er issues, like racism in America or the Vietnam war, organizations gather together and mix, like finger paintings, to form a "movement.") Friends say that as a sophomore in 1966-67, Rudd became increasingly impatient, irascible, and action-oriented. The refusal of U.S. leaders to pull out of Vietnam really bugged him. "By the end of the spring term, he was almost a Maoist," recalls one classmate. His disgust mounted for President Johnson, for President Kirk, who refused to come out against the United States' involvement in Vietnam publiclv (although Kirk privately had grave reservations about the conAict), and for the "stupid" middle class in America who sheepishly went along with the "senseless slaughter" of Asians. He had to be rebuked by the College's Dean's Office in the spring of 1967 for sitting in a lavy R.O.T.C. class on March 1 with the purpose of disrupting it. 'Vhen he came back to the Morningside campus in September 1967, Rudd frequently appeared as furious and energetic as a newly-caged lion. He was convinced that drastic action- not just talk and picketing-has to be undertaken. In early October Rudd drew up a bold "Position Paper on Strategy for the Rest of the Year." In it he stated that SDS students had to move beyond a mere "posture of radical action." A carefully prepared, direct assault on the University was now necessary "to end university complicity with the war: I.D.A. (Institute for Defense Analyses), N.R.O.T.C., C.I.A. contracts, recruiting, etc." Said Rudd, "We're going to have to develop the two things which we lack now-a coherent strategy and an effective organization." Rudd proposed a timetable of action, from the formulation of strategy for the campaign in early November, 1967, to "Phase V, Mass Action" in April, 1968, when there was to be "A sit-in at Low Library which, after one dav, turns into a general strike. University capitulates." To pull the assaults off, Rudd argued, SDS had to succeed in one vital area: "The radicalization of studentsshowing people the connections in the liberal structure, showing them how our lives are unfree in this society (and at Columbia), getting them to act in their own interest." W'ithout this the SPRING, 1968
take-over would fail. ""'e can never force the University to submit to our demands unless we have behind us the strength of the majority of students on campus." To mobilize student support, Rudd urged "a steady stream of propaganda and exposures," as well as a series of limited actions such as "harrassments of recruiters and N.R.O.T.C.
classes" and spontaneous demonstr:ltions was imperative. '''hat was evident in the position paper was Rudd's single-mindedness about striking a blow at the Government's war effort through actions at Columbia, and his confidence in the manipulability of Columbia's students. Conspicuously absent in the document
Mark Rudd, chairman of the Columbia SDS chapter, addressing a rally on Low Plaza. To strike a blow at the U.S. war effort, he felt the students and faCt/lty had to be "radicalized," the Administration wrecked.
7