SA Intelligencer Number 83
26 October 2010 Editor: Dalene Duvenage Contributions and enquiries dalene@4knowledge.co.za
Reports from October 2010 Protection of information and leaks: impact on intelligence Page 2 Reduced intelligence sharing HUMINT: breakdown of trust and reduced access A counter intelligence nightmare Everyone cannot be an intelligence analyst! A changed role for the media in intelligence Russia: parliament moves to expand official secrets list Secrets case launched against Ukraine museum head Uganda: Museveni passes law on telephone tapping Developments in world of intelligence Page 8 Niger ex-intelligence chief arrested: source Botswana: opposition party BNF wants DIS disbanded Message from the CIA Director: Lessons from Khowst Selective sharing of information on David Headley by US angers India CIA and FBI sent on museum course to refresh sense of inquiry Canada may need foreign spy service as intelligence gathering expands: watchdog Australia: Report criticizes spies’ handling of secrets, as complaints against agencies rise steeply Australia: Spy agency cancels jihadists’ passports UK/Australia: James Bondi: Australian secret service tries to recruit British spies UK: Intelligence assumes a front-line position in SDSR Subscriptions: info@4knowledge.co.za Also available at www.4knowledge-za.blogspot.com/
From the editor I’m sitting in Nigeria writing this edition - expensive internet access forces me to focus on those issues I think might not have received coverage in the mass media. This edition looks at the consequences of the new intelligence landscape after the Wikileaks, some developments on access to information in other countries, and developments in the world of intelligence. The new Iraqi Wikileaks saga again emphasizes the tension between the intelligence community and human rights groups on protection of information. Here in South Africa, the proposed Protection of Information Bill gave rise to an unprecedented debate on our hard-earned human rights of access to information and freedom of speech. This debate reverberates in democracies all over the world and highlights the difficulties in respecting human rights vis-à-vis the state’s mandate to defend the country. There is little empathy in the “open” world with the reality that intelligence organizations all over the world are using the same rules of classification and protection of their information and sources, whether open or secret. If one intelligence agency were to open the access floodgates, it will have a negative impact on human source’s lives and their willingness to provide crucial information that is not available by any other means. The reverberations in the world of counter intelligence and espionage will be far-reaching and put the country’s interests in danger. The upside of the debate is that all parties at least talk to each other: the nature of intelligence is better understood (hopefully) and intelligence organizations redefine and narrow their interpretation of “national security” and classification procedures. Dalene Duvenage Upcoming 4Knowledge courses 17-28 October 2010: Intelligence investigations, Nigeria 9-12 November 2010: Internet Intelligence, Pretoria 15-19 November 2010: Intelligence Analysis, Pretoria 22-26 November 2010: Intelligence-driven investigations, Pretoria
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Below is a 3D visualisation of the WIkileaks documents on Afghanistan. For more information on Starlight Visualisation software, visit www.futurepointsystems.com or contact dalene@4knowledge.co.za.
Protection of information and leaks: impact on intelligence Editor: These are some excerpts from various sources on the ramifications of the Wikileaks reports on both Afghanistan and Iraq on the intelligence environment. The 1st consequence: Reduced Intelligence sharing Bruce Riedel, Sunday Independent, 28 July 2010
“In the wake of 9/11 there was an enormous shift in the way that counter-terrorism intelligence was shared. No threat goes unreported now and intelligence goes to the maximum number of potential consumers because nobody wants to be blamed for a second 9/11. But the Afghanistan leak is likely to lead to more controls to prevent self-proclaimed whistleblowers from gaining access to this kind of information. Things are unlikely to revert entirely to the way they were, but there will be an effort to groom distribution lists and to monitor consumers. Wikileaks may find themselves having made such leaks less, rather than more, likely in the future. Once you begin to protect the dissemination list, the first to fall off are foreigners. That makes the Afghan situation even more difficult for the 40 countries with troops on the ground. Intelligence sharing is absolutely critical, but if there are doubts as to who can keep a secret, there will be pressure to pool information more closely...” The 2nd consequence: HUMINT: Breakdown of trust and reduced access Bruce Riedel, Sunday Independent, 28 July 2010
“The second big ramification will be with friends and allies of the US, particularly the Pakistanis, who are going to look at this and say: "We may be duplicitous, but at least we can keep a secret."
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On the ground in Afghanistan, the story is likely to be widely spread that if you tell the Americans anything, it will show up on a computer somewhere with your name on it and the Taliban can come after you. That's going to have a chilling effect on intelligence gathering in Afghanistan. It will make very tough intelligence channels even more difficult. It may also lead to less sharing with allies.� The 3rd consequence: A counter intelligence nightmare Gary Thomas, Voice of America, 03 August 2010
"I believe that this information puts those in Afghanistan who have helped us at risk," Gates said. "It puts our soldiers at risk because they [the Taliban] can learn a lot, our adversaries can learn a lot about our techniques, tactics and procedures from the body of these leaked documents. And so I think that is what puts our soldiers at risk, and then, as I say, our sources. And, you know, growing up in the intelligence business, protecting your sources is sacrosanct." Documents containing the names of sources were marked "Secret," a mid-level security classification. They then were widely distributed across a classified Pentagon computer network called "SIPRnet," a kind of classified Internet, as one analyst put it, which was set up to foster greater information-sharing within the defense and intelligence communities. Officials believe this is how the leaker got his hands on them. Former CIA director Hayden emphasizes that the Pentagon's rules may be different than those of the CIA. But he adds that it is tough to balance the security of intelligence sources' identities with the need for analysts to know them in order to properly assess the information they provide. "I am not calling for the widest distribution of source-identifying data," Hayden said. "But very often an analyst, to understand what gravity he wants to give to the information he has in front of him, what credibility, depends somewhat on who the source is. So you really have a dilemma here, don't you? I mean, enough data to allow the analyst to do what he has to do, but not so much that the vertent [deliberate] or inadvertent leakage of it puts somebody at risk. That is a pretty narrow sweet [optimum] spot." The Taliban has said it is studying the Wikileaks documents to identify and hunt down informants who have aided U.S. forces. The 4th consequence: Everyone cannot be an Intelligence Analyst! The Atlantic: July 27 2010
WikiLeaks' release of 92,000 military intelligence documents, now being parsed by media outlets across the globe, has sparked a groundbreaking experiment in opensource intelligence analysis. For the first time, journalists and amateurs can access and draw conclusions from the intelligence typically restricted to professional government analysts. But we in the public may be about to learn the same lesson that the Bush administration learned the hard way in the months and years following September 11: Analyzing intelligence is a science. It has specialized practices and methods. Done wrong, it can be dangerous.
For the first time, journalists and amateurs can access and draw conclusions from the intelligence typically restricted to professional government analysts. But we in the public may be about to learn the same lesson that the Bush administration learned the hard way in the months and years following September 11: Analyzing intelligence is a science. It has specialized practices and methods. Done wrong, it can be dangerous‌
As Jane Mayer documents in The Dark Side, one of President Bush's first and most serious mistakes after 9/11 was cutting out the intelligence analysts. Mayer writes: “In the days immediately after
Editor: Dalene Duvenage
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the attack, he and Cheney demanded to see all available raw intelligence reports concerning additional possible threats to America on a daily basis. Cheney had long It's like trying to put been a skeptic about the CIA's skills, and was particularly insistent on together a jigsaw puzzle. reviewing the data himself. "The mistake," [high-ranking National You maybe have 200 pieces Security Council official Roger] Cressey concluded later, "was not to of the puzzle. The first thing you don't know is, is have proper analysis of the intelligence before giving it to the President. this a 500-piece or 1,000There was no filter. Most of it was garbage. None of it had been piece puzzle? And then corroborated or screened. But it went directly to the President and his with the 200 pieces you advisers, who are not intelligence experts. That's when mistakes got have, maybe half of them made." don't belong to this puzzle at all. They're in the wrong box. And then every hour In reviewing raw intelligence without the standard rigors of the analysis or so, someone comes process, the Bush White House was led to policies of historic along and dumps 10 more significance. The two most famous were their conclusions, based on pieces on your desk -- and highly fragmentary intelligence, that Saddam Hussein was actively nine of them aren't even seeking weapons of mass destruction and that Iraq had ties to alpart of it.� Bruce Riedel Qaeda. The mistakes were so serious that eventually the Bush administration not only reinstated the role of analysts but actually increased their prominence in the intelligence process. The long-standing "wall" between the CIA's analysis and operations wings, the latter of which is responsible for gathering intelligence, has been partially dismantled so that analysts can better oversee and vet the gathering process.
Intelligence generally comes in several forms, and during CIA Director George Tenet's tenure from 1997 to 2004, one of the most common sources of intel on Afghanistan was HUMINT, or human intelligence, which is derived from conversations and interrogations. But all intelligence, especially HUMINT, can be notoriously unreliable and fragmentary. Much of it comes from speculation, second-hand rumors, or outright lies. Often the source has an agenda; sometimes he or she simply wants to get paid. One of the most important jobs of an intelligence analyst is determining the veracity of intelligence, most of which he or she is likely to discard. This week, as tens of thousands of pieces of intelligence are made publicly available on the Internet, the media may risk falling into the same trap as did the Bush White House of treating junk intelligence as gold. We are already seeing various reports, based on conjecture in the leaked intelligence documents, that Osama bin Laden is linked to Iran, that he bought remotecontrolled rockets from North Korea, and that he died in June 2007 in Peshawar. Clearly, not all of these reports can be true, and most likely none of them are. Will the media seize on the allegations of Iranian support for al-Qaeda as actionable fact or as the ambiguous intelligence fragment that it is? Unlike the president of the United States, the media does not have the power to launch a war in the Middle East. But it does have the power to influence public opinion, which can lead to changes in policy. The Bush administration learned the risks and the lessons of evaluating raw intelligence outside the rigors of professional analysis. With 92,000 pieces of raw intel now accessible to anyone with an Internet connection, every curious journalist, editor, and reader will have to develop tremendous skepticism. It may be time to modify the adage of media in the Drudge era: We are all analysts now.
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The 5th consequence: A changed role for the media in intelligence The Atlantic, Jul 25 2010
The rogue, rather mysterious website provided the raw data; the newspapers provided the context, corroboration, analysis, and distribution. While the impact of the documents and newspaper reportage on the war in Afghanistan will take a while to "In media history up to now, the press is suss out, the publication of these documents will be seen free to report on what the powerful wish as a milestone in the new news ecosystem. Traditional to keep secret because the laws of a given media organizations are increasingly reaching out to nation protect it. But Wikileaks is able to different kinds of smaller outfits for help compiling data report on what the powerful wish to keep and conducting investigations. New conduits have opened secret because the logic of the Internet permits it. This is new." – Jay Rosen into the most highly regarded newsrooms in the country; while that's probably a good thing, it adds a layer of complexity to a story like this. The New York Times' David Carr may have nailed the issue when he tweeted that it was the "asymmetries" that Wikileaks introduces into the equation that have the government spooked. In the new asymmetrical journalism, it's not clear who is on what side or what the rules of engagement actually are. But the reason Wikileaks may have just changed the media is that we found out that it doesn't really matter. Their data is good, and that's what counts. NYU journalism professor Jay Rosen calls WikiLeaks the first "stateless news organization" in an excellent post on this episode."In media history up to now, the press is free to report on what the powerful wish to keep secret because the laws of a given nation protect it," Rosen writes. "But Wikileaks is able to report on what the powerful wish to keep secret because the logic of the Internet permits it. This is new." Robert Parry, Baltimore Chronicle 30 July 2010 Journalists also bear a profound responsibility to the American people, who represent the sovereign power of a democratic Republic. The United States is not a monarchy or a dictatorship where government secrets are the possession of a king or the dictator. Information is not only the lifeblood of the democracy but it belongs to the democracy. That has been a fundamental principle of American self-governance for more than two centuries despite delusions of grandeur among some recent presidents, like Richard Nixon and George W. Bush who believed they owned their White House secrets and could even bequeath them to their descendants. Without doubt, there are legitimate secrets that the public doesn’t need to know and that would cause grave dangers if released (such as how to construct nuclear weapons). But what I have seen time and again is that the government over-classifies information, either from an exaggerated fear of hypothetical risks or from political expediency. My rule of thumb is that journalists who come into possession of classified material must lean toward sharing the information with the people while exercising common-sense restraint to avoid unnecessary harm. Granted, that is not a perfect solution. It is not without risks, but nothing is. Also read: Open government’s Secrecy Report Card: http://www.openthegovernment.org/otg/SecrecyRC_2010.pdf
In other parts of the world... Russia: Parliament moves to expand official secrets list 22/09/2010 RIA Novosti. Andrei Stenin
The lower house of the Russian parliament on Wednesday adopted amendments to the Official Secrets Act enlarging the list of information that constitutes a state secret.
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The State Duma passed in the first reading a bill that classifies information related to anti-terrorism activity as officially secret, including measures to protect vital infrastructure and potentially dangerous installations. It also lists information related to the means, methods, sources, plans and results of anti-terrorism activity, as well as the monitoring of organizations and individuals involved in terrorist activity. In its advisory opinion, however, the State Duma Legal Department noted that some of the bill's definitions need clarification - for example, the concept of "protection of critical installations" and "potentially dangerous elements of infrastructure." As concerns the means, methods, sources, plans and results of anti-terrorism activity, such information is, as a general rule, the result of intelligence or counterintelligence activity and therefore already constitutes an official secret, the department said. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100922/160687187.html
Secrets case launched against Ukraine museum head Sep 9 2010 | Reuters Ukraine's state security service on Thursday opened a criminal probe against a museum director on suspicion of preparing to divulge secrets in what appeared to be a toughening of policy on declassifying historical documents. Under former President Viktor Yushchenko, old KGB archives in the ex-Soviet republic were opened up in 2009 and thousands of documents spanning the Soviet period were declassified. But a new state security (SBU) chief, appointed when President Viktor Yanukovich came to power in February, has come out against free public access to KGB-era files and said the job of Ukraine's SBU service is to guard secrets, not leak them. On Thursday, the SBU said it had opened an investigation against Ruslan Zabily, director of a museum in Ukraine's western city of Lviv, for preparing to divulge state secrets. Zabily -- whose museum is dedicated to the tens of thousands who died in western Ukraine under Soviet and Nazi rule -- had illegally gathered material containing state secrets, and intended to pass this on to other people, an SBU statement said. He denied any state secrets were being compromised and said the historical documents on his laptop, which was seized by SBU agents on Wednesday, were publicly available. Zabily, speaking at a Kiev news conference Zabily on Thursday, said the move was part of a drive by the Yanukovich leadership to play down the role of the Ukrainian nationalist movement in the nation's history and cover up Soviet-era abuses. New SBU chief Valery Khoroshkovsky reversed Yushchenko's policy on the KGB archives after taking over earlier this year and said: "The job of the secret service is primarily to guard its secrets, guard the laws that created these secrets." Volodymyr Vyatrovych, a former SBU archives chief who played an energetic role in opening up historical files until he was sacked when Yanukovich took over, said the action against Zabily seemed like a "witchhunt against historians". "SBU agents not only are trying to cover up the crimes of the Stalin regime, but use his methods today as if it is not 2010 but 1937," Vyatrovych said in a statement. The SBU said compromising material had been found on Zabily when he arrived in Kiev from Lviv on Wednesday. Its statement said action was under way "to identify the circle of people to whom the secret information had been intended." Editor: Dalene Duvenage
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Read more: http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/81748/#ixzz10uTc4jeU
Uganda: Museveni Passes Law On Telephone Tapping Emmanuel Mulondo: 29 September 2010 (Ed: excerpted)
Kampala — President Yoweri Museveni has signed into law the Regulation of Interception of Communications Bill, 2010, giving powers to security officials to listen into private communication if they have sufficient reason to suspect the communication is in aid of criminal activity. The controversial Bill, which attracted criticism from media and human rights activists, was passed by Parliament on July 14, just three days after the twin terrorist bombing at Kyadondo Rugby grounds and Ethiopian Village Bar and Restaurant, in which at least 76 people were killed. President Museveni assented to it two weeks later on August 5 and, according to the Uganda gazette it came into force on September 3. Popularly referred to as the "Phone tapping law," the Act initiated by Security Minister Amama Mbabazi empowers security agencies to tap private conversations for security purposes. Mr Mbabazi, who could not be reached for Pres Museveni of Uganda comment yesterday, said during debate on the draft that the law was overdue. The bombings helped its quiet passage as it drowned out voices calling for careful scrutiny before its passage. The Act makes it compulsory for all mobile phone users in the country to register their SIM cards for security purposes such that if a sim card is used for criminal communication and coordination, the user can be traced. Communications that could be intercepted under the law include internet and postal exchanges. The minister is empowered to make regulations to follow in the implementation and now all telecom companies operating in the country have an obligation to register all customers who join their networks. Telecom companies are obliged to give government security agencies cooperation to place their (agencies') tapping gadgets on their network equipment with the aim of enabling the security men access private conversations or exchanges. But according to the law, only a High Court judge can grant permission to a state security operative to tap into a person's “Nowhere in the world was government 100 percent open communication. The Act provides for the establishing of a because there were strategic, monitoring centre manned, operated and controlled by security and social reasons� designated technical experts appointed by the Security Ugandan Army spokesperson minister. Now information secured in this covert way is admissible as evidence in courts of law, which has not been the case. Critics say though there's legitimate concern to fight terror, the government is likely to go beyond the spirit of the law and eavesdrop into purely personal or other non-security discourses. Meanwhile, Information and National Guidance Minister Kabakumba Masiko yesterday expressed government's commitment to the full implementation of the Access to Information Act. Ms Masiko had just closed a dialogue to mark World Right to Know Day in Kampala. Several speakers from both civil society and the media had complained about government's lukewarm attitude towards the implementation of the law, five years since its enactment. Human Rights Commission chairman Editor: Dalene Duvenage
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Med Kaggwa, Head of Public Service John Mitala, National guidance Commissioner Kambarage Kakonge and UPDF Spokesman Lt Col Felix Kulayigye although recognised the right to information, said that nowhere in the world was government 100 percent open because there were strategic, security and social reasons. http://allafrica.com/stories/201009290177.html
Developments in the world of intelligence Niger ex-intelligence chief arrested: source Star Africa: 19/10/10
Niger's intelligence chief was dismissed Monday, days after four senior members of the ruling junta were arrested for an alleged "attempt to destabilise the regime", an official source said. Seini Chekaraou headed the country's counter-espionage agency and is reportedly close to Colonel Abdoulaye Badie, the former number two in Niger's junta, who was arrested on Friday, according to those close to junta chief General Salou Djibo. The junta took power in a February 18 coup which ousted President Mamadou Tandja after a decade in power. Djibo has named lieutenant-colonel Yaye Hamadou to replace Chekaraou, according to a decree read on public radio. Badie and three others were arrested over an alleged plot that aimed to delay the pledged transition to civilian rule. The transition process is due to kick off on October 31 with a constitutional referendum followed by a presidential election on January 31. Rumours of another coup have swirled in Niamey over the past few weeks. For several days, the military presence in the capital and its suburbs has been stepped up with larger patrols, particularly at night. http://www.starafrica.com/en/news/politics/article/niger-intelligence-chief-dismissed115460.html
Botswana: Opposition party BNF wants DIS disbanded LEKOPANYE MOOKETSI, 12 October 2010 (Ed: excerpted)
The Botswana National Front (BNF) youth league staged a march on 9 October 2010 at Nkurumah Freedom Square in Gaborone West to demand that the spy agency be disbanded. Addressing the rally, the president of the youth league, Kagiso Ntime warned that this will not be the last time they march against the DIS. He said they are going to declare 2011, the year of mass action. He dismissed DIS as a notorious organisation involved in violations of human rights, unlike its predecessor, the Special Branch. He said DIS funds could be used for political purposes and this is why the money is not accounted for. "This is why we don't want the DIS," he charged as he called for the disbanding of the organisation. He suspects that the DIS is trailing him. He said he was forced to buy a Blackberry cellphone because he suspected that the other sets he was using are bugged. He said the phones were always making strange noises.
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He said the BNF is not against the country having a spy agency, but they are opposed to the manner in which DIS is run. Ntime said even the BNF used to have its own intelligence gathering wing. Addressing the same rally BNF president, Duma Boko wondered what security threat Botswana is facing to justify the formation of DIS. "Do we really need DIS," Boko asked rhetorically. "We should be asking whether DIS is capable of intelligence gathering. Does it have people who are capable of intelligence work," he questioned. "Do the men who are running the organisation have the expertise, not necessarily being marksmen," he added. Boko alleged that DIS has been maiming and killing people because it does not want to take them to court. He added that the cases investigated by the DIS do not end up in court like those that are handled by the police. The BNF leader said the police have been trained for investigations, while DIS personnel have not been trained to do this. He said DIS can do anything because they are only accountable to President Ian Khama. "We want DIS disbanded. DIS will get President Khama into trouble. He will end up at the International Court of Justice," he cautioned. http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=1&aid=5554&dir=2010/October/Tuesday12
US: The decline of the independent CIA Presidents — including Obama — have corrupted or ignored intelligence estimates By Melvin A. Goodman: Baltimore Sun: October 18, 2010 (Ed: excerpted)
President Harry S. Truman created the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 to ensure that the policy community would have access to independent intelligence analysis that was free of the advocacy of the Department of State and Department of Defense. The CIA's most important analytic mission was the production of national intelligence estimates (NIEs) and assessments that tracked significant political and military developments and provided premonitory intelligence on looming threats and confrontations. But over the years, that independent function has too often been corrupted, ignored or dispensed with altogether with disastrous results. Presidents Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson did not interfere with the production of intelligence analysis in these crises as America faced armed conflicts; two presidents (Richard Nixon and George W. Bush) tried to slant intelligence analysis; and now a president Barack Obama is fighting an Afghanistan war without benefit of the estimative capabilities of the intelligence community at all. The Iraq War, of course, brought forth the worst in CIA tailoring of intelligence, particularly in the run-up to the war. The CIA cherry-picked the evidence to support the Bush administration's case for war and “Either President Obama does not believe that the CIA and the intelligence thoroughly corrupted the intelligence process to convince community have the resources to the Congress and the American people of the need for provide useful insight into these invasion. In October 2002, the CIA produced a phony matters or he realizes that the findings intelligence assessment on Iraqi weapons of mass of such an assessment would not be helpful to the policy he had already destruction (WMD) and then a declassified White Paper decided to pursue” on WMD, which was nothing less than an exercise in Melvin Goodman, Author of various policy advocacy and thus a violation of the CIA's charter. books on intelligence The efforts of Vice President Dick Cheney and his chief of staff, Lewis Libby, to tailor CIA intelligence have been well documented. The failure to tell truth to power in the case of the Iraq War is the most serious intelligence failure in U.S. history. The Obama administration's decision-making on the Afghan War has been both puzzling and disappointing. President Obama campaigned on the basis of greater openness and transparency in government as well as a willingness to consult diverse viewpoints. His decision-making on
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Afghanistan has offered none of this, particularly with his failure to commission NIEs on Afghanistan in 2009 before the decisions were made to significantly expand U.S. forces there. An intelligence assessment could help to answer crucial questions regarding the course of the Afghan War, including relations between the Taliban and Al Qaeda; the success of a counterinsurgency campaign without the benefit of a stable indigenous government; the unwillingness of Pakistan to degrade and disrupt Taliban efforts to launch military or terrorist attacks; and the uncertainty of stabilizing governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Either President Obama does not believe that the CIA and the intelligence community have the resources to provide useful insight into these matters or he realizes that the findings of such an assessment would not be helpful to the policy he had already decided to pursue. Melvin A. Goodman is a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy and adjunct professor of government at Johns Hopkins University. http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-intelligence-failures20101018,0,2904415.story
Message from the CIA Director: Lessons from Khowst CIA Website: October 2010 (Ed: excerpted)
“Earlier this year, I directed that a task force of seasoned Agency professionals conduct a review of the Khowst attack. The purpose was to examine what happened, what lessons were learned, and what steps should be taken to prevent such incidents in the future. In addition, I asked Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Charlie Allen, a highly accomplished former Agency officer, to conduct an independent study of the Khowst attack and to review the work of CIA Director Panetta the task force. They concurred with its findings. One of CIA’s greatest strengths is our ability to learn from experience, refine our methods, and adapt to the shifting tactics of America’s enemies. In highly sensitive, complex counterterrorism operations, our officers must often deal with dangerous people in situations involving a high degree of ambiguity and risk. The task force noted that the Khowst assailant fit the description of someone who could offer us access to some of our most vicious enemies. He had already provided information that was independently verified. The decision to meet him at the Khowst base—with the objective of gaining additional intelligence on high priority terrorist targets—was the product of consultations between Headquarters and the field. He had confirmed access within extremist circles, making a covert relationship with him—if he was acting in good faith—potentially very productive. But he had not rejected his terrorist roots. He was, in fact, a brutal murderer. Mitigating the risk inherent in intelligence operations, especially the most sensitive ones, is essential to success. In this case, the task force determined that the Khowst assailant was not fully vetted and that sufficient security precautions were not taken. These missteps occurred because of shortcomings across several Agency components in areas including communications, documentation, and management oversight. There are no guarantees in the dangerous work of counterterrorism, but the task force identified six key areas that deserve greater focus as we carry out that vital mission. We will: Enforce greater discipline in communications, ensuring that key guidance, operational facts, and judgments are conveyed and clearly flagged in formal channels. Strengthen our attention to counterintelligence concerns while maintaining a wartime footing.
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Apply the skills and experience of senior officers more effectively in sensitive cases. Require greater standardization of security procedures. More carefully manage information sharing with other intelligence services. Maintain our high operational tempo against terrorist targets, even as we make adjustments to how we conduct our essential mission. I have approved 23 specific actions recommended by the task force, some of which I ordered implemented months ago. They provide for organizational and resource changes, communications improvements, tightened security procedures, more focused training, and reinforced counterintelligence practices. These include: Establishing a War Zone Board made up of senior officers from several components and chaired by the Director of the National Clandestine Service. It will conduct a baseline review of our staffing, training, security, and resources in the most dangerous areas where we operate. Assembling a select surge cadre of veteran officers who will lend their expertise to our most critical counterterrorism operations. Creating an NCS Deputy within the Counterterrorism Center, who will report to the Director of the Counterterrorism Center and ensure a more integrated effort across Agency offices. Conducting a thorough review of our security measures and applying even more rigorous standards at all our facilities. Expanding our training effort for both managers and officers on hostile environments and counterintelligence challenges. Creating an integrated counterintelligence vetting cell within our Counterterrorism Center that focuses on high-risk/high-gain assets, evaluates potential threats, assesses “lessons learned,” and applies the latest technology and best practices to counterterrorism operations. Designating a senior officer to ensure that all the recommendations are indeed implemented. We’ve now taken a hard look at what happened and what needed to be done after the tragedy at Khowst. While we cannot eliminate all of the risks involved in fighting a war, we can and will do a better job of protecting our officers. Drawing on the work of the task force and its insights, it’s time to move forward. Nothing in the report can relieve the pain of losing our seven fallen colleagues. By putting their lives on the line to pursue our nation’s terrorist enemies, they taught us what bravery is all about. It is that legacy that we will always remember in our hearts. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-2010/messagefrom-the-director-lessons-from-khowst.html
Selective sharing of information on David Headley by US angers India DNA/New Delhi, Oct 20, 2010
United States President Barack Obama’s visit to India is just a few weeks away and New Delhi and Washington DC are sparring over at India’s anger at what it perceives is the US’s selective sharing of intelligence information. The cause of the rift is reports that US counter-intelligence agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), had kept silent for years about the identity of David Headley, who played a key role in the run-up to Editor: Dalene Duvenage
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the 26/11 attacks. According to recent reports on Headley’s confessions, he has spoken about the ISI masterminding the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 and that senior ISI *Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence] bosses had visited Lashkar-e-Toiba militants in prison the attacks. Pakistan had arrested a few LeT militants soon after 26/11, but insisted that the ISI had no connection with the attacks. Headley’s wives have claimed that they had informed the authorities about his links to terrorist groups, his visits to Mumbai for reconnaissance, and that the FBI was aware of his earlier name (Headley was born Daood Gilani). New Delhi is angry that Washington did not share any of the information, including the fact that Headley’s earlier name was Daood Gilani and that he was of Pakistani origin. Headley’s American wife said that Headley was active with the LeT, had trained in terrorist camps with the same group that carried out the attacks in Mumbai, and bought night vision goggles. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_selective-sharing-of-information-on-david-headley-by-usangers-india_1455238
CIA and FBI sent on museum course to 'refresh sense of inquiry' CIA and FBI agents have been sent on a course at a New York museum to "refresh their sense of inquiry" by analysing paintings. Jon Swaine, 25 Oct 2010 (Ed: excerpted)
They are among groups of law enforcement officials, also including New York police officers and members of the US Secret Service, who have attended classes at the city's Metropolitan Museum of Art. The course, titled The Art of Perception, is aimed at improving officers' ability to describe what they see in the course of their inquiries. Amy Herman, the course leader, said: "We're getting them off the streets and out of the precincts, and it refreshes their sense of inquiry. They're thinking, 'Oh, how am I doing my job,' and it forces them to think about how they communicate, and how they see the world around them." Inspector Kenneth Mekeel, of the New York Police Department, said the course helped the city's officers with their usual line of work. "We always teach them step back, look at what you have, the crime scene, make observations," he said. "There's more to a picture than meets the eye." Ms Herman said that law enforcement officers made "terrific" art critics. "They're so smart, they're so observant, they do it every day," she said. "Often, they see things that art historians don't always notice." Bill Reiner, an FBI special agent, said Ms Herman's classes had helped one of his officers crack a fraud scheme worth up to $100 million (£64 million). "Amy taught us that to be successful, you have to think outside the box," Mr Reiner said. "Don't just look at a picture and see a picture. See what's happening." http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8086280/CIA-andFBI-sent-on-museum-course-to-refresh-sense-of-inquiry.html
Canada may need foreign spy service as intelligence gathering expands: watchdog Jim Bronskill/ The Canadian Press/ October 25, 201 0(Ed: excerpted)
OTTAWA - The watchdog over CSIS says it's time to decide whether Canada should have a fullfledged foreign spy service. In its annual report, the Security Intelligence Review Committee notes a worrisome expansion of CSIS' intelligence gathering. The committee, which reports to Parliament,
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says it put the question of a dedicated foreign spy agency directly to Public Safety Minister Vic Toews in a secret study. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service can operate anywhere in the world to collect information about threats to Canada, such as a brewing terrorist plot. But CSIS is allowed to gather foreign intelligence — for instance, details of another country's diplomatic intentions — only within Canada's borders. Still, the review committee says these distinct roles are blending together more frequently, due to greater demands for intelligence from the federal government. And that raises new concerns. "If this were to continue, CSIS could become what Parliament never intended it to be: namely, a Service with equal security intelligence and foreign intelligence mandates," says the annual report. It would not only "go against public arguments to the contrary," but also ignore the longstanding practice of respected allies such as the United States and Britain, which have handed foreign spying duties to stand-alone agencies, the CIA and MI6 respectively. "This raises questions about whether there should be a dedicated foreign intelligence service in Canada, consistent with past thinking on the need to maintain a distinction between foreign and security intelligence," says the review committee report. The committee argues for a public discussion on what Canadians expect of their intelligence agencies and on the "real risks and benefits" such work entails. It says that should include a look at what role is most appropriate for CSIS with respect to foreign intelligence and overseas activities. The committee also urged CSIS to: "reconsider" the resumption of exchanges of secret information with an unnamed foreign agency due to the risks involved, including possible human rights violations; seek ministerial guidance on use of the technique known as disruption — that is, defusing a national security threat by letting suspected terrorists or spies know they are under investigation with the aim of prompting them to drop their plans. Toews' office said it was reviewing the report's recommendations with interest. CSIS had no immediate comment. http://www.macleans.ca/article.jsp?content=n4935715
Australia: Report criticises spies' handling of secrets as complaints against agencies rise steeply James Massola: The Australian: October 15, 2010 (Ed: excerpted)
AUSTRALIAN sp ies ha ve b een p ub lic ly reb uked for ha nd ing over top sec ret inform a tion to foreig n intellig enc e servic es w ithout p rop erly rec ord ing the exc ha ng es.
And the number of complaints made about Australia's spy agencies has more than quadrupled in the last year. The rebuke, contained in the Inspector-General of Intelligence's annual report, finds that “in some instance there is a lack of documentary evidence that the considerations articulated in the policy are being given effect”. But the report finds ASIO must “maintain appropriate records of such decision-making and approvals (to share intelligence)” and warns that “it is the potential gravity of the consequences of passing information to foreign liaisons that means documenting the basis for each decision is of particular importance”.
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ASIO liaises with 316 authorities in 122 countries, most of which are foreign security and intelligence services. The number of complaints made to the Inspector-General's office also rose sharply to 1187 in 2009-10, up from 284 in 2008-09. The report attributes the rise to a “sharp increase in complaints about the timeliness with which ASIO processes security assessments for persons seeking visas to enter or stay in Australia” reflecting the rise in the number of detainees on Christmas Island. And the new Inspector-General of Intelligence, Vivienne Thom, also found that Defence Signals Directorate had illegally monitored an Australia citizen after a mistaken direction by ASIO officers. The rebukes for the spy agency come as the former inspector-general Ian Carnell conducts a review of all Australian spy and intelligence-gathering agencies. The roles of the Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation (DIGO), the Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO), Defence Signals Directorate, (DSD), Office of National Assessments (ONA), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) are being reviewed by Mr Carnell, who stepped aside after six years service for Dr Thom in April this year. The $3 million review, announced in May and set to be completed by the end of 2011, had not been “driven by a particular event”, according to the annual report. The annual report also rejected reports in the media that ASIO officers would be allowed to carry weapons for self-defence, that ASIS officers would be allowed to engage in paramilitary activities and that DSD would be allowed to conduct surveillance on Australian telecommunications networks. And it found that several intelligence agencies continued to expand, though the rate of growth was slowing. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/report-criticises-spies-handling-of-secrets-ascomplaints-against-agencies-rise-steeply/story-fn59niix-1225939052672
Australia: Spy agency cancels jihadists' passports The Australian: October 22, 2010 (Ed: excerpted)
Director-General of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, David Irvine yesterday warned Australia's peak spy agency was investigating "hundreds" of potential terror concerns that could have an impact on the nation's security. The move was prompted by a major spike in the number of Australians travelling abroad to engage in terrorism ASIO also revealed it had sought a warrant to question a suspect on two separate occasions for a total of five hours and 48 minutes. It did not say why. In one of the clearest indications yet that authorities now regard homegrown jihadists as the prime threat to Australian security, ASIO revealed it had issued eight adverse security assessments against Australian passport holders in 2009-10. There were no passport cancellations in 2008-09. http://www.news.com.au/national/spy-agency-cancels-jihadists-passports/story-e6frfkvr1225942022094#ixzz13LaSUmYa
UK/Australia: James Bondi: Australian secret service tries to recruit British spies Telegrapgh:October 2010
The Australian Secret Intelligence Service has launched a recruitment drive to lure disillusioned British spies, according to a report. The Sunday Times reported last week that up to 50 spies have responded to an advertisment at the headquarters of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) at Vauxhall Cross for jobs at the Australian Editor: Dalene Duvenage
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Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) in Canberra. The ASIS are said to be recruiting for around 12 posts, and are offering British spies the chance to gain full Australian citizenship while retaining British nationality if they choose to move to Australia's capital city. The strong response to the advertisement is believed to be due to a "crisis of morale" at SIS, often known as M16, as it faces pay freezes, the threat of job cuts and an increasing emphasis on deskbound UK work as opposed to the glamorous James Bond-style globe-trotting often considered synonymous with the agency. Employees are also said to be upset by repeated allegations over the past few years that SIS agents have been complicit with the torture of terror suspects held overseas. Professor Anthony Glees of the University of Buckingham's Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies said: "The next year is not going to be an easy one for our secret agencies, and there are interesting developments afoot for the job that SIS is going to have to do in the future. But from my sources, I understand that most officers are happy with the slight cuts they will take as part of the spending review, especially as it doesn't look like there will be many redundancies. Despite overall cutbacks in the military, the Government has said that it will give the security and intelligence services extra funds to deal with the threat of cyber terrorism. £650 million is to be spent over the next four years on a "National Cyber Security Programme", designed to tackle threats to the UK's computer infrastructure. A spokesman from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) said that it was not prepared to comment on the details of the matter. “However, there is a very close relationship between the Australian Secret Intelligence Service and SIS, and job advertisements of this type are not unusual,” he said. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/8078113/James-Bondi-Australian-secret-servicetries-to-recruit-British-spies.html
UK: Intelligence assumes a front-line position in SDSR By Nigel Inkster, Director of Tra nsna tiona l Threats a nd Politica l Risk: 19 October 2010
Almost all of the early commentary on the UK government's Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) has focused on the defence dimension. But there are some important issues that emerge in the section of the SDSR entitled 'Wider Security' which deserve attention. First and most immediately is the central role given to intelligence. It is listed as the first of the government's eight national-security tasks – the final bullet point relating to intelligence makes clear that it is central to achieving the other seven tasks. Intelligence can prove a cost-effective In the section on wider security, an entire page is investment but only within a context of devoted to the implications of the SDSR for intelligence. stable funding and a critical mass of This makes clear that while terrorism remains the UK's capacities. The new approach in the top security threat, the nation's intelligence capabilities SDSR represents a real strategic shift. will continue to have a far more wide-ranging role: both identifying and anticipating threats and supporting action, whether in the diplomatic, security or military arenas. There is an explicit statement that intelligence collection will take place against states, as well as non-state entities. And that intelligence will be used to exploit opportunities to advance UK national interests, as well as to protect against threats. Prominence is also given both to maintaining and strengthening existing intelligence alliances, especially the 'Five Eyes' cooperation with the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and to developing new partnerships. It is not yet clear what the financial settlement will be for the intelligence agencies, though in the overall scheme of government spending it represents small change. A brief reference is made to
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increasing the pace of savings to be achieved through a programme of collaboration within the intelligence community – essentially a focus on the sharing of back-office functions which has been in existence for at least the past decade – and a reduction of effort against lower-priority targets, which is hardly a new initiative. In the aftermath of the 7 July 2005 London bombings, when the intelligence community was coming under pressure to throw everything it had into counterterrorism, cut-backs elsewhere left some other important intelligence priorities under-resourced and in need of reprovisioning. None of this suggests a significant reduction in funding: £650 million has to be found to fund the government's newly announced cyber programme with much of that money likely to go to GCHQ. But given that this figure represents something close to a third of the Single Intelligence Vote (or SIV – the combined budget for MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) it looks unlikely to come from there. Britain's intelligence chiefs have for some time been quietly making the case that the SIV, which is designed to provide assurance against a wide array of threats, represents a third of the annual cost of the UK military deployment in Afghanistan, which purports to deal with just one of these threats. That message appears to have been heeded. Intelligence can prove a cost-effective investment but only within a context of stable funding and a critical mass of capacities. In the past, the UK's intelligence community has been the subject of across-the-board Treasury-imposed spending reductions which have taken little account of this. The new approach in the SDSR represents a real strategic shift. The SDSR section on intelligence glosses over two issues which will attract further commentary in due course. The first, which is mentioned in the national-security tasks, talks of 'investment in technologies to support the gathering of communications data vital for national security and law enforcement'. This programme, details of which have yet to be announced, is bound to prove controversial in terms of civil liberties. The second is the avoidance of any mention of the legal and ethical difficulties which have complicated intelligence liaison with a host of services including the CIA. Until these difficulties are resolved some inhibitions to collaboration will remain. http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-experts-commentary/intelligence-assumes-a-front-lineposition-in-sdsr/ Go to http://4knowledge-za.blogspot.com/ for Intelligence related events around the world and copies of previous SA Intelligencers. Publishing the Intelligencer is a labour of love, an awareness campaign, and an educational vehicle. Your email address is confidential and will not be used for other purposes or shared with anyone. Previous editions can be found at http://4knowledge-za.blogspot.com/ Notice: The SA Intelligencer does not confirm the correctness of the information carried in the media, neither does it analyse the agendas or political affiliations of such media. The SA Intelligencer’s purpose is informing our readers of the developments in the world of intelligence for research and environmental scanning purposes. We only use OSINT from free open sources and not those from fee-based sources. The SA Intelligencer contains copyrighted material - the use of which has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. The content has been harvested from various news aggregators, web alerts, lists etc. Further reproduction or redistribution is subject to original copyright restrictions. 4Kowledge provides no warranty of ownership of the copyright, or accuracy with respect to the original source material.
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