What Is Wrong with the Realist Psychology?
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fication, empathy, sympathy, and cooperation, as well as for human learning and social progress, are extremely pessimistic. This pessimism is so strong that it appears at times even incompatible with other elements of realist thought. For example, realists generally fail to take note of the fact that noncooperative behavior is often in the long run self-defeating and thus ill-compatible with the assumption of rationalit y.23 This is because individuals and states are bound to interact with others not only once and never again but often on a continuing basis, which requires them to cultivate a reputation for being acceptable “players.” Inasmuch as nation–states in today’s world are interdependent, at least economically, the motive of achievement could actually be expected to encourage states to value their “reputations” more highly. Thus it does not have to operate in the dysfunctionally competitive ways predicted by realism.24 Neither does the motive of pride, if we consider that it is an important emotional element in, and driving force to support, an individual’s identification with others. Such identification, in turn, plays a crucial role in the establishment of communit y. The fact that individuals can develop various overlapping identities and an inclusive sense of communit y at least counteracts the competitive and hostile aspects of Hobbesian vainglory. It should be noted that, by insisting on their view of human nature, realists choose to disregard a host of contradictory findings. Assuming the stabilit y of human nature, for one, f lies in the face of the entire discipline of psychology, and especially its subfield of psychiatry, whose very raison d’être is that “human nature” contains a significant range of dependent variables, and that socially destructive behavior, for example, can be “cured.” The very notion of “character” implies that any individual personalit y is composed of various traits, some aggressive, some nonaggressive, and that the strength of any particular trait varies and can be affected by experience or treatment. Fixed traits are found by psychologists to be minimal and to extend not far beyond instincts. They certainly do not include a choice of particular goals or strategies to achieve them. In addition, most psychological studies of motivation accede that needs or instincts function as “natural” motives only as long as actors are not conscious of their impact.25 In this view, consciousness almost by definition implies choice. This perspective contradicts the deterministic view of human motivation which is propagated by realism. It is also worth noting that many psychological approaches view man as an inherently social being.26 They point out that the interests and goals of human beings are not simply attributes of individuals but are developed in social interaction and can, through complex processes of identification, create interpersonal and communal bonds, which, in turn, shape individual preferences and strategies. While such approaches also take note of the problems that affect social interaction, their judgment of its possibilities tends to be vastly more optimistic than that which characterizes realist theory.27 In fact, their view, which emphasizes the possibilities of adaptation, learning, and social evolution, is considerably closer to the view of human nature that informs political idealist approaches.28