38
The International Relations Review
PHOTO BY Erin Thibeau, CAS ‘13
Pictured above is the sacred calligraphy in the Aya Sofia in Istanbul, Turkey.
of their buildings were constructed without state assistance.8 Instead, the vast majority of this money comes from various private institutions, foundations and associations. Gülen and Imam-Hatip schools also share a significant amount of criticism from Turkey’s secularist movement. Despite the Gülen schools’ efforts toward transparency and assurances that they operate in cooperation with every nation’s national curriculum, they are still being accused of harboring Islamist and fundamentalist traits by secular institutions like the STKB (United Civil Society Organizations). In the late 1990s, the Gülen movement’s conflict with the STKB and Turkish courts caused its founder, Fethullah Gülen, to offer to transfer the ownership of the schools over to the state. In 1998, the Turkish military and government announced that such a transfer of ownership was not necessary. They considered Gülen’s followers “sincere Muslims” who should be allowed to keep their schools because they acted within the “moral principles of Islam” privately while still respecting the secular discourse publicly.9 The event demonstrated that, like Imam-Hatip schools, Fethullah Gülen and his followers showed obedience to the state without any intentions of betraying
the Turkish government. Overall, Gülen schools appear to have a better record of upward mobility for its graduates than the state-sponsored Imam-Hatip schools. However, Gülen schools may not be the best option for all religiously observant youth. Several former followers and students (perhaps coerced by organizations that disapprove of the schools’ role within the Turkish education system) have come forward to testify that the movement was entirely too involved in their lives and personal choices. T h e r e are also many critiques of the Imam-Hatip schools, one of them being that teachers do not allow students to express any form of doubt about their religion.10 Students who do express curiosity or ask questions are sometimes subjected to humiliation and told that they are ignorant. These methods of education encourage these students to internalize beliefs of their teachers that are not necessarily a part of the state-mandated curriculum. Furthermore, the curriculum’s limited world religions course only offers a short introduction to other religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism, potentially contributing to intolerance. Often times, Imam-Hatip students do not inter-
Spring 2013 nalize the meaning of pluralism nor do they believe that other religions are valid. This level of intolerance may encourage those of the religious conservative lifestyle to avoid relationships with others who do not live in the same manner. Soon-Yong Pak writes that Imam-Hatip school graduates who give up the “Islamic way of life” are sometimes forced to cut off contact from their close friends and family due to strained relationships. Lastly, Imam-Hatip graduates tend to receive less support from within Turkish society and the state, causing them to feel isolated especially in sharp contrast to the intimate environment of their high schools. Despite this isolation, Kemalists have desired to make Islam compatible with secular culture and the modern Turkish state since its inception. Instead of offering religious courses and schools to religiously observant families, they wish to make religion and religious organizations a private affair that should be kept out of the public sphere. However, this is not consistent with the tenets of laicism, which place religion under the control of the state. The intent of laicism was to have greater authority over religious education than had previously been presided over by the “ulama,” those scholars of Islamic studies. Out of an elitist fear that other interpretations of Islam would spread information that challenged the authority of the secular state, a cooperative effort between the ministries of education and religion shut down the religious institutions run by various “tarikats” (religious orders). Regardless of both the ImamHatip and Gülen schools’ obvious efforts to appease the Turkish government and military, the secularists’ learned distrust of Islam forces them to remain wary of these schools’ existence in Turkey. Additionally, the evidence offered in Kim Shively’s article on unauthorized religious courses in the suburbs of Ankara demonstrates that regardless of the availability of legal religious education, people will find a way to learn and discuss Islam. At present, both the Imam-Hatip and Gülen schools have proven that religious conservatives can contribute to a modern society as long as they are given the resources to improve their social and economic standing. These schools have allowed religious youth to receive the necessary education to develop a voice within Turkish society. However, past measures to
limit the influence of Imam-Hatip schools have negatively affected their enrollment numbers. Penalties on university entrance exams are convincing families to send their children to secular high schools to improve their chances of attending university. Many Turks have argued that because graduates of Imam-Hatip schools are not remotely qualified to be religious leaders, the penalties for testing outside of one’s high school concentration should be removed. Without a curriculum that properly trains its students to become religious preachers and teachers, the schools are mostly attracting students who do not have goals of receiving additional education after graduation, thus the quality of their student body has changed. Many of the reasons why students choose to attend have to do with religious freedoms, a sense of security and a well-rounded education. Despite the AKP’s efforts to empower Imam-Hatip graduates in their post-graduate education and careers, the victories they have gained now cannot be guaranteed if this party loses power in the future. Since 2002, these graduates have been filling more jobs in non-religious sectors, especially in government. This gradual shift within Turkey’s secular society has angered the Kemalists, however, their fears of terrorists infiltrating the secular state or reverting Turkey back to an Islamic state are unfounded. Many religious Turks have not been demanding an Islamic state, but rather freedom to follow their religion without government limitations because the state is such a large part of their lives. It is therefore unlikely that they wish to threaten the state or work to achieve its demise. However, Kemalists are correct to question whether Turkey’s policy of laicism will last forever. The Imam-Hatip and Gülen schools have shown that they are not reliant on state funding to operate. While the teachers are required to teach specific outlines and lesson plans, they still manage to impart their opinions of Islam to their pupils. While some Turks are willing to risk arrest and jail time by teaching their own “illegal” interpretations of Islam, the last several decades have proven that religious individuals can integrate into Turkish society without threatening its status as a modern state.11 Perhaps one day, these developments will allow pious Muslims in Turkey to practice their religion as they see fit.
39
Transformation of Terrorism
Convergence of Threats in a Globalized World By Dean Borza, CAS ‘13 Although increasingly rapid globalization during the post-Cold War era has brought many positive developments in technology, transnational trade and global governance, it has also brought about more complex threats and security concerns. Neither terrorism nor organized crime are new phenomenons. Today’s security threats, however, are taking on a distinct transnational identity, making the effects of terror and organized crime increasingly virulent on a global level. The activities and goals of terrorist organizations and transnational organized crime (TOC) syndicates are converging on points of common interest as these clandestine actors realize the benefits of increased cooperation. President Bill Clinton’s 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century was one of the first instances during which the U.S. government acknowledged international crime (or TOC) as “a serious and potent threat to the American people at home and abroad.”1 While this strategy hinted at the connection between terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, it failed to stress the full extent of their convergence and proceeded to analyze these threats separately. Over a decade later, the National Security Council (NSC) under the Obama Administration has made great strides in highlighting the convergence of these threats. The Department of Justice reports that 29 of 63 organizations on its FY 2010 Consolidated Priority Organization Targets list, which includes the most significant international drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) threatening the U.S., were associated with terrorist groups.2 The U.S. Government’s acknowledgment of the nexus of terror and TOC represent the transition from the treatment of these threats separately to an increased awareness of the manner in which they are converging and growing. The analysis of the specific nature and characteristics of groups carries implications for the often nebulous identities of terror and TOC. Analysts and academics often identify terrorist groups by their ideo-
logical, religious or political motivations in achieving change. In contrast, scholars tend to characterize TOC groups by their economic motivation and power-maximizing goals. James Cockayne explains that, “terrorists aim to magnify their social and political power through the use of public media and indiscriminate violence, whereas criminals adopt narrower commercial goals and more discriminating methods.”3 These goals, however, are not mutually exclusive. Funding obtained through the illicit commercial activities of TOC groups may be a means to a political end. In addition to intersections of goals and purpose, both organizations thrive in weak or failing states with inadequate executive, legislative and judicial institutions. Defining the goals and identities of these organizations can strongly impact policy to combat these threats and their complex consequences. As terror and TOC unite, states must centralize and share intelligence while strengthening global governance norms and institutions through multilateral efforts. Significant challenges, however, still remain in establishing a unified transnational response to a distinctly transnational threat. The 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century identifies international crime as a series of activities rather than a specific entity: “Drug trafficking, illegal trade in firearms, financial crimes—such as money laundering, counterfeiting, advanced fee and credit card fraud, and income tax evasion—illegal alien smuggling, trafficking in women and children, economic espionage, intellectual property theft, computer hacking and public corruption…”4 While one can certainly classify terrorism according to activities and tactics, the U.S. NSC refers to terrorism primarily by entity rather than activity.5 It would be a dire oversimplification to delimit terrorism and TOC in this manner, just as political, ideological, and economic motivations can no longer be separated. For instance, the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) reports that transnational terrorist