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Russia’s Resur-­ Impact  of   gence  &  How  to   China’s  A2/AD   Deal  With  It Capabilities   North  America  Section    PAGE  5

April 2011

Turmoil in the Arab  World PAGE  17

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

Asia Section    PAGE  12


3 Letter From the President

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5

North America

Russia’s Resurgence & How to Deal With It

Europe

8 Rise of Turkey & American Foreign Policy

17 Theme

Asia

China’s A2/AD Capabilities: Impacts on Regional Deterrence Dynamics 16 Is Corruption Draining the Indian Economy?

Turmoil in the Arab World 19 An Age-Old Problem, Addressed by theTwentyFirst Century 21 Timeline

38 Feature

Julian Assange

President: Karia  Sekumbo Secretary: Bethlehem  Solomon 3XEOLF5HODWLRQV2IÀFHUTianyi  Zhang Treasurer: Truong  Pharm Editor: Sungtae  Park Art Director: Ying  Wu Graphic  Assistant:  Julie  Yiu

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23 Regional Perspectives 24 Interview with Wellington Nyangoni 27 Interview with Shai Feldman

Assistant Editors:   Tanay  Paranjape,  Jesse   Koklas Interviewees: Wellington  Nyangoni Shai  Feldman

Nicolas Sarkozy: The Reelected President

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Africa

Africa’s 54th State: The Future of Free Southern Sudan 32 Failures of International Pressure and Intervention Leave Ivory Coast in a State of Anarchy 34 Democratic Republic of Congo. Is There Any Hope?

40 End

How to be involved

Supporting: International and  Global  Stud-­ ies  Department Crown  Center  for  Mid-­ dle  East  Studies E-mail: brandeisintljournal@gmail.com

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


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Note from the President:

t is with the utmost pride and satisfaction that after three months of dedicated work from a group of motivated, passionate, and globally conscious students that we finally present our first issue of the Brandeis International Journal. As a campus that boasts so many different cultures and perspectives from different corners of the world, it was only a matter of time before a journal dedicated to discussing global affairs was introduced to the community. It is my personal belief that in order to foster amicable relations between diverse people around the world, there needs to be an understanding of the different problems that exist in the different regions of the world. A sense of global awareness and consciousness has to be instilled within everyone before talks of peaceful co-existence may even take place. After all, we are all citizens of the world. Brandeis University is a community that has future leaders presently walking around campus as it is. Therefore, it is because of this reason that it is important that we engage each other in the various issues that persist around the world and always look to find solutions to these problems so that, we, as a human race are constantly rectifying on mistakes of the past and improving on the prospects for peace and prosperity for future generations. Even when you are in disagreement with the views shared by your neighbor, bringing the views to the table in the first place is the most important step in arriving at any sort of compromise especially as we do not live in a world that consists of one opinion, but many. It is only through continuous discussion and engagement amongst one another that we are able to arrive at a point of agreement and conciliation. Therefore, it is my request and hope that; as you, the members of the Brandeis community read our first issue of the Brandeis International Journal and future issues, you will use the magazine as an avenue through which you are able to read about various topics around the world and also as an opportunity where you are able to voice your own opinion and engage one another on issues that you may hold dear to you. As citizens of the world, we need to step out of our own comfort zone and begin to look at and acknowledge the rest of the world and work towards bringing about the change, peace, and prosperity that we all desire. Karia Sekumbo ‘14 President of  the  Brandeis  International  Journal

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

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North  America

Resurgence  of   Russia  and  How  to   Deal  With  It By Sungtae Park

I

n  early  March,  American  Vice   President  Joe  Biden  made  a  visit   to  Russia  during  which  Vladimir   Putin  famously  proposed  abolishing   visas  between  the  United  States  and   Russia.  Although  the  media  mainly   focused  on  the  cooperative  talks  and   silly  moments  such  as  Putin’s  tidbit   about  doing  away  with  visas,  the  main   reason  Biden  went  to  Russia  was  to   talk  about  the  strategic  issues  that  the   two  countries  will  soon  be  facing  after   the  American  disengagement  from   Iraq  and  Afghanistan.                    The  United  States  and  Russia   have  constantly  been  at  odds  with  each   other  ever  since  the  internationaliza-­ tion  of  American  foreign  policy  after   World  War  II.  As  early  as  the  19th   century,  astute  minds  such  as  Alexis   de  Tocqueville  predicted  the  rise   and  clash  of  the  two  countries  as  the   two  dominant  world  powers  and  for   rightful  reasons.  One  only  needs  to   carefully  examine  the  national  security   history  and  imperatives  of  the  United   States  and  Russia  to  see  why  their   clash  was  inevitable  and  why  they  are   bound  to  clash  yet  again  in  the  near   future.                    By  the  end  of  the  19th  century,   4

the  United  States  emerged  as  the  larg-­ est  economic  power  of  the  world.  Its   security  was  guaranteed  by  two  great   RFHDQVWKH$WODQWLFDQGWKH3DFL¿F on  its  coasts  and  two  weak  countries,   Canada  and  Mexico,  on  its  northern   and  southern  borders.  After  expe-­ riencing  two  world  wars,  however,   the  United  States  added  two  more   national  security  concepts:  dominant   control  of  all  the  world’s  oceans  and   nuclear  weapons.  Controlling  the  sea   meant  that  the  United  States  could   not  be  attacked  conventionally  on  its   homeland,  while  it  could  deploy  its   powerful  navy  anywhere  in  the  world   to  threaten  or  attack  any  other  con-­ tinent.  Moreover,  control  of  the  sea   gave  the  United  States  control  of  the   global  trade,  economy,  and  wealth.   Countries  hostile  to  the  United  States   faced  possibilities  not  just  of  attack  by   the  powerful  American  military  but  of   economic  blockades  from  the  global   trade  as  well.  Nuclear  weapons,  on   the  other  hand,  prevented  the  United   States  from  total  defeat.  The  only   way  the  United  States  could  lose  was   through  mutually-­assured-­destruction   vis-­à-­vis  the  Soviet  Union.  Therefore,   the  United  States,  since  WWII,  has  

stuck  to  two  key  national  security  im-­ peratives:  Preventing  the  dominance   of  any  region  by  one  single  power  by   keeping  the  balance  of  power  in  each   region,  stable  preferably  for  the  sake   of  global  economy,  in  different  parts   of  the  world  and  preventing  nuclear   proliferation,  all  the  while  keeping   strategic  nuclear  parity  with  the  Soviet   Union.  Keeping  the  balance  of  power   in  a  region  meant  that  no  major  power   could  invest  enough  resources  to  build   a  navy  that  could  challenge  the  Ameri-­ can  navy  because  resources  needed  to   EHIRFXVHGRQ¿JKWLQJODQGZDUVZLWK nearby  major  powers.  Preventing  nu-­ clear  proliferation  reduced  the  risk  of   any  nuclear  power  that  could  eventual-­ ly  challenge  American  nuclear  forces,   its  last-­resort  measure.  Through  those   means,  the  United  States  protected   its  political,  economic,  and  physical   security.                    Russia’s  national  security  im-­ peratives,  on  the  other  hand,  have  his-­ torically  depended  on  carving  out  its   VSKHUHRILQÀXHQFHLQ(XUDVLD5XVVLD as  large  as  it  may  seem,  is  actually  not   so  large  if  you  cross  off  Siberia,  which   is  very  much  a  lot  of  nothing,  and   regions  with  hostile  ethnic  minorities.   BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


North  America

“

Putin  believes   that  the  West   is  determined   to  strangle   Russia  and   reduce  it  to  a   minor  player   in  the  region.

“

BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

One  can  see  that  most  of  Russia’s  population  is  con-­ centrated  in  Moscow  and  its  surrounding  regions.   Historically,  the  main  security  issue  for  the  Russians   was  that  the  Moscow  region,  the  heartland  of  Rus-­ sia,  is  located  on  a  very  open,  vulnerable  plain  that   could  easily  be  invaded  from  the  West,  South,  and   IURPWKH6RXWKHDVW,QIDFWRQHFDQ¿QGWKDW5XV-­ sia’s  history  is  a  tragic  one  of  destructive  invasion   after  another  by  powerful  foreign  entities,  whether   they  be  the  Mongols,  the  Prussians,  Napoleon,  or   the  Germans  -­  twice.  Hence,  the  Russian  security   depended  on  extending  its  strategic  depth  through   FRQTXHVWDQGGRPLQDWLRQRILWVVSKHUHRILQÀXHQFH as  well  as  nuclear  weapons.                    Here,  one  can  see  why  American  and  Rus-­ sian  national  security  imperatives  are  ultimately   incompatible.  Americans  want  to  prevent  a  domi-­ nant  regional  power  from  rising;͞  Russians  want  to   become  one.  Although  the  United  States  did  not  win   the  Cold  War  through  military  attack,  it  engaged  in  

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North  America

a  costly  arms-­race  and  blocked  the   economically  weak  Soviet  Union  from   participating  in  the  global  trade,  there-­ by  bringing  its  downfall  from  within.   American  obsession  with  preventing   Russia  from  becoming  the  dominant   regional  power  continued  even  after   the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union,  as  NATO   expanded  to  include  the  three  Baltic   states  and  Poland,  the  states  which   Russia  saw  as  parts  of  their  sphere   RILQÀXHQFH7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVHYHQ attempted  to  include  Ukraine  and   Georgia,  which  would  have  brought   NATO’s  border  closer  to  Moscow  than   it  would  have  liked  to  see.  For  many   Russians  and  leaders  like  Vladimir  Pu-­ tin,  NATO  expansion  into  the  Russian   VSKHUHRILQÀXHQFHUHSUHVHQWVIDOVH promises  and  back-­stabbing  by  the   West,  which  promised  cooperation  and   aid.  Putin  believes  that  the  West  is  de-­ termined  to  strangle  Russia  and  reduce   it  to  a  minor  player  in  the  region.

their  interest  in  their  sphere,  as  long  as   the  United  States  is  still  occupied  with   Iran,  Iraq,  and  Afghanistan,  and  that   the  Russian  military  is  not  as  weak  as   it  is  believed  to  be.  People  continue  to   underestimate  the  strength  of  the  Rus-­ sian  military,  however,  as  they  tend  to   link  Russia’s  economy  with  Russian   military  power.  By  studying  Russian   KLVWRU\QHYHUWKHOHVVRQHFDQ¿QGWKDW its  political  and  military  power  never   depended  on  its  economy  because  the   Russian  economy  has  always  been   weak.  Russia  has  always  been  able   WRPXVWHUVLJQL¿FDQWPLOLWDU\DQG SROLWLFDOSRZHUE\XVLQJLWVLURQ¿VW authoritarian  system  at  the  expense   of  the  general  welfare  of  its  people.   Putin  does  not  intend  to  create  the   5XVVLDQVSKHUHRILQÀXHQFHWKURXJK conquest.  One  lesson  he  learned  from   the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union  was  that   direct  control  is  often  too  costly  and   unsustainable.  He  does,  however,  plan   to  use  military,  political,  and  economic   power  of  Russia  to  render  the  states   on  its  periphery  submissive  towards   Russia.

establishing  the  missile  defense  sys-­ tem  with  American  military  personnel   in  Poland  is  that  it  is  a  symbolic  ges-­ ture  of  American  security  commitment   of  Eastern  Europe  against  Russia.   Thus,  the  world  is  already  beginning   to  witness  the  clash  between  resurgent   Russia  and  the  United  States  that  is   trying  to  contain  it  yet  again.

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RPLQJFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQ5XVVLD and  the  United  States  seems   inevitable,  although  it  prob-­ ably  will  not  be  one  of  direct  military   confrontation,  as  the  two  countries   still  both  possess  very  large  stockpiles   of  nuclear  weapons.  As  with  the  Cold   War,  the  United  States  must  pursue   a  policy  of  containment  vis-­à-­vis   Russia.  During  the  Cold  War,  it  was   NATO,  composed  of  Western  Europe,   which  acted  as  a  wall  against  the  So-­ viet  Union’s  eastern  sphere.  This  time   around,  however,  Western  Europe  does   not  feel  the  immediate  danger  that   the  Soviet  encroachment  presented   ver  since  he  became  the  leader   before.  Instead,  it  is  Eastern  Europe,   of  Russia,  Putin  has  been  deter-­ consisting  of  former-­Soviet  states   mined  to  reverse  Boris  Yeltsin’s   not  wishing  to  come  under  the  Rus-­ open  policy  and  recreate  the  Russian   s  the  United  States  eventually   VLDQLQÀXHQFHDJDLQWKDWWKH8QLWHG VSKHUHRILQÀXHQFHWKHPDLQSUREOHP withdraws  and  lays  its  eyes   States  must  form  a  defense  block   being  the  potential  interference  by   off  Iran,  Iraq,  and  Afghani-­ with,  along  with  other  concerned   the  United  States.  The  perfect  chance   stan,  it  will  return  to  pursuing  its   states  such  as  Turkey  and  Georgia.   came,  however,  when  the  United   geopolitical  imperative,  which  is  to   Because  of  the  economic  constraints   States  became  bogged  down  in  two   prevent  the  rise  of  a  regional  hegemon,   coupled  with  ethnic  troubles  and  the   wars  in  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  and  now   DQGRQHFDQSUHGLFWPRUHFRQÀLFWVWR demographic  problem  of  declining   is  occupied  with  Iran.  In  fact  Russia’s   arise  between  the  United  States  and   population  it  is  facing,  Russia  should   refusal  to  cooperate  fully  on  sanc-­ Russia.  A  key  issue  that  was  raised   be  easy  to  contain,  much  easier  than   tions  on  Iran  and  willingness  to  give   during  Biden’s  visit  was  the  issue  of   containing  the  Soviet  Union.  An  al-­ technological  assistance  to  the  rogue   the  missile  defense  system  and  de-­ ternative  solution  would  be  to  get  the   state’s  nuclear  program  are  both  meant   ployment  of  American  air  force  units   Russians  to  accept  a  status-­quo  with   to  keep  American  attention  on  Iran  as   in  Poland.  The  United  States  claims   American  missile  defense  and  mili-­ long  as  possible.  Meanwhile,  Putin  has   that  the  system  is  aimed  at  preventing   tary  commitments  in  Poland  and  with   been  utilizing  Russia’s  abundance  in   rogue  states  such  as  Iran  from  attack-­ Ukraine,  Georgia,  and  the  three  Baltic   natural  resources,  especially  natural   ing  Europe  with  short  to  intermedi-­ states  remaining  neutral  or  under  the   gas,  to  boost  its  economy  as  well  to   ate  range  missiles,  not  Russia.  Yet  it   5XVVLDQLQÀXHQFH¹DKLJKO\XQOLNHO\ apply  pressure  Eastern  and  Central   refuses  to  let  Russia  control  it  jointly.   compromise  that  neither  side  would   Europe  that  are  dependent  on  Russian   One  must  remember,  however,  that   accept.  Geopolitics,  to  a  great  extent   natural  gas  pipelines.  Russian  military   the  current  missile  defense  system  is   is  determined.  The  role  of  a  statesman   LVDOVRRQWKHZD\WRVLJQL¿FDQWUHFRY-­ nowhere  close  to  being  able  to  defend   is  to  let  the  destiny  be  the  guide  and   ery,  if  not  as  powerful  as  the  military   against  Russia’s  large  arsenal  of  short   JRZLWKWKHÀRZRIKLVWRU\)RUWX-­ of  the  Soviet  Union.  The  Russian  inva-­ and  intermediate  range  missiles.  Then,   nately,  the  United  States  is  destined   sion  of  Georgia  in  2008  was  a  clear   why  is  Russia  fussing  so  much  about   WRSUHYDLOLQWKHFRPLQJFRQÀLFWZLWK statement  made  by  Putin  and  Medve-­ it,  and  why  is  the  United  States  not  let-­ Russia,  and  American  statesmen  must   dev,  who  made  clear  that  they  are  pre-­ ting  Russia  control  it  jointly,  if  it  is  not   ease  that  hand  of  destiny  by  going   pared  to  use  military  force  to  protect   aimed  at  Russia?  The  real  reason  for   along  with  it.

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North America

Rise of  Turkey  &   American  Foreign   Policy By Sungtae Park

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he world’s attention is currently focused on the internal political unrest in the Middle East, even more than Iran’s nuclear program. Turkey, on the other hand, never seems to make it to the headlines of today’s media. Many people do not even consider Turkey to be part of the Middle East. Yet, by examining the country, it is hard not to recognize its regional dominance as well as its potential significance with regard to the American policy in the region. There are many ways to measure power. One could measure power in terms of military and economic influence, as well as soft power appeals. Looking at Turkey, it is easily the largest economy in the Middle East, the 17th largest in the world, and still growing at a rapid pace. Militarily, it has a much larger military expenditure than Israel, has a massive, well-trained army, armed with modern equipment, BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

has extensive combat experience fighting Kurdish militias, and is the only major naval power of the Middle East. The Turkish army constitutes the most powerful ground forces in the Middle East and probably even among the European armies as well, not counting Russia. Politically, it is a democracy, although imperfect, and has a fairly stable government backed by powerful and secular military. In terms of soft power, it is perhaps the only power in the region that has wide-appeal among other regional states, even with Iran and Israel, although the flotilla incident did mean a downturn. At the same time, Turkey is also culturally tied to Europe and is seen by the West as a Middle Eastern model of secularism and modernization. Turkey has historically been a major power. One could just point to the example of the Ottoman Empire, which at its height controlled the

entire Middle East (with the exception of Iran), parts of Central Asia, the Balkans, and Northern Africa. After World War I, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk self-contained the once-great-power in its homeland in the Anatolian peninsula in order to thoroughly modernize and to democratize. Throughout the Cold War, until the end of the Cold War, and even until the Iraq War in 2003, Turkey pursued its foreign policy largely in line with the United States and NATO. Iraq War of 2003, however, was a bit of a wake-up call for Turkey to pursue its own and more forceful foreign policy again. Turkey was vigorously opposed to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 because it feared that the Iraqi Kurdish elements, which the Americans supported against Saddam Hussein, would be let loose and would destabilize Turkey with its own rebellious Kurdish population. Moreover, 2


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Turkey was not interested in seeing the balance of power between Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia destroyed, as a single power dominating the Gulf region would not be in Turkish interest. Nonetheless, the United States during the Bush administration ignored dissent from Turkey and many other 8

countries and went through with the invasion. At that point, Turkey realized that it could not count on the United States to look out for its interests and that it needs to look out for its own interest. At the current stage, Turkey is already the most powerful Middle

Eastern power, whether it is ready to accept it or not. With eventual disengagement of the United States from the Middle East and with readiness to pursue its own independent foreign policy, Turkey will definitely be playing the dominant role in the region as the most powerful economic, military, and BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


North America

Turkey is  already  the   most  powerful  Middle   Eastern  power,  wheth-­ er  it  is  ready  to  accept   it  or  not.  

political player. This is a fact that is being realized among the Turkish people as well, as one can hear talks of neo-Ottomanism going around in the country, although the country is not exactly sure how and where to direct its new and growing power. As of now, Turkey has adopted a makeBRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

no-enemy foreign policy. Nevertheless, as with any great power, being friendly with everyone is impossible, as countries with conflicting interest will want to forge relations, a great example being the United States and Iran both wanting stronger relations with Turkey. At some point in the near future, Turkey will have to make some important decisions about which powers it will align with and which powers it will align against. The other major power contender, Iran, although it may claim influence in the Gulf region after the American withdrawal, will have fairly limited influence across the rest of the Middle East due to its limitations on available resources, and any attempt to extend its influence will surely be checked by Turkey. Moreover, the Iranians, recognizing their relative weakness vis-à-vis Turkey, are very careful to not antagonize Ankara, which could potentially be forced to be involved actively in the region much sooner than it would like to be. In this respect, Turkey and the United States could attempt to align their interests in the region again.

W

ith respect to Iran, neither the United States nor Turkey is interested in seeing the Iranian domination of the Gulf. Yet, the United States is set to withdraw from the region. Instead of the United States, Turkey could exert

political pressure against potential Iranian domination of Iraq and the GCC states. The fact that Turkey does not have hostile relations Iran would greatly help. Although not a member of the P5+1, Turkey could also play a more active part in negotiating to rid Iran of its nuclear developments. Regarding the Arab-Israeli relations, Turkey, as a country that can appeal to both the Arabs and the West, could be seen as a fairer mediator between the two sides, unlike the United States, which does not have mass appeal in the region. The most crucial area in which the United States and Turkey could cooperate on is perhaps on putting a lid on the Russian dream of recreating its sphere of influence, which Vladimir Putin has been working on for the past ten years and will continue to do so even more aggressively in the future. Turkey is perfectly aware that, since the aftermath of World War II, its strategic position vis-à-vis Russia has depended on its relationship with NATO and another powerful outside power, the United States. With resurgent Russia on the horizon, American and Turkish interests should perfectly align in this area. The Middle East is shaking because of internal unrest but Turkey is still thriving. For the United States, Turkey may be the ideal country to work with in stabilizing the region as well as countering the Russian influence. 9


Europe

Nicolas Sarkozy:  The  Reelected   President By Dan Lahmi

A Â

recent  poll  released  by  the   French  daily  newspaper  Le   Parisien  showed  that  if  the   presidential  elections  were  held   today,  the  current  French  president,   Nicolas  Sarkozy  would  receive  21%   of  the  votes  while  his  potentially   main  opponent  Dominique  Strauss   Kahn-­  a  socialist  candidate  and  current   president  of  the  IMF-­  would  have  23%   and  Marine  Le  Pen,  the  leader  of  the   extreme  right  party  called  the  Front   National-­  a  political  party  considered   fascist  by  many  journalists  and  politi-­ cians-­  would  have  24%  of  the  votes.   In  other  words,  if  France  could  vote   today,  according  to  the  poll,  Sarkozy   might  not  even  qualify  himself  for  the   second  round.  Moreover,  many  people   among  his  own  political  party,  UMP,   argue  that  he  is  not  the  best  candidate   anymore  to  represent  right  wing  ideas.   However,  beside  the  current  political   atmosphere  being  against  Sarkozy,  he   still  has  a  high  probability  to  win  the   presidential  elections.          Sarkozy  appears  as  the  most  cred-­ ible  candidate  of  the  election  on  the   right  wing.  For  instance,  beside  the   fact  that  he  knows  how  to  govern   a  country,  he  has  defended  many  

10

unpopular  reforms  that  he  considered   necessary  for  France.  He  postponed   the  retirement  age  from  60  years  old   to  62  and  afterward  his  popularity   decreased.  However,  even  though   the  reform  substantially  decreased   Sarkozy’s  popularity,  it  showed  his   determination  to  deal  with  important   issues  whatever  political  costs  he  may   pay;Íž  this  image  will  certainly  help  him   during  the  campaign.  For  instance,   due  to  some  punctual  reasons,  such   DVÂżQDQFLDOFULVLVDQGWKHHXURFULVLV coupled  with  structural  reasons,  as  the   )UHQFKGHÂżFLWIRUH[DPSOHUHDVRQDEOH candidates  will  have  nothing  to  offer   but  “blood  toil  tears  and  sweatâ€?  and  an   important  part  of  the  French  popu-­ lation  will  see  in  Sarkozy  the  only   person  who  would  have  the  courage  to   implement  this  program  on  a  national   scale  since  he  had  already  fought   for  unpopular  reforms.  Therefore,   his  credibility  to  cope  with  delicate   issues  will  have  a  positive  impact  for   him  when  people  will  have  to  choose   a  candidate.  Furthermore,  his  recent   PLQLVWHULDOUHVKXIĂ€HZLOOLPSRVHKLP-­ self  as  a  solid  candidate.                    Sarkozy’s  designation  of  two   undeniably  competent  ministers,  Alain  

JuppĂŠ  and  Claude  GuĂŠant,  in  a  strate-­ gic  ministries-­  the  ministry  of  foreign   affairs  and  the  ministry  of  domestic  af-­ fairs  respectively-­  will  boost  Sarkozy’s   popularity  in  the  polls  few  months   before  the  elections.    Alain  JuppĂŠ  and   Claude  GuĂŠant,  will  certainly  give  him   an  advantage  during  the  campaign.   Both  ministers  are  widely  accepted  as   KLJKO\HIÂżFLHQWE\DOOWKHSROLWLFDODQD-­ lysts  and  are  both  going  to  lead  a  very   strategic  ministry.  In  fact,  because  of   Sarkozy’s  decision  to  check  the  rise  of   the  Front  National  by  organizing  a  de-­ bate  about  the  theme  of  public  safety   as  well  as  about  the  place  of  Islam  in   France,  drop  in  the  numbers  of  crimes   and  aggressions  proved  to  be  crucial  if   Sarkozy  wants  to  win.  Hopefully  for   the  French  president,  Gueant’s  nomi-­ nation  will  certainly  sensibly  affect   the  diminution  of  crimes  and  aggres-­ sions.    Moreover,  due  to  the  “spring   revolutionsâ€?  in  many  Arab  countries   and  because  of  the  close  historic  ties   between  France  and  North  African   countries,  France  attitude  toward  its   North  African  neighbors  will  still  be   on  the  French  foreign  policy’s  agenda   and  will  still  captured  the  attention  of   the  public  opinion.  Sarkozy  will  be  

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able  to  rely  on  Juppe  for  good  diplomatic   results.  Subsequently  Sarkozy’s  diplomatic   successes  and  solid  improvement  of  the   people’s  security  in  France  will  place  him  as   a  serious  contender  for  the  elections.    In  addi-­ tion  Sarkozy  can  still  believe  in  his  reelection   because  he  will  certainly  be  the  only  candi-­ date  of  the  right  as  well  as  for  the  following   reasons.       he  candidate  de  Villepin  will  not  run   and  his  voters  will  vote  for  Sarkozy.   The  poll  published  by  Le  Parisien   indicated  that  if  Dominique  Strauss  Kahn   GRHVQRWUXQ6DUNR]\ZRXOGEHTXDOL¿HGIRU the  second  round,  just  behind  Marine  Le  Pen,   and  if  Strauss  Kahn  runs  Sarkozy  would  not   EHTXDOL¿HGDWDOOIRUWKHVHFRQGURXQG$O-­ though  this  poll  reinforces  the  idea  that  Sar-­ kozy  will  not  be  reelected,  it  paradoxically   consolidate  his  chance  to  win  the  elections.   For  instance  the  poll  included  the  candidature   of  Dominique  de  Villepin-­  a  former  member   of  the  UMP  who  became  a  dissident  of  the   party  and  created  his  own  party-­  and  assessed   that  7%  of  the  voters  would  vote  for  him  if   the  elections  were  held  today.  However,  be-­ cause  of  the  great  chance  that  Marine  Le  Pen   accedes  to  the  second  round  while  Sarkozy   might  not  even  accede  to  it,  de  Villepin  will   not  run.  In  fact,  the  latter  knows  that  he  does   not  have  any  chances  to  win  the  elections  and   would  rather  prefer  as  President  of  France   someone  who  supports  right  wing  idea   rather  than  a  proponent  of  left-­wing  ideas  or   extreme  right  wing  ideas.  Consequently,  de   Villepin’s  voters  would  switch  to  Sarkozy   and  he  would  gain  approximatively  7%  of   more  votes,  which  would  position  him  as  a   potential  winner  of  the  election.                      To  conclue,  Sarkozy  can  and  should   still  believe  in  his  reelection  because  of   his  unique  image  of  a  courageous  reformer   because  of  the  expected  good  result  in   ministries  that  will  count  during  the  election   and  because  of  his  probable  monopoly  as  the   only  candidate  representing  the  right  wing.   Furthermore,  in  politics  time  tends  to  run   slowly,  the  Presidential  elections  will  happen   in  14  months  or  in  other  world  in  an  eternity   for  a  politician.  In  few  days  everything  can   change  and  usually  in  French  politics  it  does;͞   all  French  presidents  who  have  been  elected   XQGHUWKH¿IWK5HSXEOLFZHUHQRWJLYHQZLQ-­ ner  by  any  poll  a  year  before  the  election.   Why  would  it  change  today?  

“

T

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Europe

In  a  few   days  every-­ thing  can   change  and   usually  in   French  poli-­ tics  it  does.

“

Nicolas  Sarkozy .

11


Asia

China’s A2/AD Capabilities:

Impact  on  Regional  Deterrence   Dynamics By Jieming Chu

O

n  December  26th,  2010,  in   an  interview  with  China   Signpost,  Admiral  Willard  of   WKH863DFLÂżF&RPPDQGVDLGWKDW China’s  DF-­21D  Anti-­Ship  Ballistic   Missile  (ASBM)  had  reached  its   Initial  Operational  Capability  (IOC).   Achieving  the  IOC  for  the  ASBM  is   VLJQLÂżFDQWEHFDXVHLWLVDPLOHVWRQH in  China’s  development  of  “anti-­ access  area  denialâ€?  (A2/AD)  systems.   China’s  determination  in  acquiring   these  capabilities  necessitates  care-­ ful  analysis  of  China’s  underlying   motivations  as  well  as  the  intended   or  unintended  geopolitical  impacts  of   these  capabilities.        The  major  motivation  for  the   development  of  these  systems  is   China’s  grave  concern  over  Taiwan’s   potential  de  jure  independence.   Taiwan  has  huge  social  and  geopoliti-­ FDOVLJQLÂżFDQFHLQWKHH\HVRI%HLMLQJ

12

and  is  one  of  the  “core  interests�  of   China.  Taiwan  currently  is  a  prosper-­ ing  democracy  in  East  Asia  and  an   important  component  of  the  First   Island  Chain.  People  in  China,  as   time  passes,  often  look  up  to  Taiwan’s   economic  prosperity  and  the  degrees   of  individual  freedom  Taiwanese   enjoy.  The  deep  contrast  between  a   democratic  Taiwan  and  an  oppressive   China  raises  a  serious  and  dangerous   legitimacy  crisis  to  the  ruling  Chinese   Communist  Party.  A  prospering  Han-­ democracy  at  China’s  door-­step  is   thus  a  de-­stabilizing  factor  to  China’s   domestic  politics.          Beijing  is  also  concerned  about   Taiwan’s  unique  identity  as  a  key   component  of  the  First  Island  Chain.   Historically,  during  the  Cold  War,   the  First  Island  Chain  became  the   frontline  for  the  United  States  and  its   allies  to  contain  Soviet  imperialism  

LQWKH3DFL¿F7KHDWHU1RZLQDSRVW Cold  War  world,  Beijing  put  itself  in   the  vacant  position  left  by  the  former   Soviet  Union  as  the  key  competitor   of  the  U.S.  in  the  21st  century.  China,   therefore,  is  deeply  concerned  with   the  U.S.  military  presence  in  East   Asia  and  suspects  itself  to  be  the  tar-­ get  of  a  new  containment.  Although   the  control  of  the  island  of  Taiwan   GRHVQRWVLJQL¿FDQWO\ERRVW$PHULFDœV military  projection  capabilities  given   the  quality  and  quantity  of  America’s   military  projection  platforms,  it   certainly  will  boost  such  capabili-­ ties  of  any  other  regional  power  who   controls  Taiwan.  China’s  growing   economy  has  become  increasingly  de-­ pendent  on  the  import  of  oil  and  other   strategic  materials  through  maritime   trade  routes.  The  security  of  China’s   trade  routes  is  thus  directly  linked   to  the  ability  of  China  to  maintain  

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Asia

PLAN vessel  ranges  illustrate   maximum  time  on  station   (unreplenished)  at  state  range

an 8%  annual  GDP  growth.  The  >8%   GDP  growth,  together  with  national-­ ism,  are  the  major  current  sources  of   legitimacy  for  the  Chinese  Communist   Party.  Therefore,  China’s  acquisition   of  Taiwan  would  allow  China  to  break   through  the  First  Island  Chain  and   ensure  that  China  does  not  become  the   next  victim  of  economic  strangulation   under  a  new  American  containment.          In  1996,  prior  to  Taiwan’s  presiden-­ tial  election,  China  launched  mis-­ siles  and  held  massive  military  drills   near  Taiwan  to  warn  the  Taiwanese   electorate  not  to  vote  for  the  pro-­inde-­ pendence  candidate  Lee  Teng-­hui.  At   that  time,  tensions  directed  across  the   Strait  reached  an  all-­time  high  and  the   U.S.  president  Bill  Clinton  sent  in  two   aircraft  carrier  battle  groups  into  the   Taiwan  Strait  and  neutralized  China’s   threat.  During  this  crisis,  both  China   and  the  U.S.  sent  each  other  a  strong   BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

message. The  Chinese  leadership  reaf-­ ¿UPHGLWVUHVROXWLRQWRWDNH7DLZDQ by  force  should  Taiwan  seek  de  jure   independence.  The  United  States,   on  the  other  hand,  demonstrated  its   credibility  to  its  Asian  allies  and  its   determination  to  come  to  Taiwan’s  aid   under  the  provisions  of  the  Taiwan   Relations  Act.

I  

n fact,  China  backed  down  in  this   crisis  facing  the  strong  coercive   force  posed  by  the  two  American   aircraft  carriers.  Beijing’s  show  of   force  even  eventually  brought  it  with   counter-­productive  outcomes  as  Lee   Teng-­hui  enjoyed  a  5%  boost  in  public   support  and  won  the  election  with  a   majority.  This  crisis  led  Beijing  to   speed  up  its  military  modernization   process  and  construct  strategies  that   could  guarantee  victory  vis-­à-­vis  a   U.S.-­backed  Taiwan  in  a  conventional  

war. This  winning  strategy  that  Beijing   proposed  is  A2/AD.        China’s  A2/AD  strategy  employs  a   wide  range  of  conventional  military   systems  including  high-­tech  sub-­ marines,  state-­of-­the-­art  air  defense   systems,  advanced  aircrafts,  over-­the-­ horizon  radars,  spy  satellites  as  well  as   the  ASBMs.  The  combination  of  these   systems  is  expected  to  effectively  de-­ ter,  delay,  or  destroy  incoming  Ameri-­ can  military  interventions  in  a  possible   Sino-­Taiwanese  war.  In  essence,  the   A2/AD  capabilities  will  allow  China   to  exploit  its  asymmetrical  advantages   to  win  a  limited  conventional  war   against  the  much  more  superior  U.S.   air  and  naval  forces  in  the  Taiwan   Theater.          China  understands  that  America’s   defense  commitments  to  Taiwan  are   not  bound  by  any  treaties  but  are   only  vaguely  described  in  the  Taiwan   13


Asia

“

China’s  determination  in  acquiring   these  capabilities  necessitates  care-­ ful  analysis  of  China’s  underlying   motivations  as  well  as  the  intended   or  unintended  geopolitical  impacts   of  these  capabilities.

“

Relations  Act.    The  ambiguity  of  the   wording  of  the  Taiwan  Relations  Act   allows  the  U.S.  to  come  to  Taiwan’s   aid  under  circumstances  and  in  ways   LWVHHV¿W7KLVDPELJXLW\DOORZVÀH[-­ ibility  of  American  military  response   but  it  also  has  its  weaknesses.  China,   with  proper  means,  can  manipulate   and  exploit  this  particular  ambigu-­ ity.  Whether  a  bluff  or  not,  China’s   A2/AD  capabilities  would  play  into   America’s  consideration  of  interven-­ tion.  The  ever  growing  economic   tie  between  China  and  the  United   States  eliminates  incentives  for  direct   military  confrontation  of  these  two   states.  Now,  realizing  China’s  possible   DELOLW\WRLQÀLFWKHDY\FDVXDOWLHVRQ traditional  American  military  projec-­ tion  platforms,  America’s  administra-­ tion  would  be  more  reluctant  to  risk   suffering  heavy  economic  and  military   losses  in  asymmetrical  warfare  at  the   time  and  place  of  China’s  choosing.   If  the  deterrence  fails  and  the  Ameri-­ can  leadership  decides  to  stand  up  to   China’s  threat  and  come  to  Taiwan’s   aid,  Beijing’s  hope  would  be  that  the   A2/AD  systems  would  cause  enough   damage  and  disruption  to  America’s   deployment  of  military  assets  into   the  theater  of  war  so  that  de  facto   Chinese  control  over  Taiwan  could  be   HVWDEOLVKHGDQGWKHFDXVHRIUHXQL¿FD-­ tion  irreversible.  In  this  situation,  the   international  community  would  most   possibly  be  coerced  to  accept  the  Chi-­ 14

nese  occupation  of  Taiwan.  

 O

ne  fact  that  is  often  over-­ looked  is  the  third  possible   situation  in  which  the  United   States  decides  to  intervene  regard-­ OHVVRIWKHFRVWZKHQLW¿QGVWKDWLW has  too  high  a  stake  in  the  de  facto   independence  of  Taiwan  and  too  much   credibility  to  lose  if  it  fails  to  uphold   its  commitments  to  its  ally.  In  this   case,  the  Chinese  leadership,  under   strong  domestic  pressures  of  national-­ ism,  would  be  unlikely  to  back  down   from  a  military  offensive  against   Taiwan.  Therefore,  it  is  reasonable  to   assume  that  China  also  has  a  plan  to   use  the  A2/AD  systems  to  destroy  U.S   military  assets  in  the  Taiwan  Theater   LILW¿QGVLWVHOISDVWWKHSRLQWRIQR return.  Hence,  China  would  continue   to  develop  its  A2/AD  capabilities  to   prepare  for  this  worst  situation  and  to   serve  as  a  credible  deterrence.  

C

hina’s  wishful  thinking,  its  ag-­ gressive  postures  in  the  year  of   2010  and  its  growing  military   superiority  in  East  Asia,  however,   have  brought  immediate  unintended   geopolitical  consequences  in  East   Asia.  Regional  powers  have  sensed   China’s  growing  A2/AD  capabili-­ ties  and  viewed  China  as  a  threat  to   traditional  balance  of  power  in  East   Asia.  Japan,  in  particular,  felt  the  need   to  address  China’s  threat  to  Japan’s  

vital  national  interests  in  the  resource-­ abundant  East  China  Sea.  Japan’s  new   defense  strategy  in  2010,  therefore,   calls  for  a  shift  in  Japan’s  defense   posture  and  a  greater  integration  of   Japanese  military  with  the  United   States  military.  The  Association  of   Southeast  Asian  Nations  (ASEAN)  has   also  moved  closer  to  the  United  States   to  curb  Chinese  threats.  Apparently,   China’s  growing  military  capabilities,   especially  its  potential  ability  to  keep   WKH86RXWRI&KLQDÂśVVSKHUHRILQĂ€X-­ ence  in  the  future,  has  triggered  wide-­ spread  regional  security  concerns  and   only  invited  a  more  prominent  U.S.   PLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHLQWKH:HVWHUQ3DFLÂżF        Maintaining  the  geopolitical  bal-­ ance  of  power  in  East  Asia  is  therefore   fundamental  to  regional  stability  and   the  United  States  has  to  take  lead  in   accomplishing  this  task.  Good  news  is   that,  amid  concerns,  Admiral  Willard   VWLOOUHPDLQVÂżUPO\RSWLPLVWLFDERXW America’s  ability  to  stand  up  to  the   challenges  posed  by  China’s  growing   A2/AD  capabilities,  saying:  “Cer-­ tainly,  this  kind  of  capability  should   be  a  concern  to  the  region,  and  it   poses  a  challenge  to  any  naval  or  air   operations  that  would  be  conducted   in  that  area  were  it  to  be  employed.  Is   it  affecting  my  operations  today?  Not   at  all.  Were  it  to  pose  a  challenge  to   WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV,ÂśPFRQÂżGHQWWKDW, have  the  capability  to  operate  in  that   air  space  and  water  space.â€?  

BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Is corruption T draining the Indian economy? By Tanay Paranjape

Former Telecom  Minister  A  Raja.

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

Asia

he Indian government announced this week that GDP grew by 8.9% year-on-year in the most recent quarter. This makes it the second fastest growing economy after China However everything does not seem to be going well, as the country has seen many corruption scandals involving major corporates. Some of the major scandals include alleged bribes-for-loans involving state-controlled banks and lenders. There is alleged corruption in telecom market which cost the government exchequer a whopping $ 40 billion. Recently published IMF reports suggest a capital flight of $462 billion since independence. The telecom scandal has received the most attention due its magnanimity. The scandal has lead to the resignation of the Telecom Minister Andimuthu Raja subsequently charges were framed against him leading to his imprisonment. The Telecom Department under Minister Raja sold second-generation (2G) mobile-telephone licenses and bandwidth in 2008 at throwaway prices. Instead of auctioning them, he sold them at prices that had been set in 2001, when the market was far smaller causing the government a major revenue loss.      To make matters worse, many of the firms that won licenses appear not to have been qualified. An audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India published last month said the sale was conducted on a murky “first come, first served basis”, in many cases to companies that lacked the necessary capital or had fogged essential documents. Two firms won licenses and then sold them to foreign firms: Unitech, primarily a property company, was part-bought by Norway’s Telenor; and nearly half of Swan Telecom was bought by Abu Dhabi’s Etisalet ETEL at much higher prices.        India has grown rapidly since it underwent liberalization and major economic reforms in 1991. The country’s economy has grown over $ 1.43 trillion and has the potential for much more. But is this sort of crony capitalism hindering economic development? Is the money remaining the hands of a few where as a large section of the population does not benefit for the fruits of growth?        The $ 40 billion dollars earned could be well spent in welfare schemes where the money is much needed. Healthcare, education and infrastructure which are among the major sectors needing massive government spending remain neglected which could provide for a more inclusive growth. The nexus between business and politicians is preventing the common man to benefit from the growth the nation has undergone.        The government needs to take firm action against cases of corruption at all levels of government and bureaucracy. The imprisonment of a high ranking union cabinet minister will hopefully pose as a deterrent to others in government. 15


Turmoil in the Arab World

16

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Theme

Thousands camp  out  in  Tahir  Square,  not  willing  to  give  up  until  they  have  won  their  rights.

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

17


Theme

T

he stirrings  of  discontent  in   the  Arab  world  that  evolved   into  (in  many  cases)  passion-­ ate  protest  and  much  violence,  did   not  stem  from  issues  unheard  of   until  now.  The  protests  occurred  be-­ cause  these  people  were  unhappy,   GLVVDWLV¿HGZLWKWKHLUTXDOLW\RIOLIH This  unhappiness  originated  most   directly  from  miserable  unemploy-­ ment  rates.  Naturally,  the  people   blame  their  leaders.  Oppressive   leaders  have  existed  for  as  long  as   leaders  have  existed,  and  yet  now,   the  people  have  more  weapons  with   which  to  combat  them.  The  twenty-­ ¿UVWFHQWXU\LVDQH[SHUWLQWKH science  of  communication.  Social   PHGLDIDFLOLWDWHVH[WUHPHO\HI¿FLHQW sending  and  receiving  of  messag-­ es-­  perfect  for  mass  protests,  and   perfect  for  the  countries  in  question,   who  have  very  young  populations.   The  spread  of  these  uprisings  is   ZKDWPDNHVWKHPVRVLJQL¿FDQWLQ a  few  short  months,  millions  have   fought  in  the  streets  for  the  right  to   be  heard,  decades-­long  rules  have   been  disrupted,  and  an  entire  region   is  in  turmoil.  In  the  following  few   pages,  we  attempt  to  examine  all   aspects  of  the  protests,  using  statis-­ tics  and  professional  opinions.  We   begin  with  a  background  of  events,   which  starts  with  Tunisia,  the  spark   WKDWLJQLWHGWKHÀDPH«

Tunisia

Libya

Note: We  concede  that  as  events  are   changing  day  to  day,  especially  in  the   case  of  Libya,  some  of  the  views  ex-­ pressed  in  this  section  may  not  consider   the  most  current  developments.

An Age-Old Problem, Addressed by the Twenty-First Century Theme Section by Jesse Koklas 18

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Theme

Longtime Arab Leaders

Jordan

Algeria

Egypt

Saudi  Arabia

Bahrain

Yemen

Leader,  took  power          From  U.S.  State  Dept.reports President  Abdelaziz Thousands  of  enforced  disappearances: %RXWHÀLND freedom  of  association  is  very  restricted

Morocco King  Mohammed VI,1999

-XGLFLDU\LQĂ€XHQFHGE\SROLWLFV FRUUXSWLRQLQHIÂżFLHQF\

Libya

Col. Â Moammar *DGKDÂż

Authoritarian  regime;͞  torture,  arbitrary arrest  are  continuing  problems

Egypt

President  Hosni Mubarak,  1981

Emergency  law  in  place  for  30  yeaars effectively  outlaws  political  parties

Sudan

President  Omar AI-­Bashir,  1993

Bashir  indicted  for  genocide  for  his counterinsurgency  campaign  in  Darfur

Jordan

King  Abdullah 1999

Law  does  not  provide  citizens  the  right   to  change  government

Syria

President  Bashar Asad,  2000

Has  failed  to  comply  with  minimum international  human  rights  standards

Saudi Arabia

King  Abdullah, 2005

Severe  violations of  religious  freedom

Yemen

President  Ali Abdullah  Saleh, 1990

Mounting  poverty  among  a  growing   young  population;͞  frustration  with a  lack  of  political  freedoms  

Youth  and  Poverty   Pop.(m)

Median  age

jobless%

Below  poverty  line% Internet  Users(m)

%pop  on  internet

Tunisia

2.50

20.90

16.50

46.00

1.30

52.00

Egypt

80.50

24.00

9.60

20.00

20.00

24.84

Libya Saudi  Arabia Yemen Bahrain

6.40

24.20

30.00

33.00

0.35

25.70

24.90

10.80

N/A

9.6

37.35

23.40

17.89

35.00

45.20

2.20

9.40

1.21

30.90

15.00

N/A

0.42

30.00

Unemployment  is  a  chief  concern  of  the  young,  and  a  reason  to  rebel.

BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

5.47

Statistics  from  CIA  World  Fact  Book

19


A Timeline of Discontent Tunisia (the Spark) December 17, 2010: Mohammed Bouazizi, a young fruit and vegetable vendor, sets himself on fire in the street after local officials confiscate his stand because he did not have a permit. Many, who want better job options and a higher quality of life, share his discontent. Protests begin in Sidi Bouzid that same day. December 28, 2010: After several protests, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali says that the protests are unacceptable. Tunisia Federation of Labor Unions and 300 lawyers also rally to show their support for the protesters. The Tunisian ministers of communication, trade and handicrafts, and religious affairs are dismissed. Januray 2, 2011: The cyberactivist group “Anonymous” starts Operation Tunisia in solidarity with the protests by striking down a number of Tunisian government websites. Januray 7: A group of bloggers, journalists, activists and a rap singer are arrested. Snipers carry out a series of charges in Kasserine and Thala. Januray 13: Approximately 66 dead since the protests began. President Ali

announces he will not run for reelection. Januray 14: Ben Ali orders a state of emergency, and bans meetings of more than three people. The army seizes the country’s main airport. Ali’s family members are arrested. He escapes the country by plane. According to the UN, approximately 219 were killed in the uprisings, and another 510 injured. Egypt (the Big Deal) Januray 25, 2011: Protesters take to the streets in Cairo’s Tahir Square. Calls of “Down with Mubrak” resound. Januray 28: Internet and mobile phone text messages are disruped. President Hosni Mubarak announces he dismissed his government. Januray 29: Mubarak appoints a vice-President for the first time in three decades. Januray 31: 250,000 people gather in Tahir Square to protest an oppressive regime. The EU calls for free and fair elections in Egypt. The White House says the government must address the people and resolve unrest. Worldwide investors continue withdrawing signifi-

cant capital from Egypt in the midst of mounting unrest. February 1: Mubarak declares he will not run for reelection, but refuses to step down. President Obama says only the Egyptian people can determine their leaders. Protests continue and clashes break out between pro-Mubarak and anti-government forces. February 2: Internet is partially restored. Google improves its speak2tweet technology for the protesters. February 7: Thousands are camped out in Tahrir Square. The government approves a 15 per cent raise in salaries and pensions in a bid to appease the angry masses. Estimated number of people dead is 302. February 11: After tens of thousands people take to the streets across Egypt in angry protests, Mubarak resigns and hands over power to the army- technically a military coup. Scattered protests are still occurring, but the main objective, to remove Mubarak, was achieved. Libya (the Oil) February 15-­16,2011: Protests erupt

in Benghazi.

The beginnings  of  unrest.  Protesters  experience  violence  in  Tunisia. 20

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Theme

February 17: Calls for a “Day of Rage”

is made in response to an oppressive government under Muamar Qaddafi. February 22: Qaddafi orders his force to crush the uprisings. February 25: The EU agrees to impose an arms embargo, freeze assets, and impose a travel ban. February 28: Western powers discuss a no-flight zone, but need the Security Council’s decision. Pro-Qaddafi forces continue to clash with protesters, and the police and security continue to use weapons and violence against the protests. March 10: African Union summit held to find a solution. AU says external countries should not meddle in the affairs of Africa, and a no-flight zone would be violating previous agreements. March 17: The UN has backed a noflight zone. Enforcement is set to begin the 20-21st. Bahrain February 14: Clashes are reported

from parts of Bahrain. At least 14 people were injured in clashes over-

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

night where police used tear gas and rubber bullets. February 15: On February 15, thousands of protesters manage to gain control of the Manama Pearl Roundabout, and tent there overnight, mimicking the protests in Tahir Square. February 18: Government uses live ammunition against the protesters. Protests and fighting continues, with no leniency on the part of the government. March 15: The king declares a threemonth state of emergency, authorizing armed forces chief to take all measures to “protect the safety of the country and its citizens.” Saudi Arabia Januray 15: Announces it is hosting Ben Ali and his family. In response to Bahrain unrest, the government bans all protests. March 16-17: Hundreds protest in the east in solidarity with the Bahraini protests. Yemen February 2, 2011: Thousands take to the streets in this “First Day of Rage.” March 1: : Hundreds of thousands rally

in most main cities to express solidarity with the families of protesters killed in the past month, particularly for a “Tuesday of Rage.” March 10: President Ali Abdullah Saleh goes on TV to announce plans to change the constitution to transition to a parliamentary system. He refuses to step down until 2013 (he has ruled for 32 years). Jordan Members of the Muslim Brotherhood, trade unions, and leftist organizations, numbering 500, demand that Samir Rifai step down as prime minister and that the government control rising prices, inflation and unemployment. Protests reported in the capital and six other cities. February 10: The old government officials let go a week earlier, a new government is sworn in. February 18: Protesters clash with police forces. February 25: 6,000-10,000 take to the streets in the capital, in a protest called for by 20 political parties. Protests continue. Januray 28, 2011:

21


Theme

Regional Perspectives European Perspective

Asian Perspective

Western  Europe  has  always  been  a  supporter  of  giving   the  common  man  a  voice.  The  European  Union  has   called  the  governments  in  the  Middle  East  to  enable   a  transition  to  a  functional  democracy.  Particularly  in   WKHFDVHRI/LE\DDQRÀLJKW]RQHLVEHLQJFRQVLGHUHG Members  aspiring  to  form  an  alternate  government   are  in  the  process  of  meeting  European  heads  of  state   and  other  political  leaders.  Europe  hopes  a  transition   to  democracy  will  occur,  where  people  get  the  legiti-­ mate  rights  they  are  being  denied.

The  rising  crude  oil  prices  have  been  a  great   concern  for  most  Asian  countries.  Asia   heavily  depends  on  the  Middle  East  to  meet   its  crude  oil  requirements.  The  uncertainty   associated  with  the  production  of  oil  has  af-­ fected  stock  markets  across  Asia.  Stability  in   WKH0LGGOH(DVWZRXOGKHOSUHVWRUHFRQ¿GHQFH in  the  markets.  Asian  countries  desire  quick   restoration  of  peace  and  tranquility  in  the   Middle  East.

North American Perspective Overall,  it  is  not  in  the  interest  of  the  United   States  for  an  anti-­American  regime  to  come   into  power  for  any  of  the  countries  in  the   region,  although  nothing  is  certain  at  the  mo-­ ment.  If  Egypt,  the  center  of  the  Arab  nation,   becomes  anti-­American  and  anti-­Israeli,  the   United  States  will  have  to  overturn  its  compre-­ hensive  Middle  East  strategy  formulated  with   the  1979  Egypt-­Israel  Peace  Treaty.  If  Bahrain   becomes  anti-­American,  or  even  worse,  an   ,UDQLDQSUR[\WKH86WKÀHHWZLOOKDYHWR ¿QGDQRWKHUEDVH)LQDOO\LIWKH/LE\DQVLWXD-­ tion  degenerates  into  complete  breakdown  of   law  and  order,  it  could  potentially  turn  into  a   terrorist  haven.  The  United  States  advocates   DQRÀ\]RQHLQ/LE\DEXWUHFRJQL]HVWKDWDQ invasion  would  not  be  in  American  interest.

22

The Arab League A  quick  resolution   to  the  unrest  is  the   wish  of  the  Arab   League.  In  the   case  of  Libya,  a   QRÀ\]RQHVKRXOG be  employed,  but   there  should  be  no   invasion  of  Libya.

African Perspective The  African  Union  initially   did  not  want  to  get  involved  in   WKHFRQÀLFWVRILWV$UDEQRUWK 1RZWKDWDQRÀLJKW]RQHLV being  considered,  however,  the   African  Union  has  spoken  out   against  it,  saying  it  goes  di-­ rectly  against  the  Declaration   of  Economic  Development   signed  at  the  1973  conference   in  Algiers,  which  condemned   foreign  intervention  in  the   affairs  of  Africa.  Rwanda,  as   head  of  the  Peace  and  Security   Council,  advocates  an  end  to   the  violence  and  loss  of  life  in   Libya.  

BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


!

Educated Opinions

Theme

#

For  the  educated  opinions,  we  turn  to  our  professors.   Who  better  to  go  to  than  the  people  who  educate  us,   and  shape  how  we  think  of  the  world?   %HIRUHXVZHKDYHWZRRI%UDQGHLVœ¿QHVWZKRDS-­ proach  the  same  issue  a  bit  differently.

Interview  With   Professor  Wellington  Nyangoni Undergraduate  Advising  Head,  Professor  of  African  and  Afro-­ American  Studies by Jesse Koklas Do  you  think  the   same  force  is  behind  the  unrest  in   Tunisia,  Egypt,  and  Libya? Jesse Koklas:

Professor Wellington Nyangoni:

Yes or no. Many people were taken by surprise by the events in Tunisia, which was considered quite stable compared to Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries. But one could say that the government of Ben Ali had become very repressive, and it was a military regime that did not grant people the liberty that they wanted to have. So there was a simmering against the government, because when Ben Ali overthrew Bourguiba he claimed that there would be an open election, a democratic one. This openness [that had been promised] never came, and instead the military entrenched itself in power more and more and more. BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

In terms of Egypt, one could argue that the state of emergency, which was proclaimed after Anwar Sadat was assassinated, was never removed, and also the democratic changes that were promised never came. The government became more oppressive, and different types of views were not accepted. When the rebellion would take place was a question of time, and eventually, it did. But I think where the problem lies is that we are not sure of how this was organized, we just hear it was all of a sudden- I don’t think it was all of a sudden, I think it was organized. JK:   So  do  you  think  democracy  was  

a  main  force  behind  the  protests,  or   an  actual  force?   WN: We are not sure, because we do not know the powers behind the

revolt- are these people democratic or not? We do not know. Particularly if you look in Tunisia, they rebelled. The army was in power. We really don’t know who were the real brains behind the revolt, what is their ideology? If they are indeed talking about democracy, we do not know what kind of democracy they have in mind. You know, no one’s really come out and said, “This is what we want; we want democracy.� What kind of democracy are people talking about? We don’t know. In Egypt, some of the people who were behind this, the young people, have also not told us a clear vision of the Egypt they want. “Mubarak go Mubarak go,� the army is now in power. They wanted changes, they wanted a new constitution, but we really do not know what kind of de23


Theme

mocracy they have in mind, and what kind of ideas they want this country to stand for. Their issues about Egypt’s relationship [with] Israel, not much has been said. Their ideas about the Arab League? Not much has been said. What about the ideas in the African Union, not much is said. I don’t want to say that it is democracy- one needs to know the characters behind this. In the case of Egypt, there is the Islamic

Brotherhood. What are its views about all these things? We know what they stood for in the past, and their enmity, their hatred for the West, we know. It is still unclear to me. JK: Is  the  situation  in  Libya  jeop-­

DUGL]LQJWKHVHFXULW\RIWKHDUHD" :RXOGLWEHEHQH¿FLDOIRU4DGGD¿ to go? WN: I know the common view ex-

We just  had   many  more   people  killed  in   the  Sudan,  in   Darfur-­  we  did   not  enforce  a   QRÀLJKW]RQH there.”

pressed by many people is that Qaddafi should go. But who is going to replace him, what do these people believe in? I wish I knew the people who were trying to replace him and what their philosophy is of this revolution, if it indeed can be called a revolution. Where do they want to take Libya to? The other thing too, it’s all an issue of international law. The United Nations says that countries should not inter-

Education and the Internet These countries  have  a  very  high  percentage  of  young  adults  of   university  age  in  school.  The  majority  of  people  protesting  are   young  adults,  frustrated  by  the  lack  of  job  options  after  graduat-­ ing  university.  The  Internet  is  a  viable  way  to  spread  informa-­ tion,  especially  by  young,  educated  people.

fere in the internal affairs of member states, and I am not sure I am the right person to say “Qaddafi should go.” JK: Well it’s  your  opinion. WN: Yes but I think it is the opinion of

the majority of Libyans who should say if he should go. It’s their country, and I think they have a right to determine how they should be governed and who should govern them. But I know some people have flown to Europe, saying Europe should impose a no-flight zone, but a no-flight imposition, that’s almost like a declaration of war. Do we 24

really want to intervene in Libya? If we do so, are we continually going to intervene everywhere where there is internal revolt? If there are revolts in any country, should we impose a no-flight zone in those areas? What about if it is a minority that is revolting- should we take the side of the minority? I mean I know the Marxist people have revolted in Bengazi, but that doesn’t reflect the overall opinion of what the Libyans think. I know for some reasons other people don’t like Qaddafi, he has been a thorn in the flesh of many countries, so many people want him to go. But

I’m not sure whether our like or dislike of Qaddafi should be the basis to say the government should be changed. JK: To  what  extend  should  the  

United States  intervene  in  the  revo-­ lutions?   WN: I personally don’t think that the United States alone should intervene; I think it should be a question for the UN to intervene. Or Europe. It should be the global community as agreed by the UN (particularly the Security Council). That would give it a semblance of legality, but if we just go by BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Theme

ourselves to intervene, I don’t think that would be legal under international law. JK:  So  why  are  we  pushing  for  a  no-­ ÀLJKW]RQHGRZHHYHQKDYHLQWHU-­ ests  besides  humanitarian  interests   in  Libya? WN: Libya is a very rich country in terms of oil, and some people want access to that oil. Italy and the Europeans have that, but that does not mean we

will not become interested in that oil[we as in] American companies. Was  there  any  country  that   EHQH¿WHGIURPWKHUHJLRQDOXQUHVW" Or  is  it  too  early  to  tell? WN: I think it’s too early to tell, and also when we say benefits what do we mean, are we talking about political benefit, strategic benefit, what are we talking about. It is very difficult, JK:

Crisis  in  Egpt,  Tunisia  &  Yemen

because these are unfolding events. Now, if Qaddafi is overthrown, maybe that will be a benefit in and of itself to some people. But suppose he clings onto power, and is not overthrown, what happens? What is our relationship going to be in the future with that country? I don’t think we should be guided by the principles that we don’t want him and therefore we should intervene- there should be much more

BuzzGraph  of  leading  keywords

sourcce:sysomos.com

Tweets  rose  dramatically  during  the  period  of  most  intense  protest  in   these  countries,  which  shows  how  important  and  effective  social  media   was  when  spreading  and  organizing  the  spirit  of  unrest.

than that, in terms of what our strategic interests in the area are. JK: Â :LOOLWVLJQLÂżFDQWO\LPSDFWWKH

African  Union  if  he  goes,  or  does  he  have   UHODWLYHO\OLWWOHLQÀXHQFH"

Well, I would be surprised if many African countries would support the overthrow of Qaddafi, or even a noflight zone imposed, because Qaddafi is a member of the African Union, an active member, and the African union is opposed to foreign countries intervening and changing governments in Africa. If they go to Libya, where else will they go? Many of the African countries would rather have WN:

BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

immediate settlement in the area. As you and I are talking, there are efforts in the African Union right now to try and mediate what is happening to try to bring peace to the area. We just had many more people killed in the Sudan, in Darfur- we did not enforce a no-flight zone there. A lot of people have been killed in the Congo, and although the UN is there, not much is happening, there has not been a major posture to intervene in Darfur. JK:  What  effect  will  these  revolutions  

have  on  the  world’s  oil  supply? WN:

Saudi Arabia has said that it will

increase the production of oil to offset the loss of the oil from Libya. Nigeria and other countries have said they are willing to step up their supply- good for them economically. But one just wonders if there was really no oil, if there was nothing, whether the international community would have been so moved to try and intervene and argue for the overthrow of Libya. It’s suspicious. But I have not talked to any of these people, to the people in the U.S. government, so there is no definitive answer. I can merely speculate as to why some countries would want to intervene. 25


Theme

Interview with   Professor  Shai  Feldman       Judy  and  Sidney  Swartz  Director’s  Chair  of  the  Crown  Center  for   Middle  East  Studies  and  Professor  of  Politics by Sungtae Park

Sungtae Park: What  are  the  un-­

derlying causes,  conditions  of  the   unrest  in  the  region?  Are  they  all   different? Professor Shai Feldman: The deeper, structural causes are at least three. You have one very authoritarian regime. You have huge corruption. You have huge economic disparities even in countries that experienced recently rapid economic growth. The fruits of the economic growth were not distributed fairly. The most went to a very thin stratum. Then, you have the complete inefficiency and dis-functionality of the government. Finally, you have the demography, which is very young population that is getting into the workforce without sufficient employment opportunities. So the huge dis26

content in the middle class. And that’s common to a number of different Arab countries. None of this explains, by the way, why this happened now. No one predicted that this would happen now. Beyond these three or four main, basic reasons, there are huge differences between every country. In Bahrain, you have the whole issue of the SunniShia divide. Even with respect to these days, when we see the beginning of some protest in Saudi Arabia. To some extent, it’s taking place in the Eastern provinces and is also connected to the Sunni-Shia divide. In Jordan, all these socio-economic issues intersect with the issue of the Palestinians. So, yes, there are some basic, common issues in the Arab world but there are also big differences. Again, no one actually

saw all this coming. So that leaves a different question. Why did it happen now? What can  the  outsiders  do  about   the  unrest  in  the  region? SF: One thing I’m going to stay away from is giving advice to the U.S. government. What we need to take account is that these are revolutions or protests that are run by the people themselves. Whether it’s the U.S. or anybody else. I don’t think there’s much that outsiders can do. Now, if you have situations like in Libya, which is different from all the other situations because there, the situation has deteriorated to a civil war. The outsiders can affect it because what you see is the use of airplanes, artillery, SP:

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Theme

tank forces, and so on. To the extent to which the use of these weapons will be constrained by outsiders, they can influence the situation. They can influence the balance of power between the pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi forces. Whether they should do that or not is a value judgment. But we can at least say that in contrast to the situation in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and other places, where this was primarily a protest movement and a confrontation between a protest movement and the regime, where I don’t think outsiders could affect it much. They could affect

one aspect of it, which is the reaction of the military, to the extent to which other militaries have relationship with, for example, the Egyptian military. They could probably somewhat affect the reaction of the Egyptian military and the decision not to confront and not to suppress the protesters. But overall, the impact of outsiders in this situation was very limited. In Libya, now that it has degenerated into a civil war, outsiders, if they are willing to intervene militarily, they can affect the outcome of the civil war. But they have to be willing to do that.

:KREHQH¿WVDQGZKRORVHV from the  unrest? SF: I think that’s a question that is much too early to answer because all of this is still work in progress in almost all these countries. So the issue of who benefits and who loses is a question that can only be answered once these developments will begin to stabilize and we know what’s happening. In Egypt, which is the most important, the largest, and the most populous of the Arab countries, one that has set the pace of the Arab world on more than one occasion, we are only in the SP:

In the  end,  we  have  to  remember  that   whatever  regime  change  there  will   be,  in  any  one  of  these  countries,  they   will  have  to  sell  their  oil.

beginning of this process. The constitutional amendments committee has just brought out the amendments that it wants to see. This will be up for the referendum very soon. There will be new parliamentary elections. There eventually will be presidential elections. We will have to see the outcomes of all these moves to be able to see what kind of new Egypt will emerge out of that. Even after all of that, we will not be able to say anything remotely definite as to who benefited and who lost in the region. Take Iran for example. If the net result of all of this would be the strengthening of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, does this benefit Iran? On one side, it supports religiosity. The religious forces become stronger. But on the other hand, it’s BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

the religiosity of the rival camp. It’s the Sunnis. In a way, a challenge to the religious leadership of the Shia in Iran. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Sunni religious leader that was in Qatar and now was permitted to come back to Cairo and give a sermon in Tahrir Square. That’s a big boost for the Sunni camp. It’s just a small example of how difficult it is at this point and time to say who’s benefiting and who’s losing and so on. I guess one can say that the only party that you could say in this situation, that is very hard to see how they could lose as the result of all of these is, but not impossible, everything is possible in the Middle East, are the Muslim Brothers. They are the best organized to take advantage of the situation, and already it seems like many of

the constraints that they have suffered for a number of decades, at least temporarily, have been lifted. It was inconceivable that al-Qaradawi would be allowed to give sermons in Tahrir Square three months ago. Clearly, they have proven to have organizational capacities better than anyone else except the military in Egypt. One of their members is a member of the constitutional amendment committee. Sympathetic to them, close to them, is the chairman of the committee. At least in the near term, it’s quite clear that the Muslim Brothers have gained from these developments. But that’s in the short term, and nobody can say what’s going to happen in the long term. SP: How will  the  unrest  affect  the   27


Arica

Southerners wait  to  vote  on  the  matter  of  secession.    Photograph: Jenn Warren/USAID Africa Bureau

Africa’s 54th  State The Future of a Free Southern Sudan By Jesse Koklas

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BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Africa

It is…the  strength-­ ening  of  a  distinct   African  identity-­   an  identity  as  free   as  possible  from   (XURSHDQLQÀX-­ ences.

BRANDEIS INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

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Africa

“T

he  independence  of   south  Sudan  will  force   governments  to  pay   greater  attention  to  the  concerns   and  grievances  of  marginalised   areas.  Regions  which  have  had   long-­standing  secessionist  threats   are  likely  to  receive  closer  at-­ tention  from  African  leaders,â€?   Knox  Chitiyo,  head  of  the  Africa   programme  at  the  Royal  United   Service  Institute,  has  said.   When  the  European  powers  drew   borders  in  the  “scramble  for  Af-­ ricaâ€?  in  the  1880’s,  ethnic  bound-­ aries  of  Africa’s  inhabitants  were   disregarded.  When  independence   was  won  from  colonial  control,   keeping  these  borders  avoided   disputes  that  could  easily  escalate.   7KHVRXWKHUQ6XGDQZLOOEHWKHÂżUVW nation  to  secede  post-­independence   IURPFRORQLDOFRQWUROLWLVWKHÂżUVW 32

nation  to  disregard  the  African   Union’s  wish  that  its  countries   remain  united.          Joint  British-­Egyptian  rule  of   the  Sudan  ended  in  1956.  Unrest   quickly  evolved  into  full-­scale  civil   war,  which  resulted  in  an  extremely   unstable  government  and  strained   relations  with  its  neighbor  Chad.   Extensive  human  rights  abuses   KDYHRFFXUUHGIURPWKHFRQÀLFW in  Darfur,  which  has  caused  2.7   million  people  to  leave  their   homes  (according  to  the  UN)  and   more  than  200,000  to  die  in  seven   years.  In  January  of  2005  a  peace   deal  was  signed,  followed  by  the   establishment  of  a  power-­sharing   government  in  Khartoum,  the   capital.  In  October  of  the  same  year   an  autonomous  government  was   formed  in  the  south,  run  by  former   rebels.  In  2009  the  war  in  Darfur  

ZDVRI¿FLDOO\FRQVLGHUHGRYHUDOWKRXJK ¿JKWLQJGLGQRWVWRS,Q'HFHPEHU the  leaders  of  North  and  South  reach  the   terms  of  a  referendum  agreement  for   secession.  In  January  of  2011  the  people   of  the  South  voted  in  favor  of  full  inde-­ pendence  from  the  North.   $IWHUGHFDGHVRI¿JKWLQJZLWKDGHDWK toll  of  over  1.5  million  people,  the  South   LVRQHVWHSFORVHUWR¿QDOO\JDLQLQJWKHLU own  identity  when  it  splits  from  the   North  in  July.        The  most  immediate  issue  of  the  suc-­ cession  is  the  dispute  over  the  (question-­ ably)  oil-­rich  border  town  Abyei.  Short-­ ly  after  the  peace  deal  in  January,  from   10  to  36  people  were  killed  in  quarrels   over  grazing  rights  for  cattle-­  an  integral   part  of  the  economy  there.  The  two  main   ethnic  groups  involved  were  the  Dinka   Ngok,  who  want  their  city  to  be  south-­ ern,  and  the  Arab  Misseriya  who  want   it  to  be  northern.  Abyei  will  vote  in  the   near  future.  Doubts  have  surfaced  as  to   whether  it  would  dare  join  the  South  and   anger  the  North.  If  it  does,  the  North  is   XQOLNHO\WRDFFHSWLWZLWKRXWD¿JKW %HVLGHVWKHFRQÀLFWWKDWLVVXUHWRDULVH over  Abyei,  the  South  has  much  work   and  developing  ahead  if  it  is  to  be   successful.  The  current  transportation   infrastructure  and  the  amount  of  schools   and  hospitals  cannot  accommodate  its   roughly  8  million  people.        The  African  Union  has  called  for   unity  and  discouraged  secession  in  the   past.  However,  the  secession  of  South   Sudan  could  very  well  be  considered  an   effort  towards  unity  in  a  different  sense.   ,WLVWKHRI¿FLDOVSOLWWLQJRIDFRXQWU\ that  was  always  much  too  diverse  to   be  united,  and  the  strengthening  of  a   distinct  African  identity-­  an  identity  as   IUHHDVSRVVLEOHIURP(XURSHDQLQÀX-­ ences.  It  is  foreseeable  that  North  Sudan   will  identify  more  strongly  with  the   Arab  North,  and  the  South  will  be  a   welcomed  addition  to  the  character  of   southern  Africa.  Although  there  is  clear-­ ly  much  work  ahead  and  more  violence   almost  inevitable,  the  new  nation  should   be  seen  as  a  positive  step  for  Africa.  It   is  a  symbol  of  self-­determinism,  and  a   breaking  free  of  the  limitations  of  impe-­ rialist  boundaries.  Africa’s  54th  addition   may  be  its  most  African  yet.       BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Africa

Failures of International Pressure and Intervention Leave Ivory Coast in a State of Anarchy By Karia Sekumbo

A

s Ivory  Coast  nears  4  months   since  the  presidential  elec-­ tions,  the  country  has  not   moved  closer  in  deciding  who  the  next   leader  will  be.    Tensions  in  Abidjan   run  high  as  presidents  elect  Llaurent   Gbagbo  and  Alassane  Ouattara  cling   on  to  the  title  of  president.  Outtara   holds  his  ground  on  the  basis  of  a   United  Nations  backed  electoral  com-­ mittee  recognizing  him  as  the  right-­ ful  president.  Conversely,  Gbagbo,   refuses  to  relinquish  power  on  the   claims  that  there  was  rigging  in  the   north.    As  a  consequence  of  the  rig-­ ging,  the  Constitutional  Council  of   Ivory  Coast  has  over  ruled  the  results   coming  from  the  north  and  has  sworn   BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

in Llaurent  Gbagbo  as  the  rightful   president.  The  international  communi-­ W\KDVWDNHQVLJQL¿FDQWVWHSVWRZDUGV isolating  Gbagbo,  including  freezing   of  foreign  assets  and  a  recent  ban  on   cocoa  exports  (Ivory  Coast’s  chief   export  and  provider  of  foreign  cur-­ rency)  whilst  it  has  also  urged  member   states  of  the  Economic  Community   of  West  African  States  (ECOWAS)  to   take  action  against  him.  However,  as   Gbagbo  still  maintains  strong  back-­ ing  from  the  military  and  considerable   local  support,  these  steps  taken  by  the   international  community  have  proven   to  be  futile  as  he  refuses  to  relinquish   power  and  has  in  fact  moved  towards   coercing  Outtara  to  recede  from  his  

claims of  being  president.  This  dan-­ gerous  stalemate  has  left  Ivory  Coast   in  a  situation  edging  closer  towards   civil  unrest.        As  per  the  laws  of  international   sovereignty,  it  has  to  be  called  into   question  why  the  UN  backed  electoral   committee  had  such  a  heavy  say  in  the   domestic  affairs  of  Ivory  Coast.  More   so,  as  the  country’s  local  authorities   have  sworn  in  Gbagbo  as  president,   what  right  does  the  UN  electoral  com-­ mittee  have  in  recognizing  Outtara   as  the  president  and  thus  ignoring  the   local  constituents?  The  sovereignty   of  any  country  lies  in  its  ability  to   act  autonomously  without  foreign   involvement  in  domestic  affairs,  and   33


Africa

Alassane Ouattara

Alassane Ouattara Born:     1st  January  1949 Political  Party:     Rally  of  the  Republicans Religion:   Islam Served  as  Prime  Minister:    7th  November  1990  -­1993

34

the United  Nation’s  decision  to  go   beyond  the  boundaries  of  provid-­ ing  humanitarian  and  technical   assistance  has  proven  to  be  contra-­ dictory  of  its  own  ideals  in  respect-­ ing  and  recognizing  international   sovereignty.        With  the  Economic  Community   of  West  African  States  (ECOWAS)   showing  no  intent  on  following   through  on  their  word  to  use  “legiti-­ mate  force”  in  removing  Gbagbo,   it  is  apparent  that  whatever  interna-­ tional  intervention  was  promised  in   Ivory  Coast  has  failed  to  material-­ ize  and  has  instead  left  Ivory  Coast   in  a  state  edging  closer  and  closer   WRFLYLOFRQÀLFW        After  having  seen  two  attempts   by  former  UN  Secretary  General;;   .R¿$QQDQDQGIRUPHUSUHVLGHQWRI South  Africa;;  Thabo  Mbeki  fail  at   mediating  the  disputes  between  the   two  parties;;  there  are  no  positive   signs  for  a  peaceful  resolution  and   agreement  between  the  two.  This  

comes after  Outtara’s  party  express-­ ing  a  positive  attitude  towards  a   power  sharing  agreement.      In  any   case,  allowing  any  sort  of  power   sharing  agreement  would  set  an   ominous  precedent  for  future  demo-­ cratic  elections  in  any  African  state   DVLWVLJQL¿HVWKDWWZRULYDOSDUWLHV may  contest  and  pledge  a  case  for   power  sharing  in  the  event  that  they   do  not  agree  with  the  outcome  of   their  elections.  This,  in  effect  would   be  counter  intuitive  for  any  demo-­ cratic  state  in  the  world.        As  things  currently  stand,  Outtara   is  the  more  isolated  party  in  this   circumstance  as  he  is  administers   his  affairs  from  a  hotel  in  Abidjan   heavily  guarded  by  UN  troops.   On  the  other  hand  Gbagbo,  stands   in  a  position  of  more  power  than   Outtara  as  he  still  controls  most   of  Ivory  Coast’s  resources  despite   a  freezing  of  foreign  assets  and  is   most  importantly,  in  control  of  the   army. BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Africa

Llaurent Gbagbo

     Therefore,  the  cleanest  resolu-­ tion  from  this  situation  is  to  allow   Gbagbo  to  serve  another  term  in   RI¿FHWKURXJKZKLFKKHKDVWKH option  of  recognizing  Outtara   as  a  subordinate.  With  interna-­ tional  intervention,  Ivory  Coast’s   sovereignty  is  put  in  severe  ques-­ tion.  Also,  this  option  must  be   discarded  as  it  sets  an  example  for   the  international  community  which   would  not  be  kept  in  all  countries   where  there  are  political  disputes,   particularly  in  the  countries  whose   political  presence  on  a  global  scale   LVRIDPRUHVLJQL¿FDQWOHYHOWKDQ Ivory  Coast.            In  addition  to  this,  as  long  as   Gbagbo  retains  military  support,   the  threat  of  violence  escalat-­ ing  to  disproportionate  heights   always  looms.    Therefore,  on  the   grounds  of  respecting  international   sovereignty  and  avoiding  the  risk   of  civil  unrest,  casualties,  and   displacement,  it  is  of  paramount   BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

importance that  the  United  Nations   and  all  other  interested  interna-­ tional  parties  including  France  and   Britain  withdraw  from  any  political   interference  in  the  Ivory  Coast  as   they  may  provoke  a  humanitarian   crisis  amid  confrontation  with  pro   Gbagbo  forces.          With  allowing  for  Outtara  to   serve  under  him,  Gbagbo  would   WDNHDVLJQL¿FDQWVWHSLQEULGJLQJ political  factions  within  the  coun-­ try  and  at  the  same  time  appease   himself  towards  member  states  of   the  international  community  as  he   takes  steps  towards  working  with   opposition  for  the  welfare  of  the   people  of  Ivory  Coast.    In  Outtara’s   situation,  as  he  is  current  cornered   into  a  position  whereby  he  holds   no  credible  authority,  serving  under   Gbagbo  would  allow  him  to  par-­ tially  administer  the  policies  that   he  had  wanted  to,  and  at  the  same   time  regroup  his  political  party  to   consider  their  next  strategy.

Llaurent Gbagbo Born:     31st  May  1945 Political  Party:     Ivorian  Popular  Front Religion:   Roman  Catholic $VVXPHG2I¿FH  26th  October  2010

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Africa

Democratic Republic of Congo: Is There Any Hope? By Jesse Koklas

T

he  Democratic  Republic  of   Congo  is  rich  in  valuable  min-­ erals  and  natural  resources,  rare   animal  species,  and  beautiful  rainfor-­ ests.  It  is  poor  in  every  other  way:  it  is   one  of  the  most  economically  stricken   and  war-­torn  countries  in  the  world.          In  1960,  Belgium  was  no  longer   able  to  maintain  control  of  such  a  vast   territory,  and  the  Republic  of  Congo   became  independent  of  imperial  rule.   The  country  greeted  independence   with  instability  and  questionable  lead-­ ership.  In  1964  Joseph  Mobutu  seized   power  through  a  coup,  and  renamed   the  country  Zaire.  Due  to  a  lack  of   foresight  and  poor  decision-­making  on   Mobutu’s  part,  the  economy  steadily   deteriorated.  In  1990,  in  response   to  voices  of  dissatisfaction,  Mobutu   agreed  to  lift  the  ban  on  multiparty   politics  and  hand  over  a  small  portion   of  his  power  to  a  transitional  govern-­ ment.  In  May  of  1997,  rebels  captured   the  capital,  and  named  the  country  the   Democratic  Republic  of  Congo  once   more.  Laurent  Kabila  is  made  presi-­ dent.          Turmoil  continued.  In  August  of   1998  rebels  backed  by  Rwanda  and   Uganda  rose  up  against  Kabila,  and   Zimbabwe,  Angola,  and  Namibia  sent   troops  to  help  repel  them.  The  rebels   took  control  of  much  of  the  east,  and   ZDUEHJDQ$OWKRXJKDFHDVH¿UHZDV

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VLJQHGWKHQH[W\HDUWKHZDURI¿FLDOO\ continued  until  2003.  In  May  of  2005   a  new  constitution  was  adopted  by   parliament,  but  did  not  signify  hope   or  a  new  era  for  the  DRC;͞  violence   remains  an  active  part  of  life  today.   In  fact,  that  very  year  the  ICC  ac-­ cused  warlord  Thomas  Lubanga  of   employing  child  soldiers.  The  rape,   kidnapping,  mutilation,  and  torture  of   thousands  of  women  and  girls  by  the   Congolese  army  and  foreign  militias   were  almost  completely  ignored.   There  is  more  attention  today  on  these   issues  today,  but  these  atrocities  still   occur.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  fact   that  the  media  is  mainly  state-­run,  and   those  who  try  to  uncover  corruption   are  faced  with  threats,  arrest,  and  vio-­ lence.  The  violence  is  also  extremely   GLI¿FXOWWRFRQWDLQEHFDXVHWKHUHLV simply  too  much  of  it.        Each  attempt  to  usurp  an  oppres-­ sive  government  has  served  only  to   institute  a  different  oppressor.  All   use  violence,  and  all  seem  to  have  no   regard  for  their  people.  Again,  clashes   broke  out  in  August  2008,  this  time  in   the  east  between  army  troops  and  reb-­ els  led  by  Laurent  Nkunda.  Thousands   were  forced  from  their  homes.  This   bout  of  battles  seemed  to  be  a  mistake   strategically  on  the  part  of  Nkunda-­  in-­ ternational  discontent  soared  because   of  it,  and  in  2009  he  was  arrested  by  

Rwandan  forces  (those  who  were  once   loyal  to  him).          Solutions  to  the  violence  were  not   near.  In  May  of  2009  Kabila  approved   a  law  that  gives  amnesty  to  armed   JURXSVLQDQDWWHPSWWRHQGÂżJKW-­ ing  in  east,  yet  all  it  seemed  to  do   ZDVH[FXVHWKHÂżJKWLQJDQGDOORZLW continue.  From  June  to  August  of  the   same  year,  an  operation  was  launched   against  Ugandan  rebels  that  forced   SHRSOHWRĂ€HHIURPWKH1RUWK Now,  President  Kabila  is  pressuring   the  UN  to  leave  the  country  before   elections  in  2011.  It  seems  unlikely   that  the  UN  will  leave  now,  though,   after  a  peacekeeping  effort  of  eleven   years.  A  New  York  Times  article  aptly   described  the  situation:  “nowhere  else   in  the  world  has  the  United  Nations   invested  so  much  and  accomplished   so  little.â€?  It  appears  clear  to  all  except   the  UN  that  its  peacekeeping  there  is   futile.          The  devastation  brought  on  by  the   turbulence  of  the  past  few  decades   is  extensive.  But  is  there  truly  no   hope?  It  sure  seems  that  way.  The   army  is  corrupt,  promoting  violence   WRSURÂżWIURPPLQLQJVPXJJOLQJDQG poaching,  according  to  the  UN.  The   leadership  has  failed  countless  times   to  improve  life  for  its  people.  Rebels   roam  the  country.          There  has  been  much  attention  on  

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Africa

“

Approxi-­ mately  45,000  peo-­ ple  have  died   each  month   since  2003,   when  the   war  ended.

“

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%R\VGLVSODFHGE\¿JKWLQJLQWKHHDVW1RYHPEHUSHRSOHZHUHVKHO-­ tered  here  at  the  Don  Bosco  school  compound.  Picture Reuters/Finbar o’Reilley

the  “revolutionsâ€?  in  the  north  of  Africa,  while  relatively  little  atten-­ tion  is  paid  to  a  crisis  where  approximately  45,000  people  have  died   each  month  since  2003,  when  the  war  ended.  But  will  more  interna-­ tional  intervention  help?  The  leaders  of  the  DRC  will  work  to  evade   international  law,  which  they  appear  to  have  no  regard  for.  By  re-­ questing  the  UN  to  leave,  they  have  made  it  clear  they  want  no  help.   What  the  international  community  can  do  is  streamline  aid.  There   is  currently  around  $3  billion  in  development  aid  from  donor  coun-­ tries-­  where  is  the  money  going?  This  brings  us  back  to  the  issue  of   corruption-­  present  in  many  African  governments.  Usually,  the  affairs   of  Africa  should  be  for  Africa  to  attend  to,  and  its  own  people  should   solve  its  problems.  When  an  outside  country  is  giving  aid,  though,   the  path  the  aid  takes  should  be  monitored.  The  donor  countries  of   the  DRC  should  make  efforts  to  ensure  the  money  is  not  used  for  the   personal  uses  of  those  with  power,  but  that  it  actually  makes  it  to  the   people.          The  way  to  help  the  people  is  by  working  to  improve  their  quality   of  life.  Hospitals  and  schools  need  to  be  built.  Education  empow-­ ers  the  people,  and  provides  a  way  out  of  poverty.  A  transformation   is  necessary  from  the  bottom  up;Íž  greater  development  of  education,   KHDOWKDQGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHLVWKHÂżUVWVWHSWRZDUGVDPRUHKRSHIXOQD-­ WLRQIUHHRIÂżJKWLQJDQGGLVRUGHU$VRIQRZWKHUHLVDSSUR[LPDWHO\ $24  trillion  worth  of  untapped  resources.  The  resources  should  be   used  to  help  the  country  and  the  people,  not  as  a  source  of  war.  If   greater  value  is  placed  on  the  people  and  on  strengthening  the  unity   of  the  nation,  this  very  long  process  of  improvement  can  begin.  

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Feature

Julian Assange By Sam Datlof

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irected and  represented  by  the   now  world-­famous  Julian  As-­ sange,  Wikileaks  sprang  into   the  general  American  consciousness   in  the  summer  of  2010  upon  releasing   the  leaked  “Collateral  Murder”  video   that  depicts  the  slaughter  of  dozens   of  civilians,  including  two  Reuters   journalists,  in  Iraq.    Although  the  orga-­ nization  has  been  releasing  private  and   FODVVL¿HGGRFXPHQWVIRU\HDUVRQWRS-­ ics  from  Arab  assassination  schemes,   to  Peruvian  oil  scandals,  to  the  Iranian   nuclear  program,  it  took  the  combina-­ tion  of  “Collateral  Murder”  and  the   publishing  of  some  250,000  US  dip-­ lomatic  documents  in  November  2010   to  spark  the  international  debate  about   privacy,  security,  and  transparency,   that  is  occurring  today.              Wikileaks  pursues  its  ends  in  an   overzealous  manner,  striving  to  drive   governmental  transparency  to  lev-­ els  neither  attainable  nor  functional.   Wikileaks’s  stated  goal  is  to  promote   transparent  and  fair  government  and   business  by  providing  a  mechanism   for  whistleblowers  to  anonymously   submit  evidence  of  oppressive  and   38

corrupt practices  around  the  world.    A   small,  and  ironically  nameless,  team  of   employees  then  vets  the  information   submitted  by  the  whistleblowers  and   presents  the  revelations  in  the  form  of   “leaks”,  attempting  to  expose  state  and   corporate  secrets  while  maintaining   the  anonymity  of  whistleblowers.     The  reactions  to  the  leaks  have  been   passionate,  both  for  and  against   Wikileaks.    Human  rights  and  jour-­ nalism  organizations,  like  Amnesty   International  and  The  Economist,  have   bestowed  upon  Wikileaks  and  Mr.  As-­ sange  some  of  their  most  prestigious   awards.    On  the  other  hand,  Attorney   General  of  the  United  States,  Eric   Holder,  threatens  to  prosecute  those   who  publish  American  state  secrets.   He  even  warns  that  the  United  States   will  work  to  “close  the  gaps”  prevent-­ ing  the  prosecution  of  foreign  nation-­ als  like  Mr.  Assange.    These  “gaps”   already  appear  to  be  closing,  as  mem-­ bers  of  both  the  Senate  and  the  House   of  Representatives  have  proposed   amendments  to  the  Espionage  Act  that   would  make  publishing  the  names  of   US  informants  a  violation  an  act  of  

espionage.      The  current  and  future  effects  of   Wikileaks  on  international  affairs  are   both  wide-­ranging  and  uncertain.    The   organization  has  uncovered  corruption   in  many  parts  of  the  world,  catalyzing   change  and  transparency.    It  sends  a   powerful  message  to  potential  wrong-­ doers:  the  world  is  changing,  and  with   new  forms  of  communication,  legal   and  moral  transgressions  are  more   likely  to  be  uncovered.    More  disturb-­ ingly,  Wikileaks  has  also  revealed  the   identities  of  many  US  informants  in   Afghanistan,  putting  the  lives  of  inno-­ cent  people  at  the  mercy  of  a  Taliban   that  is  just  as  able  to  read  the  leaks  as   any  Western  citizen.    While  it  is  still   unclear  if  any  lives  have  been  lost  due   to  this,  the  possibility  is  real.  Addition-­ ally,  Wikileaks  has  made  public  hun-­ dreds  of  thousands  of  US  diplomatic   cables  revealing  a  wide  array  of  pri-­ vate  correspondences.    These  include   KRQHVW\HWXQÀDWWHULQJFKDUDFWHUL]D-­ tions  of  foreign  leaders,  and  sensitive   diplomatic  communications  within   the  US  government  and  with  other   entities  that  were  not  intended  for   BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL      APRIL  2011


Feature

The world  is  changing,  and  with   new  forms  of  communication,   legal  and  moral  transgressions   are  more  likely  to  be  uncovered.

public scrutiny.  At  the  very  least,  it  is   likely  that  these  revelations  will  have  a   chilling  effect  on  diplomatic  relations   across  the  globe;;  if  actors  realize  that   WKHLUFRQ¿GHQFHFDQQRWRUZLOOQRWEH kept,  they  will  be  less  likely  to  engage   in  any  delicate  or  private  activity,  be  it   illicit  or  legitimate.        But  what  motivates  the  actions  of   Mr.  Assange?  What  are  his  goals  and   what  is  his  end-­game?  Some  insight   can  be  gleaned  from  two  essays   published  by  Mr.  Assange  himself  in   2006:  State  and  Terrorist  Conspira-­ cies,  and  Conspiracy  as  Governance.     $VVDQJHLGHQWL¿HVJRYHUQPHQWVDQG corporations  as  “conspiracies”,  or   organizations  that  makes  “secret  plans   jointly  to  commit  a  harmful  act”.    He   then  goes  on  to  describe  conspiracies   as  decentralized  groups  that  rely  on   communication  to  achieve  their  devi-­ ous  ends.    The  traditional  means  of   destroying  a  conspiracy  is  to  destroy   the  most  central  or  active  members   who  communicate  with  the  most  other   members  of  the  conspiracy  or  are  the   most  fundamental  parts  of  the  plot,   either  through  assassination,  incarcera-­ tion,  or  any  other  means.    According  to   Mr.  Assange,  this  “traditional”  attack   on  conspiracy  may  not  be  the  most   effective  strategy  in  the  age  of  modern   communication.    Wikileaks  is  based   on  the  theory  that  instead  of  attacking   individual  members  of  a  conspiracy,   it  is  possible  to  attack  the  group  as  a   whole,  by  inhibiting  their  ability  and   willingness  to  conspire.    Releasing   FODVVL¿HGGRFXPHQWVIURPJRYHUQ-­ ments,  corporations  and  individuals   destroys  the  perception  of  secrecy  that   these  actors  once  had.    The  logical  ex-­ BRANDEIS  INTERNATIONAL  JOURNAL        APRIL  2011

tension of  this  involuntary  increase  in   transparency  is  a  disincentive  against   morally  bankrupt  acts.

practiced by  Wikileaks  until  2010,   with  the  massive  leak  of  US  diplo-­ matic  cables  they  elected  to  instead   throw  sand  in  the  cogs  of  the  entire  US   here  are  many  problems,  both   government,  complicated  both  legiti-­ practical  and  theoretical,  with   mate  and  illegitimate  action.  Instead  of   Mr.  Assange’s  theory.    First   putting  and  end  to  “lying,  corrupt  and   and  foremost,  a  perfectly  transparent   murderous  leadership  from  Bahrain   government  cannot  function.    While   to  Brazil”,  as  he  claims  is  his  goal,  he   increased  transparency  in  government   vastly  complicates  the  legitimate  tasks   is  a  laudable  goal,  especially  given   of  governments  to  form  trade  agree-­ recent  revelations  of  human  rights   ments,  come  to  diplomatic  solutions   abuses  on  American  soil  as  well  as   to  international  problems,  protect  their   abroad,  the  standard  of  transparency   informants  helping  protect  innocent   Wikileaks  forces  upon  governments   lives  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  and  any   is  unattainable.    A  certain  level  of  pri-­ number  of  other  governmental  tasks   vacy  is  essential  in  governance.  Frank   that  require  even  a  grain  of  tact  or   and  honest  assessments  of  foreign   secrecy. leaders  need  to  be  made  so  that  dip-­        Somehow,  in  the  crusade  against   lomats  can  most  effectively  conduct   conspiracy,  Assange  forgets  the  most   business  with  them.    Military  and  in-­ LPSRUWDQWZRUGLQKLVGH¿QLWLRQRI WHOOLJHQFHLQIRUPDQWVLQWKH¿HOGQHHG the  enemy:  harmful.    Secrets  shared   WRKDYHFRQ¿GHQFHWKDWWKHLULGHQWLWLHV among  a  group  of  actors  do  not  inher-­ will  not  be  published  on  the  Internet.     ently  constitute  conspiracies,  and   Leaders  willing  to  make  concessions   therefore  do  not  merit  destruction.    Mr.   for  the  greater  good  but  who  cannot   Assange’s  concern  is  a  legitimate  one:   lose  face  need  to  keep  facets  of  agree-­ that  governments  have  too  much  free   ments  hidden.    The  fact  of  the  matter   reign,  that  they  use  wars  as  an  excuse   is,  a  perfectly  transparent  government   for  secrecy,  and  that  trust  in  the  United   would  destroy  any  country’s  ability   States,  the  supposed  beacon  of  de-­ to  defend  itself.    Without  the  capac-­ mocracy,  has  been  betrayed  from  Abu   ity  to  protect  intelligence  sources,   Ghraib  to  Guantanamo.  Wikileaks   negotiating  instructions,  the  identities   and  other  similar  technologies  have   of  under-­cover  operatives,  military  ca-­ the  potential  to  be  powerful  forces  for   pabilities,  and  unpopular  but  necessary   good,  for  more  transparent  govern-­ diplomatic  agreements,  a  country’s   ment,  and  for  accountability  both   ability  to  conduct  both  diplomacy  and   in  government  and  in  the  corporate   war  would  be  irreparably  undermined.       world,  but  they  need  to  learn  to  target   Assange’s  model  leaves  no  room  for   their  actions  against  those  deserving   moral,  law-­respecting,  legitimate   of  exposure.    Eliminating  corruption  is   governments.    Instead  of  focusing  his   a  worthy  goal;;  to  attempt  to  eliminate   attack  on  solely  the  corrupt  practices   secrecy  altogether,  however,  would  be   of  governments,  as  was  generally   misguided.

T

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Turmoil in the Arab World

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