Tai Chi and the fine art of diplomatic history lessons negotiation Dr. Todd Hall is an Associate Professor at the University of Oxford’s Department of Politics and International Relations and the Tutor in Politics for St. Anne’s College. Dr. Hall earned his Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 2008 and has held post-doctoral fellowships at Princeton and Harvard, as well as visiting scholar appointments at the Free University of Berlin and Tsinghua University in Beijing. Prior to joining the University of Oxford, Dr. Hall held the position of Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Toronto (2010-2013). Research interests extend to the areas of international relations theory; the intersection of emotion, affect, andforeign policy; and Chinese foreign policy. Dr. Hall is currently working on a book manuscript that examines the role of state-level emotional behavior in international relations entitled Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage, forthcoming this year from Cornell. University Press.
Todd Hall
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apan should learn from Germany when it comes to dealing with history. This is a common refrain in statements coming from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), one that we are likely to hear repeated many times anew as we approach the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II. “Germany’s sincere remorse has won the confidence of the world,” says one PRC foreign ministry spokesperson, whereas, “the leaders of Japan, which caused harm and which lost the war, are to this day still trying to reverse the course of history and deny their history of invasion.” The recent and still very tepid thaw notwithstanding, the “history problem” continues to loom large as a source of friction in SinoJapanese relations. But what exactly are the lessons of the German experience when it comes to historical reconciliation? Much has been written about the relevance of Franco-German or even Polish-German relations for the Sino-Japanese relationship, but perhaps nowhere has the ability of
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the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to achieve historical reconciliation been better showcased than in its relations with Israel. Today, Germany ranks for Israelis as the most popular state in Europe, and more than two-thirds of Israelis hold a positive opinion of Germany. Such a state of affairs would have been unthinkable when Israel came into existence and when animosity towards Germany was so strong that Israel marked its passports as valid for travel in all lands except Germany. In 1952; however, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer signed a massive compensation agreement— the Luxembourg Agreement— with Israel, paving the way for the improvement of relations and their eventual normalization in 1965. Looking at the history of relations between these two states can serve as instructive in thinking about how historical reconciliation can be achieved. In particular, four lessons stand out.
Lesson One: Perceived Incentives Matter Extending gestures of reconciliation
is not easy. Such gestures can entail significant political costs and in certain instances financial ones as well. We might hope that moral imperative would overrule such concerns. But in truth, efforts at reconciliation may lack domestic support and even face opposition. Such was the case with the Luxembourg Agreement. Only 11% of the West German public supported the Luxembourg Agreement as it stood, and it met outright hostility from government officials and parliamentarians who worried about its implications for national finances and FRG diplomacy in the Middle East. While there were those who backed the agreement for moral reasons, a crucial factor in the efforts of Adenauer and his political allies to overcome domestic opposition and push forward the Luxembourg Agreement was its anticipated rewards. These not only included German re-entry into the “family of nations,” but also stemmed from perceptions of Jewish influence. In internal party discussions, Adenauer justified the agreement stating, “We should be clear, that the power of Jewry is extremely strong… reconciliation with Jewry […] is an absolute necessity for the Federal