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The sin both of men and of angels was rendered possible by the fact that God gave us free will. –C S Lewis
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Thursday, 11 July, 2013
whither pakistan? The need for a cohesive counter-terrorism policy
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egypt’s second act Egyptians haven’t lost it, they have just made a course correction
Washington Watch dr JaMeS J ZogbY
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HOSE who had given up too soon on Egypt and the “Arab Spring” received a jolt this week from the Tamarrod movement. The Egyptian people’s resilience and resolve as manifested in massive and sustained demonstrations were a wonder to witness. As events unfolded in Tahrir Square and beyond, Egypt once again established that it is the “big stage” that can hold the world’s attention. The organisers of Tamarrod were, no doubt, aided by the public’s outrage over President Morsi’s moves toward authoritarian rule and his party’s efforts to monopolise the reins of state power. But the protest movement’s ability to organise this growing unrest into a massive petition drive and nationwide protests has been remarkable. Critics have condemned the military’s decision to intervene and depose the elected head of state, calling it a “coup” with some in the US, including President Obama, going so far as to question a continuation of US assistance programmes. But before making a snap judgment, it might be best to listen to the millions of demonstrators who were calling on the military to act and who have celebrated the downfall of the Morsi government. It might also be wise to take note that the generals did not name one of their own as interim president. Instead they turned authority over to the Chief Justice of the country’s Supreme Constitutional Court. We will see, in the weeks to come, how committed the military is to their “road map” back to an elected civilian government. Whether this is a “coup” or a “course correc-
tion” will ultimately be decided not by their action on July 3rd, but by the degree to which rule of law is restored, rights are protected, and civilian rule is established through a new constitution and elections. In a real sense this is not a “Second Revolution” as much as it is a continuation of the process that began two-and-one-half years ago. Whoever said ‘you don’t get do-overs in politics’ got it wrong. What the Tamarrod movement has done, with the support of the military, is given the Egyptian people another opportunity to redo their revolution. But demonstrations alone don’t make change. Organisation, strategy, and the ability to implement that strategy are critical to success. This time, instead of rushing into new elections, the sequencing of events will be important. First the constitution must be amended—this time by a body that is representative of the character and demographics of the Egyptian people. The fact that the military has invited the participation of liberals and conservatives, Christian and Muslim leadership, young people and women is a hopeful sign of the inclusiveness that will be needed if the aspirations of all the people will be reflected in what is to be the country’s charter document. This time, the leaders of the protest movement must join with the existing political parties or form a party of their own that can turn their petition and mobilisation successes into electoral victories. The structure they created to collect 22 million endorsements and to turn out and effectively administer mass nationwide demonstrations was no small feat. But now this must be converted into a permanent structure that can be effective in organising and turning out voters and representing their interests. That was what was missing the last time. With the dissolution of the Mubarak-era NDP, the Muslim Brotherhood was left as the country’s only remaining effective political structure, thus enabling it to win a series of elections in rapid succession. And this time, Egypt’s leaders, both civilian and military, must focus on the needs of the people. Our polling, before and after the downfall of President Mubarak, established the fact that the principal concerns of the majority of Egyptians were and remain economic. The only political concerns they raised were “corruption and nepotism” reflecting their frustration with wealth and power being con-
centrated in the hands of a few, at the expense of the many. The Brotherhood appeared not to understand this reality. Instead of immediately turning their attention to economic development and job creation, they focused on consolidating power, imposing their agenda, and punishing critics. This was surprising given their supposed business acumen and reputation as social service providers. In their failure to focus on meeting people’s needs and their failure to develop a more inclusive approach to governing, they ended up redefining “nepotism and corruption” to mean the Brotherhood. If this “second act” is to succeed, Egypt’s people will need to see immediate signs of change. The promised interim government of technocrats will need to be made up of respected and competent figures. The committee charged with amending the constitution will need to be inclusive of all segments of society and parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood. Between now and elections, those who want a different outcome, must undertake the hard work of organising for political power. And beginning now, efforts must be made to address the country’s dire economic conditions. While long-term planning and structural reform is a must, “quick fixes” should be considered as a way to buy needed time. Here is where the resources of the military, Egypt’s business community, and friends of Egypt can be helpful in designing and implementing a short-term jobcreation and benefits programme that, in the term used during America’s Great Depression, can “put a chicken in every pot”. Change is never easy and is most often messy. If the events of the last two years have demonstrated anything it is that the Egyptian people want change, they feel empowered to demand change, and, when it is not forthcoming, those in power will be held on a short leash that can be pulled back. I was pleased that our last poll was able to define the political context leading up to the June 30th demonstrations. I only wish we could predict the future with the same precision as we are able to take a snapshot of the present. What is clear is that Egyptians are finding their way through uncharted waters. They have made a “course correction” giving themselves a second chance. This time, we can all hope they get it right. The writer is President, Arab American Institute.
CCORDING to media reports the US and the Pakistan military engaged in a prolonged and arduous process of negotiations that led to the roadmap for the peace process in Afghanistan – the roadmap that is now being followed through Doha. President Hamid Karzai’s objections to some preliminary steps in Doha seem to bear out this assertion – he wanted to be recognised as a party and not sidelined. If all this is true then the perception that it is the military in Pakistan that calls the shots on national security issues gets reinforced. This will continue to be the situation till the newly elected government gets structures in place that coordinate intelligence to get a finished national intelligence estimate that can then be used to develop options for a national coordinated response. How this is done is a challenge for the government but it can be and should be done as soon as possible because the simultaneous problems that the country faces simply cannot be resolved by meetings and ad hoc measures. The need is for decision making and policy formulation and policy implementation. The discussions with the Taliban are with the Afghan Taliban – the segment that is fighting the US and NATO presence in Afghanistan. These discussions will revolve around the prisoners in Guantanamo, the Constitution of Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces and the make-up of the political and other institutions in Afghanistan. A successful conclusion of the dialogue could lead to a smooth exit for the US/ISAF from Afghanistan and political space for the Taliban. How this arrangement endures over a period of time will be an Afghan problem but it could have considerable impact for Afghanistan’s neighbours and those with economic interests in Afghanistan and beyond. The post-2014 US policy for greater South Asia will be an important factor – as will be Pakistan’s stability. Pakistan’s problem is the insurgency in its western areas spearheaded by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) but also being waged by a multitude of other smaller groups with their own interests and agendas. The TTP combine gets inspiration and support from others that see a destabilised Pakistan with exploitable vulnerabilities as being in their interest. Militant groups with sectarian, ethnic and separatist groups based within Pakistan have loosely aligned themselves with the TTP as well as politically sponsored criminal mafias within Pakistan. The result is a pattern of violence that defies any rational interpretation and that creates the image of Pakistan as an unraveling state incapable of cohesive focused action that cannot be economically viable unless its internal security problem is decisively addressed.
Like most such situations this is basically a struggle for control and power using religion and social divides to further a strategy. Pakistan has to face its demons and eschew the mindset that they feed upon. This brings us back to the question of a national response based on the threats identified in a national intelligence estimate. A successful reconciliation process in Afghanistan may help but will not resolve Pakistan’s problems. Pakistan has to do this on its own. To do this Pakistan’s foreign policy must reduce external threats including support to those destabilising Pakistan internally. The economic policy must address the energy issue and give the nation a blueprint for recovery. The internal security situation must be addressed through a thought out strategy that has all the stakeholders on board and works to integrate the country. This will require some bold and drastic decision making. This can only happen if the downgraded National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is made into a National Intelligence and Counter Terrorism Authority that has the mandate to coordinate all intelligence activity to produce a National Intelligence Estimate. A National Security Adviser (NSA) in the absence of a National Security Council and a secretariat of experts is of no use. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) could be upgraded into a National Security Committee of the Cabinet (NSCC) with prime responsibility for decision making based on the response options developed by the NSA and his secretariat staff. The military will have to support this structure with its own organisational strength. These steps will give the civil-military relationship much needed stability and institutionalise policy formulation and implementation. Spearhead Analyses are collaborative efforts and not attributable to a single individual.