IED THREAT INFORMATION SHARING
key NGO security fora to achieve better coordination and collaboration at a local level. Dedicated resources for security management, both staff and funding, will need to be earmarked and provided by organisations. Donors should correspondingly encourage the systematic incorporation of security into NGO programme budgets, and provide funding for posts to coordinate security in the field as well as for independent information-coordination mechanisms for environments identified as sensitive.28 In this sense, any formal interagency setup around security information may be construed as ‘intelligence gathering’. Clearly, the need for confidentiality and trust is even greater in a context of conflict. Yet an aid agency’s own security management and that of other aid agencies will inevitably benefit from a more complete picture of the threats and incidents and, if applicable, their non-resolution. Rather than not sharing any information, agencies may want to do it face to face in informal meetings. Whereas these, and perhaps other, reservations are pertinent, the obstacle in many situations is not so much contextual, but a problematic culture of ‘secrecy’ in aid agencies with regard to security information. This is dangerous. Failing to alert others to a serious identified threat or to an incident that has taken place or has narrowly been avoided can put other people at risk. The advantage of improved collective management of security information is the potential for incident mapping and pattern/trend analysis, as a useful tool for initial and ongoing threat and risk analysis. Such analytical work is not possible unless there is good and fairly detailed reporting of many, if not most, incidents.
▪ Develop language and systems interoperability
There is a requirement for greater standardisation in information sharing. Such standardisation should consider areas including information management/ information exchange technology, georeferenced information and standardised reporting templates. Ideally, information exchange depends on organisations agreeing to a common format or data model. However, experience has shown that such models are complex, require applications software to support them, and
are unlikely to be adopted by all members of the diverse organisations needing to exchange information – particularly civilian organisations. In reality, the majority of civilian organisations use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) applications, and experience shows that this meets their needs.29 A report emanating from the NGO sphere provides a valuable conclusion: ‘In the past, organisations have been wary about sharing information with others, partly for fear that it compromises their own security contacts, but also because of the general tendency to protect information for their own. That said, there have been some important shifts in recent years along with a more nuanced understanding that, given the significant inter-dependence with regard to security in any operational environment, collaboration on security issues is in everybody’s best interest.’30 In the final analysis, it is true, as Laipson notes, that ‘information-sharing is part of a larger story – of the rise of NGOs and their growing competence; of the need for a reform of intelligence culture, so that government analysts are rewarded for integrating all available source material into their work and engaging with nongovernment experts; and of globalization, where agile partnerships between formal state structures and civil society are constantly emerging.’31 There will be difficulties along the road to genuine cooperation between the military and civilian organisations in conflict environments, but the vision of
Pakistan NGO safety training.
counteriedreport.com
21