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amakudari. Furthermore, reciprocal obligation is served through amaagari. Often in the pretext of lack of technocrats at the regulatory agencies or government advisory committees, industry professionals are appointed who previously served at the power utilities. This underscores the collusive interest that lies at the centre of the nuclear village. Amakudari-amaagari mutual reinforcement has fostered structural corruption. The TEPCO has a legacy of showing scant respect for nuclear safety. The NISA’s failure to verify TEPCO’s tsunami memo in 2001 which claimed the waves are unlikely to reach beyond 5.7 meters reflected a negligent regulatory ethos. Had NISA been vigilant, TEPCO could have been better prepared for the 3/11-disaster. In 2002, based on the actions of whistle-blower Kei Sugaoka, an investigation uncovered 29 false reports by TEPCO between late 1980searly 1990s (The Yomiuri Shimbun August 2002). Moreover, just a month before 3/11 disaster, NISA granted an operating license extension beyond the 40-year statutory limit until 2021 to the aging reactors of the Fukushima Diichi plant, despite stress cracks in back-up diesel generators and a proven record of irresponsibility towards nuclear safety. The nuclear lobby has a strong influence on sections of media through massive advertising funds and by manipulating the kisha clubs (press clubs). Nikkei Advertising Research Institute estimates that the power-supply industry’s annual advertisement expenditure is US$ 1.1 billion, of which TEPCO alone boasts of US$ 305.72 million. Furthermore, influential segments of academia form an integral part of the village by aligning their research with the interests of the nuclear industry. People belonging to the other side of the debate are often deliberately shunned by the powerful nexus. Opportunities emerging from the disaster The oil shocks of the 1970s triggered policies endorsing energy resource diversification and efficiency. Nuclear energy was aggressively promoted over the decades as quasi-indigenous to enhance energy security that aligned well with environmental sensitivity. However, the nuclear disaster has raised severe concerns about nuclear safety and has prompted a national debate on fresh energy policy. This raises the prospects of instituting a sustainable energy system. Immediate discarding of nuclear energy is easier said than done. However, it will be a mistake if Japan maintains the status quo (preFukushima) as desired by the nuclear village, and misses this opportunity to genuinely rethink the restructuring of the energy mix. Gradual reduction of the nuclear dependence from the energy mix, replaced by smarter energy options within a set timeline, is desirable. Constructive initiatives in this
ASIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS VOL. 5. NO. 2