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In Corsica, however, the liberation front was more consistently willing to resort to violent measures, and loss of life as a result of this violence was considerably more common (Sanchez 2008, 656). In regards to ethnic exclusion, the two regions also differ. Zariski (1989, 261) found that ethnic exclusiveness, or the “outright rejection of other ethnic groups…even as allies” is prevalent in the Corsican movement, as Corsican separatists have attempted to expel “continentals” from the island. The movement leaders in Brittany, in contrast, have been much more open to immigration and other ethnicities. Despite this myriad of differences, the state’s response has been the same: in both Brittany and Corsica, the central government made concessions to the separatists’ demands. Neither of the two movements has been successful in obtaining home rule outside of the French Government. Using a method of difference case study, therefore, will allow for the isolation of the state response variable to examine its affect on the success of separatist movements.
Case Study Brittany The origins of the separatist movement in Brittany stem from its isolation. Geographically the peninsula of Brittany lies in the northwest corner of France, with difficult access to other regions. Culturally, the Bretons descend from the Celts—a tribe that migrated from the British Isles originally populated the peninsula, and traces of the Celtic origin remain prominent in Breton society (Reece 1977, 6). After being annexed by France in 1532, the Breton people maintained their local culture, language, and traditions, culturally isolating themselves from the rest of the country. Against this backdrop of physical and cultural isolation, the separatist movement emerged in
Brittany. Various individuals and organizations began calling for Breton independence beginning as early as 1927, however it was not until World War II and the founding of the separatist party, the Parti National Breton, that the movement truly began to take root. Just before the dawn of World War II, the two main leaders of the Breton separatist movement, Olier Mordrel and Fanche Debauvais fled to Germany. The idea that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” prompted them to seek safety and support from the German leaders. In Berlin they drafted a manifesto called Diskleriadur (Déclaration) in which they called for Brittany’s complete separation from France in order to end the persecution of Breton patriots (Reece 1977, 150). While there, Mordrel and Debauvais discovered a cautious, but nonetheless willing ally. On May 10, 1940, the Germans, now in control of most of France, issued a decree that allowed Breton “autonomists” preferential treatment in all German camps (Reece 1977, 152). With mild German support, Mordrel and Debauvais founded the Conseil National Breton (CNB). On November 20, 1940, Fanche Debauvais sent a letter from the Conseil National Breton to Monsieur le Maire, the head of the German occupation government. In it Debauvais (1940) says, “The third of July, a group of Breton patriots gathered at Pontivy and decided to resume action taken before the war, with the goal of returning to Brittany her rightful liberty. To give strength to this movement, we created the Breton National Counsel.” Such an organization was intended to eventually create the nucleus of an independent Breton state, and the German leader agreed to acknowledge its formation. The governmentsanctioned creation of the CNB represents the first of a few moderate concessions by the central authority. The remainder of the November 20th, 1940 letter reveals what Debauvais perceived to be favor from the