“You need to have a strategy for getting [the war lords] to give up power,” she says. “You have to be able to entice them into a deal, and there has to be give and take. It can’t be a zero-sum game.”
went on to get her master’s and PhD in government from Harvard. Besides chairing Barnard’s political science department, a position she took on last fall, Berman also maintains an active teaching load. Her spring classes include a course on democracy and dictatorship in Europe, as well as a senior research seminar in comparative government. At first glance, the French experience may not seem to have much relevance for modern-day Afghanistan, or for that matter Iraq, where the government is also dangerously weak. But Berman sees important parallels. She notes that France’s experience offers some valuable lessons in state-building, and she believes that U.S. policymakers should consider taking heed. “I really thought the debate over Afghanistan needed some kind of historical perspective,” says Berman, whose article “From the Sun King to Karzai” was published in the March/April 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs. “Obviously, the more cases you have the better informed you are.” Much like Afghanistan today, Berman says that before Louis XIV France was also beset by ethnic and regional rivalries and violence, and in the absence of a strong central government, power largely rested with local lords, many of whom controlled their own armies and militias, and weren’t about to surrender their authority easily. The Sun King’s regime, however, gave them some powerful incentives, notes Berman, including tax exemptions and lucrative monopolies and state offices. “The government gave out all kinds of goodies,” she says. “Most of these warlords were in it for their own interest, and if they’re led to believe it’s in their best interest to make a deal, they make a deal.” Berman firmly believes that ultimately the same principles will hold for local warlords in Afghanistan, though thus far she notes the Obama administration has focused mainly on the military side of the equation. “It’s been all about how to use the troops, and the counterinsurgency strategy,” she says. “And that’s only half the game.” Just as in France, local warlords in Afghanistan will have to be co-opted. “You need to have a strategy for getting them to give up power,” she says. “You have to be able to entice them into a deal, and there has to be give and take. It can’t be a zero-sum game.” Afghanistan’s forbidding terrain will obviously make the job of unifying the country even tougher. And Berman says there’s no way of predicting how the process will ultimately play out. But as French history clearly shows, it won’t be easy—or quick. “State-building doesn’t happen on a five- or 10-year timeline,” says Berman. “You’re not going to turn Afghanistan into France in a decade.”
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