Science Meets Policy

Normally, the interaction between science and politics follows a predictable pattern: politicians pose questions to a group of scientists and use their answers to inform new policy decisions. However, this approach has two drawbacks. First, the answer one receives from ‘science’ strongly depends on what questions you ask and whom you ask. In the past year, this model has repeatedly shown its limits: the (limited) representation of disciplines, the selection of scientists, and how some of them fulfilled that role have been widely criticized. Secondly, scientists rarely formulate clearcut answers. Sometimes the required research is still in progress, sometimes it has yet to begin. Even when the results are in, there may be knowledge gaps, for example, between lab studies done in highly controlled conditions and what may happen outside the lab. Moreover, simulation studies are often reported in terms of possible scenarios rather than univocal conclusions ready for implementation. A correct assessment of these uncertainties (and their consequences for policy-making) requires a lot of disciplinary knowledge. And the assumptions that go into these studies need to be critically examined as well. Yet, the translation of scientific results into practical measures is a task that both scientists and policymakers are rarely trained in. During the Covid-19 crisis, many scientists felt powerless. Some had crucial pieces of the puzzle, but found no audience among policy makers. Meanwhile, science itself went into overdrive, resulting in an avalanche of Covid-19related publications. It was difficult to amplify the signal of high-quality information in such a way that policy makers would pick it up. Moreover, scientists are often reluctant to share their knowledge because of the uncertainty

of their models, the incompleteness of their disciplinary perspective, and the changeability of insights. Combined with the fact that the traditional process of internal discussion became overwhelmed by this publication avalanche, this meant that there was little consolidated knowledge on which to base unambiguous advice. The challenges are clear. It is less clear how this vital connection between science and policy can be organized better. We seek a solution to three main questions. (1) How can policy makers ask better questions? (2) How should it be decided who will be consulted, both in terms of disciplines and representatives of those disciplines? (3) How should partial answers from different disciplines be integrated, without pitting them against each other and without diffusing the quality?

In our view, the long-term solution requires strengthening the scientific culture. After all, greater scientific literacy in society would lead to more informed questions and a more critical approach to the answers. A first special role in this process is played by scientists who move into politics, such as the Chancellor of Germany, Dr Angela Merkel, who has received international praise for her scientifically informed approach to the corona crisis. A second crucial task lies with the media. A good example is New Zealand, where journalist Tova O’Brien openly rebuked politician JamiLee Ross when he tried to profit from spreading disinformation. Closer to home, when lobbyists claimed that there was no scientific evidence that their particular industry was responsible for many infections, they used a typical denialism strategy: undermining science by making impossible demands. In a society with a strong scientific culture, a critical journalist can call out such a strategy. Moreover, in such a society, different opinions are not automatically given equal weight. After all, it is crucial to base conclusions only on the best possible analysis. The truth lies rarely in the middle, as scientists who are most knowledgeable often express themselves most cautiously.

This culture of scientific literacy is a long-term goal, which can only be influenced indirectly. In the shorter term, we can invest in sound policy advisory structures that mediate between science and politics. Such structures are crucial to managing the role of the scientist as expert, so that the mandate is clearly defined and society as a whole can benefit from policy choices supported by reliable knowledge. In this way, they can immediately act as a lever and contribute to the required long-term cultural change.

What structures are there in Belgium? Sciensano, the scientific health research institute, played a leading role, despite the structural underfunding of federal scientific institutions. In addition, departmental administrations, personal staff of ministers and study departments of parties in our country are important places where scientific studies and advice are translated into policy proposals. This creates a fragmented landscape, in which no one has enough clout to manage a crisis of this magnitude. We do not need so many structures, we need the right ones. The best time to install protocols for organizing time-sensitive policy advice is between crises. Doing this well ensures that all people involved know the scope of their role (for example, when and how the consulted scientists should make their reports public) and that the process as a whole is trustworthy (for example, independent of who is in power). It makes sense to incorporate this task into politically independent structures for policy advice. There are good examples of these abroad. The Netherlands, for instance, has the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, WRR) and the European Union installed SAPEA: Science Advice for Policy by European Academies. Although these are not intended to provide advice in an acute crisis, we believe that they can play an essential coordinating role in times of crisis. Starting from an existing network of experts and existing protocols to ask the right questions, designating new advisory boards, and pooling responses is easier than starting from scratch.

It is a poignant paradox: we live in a country with enormous scientific capital, with many policy makers, scientists, journalists, and opinion makers, the vast majority of whom want to contribute constructively to the solution of this crisis, and yet the impact of the pandemic on Belgium is immense. In recent months, many reasons for this have been put forward, but we think that the deeper causes of many of these factors are a matter of culture and structure. A culture in which the general level of scientific literacy is too low and a structure that lacks essential channels to streamline the interaction between science and policy adequately. With the Young Academy, we want to contribute on both fronts. Changing structures, following the example of institutes abroad, can be done in the short term. We hope that the necessary steps will be taken now, at a time when the Covid-19 crisis is still fresh in our minds. In addition, we reconfirm our commitment to our Science-Meets-Parliament initiative and to the many projects on education, scientific communication, and journalism. In this way, we also hope to contribute to a long-term culture shift, in which science and policy cooperate optimally with each other in dealing with complex, societal challenges. After all, we need this vital nexus not only in times of crisis.