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Brexit: A discursive narrative towards it’s future WIlliam Martyn 10617650 HTCC6 6298

Fig.1 second referendum to protest the UK Leaving the EU in front of the Houses of Parliament. CNN, ‘Thousands march to protest Brexit’ (2016) < https://edition.cnn.com/videos/ world/2016/07/02/london-march-brexit-vause-live-nr.cnn > [2/01/2021]


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Abstract The sovereignty of United Kingdom has created a series of ambivalent identifications towards its past, this notion has manifested Brexit as a belief for many of its citizens, inciting notions of ‘take back control’. This essay explores the relationship between xenophobia and nationalism, where a rhetoric of independence and isolation has prevailed. In the run up to Brexit, migrants were characterised as criminals, and the citizens transformed into proxy border officials, alluding to power is everywhere. Deep divisions are forming as one side is calling for a homogeneous mass, a powerful nation state, and powers to do as it pleases, and the other is characterised by inward migration, creating prosperous spaces that serve more than just themselves. Brexit has only served to make it clear that freedom is fabricated with the likes of the hostile environment policy being enforced to a much larger degree. With immigration laws woven into our everyday lives, it becomes a homogeneous doctrine of us against them. The narrative that the leave campaign attached itself to disregard the massive amounts migrants serving to make the country a prosperous one, even actively treating these people as criminals as seen in the Windrush generation. The ambivalence towards our own identity suggests that there is a deep resentment towards others as the totalising narratives of unethical treatment of people like those of the Windrush generation are just another example of a fabricated future. This essay calls for change in the approach to borders, and the governing architecture that fosters illusions of power over others of a differing identity.

Contents

Amorphous figures distorted by a border.

BREXIT

Introduction

7

The Hostile Nation

9

Narratives in the Nation

17

Between Nation

23

Conclusion

28

Bibliography

29

Appendix

32

William Martyn


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Introduction

Brexit campaign attempted to split this ambivalence of modern society by prescribing a narrative7 of ‘take back control.’8

Through an in-depth critical analysis of Brexit, I will investigate xenophobia and nationalism through a rhetoric of independence and isolation from the European Union.1 The presence of which was particularly evident with the ‘White Working Class’ as well as older generations who live in post-industrial areas of Britain voted leave as they are ‘anti-immigration and dissatisfied with the loss of national sovereignty.’2 (Fig. 2) Homi Bhabha suggested in Nation and Narration that people who prescribe to a sovereignty, if pushed too far, may assume something resembling the archaic body of the despotic or totalitarian mass3 this notion resonates with the motions of Enoch Powell’s ‘River of Blood’ in the calling for a racialised civil war.

The Brexit campaign took a path of exclusion of minorities, focusing on immigration.9 A leading proponent for the Leave campaign, Nigel Farage, singled out countries in the former Eastern bloc such as Romania that while In Europe had fallen behind the iron curtain. 10 Farage’s position was also that Eastern European countries were less likely to speak English and understand our common law, revealing a xenophobic agenda.11 A key step that Farage took was a poster campaign called ‘Breaking point’ denoting a powerful narrative of “We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders (Fig.4).” When discussing the notion of xenophobia in the United Kingdom, it is key to understand territory and power through the lens of narratives which shall be discussed in chapter 2, The Narratives of the nation. Despite millions of people flocking to the street (Fig. 1), and in front of the houses of parliament (Fig.3), to demand a second referendum in the short weeks before the UK would leave the EU without a deal. The agenda of coming to make voices heard and for the same to be translated into action may be described via the thinking of Vilem Flusser where “[t]he multiplicity of languages reveals the multiplicity of the categories of knowledge.”12 As each language allows for a different perspective upon the understanding taking place. However, since this protest no referendums have taken place at the time

The agenda of Brexit is peculiar considering that the entire world now operates as global village, a platform of trade, media, and communications, the majority of British social ideals disregard those who do not share our identity.4 However, the presence of nationalism was seen even in 2012. The Hostile environment policy of 2012 that was put forward by Theresa May stated that “[t]he aim is to create here in Britain a really hostile environment for illegal migration.”5 The hostility is tied to power and sovereignty, which will be addressed through the lens of Michel Foucault and Stuart Elden. Alongside this, Hommi Bhabha’s thoughts on positions of power will help analyse Brexit in terms of discursive liminality and ‘ambivalent identification.’6 The argument being that the

7Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990) p.297 8Simon Goodman, ‘“Take Back Control of Our Borders”: The Role of Arguments

1Brexit: The backstage of a divorce, Thomas Johnson, Eric Albert, online

Fig.2 Referendum location densities of Leave/Remain vote.

New York Times, ‘How Britain Voted in the E.U. Referendum’ (2016) < https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/24/world/europe/how-britain-voted-brexit-referendum.html > [2/01/2021]

streaming video, Amazon Prime, 2019, <https://www.amazon.co.uk/Brexit-Backstage-Divorce-Thomas-Johnson/dp/B07XM8B2ZD#customer-review-section> [21 October 2020]. 2Unknown Author Identity, Belonging, and the Role Of the Media in Brexit Britain (2020) <https://brexit-studies.org/belonging/> [10/10/2020] 3Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 294 4Francis Fukuyama, Identity (London: Profile Books Ltd 2019), p. 3-11 5Erica Consterdine, ‘Hostile environment: The UK government’s draconian immigration policy explained’ (2018, April 26) <https://theconversation.com/ hostile-environment-the-uk-governments-draconian-immigration-policy-explained-95460> [11/10/2020] 6Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990) p.295

about Controlling Immigration in the Brexit Debate.’ Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 15.3 (2017): 35-54. 9Tim Oliver, Understanding Brexit: A concise introduction (Bristol: Policy Press 2018) p. 90 10 Rowena Mason, ‘Nigel Farage: Indian and Australian immigrants better than eastern Europeans’ The Guardian, (22 April 2015) <https://www.theguardian. com/politics/2015/apr/22/nigel-farage-immigrants-india-australia-better-than-eastern-europeans > [15/10/2020] (para 2 of 15) 11Rowena Mason, ‘Nigel Farage: Indian and Australian immigrants better than eastern Europeans’ The Guardian, (22 April 2015) < https://www.theguardian. com/politics/2015/apr/22/nigel-farage-immigrants-india-australia-better-than-eastern-europeans > [15/10/2020 (para 2 of 15) 12 Cláudia Santana Martins ‘Does Translation Have a Future in the Post-Historical Society?’ Flusser Studies 20 (2015)


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of writing despite the growing acknowledgment of the majority of the people would now vote remain. Despite this the government has pushed on with its attitudes with Brexit and immigration laws in a massive demonstration of power over the other. Thinking nation in terms of a homogeneous mass and its underlying discontent of the countries that form it will be the focus of the third chapter. Utilising Bhabha’s thinking, once the ‘liminality of the nation space is established’13 its ‘reason of state’14 will be political solidarity and therefore othering and marginalising individuals will emerge from disjunctive temporalities that the sovereignty of an ‘imagined community’ within the UK.15 By latching on to a moment of history and by disregarding counter narratives that ‘evoke or erase totalizing boundaries’16 allows for history and nation to seen as a homogeneous and totalising mass and In addition to this it will discuss the future of the UK.

THE HOSTILE NATION “the aim is to create, here in Britain, a really hostile environment for illegal immigrants” Theresa May, then Home Secretary 201217

Fig. 3 Demonstrations of affiliation outside the Houses of Parliament.

Within my first year manifesto I delve into the ideas of adopting other cultures to foster closer communities. This has since developed by understanding that there are larger issues that prohibit these ideas towards alternative cultures within the UK which some are explored within this essay.

13 Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 301 14 Michel Foucault, Technologies of self, (London: Tavistock, 1988) p.66 15 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991) p.67-83 16 Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 300

17 Erica Consterdine, ‘Hostile environment: The UK government’s draconian immigration policy explained’ (2018, April 26) <https://theconversation.com/ hostile-environment-the-uk-governments-draconian-immigration-policy-explained-95460> [11/10/2020]


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A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 11 The hostile environment policy of 2012 was a first crucial milestone on the road to Brexit; at the time net immigration to the UK was at about 250,000 people which is well above the policies that the coalition government proposed (Fig.4).18 The basic objective of this policy was to make life as difficult as possible for any migrant that seemed irregular no matter if they had been proven guilty of being an illegal immigrant installing the idea that there will be prejudices towards others that display difference.19 Immigration laws are not just rooted at our borders, with this policy immigration extends far into our everyday spaces as the ‘government requires employers, landlords, private sector workers, NHS staff and other public servants to check a person’s immigration status before they can offer them a job, housing, healthcare or other support. Landlords and employers can face fines and even criminal sanctions if they fail to do so.’20 Indeed, ‘power is everywhere.’21 In Foucault’s lectures Security, Territory and Population this notion is expanded upon by outlining that the state is not the origin of power but the process of power relations, this is the experience we have, when we feel we are being governed from one location such as Parliament and 10 Downing Street here in the UK, by drawing on 18th century literature he argues that the State and Government are synonymous with each other.22 The power of sovereignty ensures the survival of, and definition by, the limits of the state.23 The limits of which are present in modes of governing,

Fig.4 Theresa May on immigration, but blind to the true narrative of the nation.

18 Erica Consterdine, ‘Hostile environment: The UK government’s draconian immigration policy explained’ (2018, April 26) <https://theconversation.com/ hostile-environment-the-uk-governments-draconian-immigration-policy-explained-95460> [11/10/2020] 19 Erica Consterdine, ‘Hostile environment: The UK government’s draconian immigration policy explained’ (2018, April 26) <https://theconversation.com/ hostile-environment-the-uk-governments-draconian-immigration-policy-explained-95460> [11/10/2020] 20 Liberty, A guide to the hostile environment (London: Liberty, 2019) https:// www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/report-a-guide-to-the-hostile-environment/ [11/10/2020] 21 Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality: The will to knowledge. (London: Penguin 1998) p.63 22 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population – Lectures at the Collége De France, 1977-78, Translated by Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave 2007) p.192-193 23 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population – Lectures at the Collége De France, 1977-78, Translated by Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave 2007) p.192-193

a conceptual architecture of the modern liberal state in terms of its strategies, techniques and procedures and the way in which they are acted upon the human body and social behaviour. 24 In a modern state such as the United Kingdom, power is exercised through the governing and administration of life.25 Thus, the many capillaries of power are introduced in policies such as the hostile environment. This policy allows the modern neoliberal state, to express that any citizen is to be the ethical embodiment of the governmental power – that self manages as a free subject. Therefore, citizens at all levels of society are proxy border officials creating a web of immigration checks embedded in all aspects of daily life (Fig.5).26 Utilising Francis Fukuyama’s thinking, this would be likened to the politics of resentment,27 where in this case the people of Britain and their national identity supersedes that of their European identity. We (we=British) marginalise others out of fear.28 Fear driven by nationalism is reignited by the hostile environment policy, where nationalism is made possible through the solidarity and mobilisation in homogeneous doctrines that allow for parliamentary sovereignty. Further more Britain never initially wanted to join the EU, Britain has a continuous narrative resisting continental encroachment. The wars of the 18th and 19th centuries made Britain an imperial power and then closely followed by the World Wars saw Britain’s political institutions emerge vindicated as the country was seemingly standing alone in the ashes of Europe.29 The Windrush scandal that followed the hostile environment policy suggests deeper historical identity

24 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population – Lectures at the Collége De France, 1977-78, Translated by Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave 2007) p.192-193 25 Stephen J. Ball, Foucault, power, and education (London:Routledge, 2012) P.59-60 26 Mano Candappa, ‘Border politics, the “hostile environment” for’ migration, and education in the UK’ Hungarian Educational Research Journal, 9.3(2019) p.414-433 27 Francis Fukuyama, Identity (London: Profile Books Ltd 2019), p. 3-11 28 Ryszard Kapuściński, The Other (London: Verso 2018), p.51 29 Graham Gee, Rubini Luca, and Trybus Martin, ‘Leaving the EU: The Legal Impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom.’ European Public Law 22 (2016) p.51


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A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 13 issues, in the UK that has started to foster the British reterritorialization. To preface, the Windrush generation were a group named after the Empire Windrush, the ship that brought one of the first groups of West Indian migrants to the UK in 1948 and continued to do so until 1973 to help with labour shortages following World War Two.30 During this period it was a legal right of anyone who was a part of the colonies within the former British Empire to settle within the UK if they had means to do so until 1973 when the UK was in the process of joining the EU.31 Many children and family members travelled under their relatives British Colonial passports, and upon arrival were not given any form of documentation thus, leading to a generation of people without things such as passports and in 2009 their landing cards were destroyed.32 The scandal made headlines in 2018 following a series of investigative newspaper reports. These reports detailed and revealed immigration laws had changed with the hostile environment policy and resulted in ‘an unfair culture of punitive enforcement of immigration legislation’33 and procedure. The outcome resulting in migrants of the Windrush generation and their children being unjustly detained, refused access to social benefits, and in many cases forcibly expelled from the UK to countries where they had never lived or where they had few or no sustained ties. To make the case worse since 2018 164 black British citizens have been wrongly deported or detained the home office admitted, 11 of these people have died on foreign streets.34 The Windrush scandal (Fig.6 Fig.7) suggests that Brexit is a part of a longer state doctrine of border control, that has

Fig.5 A web of immigration checks.

30 Kenneth Lunn ‘The British state and immigration, 1945–51: New light on the empire Windrush’ Immigrants & Minorities, 8:1-2, (2010) 161-174, 31 Unknown Author, ‘The Cabinet Papers: The EEC and Britain’s late entry’ (2020) < https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/themes/eec-britains-late-entry.htm > [28/11/2020] 32 Georgina Gee, ‘Channel 4 Fact Check: Who destroyed the Windrush Landing Cards?’ (2018)< https://www.channel4.com/news/factcheck/factcheck-whodestroyed-the-windrush-landing-cards> [28/11/2020] 33 Ronald Cummings ‘Ain’t no black in the (Brexit) Union Jack? Race and empire in the era of Brexit and the Windrush scandal’ Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 56:5, (2020) p.593-606 34 David Lamey, ‘The Guardian: Two years after Windrush, we’re deporting people who’ve only known Britain as home’ (2020) <https://www.theguardian. com/commentisfree/2020/feb/10/windrush-deporting-people> [29/11/2020]

continually manifested within the UK where unsettled histories of border, race, and empire are a part of British national identity. The Notion of borders, however, are thoroughly ideological according to Bridget Anderson, where they are both productive and generative as they place people in new types of power relations creating deep divisions and inequalities between people. This suggests that borders are much more than territorial as they are part of the political space, for example those who are deemed foreign workers by the state don’t have the privilege to change their employer, or type of employment unlike citizens of liberal democracies. Anderson adds to this by stating that bodies are territorialised as ‘one’s wage rates, access to employment, to rights, to welfare benefits, [and] to land’ are all tied to persons legal residence.35 Borders initially were synonymous with the hard lines separating the sovereign territory of states in the international system, through the ages of colonialization which mostly stay at a purely geographical level. Our understanding now, however, is that location is the basis of the parameters in which our identities are conceived despite the sovereignty which may change over time. Nationalism though, is contingent with borders, the essence of a border is to separate the ‘self’ from the ‘other’ according to David Newman. This fosters a toxic ideal where through the establishment of borders prevents the entry of undesired elements on a prejudgmental basis therefore borders are institutions, something inherently resistant to change Newman states.36 Borders and homogeneity are exemplified in the ‘Rivers of Blood Speech’ by Enoch Powell who served as a Conservative Member of Parliament (1950–1974) and was the Minister for Health and then became the Defence Secretary (1965-1968)37. In 1968 he warned of a racialised civil war in regard to the increase of

35 Bridget Anderson Nandita Sharma Cynthia Wright ‘Why No Borders?’ Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 26.2, 5-18. (2009) p.7 36 David Newman ‘On borders and power: A theoretical framework’ Journal of Borderlands Studies, 18:1, (2003) p.18 37 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Enoch Powell Encyclopædia Britannica’ (2020)< https://www.britannica.com/biography/Enoch-Powell> [1/12/2020]


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A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 15 migrants in Britain by stating that migration is a “process of national decline [ ... ] coinciding with the dilution of once homogenous and continuous national stock by alien strains”.38 The question of social visibility is suggestive of Bhaba’s ‘narrative struggle’ in terms of naturalising national affiliation by altering the narrative which generates an ambivalence towards a necessary future of satisfying labour shortages. in preparation for Brexit the government commissioned oxford economics to analyse the fiscal impacts of immigration to the uk and found that ‘[t]he average European migrant arriving in the UK in 2016 will contribute £78,000 more than they take out in public services and benefits over their time spent in the UK.’ By comparison the average UK citizen’s net lifetime contribution in this scenario is zero. Implicitly, the idea of a racialised civil war is suggestive of the politics without duration through the principle of ‘the many as one’, where theories of holism of culture and community are lost to a totalitarian mass.39 The Black Atlantic diasporic histories and British– European border politics have long been interlinked in the political sphere and in the making and remaking of British border politics.40These people from places like Jamaica tremendously benefited the economy at the time and helped rebuild Britain, however, due to ignorance many British people did not treat them as if they were British and often became victims of racial abuse. Once these people were in the UK the age of decolonialisation started to occur and the remaking of British borders was underway, British subjects from the Caribbean hadn’t crossed the border but it was the border that crossed them, meaning that to control borders is to have power over an Other. The concerns that surround the use of proxy border officials in this case is that it’s unclear who entails as a Migrant. For Anderson, ‘a person may be ‘foreign born’ and nevertheless be a British citizen

Fig.6 Empire Windrush route

38 Paul Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. (London: Routledge, 1987) p.46 39 Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 294 40 Ronald Cummings ‘Ain’t no black in the (Brexit) Union Jack? Race and empire in the era of Brexit and the Windrush scandal’ Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 56:5, (2020) p.593-606

by naturalization, or be a British citizen born abroad’41 For Heidegger, ‘the Other’ is a product ‘self,’ meaning that one cannot consider personal identity without the perspective difference of the other.42 The power of border politics has been masqueraded from the notion of a hard line such as a wall. As Wendy Brown notes this to be inefficient as ‘walls produce borders as permanent zones of conflict and lawlessness, incite sophisticated and dangerous underground industries, expand the size and expense of the problems they would solve, and aggravate hostilities on both sides’.43 A clear example of this is the border control at Calais, due to the thinking that ‘[i]ts success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.’44 Through the enactment of proxy border officials rather than a physical manifest allowing a gross fetishization of border politics in the UK that has continued to prevail in a subtle undertone. With the rise of freedom through constitutional sovereignty, the exercise of power through the rule of law, is seen by Foucault as the “rise of unfreedom.”45 In other words, freedom is fabricated. There is an illusion of freedom on the part of such Machiavellian power, Foucault calls for resistance, in this case to resist policies that only increase the divide between us and them. Foucault states that the sovereign has the prerogative to rule as long as it guarantees the safety of its citizens.46 With policies in place such as the Hostile environment, it posits an idea that permeable border to allow foreigners to pass through and can be seen as an crime upon state sovereignty, this will be acted upon, in some cases unethically through actions such as deportation.47 This

41 Bridget Anderson, ‘Towards a new politics of migration?’ Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40.9, (2017) p.1527-1537 42 Vilem Flusser, The Freedom Of The Migrant: Objections to Nationalism (University of Illinois Press, 2003) p.16 43 Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York: Zone, 2010) p.114 44 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction, Trans. Robert Hurley, (New York 1990), 86. 45 Rainer Friedrich ‘The Enlightenment Gone Mad (II) The Dismal Discourse of Postmodernism’s Grand Narratives’ A Journal of Humanities and the Classics 20.1 (2012) 46 Michel Foucault, The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978–1979. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) p.157

47 Mano Candappa, ‘Border politics, the “hostile environment” for’


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then leads to a narrative of irrational xenophobia in places far behind the borders, which Foucault would call for us to hold the unethical sovereign power accountable as these proxy border officials should feel able to speak against the sovereignty freely as Foucault says: “The suffering of men must never be a silent residue of policy. It grounds an absolute right to stand up and speak to those who hold power.”48

Fig.7 Windrush Generation Protests.

migration, and education in the UK’ Hungarian Educational Research Journal, 9.3(2019) p.414-433 48 Michel Foucault, James D Faubion, Power: Essential works of Foucault, 1954–1984 (Vol. 1) (London, UK: Penguin, 2002) p.49

Narratives in The Nation “Any normal and fair-minded person would have a perfect right to be concerned if a group of Romanian people suddenly moved in next door.” Nigel Farage, UKIP Leader, 18th May 2014


Brexit 18 Stuart Elden states that there are two definitions towards territory; the first being territory as a bounded space, a container, under the control of a group of people normally a state, and the second is an outcome of human territoriality, human behaviour or strategy.49 While these are not mutually exclusive they don’t solve the reasons for needing of borders or how they get drawn.50 They do however, draw attention to the people of state, more closely, how the state affects the citizens behaviour and how this affects people who they would consider ‘Others’. ‘The Breaking Point’ poster campaign allows us to see the xenophobic campaign be pushed into the political and public sphere (Fig.8). Politicians such as Farage villainised migrants and refugees in the name of British values and inciting that we should “take back control.”51 This narrative of control stems from the British Empire, and the sovereignty that parliament held as a supreme power. However, the collapse of this empire following the World Wars was coupled with extreme economic inequality and the loss of almost all of its remaining colonies in the 1970s, at this time Britain was under pressure to join the EU. At this stage, the government hadn’t collapsed but some of the damage may be blamed on parliamentary sovereignty. The European Union stripping a defenceless British parliament of its powers was a pervasive topic during the run-up to the referendum.52 The rhetoric has exacerbated and capitalised on people’s fears and frustrations of immigration to the UK putting pressure on the economy, the beloved NHS, and claiming benefits at the expense of the British tax payer; misdirecting and seeking to convince the electorate, through public acts of misinformation, that the source

49 Stuart Elden ‘Terrain, politics, history’ Dialogues in Human Geography (2020) 50 Stuart Elden, ‘Thinking Territory Historically’ Geopolitics, 15:4, (2010) p.757-761 51 Heather Stewart, Rowena Mason, ‘The Guardian: Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant poster reported to police’ (2016) https://www.theguardian. com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defendsukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants [12/12/2020] 52 Juliette Ringeisen-Biardeaud ‘“Let’s take back control”: Brexit and the Debate on Sovereignty’ French Journal of British Studies 22.2 (2016)

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 19 of all ills lies are squarely at the feet of the ‘other.’ For example there was a fear that Turkey would join the EU and millions would migrate to the UK, at this time it was claimed that the UK was paying the EU £350million each week, something leave voters thought we could spend on the British public sector such as the NHS, however, it doesn’t represent the total economic costs and benefits of EU membership to the UK. At this time there was a feeling that ‘[t]he European idea has turned rancid’53 as its economy seemed slow and has its priorities confused; this essentially means that who can trust a single state in an ocean spanning trade agreement, Gillingham uses the example of the Scandal in mid 2015, where Volkswagen, a massive tributary to the EU altered results of the efficiency of their catalytic converters to the degree where the emissions where in excess of global emissions standards all in an effort to satisfy the demands of the EMU54. This was all compounding with the notions of people from other countries were here in the UK and were abusing the health care system as this would not be available in their home countries, not to mention that there would be an endless population increase as a result of immigration from EU countries, but this was purely speculation.55 On the other hand, Tim Oliver stated that ‘remain had no answer to arguments about immigration’56 through campaigns like breaking Point that encouraged people to vote “leave” through a refostered identity politics and English nationalism. The remain campaign pushed an economic truth agenda which held little traction despite it being accurate and logical.57 The campaign made points such as immigration will never be stopped as the economy relies on skilled works from other countries, and were constantly on the back foot by correcting the misinformation published by the leave campaign with

53 John R. Gillingham, in, The Brexit Crisis, ‘The European Idea has Turned Rancid’ (London: 2016, Verso books) p.128-143

54 John R. Gillingham, in, The Brexit Crisis, ‘The European Idea has Turned Rancid’ (London: 2016, Verso books) p.128-143 55 Osea Giuntella, Catia Nicodemo, Carlos Vargas-Silva, ‘The effects of immigration on NHS waiting times’ Journal of Health Economics, 58 (2018) p.123-143, 56 Tim Oliver Understanding Brexit (Bristol: policy press, 2018) p.90 57 Tim Oliver Understanding Brexit (Bristol: policy press, 2018) p.90

Fig.8 Breaking Point Poster campaign pushed into the public space. The Guardian, ‘Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant poster reported to police ‘ (2016) < https:// www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants > [5/01/2021]


Brexit 20 statements that usually have the rhetoric of ‘it’s more like £250 million a week. In any case the impact on the economy from changes to trade after leaving the EU is likely to be far bigger than savings from the UK’s membership fee.’58 In Ryzard Kapuściński’s The Other, he talks of where the real place culture happens, where interpersonal interactions allow for more self-reflection. In world where globalisation is making encounters with others inevitable the increase to react initially with mistrust and uncertainty is of a higher probability instead of a sense of needing these people.59 While political dissent is needed in order to have a progressive state; but at the cost of others in the public space, Lefebvre understands it as simply ‘[v]iolence cloaked in rationality and a rationality of unification is used to justify violence.’60 In the UK, parliament has the image of a centralised power which seeks to be above and eliminate any other nationality through its policies such as the hostile environment. In the case of the breaking point poster in front of parliament, it will seem to be a form of the sovereign rule; as space in Lefebvre’s terms: ideas “cannot be conceived of without reference to the instrumental space that they make use of.”61 The Breaking Point campaign created an ideology that compounded with the Hostile environment policy where legislation and public demonstrations were actively employed against minorities suggesting a narrative that Britain should take towards Leaving the EU and tighten its border restrictions. Public space in the UK has been a neoliberal urban since the 1980s and allowed for better empowerment of urban dwellers. I argue that the right to the city holds promise for the Other and the UK together and not as

58 Full Fact Team, ‘£350 million EU claim “a clear misuse of official statistics”’ https://fullfact.org/europe/350-million-week-boris-johnson-statistics-authority-misuse/ [28/12/2020] 59 Full Fact Team, ‘The UK’s EU membership fee’ (2019) https://fullfact.org/ europe/our-eu-membership-fee-55-million/ [28/12/2020] 60 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), p282 61 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), p281

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 21 a xenophobic state where Policy and Political agendas are intrinsically tied together in all walks of everyday life. However, Lefebvre also states that the public space is “the outcome of past actions, social space is what permits fresh actions to occur.”62 This argues with the notions explored in the previous paragraph as it suggests a successful city and by extension, territory, is so, because of the diversity and heterogeneity that is within. This stands in opposition to the cultural populism of the totalising far right politics pushed by people such as Farage and formerly Powell. The xenophobic rhetoric that ignited Brexit continued after the referendum as Amber Rudd (2016 Home Secretary) announced plans to “name and shame” every foreign worker in the United Kingdom to allow more British people into jobs. This was not supported by the labour statistics as at the time employment across the UK was at a record high of 74.2%.63 This suggests that they hold power through keeping people in ‘enforcing inequality and increasing poverty’64 over migrants already in the UK contributing to the economy. These plans were ultimately dropped after uproar from business’ and opposition politicians but serve to represent an anti-foreigner agenda emanating from the heart of the sovereignty that continually panders to right wing reactionary politics. Foucault would refer to these measures such as using the notion of protecting socio-economic welfare for reasons to be against immigration as technologies of power.65 Homi Bhabha says that Political entities are affective sources of cultural identity and serve to displace the historicism that has dominated the discussions of the nation as a cultural force66 meaning that it would attempt to hide its former narratives of weakness despite it offering a blueprint for how it can better itself. Not only

62 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991), p73 63 Sarah Looney, ‘Breaking Point? An Examination of the Politics of Othering in Brexit Britain’ TLI Think! 69.1 (2017) 64 Sarah Looney, ‘Breaking Point? An Examination of the Politics of Othering in Brexit Britain’ TLI Think! 69.1 (2017) 65 Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality: The will to knowledge (London: Penguin 1998) p.103-114 66 Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990) p. 291

this but a political entity serves as an identity for people to prescribe to, it offers a narrative to assign yourself. At times like these it’s not uncommon to hear things such as ‘us’ and ‘them’, friend and foe, belonging and not belonging, in-groups and out-groups, within the Brexit rhetoric, which defines ‘us’ in relation to others, or the Other. This sets the stage of imagined communities67 where in Culture and Identity, Simon Clarke discusses that the reason we might have these feelings in the first place is because cultural identity is so strong that ‘it is impossible for two cultures to co-exist.’ Especially at a time when in the western world according to Clarke in one of his points to what ‘New Racism’ is, that we believe that our political and cultural systems are better than others,68 and evidenced through Farage’s statement of people fell behind the iron curtain “were less likely to speak English and understand our common law” suggesting that many nations have not evolved since that time. As well as this, more times than not stress is placed on the difference of the other and not the similarities as Clarke discusses the notion of people having a strong attachment to their way of life which is only evermore strengthened when people share these as well as enhanced by a governing entity creating a ‘emotional boundary between us and them’.69 If people share common values and beliefs and in a nation where a predominate amount of people (as evidence through the referendum) see other cultures as pathological; in that they see otherness as an issue for the dominant culture. Language, beliefs, religions and custom differences are under irrational analysis and genuine fears will rise towards affective attachment of their everydayness and once again a resultant of the politics of resentment. Derrida’s unsettling notion of responsibility of ‘I am always indebted with respect to a tradition - an identity, a culture, a language’ means that we are in a continual rhetoric of xenophobia(Fig.). As individuals responsible for the nation, our ‘enemies’ are already chosen for us when we open our mouth to

67 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983) 68 Simon Clarke ‘Culture and Identity’ The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Analysis (2011) 69 Simon Clarke ‘Culture and Identity’ The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Analysis (2011)

speak in one language rather than another70 as Derrida suggests that every statement is a decision towards a national background despite how inexorable it is to make a political statement in reference to nation, as we are deciding for one and not the other.71

70 A.j.P Thomson, ‘The Nation in the Work of Jacques Derrida’, Irish Review 28. (2001) p.125-136 71 A.j.P Thomson, ‘The Nation in the Work of Jacques Derrida’, Irish Review 28. (2001) p.125-136


Brexit 22

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 23

Between Nations ‘The agony of Britain in the last two years has clearly been a subtext for ‘Let’s try to make this thing work’’ Stephen K. Bannon, a former White House chief strategist who consults with nationalist parties72

Fig.9 How are we to know what language to speak, if they are stuck behind a border, or an act unwillingness to engage

72 Chico Harnlan, ‘The Washington Post: Frexit? Italeave? After watching Brexit, other European countries say: No, thanks.’ (2019) https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/europe/frexit-italeave-after-watching-brexit-other-european-countries-say-no-thanks/2019/03/29/7b6e059a-4be0-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_ story.html [30/12/2020]


Brexit 24 In the previous two chapters we have discussed how the xenophobic rhetoric has manifested through Brexit and its approach to borders. Britain’s attitudes towards its nation state resembles something like that of the term ‘Village’ where people share a common fate and know each other well in the essence of a shared culture, and a postmodern discourse is assigned to all going forward. Britain in recent years has continually relied on A ‘master narrative’ which forms its discourse.73 This has led to a sense of rootedness in British society that emerges from the right-wing politics therefore in this final chapter we are going to look at what is to come for nation states and what it means for the UK and the countries that form it. In the Chapter ‘To Be Unsettled One First Has To Be Settled’, Flusser puts forward a radical notion of ‘being expelled is a good way of becoming a human being in the fullest sense of the word’74 implying that you need to be have gone through devasting upheaval of life and be subjected to literally unsettling events in order to be human, something similar to the people portrayed in the breaking point poster campaign for example. He likens this notion to that of a tourist becoming experienced in the ways of the world, however, the difference between tourists and expellees is that the expellees have an opportunity to take a truly horrific event and make a positive. Adding to this, their expellers tend towards being vegetables (as native) as Flusser describes them, people with thoughts that are putative and singular so that their ‘spawn remains the same’ like the kind that Enoch Powell presented in his Rivers of Blood speech. To expand upon the this, we realise that people unsettle themselves when they are unseated from their daily habits and adversely exorcised, however, in this case people return to a previous state rather than growing from it, Flusser again noting them to be vegetables. This attitude towards Others, lacks hospitality even with foreign guests workers, as first seen in the Windrush generation, and continuing to this day where within some

73 Gervork Hartonian, Modernity and its Other (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1997) p.6-49 74 Vilem Flusser The Freedom of the Migrant (Oxfordshire, University of Illinois Press, 2003) p.25

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 25 cultures with social dismay towards people taking their jobs.75 This understanding makes us aware that people only notice change and not what remains constant. Flusser discusses how our habits and customs which are dictated by our identity form a blanket that covers the realities of existence(Fig.).76 This is the mode at which our habits and thus identity becomes a nationalism, a tool which is primitive, oversimplifying and trivialising of the ‘Other’ as discussed by Kapuściński in The Other. Like racism, at first, it is only at the face value of the Other. For example even between nations we are identified with our originating nation for I would be a ‘Brit’ in America and a ‘Pole’ for Kapuściński, it seems as if we can never shed this rootedness of nation and with that a narrative and this narrative will always hold power over us as long as national affiliation exists. Anderson in Imagined Communities discusses language as political love where this gives us a case to hate, as romanticism is understood by a common language which enables kinship and a love for nation especially when the language is named after that nation and in this case hate towards those who do not speak English.77 Northern Ireland and Scotland while apart of the UK are their own countries and by extension, nations. Both of these countries unequivocally voted remain in a stark contrast to that of the British rhetoric that we have previously investigated that has largely developed through British imperial geographies and a series of social and economic fragmentations within the United Kingdom. This raises a contested and uncertain nature of the UK’s territorial constitution and suggest that Brexit revealed various weaknesses in the dominant reliance on political mechanisms. In this case it justifies a referendum for Scottish independence and thus increased their political importance and might force a constitutional reform, thereby, requiring a shared process of redrawing and rebuilding the United Kingdom’s multi-level constitutional

75 Vilem Flusser The Freedom of the Migrant (Oxfordshire, University of Illinois Press, 2003) p.34-37 76 Vilem Flusser The Freedom of the Migrant (Oxfordshire, University of Illinois Press, 2003) p.38 77 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983)

Fig.10 A blanket covering the realities of existence, and the ambivalence towards the time line.


Brexit 26 architecture. In the run up to Scotland’s independence referendum (2014) it was felt that there were inadequate voices in matters formally reserved for the UK, and thus made the country feel as if there was a lack of constitutional security.78 At this time (2021) a great deal of uncertainty remains for Scotland and Northern Ireland. These countries were highly dependent on funding from the EU and migrants who worked on agricultural projects as well as rural development.79 The Scottish government has suggested that, in the wake of the UK leaving the EU, ‘powers relating to immigration, employment law, equality, and health and safety at work – as well as other powers over making international agreements, financial services, professional regulation and social protections – could be devolved’ .80 For Ireland there has been significant attention on the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as it will become an international border between the UK and the EU. Trade and peace between the two nations will be tested as a result of Brexit and trying to maintain a soft border between the two, however the issue features prominently in the guidelines for negotiations published by the European Council following the UK’s notification to trigger Article 50. As it stands there will not be any border checks between the two Irish countries, however, there will be border checks between Northern Ireland and the UK.81 At this current time its hoped that this check point will be relatively seamless but sets precedent of creating further divide between the UK and northern Ireland as there are already talks of a United Ireland that is a member of the EU. However, the rise of Scottish Nationalism seeking independence at the same time as UK leaving the EU fuelled by Nationalism may leave Northern

78 Aileen McHarg, James Mitchell, ‘Brexit and Scotland’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19.3, (2017) p.512–526 79 Derek Birrell and Ann Marie Gray ‘Devolution: The Social, Political and Policy Implications of Brexit for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’ Journal of Social Policy, 46.4 (2017) p.765-782 80 Derek Birrell and Ann Marie Gray ‘Devolution: The Social, Political and Policy Implications of Brexit for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’ Journal of Social Policy, 46.4 (2017) p.765-782 81 Derek Birrell and Ann Marie Gray ‘Devolution: The Social, Political and Policy Implications of Brexit for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland’ Journal of Social Policy, 46.4 (2017) p.765-782

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 27 Ireland a political orphan. The Balkanisation of the UK will create new governments but will leave Northern Ireland vastly underrepresented in the wake of the two nations splitting due to the Scotland’s and Northern Ireland representation being similar at parliament, therefore dividing the minority. Populist ideals emerged from the far right in the moments following the referendum in many nations across Europe; as the French nationalist party leader Spoke of a Frexit and the far-right Dutch leader wanted a vote on Nexit. Populism has been seen to be hostile to liberal democracy through the combination of populism, nationalism and authoritarianism.82 The mix of leading parties and clamorous outside voices on both the left and right remain discontent over issues of migration, low economic growth and a perceived imperialness of the EU elites. However, Brexit has shown despite finally leaving the EU as of 1st January 2021, there is still social tension between ‘Leave’ and ‘Remainers’ and Parliament had a near 5 year process to finally strike a deal with the EU, which caused the Great British Pound to fall in value and economic forecasters say Brexit could dampen growth for years.83 This led to many of these voices formerly mentioned to disregard their previous notions of following suit of the UK and looks to making an argument of decentralising the power of the EU. Currently nation states exist in the framework of the EU demonstrating that the EU is an Unfinished federal quasi state, therefore while there are nation states that hold onto narratives of sovereignty as did the UK, there will be illusions of the potential to hold great powers such as Imperial Britain did. Churchill said when addressing democracy, there is no ‘Finality’ to it, the same can be said for the EU, it is full of contradictions and deficits such as nationalism and cosmopolitan aspirations facing each other on issues

82 Bart Bonikowski, ‘Populism and nationalism in a comparative perspective: a scholarly exchange.’ Nations and Nationalism 25.1 (2019) p.58-81. 83 Chico Harnlan, ‘The Washington Post: Frexit? Italeave? After watching Brexit, other European countries say: No, thanks.’ (2019) https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/europe/frexit-italeave-after-watching-brexit-other-european-countries-say-no-thanks/2019/03/29/7b6e059a-4be0-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_ story.html [30/12/2020]

suchas mass migration.84 These contradictions limit the EU in integrating deeply with its member states and therefore doesn’t allow it to be a possible federal system. Cities hold the future for the argument against Nations being supported by narratives of totalising sovereignty that form the basis of populism and thus in escapable borders that in effect trap its citizens also. In the Brexit referendum 60% of London’s voters were in favour of remaining in the EU, a city characterised by high levels of diversity and inward migration not to mention a hub of finance, tech innovation and culture. London’s economy is far stronger than any other region on the UK while only containing ‘13 per cent of the UK’s population, London generates about 23 per cent of UK GDP’ suggesting that its more than capable to split from the rest of the nation forming a city-state. In A City State Britain: A Counter Narrative To Brexit John welsh discusses the capacities needed for a city state to be successful, where he works from a Foucauldian dictum of knowledge is an effect of power.85 In this case the knowledge of the city and the ability to act upon the needs of its citizens allows prospective capacity to shape political discourse, rather than report upon it. Like Sam Haselby said, ‘national governments debate and dither, cities act, cities do.’86 This opens the possibility for new more affective political vocabularies, strategies, narratives, and organisation. This theory aligns itself with Lefebvre’s ‘production of space’ in that its socially driven, and produced for the people by the people, constantly evolving and growing with the times. As Bhabha discusses, the people are the cutting edge between totalising powers and the identities within the population.87

84 Anton Pelinka, ‘The European Union as an Alternative to the Nation-State.’ International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, v24.1/2 (2011) p.21–30 85 John Welsh ‘City-State Britain: A Counter-Narrative to ‘Brexit’’, Geopolitics, (2020) 86 Sam Haselby, ‘Return of the City State’ (2017) https://aeon.co/essays/theend-of-a-world-of-nation-states-may-be-upon-us [9/01/2021] 87 Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990) p.297-299


Brexit 28

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 29

Conclusion

invisible net across the UK as well as a hard border truly inciting the thought of ‘Power is everywhere’.91

Bibliography

I discuss notions that have fed the Irrational xenophobia of the UK, namely through the Hostile Environment policy and Windrush generation in the run up to Brexit and thus fostering a narrative of total border control from the EU. Stemming from the Imperial histories of Britain, the government has made efforts to extend control over its citizens by giving them powers of proxy border officials that makes citizens actively identify others as opposed to judging them on merit.88 This compounded with a narrative of ‘take back control’ put forward by the Leave campaign incited feelings of hate towards others, this hate created illusions of being trapped by the Elites of the EU. Homi Bhabha discusses In Nation and Narration, the necessity of the past, and that it is crucial for the necessary future, however, he adds that it amounts to a consistent ghostly repetition of national narratives.89

Narratives of a nation are vital, unifying and divisive. UK has taken a path of Ambivalence towards its own histories, as evidenced through the Breaking Point campaign; we saw how attaching ourselves to both a misinformed use of an image that victimised Croatian’s fleeing war and a narrative of the UK alone could ‘control’ the state as did it at the time of its Imperial prowess, catalysing the UK to vote leave along with further trappings of inciting marginalisation in the public sector such as the spectacle that Farage created through this campaign. The UK has left the EU, but its citizens are divided in wake of Brexit and the UK’s future independent of the EU is uncertain. The ambivalence to its former Narrative is tearing the cultural identity of the UK apart, where people are disillusioned by the rhetoric of the leave campaign despite the potential that migrants offer the country. As Flusser discusses the freedom of the migrant allows people to act, just as cities do, with this in mind, I look to London, a city that offers hope to the people beyond the border. The nation state model is out of touch with the world, as diversity and inward migration are characterised by cities all over the world and act as centres for glocalism; they are even more similar to each other than they often are the nation states they exist part of. Sovereign authority is increasingly out of step with the world, and we are upon a time where the grand narratives of old need to be reconsidered in a time of globalisation and the political architecture of the 19th century should be reimagined.

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Brexit has only served to make it clear that freedom is fabricated with the likes of the hostile environment policy being enforced to a much larger degree. With immigration laws woven into our everyday lives, it becomes a homogenous doctrine of us against them. The narrative that the leave campaign attached itself to disregard the massive amounts migrants serving to make the country a prosperous one, even actively treating these people as criminals as seen in the Windrush generation.90 The ambivalence towards our own identity suggests that there is a deep resentment towards others as the totalising narratives of unethical treatment of people like those of the Windrush generation are just another example of a fabricated future. This was approached through a Foucauldian analysis where rhetoric’s of resisting the powers of the sovereignty that present unethical doctrines that have been masqueraded into an

88 Erica Consterdine, ‘Hostile environment: The UK government’s draconian immigration policy explained’ (2018, April 26) <https://theconversation.com/ hostile-environment-the-uk-governments-draconian-immigration-policy-explained-95460> [11/10/2020] 89 Homi Bhabha, Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990) p.297 90 Kenneth Lunn ‘The British state and immigration, 1945–51: New light on the empire Windrush’ Immigrants & Minorities, 8.1-2, (1989) p.161-174,

91 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge (London: Penguin 1998) p.68

Brown, Wendy Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (New York: Zone, 2010) p.114 Candappa, Mano ‘Border politics, the “hostile environment” for’ migration, and education in the UK’ Hungarian Educational Research Journal, 9.3(2019) p.414-433 Clarke, Simon ‘Culture and Identity’ The SAGE Handbook of Cultural Analysis (2011) Consterdine, ‘Erica Hostile environment: The UK government’s draconian immigration policy explained’ (2018, April 26) <https:// theconversation.com/hostile-environment-the-uk-governments-draconian-immigration-policy-explained-95460> [11/10/2020] Cummings, Ronald ‘Ain’t no black in the (Brexit) Union Jack? Race and empire in the era of Brexit and the Windrush scandal’ Journal of Postcolonial Writing, 56:5, (2020) p.593-606 Elden, Stuart ‘Terrain, politics, history’ Dialogues in Human Geography (2020) Elden, Stuart ‘Thinking Territory Historically’, Geopolitics, 15:4, (2010) p.757-761 Flusser, Vilem The Freedom Of The Migrant: Objections to Nationalism (University of Illinois Press, 2003) Foucault, Michel Security, Territory, Population – Lectures at the Collége De France, 1977-78, Translated by Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave 2007) Foucault, Michel Technologies of self, (London: Tavistock, 1988) Foucault, Michel The birth of biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978–1979. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) Foucault, Michel The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction, Trans. Robert Hurley, (New York 1990) Foucault, Michel The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge (London: Penguin 1998) Foucault, Michel, Faubion, James D, Power: Essential works of Foucault, 1954–1984 (Vol. 1) (London, UK: Penguin, 2002) Friedrich, Rainer ‘The Enlightenment Gone Mad (II) The Dismal Discourse of Postmodernism’s Grand Narratives’ A Journal of Humanities and the Classics 20.1 (2012) Fukuyama, Francis Identity (London: Profile Books Ltd 2019) Full Fact Team, ‘£350 million EU claim “a clear misuse of official statistics”’ https://fullfact.org/europe/350-million-week-boris-


Brexit 30 johnson-statistics-authority-misuse/ [28/12/2020] Full Fact Team, ‘The UK’s EU membership fee’ (2019) https://fullfact.org/europe/our-eu-membership-fee-55-million/ [28/12/2020] Gee, Georgina ‘Channel 4 Fact Check: Who destroyed the Windrush Landing Cards?’ (2018)< https://www.channel4.com/news/ factcheck/factcheck-who-destroyed-the-windrush-landing-cards> [28/11/2020] Gee, Graham. Luca, Rubini and Martin, Trybus. ‘Leaving the EU: The Legal Impact of Brexit on the United Kingdom.’ European Public Law 22 (2016) p.51 Gillingham, John R. in, The Brexit Crisis, ‘The European Idea has Turned Rancid’ (London: 2016, Verso books) Gilroy, Paul. There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. (London: Routledge, 1987) Giuntella, Osea. Nicodemo, Catia. Vargas-Silva, Carlos. ‘The effects of immigration on NHS waiting times’ Journal of Health Economics, 58 (2018) p.123-143, Goodman, Simon ‘“Take Back Control of Our Borders”: The Role of Arguments about Controlling Immigration in the Brexit Debate.’ Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej 15.3 (2017): 35-54. Harnlan, Chico ‘The Washington Post: Frexit? Italeave? After watching Brexit, other European countries say: No, thanks.’ (2019) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/frexit-italeave-after-watching-brexit-other-european-countries-say-nothanks/2019/03/29/7b6e059a-4be0-11e9-8cfc-2c5d0999c21e_story.html [30/12/2020] Hartonian, Gervork Modernity and its Other (Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1997) Haselby, Sam ‘Return of the City State’ (2017) https://aeon.co/essays/the-end-of-a-world-of-nation-states-may-be-upon-us [9/01/2021] Kapuściński, Ryszard The Other (London: Verso 2018) Lamey, David ‘The Guardian: Two years after Windrush, we’re deporting people who’ve only known Britain as home’ (2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/feb/10/windrush-deporting-people> [29/11/2020] Lefebvre, Henri The Production of Space (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991) Liberty, A guide to the hostile environment (London: Liberty, 2019) https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/issue/report-a-guideto-the-hostile-environment/ [11/10/2020] Looney, Sarah ‘Breaking Point? An Examination of the Politics of Othering in Brexit Britain’ TLI Think! 69.1 (2017) Lunn, Kenneth ‘The British state and immigration, 1945–51: New light on the empire Windrush’ Immigrants & Minorities, 8:12, (2010) 161-174, Mason, Rowena ‘Nigel Farage: Indian and Australian immigrants better than eastern Europeans’ The Guardian, (22 April 2015), < https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/22/nigel-farage-immigrants-india-australia-better-than-eastern-europeans > [15/10/2020 (para 2 of 15) McHarg, Aileen. Mitchell, James. ‘Brexit and Scotland’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 19.3, (2017) p.512– 526 Newman, David ‘On borders and power: A theoretical framework’ Journal of Borderlands Studies, 18:1, (2003) p.18 Oliver, Tim Understanding Brexit: A concise introduction (Bristol: Policy Press 2018) Pelinka, Anton ‘The European Union as an Alternative to the Nation-State.’ International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 24.1/2 (2011) p.21–30

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 31 Ringeisen-Biardeaud, Juliette ‘“Let’s take back control”: Brexit and the Debate on Sovereignty’ French Journal of British Studies 22.2 (2016) Santana Martins, Cláudia ‘Does Translation Have a Future in the Post-Historical Society?’ Flusser Studies 20 (2015) Stewart, Heather. Mason, Rowena. ‘The Guardian: Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant poster reported to police’ (2016) https://www. theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defendsukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants [12/12/2020] The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, ‘Enoch Powell Encyclopædia Britannica’ (2020)< https://www.britannica.com/biography/ Enoch-Powell> [1/12/2020] Thomson, A.j.P ‘The Nation in the Work of Jacques Derrida’, Irish Review 28. (2001) p.125-136 Unknown Author ‘Identity, Belonging, and the Role Of the Media in Brexit Britain’ (2020) <https://brexit-studies.org/belonging/> [10/10/2020] Unknown Author, ‘The Cabinet Papers: The EEC and Britain’s late entry’ (2020) < https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ cabinetpapers/themes/eec-britains-late-entry.htm > [28/11/2020] Welsh, John ‘City-State Britain: A Counter-Narrative to ‘Brexit’’, Geopolitics, (2020)


Brexit 32

Proformas: Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation (Oxon: Routledge Classics, 2001) In the Chapter “The Insane” Foucault discusses the madness through the ages and how it has become to be treated as well as observed suggesting the further we go back in time, our understanding of the so called animalistic tendencies were less that of an insult to humanity but a spectacle. Whereas since the shift of the spectacle in the middle ages to renaissance, a sense of shame in human nature directed us to treat those who were insane forcing those to be confined like animals, chained to beds. Their behaviour was unreasonable and therefor it had to be contained and treated like a disease, through confinement, punishment and discipline. However through the ages this idea of unreason and its force in the society of the renaissance we start to contradict our own actions of defining this unreason in different ways forcing this unreason to the spectrum of madness, or evil, then treating all as such with the same actions as we did previously. By looking at past treatments of the insane Foucault initiates this discussion of when times were perhaps the downward spiral of judgement and differentiation started occurring in those who were mad, The Middle Ages. This was then taken through to the classical era. By not being able to experience many of the times that Foucault was discussing he looked into accounts of that time for example that of the case of Gilles De Rais, a serial killer, who’s shame was needed to be exposed in order for them to convict the evil sodomite. This case is a controversial one due to his knight hood and lordship in Brittany. This suggests that this shame was shared throughout the those of his stature also. In order for Foucault to discusses the nature of insanity, he needed a historical context. Focused on his immediate surroundings this analysis looked at western Europe from the renaissance onwards primarily from those suppressing the insane by means of observing from afar

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 33 or behind the protection of a cage. Knowing that most of the accounts came from those of a sound mind he argued that this response to the unreason was out of fear of these people being so liberal with their actions at time when refined Christianity was becoming less popular and the madness started to fill its place.

Francis Fukuyama, Identity (London: Profile Books Ltd 2019), p. 3-11 Francis Fukuyama raises the notion of people’s dignities are the biggest motivational factor within the chapter ‘The Politics of Dignity’. He suggests that people that are individualistic at the end of the day but align themselves with certain groups in order to raises their status in one way or another. In essences it takes not of the rapid globalization from the increase of liberal democracies where more countries have a say in what is going on. However, in the west he states that ‘disruptive social change from more money, goods and people moving from one place to another’ is occurring, thus in a very brief overview, people are more frequently losing and gaining money, causing a nature that he calls ‘politics of resentment’. This resentment mobilises those to act out against opposing identities. This now has caused a more prominent struggle for recognition in the face of increasing liberal democracies, meaning that before we go any further, we must understand our behavior to greater degree, a political model that is in line with new theory for the ‘human soul’. Being a politically motivated text, it takes on a sociological standpoint exploring people’s motivational factors. Globalization has caused people on the right to call for more nationalism and those on the left and now calling for more ethnic minorities to be respected and celebrated for their individualism. These are questions of identity, and knowing this Fukuyama makes note of ‘ identity has a wide number of meanings today’ but also suggests that these identities even on a national scale can fluctuate, for example he mentions that some countries who went towards a democratic model, slipped into similar previous state coined as a ‘ Democratic recession’. Some countries worth noting would be Russia from when the communist Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 took on a democratic model but is now drifting towards Authoritarian leadership while China, a distinctly an undemocratic nation started promoting the ‘China model’ in its wake of a renewed market as a product of globalization. Thus, these factors have all suggested to

be motivated by financial recognition. This text is propelled by the rapid increase in liberal democracies around the world appearing around the 1970’s, however, also states that the book would not been written for the electoral surprises of 2016, these being Britain leaving the European Union and Donald J. Trump being elected president of the United States of America. These shock events, are intrinsically linked to that of a growing national identity in the ‘face’ of globalization and more ethnic groups appearing in the west, suggesting a change in social norms. Disruptive social change was linked directly linked to Money, People by Fukuyama; ‘Money is perceived to be a marker of status and buys respect’, the west as well as many other nations operate the “economic model”.


Brexit 34 Francis Fukuyama, Identity (London: Profile Books Ltd 2019), p. 50-59 The central concern of Fukuyama this chapter appears less to be expressive identity but more that of reasons for individual’s identity. The initial discussion of the chapter is rooted in dignity of individuals where Fukuyama mentions that it is more absent in politics of the west than elsewhere in the world however goes on to explain through Kant, that in the western world we have long operated through a rule system that dictated our for freedom, this based through religious or secular reasoning. Most people operate on shared cultures based on the space they exist in, forming society, this allows us to cooperate on shared tasks. Within this people appear to grow an autonomous identity. Hobbes, Locke, Kant and Nietzsche were all discussed alongside religions such as Christianity and Islam, to understand the basis of our morals and social rules we all naturally adhere too in a vast philosophical sense. Something that was agreed upon throughout is that humans are intensely social creatures, however there was a fork in this realization of there are two predominant ideas in the dignity of humans and the political model they engage as realized by the early 19th century through the beliefs of Hobbes and Locke. ‘Liberal societies sought to provide citizens with an ever-expanding scope of individual autonomy.’ Whilst the other societies provided a collective identity that was formed on the basis of nationalism and politicized religion. These all demanded special status. For example, the exclusive nationalism of Germany in the early 20th century and the contemporary Muslim world creating a political basis, leading a military coup in 2013 in Egypt. Expressive individualism has a strong political backdrop framed in history up to modern day events, where social discourse is ignited through dignity of groups being dismantled through a lack of knowing one’s true inner self, this presents a choice, and highlights a new expressive identity leading to autonomy or common identity. These choices sometime suppress inner

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 35 identity through pressure to conform with a collective surrounding identity. This was framed through the laws of Christianity, suppressing evil desires, and freedoms that we are allowed in liberal democracies that still taut a plenitude of feelings hushed by outwards conformity. It has come down to us as individuals to make choices, making choices that comply with common identity lay the groundwork for nationalism, making choices based on a moral compass is a liberal discourse that would insult a collective rule book of that of a religion.

Juhani Pallassma, Matteo Zambelli, Inseminations, Newness, Tradition and identity: Existential Content and meaning in architecture (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons 2020) p.132-133 In two short paragraphs Pallasmaa discusses the continuum that is cultural identity. He states that identity is a two-way street through saying ’as I settle in a place, the place settles in me’ and that culture is intrinsically a locality. In some annoyance Pallasmaa, gives a great deal of significance to tradition, and that the practice of operating in an alien culture is a cardinal sin, especially for commercial interest. Pallasmaa looks at culture as a timeline of layers where he takes note from anthropologist Edward T. Hall, knowing that ‘essences of culture takes a lifetime to learn’. This connection of culture and identity being a series of layers is important when coming from a politically left standpoint, which is evident in this text questioning colonialization. This has now bought to the forefront of this architectural thought that when people operate in a capitalist manner towards exterior cultures from their own, it appears that; even by ‘executing our designs in cultures very different from own’, we are whitewashing these layers, distorting the codes of culture, perhaps causing disruptive social change igniting political discourse. This may cause people to question their own identity, through a collective identity being altered. I now must consider the fact of how does change ever come in dramatic progressive ways for good, or are we condemned to taking small steps or respecting cultures slowly adding a personal identity and thought? It calls for the need that we must have an endearment to our perception of looking out from the view that Ludwig Wittgenstein and many other shares of “I am my world”


Brexit 36 E Relph, Place and Placelessness (London: Pion Limited, 2008) p.44-61 On the identity of places, E Relph, starts a discussion of place being intrinsically linked to the people of place and the outlook at which insiders and outsiders of places have. He sets out rules for himself in order to later discuss the nature in which he will examine identity with respect to place stating that ‘Generalizations about places cannot be formulated’ and that the way we observe identity of others, the ‘‘essential character’, depends largely on artistic insight and literary ability’. Adding to this, identity to him is a ‘invisible unity’ where people exist in a place at a certain time, the time reflects the way they act, and the place offers frame in which to look out of or into. By being taught to see what our culture has to offer we look for things we recognize in others, generating assumptions, highlighting our very own identity and the sameness within the difference, suggesting that wherever we are identity, as Heidegger said, ‘makes it claim upon us.’ Later he bullet points and discusses several topics of identity linked to place and the different perspectives that create distinctive definitions of components, insidness and outsideness, mass images of place and finally the way in which identities develop. Developing identities will now be the sub-genre I focus upon. Identity forms from a structuring of knowledge Relph describes where ‘we balance the processes of assimilation and accommodation’ this happens where ever we are and all places have to offer identity to make us refocus our thoughts making us assimilate with the surrounding with past present and future thoughts and then accommodating them with our own selves. Relph previously outlined the personality types and the way the act to events big and small (this can even be the thing they repeatedly do every day like having breakfast), where Existential insiders often gradually develops identity according to place from childhood, the Empathetic insider will observe sensitively attempting to learn about the culture to its greatest depths disregarding personal values. On the other side of the spectrum Relph articulate that there are people who are

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 37 outsiders, those with a preconceived idea of people and place who have differing identities to themselves. This preconceived idea is generated through the mass image and collectivization of behavioural traits, the image vastly outweighs experience to these types of people. This mass identity that the outsiders prescribe to allows them a cloak arbitrary fabricated set of acceptable signs. This lacks roots and belonging. The development of identity is theoretical based on time and setting, where multiple different personalities have different approaches to others, which in the grand scheme of things is fine. But the identity of place cannot be a tag, it takes many forms, but is always the very basis of our experience of this place as opposed to any other.

Michel Foucault, Jay Miskowiec, “Of Other Spaces”, Diacritics, 16.1 (1986), 22 Foulcault discusses the principles of the heterotopian occurrences and worlds, with direct relation to humankind, and its knowledge and understanding of the utopian world being exactly what it is not. Humans dream of worlds better than the one they are currently in he suggests, where life is a never-ending stream of perfection, a utopia, fundamentally though they are ‘unreal spaces.’ Foucault believes that there is a place between the here and there (there being a dream like collectivised world of intangible moments and objects) this place is both ever present in our lives, while being wholly outside if this realm. Foucault uses the example of a mirror where the reflection is a tangible space, as it exists in our very world but to exist is in essence never achievable to alter that space without having to change this space also. This idea of heterotopia is broken down to five principles. Time becomes a distributive matter that is linked to spaces, from here to there, from this to that, where more space means more time. Through a historical lens to begin with Foucault discusses the anxieties of era from the 19th century onwards was the rapid development of ourselves, where we are directly next to the thing that is to come, juxtaposing our experiences with ones that have come to ones that will be, suggesting that there is strive to expand upon our ever-accumulating past in a near instant. Through the documentation of past events we create these worlds that can exist but are also unachievable because they have come but they are connected to the distributer known as time. Through history and the documentations of Galileo, allowing for both rediscovery of thoughts, Foucault directs this study in a philosophical manner, pushing the boundaries of our understanding our world and our dream worlds, where sacred places are a representation of the dream we wish to achieve and museums are worlds of ever ageing history while also being located outside the realm in which the artefacts come from, in some essence heterotopias are selfish manifestation of the human experience.

Foucault being a Frenchman growing up in the 20th century he focussed on the predominant elements of surrounding cultural norms. The rich Christian attitudes of the spaces he inhabited forced him to focus on things such as churches and the attitudes they had towards life and death, and its developments from the middle ages for the example of relocating previously sacred dead from the centre of the city, the soul as it were, to the outskirts meant that there was development in understanding of human life and disease, a change in attitudes. This was then juxtaposed to beliefs and rituals of Persians, who mirrored their utopian worlds within gardens, these gardens were far to sacred for normal common folk however these people created carpets of great value that mirrored the gardens that mirrored the idealised worlds full of life, vegetations, and ornate golden art, originating from Zoroastrianism in 550 bc.


Brexit 38 Ryszard Kapuściński, The Other (London: Verso 2018), p.51 Condensing a lifetime of travel journalism Ryszard Kapuściński outlines his experience of other through the reactions he has had himself during his lifetime being an empathic insider as E Relph would call it. This has taken him out of his European roots to worlds wider than the west, making him come to almost despise the concept of Nationalism. This is because the ‘dangerous feature of nationalism is that an inseparable part of it is hatred for an Other’ where the other becomes this deformed mass that has no name, has no profession, has no age, for Ryszard, he would simply become a Pole. He notes that others always have a sensitivity towards skin colour and uses the example of children in Uganda were fascinated by his skin tone, touching him and checking to see if they also turned white…. Where the feeling was a sense of tension for him and others at this moment, they were both others surrounded by other others. Ryszard Kapuściński largely discusses this chapter in a philosophical sense pulling from real world experience. For example he documents the wests actions during the Iranian revolution, where there was an absence of western reporters and writers, almost as if the western world was ignoring a world drama even in the wake of this new globalization taking place where the human population of the world map changed in a near overnight event during the 20th century. This ignorance to third world events meant that this new world of a globality still remains in the 19th century where ‘researching’ ‘interpreting philosophies’ ‘fathoming’ ‘thinking and way of life remains in the hands of a narrow group of specialists.’ This would suggest that it distorts the true nature and explains the idea also discussed by E Relph of the mass image. Thus, making an autonomous homogenic state that appears to be one thing without real life events, real life dramas and real people. He sees the world as a real life Tower of Babel, all striving for power, where god has not just mixed language,

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 39 but culture, customs, passions and interest, a far more complex group all seeking their own agenda generated by their identities; this then creates a tower of his own and the alien. This suggest that there is going to be a power struggle forever, a capitalistic like structure governing the ways we do things, forever, unless we come up with a ‘new theory for the human soul’ as Francis Fukuyama would put it, where we all understand that there is ‘Great human family that we all belong to’. By being an atheist Kapuściński has realized that his other for example when he is asked do you believe in god, is, someone ‘who believes deeply in the existence of an extra-corporeal world, an extra material world.’ Something that is true to the other, but not to him, a difference. This difference is a heterotopian divide, as seen by Foucault, suggesting that with others in the presence of self, we perhaps exist in the heterotopia and the real is the illusion, by way of examples such as ‘democracy and totalitarianism’

Ryszard Kapuściński, The Other (London: Verso 2018), p.63 The ‘Other in The Global Village’ is primarily concerned with ‘Philosophy of dialogue’ and the ‘The philosophy of encounter’ in a world that has been dominated by the European culture for the past five centuries. Due to controversial way European culture has been overbearing of others it has led ‘The philosophy of encounter’ ignoring race, religion or culture alike. Resulting in a distorted image, and now marginalized groups are demanding a seat at the global round table (figure of speech) that has up until this point been primarily occupied by the European and American factions, in the face of technological advancements. Advances in communication has made our multicultural world more obvious and ubiquitous Kapuściński argues, humiliating the Other. While it is important to note the other at every step Kapuściński, is careful to realizes he comes from this western faction of ‘we = Europeans’ where in the closed mindedness of old we thought it to men we = the world and makes note that Philosophy of dialogue is now being questioned by ongoing historical changes. This historical change is in the light of media and communications where people such as Marshall McLuhan started to dream and fantasize of a global village, where people truly new each other, on a global scale but is now more like an anonymous crowd at an airport that are mutually indifferent and ignorant, where dialogue is absent even in the presence of encounters. Was discussed at great length in this chapter, when considering the world that was filled with selfishness and greedy consumerism predominately expressed through the western mass image, however over and over again in this culture we move on rarely uncovering any identity of person or object alike as we continually are wanting to move on to the next best thing. It suggests that we look forward so much to what we want that we never look around to our neighbour or even to our past, even globalized media Kapuściński argues that it’s becoming shallower, more incoherent and confused. There is an absence of ethics, an absence of consideration towards

the other. ‘I know that I am because I know another is’, this quote offers identity through the act of turning towards an Other and becoming acquainted with them, and through dialogue as ‘man is a creature that talks’ we learn about ourselves by learning of an Other. However, suggest this practice throughout history shows at ‘first moment, as a first reflex a person reacts to an Other with reserve and restraint, mistrust or plain reluctance, or even with hostility.’ Written in the mid 2000’s Kapuściński pulls from real world events in a European lens torn between capitalism and communism in Poland, where technology is steaming ahead with advancements at the cost of the human soul among so many more things. This thinking of the enslavement of the human soul goes along with the concepts of mass taste (or lack of), mass hysteria, mass paranoia and finally mass murder, this was supported the treatment of a extremely brief look into Jewish philosophers such as Hannah Ardent, someone who was actively involved with Heidegger, who sympathized with the Nazi regime, who took identity to new lows with the treatment of (and I hate to say in this way) the Jewish people, with the mechanism of propaganda via film radio and print media.


Brexit 40 Peter Antich, ‘Narrative and the Phenomenology of Personal Identity in Merleau-Ponty’ Life Writing 15.3, (2018) p.431-445 Peter Antich discusses narrative through the phenomenology of personal identity via Merleau-Ponty views forming a distinction between narrative and prenarrative existence, and thus what impacts these have upon our identity. For this he delves into Merleau-Ponty’s claims, and self-reflections of his own experience which then is expanded upon by Antich via examples for both Narratives and pre-narratives. For example, ‘in the phenomenological sense active – the self that decides upon ends, deliberates, is directly conscious of objects and articulates to itself its mode of existence, i.e. the I that has a personal history.’ This is what personal existence is suggested to be, a reactionary basis from previous interactions, something Merleau-Ponty would call a series of rhythms as if a piece of music the previous note dictates the following as is deliberate means to compose. However, this denotes a rather impersonal intent as dictated by the ‘field’ of existence and would almost suggest that the real world with perceive is a heterotopian world and the and perceive we have a choice. Because I prior narrative is narrating the current and future narrative. This would make ‘personal existence intermittent’ and it is precisely through narrative that we acquire personal identities. The article was explored in 4 primary stages starting with to examples centred on the worker and the lover with extracts from Merleau-Ponty which allowed Antich to form a framework to further discuss Merleau-Ponty’s ideas on identity. By doing acts people form identities but what motivates these acts that ultimately form narrative of life of a person? ‘I exist as a worker’ or ‘I exist as a bourgeois’ first, and this mode of communication with the world and society motivates both my revolutionary or conservative projects and my explicit judgments’ this small extract offers a glimpse into the motivators for work, where Antich explains that Merleau-Ponty is only partly complicit in his decision due to that fact that she is given the space and time to interpret the historical

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 41 meaning of her life, and sharing thoughts towards social norms with peers. The next is love, a either superficial or genuine feeling, where the false love is a memory reappearing, a pre-narrative. Or the making of a narrative that dictates choices of a future realm. This was all in theory of course that was later expanded upon by Antich in philosophical context in the last three stages where he discusses existence (something I couldn’t help but relate to Heidegger and his philosophy on being present), in a personal and pre-personal manner. Which is then followed by an explanation of relations where he discusses previous point in a new dynamic way while still relating the main concern of Merleau-Ponty and personal identity. And finally, an analysis of Judith butlers works and the resemblances between the two theorists. Merleau-Ponty, was a French phenomenological philosopher who lived and worked in the 20th century, and was greatly influenced by Heidegger, Husserl, and Sartre. These philosophers strongly coincide with primary focus of the article, by having a perception of existence in a historical context, almost as if we are walking forwards while looking back. Later in the article Judith butlers work draws out some sinister ideas that narratives are actually detrimental to the self, and by some means harmful to which some accounts of narrative are implicitly committed, by stating ‘According to Butler, only if we acknowledge the limits placed on narrative identity by its emergence within a pre-narrative existence can we avoid impossible and potentially harmful accounts of the self’ and a truly touching ending note is such; ‘Views about personal identity only become impossible or harmful when they seek to detach personal existence from its pre-personal roots.’ Meaning personal narrative and identity are existence. Something that appears in the works of Heidegger over and over.

Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Albany: State University of New York, 2010) p.112 -127 The way in which we consider and understand the existential question of the ‘who’ in human existence (Dasein), is usually, who am i? but when we say who we consider that of us, we, the humans that existence and not I but they are also intangibly linked, I thus becomes a product of who, and thus when we consider I we also must consider all humans, in essence. The ‘mode of being of beings’ is more important than the suggestive answers than the phenomena of human existence. Heidegger outlines a phenomenological problematic, where consciousness is a reflective perception, verging on the realm of existence is more heterotopian than real. The question of ‘I’ is all too easy to consider, for human existence; I am present, I am here, we give ourselves to our surrounding, there is always a reflection of self but what of the ‘other’, there is a suggested undertone of the chapter, where givenness as Heidegger understands it in the ontological sense has been only interpreted in the positive sense, where we are in essence overlooking the phenomenon of the world, as ‘I’ is much too innerworldly, mere subject without our world is never given so for I to be isolated without others is something that is not or ever has been. While we exist, Heidegger suggest that others have always had a phenomenological ‘beingin-the-world’ needing the question of who as a part of Dasein This is explored as if human existence in not actually a subject at all but a series phenomenological occurrence where they are fleeting, and the differences between perception is all that remains, thus meaning being is essentially being-with-others. So human existence, has no self, but gives phenomenon to being amongst others and these others are shown to be invariably apart of my world, am I a part of theirs. ‘I know I am because I know they are’, I know their actions, perceived through one’s own existences, however without this presence or care or forethought to the other we cease to exist. Later the discussion is directed towards the anti-individualism of his account of the Cartesian subject rests on the thesis

that the self is defined by its relationships to the world and to other subjects, taking a caring stance upon the other by considering that of another besides one’s self, noted as ‘being-with-one-another’. The context is ‘Existential analytic of factical human existence’ as stated by Heidegger, where we exist in relation to each other and ourselves, even our body and mind. This is translated via the everydayness of Dasein, for example ‘people are what they do’. When things are taken care of, one has taken hold of, for or against others, this provides a lens into the fact that there is always a differing phenomenon, one that always seems to be equalizing to Heidegger. Human existence stands in subservience to others, describing that this context is framed in opposition, and harmony with the other, providing a sense of essential belonging, however is later argued that in the advancement of technology in the everyday the ‘surrounding world’ every Other is like the next, they become inconspicuous, we have fun the same way they have fun, there is an averageness, human existence thus becomes monotonous in its everydayness.


Brexit 42 John R. Gillingham, in, The Brexit Crisis, ‘The European Idea has Turned Rancid’ (London: 2016, Verso books) p.128-143 John R. Gillingham, in the chapter ‘The European idea has turned rancid’ primarily discusses the idea of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is the primary downfall of the Union in an age of globalization and technological change. As one power that dictates change in such a rapidly moving time would appear to be to slow and has its priorities confused; this essentially means that who can trust a single state in an ocean spanning trade agreement, setting standards and being responsible for many products and processes, suggesting a lack of conversation of a presumed shared assumption of ideals. To futher catalyze this thought, Gillingham uses the example of the Scandal in mid 2015, where Volkswagen, a massive tributary to the EU altered results of the efficiency of their catalytic convertors to the degree where the emissions where in excess of global emissions standards. Why did this happen? To satisfy the demands of the EMU. In a sociopolitical frame Gillingham looks at the EU as a weakened state of affairs where they are pushing for an unachievable agenda, with Greece unable to afford the bailout, they know something must give, alongside this however Italy hold the most sovereign debt with the EU where the Minor banks are receiving help but, “the perilous financial state of their country could well degenerate into an Existenzkrise of the EU” because “they have propped up outmoded national banking communities that cannot provide the credit the economy needs for recovery” thus further proving that the slow moving nature of the EU is insufficient. Modern day Europe is under analysis is this chapter, noting the advantages of that of “Poland, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden, and Britain” by not having a adopted the EMU (the Euro) and the downfalls at Brussels, likening it to wanting to upgrade you ticket from second to first class in an already sinking ship… no

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 43 one with any sense would do it. Adding to the previously mentioned scandal of Volkswagen, this could be seen as the pinnacle of European attempts so satisfy the globe by cutting corners and evading the correct ways to do things in essence cheating the own progression of technology and standards.

William Davies, in, The Brexit Crisis, ‘Thoughts on the Sociology of Brexit’ (London: 2016, Verso books) p.15 - 29

Within the report by William Davies his primary concern was the ‘Sociology of Brexit’ and took a key stance that this event of political discourse in the west was mirroring that of the actions and products of the 1970s under Margaret Thatcher’s government. (A key thought here is that at this time the tensions between Communism and Capitalism were at their highest ever). The premise of the report suggested that the idea of Brexit and the European union was a product of two distinct ideas; the first being that many county’s that benefitted from the EU resented that fact that they took handouts from these ‘Elites’ and wanted a Britain that would allow them to be selfsufficient. This made them ungrateful from this financial support, as it marginalized them (I can’t help but feel a sense of irony here as these are also the communities that typically have a small-minded attitude towards the ‘Other’) the next idea is that in the modern age we have new understanding of ‘Data not facts’ by looking at data we have given up on the future the texts suggests, where we focus on the pessimistic understandings and rebuttals to the politics at hand. Meaning that ‘Brexit Was Not Fuelled by a Vision of the Future‘. This report takes on a negative discourse towards most politics, where he brings up the short comings of the labour and conservative government, the Thatcher administration, and the entirety of the EU as whole. Looking towards Labour, Davies likens their approach to Marx’s idea of the ‘spatial fix’, in Nancy Fraser’s terms, New Labour offered ‘redistribution’ but no ‘recognition’ something Explored deeply by Francis Fukuyama’s book ‘Identity’. Recognition is a powerful sentiment, at the end of the day everyone is striving for recognition, and when this is denied they look elsewhere for it (in the essence I am setting the tone for labour being pro EU and Conservative being pro Brexit) so when the chance arose those in these new marginalized areas by the EU and Labour the communities looked towards a new frontier suggests Davies. This was a product of the data that was already set however, and disillusioned by statements and

date that ignored many other key features of the situation, for example Gordon Brown’s beneficial decision not to use the Euro (shared currency with many EU countries) not only this Britain is actually the least ‘Shackled’ by the EU. Therefor Davies wondered over why Brexit even happened, as it benefited from economic stability, a clear international regulatory framework and a sense of cultural fraternity with other member states. Brexit of course is the context of this report that started with the 2016 referendum, and his discussion is supported by outlining locations were communities are of a polarizing nature, for example Cornwall a location deprived of economic wealth due its seasonal model and lack of infrastructure, is the poorest county meaning that farming business cannot be supported by the county they pay taxes too, thus are in need of support from the EU in return for exportation deals to other European countries. However, because they are resenting the fact they are taking subsidiaries from elites. Due to this small community nature and lack of diversity it is believed that people are swayed by their peers and peers alike and fail to hear the diverse amount of options they have towards them.


Brexit 44

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 45

J. P. Thomson ‘The Place of the Nation in the Work of Jacques Derrida’ The Irish Review (Cork) 28, (2001), p.125-135

a member of a series like every other nation, however there is no philosophy that avoids the way in which nations claim particularity, as previously discussed selfidentification is to make a claim to a nation.

Thomson briefly set out what he sees as key features of Derrida’s work on Nationalism and the consequences upon Scotland when considering Nation and Nationalism. To do this he draws on Derrida’s seminars of 1983, where his key inquiry is ‘Philosophical Nationality and Nationalism’, the importance of these is generally acknowledged Thomson notes, as these were often the precursor to his published works. As discussed in this article there were three key stages Thomson outlined to Derrida argument about nationalism and are to be seen in order, of ‘The concept of the nation is philosophical’ next ‘all philosophy must be national (and therefore political)’ and finally ‘nationalism is always a cosmopolitanism’. In order for the first point to be is to distinguish nation from race and state, this is to avoid an empirical investigation as Thomson believes Derridas work to say that it is to be understood as a culture, and thus a common language. Next the Nation is idiomatic, a form of philosophical thought, and resulting to be political. Thomson bring us to the unsettling notion of responsibility following this sentiment: ‘I am always indebted with respect to a tradition, an identity, a culture, a language.’ In that through the act of making a choice which is inherently political and also of a form of nationality.

Finally, Thomson takes from Derrida’s work that we should think beyond nationalism but never assume that we can step beyond it. For this to happen we should never assume via politics that other people are strangers Derrida’s discusses, never listening for difference. Simply, borders, as Derrida discusses are historically not permanent, and permeable. This was arrived at through Derrida’s refusal of cosmopolitanism, a notion directly tied to Nationalism and Eurocentrism. To explore this idea Thomson connects Derrida to Kant with the motion of Hospitality, where this act is only granted to someone who is a visitor. Hospitality is a model for treaties to govern relations between nations, and therefore to be a visitor you have to be of a nation, not to mention a nation where such treaties have been drawn. However, Derrida has expanded upon this calling it an ‘uncertain calculation’ not achieving unconditional hospitality and not even recognising a Stanger to exist at all.

In the form of responsibility, Thomson explores Derrida’s work, where we do not follow rules to speak a certain language as he suggests that would devolve us of any responsibility. It’s the mere idea of following a pattern, the unfolding of a programme that sets us in the motion to speak a chosen language. However by doing this we betray an infinite amount of Others Derrida outlines as we are ‘deciding for one and against another’ Following this, Thomson discusses Derrida’s third point, that being Nationalism is universalism, for example every nation may not claim to be the (best) nation, however it will always claim to be like a nation like any other. Derrida also argues that every nation is a work in progress, just

Stuart Elden ‘How Should We Do the History of Territory?’, Territory, Politics, Governance, 1.1 (2013) p.5-20

Stuart Elden first discusses the registers of territory today as well as modern history, and the changes that took place with the devolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and which resulted in fighting over the delineation of boundaries with many more examples pushing up to this moment in time where are entities are ‘seeking control of space, a territory.’ To understand the notions naturally associated with territory Elden starts to ask questions, for example ‘What different elements made up the modern notion of ‘territory’’ in hope of offering some reflections to the subject where he explores his book The Birth of Territory and makes engagements to Foucault’s work. This engagement happens due to Foucault’s neglect of territory Elden discusses, however suggests that territory is intrinsic to space, power and governmentality. Elden goes on to note that to understand territory, we need to look at it in a historical sense as it relates it relates to the politics of the roman era, but territory emerges in the west much later. To do this he breaks his study down into four stages; Foucault on Territory, Foucault’s Historical Approach, Towards the Birth of Territory and finally he concludes with returning to the first questions. Firstly, Territory is controlled by a type of power Elden notes from Foucault’s work, however, draws that where territory is addressed it doesn’t fall short into a normal collapse of political-economic concerns but expands upon them making territory register with legal, strategic, economic, and technical. However, this again still falls short to Elden as he notes Foucault to say, sovereignty is exercised through territory. Looking at this historically for Elden territory is all about conquering new territories, or holding onto conquered territories, fostering a thought that people of other territories are either future subjects soon to be under a new rule of law or enemies. This results that man, among the population, is the subject of law and not a ruler who grantees to protect and vice versa but now controlled by doctrine. The note of doctrines though

is that they come with a level of ambiguity allowing them to transform just like territory. However, people define the territory, in that if you don’t control the people, people will mould the territory to their likening, meaning that no one is behind territory other than a government. Finally Elden discusses the notion of territory as a process, rather than a product, and finds flaws in Foucault’s work suggesting that we shouldn’t take His work for granted despite being an appropriate way of understanding geopolitics, as it poses great questions, for example Elden believes that governmentality is calculated and therefore reflected political practice, while Foucault argues that the modern state is born.


Brexit 46 Vilem Flusser The Freedom of the Migrant (Oxfordshire, University of Illinois Press, 2003) p34-37

In the Chapter’ From Guest to Guest Worker’ Vilem Flusser discusses the distinction of the guest to the work within a state, where the guest is treated with hospitality, and the notion across the world is respected, where people naturally offer hospitality. And the worker will always be respected, as it is seen to be a provider. However, the Guest work challenges these notions according to Flusser, and has only really been a motion ever since the industrial revolution, a context that he further explores this idea. At this time the machine replaced the people for complex and/or difficult tasks, this to Flusser meant that humans were left to do the easy (and degrading) tasks. For Marxist’s philosophers the machine was supposed to free people, however Flusser articulates the reality of this in that, it is the rise of general unfreedom, in that the guest worker was imported to carry out manual labor for primitive manipulations. Unfreedom to the guest worker has conations that are often associated to slavery says Flusser, however they enter into a contract, and are free to go home, along with their earnings. On the other hand though, the contract denies the guest work hospitality argues Flusser, so for a foreign worker looking to be a guest worker in another country, their contract offers no information to the economic market he will be entering, for example will the pay be enough for rent, or perhaps is there any prejudice towards the work he is being asked to undertake. Adding to this, the country he is not entering a contract into with takes a portion of his wages for just working in the country, what does this say of hospitality? At this stage in the reading I can’t help but analyze that here in the UK, a country that operates on a capitalistic model, noting is for free, and its everyone for themselves, where traditions of hospitality have been masqueraded into a presenting itself to be free. Oh and not to mention the alienation in which the money a guest worker will earn will also be subjected to alienation when taken back to persons home country.

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 47 Finally Flusser talks of societal norms of a host country, for a guest work is an odd sort of guest, as everything about him/her will threaten the fabric of the well woven defensive society. In western culture Flusser argues, we see Others as a developed form of slave, merely a tool, disposable and inconsequential.

Tim Oliver Understanding Brexit (Bristol: policy press, 2018) p.177-

The final chapter by Tim Oliver in his book Understanding Brexit looks at the Brexit Britian in relation to the rest of the world in regard to its security, trading relationships and power. Tim starts with the notion that Brexit was put initially forward by Eurosceptics, however now at the point of actually leaving the EU, Britain is faced with a number of choices as to what sort of player it tries to be. Tim quotes from Theresa May on that Britain wants to rediscover its heritage of a great global trading nation. This reflects the time in which Britain was an Imperial Power. Previously under the EU, international trading negotiations had to discussed with the union before going ahead, as well as this, the weight of the EU often worked in Britain’s favour to get more fruitful deals. However, the size often meant that dealing with the EU according to Oliver was slow and complex. Oliver expands this rhetoric by suggesting that politicians hopes were the nation would be more nimble in creating deals with other countries however this would also generate a vision of trade sole to the UK and might be narrow minded Oliver notes. To further this understanding, he dedicates a section to Anglo-Irish relations. Northern Ireland collectively voted remain however were outvoted by Britain and Wales, which raises tensions with Ireland as a whole and the rest of the UK. Adding to the problems would be the border between the republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, now an international border, Oliver states that both sides wish to avoid a hard border. Next Oliver discusses citizens’ rights, and the devolution of freedom of movement, there are concerns surround the some 3.2milllion migrants in the UK and the 1.2 million Britons living in EU countries and what their rights would be. The main issues for these citizens would be the xenophobia with in the UK towards those of other countries, and was a leading reason to why people voted leave discusses Oliver, furthermore the home office will now have to register the EU residents in the UK as international citizens, not to mention the incredible pressure the EU

have placed on maintaining their rights in the UK, making the whole process very dubious. To add salt to the wound of Brexit many people who are poor, mentally ill and sick individuals will struggle with the complex system the UK already employs for internationals, this system wouldn’t be so strained argues Oliver if Britain didn’t want to end free movement. Finally Oliver discusses Brexit in a changing west, most notably the trend in western politics in that there is a stagnation in the EU and the rise of populist ideals, and the distance people feel from control and the mainstreams of the their societies. The UK, US and EU remain key partners but need to address common problems that are causing deep divisions. The inward facing polices of western nations like that of the us ban (trump administration) on Muslims entering the country and the UK ending free movement with the EU could end in fragmenting western leaders as they aspire for solidarity in their own nations and in turn damage the globalisation that has taken place ever since 1945.


Brexit 48 Stephen J. Ball, Foucault, Power and Education (New York: Routledge, 2013) p.119-153 In the Final Chapter of Foucault, Power and Education, Ball explores neoliberalism, ethics and discusses resistance and freedom. The analysis employs a Foucauldian outlook on history to the present, welfare to neoliberal, and from discipline to subjectivity. Firstly, Ball discusses Governmentality in that it is a calculated practice or that it is often described as the ‘conduct of conduct’ in that it is to a discursive field in which the exercise of power is rationalised states Ball. Next ball draws on Gillborn’s works on Neoliberalism, suggesting it to be competitive individualism, in that people justify and explain inequalities through character development and is therefore insinuated to be ethical. Ball then starts to explore subjectivity; this focuses on Foucault’s notion of who are we and who are we to become in the modern world and pulls on the rhetoric of a continual intensification of power. power acts upon us in and through our subjectivity states Ball, which he expands upon by suggesting resistance and struggle to be free should be focused in our subjectivity to the government. Secondly Ball discusses Neoliberalism in relation to the state and subjectivity, by looking into the lecture’s series The Birth of Biopolitics by Foucault, which has been taken in an unusual direction. This he feels creates a new inflection on Biopolitics, where neoliberalism is polymorphic, where the goal is to not govern too much, however the ‘state constructs the conditions of possibility for the economy’ facilitating competition. This has be deduced to mean by ball that the population is a resource in a neoliberal state, requiring its individuals and institutions to be lean fit and flexible. In relation to this analysis it is also an undertone narrative of Brexit put forward by the political elite when campaigning remain as discussed in the proforma Understanding Brexit, where it could be seen as the EU wasn’t aligned with the neoliberal UK, wanting the nation as an institution to be more nimble in the global market. Finally, Ball discusses ethics resistance and freedom

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 49 through the critique of the present by clarifying it by the historicism at place. Describing Foucault as an exemplar for new forms of political and ethical and academic practise, as his analysis of power is awakening, for example ball notes that the exercise of power is hidden in everyday life where it proposes itself to be mundane and intimate allowing it to be tolerable. To conclude ball suggests that Foucault was always looking to free himself from power relations, as his works draws from Heidegger, Kant and Socrates. This allows him to reject the notion of essential self and hopes to find ourselves. Balls furthers this rhetoric by suggesting that people are freer than they think however this freedom is never stable in modern approaches as it is still being practiced, ‘Foucault saw it as a means of self-transformation through the minimisation of states of domination’

Paulina Ochoa Espejo, The Time of Popular Sovereignty (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011) p.170-196 Espejo starts the chapter ‘A Democratic People as a Process’ with that the people of democracy rule themselves and discusses the issues that come with this. Firstly, the main issue is, how are these people ever united if they rule themselves as individuals and adds that popular unification plagues many theories on democracy, therefore Espejo seeks to understand what democratic legitimacy actually is, and to do this she uses a processualist theory of peoplehood. People as a process do not become trapped logical problems, she argues, this is because progress provides sufficient stability over time. To do this she splits the problem into two, the first thing Espejo tackles is defining the people as a process and the next is to understand the infinite regress and breaks of the vicious circle of selfconstitution by the people, and how people as process can solve the problem of continuity with duration. Firstly, Espejo the democratic people as a process by stating that ‘people, in turn, is an unfolding series of events coordinated by the practices of constituting, governing, and changing a set of institutions.’ Institutions like these are the highest authority but the people have equal say in how they are constructed describes Espejo. However, she adds that all democratic people are not alike but In sum, we can individuate democratic peoples by fostering their differences in their characteristic of governing practices. Democratic people can persist over time without unification but through general will for freedom. By looking at political theory of democracy as the people as a process she suggests that it is a high price to pay in order to clear the theory of its logical problems. As well as this it makes dual tenets possible with in a political structure. Finally, Espejo starts to round off her argument by saying that we should tolerate the state as a necessary evil however adds that if there is an illegitimate government, there should be no reason to try and maintain it, let

alone improve it. To have a functioning state there needs to a good theory on democratic legitimacy, and in order to continuing improving we no longer need to improve the governmentality but change our theory of the people as currently the system does not serve the collective experience of people. This is because of a lacking vocabulary, as of now Espejo suggests our words speak of being and describe stable things, this is to find otherness where there is certainness she describes in the final paragraph.


Brexit 50 Michel Foucault, The history of sexuality: The will to knowledge. (London: Penguin 1998) p.103-114 The Chapter ‘Domain’ by Foucault discusses power relations contextualised through sex and expanded upon through an eighteenth-century rhetoric of knowledge and power, centred on sex. In that he discusses that sex has been reduced down to reproductive functionality, in that this relationship formed the basis of become consistent towards a political stance that at the time was in their perspective effective. This attitude towards sex, Foucault understood as described through autonomy; first, the hysterization of women’s bodies, in that he discusses that the female form is saturated with sexuality, by looking after the child until education is complete, insurance of the family space, its biological capacity to bear children and finally, the mother as a nervous woman, in which Foucault adds to be negative. Secondly, a pedagogization of the children’s sex, where children are deemed to be preliminary sexual beings, and assertion of dangerous dividing line, however Foucault suggests that all children are prone to engage with sexual activity, but deemed unwarranted, and natural. Third, a socialization of procreative behaviour, for Foucault this is an economic social action, to allow fertility, while all being responsible to the accepted social activities. Finally, a psychiatrization of perverse pleasure, Foucault state that sex was a clinical act, and by which any form of alternative pleasure was pathologized and corrective technologies were employed to correct this. In sum, the Hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple and the perverse adult. Foucault asks, what was at issue with these strategies in the struggle against sexuality. Foucault initially suggests categorising these it was to gain control over them, inciting the feeling to categorise is to gain power, and surely categories are a form of knowledge, in that knowledge is power. However, Foucault questions if this was actually acceptable or useful. This analysis of sexuality is the basis for the production of sexuality, where Foucault states that sex should not be thought of in this way, as a symptom, where power tries to control it but the but something that

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 51 shouldn’t be attempted to grasp nor be deemed difficult to do so but seen as a multitude of things such as a ‘great surface network’. Furthermore, Foucault notes that sex gave rise in every society, in a form of deployment of alliance, a deal where exchange of names, possessions and the making of kinship ties. However, Foucault adds that this deployment in the western world was then destroyed by the forms of control by circulation of wealth through the contract of marriage. Control continues into the form of this alliance, where adultery was problematic at the time of the new pastoral, and sex now was sacred to the alliance, by the governing of the articulated deployment of sexuality and alliance. Finally, Foucault explores the Family since the 18th century, as an obligatory locus of affects feelings and love, in that sexuality has a privileged vantage point of control which is incestuous, as it here where sex is the active site in Foucault’s society. However, this incest is trapped by the grand laws and narratives established in the laws of alliance. New Mechanisms of power will always have their place, the deployment of alliance in the past allowed for a new type of prerogative to emerge states Foucault, for example a young homosexual who reject marriage is used as an example as an alliance gone bad, all emanating from the family structure. He closes with the rhetoric of the politics of sex makes little use of the law of taboo, but brings into play technical machinery, through the repression of sex, to allow for our attention to be placed elsewhere, meaning that sexuality has economic values if supressed through being able to focus on things such as the problems of the labour work force.

Wendy Brown, Walled States Waning Sovereignty (New York: Zone, 2010) p.119-146 Chapter 4 in Wendy Brown’s book Walled States Waning Sovereignty explores the relationship between people and their country and the imaginary relations that walls evoke. The notion of ‘Desiring Walls’ and the feelings people have to them are debated not by looking at how much immigration, terrorism and smuggling they do stop suggesting a numerical value, but rather looking at the as a symbol and how these symbols are consumed by a country. To do this she refers to Benedict Anderson’s book Imagined Communities where she pulls on the notions of people see themselves belonging to a big social group, in this case perhaps a nation. The binding agent to these communities come not by birth to a family Brown states but by separating ‘Us’ from ‘Them’. For example, we are here together on this side and they are there on that side. This rhetoric is no as creating ‘We’ through the separation of culture, language and race, via walls that create a sense of community where there are shared common values. Brown plays on a notion of belonging, if one happens to be on this side, they create for themselves a sense of belonging. A fantasy comes into play of walls are impermeable, were we see our shared values as good, ethical, and innocent, as the other side of the wall is unknown and therefore dangerous like a germ on the outside of the glove looking to sneak in and cause disturbance. This feeling of being the good behind the wall also creates the illusion of being a Righteous nation, one that makes people feel they have a right to be above or protected from others. Finally, Brown looks at the wall as mere a psychological defence mechanism, as she previously explored in chapters before this one the idea that walls don’t stop things like immigration but more so exacerbate the problem. This proves that the fantasy of departing themselves from reality is false and should suggest we need to address the facts of nations are just like most over nations. However, the walls are only built, when the

sovereignty of a nation is being lost brown discusses, this is to provide the nation with an illusion of strength and national homogeny. This homogeny is all stable and good while the downsides of a nation, or community, are project beyond the wall, where an infiltrator has contaminated the homogeneous strain in a similar to that of Enoch Powell saw the UK. This analysis is informed by Sigmund Freud, were a defence mechanism is used to protect against something bad or attached to negative ideas. The discussion points towards to forms of defence mechanism, the wall to protect sovereignty and the idea that we can project beyond our space, where fear can still be experienced but they blame it on other instead of the waning sovereignty.


Brexit 52 Anton Pelinka ‘The European Union as an Alternative to the Nation-State’ International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 24.1/2 (2011) p.21-30 This article over describes the specific character of the EU and its status of an unfinished federal quasistate and delves into the nation states that make up the union and their approach to nationalism. Pelinka begins by discussing globalization and how this has eroded the nation state of old, as it can no longer control the economy that was previously restricted by border. To complicate the situation further mass migration has created a relativity of citizenship and the state’s power is a trend full of ambivalences. Now civilisations are defining regions and less than the states, as they are mentalities that are not restricted by state borders. The most prominent divide of today’s world politics is not between states but as a universal civilisation. Pelinka explores the decline in state-based democracy and how democracy was manifested for states, and if nations states are in decline it would also suggest that democracy is also. With the explosive growth of non-citizens Pelinka suggests that democratic welfare will lose balance due to these non-citizens not having equal rights as those who are citizens. In a growth of non-citizenship, the governmentality becomes less significant. Its significance has been stable since its conception after world war two when the states were looking to live up to the standard of pluralism, liberal democracy and a guarantee of freedom, up until the late 20th century, were globalisation was accessible to the masses. Pelinka adds that the notion of democracy as we know it is out of date as the conditions, we live in are like no other ever before in time. If the reconstruction of the democratic welfare state is to happen it needs to based on the conditions of the 21st century. At tis stage Pelinka introduces the European Union as an experiment in building a transnational government which as it stands is an unfinished federal quasi-state. The EU has no defined centre, Brussels is not intended to be a place for national hegemony like Paris was in

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 53 the Napoleonic era states Pelinka, but has a distinct economic character instead, through the monetary union the EU gains is ‘quasi’ status. But he adds that the Union is lacking in foreign security affairs, as nationalist across Europe see the union as the downfall of the nation state. Finally Pelinka discusses the future of the European Union, where he discusses how its integration isn’t as deep as it could be: in that there are interests of the lager member states that still have illusions of holding great powers (as the UK does), there are feelings of wealth being redistributed from prosperous states to undeserving states, and smaller states are worried that if there is another step taken towards federalisation that there will be a population count that orders states in terms of their powers they have with in the union as posed to the productivity per capita. The process of integration is slow, but the prospect of a singular nation with unlimited sovereignty remains to be discouraging to the collective and therefore the EU will continue to progress, no matter how slowly.

David Newman ‘On borders and power: A theoretical framework’ Journal of Borderlands Studies, 18:1, (2003) p.13-25 David Newman discusses borders and power through three parts the first being ‘borders as institutions’ and the next as the ‘Bordering Process’ and the final being ‘Towards A Research Agenda for the Study of Borders?’. He introduces the us by discussing the theory of bordering with diverse types of borders and experiences of the border. To do this he asks how borders are redefined in contemporary times. To do this he notes that borders are now not just lines drawn on a map but are institutions, we all know what borders serve to do, but he expands this to consider that borders are there to be crossed, and suggests that the grass is not always greener on the other side, especially when the border is more of an institution rather than a totalising element, for example people who cross without the right documentation come with a disillusioned reality which is then ever more torturous than scaling a wall. He expands on this discussion through the notion of institutions are resistant to change, and in this case, it is important to study the bottom up approach to political institutions. Next Newman starts discussing the bordering process, in that stating that all border share a common function, with the exclusion of territorial compartmentalisation, or the online essence to belonging to a group but exist by virtue therefore suggesting that borders are progressive in that they create continual differences and enable some sort of order. The process of territorial ordering was imposed by the elites of the time of decolonisation in the same way that the groups establish codes and conducts and values states Newman. By the creation of otherness, we create multiple foreign identities through the maintenance of the border, whether through its fluctuations of decline or expansion, they will always demarcate the parameters within which identities are conceived, perceived, perpetuated and reshaped, states Newman. Nationalism is contingent upon borders and offer the interaction with the other, what if we were to see the border not as a totalising mass, that actively separated

good from bad, me from you, but as a consideration to other people and growing from each other like student to teacher, and parent to child, friend to friend. Finally, Newman considers where attention should be focused when looking at border related research as he suggest up until this point research has been focused on the geographical. While recently with the advent of globalisation has happened people are looking at border in much multidisciplinary way however the crux of the whole agenda of the border is the semantics of parameters and concepts of the new discourse as all languages have a different meanings. In addition to this he looks at the EU as a common open space, that starts to suggest the world will be borderless one day, which calls us to look at migration and zones of where migration happens moreso, this is where Newman picks up focus on the inner cities, where hybridization takes place, languages are shared and culture debated in friendly ways, borders still exist here but to define the differences in understanding and not who is good or bad, right or wrong, ignorant and smart.


Brexit 54 David Harvey, ‘The right to the city’ International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 27.4 (2003) p.939-41 Harvey begins by pulling from a quote from Robert Park where looks at the right to the city after it is becoming into existence but also the right to change it to our hearts desire. The act of remaking, is one of humanities finest traits suggest Harvey, being able to reflect on our actions and grow. This is contextualised through the city a naturally a chaotic manifestation, where the outcome could either be creative or destructive, but who has a say over what actually happens discusses Harvey, where again he pulls from philosopher Marx, in that, Force decides, where the right to fight for one’s desire, however adds that this is a far cry, in mocking sort of manner, from the UN standards. Next he starts to discuss the idea of dreaming of a better city before its new manifest, but these often fall into the category of the bad rap utopias. To combat this he discusses if the state should step in when private interest fall out of line with the direction of the city, but like all the other theories on how we should decide on who has the upmost right to the city, they fail to take into account the others of differing opinions. Newman suggest that this debate will ultimately end with ourselves looking into a mirror and asking how to provide a just form for justice for all. However, in the middle of his discussion he come across a sad realisation, that justice is just whatever the ruling class wants it to be. Despite this though Newman believes that the utopian wonders keeps dreams alive motivating the people To contextualise his theories Newman looks into the President Bush’s motivation to go to war, the endless accumulation of capital, war was to protect the free market, where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, the city gets more and more divided, as the rich seal themselves off to protect their own capital, the free capital market is then the rise of unfreedom for some people. The inalienable right of the uber rich hold all the cards, but it’s the people strife that gives them these possibility as the market thrives on scarcity. Some are

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 55 trapped and some are free, Newman believes that it’s the people who exist in the city and make good from a bad situation should have the right to the city, not just the right to equal property but equal change, equal voices. This would require a new urban common that forces a roll back on the privatised world within the city, calling for these spaces to be reimagined and more inclusive.

Peter Marshall ’Brexit in its Worldwide Aspect: An Opportunity to be Grasped’ The Round Table 105.5 (2016) p.451-461 The article by Peter Marshall looks to uncover what Brexit and Brexitation means and resolve the vast difference between them. He notes that Brexit is a tidy term, to invoke article 50, but Brexitation however is filled with perplexities and complexities. First Marshall breaks down Brexitation into three facts; to begin, there is a need to remedy the deep divisions, discontents and short coming of the UK as a state. Next, Marshall states that negotiating an exit with the EU and its partners will be intricate and will have to be precise. Lastly, Brexitation is the period of adjustment to our post Brexit status and how the nation handles the international exposure without the backing of European Union. He Continues the discussion like many others, the illusion of selfcontained exercise, however in a world of globalisation, Marshall suggest that the economy among other things is that of a global village, anything anyone does effects everyone else, in some way whether it be small or large. Marshall continues to explore the wider contexts of Brexit as he continues where he begins go look into Macrodiplomatics, the Home Front and Micro-diplomatics. While Brexit would be considered as the Home Front it goes much beyond this where the micro-diplomatics are centred around the withdrawal negotiations, and the macro-diplomatics delve into the history since the second world war to joining the Union. Here he discusses how we will get back into the rhythm of operating on our own again and will most likely fall back into the habitual practice of ignoring the history of the situation and only focusing on the unwelcome manifestations of now. He Then Steers the discussion towards British semi-detachment from Europe, integration for the UK and the EU have always been hard, of course there are geographical reasons for this but he argues that history and national disposition have played the major roles in the friction that was there from the outset. Adding to this Marshall suggests that Britons do not like their rules being made for them by people from foreign countries,

therefor the discontent with the EU could be focused more so on the domestic rather than the shortcomings of the EU. Making our post-Brexit living in the global village was discussed next, the idea was that the UK could flourish in the global market as at the time it had the 5th largest economy. But this rhetoric failed to suggest that being the 5th largest economy didn’t mean we were the 5th least venerable. His final three points cover the vulnerabilities in how we make our living; as an island nation we rely on international stability, and its vulnerability at homes is due to a lack in natural resources. To only some extent we have remained stable due to the Oak, Coal, and North Sea Oil industries but a way we could stabilise it further would be a further advent in nuclear technology. The second to last point he covers is the concept of soft power; this is the ability to get what you want by persuasion or coercion. Marshall asks what abilities does the UK have and how does it deploy these soft powers, but does not seem to answer the questions besides further stating that we exist in a global village, does this mean we share a common fate, and therefor coercing us to do just as well as the next if not better. To do this would result in wondering, when does it stop, will we find easier ways to do things or will we just continue to burn ourselves out, because this is what capitalism demands.


Brexit 56 Bridget Anderson, Nandita Sharma, and Cynthia Wright, ‘Why No Borders?’ Refuge: Canada’s Journal on Refugees, 26.2 (2009) p.5-18. The Trio begin by suggesting that borders are imposed by the rich, nation states seem to have a habit of imposing restrictions on migration to their nation at a similar time to when people need resources to keep up with the world. The lessening of freedom of mobility coincides with the increase of neo-liberal reform suggest the authors, however they are looking to show that through allowing more mobility within capital and less to migrants is a crucial underpinning to capitalism and the global system that nation states prescribe to. Migrants are increasingly being treated as sub-human simply because they leave one place to go to another place however the imposition that nation states impose often cause unfair labour, criminalisation, prejudice, and death. In this article they look to analyse the notion of a borderless world (not a form of categorisation but fluid mobility and equal rights between nations). To do this they break their study down into five sections, the first being Rethinking Borders; here they ask what is a border, in that they discover them to be temporal but treated as permanent, here they believe that nations are making unrecognized moves to exert greater control over these temporal aspects of mobility, as seen in the Hostile environment policy of 2012, but also not to mention the increase in temporary work permits and increase in obstacles that prevent people from becoming citizens. Some motions that restrict borders haven’t gone unnoticed they state which is why they include a section about rethinking protests, the rhetoric in this section explores labour and ways in which migrants have tried addressing the injustices and inequalities presented to them. However, they feel not everyone who is a migrant wants to be a worker, suggesting that there are borders between the public and private realms for migrants, and this divide in most nation states on sexuality, and falls into relation with the previous reading on Foucault, The History of Sexuality.

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 57 The last three points of their discussion follow as such: Rethinking Migration as a Human Activity, here the explore the nationalist narratives of people being attached to lands as there is an essence of rootedness a notion Flusser would call to be a Vegetable. In nation states it is to see that everything is boiled down to a relation of space. Next the group considers that of a no border approach, after all borders have never successfully stopped people’s desire or will to move and migrate. And finally, the challenge of no borders, the most prominent of all is the competition between workers, and their aim to be the best, increasing productivity and thus improving their lives however this view is also attached to the capitalist economic model. They pose the statement that currently there are more benefits facing us if there was a world without borders as there would be more equality.

Francis Fukuyama The End Of History And The Last Man (London: Penguin books, 1992) p.82-89 Fukuyama begins the chapter ‘No Barbarians at the Gates’ by discussing the notion of a dystopian world were a massive form of destruction occurs destroying the modern world and returning man to barbarianism. He does this to then inform us that no matter what happens we are most likely to end up where we are now with regard to modernity and all that is rational sociality. This poses the question of if we can revert to a period of time in the past or at least take elements of it. This he breaks down into two parts, rejection of existing societies and the involuntary loss of modern natural science. The most coherent of our time that fosters wishes like these would be the environmental movement he suggests, this is because man might be happier in a more natural world, like that of the pre-industrialisation. Doctrines like these have a common thought in the ancestor of JeanJacques Rousseau, the first philosopher to question modern progress. Unhappy, fukuyama believes that the world we have found ourselves in serves to make us unhappy, he states that man needs very little to exist, but its man’s ability to compare himself to others that makes us discontent with our predicament. To explore notions such as these he pulls on contexts of the destructive power of nuclear energy, stating that since Hiroshima this has been man’s biggest fear, however there are other advents to consider such as biological or chemical agents, The horrors of science due to man’s aspirations offer revival to antimodern groups, who would attempt to create emotional barriers. Fukuyama suggests at the moment there are no barbarians at the gates with the potentials of modern science, but this is because all the power is in the hands of a select few. This ability of power over other states, suggests that they are taking cues from bad states and not following a self-destructive narrative, suggesting Brexit may have been good for the nation state but calls into question does power make us happy if we are to compare ourselves and continually worry about others.


Brexit 58 Paul Hirst, Grahame Thompson, ‘Globalization in one country? The peculiarities of the British ‘ Economy and Society, 29.3, (2000) p.335-356 Hirst and Grahame discuss the UK and its international integration with the world wide economy in two ways. First they discuss the UK from the perspective of optimist, in that the UK is ahead of the game, leading the way for globalization. Second they look at the UK in a sceptic way, where the UK has been exposing itself to economic shocks, unlike its competitors, which has intern has impacts on its manufacturing trade, fostering a lack of mass vital to keeping it eligible to maintain a national system. With this understood they look to the Thatcher and Major governments which characterised its change industry as well as the advent of joining the EU for making the UK a leader for globalization, for its ever expanding connections with the commonwealth and EU, that offers cheap and flexible labour.

A discursive Narrative to wards it’s future 59 example, London’s capitol far exceeds that of its people, as its a centre for the UK economy and changes with the market however the governments acts after the fact, stunting rapid change to a world characterised in the 21st century as a global village to many. The economy reacts to the will of the people within London. Could the advent of re-domestication of the economy foster London to become a city state, where urban densfication is needed to facilitate and inspire rapid change

The discussion a follow of conservative polices of containing public expenditure and internationalizing the economy, however neglected improving internal infrastructure. Then to juxtapose this they discuss the positions of the New Labour government, stating that their position was much more complex than that of the conservatives, where the looked to improve the employment enhancing services, looking to this as a long term solution to macro-economics, this system encouraged the use of modern technologies worker training and management benchmarking, however was believed to be in response to global pressures, and therefore exposing the economy to international shocks. The study suggests that the UK ought to invest more in its domestic manufacturing sector, which currently lacks in size compared to other nations also in the fore front of globalization instead of international trading for its income. It adds that interest and capital will be hard to find for the re-domestication of the UK economy. In addition to this i cannot help but believe this relates to Sam Haselby piece on the end of the nation state, for

Thank You, For all the support, encouragement, and inspiration, it is truly valued. Will


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