 July 2012) Nye, Joseph, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York, Public Affairs, 2005 Oberleitner, Gerd, “Human Security and Human Rights”, ETC Human Rights and Democracy Occasional Paper, Issue no. 8, June 2002 Obuchi, Keizo,“Speech at Intellectual Dialogue on Building Asia’s Tomorrow”, Tokyo, Japan, December 2, 1998, http://www.jcie.or.jp/thinknet/tomorrow/1obuchi.html (Accessed 10 July 2012) Obuchi, Keizo, “Speech entitled ‘Toward the Creation of a Bright Future for Asia’ at the Institute for International Relations in Hanoi, Vietnam”, December 16, 1998, http:// www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/policyspeech.html (Accessed 15 July 2012) Pflanze, Otto, “Realism and Idealism in Historical Perspective”, Nolan ed., Cathan J., Ethics and Statescraft - The Moral Dimension of International Affairs, Westport, Praeger, 2004 Ramcharan, Bertrand, “Human rights and human security”, Disarmament Forum Strengthening Disarmament and Security, no 1, 2004 Sen, Amartya, Human Rights and Asian Values, New York, Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1997 Shin, Doh Chull, Confucianism and Democratization in East Asia, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012 Tadjbakash, Shahrbanou and Chenoy, Anuradha M., Human Security: Concepts and Implications, New York, Routledge, 2007 Tuvh, Hans, Communicating With the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1990 UN, “United Nations Charter”, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (Accessed 20 May 2012) UNDP, Human Development Report, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994 UNDP, Human Development Report, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999 UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome (A/RES/60/1), 24 October 2005 UN General Assembly, 56th Session Verbatim Record (A/56/PV44), 44th Plenary Meeting, 10th November 2001 UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary General (A/66/763), 5 April 2012 Yamane, Ryuje, “Statement by Mr. Ryuji Yamane Parliamentary Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan High-level Segment of the Human Rights Council,” Nineteenth Session, 28 February 2012, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/svm/ statement120228_2.html (Accessed 20 June 2012)

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April 2013

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine By Stan Starygin*

Abstract The Bougainville Peace Agreement did not bring the peace to Bougainville many had hoped for. It brought a stalemate of lawlessness presided over by a weak unarmed autonomous government that tries to navigate its way around the armed gangs formed from the residue of the civil war. The gangs control the half of the island which houses one of the world’s largest deposits of copper and gold, the Panguna mine. This paper offers a close look at these gangs and seeks to answer the questions of (1) how each gang relates to the mine through the traditional rules of land tenure; (2) how much control each gangs exercises over the mine and (3) what each gang’s views on reopening of the mine are. Keywords: Bougainville, Crisis, civil war, Combatant, Reconciliation, Gang, Panguna mine

Email: stan.starygin@gmail.com

www.cesran.org  Stan Starygin has been involved with legal and judicial reform projects in early recovery and postconflict countries across Africa and the South Pacific. He first arrived in Papua New Guinea in 2009, eight years after the Bougainville Peace Agreement, originally serving for one year and then returning in 2010 and remaining throughout the period of writing of this paper. The paper was almost entirely researched and written in Papua New Guinea, with intermittent critical input into the developing draft from Bougainvilleans and those others familiar with the Bougainville Crisis and its present state.

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security Vol. 3| No. 1 April 2013

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

Introduction1 It will be difficult to dispute that the international media determines which conflicts the world follows. Certain armed conflicts (mainly those which involve US or European interests), in the opinion of the international media, merit sustained attention throughout their duration while others barely merit a mention. The Bougainville conflict (often known as ‘the Bougainville Crisis’) belongs in the latter category. While having received reasonably significant coverage from the Australian and New Zealand news media, it developed, reached its peak and transformed unnoticed by the rest of the world. The Bougainville Crisis started out as a series of terrorist acts2 staged by a certain segment of the traditional owners of the land which housed one of the world’s largest copper and gold mines, the Panguna mine. The terrorism was aimed at first at the property of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL), - the British company Rio Tinto’s Australian subsidiary - which operated the mine, and then secondly at the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (‘PNGDF’) that was deployed to quell the unrest. These terrorist acts had the effect of shutting down the mine. The fight against the Papua New Guinea Defense Force quickly escalated to the reigniting of Bougainville’s struggle for independence from PNG3 based upon a well-entrenched belief that “Bougainville would be better off being independent”4 and to “broaden the support base” for the escalating fight.5 While theories on the causes of the Bougainville Crisis abound,6 there is no credible way of believing that a conflict of that scale and intensity would have happened without the Panguna mine.7 There is equally no plausible argument to be made that a claim of monetary compensation of 10 billion kinas (“at the time approximately $US 10 billion”)8 and its rejection by the BCL formed at least the initial grievance the satisfaction of which the

2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7.

My heartfelt gratitude goes out to those on Bougainville who helped me research this paper. These individuals are referenced in this paper under codenames as retaliation for many of them is not a mere word they read in literature but that which affects every fibre of their lives. I would also like to thank my partner Kristina and my son Nathan for being my anchor throughout this process. Filer, ‘The Bougainville Rebellion’, 1 Connell, ‘The Future of an Island Microstate’, 193 Regan, ‘Current Development in the Pacific, 273 Banks, ‘Understanding ‘Resource’ Conflicts,’ 27 Regan, ‘Current Development in the Pacific,’ 269-270, Hilson, ‘Mining and Civil Conflict,’ 27. Hawsley, ‘Papua New Guinea at Thirty,’ 168. 3 Banks, ‘Understanding ‘Resource’ Conflicts,’ 27. Filer, ‘The Bougainville Rebellion’, 6. Boege, ‘Peacebuilding and State Formation,’ 29 Braithwaite and Nickson, ‘Timing Truth, Reconciliation, and Justice,’ 452. Newell and Sheehy, ‘Corporate Militaries and States’. Regan, ‘Current Development in the Pacific,’ 277.

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landowners sought through the violence.9 The man who led the group that claimed this compensation, Francis Ona, stood to personally benefit from the satisfaction of the claim through which he sought to compensate himself and his family for otherwise “little entitlement to [mining lease] land […] and […] scant rent and compensation” 10 they received.11

Disagreements on how to proceed within the central command of the BRA eventually led to a schism, which divided those who went on to join the peace process (led by Ishmael Toroama) which culminated in a peace agreement (Bougainville Peace Agreement) in 2001, from those who categorically refused any involvement in the peace agreement (led by Ona).16 Following the signing of the BPA, Bougainville’s autonomy within the Papua New Guinean state it established gave rise to the creation of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (‘ABG’). Many of those who joined the peace process ended up in the ABG reaping the financial benefits of PNG and international donor funding;17 those who did not continued on with what one observer aptly called “Rambo-style leadership”18 bringing the conflict down to the level of jockeying for position of control over strategic locales. Observers of the peace process anticipated a threat to the peace contained in the latter, more specifically in Ona and his followers,19 and so it has come to pass with the “Rambos” continuing to engage in armed violence and continuing to control access to the Panguna mine20 and other resource sites. The United Nations and Pacific countries-sponsored effort at disarming these individuals experienced an eventual failure, after initial success,21 with scores of contained weapons having made their way back to the gangs by 2006 and remain in their possession today. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

Filer, ‘The Bougainville Rebellion,’ 1.Islam, ‘Secession Crisis in Papua New Guinea,’ 453 .White, ‘Including Local Communitie,’ 332 . Regan, ‘Current Development in the Pacific,’ 277. Strathern and Stewart, ‘The Problems of PeaceMakers,’ 689. Kopel, et al, ‘Firearms Possession,’ 397. Regan, ‘Current Development in the Pacific,’ 277. Islam, ‘Secession Crisis in Papua New Guinea,’ 453-454. Sam Kauona, Palmerston, New Zealand, 16 June 2000, interview with NZine Regan, ‘Current Development in the Pacific,’ 278. Boege, ‘Peacebuilding and State Formation,’ 29, 31. Oswald Iten, ‘Peace Treaty for Bougainville’. Regan, ‘Current Development in the Pacific,’ 278. Regan, ‘The Bougainville Political Settlement,’ 115-116. Kent and Barnett, ‘The Bougainville Political Settlement,’ 34, 38. Filer, ‘The Bougainville Rebellion,’ 11. . Regan, ‘The Bougainville Political Settlement,’ 124. Boege, ‘How to Maintain Peace,’ 355. Spark and Bailey, ‘Disarmament in Bougainville,’ 606.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

The first acts of terrorism led to the establishment of a small terror group which called itself the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (‘BRA’). The use of the name was quickly expanded to become a rallying call to which “[t]he strongest support came from frustrated young men with few economic opportunities for whom membership of the BRA gave power and status” 12 and who were not “direct beneficiaries of the mine”;13 a number of these men were engaged in criminal activity prior to the beginning of the Crisis and the inception of the BRA. Despite the ring of its name the BRA was never a cohesive force, with the central command often having trouble imposing its will on the smaller local groups that comprised the BRA.14 The constituent groups were of great diversity and ranged from “disciplined and highly motivated” to those that were “little more than criminal gangs”.15

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This paper examines the personas of the main protagonists of this “Rambo-style leadership”, their relation to the Panguna mine, to one another, to the ABG, the level of control they exercise over the Panguna mine, and their views on reopening of the mine. Ishmael Toroama One of these “Rambos” is a Central Bougainville native Ishmael Toroama. Western audiences first met Toroama in a documentary entitled The Coconut Revolution which sought to portray the BRA as a gang of convivial guerrillas in pursuit of self-reliance and return to their traditional lifestyle.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

The less cartoonish Toroama is the man who signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement (‘BPA’) as “Chief of Defense, Bougainville Revolutionary Army”. Toroama joined the BRA in the early days of the movement and according to some contested accounts was the first BRA guerrilla to obtain an automatic weapon from the enemy, the Papua New Guinea Defense Force (‘PNGDF’).22 Having gained a position of respect early in the conflict, Toroama quickly became a prominent ‘field commander’. He became a natural choice for successor in the opinion of the BRA’s original chief of defense Sam Kauona when Kauona decided to leave the BRA in 1999 to “study in New Zealand”.23

With the BRA never having been a cohesive military force, cohesion was not forged under Toroama’s command. In fact, further fracturing and inadvertent devolvement of command power continued.24 Therefore the question remains as to what extent of command power Toroama represented when he signed off on the BPA as “Chief of Defense, Bougainville Revolutionary Army”. While the extent of Toroama’s command power over the BRA at the time of signing of the BPA is a topic for another study, it can be said with certainty here that wherever that power was held it was not held by the BRA faction loyal to Ona, evidenced by Toroama giving Ona an ultimatum to disarm in 2003.25 During the outset of the BPAprescribed disarmament process, as distinct from other attempted disarmament processes, Toroama presented himself as ‘an agent of peace’ and placed all the blame for disruptions in the process on the Ona faction of the BRA, now known as ‘the Me’ekamui Defense Force’.26 Toroama’s desire to be seen as part of the solution during this period is beyond doubt. His actions and those of “his men” tell a more conflicted tale.27 It is evident that Toroama’s version of the story was accepted by the international community who continued working on disarmament with and through him. The international community’s honeymoon with Toroama continued despite “his men” re-opening the weapons containers and rearming themselves. Historical studies will show whether Toroama’s argument for rearmament can be substantiated by security concerns, however, this paper will limit itself to acknowledging the fact that such rearmament did take place. Starting from that point and given that the acronym ‘BRA’ was relegated to history Toroama began to preside over what can be best 22. Braithwaite et al., ‘Peacebuilding Compared Working Paper 6: Bougainville (2009).Informant C2, Port Moresby, February, 2012, Personal Interview. 23. Sam Kauona, Kieta, Arawa, Bougainville, April, 2009, Personal Interview 24. Informants C3 and S1, Arawa, Bougainville, October 2009, personal Interview. 25. Toroama’s Letter to Ona (March 11, 2003). 26. Toroama’s Letter to Ona (March 11, 2003) 27. Spark & Bailey, ‘Disarmament in Bougainville,’ 605. Toroama’s Letter to Ona, 11 March 2003.

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described as a street gang composed of ex-combatants and the new crop of ‘wannabe’ combatants who were too young to fight in the Crisis.28

Traditional reconciliations in Bougainville are complex processes that, at a minimum, include: (1) first approach and “cooling-down payment” (sometimes known as ‘payment to stay the anger’); (2) payment of the compensation; (3) acceptance of compensation and forgiveness; (4) a ritual feast and (5) a vow of non-continuation of the conflict.30 Besides being lengthy, these processes are also very expensive. Toroama fashioned himself into a true master of ceremonies for these events. This role went beyond the use of his celebrity to bring disputants together and grew to include event management by Toroama’s gang and those businesses in which Toroama had ‘an interest’ which, in turn, became the main conduits for AusAid and UNDP’s reconciliation dollars.31 There is no reason to believe that either AusAid or UNDP (at least at the management level) intended to create an environment for enriching Toroama and his gang;32 the enrichment that did occur took place due to these agencies’ lack of understanding of the context of the residual Bougainville conflict, local power dynamics,33 absence of long-term vision or strategy,34 methods of or efforts to evaluate aid effectiveness,35 and these agencies’ equation of the amounts disbursed for reconciliation ceremonies with these agencies’ effectiveness as partners in the peace process. As the volume of reconciliation largesse was reduced towards the end of 2009,36 Toroama began turning to other sources of income for himself and his gang. The rusting Panguna mine equipment was his natural next target. The owner of this equipment, Bougainville Copper Limited, which continues to operate in Papua New Guinea, approached the ABG in the wake of illegal dismantling of the equipment, with a request to regulate the ongoing dismantling and sale of the Panguna mine equipment in a manner that would ensure that “some benefit 28.

Kent and Barnett, ‘The Bougainville Political Settlement,’ 38. 29. Gewertz and Errington, ‘Emerging Class in Papua New Guinea,’ 13-14. 30. Tanis, ‘Reconciliation: My Side of the Island’. 31. Informants C1, Arawa, Bougainville. October 2009 and C2, Port Moresby, January, 2012, personal interview 32. Program Specialist for Prevention and Recovery of the UNDP PNG Country Office Jörg Schimmel, Port Moresby, February 2012, Personal Interview 33. Program Specialist for Prevention and Recovery of the UNDP PNG Country Office Jörg Schimmel, Port Moresby, February 2012, Personal Interview 34. Jorg Schimmel, Port Moresby, February 2012, Personal Interview 35. Jorg Schimmel, Port Moresby, Feburary 2012, Personal Interview. Personal Discussion with Bougainville AusAid Representative Edwina Betts, Buka, Bougainville, January 2010. 36. Jörg Schimmel, Port Moresby, February 2012, Personal Interview.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

Stories of old glory helped Toroama maintain some of his Crisis-period support base and attract new recruits but more tangible things were needed to elicit longer-term loyalty. From fairly early days of Australian administration in Papua New Guinea the governing authority noted that much of Papua New Guinean wealth was channeled into “the ownership of pigs and staging of feasts”.29 These were the main manifestations of status and those who sought status sought to devise ways of accumulating pigs and using them to stage feasts. Toroama saw a shortcut to acquiring status through traditional means by tapping the largesse brought to Bougainville by Australian Agency for International Development (‘AusAID’) and the United Nations Development Program (‘UNDP’), a bulk of whose efforts were geared towards postconflict reconciliation through traditional means.

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[s] [were] passed back to the landowners and to Bougainvilleans in general, and that [the export of scrap metal be] done with [ABG] knowledge and approval and [that it] compli[ed] with the laws of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea”.37 The Komeri Holdings Limited was incorporated as a result of this request and as a mine-lease area landowners company.38 The landowners did secure the controlling interest in the company but the armed men of the area did not miss a chance to attach themselves onto this action. Toroama’s gang was no exception to that; in fact it secured the largest interest (20%) in the company among the armed gangs. The volatility of this uneasy alliance with other gangs was evident from the outset of the project and it has come to a head on a number of occasions on which Toroama’s gang clashed with that of Chris Uma in armed confrontation. The two’s current participation in the stripping of the Panguna mine equipment keeps the situation around the township of Arawa -the town built by BCL to house the Panguna mine personnel- tense and unpredictable with Arawa’s denizens being aware that both gangs have weapons and are ready to use them at the slightest of provocation.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

In addition to the scrap metal project Toroama’s gang offers ‘protection service’ to local businesses and helps them ‘ward off’ competition.39 This mafia-like authority of Toroama’s gang is manifest in denizens turning to Toroama for issues of law and order more readily than they do to the unarmed and often powerless ABG police, a police force that is unarmed as a result of arrangements agreed to during the peace process.

Toroama’s BRA-days notoriety, his role in the peace process, the magnitude of his post-Crisis ‘economic activity’ and the possession of weapons and loyalty of the men who carry them have made Toroama a viable political force in Central Bougainville. Toroama has not won an election yet but it is not for want of trying. He is no underdog and has come a solid second in the last two elections, although the voters each time preferred a civil servant with a record of service to Toroama.40 Encouraged by his numbers and undeterred by defeat Toroama has announced his candidacy for President of Bougainville for the 2015 election. Toroama’s relationship to the Panguna mine through the rules of traditional landownership is very simple: he has none; he is from the Kongara Mountains that lie miles away from the Panguna mine-lease area. This may explain his statement that now that a war has been fought over it the Panguna mine “belongs to all Bougainvilleans”.41 Toroama’s present connection to the mine rests on the stake his gang holds in the Komeri Holdings and the fact that he and his gang currently maintain a physical presence at the Panguna mine. To reach his present location at the mine Toroama has to travel through a checkpoint (the Morgan Junction Roadblock) maintained by Uma’s gang, a fact that significantly curtails Toroama’s scope of control of the mine. Besides the vast amounts of scrap metal presently remaining at 37. Personal Email BCL General Manager Paul Coleman, 9 March 2012. 38. Personal Email BCL General Manager Paul Coleman, 9 March 2012. 39. An instance this ‘protection’ occurred in May, 2011 when Toroama’s gang was reported as having fired shots at newly-established businesses to prevent them from competing with their ‘client’ businesses (Post-Courier, ABG Walking Tightrope, May 27, 2011 + Informant C2). 40. In the Bougainville election of 2010, he came second for the South Nasioi Constituency with 707 votes to the winner’s 817. Laukai, ‘New Dawn on Bougainville’, Elections Results Update. In the national (PNG) election of 2012, he came second for Central Bougainville with 18,629 votes (Toroama had the lead for a period of time) to the winner’s 23,549. Laukai, ‘Final Count’. 41. Callick, ‘Politics: Countdown Begins for Panguna’.

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Chris Uma Coming into the BRA Chris Uma was one of the “number of […] men [who] were engaged in criminal activity prior to the beginning of the Crisis” (he was convicted of a criminal charge). Uma’s notoriety at the outset of the Crisis came from his older brother, John Ampona, who was the putative killer of the first PNGDF soldier to die in the Bougainville Crisis.44 Uma built on that notoriety and made a name for himself by being an implementer of Ona’s ‘cleansing’ policy which, among other aspects of it, meant the execution of reputed sorcerers and spies.45 Uma stayed loyal to Ona through the rifts in and the eventual split of the BRA which paid off by propelling him to the position of General Commander of Ona’s faction of the BRA named the Me’ekamui Defense Force (displacing MDF’s original General Commander, Moses Pipiro, who was removed from that position in the midst of allegations of an extramarital affair involving Pipiro and Ona’s wife).46 Uma remained in that position until Ona’s death in 2005 which resulted in the fracturing of Ona’s gang. Uma went baka otong (‘out on his own’) while continuing to refer to himself as the Me’ekamui Defense Force and later ‘the Original Me’ekamui’ in order to distinguish himself from the other splinter factions of Ona’s now defunct gang and to stake his claim to Ona’s legacy. In an attempt to attain the appearance of government, which has always been held by Ona’s gang, and being more militarily minded, Uma joined forces with a number of respected elders of the area, Blaise Iruniu, William Mungta and Blaise Barasio, to form the political wing of his gang. Uma’s gang considers itself to be “the government of Bougainville” and dismisses the ABG as “a small group of people who are influenced by white men”.47 Uma has never been a part of the peace process or disarmament and no amount of efforts have had any tangible effect on co-opting him.48 As such, he has never benefited from the

42. Callick, ‘Politics: Countdown Begins for Panguna’, 43. Thomson, ‘Blood and Treasure’. 44. Informant C2, Port Moresby,January-March, 2012, personal interview. 45. Informant C2, Port Moresby,January-March, 2012, personal interview 46. Informant C1. Arawa, Bougainville, October, 2009, personal interview. C2, Port Moresby,JanuaryMarch, 2012, personal interview. 47. Marshall, ‘A Killer Deal’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 48. President Tanis’ cooperative agreement with Uma’s gang (and the other branch of the Me’ekamui) that was hailed “historic” at the time of signing has achieved nothing other than ABG paying off Uma’s gang to get its services past the Roadblock, a method of ‘cooperation’ with Uma’s gang which would have been available to the ABG, cooperative agreement or not.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

the Panguna mine, it is not difficult to see that Toroama is likely to want to continue maintaining his base in the area for as long as possible as he jockeys for position in negotiations for reopening of the mine (in which he is likely to want a security contract for his gang). Toroama’s relationship with Uma will doubtless continue being a source of insecurity and instability for the area but the current scrap metal sharing arrangement appears to be able to preserve the status quo and might be a blueprint for future mine-related arrangements. It is, however, doubtful that Toroama will be a productive force in the negotiation of reopening of the Panguna mine unless he changes his position on Ona’s 10 billion-kina claim “remain[ing] extant”42 and his attitude towards the BCL management from “[w]e could get the blood and spit all over his [Peter Taylor; BCL Director] face […] [t]hat’s it, very simple […] you have not paid on the land that you are walking on” 43 to something, perhaps, less gory.

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largesse that came with the peace process, which others, like Toroama, so adroitly tapped. As the pressure to deliver for his gang mounts and as patience of those loyal to Uma is wearing thin, Uma has to display ingenuity to keep the lid on the situation. He resents Toroama for being “a tycoon”49 and for being constantly compared to him but rides his coattails in the scrap metal business Toroama dominates. While Toroama brings manpower, equipment and connections to the table of scrap metal business, Uma’s gang, essentially, gets paid for having an armed checkpoint which stands in Toroama’s way to the wharf from which scrap metal is exported to international markets. Uma’s gang’s other sources of income include the ‘visa fee’ the gang charges foreign visitors to pass through the Morgan Junction Roadblock (200 kinas (US$ 100) per visitor) and ‘the afterhours fee’ (10 kinas (US $5) charged to any vehicle that wishes to pass through the Roadblock outside its ‘regular business hours’, and helping small gold operators secure mining ‘rights’.50 Occasionally, Uma’s gang profits from the ABG who pays it off to bring government services to the communities cut off by the Roadblock.51

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

It has been established prior that money is integral to status in Bougainville society but is not its sole foundation. Recognition of one’s status by an outsider too carries significant weight. In Uma’s case his maintenance of the Roadblock has garnered him recognition of a number of high-profile outsiders (including that of the Australian ambassador to PNG who ceremonially brought Uma a pig as a reconciliation gift for Australia’s role in the Crisis).52

Uma is originally from the Kerei’nari Valley and is married into Araba village, both of which are sufficiently removed from the Panguna mine-lease land to prevent him from having any claim to the mine through the traditional rules of land tenure. Prior to Ona’s death Uma maintained a tenuous connection to the Panguna land through him and others loyal to Ona; this is no longer the case. What Uma does have is the control of an armed checkpoint set up at the gateway to Panguna. The checkpoint makes Uma’s views on reopening of Panguna relevant. These views have undergone drastic change in the past few years. In Ona’s lifetime and shortly after his death they were consistent with those of Ona, i.e. (1) mining was the source of all sorts of disruptions in the traditional society of Bougainville; (2) no discussions of the possibility of reopening of the Panguna mine may be held until Bougainville is an independent country.53 Three years after Ona’s death Uma’s position on the issue shifted to two conditions: (1) “development can [should] come first then mining can come later”; 54 and (2) “the Me’ekamui is government [of Bougainville] and the Me’ekamui Defense Force is recognized as authority”.55 After another three years Uma’s position changed again, this time to a radical departure from his uncompromising positions of the past to “make a clear statement to the Australian government and the world that, today, we [he and his gang] are talking [about the

49. Informant C2, Port Moresby, Jan-March 2012, personal interview. 50. Informant C1, Arawa, Bougainville, Jan 2010, October 2009, personal interview 51. E.g. In 2007, the ABG paid out 30,000 kinas (US$ 15,000) in cash, pigs and other food for Uma’s gang’s permission to resurface the ‘Bougainville Highway’ beyond the Morgan Junction Roadblock. 52. ‘Rebel Leader Wants to Talk ‘ Radio Australia, (August 10, 2011) at http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/ pacbeat/stories/201108/s3290464.htm (last accessed: February 14, 2012). 53. Kenneth, ‘Me’ekamui General Stands Ground’. 54. Marshall, ‘A Killer Deal’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 55. Gridneff, ‘Bougainville Landowners Call’., Australian Associated Press, December 12, 2008.

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Uma does not have many allies in Central Bougainville: as outlined earlier his relationship with Toroama is a tenuous status quo and Uma is militantly opposed to the Panguna Landowners Association60 with whom BCL is intent on working. Contrary to his talking the talk of being able to “solve the problem of Bougainville”,61 Uma will not be able to walk the walk as such would require having the alliances he does not have. That said, no negotiations to reopen the Panguna mine will be viable without his being a part of them so long as he maintains the roadblock unless solutions to his presence at Panguna are found which are either not being contemplated now or for which conditions presently do not exist. Being aware of this, some actors integral to such negotiations have begun the process of building alliances with Uma’s gang. As such, the other Me’ekamui gang in Central Bougainville, which is composed of persons who are likely to have a claim to the Panguna land through the rules of traditional tenure has recently reunited with Uma’s gang.62 In addition, the Panguna landowners’ company, the Khomeri Holdings, gave Uma’s gang a 5% stake in it in recognition of his position, and the Australian ambassador to PNG has made overtures to Uma.63 Whether these will result in Uma being co-opted into peaceful development is not as pertinent a question as whether a multi-billion dollar development project, such as the reopening of the Panguna mine, can rely upon Uma’s stability long-term. Moses Pipiro and Philip Miriori During the active-combat stage of the Crisis Moses Pipiro was a platoon commander in BRA’s famed ‘A’ Company. The schism in the BRA leadership (based on the divergence of opinion on how to further prosecute the conflict provided to Pipiro an opportunity for advancement and propelled him to the highest military position in Ona’s splinter army, the Me’ekamui Defense Force. Allegations of an affair with Ona’s wife cost Pipiro the elevated position and ejected him from the MDF. With a small gang of supporters, Pipiro maintained his presence in the Panguna area opposing the peace process. Ona’s death in 2005 created a succession power 56. ‘Rebel Leader Wants to Talk’, Radio Australia, August 10, 2011. Available at http:// www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/201108/s3290464.htm (last accessed: February 14, 2012). 57. Mungta, ‘A Total Disaster for the Future’. 58. ‘Rebel Leader Wants to Talk’, Radio Australia, August 10, 2011 Available at http:// www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/201108/s3290464.htm (last accessed: February 14, 2012). 59. Marshall, ‘A Killer Deal’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, June 17, 2008. 60. Gridneff, ‘Bougainville Landowners Call’. Kenneth, ‘Bougainville Rebel Warns’, Post-Courier. 61. ‘Rebel Leader Wants to Talk’, Radio Australia, August 10, 2011. Available at http:// www.radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/stories/201108/s3290464.htm (last accessed: February 14, 2012). 62. Tseraha, ‘Me’ekamui and ABG Do Deal’, Post-Courier, March 19, 2010.. Laukai, ‘Pipiro Happy’.April 20, 2011. 63. ‘Rebel Leader Wants to Talk’, Radio Australia.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

possibility of reopening the Panguna mine]”.56 Uma’s sudden shift to readiness to “talk” is not supported by his gang’s ‘political arm’ the leader of which (William Munta), speaking on behalf of the gang in the same year, stated that the gang’s position was “no to the re-opening of the mine [and] let [the] Panguna mine remain closed”.57 This statement is most curious against the backdrop of Uma’s statement that the “Panguna mine can open under the name of Chris Uma”58 a mere four months later. While Uma is now willing to “talk”, by his own admission, nothing has been negotiated yet which presumably means that Uma’s orders on access to the mine, worded as “[i]f anybody crosses this river just shoot it [sic], and report it to me what you’ve done”,59 remain standing.

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struggle which ended in Uma leaving the area immediate to the Panguna mine and Ona’s purported brother,64 Philip Miriori, and Philip Takaung declaring themselves Ona’s successors. Miriori and Takaung brought Pipiro back to command the MDF troop severely depleted by the departure of Uma’s loyalists.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

Miriori and Takaung rebranded Ona’s Kingdom of Me’ekamui into the Me’ekamui Government of Unity (‘MGU’) and significantly softened Ona’s stance on the ABG resulting in a landmark memorandum of understanding (‘the Panguna Communiqué’) in 2007. The Panguna Communiqué signaled, in part, a complete break from Ona’s positions and, in part, their significant alteration. As such, through it, the MGU denounced Uma’s checkpoint as having “abused and misused its objectives and rules of engagement under the Me’ekamui government” and as having the purpose “to blockade the Panguna people”,65 condemned “the use of arms and violence”66 and acquiesced to what can, perhaps, be best termed as a ‘two political viewpoints, one administrative structure’ arrangement with the ABG.67 In return, even though ABG has no such authority by any constitutional provision and ABG reciprocated by allowing the MGU to have its “own contingent plans on arms containment” 68 and, of course, a promise of bringing resolution of “social issues and development issues”, 69 “financial assistance, economic benefits, development packages, good and service”,70 and “other services”;71 all of these translate into ABG bringing money into the MGU-dominated area, which doubtless was the main reason for this rapprochement for the MGU.

Both Pipiro and Miriori are from the mine-lease area (Pipiro is originally from Pangka village and now lives in Mosinau village and Miriori is originally from Guava village and now lives in Parakake village) and, as such, are likely72 to stand to benefit financially from reopening of the mine under the traditional rules of land tenure. Pipiro and Miriori’s landowning position is strengthened by the fact of their physical presence in the mine-lease area and the weapons that remain in possession of Pipiro and his gang. Therefore, Pipiro and Miriori’s views on reopening of the mine are doubly important. These views are reasonably well articulated and have been widely publicized. At the signing of the Panguna Communiqué MGU’s position on reopening of the mine was stated as requiring the existence of two conditions: (1) statehood for Bougainville; and (2) compensation for the people of Panguna for “the death and destruction arising as a result of the Bougainville Conflict”.73 If these conditions were not possible, the MGU pledged to agree to an alternative set of conditions which consisted of these conditions: (1) the mining powers and functions are drawn down to the ABG (from the national government) and (2) a review of the “mining laws, policies, and legal agreements”.74 MGU made landowner representation “at any talks regarding mining at Panguna” mandatory.75 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

Informant C2, Port Moresby, February 2012, personal interview. Panguna Communiqué, art. 7. Panguna Communiqué, art. 6. Panguna Communiqué, art. 4 Panguna Communiqué, art. 6. Panguna Communiqué, art. 4. Panguna Communiqué, art. 5. Panguna Communiqué, art. 9. Informant C2, Port Moresby,February, 2012, personal interview. Panguna Communiqué, art. 10 (b) (i & ii). Panguna Communiqué, art. 10 (b) (iii & iv). Panguna Communiqué, art. 11.

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The elements of the MGU’s position on permitting the former mine operator, BCL, to come back may appear highly conflicting to some. On the other hand, Miriori is one of the plaintiffs in a lawsuit filed in US courts against BCL’s parent company, Rio Tinto, which seeks a finding on allegations of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and “overs[eeing] mass infliction of death and suffering”81 and compensation for the same. On the other hand, despite these allegations of horrendous crimes, the MGU invites (with Miriori issuing the invitation) the defendant’s subsidiary to talks on long-term cooperation.82 MGU’s message to Rio Tinto and BCL is sufficiently clear (albeit euphemized as “the international groups responsible for the previous humiliations [sic] and contaminations [sic] will not be welcomed back until all issues are resolved”):83 MGU is willing to work with them but they have to pay their way back in at the MGU’s rate. Given that the MGU has maintained Ona’s original claim,84 this rate is likely to be 10 billion kinas (US$5 billion). As Rio Tinto and BCL are unlikely to want to/be able to meet this requirement, it is not difficult to foresee that the MGU’s position on the same is likely to have the effect of rupture on any negotiations with Rio Tinto and BCL. In the absence of response to its invitations from BCL and while waiting through the lawsuit’s meandering route through the US judicial system,85 the MGU keeps itself busy by making relatively smaller claims for compensation upon which it hinges the reopening of the Panguna mine.86 In the meantime, Miriori and Pipiro’s families live off of the small businesses they run in the Panguna area, pan for gold in Panguna’s vicinity, and collect their share of the proceeds from the sale of the BCL equipment for scrap. 76. For example Laukai, ‘Me’ekamui Invites Stakeholders’, New Dawn on Bougainville. 77. Laukai, ‘Me’ekamui Invites Stakeholders’, New Dawn on Bougainville. 78. The MGU Human Rights Declaration. Available at (http://governmentofmeekamui.net/index.php? p=1_8_Human-Rights-Declaration) (last accessed: September 24, 2012). 79. The MGU Proclamation. Available at http://governmentofmeekamui.net/index.php? p=1_7_Proclamation (last accessed: September 24, 2012). 80. The MGU Business Model. Available at http://governmentofmeekamui.net/index.php? p=1_10_Business-Model (last accessed: September 24, 2012). 81. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, No. 02-56256, 19323, 19368 (9th Cir. 2011). 82. Laukai, ‘Me’ekamui Invites Stakeholders’, New Dawn on Bougainville. 83. The MGU Natural Resources. Available at http://governmentofmeekamui.net/index.php? p=1_10_Business-Model (last accessed: September 24, 2012). 84. Gatana, ‘Panguna Landowners Speak out’, The Post-Courier. 85. Filed in 2008, Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC has been through a number of courts in the US judicial system with the US Federal Court for the Ninth Circuit ruling on it most recently (October, 2011) and remanding it to the district court (for Central District of California) for “further proceedings on the claims of genocide and war crimes”. 86. Kenneth, ‘Me’ekamui Insists on Proper Burial’, The Post-Courier..

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

Neither set of conditions has transpired since the signing of the Panguna Communiqué. Consequently, by the letter of the Panguna Communiqué, MGU would have been under an obligation to “shelve any talks on the issue of mining at Panguna”. This, however, has not been the case as reports of the MGU inviting various stakeholders to negotiate have abounded.76 In the course of these invitations the MGU has relied on a utilitarian assertion that it “control[s] the assets at Panguna and all natural resources within its borders”,77 rather than on the spirit or the letter of the Panguna Communiqué. While maintaining and developing its ‘mandate of heaven’ theories78 and making other lofty declarations,79 the MGU has not let more earthly considerations remain idle. MGU’s “20%” model of distribution of “the physical gold”80 is indicative of such considerations.

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The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

MGU exists in a difficult environment of competition for the wealth of the Panguna mine. It is surrounded by other gangs and groups with whom it has sought to build alliances to varying degrees of success. MGU’s alliance with the ABG has been rocky and rife with accusations of the ABG overstating its authority to negotiate the reopening of the Panguna mine 87; strangely, however, this alliance has been the strongest MGU has had with any group. MGU’s alliance with Uma’s gang88 is tentative and remains a work in progress. As Toroama seeks greater control of Panguna (through being integral to the scrap metal project), the MGU tolerates his gang’s presence at Panguna now that the scrap metal project is ongoing. MGU does not share much more than its geography with the Panguna Landowners Association (‘PLOA’), with the level of hostility and mutual aversion between the two groups being palpable.89 Shortly after Ona’s death, the MGU publicly distanced itself from Ona’s close ally, Noah Musingku, to then disown him entirely.90 There is no reason to believe that MGU maintains alliances or has frequent communications with any other gangs in Bougainville.

Noah Musingku Noah Musingku spent the Crisis years away from Bougainville and, as such, did not participate in the hostilities in any capacity. During those years Musingku had a life that differed dramatically from that shared by his fellow-Bougainvilleans locked in a protracted civil war:91 Musingku acquired fabulous wealth92 through a pyramid investment scheme, UVistract, he ran in Papua New Guinea and other countries of the region.94 In 2002, a concerted effort of Papua New Guinea and Australia got Musingku on the run quickly shrinking safe harbors for him to his native and now lawless Bougainville. Auspiciously for Musingku, his diverse Bougainville fan base included Ona95 who was in a position to offer Musingku a safe haven under the protection of his Me’ekamui gang. Ona, at the time, was in desperate search of financial means to sustain his gang’s claim for government of Bougainville. Musingku convinced Ona that he would be able to deliver the much needed wherewithal. Ona had every reason to believe Musingku who had proven his ability to generate large amounts of money by defrauding large numbers of people in short periods of time. In 2004, from a guest of Ona’s gang Musingku was elevated to the status of a co-equal monarch in Ona’s fantasy kingdom.96 Thus were born Ona’s kingdom of the Me’ekamui and Musingku’s Kingdom of Papala. As no two kingdoms can exist under the same roof for long, Musingku moved his ‘kingdom’ to his native village of Tonu in the Siwai District of South 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95.

96.

Laukai, .Me’ekamui Invites Stakeholders’, New Dawn on Bougainville. Laukai, ‘Pipiro Happy’, New Dawn on Bougainville. Laukai, ‘PLOA Responds to Me’ekamui’, New Dawn on Bougainville. Letter of MGU Prime Minister Raymond Hakena,November 10, 2005.‘PNG Sends Police Reinforcements’, New Zealand Radio, May 15, 2006.Letter of MGU President (June, 2006). Post-Courier, ‘Me’ekamui Denies Links’. Cox, ‘Financing the End-Time Harvest,’ 2. Ibid. Cox, ‘Financing the End-Time Harvest’ Ona regarded U-Vistract as “Bougainvillean-owned” and “Bougainvillean-operated” and “a way for Bougainvilleans to economic prosperity”. A BRA delegation visited the Australian embassy in Port Moresby to inform the Australian government that “the closure of U-Vistract had ramifications for the Bougainville peace process and should therefore be halted” (Stan McKenzie, Papua New Guinea Fast Money Schemes: a Financial House of Cards Collapses, World Socialist Website. This is Musingku’s interpretation of what happened. Ona’s interpretation is quite different. Asked about this connection to Musingku Ona replied with “[n]o, my government is outside, outside Noah Musingku’s system […] I have nothing to do with him, no. He is free there. He is doing his own things” McLeod, ‘Bougainville – the Man Who Would Be King’.

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Bougainville shortly after the inauguration. Following Ona’s death, Musingku declared himself Ona’s sole successor.97 Once in Tonu, Musingku has set up a ‘kingdom’ with all the trappings of a South Pacific cargo cult: an airport to/from which there are no flights, a bank which accepts deposits but does not allow withdrawals, which issues checks that cannot be cashed and promises astronomical dividends but never pays out, and a court of law which uses the Bible as the law. All this is tightly wrapped in messianic prophesy, lavish promises of imminent cornucopia of tremendous wealth, and attempts to further isolate the people of Tonu from the rest of the world by creating a new reality for them98 through which Musingku’s life is presented as part of the Divine Plan.99 Given this multi-faceted approach to control, Musingku has gained a reputation of “smooth operator” with some.100

Musingku has multiple reasons to continue maintaining his armed gang. These reasons range from criminal prosecution to numerous angry U-Vistract ‘investors’ who want their money back.105 Musingku is safe from these for as long as Bougainville remains lawless and he manages to maintain the loyalty of his gang. 97. Papala Chronicles, July 16, 2011, at http://papaala-chronicles.blogspot.com/search?updatedmin=2011-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2012-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=2 98. Papala Chronicles, ‘Speech at the Bougainville Kina Launching Ceremony’,July 8, 2009. Available at http://papaala-chronicles.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2009-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updatedmax=2010-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=5) (last accessed: March 1, 2012) 99. Papala Chronicles, Issue 4, April 23, 2005. 100. McLeod, ‘Bougainville – the Man Who Would Be King’. 101. Informants S1, S, 2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9, Arawa, BougainvilleNovember, 2009, personal interviews ‘Me’ekamui Denies Links with Musingku’, Post-Courier. 102. Papala Chronicles, Papala Day Speech,Apr 23, 2010.Available at http://papaalachronicles.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2010-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2011-0101T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=4) (last accessed: March 1, 2012. Informant S5, Arawa, BougainvilleDec, 2011, personal interview. Papala Chronicles, Papala Day Speech,Apr 23, 2010.Available at http://papaala-chronicles.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2010-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updatedmax=2011-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=4) (last accessed: March 1, 2012) 103. Papala Chronicles, Apr 23, 2010 at http://papaala-chronicles.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2010 -01-01T00%3A00%3A00-08%3A00&updated-max=2011-01-01T00%3A00%3A00-08%3A00&maxresults=4 104. Papala Chronicles, Jul 16, 2011, at http://papaala-chronicles.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=201101-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2012-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=2 Papala Chronicles, Issue 8, May 21, 2005 105. McLeod, ‘Bougainville – the Man Who Would Be King’, May 17, 2005. McKenzie, ‘Papua New Guinea Fast Money Scheme’ World Socialist Website.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

Musingku’s ‘kingdom’ maintains an army of 30-100 men (referred to as the Me’ekamui Defense Force and the Me’ekamui Paramilitary Police),101 some of whom are armed with automatic weapons. This army is composed of unemployed and unskilled local men who have been paid in promises of unearthly riches and very earthly and simple meals since Musingku’s ‘kingdom’ fell on tough times.102 Musingku has finally recently admitted that there is no money in his ‘financial system’ or ‘kingdom’ and that the wealth acquired by operating UVistract has been frozen “in conventional banks”.103 Musingku has acknowledged that most Bougainvilleans no longer trust him and his ‘financial system’.104 Now that Musingku is out of the money he did manage to salvage from the asset-freeze, the sway of his authority over his armed gang will be tested.

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Musingku is originally from Tonu village which is 3 hours’ drive from the Panguna mine. He has no plausible ancestral claim to the Panguna land under the traditional rules of land tenure. Musingku is exceptionally verbose and prolific as a writer but no evidence of his mentioning his claims to the Panguna mine has been found, and evidence to the contrary exists.106 Had it not been for Ona’s death, Musingku could have developed a tenuous connection to the mine through him. Ona’s death caused fracturing of his gang led by men who are openly hostile to him (MGU and Uma). With Musingku’s ‘kingdom’ lying away from the mine, he does not control any area that will be vital to the mine’s operation.107

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

As such, Musingku will not be integral to mine-reopening negotiations, nor is he likely to be a threat to them so long as they do not, directly or indirectly, affect his security in his ‘kingdom’. That said, Musingku’s pyramid scheme is likely to be rejuvenated by Panguna landowners flush with hefty monthly royalty checks. In this event, the ABG will have to make a choice whether to intervene to arrest Musingku or turn a blind eye to his operation to ensure that Musingku’s arrest does not become a cause of disruption of the production.108

Damien Koike Damien Koike was one of the “men [who] were engaged in criminal activity prior to the beginning of the Crisis and the inception of the BRA” prefixed earlier in this paper. In fact, the outbreak of the Crisis had the effect of breaking Koike out of jail. A free man again, Koike moved back to his village in South Bougainville and joined the BRA there quickly rising to the rank of company commander of BRA’s ‘I’ Company. Perhaps the biggest event in the history of BRA in South Bougainville, the Kangu Beach Massacre, did not involve Koike’s troops. The fame/infamy for this killing of some unarmed PNGDF regulars and capture of others belonged to another BRA commander in South Bougainville, Thomas Tari. Koike grew to deeply resent Tari for the spotlight and the ransom money109 he attained from the Kangu Beach Massacre. After some initial flirtation with it, Koike rejected the peace process believing that the timing for it was inauspicious110 and maintained his troop as the South Bougainville detachment of Ona’s Me’ekamui Defense Force. Ona’s death and the disintegration of his gang does not appear to have had any visible effect on Koike whose gang was by then fully immersed in the local power struggle in South Bougainville. Since the BPA days, Koike’s gang has been known for banditry in South Bougainville and southern parts of Central Bougainville. Koike now claims to have anywhere from 100 to 1,000 men111 under his command but the real number appears to be somewhere in the vicinity of 30.112 What his gang lacks in number 106. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Foreign Correspondent’s report of 17 May 2005 107. Contra Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Foreign Correspondent’s report of 17 May 2005 (video on file with author) claims that Musingku might have designs for the Mine because he “controls the zone that surrounds the defunct but rich Panguna gold and copper mine”. The report entirely misinterprets the power structure around Panguna and Musingku’s position in it. 108. ABG’s previous president, James Tanis, attempted to deal with the Musingku issue by requesting that the PNG government pardon Musingku. The request gained no traction at the national level and Tanis’ short-lived presidency was over before he could make any headway on the matter. 109. Informants S1, S2, Arawa, Bougainville, July – October, 2009, personal interview. 110. Informant S1, Arawa, Bougainville, October 2009, personal interview. 111. Laukai, ‘Ceasefire in South Bougainville’, New Dawn on Bougainville. 112. Informants S1, S2, S3, S4, Arawa, Boungainville, July, October 2009 – February 2012, personal interviews. Jackson, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Bougainville Shooting, April 24 2011.

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it makes up in ruthlessness, however.113 Throughout the 2000s almost all criminality in South Bougainville was attributed to Koike’s gang.

After years of armed conflict and multiple deaths on both sides, Koike’s gang finally gained the upper hand by killing Pusua115 and other WILMO leaders and ‘reconciling’ with what was left of WILMO. This reconciliation was officiated by the ABG President and UNDP and was de facto Koike’s victory celebration over WILMO. This demonstrates that Koike’s gang is interested in Bougainville’s mineral wealth and is prepared to kill to get to it. Koike’s other known proclivities are jealousy and desire to ‘get in on the action’. The only ‘action’ in Bougainville now is the ABG’s budget. Koike has declared war on President Momis for “empty promises”116 by launching a colorfully named operation ‘Leader Out’ (essentially, threatening to kill Momis if the ABG budget was not shared with him). Momis rushed to placate Koike by offering him money under the guise of assistance with the compensations Koike and his gang were going to pay to the families of the WILMO members they had killed.117 It is not difficult to foresee that if the Panguna mine becomes the main ‘action’ in Bougainville, Koike will use threats of violence (now that he knows that they work) to get ‘his’ slice of the pie if he feels that his gang is “left out” by the distribution of Panguna’s wealth. It is doubtful that Koike has an elaborate position on reopening of the Panguna mine but what is known is that his position includes a requirement that “no white people” be allowed to do mining in Bougainville.118 Koike’s gang operates in a manner that is little different from the manner in which it operated during the Crisis. Despite his gang being responsible for the bulk of killings in Bougainville since 2006, Koike’s enemies are cabined to his immediate surroundings (the villages of Mongai, Moikui and Sininnai). In the rest of South Bougainville, he has collaborated on a number of occasions119 with Musingku (whom he considers “a financial genius”120 and in 113.

Informants S1, S2, S3, S4, Arawa, Buka, Bougainville, October 2009 – February 2012, personal interviews. 114. Informant S1 and Informant S4, Arawa, Buka, Bougainville October 2009 – January 2010, personal interview. 115. Pacific Islands News Association, Movement Leader Shot Dead in Bougainville 116. ‘Rebel Wages War on ABG’, Post-Courier 117. ‘Bougainville Wants Restorative Justice’, Radio New Zealand International. Informants N2 and N3, Buka, Bouganiville, February 2010, personal interview. 118. Informant S1, Arawa, Bougainville, October 2009, personal interview. 119. ‘Bougainville-Fiji Men Sign Deal’, Fiji Times. 120. Informant S1, Arawa, October 2009, personal interview.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

Koike is originally from Telei village, Buin District, South Bougainville and presently lives in Mogoroi village in Buin District that is 3 hours’ drive from the Panguna mine. This fact of his birth and his family lineage does not create any entitlement to the Panguna land for him under the traditional rules of land tenure. Unlike the similarly situated Musingku, Koike has shown an interest in mining. As such, Koike’s gang intermittently controlled the mining of alluvial gold in the Deuro and Konnou constituencies of the Buin District which Koike’s band road-blocked from the rest of the district in the good tradition of roadblocks in Bougainville. The local landowners pushed back by organizing into an armed gang named the Wisia Liberation Front/Movement (‘WLF/WILMO’) led by Philip Pusua and retook the mining area creating an armed standoff with Koike.114

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whose system he has ‘invested’). Koike’s connection with Uma dates back to days of Ona’s gang but there is no reason to believe that Uma exercises any measure of control over Koike or his gang.121 Koike’s connection with Pipiro and Miriori is equally tenuous122 and seemingly residual. There is no reason to believe that any connection presently exists between Koike and Toroama. While there has been no evidence of their collaboration, Koike and Tari have maintained the peace reached between them in 2009. Thomas Tari Thomas Tari became a household name in Bougainville in 1996 when he and his platoon plotted and helped perpetrate the Kangu Beach Massacre. The PNGDF who were not killed in the attack were captured. Their capture resulted in a protracted negotiation process which made Tari an important man. The newfound notoriety made Tari aspire for company commandership. Tari moved to kill the then BRA’s ‘H’ Company commander Paul Bobby Kiaku123 (and his two brothers)124 and take over the ‘H’ Company.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

Following the split in the BRA along the peace process lines, Tari joined the pro-peace process BRA who were led by Toroama and participated in hammering out of key disarmament and weapons disposal accords.125 Once the disarmament and weapons containment process got underway Tari was put in charge of the disarmament of the BRA in Buin. When the weapons containment process failed towards the end of 2005, Tari retrieved some of his company’s weapons and rearmed. Absent a political purpose and legitimacy, the remnants of his company disintegrated into a street gang.

Rearmed, Tari embarked, along with many in Bougainville, on a pursuit of what he felt was owed to him and his gang for fighting the war. The methods Tari employed in this pursuit are routinely framed as the offenses of ‘piracy’, ‘blackmail’ and ‘hijacking’126 in the most of the rest of the world but are routine in the PNG traditional culture, even if criminalized by ‘introduced’ (Western) law. Rearmed, Tari decided to append himself to the ABG in the form of an ABG-funded gang the Bougainville Freedom Fighters (BFF) through which the ABG sought to restore the balance of power127 skewed by the naiveté of the BPA drafters128 and the failure of the disarmament and weapons containment process.129 ABG used Tari’s BFF in operations against the South Bougainville Me’ekamui (Koike and Musingku) throughout 2006 and 2007 (at which point 121. Sam Kaouna, Kieta, Bougainville, May 2009, personal interview. Informant C2, Port Moresby, February 2012, personal interview. ‘ Rebel Wages War on ABG’, Post-Courier 122. ‘Rebel Wages War on ABG’, Post-Courier 123. Informants S1, S, 2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9. Arawa, July 2009 - February 2010, personal interviews. Maraki et al., ‘Long Peace Yumi Stanap’ 124. Maraki, et al, ‘Long Peace Yumi Stanap’ 125. Joint Bougainville Negotiating Position (December 14, 1999); The Rotakas Record, Joint Bougainville Ex-Combatants Agreement on Weapons Disposal, Togarau (May 3, 2001) 126. E.g. In 2005, Tari and his gang hijacked Momis’ car to demand compensation for an instance of ‘services’ allegedly provided to the PNG government during the war. This was not the first time the demand was made; Augustine Kinna, Talks on How to End Law and Order Issues Affecting South Bougainville, The National (November 7, 2006) 127. Informants S1, S 2, S7, S9, Arawa, July 2009 - February 2010, personal interviews. 128. Kopel, et al, ‘Firearms Possession by “Non-State Actors,” 399’, 129. Radio New Zealand International, ‘Bougainville Ready to Arm’

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

ABG appears to have dropped the idea of dealing with Koike and Musingku through military means). ABG then funded reconciliations between Tari and the South Bougainville Me’ekamui (Koike and Musingku) in 2009 and 2010. Tari is from Laguai village of the Buin District in South Bougainville situated 3 hours’ drive from the Panguna mine. As such, he has no entitlement to the Panguna land under the traditional rules of land tenure. Tari is not known to have laid a claim to Panguna but he may or may not share Toroama’s ‘we all fought for it and it now belongs to all of Bougainville’ approach to the mine. What is clear is that Tari has not found his way back to the life of a civilian and, as many combatants, does not see himself as anyone other than commander of BRA ‘H’ Company.130 What is also clear is that he feels that something is owed to him for his role in the Crisis and that that something has yet to be paid. It is unlikely that Tari will be satisfied by ABG-brokered overseas junkets131 in lieu of what he believes is owed to him. The reopening of the Panguna mine and the wealth it will create are likely to reignite Tari’s pursuit of ‘compensation’.

Conclusion The opening, operation and closure of the Panguna Mine and the ensued civil war have doubtless been by far the most impactful events in Bougainville’s 33,000 years of history. It does not take a sage or a seer to predict that what happened between 1969 and 2001 will continue being at the forefront of Bougainvilleans’ minds for many years to come. Contrary to its name, the Bougainville Peace Agreement of 2001 did not bring peace to Bougainville. It brought a disarmament and weapons containment process which failed by 2006, a weak autonomous government which has been on life support since its creation in 2005, and the entrenchment of the residue of civil war combatants in the form of street gangs that continue to control half the island.132 With, perhaps, the exception of Buka town, Bougainville has frozen in time. It is no longer in 1969 or 2001, or anywhere in between. Nor is it in 2012. The disarmament and weapons containment process failed in 2005 and the ABG was created the same year; there has been no significant change since. Rephrasing the words of an American playwright, in Bougainville, there is no present or future, it is year 2006 happening over and over again, now. 133 The existence of the gangs is a constant reminder to all Bougainvilleans and outsiders that, in the words of Uma, “we have a fight here and it is not over”. Gang leaders like Uma have spent their entire adult lives looking at the world through the barrel of the gun. They have had numerous opportunities to go back to civilian life but they have consciously ignored them 130. 131. 132. 133.

Kinna, ‘Ex-BRA Commander Reconciles,’ The National, December 21 2007 Laukai, ‘Tari Testifies’ Tohui, ‘Momis to Honor Old Agreements’, The National, October 21 2011. O’Neill, ‘A Moon for the Misbegotten’

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

Tari’s relationship with the Me’ekamui gangs (Koike and Musingku) in South Bougainville is that of a status quo tenuously held up by reconciliations and until recently by the fact that WILMO kept Koike at bay. This situation might change very quickly now that Koike has defeated WILMO. There is no evidence of Tari’s interaction with Toroama, Pipiro/Miriori or Uma on a level of strategic alliances which might be of relevance to reopening of the mine.

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

realizing that, in Bougainville, being a man with a gun bestows the status of power and money whereas the life of a civilian often gives neither. Only a small portion of the gang members relate to the Panguna land under the traditional rules of land tenure in Bougainville. This, however, does not mean that Toroama’s “now that a war has been fought over it the Panguna mine belongs to all Bougainvilleans” will not strike a chord with those who are dispossessed of the mine by the traditional rules of land tenure. Only time will show with how many of the gang members this will resonate and how many will be willing to step aside out of respect for the traditional rules of land tenure. A sizable portion of the gangs exercises varying measures of control over the Panguna mine. While there is some potential for events in the area to recalibrate these measures, it is unlikely that this recalibration will be of significant nature.

The Gangs of Bougainville: Seven Men, Guns and a Copper Mine

The gangs’ views on reopening of the Panguna mine are diverse, often inconsistent within the same gang, and often oscillating over fairly short spans of time. There has been one constant in these views; that constant is self-interest.134 Despite what the gangs might say in public, self-interest is the best litmus test to gauge the truthfulness of these statements. Reconciling these views is not as easy a task as they range from Ona’s two decades old claim for 10 billion kinas to various other forms of compensation to Mungta’s admonition that reopening of the Panguna mine would be a disaster for Bougainville.135 Reconciliation of these views, if at all possible, may not be of lasting nature136 and may have the effect of rupture on the production of the reopened mine.

It has been argued that indigenous cultures are a hindrance to development.137 Whether this claim passes the test of time or not, is not relevant to the Bougainville gangs’ views on the Panguna mine for a very simple reason: by ‘development’ the gangs mean that someone will come and do all the work and they will get paid simply for being there. Until conditions exist for that someone to come in and do all the work, the gangs will keep themselves and the people of Bougainville under permafrost and year 2006 will keep happening on Bougainville, year after year and again and again, now.

134. Braithwaite, et al, ‘Pillars and Shadows’ 35 . 135. Mungta, ‘A Total Disaster for the Future Bougainville Generation’ 136. Banks, ‘Understanding ‘Resource’ Conflicts in Papua New Guinea’, 26 137. Macdonald, ‘“Good” governance in Pacific island states’

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Cox, John, “Financing the End-Time Harvest: Pyramid Schemes and Prosperity Gospels in Papua New Guinea”, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, Discussion Paper, Australian National University, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 2009. Filer, Colin, “The Bougainville Rebellion, the Mining Industry and the Process of Social Disintegration in Bougainville”, Canberra Anthropology, 1990. Gatana Fabian, “Panguna Landowners Speak Out”, The Post-Courier, 30 March 2010 Gewertz, Deborah B., and Errington, Frederick K., Emerging Class in Papua New Guinea: the Telling of Difference, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Gridneff, Ilya, “Bougainville Landowners Call for Mining”, Australian Associated Press, 12 December 2008. Griffin, James, “Bougainville is a Special Case”, May, James and Spriggs, Matthew (eds.), The Bougainville Crisis, Crawford House Press, 2007. Hawsley, Charles, “Papua New Guinea at Thirty: Late Decolonization and the Political Economy of Nation Building”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27 (1), 2006. Hilson, Christopher J., “Mining and Civil Conflict: Revisiting Grievance at Bougainville”, Minerals and Energy, Vol. 2, 2006. Informant C1 and C3, Arawa, Bougainville, October 2009, personal interviews. Informant C2, Port Moresby, January-March 2012, personal interview. Informants N1, N2 and N3, Buka, Bougainville, February 2010, personal interview. Informants S1, S, 2, S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S8, S9. Arawa, July, 2009-February 2010, personal interviews. Informants S1, S2, S3, S4, Arawa, Buka, Bougainville October, 2009-February 2012, personal interviews. Islam, Rafiqul, “Secession Crisis in Papua New Guinea: the Proclaimed Republic of Bougainville in international Law”, University of Hawaii Law Review, 1991. Iten, Oswald, “Peace Treaty for Bougainville: First Step Toward Independence from Papua New Guinea?”, 2001. Jackson, Elizabeth, “Bougainville Shooting”, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 24 April 2011. Kenneth, Gorethy, “Me’ekamui General Stands Ground”, Post-Courier, 17 May 2010. Kenneth, Gorethy, “Me’ekamui Insists on Proper Burial”, The Post-Courier, 29 March 2011. Kenneth, Gorethy, “Bougainville Rebel Warns Against Reopening Mine”, Post-Courier, 28 February 2011. Kent, Stuart and Barnett, John, “The Bougainville Political Settlement and the Prospects for Sustainable Peace”, Political Geography, Vol. 31, 2012. Kinna, Augustine, “Ex-BRA Commander Reconciles”, The National, 21 December 2007. Kinna, Augustine, “Talks on How to End Law and Order Issues Affecting South Bougainville”, The National, 7 November 2006. Kopel, David B., et al, “Firearms Possession by “Non-State Actors”: The Question of Sovereignty”, Texas Review of Law and Politics, Vol. 8, 2004. Laukai, Aloysius, “Ceasefire in South Bougainville”, New Dawn on Bougainville, 3 December 2011. Laukai, Aloysius, “Tari Testifies”, New Dawn on Bougainville, 1 November 2010. Laukai, Aloysius,”Elections Results Update”, New Dawn on Bougainville, 26 May 2010. Laukai, Aloysius, “Final Count”, New Dawn on Bougainville 30 July 2012.

Laukai, Aloysius, “Me’ekamui Invites Stakeholders to Panguna Mine Talks”, New Dawn on Bougainville, 29 May 2011. Laukai, Aloysius, “Pipiro Happy”, New Dawn on Bougainville, 20 April 2011. Laukai, Aloysius, “PLOA Responds to Me’ekamui”, New Dawn on Bougainville, 1 June 2011. Macdonald, Barrie, “Good” governance in Pacific island states”, Larmour, Peter (ed.), Governance in Reform in the South Pacific, 1998. Maraki, Pakoa, et al, “Long Peace Yumi Stanap”, Adams, Rebecca (ed.), Peace on Bougainville: Truce Monitoring Group: Gudpela Nius Bilong Peace, 2002. Marshall, Steve, “A Killer Deal”, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 17 June 2008. McKenzie, Stan, “Papua New Guinea Fast Money Schemes: a Financial House of Cards Collapses”, World Socialist Website, 6 July 2000, http://www.wsws.org/en/ articles/2000/07/png-j06.html (last accessed: 5 May 2013). McLeod, Shane, “Bougainville – the Man Who Would Be King”, Foreign Correspondent, 17 May 2005. “Me’ekamui Denies Links with Musingku”, Post-Courier, 15 June 2006. Memorandum of Understanding between the Me’ekamui Government of Unity, the People of Ioro, and the Autonomous Bougainville Government, the Panguna Communiqué, 2007. Mungta, William, “A Total Disaster for the Future Bougainville Generation”, April 2011. Musingku. Noah, “Papala Day Speech”, Papala Chronicles, 23 April 2010, http://papaalachronicles.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2010-01-01T00:00:0008:00&updated-max=2011-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=4), (last accessed: 3 October 2012). Musingku. Noah, “Speech at the Bougainville Kina Launching Ceremony”, Papala Chronicles, July 8 2009, http://papaala-chronicles.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2009-0101T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2010-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=5) (last accessed: 1 March 2012). Musingku. Noah, Papala Chronicles, 16 July 2011, http://papaala-chronicles.blogspot.com/ search?updated-min=2011-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2012-0101T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=2 (last accessed: 3 October 2012). Musingku. Noah, Papala Chronicles, 16 July 2011, http://papaala-chronicles.blogspot.com/ search?updated-min=2011-01-01T00:00:00-08:00&updated-max=2012-0101T00:00:00-08:00&max-results=2 (last accessed: 3 October 2012). Musingku. Noah, Papala Chronicles, 23 April 2010, http://papaala-chronicles.blogspot.com/ search?updated-min=2010-01-01T00%3A00%3A00-08%3A00&updated-max=201101-01T00%3A00%3A00-08%3A00&max-results=4 (last accessed: 3 October 2012). Newell, Virginia and Sheehy, Benedict, “Corporate Militaries and States: Actors, Interactions, and Reactions”, Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 41, 2006. O’Neill, Eugene, A Moon for the Misbegotten, New York: Random House, 1947. “PNG Sends Police Reinforcements to Bougainville Following Clashes”, New Zealand Radio, 15 May 2006. Regan, Anthony J., “Current Development in the Pacific: Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict,” Journal of Pacific History, Vol. 3 (3), 1998. Regan, Anthony J., “The Bougainville Political Settlement and the Prospects for Sustainable Peace”, Pacific Economic Bulletin, Vol. 17, 2002. Sam Kauona, Kieta, Arawa, Bougainville, April 2009, personal interview.

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Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, No. 02-56256, 19323, 19368 (9th Cir. 2011). Schimmel, Jorg, Program Specialist for Prevention and Recovery of the UNDP PNG Country Office, Port Moresby, February 2012, personal interview. Spark, Natascha and Bailey, Jackie, ‘“Disarmament in Bougainville”: ‘Guns in Boxes’’, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 12 (4), 2006. Strathern, Andrew J., and Stewart, Pamela J., “The Problems of Peace-Makers in Papua New Guinea: Modalities of Negotiation and Politics”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 30, 1997. Tanis, James, “Reconciliation: My Side of the Island”, Weaving Consensus: the Papua New Guinea-Bougainville Peace Process, 2002. The Me’ekamui Government of Unity Human Rights Declaration, (n.d.) http:// governmentofmeekamui.net/index.php?p=1_8_Human-Rights-Declaration) (last accessed: 24 September 2012). Thomson, Brian, Blood and Treasure, Special Broadcasting Service Australia, 26 June 2011. Tohui, Joyce, “Momis to Honor Old Agreements”, The National, 21 October 2011. Toroama, “Letter to Ona”, 11 March 2003. Tseraha, Peterson, “Me’ekamui and ABG Do Deal to Work Together”, Post-Courier, 19 March 2010. Volker Boege, “How to Maintain Peace and Security in Post-Conflict High Political Order – the Case of Bougainville”, Journal of International Peacekeeping, Vol. 14, 2010. White, Heather G., “Including Local Communities in the Negotiation of Mining Agreements: the OK Tedi Example”, Transnational Lawyer, Vol. 8, 1995.

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Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

BOOK REVIEW

Sultan Barakat (Ed.) After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War London: I.B. Tauris, 2010, ISBN: 978 1 84885417 8, £ 27.00, 304 p.

Book Review

This book, After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War, was first published in 2005. Although it has been eight years since the first publication and paperback edition in 2010 is not updated with the most recent information, this book is still a highly valuable reference. In this book, a group of leading researchers from the University of York's Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) provides a comprehensive explanation on a wide range of key dimensions of post-war reconstruction practices and core topics in contemporary academic discussions which include capacity building, local context, proactive humanitarianism and public administration. In addition, the authors elaborate some significant lessons learned from their involvements in post-war countries such as Afghanistan, Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia, Indonesia, Mozambique, and East Timor bringing life to their main arguments in some chapters.

The book consists of 14 chapters, and to understand better I rearranged and categorised them into two groups: thematic discussions on various aspects of peacebuilding (chapter 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 12) and fields of practice in post-war reconstruction (chapter 6, 7, 9, 11 and 13). First, thematic discourses of main arguments of this book are explained: local context and general patterns; humanitarianism; challenges to third-party intervention; aid coordination; capacity building; and long-term commitment. In Chapter 2, Mac Ginty emphasises the importance of the end of Cold War in terms of profoundly changing contexts of postreconstruction and development in the post-Cold War era. He argues that official peace processes and local population’s actual life should be connected by relevant stakeholders of peace initiatives and processes. Özerdem and Rufini, in Chapter 3, remind us of both utility and ambiguity of the word ‘humanitarian’ introducing twin principles of ‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality’, challenges to ‘new humanitarianism’, and the discussion of finding a way for the actual implementation of humanitarian principles. In Chapter 4, Barakat, Connolly and Large analyse the case of the Province of Aceh, Indonesia and elaborate the ‘challenges to thirdparty intervention’: suitable strategy of intervention, a level playing field, implementing agreements, clean process of intervention, balancing institutional image. This chapter also discusses the use of proactive humanitarianism in creating suitable solutions to various conflicts reassuring that the case of Indonesia gives us a lesson that theory and strategies should be tailored in accordance with the relevant context. In Chapter 5, Strand focuses on the issue of effective aid coordination with the use of a case study of Afghanistan and provides some details on the clear definition and increasing

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

importance of aid coordination. In addition, in Chapter 8, Suhrke and Strand show us the Afghan case ‘through a comparative lens’ and argue that there is no such a panacea in the process of conflictual peacebuilding with the comparing reference of the cases of East Timor and Mozambique. In Chapter 10, Barakat and Chard focus on the issue of capacity building in a war-torn society and highlight the difficulty of prioritising the needs of developing the capability of people and national institutions. The authors argue that ‘a strong social and institutional infrastructure is crucial to growth and development’ and the United Nations would be the one which should make best efforts with ‘the longer perspective of development for peace’. In Chapter 12, Barakat and Deely claim the importance of long-term commitment in the process of post-war rehabilitation with the case study of sustaining local health services in Somalia. According to the authors, short-term relief assistance should go through transition to rehabilitation process and empowering local people is necessary for enhanced participation of local population and well-suited measures of post-war reconstruction. Second, some fields of practice in post-war reconstruction (chapter 6, 7, 9, 11 and 13) are also discussed in this book: economy; health and health systems; physical reconstruction and the built environment; public administration; reintegration of former combatants. In Chapter 6, Jones looks into the relationship between conflict and economy focusing on Rwanda. Jones particularly examines: ‘the role of the pre-war economy’; ‘the impact of war on an economy’; the relationship between post-war economy and poverty reduction. In Chapter 7, Deely provides an overview of the influence of conflict on health and health systems examining some major challenges to war-torn countries such as ‘increased health needs’ of the waraffected people, ‘diminished capacity of health services’ and ‘distortion of the health system’.

All in all, the biggest strengths of this publication are that comprehensive analyses are provided to deal with key post-war reconstruction discourses over the time and an insightful philosophy for long-term and sustainable post-war recovery also can be drawn. Although it only consists of fourteen chapters, in terms of timeframe of peace process, this book covers the issues occurring from the peace negotiation period for terminating ongoing violent conflicts to conflict transformation which aims to long-term peace consolidation. As for the issue areas, it explores from material reconstruction (i.e. health care institutions, economic

Book Review

In Chapter 9, Zetter examines the nature and importance of post-war ‘reconstruction of the built environment’. This chapter argues that ‘physical reconstruction is not just a sectoral and programmatic end in itself’ and that this type of recovery needs ‘long term and systematic developmental frameworks’ while suggesting a ‘strategic framework for post-conflict reconstruction’. In Chapter 11, Evans starts his arguments for post-war reconstruction from three assumptions: ‘effective public administration’ is required; ‘indigenous civil service’ should lead the process of post-war development; ‘multi-level collaborative governance’ including local and national government, donors, and international organisations. In Chapter 13, Barakat and Özerdem examine the relationship between ‘reintegration of former combatants and peacebuilding’ with the case of Kosovo. They argue that the international community should pay more attention to some issues which can be essential to set a secure and stable environment for post-war recovery including effective human resource allocation and utilising training programmes strategically.

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rehabilitation) to social and psychological issues (i.e. community development, social reintegration of ex-combatants). In this sense, this book looks like a concise handbook of post -war reconstruction. In addition, since its first publication in 2005, it has been consistently providing some food for thought to various readers - not only relevant academics and researchers of post-conflict or development studies but also peacebuilding practitioners including aid workers â&#x20AC;&#x201C; through offering keen insights on a wide range of post-war reconstruction issues. However, it should be mentioned that there is distinct room to update the information relevant to the case studies presented in this publication. Although the main arguments and theoretical discussions are still relevant, it is a little surprising that the editor did not include more up-to-date data when he decided to republish this book five years after its first publication. In addition, although this is not a criticism, I find the discussions in the book may be too deep to be an introductory reference for practitioners or undergraduate students but too brief to be an argumentative material relevant to academic researchers or research students.

Book Review

Wookbeom Park Re-Shaping Development Institute (RDI), Seoul, South Korea

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Melanie Jacques Armed Conflict and Displacement: The Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons under International Humanitarian Law Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, ISBN 978 1 107 005976, £70.00, 277p. In 2010, Alexander Betts argued that it no longer makes sense to speak of the “refugee regime”. Instead, there is…a “refugee regime complex”, in which different institutions overlap [and] exist in parallel to one another’. Melanie Jacques is the latest scholar to take up the challenge of working through the intersections between international refugee law and other branches of international and domestic law. Her new book Armed Conflict and Displacement represents the most detailed account yet published of the treatment of refugees and other displaced persons under customary and conventional international humanitarian law (IHL). Recent conflicts in the Middle East and North-West Africa confirm the urgent need for a clear and precise statement of the special protections owed to persons displaced by conflict, and this work provides a concise and interesting overview of the ways in which IHL protects displaced persons in war. Although the text’s effectiveness and readability are undermined by some shortcomings in structure and argumentative approach, it is an important and generally readable statement of the existing law in this field.

Chapter 3, the longest in the book, is entitled ‘Israeli Settlements, the Separation Wall, and Displacement of Civilians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’. It is mostly dedicated to parsing Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits occupying powers from “deport[ing] or transfer[ing] parts of [their] own civilian population into the territory [they] occup[y]”. However, it mentions the displacement effect settlements have on Palestinians only briefly and in passing. In a book dedicated to the prohibition of displacement in armed conflict, this focus on Article 49(6) is hard to understand. Indeed, the chapter feels like it was written for a separate project and only included in this book at the last minute, with a few references to displacement added to lessen the incongruity. While Article 49(6) is by no means unrelated to the prohibition on forced displacement, the chapter does not explore this connection, but is intent rather to drive home the illegality of Israeli expansionism in the West Bank. This approach is especially disappointing since the book provided Jacques the opportunity to reframe the debate on the legality of Israel’s settlement policy by moving the discussion away from analysis of Article 49(6) and focusing instead on

Book Review

The work is divided into 9 parts. The introduction establishes the circular causal connection between armed conflict and displacement, and states the book’s aim of providing a comprehensive account of IHL’s treatment of ‘war migrants’. It clearly distinguishes between IHL, refugee, and human rights law, and affirms the continued applicability of these latter branches of international law in wartime. Jacques also contends that IHL’s status as lex specialis in times of armed conflict, as well as the customary status of many of its norms, make it an especially powerful tool for the protection of persons displaced by war. Chapters 1 and 2 consider IHL’s various prohibitions on forced displacement in international and noninternational armed conflicts, and Jacques does a good job setting out the relevant legal provisions that prohibit forcible movement of civilians in wartime, even if her discussion of the mechanics of customary international law is perhaps less detailed and precise than it might have been.

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the way the settlements tend to depopulate areas traditionally inhabited by Palestinian Arabs. This would have marked a major step forward in the legal literature on Israel/ Palestine: by applying her previous chapters’ work on forced displacement to the concrete situation in Palestine to show that the settlements are illegal by virtue of their violating Article 49(1), Jacques could have cleverly undercut Israel’s arguments under Article 49(6) by demonstrating that, even if settlements could be justified under that provision, as Israel claims, nevertheless the displacement they effect renders them illegal under Article 49(1). However, the information presented in Chapters 1 and 2 is largely forgotten as Jacques rehearses arguments that the West Bank is occupied and that settlements and the security wall constitute the kind of colonization prohibited by Article 49(6).

Book Review

Chapters 4 – 7 are generally very good. Chapter 4 provides a very interesting discussion of forced displacement as an international crime, and includes careful and engaging analysis of important ICTY case-law. Jacques convincingly applies the Tadic criteria to show that forced displacement in internal armed conflicts constitutes a war crime, and her analysis of the relationship between Hague and Geneva law as discussed in the Gotovina case is fascinating. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) caught up in armed conflict. Chapter 5 on refugee protection is valuable for its detailed discussion of IHL treaty provisions that deal specifically with refugees. Its analysis of the question whether refugees of enemy nationality are or should be treated differently from non-refugee enemy aliens is especially interesting. Chapter 6 on IDPs usefully brings together a range of IHL and human rights norms to “derive…a basic regime of protection for IDPs”. In this important work Jacques could, however, have gone a little further. For example, Jacques laments that “the Geneva Convention does not consider…women-specific health needs, such as access to reproductive health care” or HIV treatment and prevention. However, since, as she tells us, Article 76(1) of the First Additional Protocol provides that “[w]omen shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape…”, mightn’t Jacques have argued that IHL does indeed impose an obligation on States not only to protect against rape but also, in the event that such protection fails, to care for rape victims, including by provision of HIV/AIDS medications and birth control? One wishes that Jacques had devoted a little more space to considering ways in which the law might be pushed, stretched, and developed to offer greater protection.

One further problem with this chapter is its somewhat disjointed structure. After a thorough analysis of the human rights norms that protect IDPs, Jacques shifts her attention to international law concerning the provision of humanitarian relief and family reunification. These sections are good in themselves, but it is unclear why they are included as sub-parts of the IDP chapter instead of as separate chapters. Jacques justifies this placing by stating that IDPs are especially vulnerable and so especially in need of humanitarian aid and reunification, but while this may be true, the law discussed in this section is not limited to IDPs. As Jacques herself recognizes, IDPs are “like any other victim of war” when it comes to their right to external assistance and family reunification. Additionally, Jacques’s analysis of these issues is sometimes less precise than it could be. Most importantly, she seems to confuse States’ distinct obligations to accept humanitarian aid and to allow the safe passage of humanitarian aid destined for third countries. As a result, some of her conclusions are unclear.

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Chapter 7 concerns the protection of refugee camps from armed attack. While some of this material is a little repetitive, Jacque’s discussion of ‘protected zones’ is original and interesting, suggesting an important way forward for refugee and IDP protection. Jacques distinguishes between a range of different formal and informal ‘protected zones’, and provides an interesting account of the open relief centres that sprang up in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s.The policy prescriptions she provides at the chapter’s end are sensible, and again make one wish that she had dedicated more space throughout the book to her own opinions and recommendations, rather than simply describing the current state of the law. Overall, Jacques’s book provides a generally good tour d’horizon of the lex lata in this important field. However, its overall effect is somewhat undermined by its lack of a unifying argument or theoretical perspective, which makes it difficult to read cover-to-cover. Read in ‘bits’, it is full of helpful, succinct and generally clear statements of black-letter law: students and practitioners seeking a brief exposition of the meaning of particular Articles or an overview of discrete topics will find interesting, informative discussion in its pages. But as a scholarly monograph, it never quite comes together. The transition between legal provisions and ideas feels disconnected at times, and Jacques could have done more to explain and clarify some of the interconnections and tensions among and between different legal rules. Certainly, there are key themes that reappear throughout the text: for instance, Jacques shows (or posits) at various points that international humanitarian law “places too much emphasis on nationality as a criterion for protection”. But these thematic discussions are not sufficiently sustained or integrated, and ultimately cannot provide the book with the unifying argumentative thread that it needs. Despite this, the book is certainly a valuable contribution. In bringing together, explaining, and systematizing (though not, perhaps, fully synthesizing) a wide range of scholarly, legislative, and judicial materials, Jacque’s book will undoubtedly serve as important basis for future research, and will be of real use both to practitioners working in the field and scholars and policy-makers seeking to further develop this most important branch of international law.

Book Review

Daniel Ari Baker New York University

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Ghassan Khatib Palestinian Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: Consensus and Competition in the Palestinian Negotiating Team Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, ISBN: 978 0 415 67374 7, 216 p., £28.00 After two decades of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and peace process; sustainable peace seems to be unattainable. The (compromised) hopes of the Palestinian people to establish their future independent state on merely twenty two per cent of the historical Palestine area, seem to evaporate with the failure of the peace process, the expansion of the Israeli settler-colonial occupation and the entrenchment of the apartheid status. The signing of the Oslo Peace Accords in 1993 was supposed to conclude in 1999 with the emergence of an independent Palestinian state by tackling the final status issues; however as of today neither a Palestinian state nor a peace process do exist. Understanding, analysing and exploring the reasons for the failure of the peace process has always fascinated scholars and researchers alike.

Book Review

This failure of the peace process was due to various reasons such as; the asymmetry of power between both sides; the weak Palestinian negotiation performance; the division between the inside and outside leaderships; the Israeli inflexibility and lack of interest in sustainable peace; the involved actors’ different readings and interpretations of the agreements clauses; the limitations of the third parties problematic involvement; the bias of the United States in favour of Israel and its exclusive domination on the process; and finally the expansion of the Jewish settlements/colonies in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In light of this set of failure reasoning, it remains relevant to ask: Was the peace process from the early beginnings doomed to fail? What went wrong, why and by whom? How did the intra-Palestinian politics and styles of governance interact with the peace process and affected its progress and outcomes? And what lesson can be learnt from two decades of negotiations and failed peace settlement? These are the set of questions to which Ghassan Khatib has provided interesting, detailed and historically embedded answers in his recent book, Palestinian Politics and the Middle East Peace Process: Consensus and Competition in the Palestinian Negotiating Team. The task of this book “is to provide a more nuanced and corrective understanding of the Palestinian leadership” through tackling the relationship between the inside and outside leaderships and how they interact with the structural and environmental defects of the peace process.1 Building on his direct experience as a member of the Palestinian delegation to the peace negotiation, the author examines to what extent did the composition and behaviour of the Palestinian negotiating team or leadership have an impact on the process and outcomes of the negotiations with Israel from Madrid to Oslo II, between 1991 to 1997. In doing so, Khatib provides a background deliberation through the lenses of the leadership role and the structure and outcome of the peace process; examines the emergence and nature of the Palestinian leadership since 1949 and analyses and discusses the Palestinian participation in the peace process, in particular the Madrid conference and the Washington negotiations. The author also examines the performance of the Palestinian delegation in the negotiation

1. Khatib p.23.

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towards the 1993 Oslo agreement through the inside-outside leadership dichotomy. The author ends his analysis by reflecting on the implementation of the Declaration of Principles, the emergence of the new Palestinian élite and the consequences of the peace process failure. Khatib argues that “there was no significant political difference between the inside and outside as distinct groups during the peace process from Madrid till the Interim Agreement in 1996.”2 Thus, the relationship between the Palestinian inside and outside leaderships was complementary: the inside needed the legitimacy and political access of the outside, and the outside needed the unity and representation of the inside.3 This complementary role is the major argument and main thrust of the book which makes it almost distinctive from other scholarly work in this field. However, he also argues that the contrasting realities out of which these two leaderships were born, led them to subsequently employ different approaches and priorities.4 Moreover, the book makes it clear that the structure and open-ended nature of the process and its effect on the behaviours of the leadership; the vagueness of the terms of reference; the restriction on Palestinian representation; and the partial role of the sponsor all contributed to the weakness of the Palestinian leadership, and its negotiation performance.5 This in turn, led to an increase in violence and strengthened the opposition, reducing the leadership’s popularity and allowing it to be further exploited in negotiations.6 While the composition of and behaviour of the Palestinian leadership were not the only factors that had an impact on the process and outcome of negotiations, however, the overall conclusion of this book is that the continuous changes made by the leadership in the composition of its negotiating teams, in particularly the marginalization of the internal leadership (and later its exclusion), displaced previously complementary relations and led to subsequently poor negotiating performance and ultimately flawed agreements. These, in turn (and bearing in mind a continuously hostile negotiating environment) led to a still poorer performance in the on-going negotiations.7

On the other hand, this book suffers from a few drawbacks despite the larger contribution it offers. The reader can notice various repetitions throughout the book, particularly in the first half, in addition to the various introductory statements which sometime harm the flow of 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Ibid p.22. Ibid p.167. Ibid p.169. Ibid p.170. Ibid p.172. Ibid p.4.

Book Review

The strength of this book is that it is inspired by the participation in the peace negotiations and the author being in the Palestinian ‘political kitchen’ until today with the wealth of insider insights and unique access. Additionally, through the historical analysis, the author manages to take the reader into a journey in the details of the early beginnings of the peace process which allow the observers to link the old events with the current trajectories. Hence, the book serves an alert duty and is an eye-opener to a better understanding of the deteriorating conditions of today due to the disastrous decisions that had been taken in the past.

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argumentation. To some extent tackling and judging the existent literature was through the lenses of the dichotomy which is ‘right’ and which is ‘wrong’ which can be problematic and subjective. Also, despite the high expectations at the beginnings that the reader will enjoy a wealth of first-hand ground-breaking new insights, information, and argumentation, this was slightly exaggerated. Furthermore and arguably, the reader can feel some contradictions in the very major argument of the book concerning the complementarity role between the Palestinian outside and inside leaderships. The contradictions weakened the argument on a few occasions through the provided and discussed empirical evidence and the trajectories of the processes. Finally, a substantial part of the book serves as a historical and contextual background, which allows less space for further analysis, discussions and reflections. However, overall this book adds a significant and distinctive contribution to the scholarly work on Palestine and provides various hints and insights to what went wrong over the last two decades in the Middle East peace process and what can be learnt so as to avoid the mistakes in the future. At the end of the day it remains an inspiring book for an uninspiring peace process.

Book Review

Alaa Tartir London School of Economics

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

James Cockayne and Adam Lupel (Eds.) Peace Operations and Organised Crime: Enemies or Allies? Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, ISBN: 978 0 415 60170 2, 240 p., ÂŁ90.00 Peace Operations and Organised Crime: Enemies or Allies? is an important book that addresses a significant although largely unexplored question: the intended and unintended relationships between peace operations and organised crime. Cockayne and Lupel present a theoretical framework alongside contributions from significant figures involved with peacebuilding, security and human rights that address the books task through a discussion of UN policy and a series of detailed case studies. The result has significant implications for the work of strategists and practitioners and deserves to be brought to the attention of all agencies involved in peace keeping and peacebuilding arrangements. Cockayne and Lupel provide a framework for understanding the complexities of intervening in conflicts. Their approach moves discussion beyond the often convenient labelling of states as failed, or criminal to consider the impact of illegal activity on peacekeeping and peacebuilding and how in some circumstances organised crime can act as alternative form of non-state governance. The editors distinguish non-state violence and organised crime by describing an analytical process that sees criminal groups having predatory, parasitic or symbiotic relationship with state governance. Predatory groups stand outside existing structures, parasitic groups are closer to legitimate systems whilst those with a symbiotic relationship can be seen to interact with legitimate structures and may even replicate some of them. Peacekeepers and peacebuilders need to be aware of these distinctions as they plan and implement interventions so that they can guard against the impact of unintended consequences.

The book explores this complexity through two thematic discussions and eight case studies. Holt and Boucher consider the UN responses to organised crime in post-conflict settings, arguing for greater cooperation between peace operations and panels of experts. They point out that criminal networks and corruption can fatally undermine efforts to restore peace and security although there is no single UN process specifically designed to address their presence. Andreas's case study of peace operations in Bosnia reaches a challenging conclusion. He finds that whilst 'illicit business' is commonly portrayed in the role of a peacebuilding spoiler, in Bosnia organised crime had a more symbiotic relationship with peacekeeping and played a crucial role in helping local economies to meet the needs of besieged communities. Friesendorfâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s discussion of fighting organised crime by 'internationals' in Kosovo highlights a failure to coordinate initiatives targeted at illegal activity, undermining

Book Review

The book raises some important questions regarding the implications of framing groups involved in conflict as criminal entities â&#x20AC;&#x201C; arguing that ill-considered labelling can have a significant impact on processes of resolving conflict and peacebuilding. Designating a group or even a state as criminal may be convenient from the perspective of the international community. However this can deny the reality of life on the ground and the extent to which groups that are seen as embodying organised crime can also from part of the societal fabric of some localities - making their eradication difficult to achieve and pointing to the relevance of understanding and working with the dynamic they represent.

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efforts to build domestic security. Reno’s exploration of criminality in West African conflict settings raises further significant issues for peacebuilders, not the least of which is the need to balance processes to transform conflict with the interests of actors who have been labelled criminal but whom retain influence and power. Machal’s study of peace operations and international crime in Somalia argues that a humanitarian perspective in itself is insufficient in an environment where crime is, in the authors terms, an ingrained artefact of life and that little can be done without the establishment of suitable governance that challenges criminality and avoids compromising existing agreements between UN staff and Somalian stakeholders. Gavigan’s study of organised crime in Guatemala argues that a failure to appreciate the impact of peace processes on illicit economies has led to an increase in peacebuilding spoilers. Those intervening in such situations need to develop a comprehensive understanding of political economies associated with illicit power structures so that mediators and negotiators have appropriate contingency plans that can respond to the risk of organised crime undermining peace process. Cockayne's case study of Haiti argues that external interventions may have actually increased the vulnerability of the population to the excesses of organised crime. Felbab-Browns assessment of drugs, wars and crime in Afghanistan argues that inadequate progress in addressing economic, structural and security problems has led to limited success in reducing the production of narcotics. In the authors view eradicating opium crops antagonises the rural population, contributes towards Talibanled counterinsurgency and that without security, there is little chance of reducing the prevalence of an illicit economy. Williams, in the book's final case study finds that organised crime in Iraq emerged as a major factor following the 2003 coalition invasion. He argues the importance of developing systems which support transparency and accountability as well as restricting opportunities by organised crime syndicates, disparate groups and elements of governance to engage in criminality.

Book Review

A second thematic study by Muggah and Krause sees existing peacekeeping and peacebuilding methodology which focuses on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration benefiting from learning arising in the fields of criminal justice and public health in order to develop a more coherent strategy to building peace and security. Finally, the editors present a concluding analysis which argues for peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities acting as a platform for elective interventions including judicial and law enforcement strategies. The editors caution against ‘quick-fix’ strategies. Rather a flexible approach, tailored to the circumstances of a specific conflict is good practice.

This book makes a challenging contribution to peacekeeping and peacebuilding methodology. It successfully treads a delicate line that does not endorse colluding with organised criminal groups - rather the books discussion recognises their existence and influence as a reality in conflict settings. Reflecting on the variety, depth and richness of the volumes case studies reveals broad and transferable themes Firstly, a failure to properly assess the impact of interventions designed to bring about improved security can make the resolution of a complex situation either more intractable or even cause it to deteriorate. This is especially the case in situations where inadequate coordination both between external agencies, and with the local population, is a feature of external interventions. Secondly the influence of organised crime actors is rooted in a pre-conflict phase, and that it is both unrealistic and short-sighted to preclude their engagement by labelling such entities as criminal – not least

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

because this can lead to their influence being exercised as peacekeeping and peacebuilding spoilers in order to maintain economic and societal status. Thirdly, organised crime groups can perform aspects of the functions normally associated with legitimate governance. Failing to assess the impact of such a role can alienate local populations from the objectives that external interventions seek to bring about. Lastly dealing with organised crime requires a range of methods and strategies. The detail of each conflict setting should determine the type of strategy and range of expertise deployed, rather than any pre-existing and externally constructed agenda of action. Dealing with organised crime is not the same as providing humanitarian interventions and requires different forms of expertise and interventions if the efforts of peacebuilding strategists and practitioners are to have some chance of effectiveness. The book does not deal with the impact and demands of western / northern hemisphere societies - the greedy consumption of illicit opiates, blood diamonds, and people trafficking â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and which provides the market place that much organised crime in poorer societyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s exists to serve. However this should not undermine the essential importance of the volume. Those involved in planning and providing peacekeeping and peacebuilding need to acknowledge the reality of organised crime and develop ways of working that includes interacting with such entities if this will contribute to improvements in the security and well-being of ordinary people. This book presents invaluable learning and guidance that will help them to do so more effectively.

Book Review

Richard Slade Coventry University

Journal of Conflict Transformation & Security

Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey and Andrew Silke (Eds.) Terrorism and the Olympic Games: Major Event Security and Lessons for The Future Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011, ISBN: 978 0 415 53242 6, 272 p., £26.00 The link between terrorism and the Olympic Games is not a new one. It has its roots in the events of the Israeli massacre at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, but has really grown as a potential threat over the last ten to fifteen years following parallel but separate rise in the success and media coverage of the Olympic Games alongside the rise in the scope, sophistication and success of certain terrorist organisations in advertising their causes through major acts of terrorism that grab headlines around the world in this age of 24 hour instant news coverage. This volume, therefore, forms a timely attempt to apply current work around terrorism and security to issues to the world’s largest sporting event.

Book Review

Following an introductory chapter by the editors setting the scene for an understanding of the potential and historical links between terrorism and the Olympic Games the rest of the book is divided into three sections. Section one entitled ‘The terrorist threat’ contains three chapters that look at the historical and potential future threats of terrorism to the Olympic Games in general, the London Olympic Games in particular and how terrorists might go about target selection. Section two looks at various ‘Response themes’ and also contains three chapters that investigate transport security, the role of surveillance and designing stadia for safer events. The third and final section comprises almost half of the book and consists of six chapters investigating ‘Coordination, roles and responsibilities’ when planning for major event security and highlights issues such as the role of the private security industry, the challenge of inter-agency coordination and major event security within the European Union area. This section and the book itself concludes with a chapter outlining historical and potential future terrorist threats to the Olympic Games from 1972 in Munich to 2016 in Rio de Janiero.

In their introductory chapter the editors claim that “this volume is not intended to be a oneoff simply because the London Olympics is on the horizon, though it will of course be of value to those practitioners involved with or interested in the 2012 Games”. As a researcher in the area of the Olympic and Paralympic Games this raises a number of criticisms of the volume for me. Firstly the ‘2012 Games’ consists of both the Olympic and Paralympic Games and yet the Paralympic Games are barely mentioned throughout the entire volume, with the exception of chapter four on terrorist target selection where the author, Andrew Silke, dismisses the likelihood of an attack on the Paralympic Games on the grounds that “terrorist groups are unlikely to view attacking disabled athletes as a saleable decision in terms of their supporters and constituents”. I believe this out-of-hand dismissal of the Paralympic Games overlooks a number of potential issues. Firstly, such an attitude could lead to a security services becoming nonchalant about the chances of an attack on a Paralympic Games, potentially even reducing the security budget and coverage as a cost saving measure and thus making the Paralympic Games a softer target than the Olympic Games. Secondly given the unprecedented media coverage of the London Paralympic Games and the fact that nearly 2.5 million tickets were sold terrorists could target the spectators and the high-profile venues rather than the athletes themselves. Finally I believe the authors have

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also over-looked the increasing links between the military and the Paralympic Games, with four countries (Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the USA) having specific programmes that fast-track military personnel injured in the line of duty into their Paralympic training programmes, thus potentially making these ‘military athletes’ legitimate targets in the eyes of some terrorist organisations. The potential for terrorist attacks upon the Paralympic Games are also likely to increase dramatically if the American networks ever start broadcasting live coverage. A similar critique could be made for the lack of discussion of the Winter Olympic Games, although Andrew Silke does at least make a more concerted attempt to justify why the Winter Games are less likely to be targeted. One other criticism I would have of this volume is that with the possible exception of Will Jennings who works in the politics and management of risk in mega-projects and megaevents and has done some work around the Olympic Games all of the authors work in the areas of security, terrorism, criminology or policy and planning with no background in the Olympic Movement or sporting events. In my view this led to two problems. Firstly in some of the chapters it felt that rather than being integrated into the text relevant information about the Olympic Games appeared bolted on in order to justify the title of the book whilst presenting information about terrorism or security that might be relevant to any situation. Secondly, as a researcher in the Olympic and Paralympic studies I think the book would have been strengthened had a chapter been added from someone inside the Olympic movement on the impacts of rising security issues and costs upon the movement, for example in terms of rising costs and the time spent by Olympic officials upon security issues that could otherwise be spent achieving some of the “fundamental principles of ‘Olympism’” outlined by Anthony Richards in chapter two. These criticisms aside, however, this book provides an important introduction to the multifaceted issues faced by mega-event organisers in the current political climate. It is likely that this will be a high profile topic for some time to come and so will become an important aspect of knowledge for anyone with an interest in mega-events either academically or practically. The book clearly highlights the complexities of the issues connected to major event security and raises some difficult questions for organisers of current and future events should the current worldwide political situation remain unchanged. Given the apparently uneventful passing of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games those involved in providing security and counter-terrorist services will no doubt be arguing that the near £2billion cost of providing these services was money well spent!

Book Review

Ian Brittain Coventry University

ISSN: 2041-1944 ISSN: 2041-1944 Journal of Global Analysis endeavours to become the foremost international forum for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of political science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography.

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J OURNAL OF C ONFLICT T RANSFORMATION & S ECURITY