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Evaluation Pack

Media and Cultural Studies KeyWorks Second Edition Edited by

Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner

List of Sample Content Table of Contents

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Preface to the Second Edition

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About the Editors

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Adventures in Media and Cultural Studies

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Written by Douglas M. Kellner and Meenakshi Gigi Durham Part I: Culture, Ideology, And Hegemony

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Introduction to Part I

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The Ruling Class and the Ruling Ideas

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Full Index

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Media and Cultural Studies KeyWorks Second Edition Edited by

Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner


This second edition first published 2012 Ó 2012 John Wiley & Sons Edition history: 1e (2001, Blackwell Publishing Ltd); revised 1e (2006, Blackwell Publishing Ltd) Wiley-Blackwell is an imprint of John Wiley & Sons, formed by the merger of Wiley’s global Scientific, Technical and Medical business with Blackwell Publishing. Registered Office John Wiley & Sons Ltd, The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK Editorial Offices 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK The Atrium, Southern Gate, Chichester, West Sussex, PO19 8SQ, UK For details of our global editorial offices, for customer services, and for information about how to apply for permission to reuse the copyright material in this book please see our website at www.wiley.com/wiley-blackwell. The right of Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner to be identified as the authors of the editorial material in this work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. Wiley also publishes its books in a variety of electronic formats. Some content that appears in print may not be available in electronic books. Designations used by companies to distinguish their products are often claimed as trademarks. All brand names and product names used in this book are trade names, service marks, trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners. The publisher is not associated with any product or vendor mentioned in this book. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold on the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering professional services. If professional advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Media and cultural studies : keyWorks / edited by Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner. – 2nd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-470-65808-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Mass media and culture. 2. Popular culture. I. Durham, Meenakshi Gigi. II. Kellner, Douglas, 1943P94.6.M424 2012 302.23–dc23 2011042974 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Set in 9.5/11.5pt Galliard Roman by Thomson Digital, India

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CONTENTS

Preface to the Second Edition About the Editors

ix xi

Adventures in Media and Cultural Studies: Introducing the KeyWorks Douglas M. Kellner and Meenakshi Gigi Durham

1

PART I:

CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, AND HEGEMONY

Introduction to Part I 1 The Ruling Class and the Ruling Ideas Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 2 (i) History of the Subaltern Classes; (ii) The Concept of “Ideology”; (iii) Cultural Themes: Ideological Material Antonio Gramsci 3 The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction Walter Benjamin 4 The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno 5 The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article Ju¨rgen Habermas 6 Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation) Louis Althusser

PART II:

27 31

34 37 53 75 80

SOCIAL LIFE AND CULTURAL STUDIES

Introduction to Part II 7 (i) Operation Margarine; (ii) Myth Today Roland Barthes 8 The Medium is the Message Marshall McLuhan

89 95 100


vi CONTENTS 9 The Commodity as Spectacle Guy Debord 10 Introduction: Instructions on How to Become a General in the Disneyland Club Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart 11 Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory Raymond Williams 12 (i) From Culture to Hegemony; (ii) Subculture: The Unnatural Break Dick Hebdige 13 Encoding/Decoding Stuart Hall 14 On the Politics of Empirical Audience Research Ien Ang

PART III:

110 115 124 137 145

POLITICAL ECONOMY

Introduction to Part III 15 Contribution to a Political Economy of Mass-Communication Nicholas Garnham 16 On the Audience Commodity and its Work Dallas W. Smythe 17 A Propaganda Model Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky 18 Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era Herbert I. Schiller 19 Gendering the Commodity Audience: Critical Media Research, Feminism, and Political Economy Eileen R. Meehan 20 (i) Introduction; (ii) The Aristocracy of Culture Pierre Bourdieu 21 On Television Pierre Bourdieu

PART IV:

107

163 166 185 204 231

242 249 253

THE POLITICS OF REPRESENTATION

Introduction to Part IV 22 Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema Laura Mulvey 23 Stereotyping Richard Dyer 24 The Readers and their Romances Janice Radway 25 Eating the Other: Desire and Resistance bell hooks 26 Booty Call: Sex, Violence, and Images of Black Masculinity Patricia Hill-Collins 27 British Cultural Studies and the Pitfalls of Identity Paul Gilroy 28 Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses Chandra Talpade Mohanty

263 267 275 283 308 318 337 347


CONTENTS vii 29 Hybrid Cultures, Oblique Powers Ne´stor Garcı´a Canclini

365

PART V: THE POSTMODERN TURN, NEW MEDIA AND SOCIAL NETWORKING Introduction to Part V 30 The Precession of Simulacra Jean Baudrillard 31 Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism Fredric Jameson 32 Feminism, Postmodernism and the “Real Me” Angela McRobbie 33 Postmodern Virtualities Mark Poster 34 Quentin Tarantino’s Star Wars?: Digital Cinema, Media Convergence, and Participatory Culture Henry Jenkins 35 Alternative and Activist New Media: A Genre Framework Leah A. Lievrouw 36 Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship d. m. boyd and N. B. Ellison

PART VI:

383 388 407 433 442

452 471 491

GLOBALIZATION AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Introduction to Part VI 37 Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy Arjun Appadurai 38 The Global and the Local in International Communications Annabelle Sreberny 39 The Homeland/Aztla´n Gloria Anzaldu´a 40 The Processes: From Nationalisms to Transnationalisms Je´sus Martı´n-Barbero 41 Globalization as Hybridization Jan Nederveen Pieterse 42 (Re)Asserting National Television and National Identity Against the Global, Regional, and Local Levels of World Television Joseph Straubhaar 43 Oppositional Politics and the Internet: A Critical/Reconstructive Approach Richard Kahn and Douglas M. Kellner Acknowledgments Index

507 511 524 539 545 567

582 597

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PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

We have produced a revised second edition of KeyWorks to collect some of the new material that has appeared since the first edition and have also included texts that colleagues have urged would be important additions to the Reader. We are grateful to Wiley-Blackwell for allowing us to select a wealth of new essays and to add studies of new media and social networking sites, as well as to expand the section on globalization and social movements which we introduced in a Revised Edition in 2006. With the constant proliferation of new media and social networking sites, there is a growing amount of analyses, debates, and conflicting positions within cultural/media studies and we attempt to capture some of the ferment in the field today by including fresh material. These

changes are reflected in the expanded and revised Introduction to the KeyWorks and the updated Introductions to each of the six Parts. Choices were extremely difficult and we were forced to exclude much important material. We appreciate comments by readers and users of the text that have helped with the revision, and the support of our Wiley-Blackwell editors Jayne Fargnoli and Elizabeth Swayze. Thanks, as well, to Allison Kostka, Susan Dunsmore, and Margot Morse. We also gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and encouragement of our spouses and families; heartfelt thanks to Rhonda Hammer, and Frank, Sonali and Maya Durham.

MGD & DMK


ABOUT THE EDITORS

Meenakshi Gigi Durham is Associate Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. She has published widely on feminist media studies and related critical approaches, especially those of race, class, and sexuality. She is the author of The Lolita Effect (2008) and is currently working on TechnoSex, a book theorizing technology and sexual subjectivities.

Douglas Kellner is George Kneller Chair in the Philosophy of Education at UCLA and is the author of many books on social theory, politics, history, and culture, including Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology of Contemporary Hollywood Film, co-authored with Michael Ryan; Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity; Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond; Media Culture; Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy; Guys and Guns Amok; and Cinema Wars.


DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM

Adventures in Media and Cultural Studies: Introducing the KeyWorks It is increasingly clear that media and culture today are of central importance to the maintenance and reproduction of contemporary societies. Societies, like species, need to reproduce to survive, and culture cultivates attitudes and behavior that predispose people to consent to established ways of thought and conduct, thus integrating individuals into a specific socio-economic system. Forms of media culture like television, film, popular music, magazines, and advertising provide role and gender models, fashion hints, lifestyle images, and icons of personality. The narratives of media culture offer patterns of proper and improper behavior, moral messages, and ideological conditioning, sugar-coating social and political ideas with pleasurable and seductive forms of popular entertainment. Likewise, media and consumer culture, cyberculture, sports, and other popular activities engage people in practices which integrate them into the established society, while offering pleasures, meanings, and identities. Various individuals and audiences respond to these texts disparately, negotiating their meanings in complex and often paradoxical ways. With media and culture playing such important roles in contemporary life, it is obvious that we must come to understand our cultural environment if we want control over our lives. Yet there are many approaches to the study of media, culture, and society in separate disciplines and academic fields. Often critics take a single perspective and use a specific method and theory to understand, make sense of, interpret, or criticize media and cultural texts. Others eschew all methodological and theoretical critical strategies in favor of empirical description and analysis. We would advocate the usefulness of a wide range of theoretical and methodological approaches to the

study of media, culture, and society. Yet we do not believe that any one theory or method is adequate to engage the richness, complexity, variety, and novelty displayed in contemporary constellations of rapidly proliferating cultural forms and new media. We have therefore assembled what we consider some KeyWorks of current theories and methods for the study of the abundance and diversity of culture and media in the present age. The texts we have chosen are “Key” because we believe that the perspectives and theorists which we have included in this volume are among the most significant and serviceable for engaging the forms and influences of contemporary media and culture. The material in this reader provides “keys” which help unlock the domain of meaning, value, politics, and ideology in familiar forms of cultural artifacts and practices. They furnish prisms which enable critical readers to see cultural texts and phenomena in a new light, generating insight into the sometimes hidden production processes and ideological constraints of media culture. Key theories and methods help unlock and unveil structural codes and organizing conventions of media texts, their meanings and values, and often contradictory social and political effects. Understanding culture critically also provides insight into the ways that media and culture construct gender and role models, and even identities, as the populace come to pattern their lives on the celebrities and stars of media culture. These readings are also “key” in that they open novel theoretical directions and formulations of culture and society; at the time of their writing, they presented inventive and sometimes revolutionary directions in the study of media and culture. The texts selected are “works” in that their methods and theories enable media-involved readers to

Media and Cultural Studies: KeyWorks, Second Edition. Edited by Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner. Ó 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2012 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


2 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM engage in the activity of analysis, interpretation, criticism, and making sense of their cultural and social worlds and experiences. The theories and methods presented provide tools for critical vision and practice, helping to produce active creators of meaning and interpretation, rather than merely passive audiences. The KeyWorks thus empower those who wish to gain skills of media literacy, providing instruments of criticism and interpretation. They provide essential elements of becoming intelligent and resourceful cultural subjects, discriminating readers, and creative users and producers of contemporary culture. The texts collected in this book can therefore help cultural consumers to become critics and creators. Our Introduction will accordingly attempt to demonstrate how the diverse approaches and texts that we have assembled provide valuable keys to cultural criticism and interpretation, helping to produce more competent and discriminating readers and critics. We discuss below how the specific groupings of the KeyWorks provide different approaches to the study of media and culture and point to the contributions and limitations of each perspective. In this opening Introduction, we accordingly furnish overviews of each distinctive way of seeing and engaging culture and media. More detailed presentation of the theorists and critics we have chosen, along with explications of the key concepts, theories, and methods selected, will head each of the six sections we have delineated.

Theory/Method/Critique: A Multiperspectival Approach There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective “ knowing”; and the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more complete will our “ concept” of this thing, our “ objectivity,” be. – Friedrich Nietzsche Our opening discussion will also give the reader a sense of current debates and issues within cultural and media theory, emphasizing which issues and controversies are of crucial importance in the contemporary era. Our narrative will track salient developments in the study of culture and media, supplying a map of the prevailing fields of theories and methods which have proliferated especially since the 1960s. Indeed, to pursue our KeyWorks metaphor, each perspective

provides an opening into the complex terrain of contemporary media and culture, furnishing access to understanding the world in which we live. Each “key” will open doors to new domains, such as ideology and hegemony, the politics of representations, new media, globalization, social networking, and other current themes of media/cultural studies. They provide novel ways of seeing and understanding the flora and fauna of images, symbols, and messages through which we wander, trying to make sense and give shape to our lives. The terrain of contemporary culture, however, is so vast, the maze of theories is so complex, and the debates over media and culture are so intense and convoluted, that we have necessarily had to choose some perspectives and theorists to the exclusion of others. In fact, there are many forms of media that saturate our everyday lives and the cultural change of the current technological revolution is so turbulent that it is becoming increasingly difficult to map the transformations and to keep up with the cultural discourses and theories that attempt to make sense of it all. Culture today is both ordinary and complex, encompassing multiple realms of everyday life. We – and many of the theorists assembled in this volume – employ the term “culture” broadly to signify types of cultural artifacts (i.e. TV, CDs, newspapers, paintings, opera, journalism, cyberculture, DVDs, Facebook, iPads, and so on), as well as discourses about these phenomena. Since culture is bound up with both forms, like film or sports, and discourses, it is both a space of interpretation and debate as well as a subject matter and domain of inquiry. Theories and writings like this Introduction are themselves modes of culture, spaces that attempt to make sense of particular phenomena and subject matter, and a part of a contemporary cultural field. A theory is a way of seeing, an optic, that focuses on a specific subject matter. The Greek word theoria signifies perspective and vision which centers upon specific topics, processes, and attributes, as a theory of the state focuses on how the government works. Theories are also modes of explanation and interpretation that construct connections and illuminate sociocultural practices and structures, thus helping to make sense of our everyday life, as an analysis of how Microsoft dominates the computer software field would indicate what particular issues are at stake. Thus, cultural and social theories are descriptive and interpretive; they highlight specific topics, make


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 3 connections, contextualize, provide interpretations, and offer explanations. There is also a narrative component to theory, as in Adam Smith’s or Karl Marx’s theories of capitalism, which tell of the origin and genesis of the market economy as well as describing how it works, and in Marx’s case offering a critique of and proposals for revolutionary transformation. All social theories are perspectives that center attention on phenomena and their connections to the broader society and a wide range of institutions, discourses, and practices. As optics, or ways of seeing, they illuminate part of the social and cultural field, but may ignore or leave in darkness other dimensions. Consequently, constantly expanding one’s theoretical perspectives and horizons helps to illuminate multiple dimensions of our cultural environment, providing richer and more complex understandings of our sociocultural life. Multiplying theories and methods at one’s disposal aids in grasping diverse dimensions of an object, in making more and better connections, and thus provides richer and more comprehensive understanding of cultural artifacts or practices under scrutiny. It is therefore our conviction that no one approach contributes the key to cultural and media criticism, that all given theories and methods have their limitations as well as strengths, their blind spots as well as illuminating perspectives. Hence, in our view, no one theory, method, or thinker dispenses privileged access to the truth of our culture and society; there is no magical formula or hermeneutic key to unlock the hidden secrets of cultural meaning and effects. Rather, we believe that the categories, theories, and texts here presented as KeyWorks provide tools for making sense of our life, or to switch the metaphor, weapons of critique which enable individuals to engage in discriminating practice in distinct contexts. Furthermore, some of the theoretical perspectives offered will furnish useful material for some tasks, while others will prove more valuable for different projects. Someone might choose, for instance, to do a feminist reading of a cultural text, while at another time the category of race or class may be most salient to one’s critical intentions. Analyses will necessarily often involve the confluence of these and other vectors. Likewise, one critical exercise might focus on the ideology of the text and the ways that texts legitimate and reproduce dominant forms of oppression, while another reading might emphasize the ways that spe-

cific texts resist dominant institutions and ideologies – or show how certain texts both legitimate and contest the established culture and society at the same time and are thus markedly ambiguous. Viewing culture from political economy, from the perspective of analysis of the system of production and distribution, may disclose how the culture industry reproduces the dominant corporate and commercial culture, excluding discourses and images that contest the established social system. Closer reading of media texts can reveal a wealth of meanings, values, and messages, often contradictory. Examining how people engage cultural texts, however, may reveal that audiences refuse dominant meanings and offer their own, sometimes surprising, interpretations. Conjoining production/text/audience perspectives can accordingly help provide a more complex sense of how culture and media actually operate in everyday life. It is our conviction that competent and critical cultural consumers and commentators need to be able to examine media, culture, and society from a variety of perspectives, in order to cultivate critical vision and understanding of the nature and effects of cultural production and the artifacts with which we interact. Each new approach, each emergent theory, equips the budding critic with a different way of seeing and interpreting, thus creating a more diverse perspective for understanding media and culture. Hence, the many concepts, theories, and methods embedded in the texts in KeyWorks will enable readers to engage for themselves in cultural and media criticism, and consequently to become competent critics and consumers. The texts and approaches we have chosen for KeyWorks are foundational in the sense that they provide building-blocks for constructing analyses, interpretations, and criticisms of cultural texts and the societies in which they originate and operate. Most of the selections are “radical” in the sense that they go to the roots of the situation (the meaning of the Latin term radix), showing, for example, how media and culture are grounded in a social system and its conflicts. All of the perspectives we have selected are “sociological” in the sense that they show, in varying ways, how media and cultural texts are rooted in a particular system of political economy such as capitalism, or in the dominant media and cultural forms of a particular social order based on relations of domination and subordination in the arenas of gender, race, and class. The roots of media and cultural


4 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM texts are consequently embedded in social reproduction and conflict, part and parcel of our social life. The theorists and writings chosen accordingly provide critical understandings and interpretations of media and culture, showing how they are often constructed to serve specific social interests and functions – and yet can be read, enjoyed, and interpreted in a multiplicity of ways. We conceive of KeyWorks as a toolkit that enables individuals to produce their own understandings, meanings, and critiques of contemporary culture, media, and society. We will try to make these often complex perspectives on media and culture accessible and to make our text “userfriendly” by, first, explaining in the sections that follow the key concepts and methods deployed in the leading competing approaches to the study of media and culture, and by introducing the theorists presented in our reader. And then, before each section, we provide more detailed contextualizing of both the particular topics through which we have organized the collection and the theorists and texts chosen. While the book was designed to be employed in classroom situations, we also hope that enterprising readers will use it on their own to become more competent cultural consumers and critics; hence, we also hope that it will prove valuable to people who wish to educate themselves in the theories and methods of cultural and media criticism. Consequently, we begin with discussion of the origins and meanings of some key concepts, to start the trek toward a more empowering critical cultural and media literacy that will enable people to make better sense of their world and to become more competent actors within it.

Culture, Ideology, and Hegemony The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. – Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Contemporary criticism has forced students and teachers to see that there are no innocent texts, that all artifacts of the established culture and society are

laden with meaning, values, biases, and messages that advance relations of power and subordination. There is no pure entertainment that does not contain representations, often extremely prejudicial, of class, gender, race, sexuality, and myriad social categories and groupings. Cultural texts are saturated with social meanings, they generate political effects, reproducing or opposing governing social institutions and relations of domination and subordination. Culture can also embody specific political discourses – liberal, conservative, oppositional, or mixed – advancing competing political positions on issues like the family and sexuality, masculinity or femininity, or violence and war. Cultural representations often transcode major political discourses and perspectives presenting, for instance, an array of positions on topics like sexuality, the state, or religion. Culture in today’s societies thus constitutes a set of discourses, stories, images, spectacles, and varying cultural forms and practices that generate meaning, identities, and political effects. Culture includes artifacts such as newspapers, television programs, movies, and popular music, but also practices like shopping, watching sports events, going to a club, or hanging out in the local coffee shop. Culture is ordinary, a familiar part of everyday life, yet special cultural artifacts are extraordinary, helping people to see and understand things they’ve never quite perceived, like certain novels or films that change your view of the world. Or, we would hope that some of the challenging theoretical texts included here will provide novel and transformative understandings of culture, media, and society. The concept of ideology, for example, forces readers to perceive that all cultural texts have distinct biases, interests, and embedded values, reproducing the point of view of their producers and often the values of the dominant social groups. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels coined the term “ideology” in the 1840s to describe the dominant ideas and representations in a given social order. On their analysis, during the feudal period, ideas of piety, honor, valor, and military chivalry were the ruling ideas of the hegemonic aristocratic classes. During the capitalist era, values of individualism, profit, competition, and the market became dominant, articulating the ideology of the emergent bourgeois class which was consolidating its class power. Today, in our high-tech and global capitalism era, ideas that promote globalization, digital technologies, and an unrestrained market society are becoming the prevailing ideas –


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 5 conceptions that further the interests of the governing elites in the global economy. As we note below, feminists, multiculturalists, and members of a wide range of subordinate groups, detected that ideologies also reproduced relations of domination in the arenas of gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and further domains of everyday life. Feminists, for example, criticized sexist ideologies that advanced the domination of women by men and social institutions and practices that propagated male supremacy. Racist ideologies were criticized that furthered the subordination of specific races and ethnicities. In a broad sense, therefore, ideologies reproduce social domination, they legitimate rule by the prevailing groups over subordinate ones, and help replicate the existing inequalities and hierarchies of power and control. Ideologies appear natural, they seem to be common sense, and are often invisible and elude criticism. Marx and Engels began a critique of ideology, attempting to show how ruling ideas reproduce dominant societal interests serving to naturalize, idealize, and legitimate the existing society and its institutions and values. In a competitive and atomistic capitalist society, it appears natural to assert that human beings are primarily self-interested and competitive by nature, just as in a communist society it is natural to assert that people are cooperative by nature. In fact, human beings and societies are extremely complex and contradictory, but ideology smoothes over conflicts and negative features, idealizing human or social traits like individuality and competition which are elevated into governing conceptions and values. For classical Marxism, the ruling classes employ intellectuals and cultural producers who both produce ideas that glorify the dominant institutions and ways of life, and propagate these governing ideas in cultural forms like literature, the press, or, in our day, film and television. The concept of ideology accordingly makes us question the naturalness of cultural texts and to see that prevailing ideas are not self-evident and obvious, but are constructed, biased, and contestable. This notion makes us suspicious and critical, putting into question regnant ideas which often serve the interests of governing groups. Moreover, the more one studies cultural forms and representations, the more one sees the presence of ideologies that support the interests of the reigning economic, gender, race, or social groups who are presented positively and idealized, while subordinate groups are often presented negatively and prejudicially.

The Italian Marxian thinker Antonio Gramsci developed these ideas further, arguing that diverse social groups attained “hegemony,” or dominance, at different times through inducing the consent of the majority of subaltern, or subordinate, groups to a given sociopolitical constellation. He points out that while the unity of prevailing groups is usually created through the state (as in the American Revolution, or unification of Italy in the nineteenth century), the institutions of “civil society” also play a role in establishing hegemony. Civil society, in this discourse, involves institutions of the church, schooling, the media and forms of popular culture, among others. It mediates between the private sphere of personal economic interests and the family and the public authority of the state, serving as the locus of what Habermas described as “the public sphere.” For Gramsci, societies maintained their stability through a combination of “domination,” or force, and “hegemony,” defined as consent to “intellectual and moral leadership.” In this conception, social orders are founded and reproduced with some institutions and groups violently exerting power and domination to maintain social boundaries and rules (i.e. the police, military, vigilante groups, etc.), while other institutions (like religion, schooling, or the media) induce consent to the dominant order through establishing the hegemony, or ideological dominance, of a distinctive type of social order (i.e. market capitalism, fascism, communism, and so on). In addition, societies establish the hegemony of males and certain races through the institutionalizing of male dominance or the rule of a specific race or ethnicity over subordinate groups. Hegemony theory for Gramsci involves both analysis of current forces of domination and the ways that particular political forces achieved hegemonic authority, and the delineation of counterhegemonic forces, groups, and ideas that could contest and overthrow the existing hegemony. An analysis, for instance, of how the conservative regimes of Margaret Thatcher in England and Ronald Reagan in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, or the Bush/Cheney regime in the 2000s, won power would dissect how conservative groups gained dominance through control of the state, and the use of media, new technologies, and cultural institutions such as think-tanks and fund-raising and political action groups. Explaining the Thatcher–Reagan conservative hegemony of the 1980s and the Bush/ Cheney hegemony of the early 2000s would require


6 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM analysis of how conservative ideas became dominant in the media, schools, and culture at large. It would discuss how on a global level the market rather than the state was seen as the source of all wealth and the solution to social problems, while the state was pictured as a source of excessive taxation, overregulation, and bureaucratic inertia. A cultural hegemony analysis of how Barack Obama won the presidency in 2008 would discuss how Obama became a master of media spectacle, how his candidacy mobilized hopes for change, justice, and a new generation of liberal rule. Explaining Obama’s rise to power would also require analysis of how his supporters used new media like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to organize support and mobilize in particular young audiences. It would describe how certain social movements and coalitions of color coalesced behind the Obama candidacy, as well as certain corporate factions. A cultural hegemony analysis would therefore show how particular media, technologies, or institutions contributed to a broader sociopolitical domination by forces like fascism, communism, or market capitalism. A Gramscian theory would also discuss how a hegemonic social order is always contested by counterhegemonic forces, such as during the 1980s, when conservative rule was contested, and the 1990s, when it was in part overthrown with a resurgence of liberalism and social-democratic movements and regimes, as well as an upsurge of oppositional social movements. Such analysis, however, would also have to show how the more liberal hegemonic groups compromised with the dominant conservative forces, whereby liberal democrats like Bill Clinton, or social democrats like Tony Blair, would themselves take conservative positions in curbing welfare, cutting social spending, or unleashing military intervention. Hegemony theory thus calls for historically specific sociocultural analysis of particular contexts and forces, requiring dissection of how culture and a variety of social institutions from the media to the university facilitate broader social and political ends. Analyses of hegemony emphasize that a wide array of cultural institutions function within social reproduction including the church, schools, traditional and elite culture, sports, and the entertainment media. The approach requires social contextualization of all ideas, representations, and cultural forms; it enjoins seeing societies as a locus of social contestation between competing groups who seek dominance and

who manipulate reigning institutions and culture to promote their ends. Theories of hegemony and ideology were further developed by a group of thinkers who were organized around the German Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt in the 1930s. Their core members were Jewish radicals who later went into exile to the United States after Hitler’s rise to power. Establishing themselves in a small institute in New York affiliated with Columbia University, the Institute for Social Research, they developed analyses of the culture industry which had emerged as key institutions of social hegemony in the era that they called statemonopoly capitalism. Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Walter Benjamin, who was loosely affiliated with the Institute, analyzed the new forms of corporate and state power during a time in which giant corporations ruled the capitalist economies and the might of the state grew significantly under the guise of fascism, Russian communism, and the state capitalism of Roosevelt’s New Deal which required a sustained government response to the crisis of the economic Depression in the 1930s. In this conjuncture, ideology played an increasingly important role in inducing consent to a diversity of social systems. To a large extent, the Frankfurt School inaugurated critical studies of mass communication and culture, showing in detail how the media were controlled by groups who employed them to further their own interests and domination. They were the first social theorists to see the importance of what they called the “culture industry” in the reproduction of contemporary societies, in which so-called mass culture and communications stand in the center of leisure activity, are important agents of socialization and mediators of political reality, and should be seen as primary institutions of contemporary societies with a variety of economic, political, cultural, and social effects. Having experienced the rise of fascism and fascist use of the media in Germany in the 1930s, they noted during their exile in the United States how the culture industry was controlled by predominant capitalist economic interests and functioned to reproduce the established market society and democratic polity. The Frankfurt School developed a critical and transdisciplinary approach to cultural and communications studies, combining critique of political economy of the media, analysis of texts, and audience reception studies of the social and ideological effects of mass


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 7 culture and communications. They coined the term “culture industry” to signify the process of the industrialization of mass-produced culture and the commercial imperatives which drove the system. The critical theorists analyzed all mass-mediated cultural artifacts within the context of industrial production, in which the commodities of the culture industry exhibited the same features as other products of mass production: commodification, standardization, and massification. The culture industry had the singular function, however, of providing ideological legitimation of the existing capitalist societies and of integrating individuals into the framework of the capitalist system. Furthermore, the critical theorists investigated the cultural industry in a political context as a form of the integration of the working class into capitalist societies. The Frankfurt School were one of the first neo-Marxian groups to examine the effects of mass culture and the rise of the consumer society on the working classes, which were to be vehicles of revolution in the classical Marxian scenario. They also analyzed the ways that the culture industry was stabilizing contemporary capitalism, and accordingly they sought new strategies for political change, agencies of social transformation, and models for human emancipation that could serve as norms of social critique and goals for political struggle. Thus, in their theories of the culture industry and critiques of mass culture, the Frankfurt School were the first to systematically analyze and criticize massmediated culture and communications within critical social theory. Their approach suggests that to properly understand any specific form of media or culture, one must understand how it is produced and distributed in a given society and how it is situated in relation to the dominant social structure. The Frankfurt School thought, for the most part, that media culture simply reproduced the existing society and manipulated mass audiences into obedience. One of their members, however, Walter Benjamin, had a more optimistic and activist view of the potential of media, such as film, to promote progressive political ends than his colleagues Horkheimer and Adorno. In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Benjamin argued that film, sports, and other forms of mass entertainment were creating a new kind of spectator, able to critically dissect cultural forms and to render intelligent judgment on them. For Benjamin, the decline of the aura of the work of art – the sense of originality, unique-

ness, and authenticity – under the pressures of mechanical reproduction helped produce a public able to more actively engage a wide range of cultural phenomena. He argued that, for instance, the spectators of sports events were discriminating judges of athletic activity, able to criticize and analyze plays, athletes, strategies, and so on. Likewise, Benjamin postulated that film audiences as well can become experts of criticism and ably dissect the construction, meanings, and ideologies of film. Benjamin saw that politics were being aestheticized in the contemporary era, deploying techniques of mystification and cultural manipulation to produce media spectacles to gain mass assent to specific political candidates and groups. He was one of the first to dissect the new public spheres that were emerging in the period when the fascist party and state used organs of public communication like film, radio, or the political rally to promote their ends. Moreover, Benjamin’s work is also important for focusing on the technology of cultural reproduction, seeing the changes in new media techniques, and carrying out political critique, while calling for a democratic transformation of media technology and institutions. A second-generation member of the Frankfurt School, J€ urgen Habermas, grew up under German fascism, found it repellent, and undertook life-long investigations of contemporary society and culture, in part motivated by desire to prevent the recurrence of fascism. After studying with Horkheimer and Adorno in Frankfurt, Germany, in the 1950s, Habermas investigated in his early work the ways that a new public sphere emerged during the time of the Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions, and how it promoted political discussion and debate. Habermas’s concept of the public sphere described a space of institutions and practices between private and public interests. The public sphere mediated for Habermas between the domains of the family and the workplace (where private interests prevail), and the state, which often exerts arbitrary forms of power and domination. What Habermas called the “bourgeois public sphere” consisted of the realm of public assemblies, pubs and coffee houses, literary salons, and meeting halls where citizens gathered to discuss their common public affairs and to organize against arbitrary and oppressive forms of social and public authority. The public sphere was nurtured by newspapers, journals, pamphlets, and books, which were read and discussed in social sites like pubs and coffee houses.


8 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM Habermas notes that newspapers were initially commercial sheets that disseminated “news” (i.e. what was novel and contemporary), but then were transformed into instruments of political debate under the pressures of the American and French Revolutions and the organization of political groups to revolutionize society. Yet newspapers also fell prey to commercial imperatives and often put profit and business interests above political opinion, selling advertising and papers via tabloid sensationalism and entertainment rather than disseminating political information and ideas. Moreover, as society became more dominated by mass media, powerful corporations came to control major institutions like newspapers, radio, film, and television. These arms of the culture industry served the interests of the media conglomerates and the corporations and advertisers who financed them. In this conjuncture, the public sphere was colonized by big media which came to dominate public life and which recast the public sphere from a locus of information and debate to a site of manipulation by corporate powers. In retrospect, the theorists discussed so far articulate the ascending stages of modern Western societies. While Habermas’s theory of the public sphere describes the earlier phase of liberal bourgeois society, Marx and Engels analyze the consolidation of the class rule of the bourgeoisie and hegemony of capitalism during the mid-nineteenth century. Gramsci in turn presents the transition from liberal capitalism to fascism in Italy in the 1930s, while the work of Horkheimer and Adorno can be read as an articulation of a theory of the state and monopoly capitalism which became dominant throughout the world during the 1930s. This era constituted a form of “organized capitalism,” in which the state and mammoth corporations managed the economy and in which individuals submitted to state and corporate control. The period is often described as “Fordism” to designate the system of mass production and the homogenizing regime of capital which sought to produce mass desires, tastes, and behavior. The culture industry discussed by Horkheimer and Adorno was the form of cultural organization parallel to Fordism as a mode of industrial production. Just as American automobiles were produced on assembly lines according to a well-organized plan and division of labor, so too were film, broadcasting, magazines, and assorted forms of media culture generated according to types and with a well-organized division of labor.

The decades following the Second World War were a period of mass production and consumption characterized by uniformity and homogeneity of needs, thought, and behavior, constituting a “mass society” and what the Frankfurt School described as “the end of the individual.” No longer were personal thought and action the motor of social and cultural progress; instead gigantic organizations and institutions overpowered individuals. The period corresponds to the staid, ascetic, conformist, and conservative world of corporate capitalism that was dominant in the 1950s with its organization men, its conspicuous consumption, and its mass culture. During this period, mass culture and communication were essential in generating the modes of thought and behavior appropriate to a highly organized and homogenized social order. Hence, the Frankfurt School theory of “the culture industry” articulates a vital historical shift to an epoch in which mass consumption and culture were indispensable to producing a consumer society based on uniform needs and desires for mass-produced products and a mass society based on social organization and conformity. It is culturally the time in the United States of strongly controlled network radio and television, insipid top-40 pop music, glossy Hollywood films, national magazines, largely conservative newspaper chains, and other mass-produced cultural artifacts. In the Soviet communist bloc, and other sectors where state-controlled broadcasting prevailed, systems of broadcasting were intended to reproduce the dominant national culture or state ideology, while serving as instruments of social integration and conformity. Of course, media culture was never as massified and homogeneous as in the Frankfurt School model, and one could argue that the model was flawed even during its time of origin and influence and that other models were preferable (such as those of Walter Benjamin, Siegfried Kracauer, Ernst Bloch, and others of the Weimar generation and, later, British cultural studies, as we suggest below). Yet the original Frankfurt School theory of the culture industry articulated the important social roles of media culture during a particular sociohistorical epoch and provided a model, still of use, of an exceedingly commercial and technologically advanced culture that promotes the needs of dominant corporate interests, plays a principal role in ideological reproduction, and enculturates the


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 9 populace into the dominant system of needs, thought, and behavior. With the economic boom of the 1960s and the proliferation of new products and ideas, structuralism became the intellectual vogue in France. Theories of structure (linguistic, anthropological, social) emerged from an age of burgeoning technology and influenced the Marxist revisionism of French philosopher Louis Althusser. Beginning with Marx’s thesis that the mode of production determines the character of social, intellectual, and cultural life, Althusser sees ideology as an effect of the structure of society, a force in which economic, political-legal, cultural, and ideological practices are interrelated to shape social consciousness. In Althusser’s version of “structural Marxism,” “ideological state apparatuses” (schooling, the media, the judiciary, etc.) “interpellated” individuals into preconceived forms of subjectivity that left no space for opposition or resistance. On this account, subjects were constructed as preconstituted individuals, men or women, members of a specific class, and were induced to identify with the roles, behavior, values, and practices of the existing state-capitalist society. In fact, it is Althusser who advanced the idea that ideology operates via everyday practices, rather than through some form of externally imposed doctrine. Combining psychoanalysis, Marxism, and structuralism, Althusser thus analyzed how individuals were incorporated into specific social systems and functioned to reproduce contemporary capitalist societies. A strain of Althusserian structural Marxism is evident in the early period of British cultural studies. Following the lines of this narrative, we will argue through the Introduction that the subsequent forms of cultural and media analysis respond to developments within Western capitalist societies from the end of the Second World War until the present. Cultural theories analyze historical metamorphoses and novelties, and articulate sociohistorical conditions, practices, and transformations. Theories provide maps of social orders and tools to understand and transform them. The proliferation of theories in the past two decades itself highlights the increasing differentiation and fragmentation of Western societies during an epoch of intense social struggle and turbulent change. Accordingly, we will map the vicissitudes of theory in the post-Second World War conjuncture in the remainder of the Introduction, providing an overview of the emergence of leading theories, methods, and themes withinthe terrainof media andcultural studies.

Social Life and Cultural Studies But certainly for the present age, which prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the original, fancy to reality, the appearance to the essence, . . . illusion only is sacred, truth profane. Nay, sacredness is held to be enhanced in proportion as truth decreases and illusion increases, so that the highest degree of illusion comes to be the highest degree of sacredness. – Ludwig Feuerbach Culture is produced and consumed within social life. Hence, particular cultural artifacts and practices must be situated within the social relations of production and reception in which culture is produced, distributed, and consumed in order to be properly understood and interpreted. Contextualizing cultural forms and audiences in historically specific situations helps illuminate how cultural artifacts reflect or reproduce concrete social relations and conditions – or oppose and attempt to transform them. The foundational writings that we discussed in the previous section provide concepts for situating culture and media within distinctive social and historical contexts. Likewise, in our Introduction, we are positioning the emergence of theories of media and culture within determinate sociohistorical circumstances, and are thus engaging in social contextualization ourselves. After the Second World War, the consumer society emerged throughout the Western world. Whereas the primary US corporations were developing systems of mass production and consumption in the 1920s, which saw the rise of media industries like broadcasting, advertising, and mass publications to promote consumer goods, the 1930s Depression and then the Second World War prevented the introduction of the consumer society. As we observed above, the Frankfurt School, living in exile in the United States, were among the first to theorize this new configuration of society and culture in their critique of the culture industry, the integrative role of mass consumer society, and the new values and personality structures being developed. By the 1950s, theorists throughout the more evolved capitalist countries were producing theories of consumption, the media, and the changed conditions of everyday life to respond to the changes and transformations in the emergent consumer and media society. In the United States, marketing research for big corporations and advertising agencies took up


10 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM broadcasting research, and out of this process a certain model of “mass communication” studies emerged. Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at the Princeton Radio Research Institute, which included Frankfurt School member T. W. Adorno, began researching which programs audiences regularly tuned into, studied audience taste, and accordingly advised corporations concerning consumer demand for broadcasting product and what sort of programming was most popular. Hence, mass communications research emerged as an offshoot of consumer research in the 1940s and 1950s, producing a tradition of empirical study of the established forms of culture and communications. Rapid modernization in France after the Second World War and the introduction of the consumer society in the 1950s provoked much debate and contributed to constructing a variety of discourses on the media and consumer society in France, inspiring Roland Barthes, Henri Lefebvre, Guy Debord, Jean Baudrillard, and their contemporaries to develop novel analyses of the emerging forms of society and culture. It was clear that the consumer society was multiplying images, spectacle, and new cultural forms and modes of everyday life. The leading French theorists of the period attempted to explain, make sense of, and in many cases criticize the novelties of the era. Roland Barthes applied the emergent theories of structuralism and semiology to make sense of the expansion of media culture and its important social functions. Structuralism was developed in the 1950s by the French anthropologist, Claude Levi-Strauss, to articulate the basic structures of culture and society. Semiology, created earlier in the century by the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, analyzed the fundamental rules, codes, and practices of language usage. In the hands of Barthes, semiology assumed that society and culture were texts that could be analyzed for their structures, significance, and effects. Barthes’s Mythologies employed both methods to analyze the codes and meanings embedded in artifacts of popular culture ranging from wrestling to soap ads, while dissecting their social functions. The “mythologies” Barthes studied functioned to naturalize and eternalize the historically contingent forms of French bourgeois culture that he analyzed. In his famous reading of a picture of a Black African soldier saluting the French flag, for example, Barthes claimed that the image erased the horrors of French imperialism, presenting a sanitized portrait of a French

soldier that made it appear natural that an African should salute the French flag and exhibit the proper signs of military behavior. A very different historical and cultural approach to the study of media and culture was developed in North America in the 1950s and 1960s by Marshall McLuhan. In his distinguished and influential work Understanding Media, McLuhan described a paradigm shift from earlier print culture to the new media culture. Whereas print culture, McLuhan argued, produced rational, literate, and individualist subjects, who followed the linear and logical form of print media in thought and reasoning, the proliferating media culture produced more fragmentary, nonrational, and aestheticized subjects, immersed in the sights, sounds, and spectacles of media like film, radio, television, and advertising. The new media culture was, McLuhan argued, “tribal,” sharing collective ideas and behavior. It was generating an expanding global culture and consciousness that he believed would overcome the individualism and nationalism of the previous modern era. McLuhan aroused a generation to take media seriously as an active agent of fundamental historical change and media culture as an important terrain of study. In his groundbreaking work, Society of the Spectacle, Guy Debord described the proliferation of commodities and the “immense accumulation of spectacles” that characterized the new consumer society. Grocery, drug, and department stores were exhibiting a dazzling profusion of commodities and things to purchase which in turn were celebrated in advertising campaigns that inscribed the seductive consumer items with an aura of magic and divinity. The media themselves are spectacles in Debord’s sense with MTV, for example, broadcasting a collage of dazzling music videos, ads, and sequences that attempt to capture the dynamics and attractions of contemporary youth culture. Films provide largerthan-life spectacle replete with special effects, snappy editing, and intense sound. Hence, the “society of the spectacle” refers to a media and consumer society, organized around the consumption of images, commodities, and spectacles. In our day, malls, the cyberspectacle of the internet, and proliferating virtual-reality devices and domains expand the realm of the spectacle, providing new relevance to Debord’s analysis. Moreover, the “society of the spectacle” also refers to the vast institutional and technical apparatus of contemporary societies which produce commodities and media


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 11 events. The concept encompasses all the means and methods ruling powers employ, outside of direct force, which subject individuals to societal manipulation, while obscuring the nature and effects of operations of domination and subordination. Under this broader definition, the education system and the institutions of representative democracy, as well as the endless inventions of consumer gadgets, sports, media culture, and urban and suburban architecture and design are all integral components of the spectacular society. Schooling, for example, involves sports, fraternity and sorority rituals, bands and parades, bullying, and various public assemblies that indoctrinate individuals into dominant ideologies and practices. Contemporary politics is also saturated with spectacles, ranging from daily “photo opportunities,” to highly orchestrated special events which dramatize state power, to TV ads and image management for prepackaged candidates during election campaigns. In the post-Second World War conjuncture, the spectacle became globalized as corporations like Coca-Cola and Pepsi, sundry national automobile corporations, IBM and the nascent computer industry, and subsequently McDonald’s, Nike, Microsoft, Apple, and a cornucopia of global products circulated throughout the world. Ariel Dorfman and Armand Mattelart record the response of Third World activists to the saturation of their Latin American culture with products from the Walt Disney Corporation. In their controversial How to Read Donald Duck, they provide critical dissection of the meanings, messages, and ideologies in artifacts as seemingly harmless as comic books. The authors explain that these popular comics contained a wealth of images and stories that naturalized capitalism and imperialism, much like the “mythologies” which Barthes criticized in France. Critical approaches to society and culture were proliferating throughout the world by the 1960s. All of the theories we have discussed so far can be seen as providing models of media and cultural studies, but the school of British cultural studies that has become a global phenomenon of great importance over the last decades was inaugurated by the University of Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in 1964. Under its director, Richard Hoggart, and his successor, Stuart Hall, who directed the Centre from 1968 to 1979, the Birmingham groups developed a variety of critical perspectives for the analysis, interpretation, and criticism of cultural artifacts, combining sociological theory and contextualization with literary analysis of cultural texts. The now

classical period of British cultural studies from the early 1960s to the early 1980s adopted a neo-Marxian approach to the study of culture, one especially influenced by Althusser and Gramsci. Through a set of internal debates, and responding to social conflicts and movements of the 1960s and the 1970s, the Birmingham group came to concentrate on the interplay of representations and ideologies of class, gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality in cultural texts, especially concentrating on media culture. They were among the first to study the effects of newspapers, radio, television, film, and other popular cultural forms on audiences. They also engaged how assorted audiences interpreted and deployed media culture in varied ways and contexts, analyzing the factors that made audiences respond in contrasting manners to media texts. From the beginning, British cultural studies systematically rejected high/low culture distinctions and took seriously the artifacts of media culture, thus surpassing the elitism of dominant literary approaches to culture. Likewise, British cultural studies overcame the limitations of the Frankfurt School notion of a passive audience in their conceptions of an active audience that creates meanings and the popular. Reproducing the activism of oppositional groups in the 1960s and 1970s, the Birmingham School was engaged in a project aimed at a comprehensive criticism of the present configuration of culture and society, attempting to link theory and practice to orient cultural studies toward fundamental social transformation. British cultural studies situated culture within a theory of social production and reproduction, specifying the ways that cultural forms served either to further social control, or to enable people to resist. It analyzed society as a hierarchical and antagonistic set of social relations characterized by the oppression of subordinate class, gender, race, ethnic, and national strata. Employing Gramsci’s model of hegemony and counterhegemony, British cultural studies sought to analyze “hegemonic,” or ruling, social and cultural forces of domination and to locate “counterhegemonic” forces of resistance and contestation. British cultural studies aimed at a political goal of social transformation in which the location of forces of domination and resistance would aid the process of political transformation. From the beginning, the Birmingham group was oriented toward the crucial political problems of their age and milieu. Their early spotlight on class and ideology derived from an acute sense of the oppressive and systemic effects of class in


12 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM British society and the movements of the 1960s against class inequality and oppression. The work of the late 1950s and early 1960s Williams/Hoggart/ Hall stage of cultural studies emphasized the potential of working-class cultures; then began in the 1960s and 1970s appraising the potential of youth subcultures to resist the hegemonic forms of capitalist domination. Unlike the classical Frankfurt School (but similar to Herbert Marcuse), British cultural studies looked to youth cultures as providing potentially potent forms of opposition and social change. Through studies of youth subcultures, British cultural studies demonstrated how culture came to constitute distinct forms of identity and group membership and appraised the oppositional potential of diverse youth subcultures. British cultural studies came to center attention on how subcultural groups resist dominant forms of culture and identity, creating their own style and identities. Individuals who conform to hegemonic dress and fashion codes, behavior, and political ideologies produce their identities within mainstream groups, as members of particular social groupings (such as white, middle-class, conservative Americans). Individuals who identify with subcultures, like punk or hip hop, look and act differently from those in the mainstream, and create oppositional identities, defining themselves against standard models. As it developed into the 1970s and 1980s, British cultural studies successively appropriated emerging analyses of gender, race, sexuality, and a wide range of critical theories. They developed ways to examine and critique how the established society and culture promoted sexism, racism, homophobia, and additional forms of oppression – or helped to generate resistance and struggle against domination and injustice. This approach implicitly contained political critique of all cultural forms that promoted oppression, while positively affirming texts and representations that produced a potentially more just and egalitarian social order. Developments within British cultural studies have been in part responses to contestation by a multiplicity of distinct groups that have produced new methods and voices within cultural studies (such as a variety of feminisms, gay and lesbian studies, many multiculturalisms, critical pedagogies, and projects of critical media literacy). Hence, the center and fulcrum of British cultural studies at any given moment was determined by the struggles in the present political conjuncture, and their major work was conceived as

political interventions. Their studies of ideology and the politics of culture directed the Birmingham group toward analyzing cultural artifacts, practices, and institutions within existing networks of power. In this context, they attempted to show how culture both provided tools and forces of domination and resources for resistance and opposition. This political optic valorized studying the effects of culture and audience use of cultural artifacts, which provided an extremely productive focus on audiences and reception, topics that had been neglected in most previous text-based methods. Yet recent developments in the field of cultural studies have arguably vitiated and depoliticized the enterprise, as we shall note in the conclusion to the Introduction. British cultural studies, then, in retrospect, emerges in a later era of capital following the stage of state and monopoly capitalism analyzed by the Frankfurt School into a more variegated, globalized, and conflicted cultural formation. The forms of culture described by the earliest phase of British cultural studies in the 1950s and early 1960s articulated conditions in an era in which there were still significant tensions in England and much of Europe between an older working-class-based culture and the newer mass-produced culture whose models and exemplars were the products of the American culture industry. The initial stage of cultural studies developed by Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, and E. P. Thompson attempted to preserve working-class culture against the onslaughts of mass culture produced by the culture industry. Thompson’s historical inquiries into the history of British working-class institutions and struggles, the defenses of workingclass culture by Hoggart and Williams, and their attacks on mass culture were part of a socialist and working-class-oriented project which assumed that the industrial working class was an agent of progressive social change and that it could be mobilized and organized to resist the inequalities of the existing capitalist societies and work for a more egalitarian one. Williams and Hoggart were deeply involved in activities of working-class education and oriented toward socialist working-class politics, seeing their form of cultural studies as an instrument of progressive social change. The initial critiques in the first wave of British cultural studies of Americanism and mass culture in Hoggart, Williams, and the Birmingham Centre paralleled to some extent the earlier critique of the Frankfurt School, yet celebrated a working class that


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 13 the Frankfurt School saw as defeated in Germany and much of Europe during the period of fascism and which they never saw as a strong resource for emancipatory social change. The early work of the Birmingham School was continuous with the radicalism of the first wave of British cultural studies (the Hoggart–Thompson–Williams “culture and society” tradition). The post-1980s work inspired by British cultural studies became global in impact and responded to the new cultural and political conditions described in postmodern theory which we discuss below. As we shall see, many forms of the study of culture and media preceded and accompanied the development of British cultural studies. In the following sections, we will observe examples of European and North American cultural studies and developments within the field throughout the world in the globalization of media and cultural studies. We will also present a range of perspectives, often critical of the Frankfurt School, British cultural studies, and the other theories that we have so far examined. Next, however, we will introduce an approach to media and culture which focuses on the system and practices of production and distribution. This “political economy” perspective is sometimes taken as antithetical to cultural studies, and representatives of each position often attack each other, claiming their approach is superior. We, however, will argue that cultural studies and political economy viewpoints can be integrated, and that both are key parts of a more inclusive critical media and cultural theory.

Political Economy and Globalization The anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy. – Karl Marx A political economy approach to media and culture centers more on the production and distribution of entertainment, advertising, news and information, and new media than on interpreting texts or studying audiences. The references to the terms “political” and “economy” call attention to the fact that the production and distribution of culture take place within a specific economic and political system, constituted by relations between the state, the economy, social institutions and practices, culture, and organizations such as the media. Political economy thus encom-

passes economics and politics, and the relations between them and the other central structures of society and culture. With regard to media institutions, for instance, in Western democracies, a capitalist economy dictates that cultural production is governed by the laws of the market, but the democratic imperatives mean that there is some regulation of culture by the state. There are often tensions within a given society concerning which activities should be governed by the imperatives of the market, or economics, alone, and how much state regulation or intervention is desirable to assure a wider diversity of broadcast programming, or the prohibition of phenomena agreed to be harmful, such as cigarette advertising or pornography. Political economy highlights that capitalist societies are organized according to a dominant mode of production that structures institutions and practices according to the logic of commodification and capital accumulation. Cultural production and distribution are accordingly profit- and market-oriented in such a system. Forces of production (such as media technologies and creative practice) are shaped according to dominant relations of production (such as the profit imperative, the maintenance of hierarchical control, and relations of domination). The system of production (e.g. market- or state-oriented) is important, as suggested below, in determining what sort of cultural artifacts are produced and how they are consumed. Hence, “political economy” does not merely pertain solely to economics, but to the relations between the economic, political, technological, and cultural dimensions of social reality. The structure of political economy links culture to its political and economic context and opens up cultural studies to history and politics. It refers to a field of contestation and antagonism and not an inert structure as caricatured by some of its opponents. Political economy should also discern and analyze the role of technology in cultural production and distribution, seeing, as in McLuhan, how technology and forms of media structure economic, social, and cultural practices and forms of life. In our era, the proliferation of new technologies and multimedia – ranging from computers to DVDs to new types of digitized film and music – call attention to the key role of technology in the economy and everyday life and make clear that technological and economic factors are often deeply interconnected. In a time of technological revolution, the role of technology is especially important, and so political economy must engage the dominant forms of technology in its analysis.


14 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM In the present stage of capitalist hegemony, political economy grounds its approach within empirical analysis of the actual system of cultural production, investigating the constraints and structuring influence of the dominant capitalist economic system and a commercialized cultural system controlled by powerful corporations. Inserting texts into the system of culture within which they are produced and distributed can help elucidate features and effects of the texts that textual analysis alone might miss or downplay. Rather than being antithetical to approaches to culture, political economy can contribute to textual analysis and critique. The system of production often determines what type of artifacts will be produced, what structural limits there will be as to what can and cannot be said and shown, and what kind of audience effects cultural artifacts may generate. Study of the codes of television, film, or popular music, for instance, is enhanced by examining the formulas and conventions of media culture production. These cultural forms are structured by welldefined rules and conventions, and investigation of the production of culture can help elucidate the codes actually in play. Because of the demands of the format of radio or music television, for instance, most popular songs are three to five minutes long, fitting into the format of the distribution system. Because of their control by giant media corporations oriented primarily toward profit, film and television production in the US is dominated by specific genres such as talk and game shows, soap operas, situation comedies, action/adventure shows, and so on. This economic factor explains why there are cycles of certain genres and subgenres, sequelmania in the film industry, and crossovers of popular films into television series. Seeing how competition for audiences decides what shows are produced also helps explain why there is homogeneity in products constituted within systems of production with established generic codes, formulaic conventions, and well-defined ideological boundaries. Furthermore, one cannot really discern the role of the media in events like the Gulf War without analyzing the production and political economy of news and information, as well as the actual text of the Gulf War and its reception by its audience. Or, one cannot fully grasp the Madonna phenomenon without discussing her marketing strategies, her political environment, her cultural artifacts, and their effects. Likewise, in appraising the full social impact of pornography, one needs to be aware of the sex industry

and the production process of, say, pornographic films, and not just on the texts themselves and their effects on audiences. In addition, study of political economy can help ascertain the limits and range of political and ideological discourses and effects. Study of television and politics in the United States, for instance, suggests that takeover of the television broadcasting networks by leading transnational corporations and communications conglomerates was part of a “right turn” within US society in the 1980s whereby powerful corporate groups won control of the state and the mainstream media. For example, during the 1980s all three networks were taken over by leading corporate conglomerates: ABC was purchased by Capital Cities, NBC merged with GE, and CBS was bought by the Tisch Financial Group. Both ABC and NBC sought corporate mergers, and this motivation, along with other benefits derived from the Reagan administration, might well have influenced them to downplay criticisms of Reagan and to generally support his conservative programs, military adventures, and simulated presidency. During the 1990s, the rise of new information industries created new powerful corporate forces, some of which merged with major old media companies like the MSNBC merger between Microsoft and NBC, while in the 2000s powerhouse corporations like Google and Yahoo absorbed new media and a wealth of other businesses and technologies. By 2003, ten gigantic multinational corporations, including AOL Time-Warner, Disney/ABC, General Electric–NBC, Viacom–CBS, News Corporation, Vivendi, Sony, Bertelsmann, AT&T, and Liberty Media, controlled most of the production of information and entertainment throughout the globe. The result is less competition and diversity, and more corporate control of newspapers and journalism, television, radio, film, and other media of information and entertainment, trends that have continued in different forms in the Age of Google, Yahoo, and emergent forms of new media. In the current conjuncture that is exhibiting a crossing of boundaries and synergy between information and entertainment industries, there have been significant mergers between the immense corporations. Previous forms of entertainment were rapidly absorbed within the internet, with the computer coming to be a major household appliance and source of entertainment, information, play, communication, and connection with the outside world. Currently, cell phones, iPads,


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 15 and other devices are making entertainment, news and information, and communication portable, But ongoing debates over “Net neutrality” or widespread access to the internet and communication highlight the battles over ownership that are products of corporate mergers and policy-level shifts to the right. The corporate media, communications, and information industries are frantically scrambling to provide delivery for the wealth of information, entertainment, and further services that includes increased internet access, cellular telephones and satellite personal communication devices, and computerized video, film, and information on demand, as well as internet shopping and more unsavory services like pornography and gambling. Hence, study of the political economy of media can be immensely useful for describing the infrastructure of the media, information, and communications industry and their effects on culture and society. Yet political economy alone does not hold the key to cultural studies, and important as it is, it has limitations as a single perspective. Some political economy analyses reduce the meanings and effects of texts to rather circumscribed and reductive ideological functions, arguing that media culture merely reflects the ideology of the ruling economic elite that controls the culture industry and is nothing more than a vehicle for the dominant ideology. It is true that media culture overwhelmingly supports capitalist values, but it is also a site of intense conflict between different races, classes, gender, and social groups. Thus, in order to fully grasp the nature and effects of media culture, one should see contemporary society and culture as contested terrains and media and cultural forms as spaces in which particular battles over gender, race, sexuality, political ideology, and values are fought. Feminist political economy involves domestic activities like cleaning, child-rearing, shopping, and additional forms of consumption. Feminist critics contend that activities of packaging, marketing, and display are important dimensions of the capitalist economy and that therefore study of consumption is as significant as production in constructing political economy. As feminist political economists point out, questions of economic power extend to issues of social power. At the heart of studies of political economy lies the question of how social resources are controlled and by whom – a question that lays open issues of race, gender, sexual orientation, and other social groupings that underpin economic privilege and power (or the lack thereof).

As Eileen Meehan observes (pp. 242–249), patriarchy and capitalism are historically intertwined; her analysis brings to the surface the ways in which the media industries’ commodification of audiences rests on the intersecting dynamics of these parallel vectors of power. Media artifacts operate simultaneously on economic and cultural levels, with one circumscribing the other. Her analysis elucidates the way that societal divisions of labor based on gender, coupled with prejudices about gender, play a significant role in defining and differentiating the media’s commodity audience. Political economy today necessarily involves discussion of a global capitalist world economy in an era marked by the fall of communism in 1989, technological revolution, and the emergence of a “new economy” based on computer and communication networks. The term “globalization” is often deployed as a cover concept for the new world economy, but as Herbert Schiller argues, its continuities with the old world-system of market capitalism should not be ignored. In fact, globalization is a contested term with some identifying it with new forms of imperialism, and seeing it as predominantly negative, while others equate it with modernization and the proliferation of novel products, cultural forms, and identities. In fact, it is best to see it as an extremely complex and ambiguous phenomenon that contains both exciting and progressive forms like the internet, novel terrains of cyberculture, and emergent economic and political actors and groups in the world economy – combined with the growing strength of transnational institutions, intensified competition on a global level, heightened exploitation, corporate downsizing, and greater levels of unemployment, economic inequality, and insecurity. The conception of political economy that we are proposing goes beyond traditional, sometimes excessively economistic approaches that focus on more strictly economic issues such as ownership, gatekeeping, and the production and distribution of culture. Instead, we are suggesting that it involves relations between economy and polity, culture and people, as well as the interconnection between production and consumption, distribution and use. Although some conceptions of political economy are reductive, focusing solely on the economic dimension, we believe that far richer notions of political economy are possible. In addition, we would argue that both political economy and more sociologically and culturally oriented approaches to the study of media culture should be combined. For some decades now,


16 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM however, advocates of media and cultural studies based in textual or audience analysis have been at war with those who advocate a political economy optic. The hostility between political economy and cultural studies, in our view, reproduces a great divide within the field of communication and cultural studies between two competing approaches with different methodologies, objects of study, and, by now, bodies of texts that represent the opposing schools. This dichotomization pits social sciencebased approaches that take media and communications as their object against a humanities- and textbased view that focuses on culture. A largely textual approach centers on the analysis and criticism of texts as cultural artifacts, employing methods primarily derived from the humanities. The methods of political economy and empirical communications research, by contrast, utilize more social science-based research strategies, ranging from straight quantitative analysis to more qualitative empirical studies of specific cases or topics, structural analysis of media institutions, or historical research. Topics in this area include analysis of ownership patterns within the political economy of the media, empirical studies of audience reception and media effects, or structural analysis of the impact of media institutions on the economy, politics, or everyday life. Consequently, the seemingly never-ending hostility between political economy and cultural studies replicates a bifurcation within the fields of communications and culture between competing paradigms. In our view, the divide is an artificial one, rooted in an arbitrary academic division of labor. These conflicting approaches point to a splintering of the field of media communications into specialized subareas with competing models and methods, and, ironically, to a lack of communication in the field of communications. The split reproduces an academic division of labor which – beginning early in the twentieth century and intensifying since the end of the Second World War – followed the trend toward specialization and differentiation symptomatic of the capitalist economy. The university has followed this broader trend which some theorists equate with the dynamics of modernity itself, interpreted as a process of ever-greater differentiation and thus specialization in all fields from business to education. This trend toward specialization has undermined the power and scope of cultural and media studies and should be replaced, as we are arguing, by a more transdisciplinary position.

Moreover, in the present configuration of the emergence of a new global economy, critical cultural and media studies need to grasp the global, national, and local systems of media production and distribution. In the 1960s, critics of the global capitalist system described the domination of the world economy by transnational – mostly American and European – corporations as “imperialism” or “neoimperialism,” while its supporters celebrated “modernization.” Today, the term “globalization” is the standard concept used to describe the new global economy and culture. One of the features of globalization is the proliferation of new voices and perspectives on culture and society and the politicization and contestation of forms of culture previously taken for granted. In a global culture, the proliferation of difference and new actors are part of the landscape and the question of representation becomes intensely politicized and contested, as we see in the next section.

The Politics of Representation Representation in the mediated “ Reality” of our mass culture is in itself Power. – Larry Gross Whereas political economy approaches to the media and culture derive from a social sciences tradition, analysis of the politics of representation in media texts derives from a humanities-based textual approach. Earlier, mass communications approaches to media content ranged from descriptive content analysis to quantitative analysis of references, figures, or images in media texts. The more sophisticated methods of textual analysis, however, derive from more advanced understandings of texts, narratives, and representation, as well as the contributions of critical concepts such as ideology and hegemony. The idea that all cultural representations are political is one of the major themes of media and cultural theory of the past several decades. In the 1960s, feminist, African American, Latino, gay and lesbian, and diverse oppositional movements attacked the stereotypes and biased images of cultural representations of their groups. These critiques of sexism, racism, homophobia, and other biases made it clear that cultural representations are never innocent or pure, that they contain positive, negative, or ambiguous representations of diverse social groups, that they can serve pernicious interests of cultural


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 17 oppression by positioning certain groups as inferior, thus pointing to the superiority of dominant social groups. Studies of representations of women or blacks on American television, for instance, would catalogue negative representations and show how they produce sexism or racism, or would champion more positive representations. Early interventions in the politics of representation concentrated on primarily “images of� particular social groups, decrying negative images and affirming more constructive ones. The limitations of such approaches were quickly apparent, and already by the 1970s more sophisticated analyses began emerging of how texts position audiences, of how narratives, scenes, and images produce biased representations. There emerged, then, more sophisticated understanding of how textual mechanisms help construct social meanings and representations of specific social groups. Exclusions of groups like Latinos, as well as negative stereotypes, were emphasized, as were the ways framing, editing, subtexts, and the construction of pictorial images produced culturally loaded and biased representations of subordinate groups. The narratives of media culture were scrutinized to discern how certain (usually socially dominant) forces were represented more affirmatively than subordinate groups, and there was a search for narratives and representations that more positively represented social types that had been excluded or negatively presented in mainstream culture (i.e. various ethnic groups, gays and lesbians, or members of the deaf community). The turn toward study of audiences in the 1980s, as we have noted, also created more complex notions of the politics of representation and construction of meaning by stressing how audiences could perform oppositional readings, reacting negatively to what they perceived as prejudiced representations of their own social groups, thus showing themselves to be active creators of meaning, and not just passive victims of manipulation. Reading culture was seen as a political event, in which one looked for negative or positive representations, learned how narratives were constructed, and discerned how image and ideology functioned with media and culture to reproduce social domination and discrimination. The debates over the politics of representation and how best to analyze and criticize offensive images of subordinate groups provided a wealth of insights into the nature and effects of culture and media. Culture was now conceived as a field of representation, as a

producer of meaning that provided negative and positive depictions of gender, class, race, sexuality, religion, and further key constituents of identity. The media were interpreted as potent creators of role models, gender identity, norms, values, and appropriate and inappropriate behavior, positioning audiences to behave in diverging ways. Audiences, however, were eventually able to perceive themselves as active and creative, able to construct meanings and identities out of the materials of their culture. Culture and identity were regarded as constructed, as artificial, malleable, and contestable artifacts, and not as natural givens. Representations in turn were interpreted not just as replications of the real, reproductions of natural objects, but as constructions of complex technical, narrative, and ideological apparatuses. The emphasis on the politics of representation called attention to media technologies, as well as narrative forms, conventions, and codes. It was determined that formal aspects of media texts, such as framing, editing, or special effects, could help construct specific representations and that different technologies produced different products and effects. In addition, the growing emphasis on the active role of audiences from the 1980s to the present suggested that people could creatively construct cultural meanings, contest dominant forms, and create alternative readings and interpretations. Audiences could be empowered to reject prejudicial or stereotyped representations of specific groups and individuals, and could affirm positive ones. The politics of representation focused on both encoding and decoding, texts and audiences, and called for more critical and discriminating responses to the products of media production. Consequently, cultural representations were perceived to be subject to political critique and culture itself was conceived as a contested terrain. Film, television, music, and assorted cultural forms were interpreted as an arena of struggle in which representations transcode the discourses of conflicting social movements. Beginning in the 1960s, alternative representations of gender, race, class, the family, the state, the corporation, and additional dominant forces and institutions began appearing in a sustained fashion. More complex and engaging representations of women, for instance, transcoded the critiques of negative stereotypes and sexist representations, as well as the demand for more active and positive representations. Calls for alternative voices and the creation of oppositional subcultures were met by


18 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM increased cultural production by women, people of color, sexual minorities, and others excluded from cultural debate and creation. Giving voice to alternative visions, telling more complex stories from the perspective of subordinate groups, and presenting works of marginalized people shook up dominant systems of cultural production and representation. The process created more variety and diversity but also intensified cultural resistance, as a backlash against oppositional groups of women, people of color, gays and lesbians, and various marginalized subcultures inevitably began. In many ways, the contests over representation have intensified as we have entered a supposedly “postracial, postfeminist” era where differences have purportedly ceased to matter, yet inequities persist. As Patricia Hill Collins astutely observes (pp. 318–337), contemporary representation functions “to erase the workings of racial discrimination” and other structural problems, while perpetuating power hierarchies and oppression.

The Postmodern Turn It seems that to talk seriously about postmodernism today, one is still by definition being defensive. This is because postmodernism has become everybody’s favorite b^ete noire, while at the same time not only generously providing something solid to argue against, when so many other things have been “ melting in the air,” but also, in some mysterious way, being a concept in the right place at the right moment. Postmodernism has therefore served the function of shifting the paradigms in cultural studies and sociology, doing that kind of intellectual work which inevitably provokes controversy and protest, all the more so when what seems to be at stake are precisely those terms like history, society and politics that have given substance and direction to the kind of work we do as teachers and researchers and the reasons why we do it. – Angela McRobbie The notion of the postmodern implies a fundamental rupture in culture and history. It suggests that there are important changes in the economy, society, culture, the arts, and our everyday life which require new theories, ways of perceiving the world, and forms of discourse and practice. Yet as the above quotation

indicates, post modernism is extremely controversial, with discourses and practices of the “post” attracting some and repelling others. To make sense of the bewildering variety of uses of the family of terms within the field of the postmodern, we would propose distinguishing between modernity and postmodernity as epochs or stages of history; modernism and postmodernism as developments within art; and modern and postmodern theory as opposed to modes of theoretical discourse and intellectual orientations toward the world. In terms of the narrative of our Introduction, a postmodern turn in culture and society would correspond to an emergent stage of global capitalism, characterized by new multimedia, exciting computer and informational technology, and a proliferation of novel forms of politics, society, culture, and everyday life. From this perspective, postmodern theorists like Jean Baudrillard, Jean-Fran¸cois Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Fredric Jameson, Angela McRobbie, Mark Poster, and others are attempting to engage the new technologies, the emergent forms of culture and identity, the innovative modes of theory and discourse, and the ascendant forms of global capitalism that are shaping the contemporary era. Just as previous theories and methods responded to the emergent historical conditions of their era, so too do the postmodern theories attempt to engage novel and original contemporary conditions. But just as previous theories and methods had their limitations and blindspots, postmodern theory also has its omissions and deficiencies. Hence, we would caution our readers, who are perhaps eager to embrace the latest theories and approaches, to be alert to drawbacks, as well as the benefits of the postmodern turn. French theorist Jean Baudrillard was one of the first to engage the novel forms of culture in theorizing the modes of simulation and hyperreality by which he described the emergent media and cyberspaces of the new technologies. While he was prescient in perceiving the importance of new forms of culture and fields of cultural experience, by declaring “the end of political economy” and by claiming that simulation, hyperreality, and nascent modes of media and computer culture are autonomous organizing forces of the contemporary world, he forfeits insight into the connections between new technologies and form of culture and the restructuring of global capitalism. North American cultural theorist Fredric Jameson, by contrast, in his famous article


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 19 “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” (pp. 407–433), interprets the emergent forms of postmodern culture within the context of contemporary capitalism, thus connecting the economy and culture. For Jameson, postmodernism is a form of culture appropriate to the glitzy surfaces, culture of image and spectacle, and high-intensity emphasis on appearance, style, and look found in contemporary consumer and media culture. Theorizing postmodernism, for Jameson, requires understanding the new forms of global capitalism and culture that are emerging, of which postmodernism is a symptomatic form. Seen in retrospect, the cultural populism, turn to the audience, and fetishism of the popular that emerged in British cultural studies during the 1980s and 1990s can be read as part of a postmodern turn in cultural studies which corresponds to a new stage of consumer and global capitalism. The Frankfurt School described a mass society and culture that sought to incorporate individuals into a more homogenized culture, controlled by big corporations, the state, and centralized media. By contrast, the current form of consumer capitalism is more fragmented, specialized, aestheticized and eroticized, and celebratory of difference, choice, and individual freedom than the previous stage. The postmodern turn has generated a great variety and diversity of novel forms of cultural studies and approaches to the study of media and culture. At their most extreme, postmodern theories erase the economic, political, and social dimensions of cultural production and reception, engage in a type of cultural and technological determinism, indulge in theoreticist blather, and renounce the possibility of textual interpretation, social criticism, and political struggle. In a more dialectical and political version, postmodern theory is used to rethink cultural criticism and politics in the contemporary era. In addition, postmodern theory can be effective in calling attention to innovative configurations and functions of culture, as it charts the trajectories and impacts of new technologies, the emergent global economy and culture, and the novel political terrain and movements, without losing sight of questions of political power, domination, and resistance. In addition, some versions of postmodern theory provide extremely useful transdisciplinary perspectives, as did the Frankfurt School, British cultural studies, feminist, and diverse critical theories at their best.

New Media, DIY, and Social Networking Human beings make their own history, but not under circumstances of their own choosing. – Karl Marx A dramatic technological revolution, centered on computer, information, communication, and multimedia technologies, has been changing everything from the ways people work, to the ways they communicate with each other and spend their leisure time. This technological revolution is often interpreted as the beginnings of a knowledge or information society, bringing with it notions of a revitalized public sphere and heightened levels of creativity and interactivity. At the same time that technological revolution is underway, important demographic and socio-political changes are taking place in the United States and throughout the world. Emigration patterns have created the challenge of providing people from diverse races, classes, and backgrounds with the tools and competencies to enable them to succeed and participate in an ever more complex and changing world. Social institutions have had to evolve rapidly to try to keep pace with these changes: for example, the new “information society” poses tremendous challenges to educators to rethink their basic tenets, to deploy the new technologies in creative and productive ways, and to restructure schooling to respond constructively and progressively to the technological and social changes that we are now experiencing. During the 1980s, computer technologies changed the way we wrote, researched, and communicated. Corporations like Apple and Microsoft, the Open Source movement, and a generation of hackers began working on developing new media and new applications. In the 1990s, the internet emerged as a new field of culture wherein new technologies and media became much more than solely information technology, but are also technologies of entertainment, communication, and play, encompassing and restructuring both labor and leisure. As it developed in the 1990s and into the new millennium, the internet became a vast open frontier of play, social identity construction and networking, and research, as the computer took on multiple functions and became the center of life for many. In the last section, we discussed how mergers in the entertainment and information industries created


20 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM corporations involved in TV, film, magazines, newspapers, books, information databases, computers, and other new media. Many new media from the 1990s and 2000s, however, came from below as young computer wizards created blogs and wikis, Google and Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. Many of these new media were conceived in the earlier libertarian computer ethos that insisted “information wants to be free,” and served to create utopias of information, gaming and play, social communication, and diverse content covering a wide expanse of topics delivered by new media and social networking sites. Social networking became a major component of everyday life for a younger “digital generation” who lived their lives on-line. The virtual life substantiated the postmodern claim that major ruptures and breaks were occurring in history as more and more people spent much of their lives in cyberspaces and virtual worlds. The DIY (Do-It-Yourself) component of the new media and social networking meant that everyone could be a cultural producer and participate in the new networked culture, as well as a consumer of the wealth of information and new media content. Thus, rethinking the notion of the media “audience” to notions of the “prosumer” or “peer provider,” and challenging our understandings of message encoding and encoding, are underway as new theories of media use are developed for the wireless world. At the same time, the new virtual terrain has become the field of new contestations and struggles over power and ideology: China has imposed rigorous censorship requirements on foreign internet providers, with particularly inflammatory confrontations with Google; Tunisia attempted to tightly control internet use but activists learned how to use cell phones to mobilize anti-government protests; the Egyptian government shut down all internet access at the start of anti-government protests in 2011; and major U.S. communication corporations like AT&T and Comcast are engaged in lobbying efforts to annihilate “Net neutrality,” or equal access to the web, in favor of a taxation system that would privilege wealthy content providers and chill the emerging online public sphere. On the user side, social relations and communication of youth and other participants in the cyberculture have produced headline-generating stories. Cyberbullying has led to well-publicized suicides, and cybercrime and identity theft have become a normalized danger in on-line commerce and communication, as more people use the internet for business

as well as pleasure. Online gaming consumes young users’ lives, with some obsessed players purportedly dying in cyberspace as they neglect food and sleep. Younger and older people use Twitter and Facebook to sext, as well as text, opening up their private lives to public scrutiny and perhaps scandal, as Congressman Anthony Weiner discovered in June 2011 when risque pictures which he’d recklessly sent to young women were suddenly the rage of old and new media and he was forced to resign. In light of these contradictory and highly politicized tensions at work in the new media environment, new theoretical directions and conceptual frameworks are needed to chart the social, cultural, and political impacts of these technologies. For many, however, the term “new media” is problematic in that it generally refers to computers and digital technology, which have now been around for decades. The notion of “new” media also suggests a rupture and a fundamental break with previous media, and while computerization and digitization have enormous effects and are an important novelty, there still are continuities with previous media. As Marshall McLuhan argued, new media often absorb the format and structures of old ones, as television took up the format of previous radio genres and the same corporations dominated both, and “new media” have progressively absorbed the forms of “old media” from writing to broadcasting and video to proliferating forms of multimedia. Yet digitization is a novelty and emergent forms of digital media and culture require careful theoretical and political analysis, as the contributors to our volume carry out, pointing out distinctive and novel features of the emergent digital culture. However widespread and common – or not – computers and new technologies become, it is clear that they are of essential importance for labor, politics, education, and social life, and that people who want to participate in the public and cultural life of the future will need to have computer and new media access and literacies. Moreover, although there is the threat and real danger that the computerization of society will increase the current inequalities and inequities in the configurations of class, race, and gender power, there is the possibility that a democratized and computerized public sphere might provide opportunities to overcome these inequities. In the next section, we will accordingly address some of the ways that oppressed and disempowered groups and social movements are using the new technologies to


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 21 advance their interests and progressive political agendas as technology and politics are increasingly globalized.

Globalization and Social Movements Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells, –Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels Postmodern, as well as modern, theorists recognize that the world is increasingly marked by transnational cross-currents and flows which on the one hand are destabilizing traditional concepts of the nation-state as they become supplanted by multinational corporations and cross-border affiliations, and on the other hand are reasserting the dominance of Western capitalism. As Arjun Appadurai argues, the “global processes involving mobile texts and migrant audiences” cross and trouble the borders of the modernist nation-state, unlocking a global imagination that opens up the possibilities of new forms of identity, solidarity, and politics. Yet Appadurai does not present an uncritical and idealizing vision: the flows that crosscut the globe are sometimes violent and repressive, at other times democratic and progressive. Globalization is a contested term with some identifying it with new forms of imperialism, and seeing it as predominantly negative, while others equate it with modernization and the proliferation of innovative products, cultural forms, and identities. For example, Douglas Kellner and Richard Kahn (pp. 597–613) identify the uses of the internet in creating alternative public spheres that foster political activism and progressive, emancipatory sodalities formed through the use of blogs and other virtual networking tools. In fact, it is best to see globalization as an extremely complex and ambiguous phenomenon that contains both exciting and progressive forms like the internet, novel terrains of cyberculture and social movements, and emergent economic and political actors and groups in the world economy – combined with the growing strength of transnational institutions, intensified competition on a global level, heightened exploitation, corporate downsizing, and greater levels of unemployment, economic inequality,

insecurity, terrorism, and war. Jan Nederveen Pieterse (pp. 567–582) acknowledges the ambiguity of globalization as a concept and argues for a recognition of plural forms of globalization that give rise to new modes of sociopolitical organizing and “hybrid spaces,” such as cities of peasants or ethnically mixed neighborhoods and cultures. Globalization is connected with the scientifictechnological-economic revolution which involves the advent of emergent forms of labor, politics, culture, and everyday life. The networked global economy contains economic opportunities, openings for political transformation, and a wealth of innovative products and technologies which might improve the human condition. Yet it also threatens to increase divisions between the haves and the have-nots, to deplete diminishing resources, to undermine union and labor rights, and to circulate novel forms of war and terrorism. Hence, globalization is highly ambiguous, with both promising and threatening features. The internet, for example, can aid progressive political struggles and movements, or can be used by corporations to enforce their hegemony and control. As Kahn and Kellner argue in a concluding article in this collection (pp. 597–613), social movements all over the world are producing “alternative globalizations” creating a “globalization from below” that fights to save the environment and animal species, to advance human and civil rights of a variety of groups, and that struggle to create a more sustainable, democratic and just world, using new media and social networking to promote progressive political change. Indeed, in the Arab Spring of 2011, movements in Tunisia and Egypt used social media and networking to help organize movements that overthrew entrenched dictatorships and inspired movements of democratic uprisings and social transformation throughout the Middle East and the globe. Globalization is always proliferating new forms of media and culture. In addition, global forces are both creating novel modes of cultural homogenization and proliferating cultural differences and hybridities. It is advancing the interests of major US and other transnational corporations, as well as providing openings for new economic forms and players. Global processes are producing proliferating transnational institutions and forces, while challenging the state to strengthen its authority and regulatory powers. And as globalization comes ever more to the fore, the importance of the local is highlighted and dramatized. Globalization is thus one of the dominant forces of our era and


22 DOUGLAS M. KELLNER AND MEENAKSHI GIGI DURHAM has expanded the terrain and scope of media and cultural studies.

Concluding Remarks Despite their dissimilarity, many of the theories and methods that we have discussed in this Introduction, ranging from the Frankfurt School to British cultural studies to French postmodern theory, are transdisciplinary in terms of their metatheory and practice. Standard academic approaches are discipline-oriented, with English Departments typically analyzing cultural forms as literary texts, Sociology Departments focusing on the social dimension of culture, Political Science Departments highlighting the politics of culture, and so on. By contrast, transdisciplinary perspectives subvert existing academic boundaries by combining social theory, cultural analysis, and political critique. Such transdisciplinary theory requires knowledge of a multiplicity of methods and theories that we have indeed attempted to assemble in our reader. While our multiperspectivist approach might suggest to the reader a liberal pluralist tolerance of disparate theories and methods, we want to advance more systematic and critical perspectives. Against pluralism and eclecticism, we believe that it is important to challenge the established academic division of labor and to develop a transdisciplinary approach that contests both the bifurcation of the field of media and cultural studies and the society that produces it. A critical media and cultural studies will overcome the boundaries of academic disciplines and will combine political economy, social theory and research, and cultural criticism in its project that aims at critique of domination and social transformation. Such a critical venture must also engage the emergent cultural, political, and social forms of the present era. Confronting new technologies, multimedia, and modes of experience such as cyberspace and social networking creates a variety of challenges for media and cultural studies, ranging from the need to chart the emergent cultural terrains and experiences to producing multiple literacies to analyze and evaluate these spheres and their forms. Since media and culture are themselves a type of pedagogy, one needs to create a counterpedagogy to question and critically analyze the often distorted forms of knowledge, misinformation, deceptive images, and seductive spectacles of the media and consumer society. Cultivating critical media literacy to analyze intelli-

gently contemporary forms of culture calls for advancement of a new postmodern pedagogy that takes seriously image, spectacle, and narrative, and thus promotes visual and media literacy, the ability to read, analyze, and evaluate images, stories, and spectacles of media culture. Yet a postmodern pedagogy is concerned to develop multiple literacies, to rethink literacy itself in relation to new technologies and cultural forms, and to create a cultural studies that encompasses a wide array of fields, texts, and practices, extending from popular music to poetry and painting to cyberspace and multimedia like DVDs or iPods and iPads. The particular pedagogy employed, however, should be contextual, depending on the concrete situation, interests, and problems within the specific site in which cultural studies is taught or carried out. Yet the pedagogy must address salient general issues. Media culture is produced in a context of asymmetries of race, class, and gender and concrete relations of domination and subordination that must be accounted for in any critical analysis. For us, a postmodern pedagogy does not elide or occlude issues of power; rather, it allows for a contemporary understanding of current social and cultural configurations of culture, power, and domination. While the distinctive situation and interests of the teachers, students, or critics help decide what precise artifacts are engaged, what methods will be employed, and what pedagogy will be deployed, the sociocultural environment in which cultural production, reception, and education occur must be scrutinized as well. Hence, a transdisciplinary media and cultural studies would productively engage postmodern theory and emergent interpretive discourses and methods while maintaining important traditional goals like cultivating literacy, critical thinking, and the art of interpretation. We are currently living in a proliferating image and media culture in which new technologies are changing every dimension of life from the economy to personal identity. In a postmodern media and computer culture, fresh critical strategies are needed to read cultural texts, to interpret the conjunctions of sight and sound, words, images, and spectacle, that are producing seductive cultural spaces, forms, and experiences. This undertaking also involves exploration of the emergent cyberspaces and modes of identities, interaction, and production that are taking place in the rapidly exploding computer culture, as well as exploring the new public spaces where myriad forms of political debate and contes-


ADVENTURES IN MEDIA AND CULTURAL STUDIES 23 tation are evolving and new forms of social interaction involved in social networking. Yet engaging the fresh forms of culture requires using the tools and insights already gained, rather than simply rejecting all “modern” concepts and theories as irrelevant to the new “postmodern” condition. As we have argued, adequately understanding postmodern phenomena requires contextualization in terms of the way that novel cultural artifacts are produced by the dominant mode of production and are used to reproduce – or contest – existing figurations of class, race, gender, and other forms of power and domination.

Indeed, a future-oriented media and cultural studies should look closely at the development of the entertainment and information technology industries, the mergers and synergies taking place, the syntheses of computer and media culture that are being planned and already implemented, and emergent wireless technologies and new modes of social interaction. A global media and cyberculture is our life-world and fate, and we need to be able to chart and map it accordingly to survive the dramatic changes currently taking place and the even more transformative novelties of the rapidly approaching future.


PART I

CULTURE, IDEOLOGY, AND HEGEMONY 1 The Ruling Class and the Ruling Ideas Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels 2 (i) History of the Subaltern Classes; (ii) The Concept of “Ideology”; (iii) Cultural Themes: Ideological Material Antonio Gramsci 3 The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction Walter Benjamin 4 The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno 5 The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article Ju€rgen Habermas 6 Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation) Louis Althusser


INTRODUCTION TO PART I 27

Introduction to Part I This section contains a set of key texts which introduce some of the fundamental concepts of cultural and media criticism. For the theorists whom we have selected here, culture always arises in specific historical situations, serving particular socio-economic interests, and carrying out important social functions. For Marx and Engels, the cultural ideas of an epoch serve the interests of the ruling class, providing ideologies that legitimate class domination. We have selected a famous text on ideology written for their unpublished work The German Ideology in 1845. Here for the first time, Marx and Engels presented their materialist theory of history whereby material interests and class struggles are conceived as the ruling forces of history – as opposed to the actions of great individuals, ideas, and cultural forces, or political events like elections and wars.1 The economic base of society for Marx and Engels consisted of the forces and relations of production in which culture and ideology are constructed to help secure the dominance of ruling social groups. This influential “base/superstructure” model considers the economy the base, or foundation, of society, and cultural, legal, political, and other forms of life are conceived as “superstructures” which grow out of and serve to reproduce the economic base. Many of the theorists in this book develop, revise, and in some cases contest this model, attempting to theorize, for example, more precisely how culture and media function within contemporary societies and everyday life. For the Italian Marxist theorist, Antonio Gramsci, the ruling intellectual and cultural forces of the era constitute a form of hegemony, or domination by ideas and cultural forms which induce consent to the rule of the leading groups in a society. Gramsci’s example in his Prison Notebooks, from which we reproduce a selection defining his concept of hegemony, is Italian fascism, which supplanted the previous liberal bourgeois regime in Italy through its control of the state and multiplied, often repressive, influence over schooling, the media, and other cultural, social, and political institutions. Gramsci

himself was imprisoned for his opposition to Mussolini’s fascist regime, and while in prison he sketched out criticism of the ways that fascism became the ruling force in Italy, an analysis through which he developed more general accounts of how ruling social groups and institutions attain social dominance or hegemony.2 Gramsci defined ideology as the ruling ideas which present the “social cement” which unifies and holds together the dominant social order. He described his own “philosophy of praxis” as a mode of thought opposed to ideology, which includes, among other things, a critical analysis of ruling ideas. In a short passage we have included on “Cultural Themes: Ideological Material,” Gramsci notes that in his day the press was the dominant instrument of producing ideological legitimation of the existing institutions and social order, but that many other institutions such as the church, schools, and different associations and groups also played a role. He proposed developing a critique of these institutions and the ideologies that legitimate them, accompanied by development of counterinstitutions and ideas that would produce alternatives to the existing system. Members of the Institute for Social Research, established in the 1920s in Frankfurt, Germany, developed some of the first critical perspectives on mass culture and communication in their famous studies of the culture industry.3 T. W. Adorno’s analyses of popular music and culture (1978 [1932], 1941, 1982, 1989, and 1991), Leo Lowenthal’s studies of popular demagogues, literature, and magazines (1949, 1957, and 1961), Herta Herzog’s studies of radio soap operas (1941), and the perspectives and critiques of mass culture developed in Horkheimer and Adorno’s famous study of the culture industry (1972 and Adorno, 1991) provide many examples of the value of what became known as the “Frankfurt School” approach. As victims of European fascism, members of the Institute for Social Research experienced first-hand the ways that the Nazis used the instruments of mass

Media and Cultural Studies: KeyWorks, Second Edition. Edited by Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner. Ó 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2012 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


28 INTRODUCTION TO PART I culture to induce submission to fascist culture and society. While in exile in the United States, the group came to believe that American media culture was also highly ideological and worked to promote the interests of US capitalism. Controlled by giant corporations, the culture industries were organized according to the structures of mass production, churning out massproduced products that generated a highly commercial system of culture which in turn sold the values, lifestyles, and institutions of American capitalism. The work of the Frankfurt School provided what Paul Lazarsfeld, one of the originators of modern communications studies, called a critical approach, which he distinguished from the “administrative research,” which served the interests of dominant corporations and institutions. The views of Adorno, Lowenthal, and other members of the inner circle of the Institute for Social Research were contested by Walter Benjamin, an idiosyncratic theorist loosely affiliated with the Institute. Benjamin, writing in Paris during the 1930s, discerned progressive aspects in new technologies of cultural production such as photography, film, and radio. In “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1969), Benjamin noted how new mass media were supplanting older forms of culture whereby the mass reproduction of photography, film, recordings, and publications replaced the emphasis on the originality and “aura” of the work of art in an earlier era. Freed from the mystification of high culture, Benjamin believed that mass culture could cultivate more critical individuals able to judge and analyze their culture, just as sports fans could dissect and evaluate athletic activities. In addition, processing the rush of images of cinema, created, Benjamin believed, subjectivities better able to parry the flux and turbulence of experience in industrialized, urbanized societies. Himself a collaborator of the prolific German artist Bertolt Brecht, Benjamin worked with Brecht on films, created radio plays, and attempted to utilize the media as organs of social progress. In the essay “The Artist as Producer” (1999 [1934]), Benjamin argued that progressive cultural creators should “refunction” the apparatus of cultural production, turning theater and film, for instance, into a forum of political enlightenment and discussion rather than a medium of “culinary” audience pleasure. Both Brecht and Benjamin wrote radio plays and were interested in film as an instrument of progressive social change. In an essay on radio theory, Brecht anticipated the internet in his call for reconstructing the apparatus

of broadcasting from one-way transmission to a more interactive form of two-way, or multiple, communication (in Silberman 2000: 41ff.) – a form first realized in CB radio and then electronically mediated computer communication.4 Moreover, Benjamin wished to promote a radical cultural and media politics concerned with the development of alternative oppositional cultures. Yet he recognized that media such as film could have conservative effects. While he thought it was progressive that mass-produced works were losing their “aura,” their magical force, and were opening cultural artifacts for more critical and political discussion, he recognized that film could create a new kind of ideological magic and aura through the cult of celebrity and techniques like the close-up that fetishized certain stars or images via the technology of the cinema. His work is also important therefore for focusing on the technology of cultural reproduction, seeing the changes in new media techniques, and carrying out political critique while calling for democratic transformation of media technology and institutions. Max Horkheimer and T. W. Adorno answered Benjamin’s optimism in a highly influential analysis of the culture industry published in their book Dialectic of Enlightenment, which first appeared in 1948 and was translated into English in 1972. They argued that the system of cultural production dominated by film, radio broadcasting, newspapers, and magazines was controlled by advertising and commercial imperatives, and served to create subservience to the system of consumer capitalism. While later critics pronounced their approach too manipulative, reductive, and elitist, it is important to note that Horkheimer and Adorno combine analysis of the system of cultural production, distribution, and consumption with analysis of some of the sorts of texts of the culture industry, and thus provide a model of a critical and multidimensional mode of cultural criticism that overcomes the divide between approaches that solely focus on political economy, texts, or audiences.5 In an encyclopedia article on the public sphere which we have included in KeyWorks, the German social theorist J€ urgen Habermas summarizes the ideas in his path-breaking book The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Providing historical background to the triumph of what Horkheimer and Adorno described as the culture industry, Habermas notes how bourgeois society was distinguished by the rise of a public sphere which stood between civil society and the state and which mediated between public and


INTRODUCTION TO PART I 29 private interests. For the first time in history, individuals and groups could shape public opinion, giving direct expression to their needs and interests while influencing political practice. The bourgeois public sphere made it possible to form a realm of public opinion that opposed state power and the powerful interests that were coming to shape bourgeois society. Yet Habermasalso notes a transition from theliberal public sphere which originated in the Enlightenment and the American and French Revolution to a mediadominated public sphere in the current era of what he calls “welfare state capitalism and mass democracy.” This historical transformation is grounded in Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis of the culture industry, in which giant corporations have taken over the public sphere and transformed it from a sphere of rational debate into one of manipulative consumption and passivity. In this transformation, “public opinion” shifts from rational consensus emerging from debate, discussion, and reflection to the manufactured opinion of polls or media experts. In this analysis, the interconnection between a sphere of public debate and individual participation has thus been fractured and transmuted into that of a realm of political manipulationandspectacle,inwhichcitizen-consumerspassively ingest and absorb entertainment and information. “Citizens” thus become spectators of media presentations and discourse which arbitrate public discussion and thus reduce its audiences to objects of news, information, and public affairs. In Habermas’s words: “Inasmuch as the mass media today strip away the literary husks from the kind of bourgeois self-interpretation and utilize them as marketable forms for the public services provided in a culture of consumers, the original meaning is reversed” (1989a, p. 171). Habermas’s critics, however, contend that he idealizes the earlier bourgeois public sphere by presenting it as a forum of rational discussion and debate when in fact certain groups were excluded. While the concepts of the public sphere and democracy assume a liberal and populist celebration of diversity, tolerance, debate, and consensus, in actuality, the bourgeois public sphere was dominated by white, property-owning males. As Habermas’s critics have documented, working-class, plebeian, and women’s public spheres developed alongside of the bourgeois public sphere to represent voices and interests excluded in this forum.6 Nonetheless, Habermas is right that in the era of the democratic revolutions a public sphere emerged in which for the first time in history ordinary citizens could participate in political discussion and debate,

organize, and struggle against unjust authority. Habermas’s account also points to the increasingly important role of the media in politics and everyday life and the ways that corporate interests have colonized this sphere, using the media and culture to promote their own interests. The issue of ideology as a colonizing force is a prevalent theme in the work of the French philosopher Louis Althusser, whose ideas were enormously influential in the 1970s, especially shaping early British cultural studies and the work of postmodern Marxist Fredric Jameson. As Stuart Hall has pointed out, “Althusser’s interventions and their consequent development are enormously formative for the field of cultural studies” (1978). Althusser drew on the vogue of structuralism in postwar France, amalgamating Barthesian semiotics, Levi-Strauss’s structural anthropology, psychoanalytic theory, and a revisionist Marxism to develop a conceptualization of “ideology” that rested on a notion of a social formation composed of economic, social, and ideological practices. Indeed, it is Althusser who shifted the discussion of “ideology” to focus on everyday practices and rituals organized via social institutions he designated as “Ideological State Apparatuses” (schools, religion, the family, the media, and others). These material practices, he argued, were part of a closed system in which individuals were constantly “interpellated” into a social order, becoming constituted as subjects unconsciously by the dominant social institutions and discourses. His most widely-read essay, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” outlines his basic assumption that experience, consciousness, and subjectivity itself, is an effect of an imaginary relationship between an individual and his/her real conditions of existence, a relationship that is constructed by the ISAs, reifies social hierarchies, and induces people to consent to systems of oppression. As he writes, “[A]ll ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constructing’ concrete individuals as subjects” (Althusser, 1971, p. 171). In later sections, we will see how a variety of other theorists and groups have analyzed current configurations of culture, ideology, and hegemony and how the positions presented in this section have been developed in a variety of fashions and have been often sharply contested as new political and theoretical impulses and movements have come to the fore. Hence, whereas a critical cultural and media studies emerged in the 1960s during an era strongly influenced by Marxism, later theoretical developments


30 INTRODUCTION TO PART I would contest Marxian positions and develop a wide variety of approaches to culture and media.

Notes 1 The German Ideology is published in vol. 5 of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works (New York: International Publishers). On Marxism, see Marx and Engels (1978). On the concept of ideology, see Thompson (1991). 2 See Gramsci (1971); on Gramsci, see Boggs (1984) and on Gramsci and cultural studies, see Hall (1996) and Morrow (1991). 3 On the Frankfurt-School theory of the cultural industries, see Horkheimer and Adorno (1972); Adorno (1991); the anthology edited by Rosenberg and White (1957); the readers edited by Arato and Gebhardt (1982) and Bronner and Kellner (1989); the discussions of the history of the Frankfurt School in Jay (1971); Wiggershaus (1994); and Wheatland (2009); and the discussion of the Frankfurt School combination of social theory and cultural criticism in Kellner (1989); Steinert (2003), and Gunster (2004); and Claussen’s study of Adorno (2008). 4 Silberman (2000) collects a wealth of Brecht’s texts on radio, film, and the construction of alternative media and culture. Enzensberger (1974) provides a highly influential updating of Brecht’s and Benjamin’s media activism in his call for a progressive media politics in the contemporary era. 5 For further discussion of the Frankfurt School culture industry analysis, see Kellner (1989 and 1997); Steinert (2003), and Gunster (2004). For more primary texts on the debates between Benjamin and the Frankfurt School, see the collection in Bloch et al. (1977). 6 For a discussion of the first sets of critiques of Habermas’s work on the public sphere, see Hohendahl (1979); for a bibliography of writings on the topic, see G€ ortzen (1981); and for a set of contemporary English-language discussions of the work, after it was finally translated in 1989, see Calhoun (1992). To get a sense of the astonishingly productive impact of the work in encouraging research and reflection on the public sphere, see the studies in Calhoun (1992) and Habermas’s “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere” (1992), which cite a striking number of criticisms or developments of his study.

References Adorno, T. W. (1941) “On Popular Music” (with G. Simpson), Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9(1):17–48.

—— (1978 [1932]) “On the Social Situation of Music,” Telos 35 (Spring):129–65. —— (1982) “On the Fetish Character of Music and the Regression of Hearing,” in Arato and Gebhardt 1982: 270–99. —— (1989) “On Jazz,” in Bronner and Kellner 1989: 199–209. —— (1991) The Culture Industry. London: Routledge. Althusser, Louis (1971) “Ideology and ideological State apparatuses (Notes toward an investigation),” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. London and New York: Monthly Review Books, 127–86. Ang, Ien (1995) Living Room Wars: Rethinking Media Audiences. London: Routledge. Arato, Andrew and Gebhardt, Eike (1982) The Essential Frankfurt School Reader. New York: Continuum. Benjamin, Walter (1969) “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” in Illuminations. New York: Schocken. Bloch, Ernst, et al. (1977) Aesthetics and Politics. London: Verso. Boggs, C. (1984) The Two Revolutions: Gramsci and the Dilemmas of Western Marxism. Boston: South End Press. Bronner, Stephen and Kellner, Douglas (1989) Critical Theory and Society: A Reader. New York: Routledge. Calhoun, Craig (1992) Habermas and the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Claussen, Detlev (2008) Theodor W. Adorno: One Last Genius. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Enzensberger, Hans Magnus (1974) The Consciousness Industry. New York: Seabury. G€ ortzen, R. (1981) J. Habermas: Eine Bibliographie seiner Schriften und der Sekund€ ar literatur, 1952–1981. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Gramsci, Antonio (1971) “History of the Subaltern Classes,” and “The Concept of ‘Ideology,’” in Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, eds. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. New York: International Publishers, 52–3 57–8, 375–7. —— (1985) “Cultural Themes: Ideological Material,” in Selections from Cultural Writings, eds. David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, trans. William Boelhower. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 389–90. Green, Marcus E. (ed.) (2011) Rethinking Gramsci. New York: Routledge. Gunster, Shane (2004) Capitalizing Culture: Critical Theory for Cultural Studies. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Habermas, J€ urgen (1989a) Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. —— (1989b) “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article,” in Bronner and Kellner 1989: 136–42. —— (1992) “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” in Calhoun 1992: 421–61.


THE RULING CLASS AND THE RULING IDEAS 31 —— (1998) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Hall, Stuart (1978) “Some Paradigms in Cultural Studies,” Annali 3: 21. —— (1996) “Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity.” In David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (Eds.), Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies. New York: Routledge, 411–40. Herzog, Herta (1941) “On Borrowed Experience. An Analysis of Listening to Daytime Sketches,” Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9(1):65–95. Hohendahl, Peter (1979) “Critical Theory, Public Sphere and Culture: Habermas and His Critics,” New German Critique 16(Winter):89–118. Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor. W. (1972) Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York: Herder and Herder. Jay, Martin (1971) The Dialectical Imagination. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. Kellner, Douglas (1987) “Critical Theory and British Cultural Studies: The Missed Articulation,” in Cultural Methodologies, ed. Jim McGuigan. London: Sage, 12–41. —— (1989) Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity. Cambridge and Baltimore: Polity and Johns Hopkins University Press. Lazarsfeld, Paul (1941) “Administrative and Critical Communications Research,” Studies in Philosophy and Social Science 9(1): 2–16.

Lowenthal, Leo (with Norbert Guttermann) (1949) Prophets of Deceit. New York: Harper. —— (1957) Literature and the Image of Man. Boston: Beacon Press. —— (1961) Literature, Popular Culture and Society. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Marx, Karl, and Engels, Friedrich (1976) “The Ruling Class and the Ruling Ideas,” in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, vol. 5, trans. Richard Dixon. New York: International Publishers, 59–62. —— and —— (1978) The Marx–Engels Reader. New York: Norton. Morrow, Raymond A. (1991) “Critical Theory, Gramsci and Cultural Studies: From Structuralism to Poststructuralism,” in Philip Wexler (ed.). Critical Theory Now. Bristol, PA: Falmer Press, 27–69. Rosenberg, Bernard and White, David Manning (eds.) (1957) Mass Culture. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Silberman, Marc (ed.) (2000) Brecht on Film and Radio. London: Methuen. Steinert, Heinz (2003) Culture Industry. Cambridge: Polity Press. Watson, Timothy (1993) “Comrade Gramsci’s Progeny,” Postmodern Culture 3(3): May. Wheatland, Thomas (2009) The Frankfurt School in Exile. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Wiggershaus, Rolf (1994) The Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Polity Press.

KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS

1 The Ruling Class and the Ruling Ideas

1. The Ruling Class and the Ruling Ideas: How the Hegelian Conception of the Domination of the Spirit in History Arose [30] The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling

material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, consequently also controls the means of mental production, so that the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are on the whole subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relations, the dominant material

Media and Cultural Studies: KeyWorks, Second Edition. Edited by Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner. Ó 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2012 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This chapter has been reproduced from Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The ruling class and the ruling ideas.” In Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5, pp. 59–62. Translated by Richard Dixon. New York: International Publishers, 1976.


32 KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance. The individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think. Insofar, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an historical epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age: thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. For instance, in an age and in a country where royal power, aristocracy and bourgeoisie are contending for domination and where, therefore, domination is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant idea and is expressed as an “eternal law”. The division of labour, which we already saw above (pp. [15–18]) a as one of the chief forces of history up till now, manifests itself also in the ruling class as the division of mental and [31] material labour, so that inside this class one part appears as the thinkers of the class (its active, conceptive ideologists, who make the formation of the illusions of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood), while the others’ attitude to these ideas and illusions is more passive and receptive, because they are in reality the active members of this class and have less time to make up illusions and ideas about themselves. Within this class this cleavage can even develop into a certain opposition and hostility between the two parts, but whenever a practical collision occurs in which the class itself is endangered they automatically vanish, in which case there also vanishes the appearance of the ruling ideas being not the ideas of the ruling class and having a power distinct from the power of this class. The existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class; about the premises of the latter sufficient has already been said above (pp. [18–19, 22–23]).b If now in considering the course of history we detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling

a

See Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5, 1976, pp. 44–8. [Editor’s note to that volume]

b

See Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works, vol. 5, 1976, pp. 48–9 and 52–3. [Editor’s note to that volume]

class itself and attribute to them an independent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that these or those ideas were dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas, if we thus ignore the individuals and world conditions which are the source of the ideas, then we can say, for instance, that during the time the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty, etc., were dominant, during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc. The ruling class itself on the whole imagines this to be so. This conception of history, which is common to all historians, particularly since the eighteenth century, will necessarily come up against [32] the phenomenon that ever more abstract ideas hold sway, i.e., ideas which increasingly take on the form of universality. For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution comes forward from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society, as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.1It can do this because initially its interest really is as yet mostly connected with the common interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class. Its victory, therefore, benefits also many individuals of other classes which are not winning a dominant position, but only insofar as it now enables these individuals to raise themselves into the ruling class. When the French bourgeoisie overthrew the rule of the aristocracy, it thereby made it possible for many proletarians to raise themselves above the proletariat, but only insofar as they became bourgeois. Every new class, therefore, achieves domination only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously; on the other hand the opposition of the non-ruling class to the new ruling class then develops all the more sharply and profoundly. Both these things determine the fact that the struggle to be waged against this new ruling class, in its turn, has as its aim a more decisive and more radical negation of the previous conditions of


THE RULING CLASS AND THE RULING IDEAS 33 society than [33] all previous classes which sought to rule could have. This whole appearance, that the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas, comes to a natural end, of course, as soon as class rule in general ceases to be the form in which society is organised, that is to say, as soon as it is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as general or the “general interest” as ruling. Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the relations which result from a given stage of the mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas “the Idea”, the thought, etc., as the dominant force in history, and thus to consider all these separate ideas and concepts as “forms of self-determination” of the Concept developing in history. It follows then naturally, too, that all the relations of men can be derived from the concept of man, man as conceived, the essence of man, Man. This has been done by speculative philosophy. Hegel himself confesses at the end of the Geschichtsphilosophiec that he “has considered the progress of the concept only” and has represented in history the “true theodicy” (p. 446). Now one can go back again to the producers of “the concept”, to the theorists, ideologists and philosophers, and one comes then to the conclusion that the philosophers, the thinkers as such, have at all times been dominant in history: a conclusion, as we see, already expressed by Hegel. The whole trick of proving the hegemony of the spirit in history (hierarchy Stirner calls it) is thus confined to the following three attempts. [34] No. 1. One must separate the ideas of those ruling for empirical reasons, under empirical conditions and as corporeal individuals, from these rulers, and thus recognise the rule of ideas or illusions in history. No. 2. One must bring an order into this rule of ideas, prove a mystical connection among the successive ruling ideas, which is managed by regarding them as “forms of self-determination of the concept”

€ G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte. [Editor’s note to Collected Works]

c

(this is possible because by virtue of their empirical basis these ideas are really connected with one another and because, conceived as mere ideas, they become self-distinctions, distinctions made by thought). No. 3. To remove the mystical appearance of this “self-determining concept” it is changed into a person – “self-consciousness” – or, to appear thoroughly materialistic, into a series of persons, who represent the “concept” in history, into the “thinkers”, the “philosophers”, the ideologists, who again are understood as the manufacturers of history, as the “council of guardians”, as the rulers.2 Thus the whole body of materialistic elements has been eliminated from history and now full rein can be given to the speculative steed. This historical method which reigned in Germany, and especially the reason why, must be explained from its connection with the illusion of ideologists in general, e.g., the illusions of the jurists, politicians (including the practical statesmen), from the dogmatic dreamings and distortions of these fellows; this is explained perfectly easily from their practical position in life, their job, and the division of labour. [35] Whilst in ordinary life every shopkeeperd is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to be and what he really is, our historiography has not yet won this trivial insight. It takes every epoch at its word and believes that everything it says and imagines about itself is true.

Notes 1 [Marginal note by Marx:] (Universality corresponds to 1) the class versus the estate, 2) the competition, world intercourse, etc., 3) the great numerical strength of the ruling class, 4) the illusion of the common interests, in the beginning this illusion is true, 5) the delusion of the ideologists and the division of labour.) 2 [Marginal note by Marx:] Man ¼ the “thinking human spirit”.

d

This word is in English in the manuscript. [Editor’s note to Collected Works]


INDEX

NOTE: Page numbers in bold indicate a text by an author. Abdel-Malek, Anouar, 349 Abrams, Elliott, 215 Abu-Lughod, Lila, 534–5 Accuracy in Media (AIM), 218 acting in films, 43 action figure films, 45, 465–7 active audience, 92, 94n, 1347, 149, 156n, 232–3; and cultural domination, 237, 528, 534 Adler, Mortimer, 64 administrative audience research, 242 Adorno, Theodor W., 6, 187, 535; audience research, 94n, 156n; culture industries, 28–9, 53–75, 176, 187; on musical experimentation, 415 advertising: amateur digital films, 468; audience as commodity, 165, 170, 173; Barthes’ margarine ad, 89, 95; coded signs, 140; and consumer ethic, 519; and cultural production, 181; and culture industry, 54–74; culture jamming, 606–7; fetishism of consumer, 519; mass communications studies, 9; news media and propaganda, 164, 204–5; Other as commodity, 308–9; and postmodernism, 10; see also consumption aesthetic populism, 408, 425

aesthetic sublimation of culture industry, 54 aesthetics, 40, 251–3; and politics, 48 affect: waning in postmodern culture, 412–14 Africa: “women of Africa” construction, 352 Aijaz, Ahmad, 522n Albrow, Martin, 568 Aldrich, Robert, 277 Alfaro, R. M., 563 Algerian war, 404 Allen, George, 199 Allen, Jeff, 468–9 Allende, Salvador, 91 alluvial folklore, 550 alternative cinema, 268 alternative computing, 386, 479, 484, 485–6 Althusser, Louis, 6, 9, 11, 80–6, 127–8, 172, 187, 431–2 amateur digital filmmaking, 454, 460, 468–9 American Enterprise Institute, 210 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 214–15, 227n American Graffiti (film), 416 American Indians, 392, 393 Americanization: alternatives to, 507, 512–14; Disney comic books in

Chile, 91, 110–14; and hybridization, 590; of television, 562–3, 583; see also cultural imperialism; United States Amin, Samir, 235, 526 Amos, Valerie, 351, 361n amusement and culture industry, 60–4, 70 ancient Rome: slave mentality, 107 Anderson, Benedict, 511, 513, 514, 537, 570 Andrade, Mario de, 557 Ang, Ien, 92, 145–59 antagonism, 146 anthropology: global media effects, 534–5; see also ethnography anthropomorphism in Western humanism, 360–1 anticommunism, 164, 204, 218, 219–20 anti-design of technology, 565 antiglobalization movements and internet, 509, 603 antiwar movements and internet, 599, 601, 603, 605 Anzald ua, Gloria, 348, 508, 539–45 Appadurai, Arjun, 21, 507, 511–23 Arab societies: neopatriarchal society, 573; and “third world women,” 354

Media and Cultural Studies: KeyWorks, Second Edition. Edited by Meenakshi Gigi Durham and Douglas M. Kellner. Ó 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2012 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


620 INDEX architecture: culture industry, 56, 72; modernism, 408–9, 415, 416, and postmodernism, 408, 409, 415–18, 425, 427; reception of, 47–8 Argentina: populism, 551; radio drama, 555–7 Arguedas, 550 Aristotle, 64, 82 arms trade, 518 army: Barthes on, 95, 96 Arnason, Johann P., 569 Arnheim, Rudolf, 43 Arnold, Matthew, 104, 125 Arnoux, Alexandre, 42 art: decoding artworks, 250, 251; as object, 122–3; reproduction of, 7, 37–53, 167; style and culture industry, 56–8 Artaud, Antonin, 405 articulation theory, 166n artisanal modes of labor, 178, 179 Arzner, Dorothy, 281 Asian renaissance, 573 Asif, Ayaz, 461 Atget, Eugene, 40 Atkinson, P., 151 Atomfilms, 465 audiences/audience research, 10; audience power, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192; audience work, 186, 195, 197, 202; as commodity, 165, 242–9; commodity audience and gender, 165, 242–8; critical vs. mainstream research, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151; and culture industry, 54, 56, 61, 64; and developmentalism in Latin America, 563; encoding/ decoding messages, 137–45, 156n, 192; fan culture, 458; and film, 28, 38–9; globalization and television, 583; mass audiences, 45; methodology, 150–2; nanoaudiences, 609; and news media, 255; politics of audience research, 139; politics of representation, 2, 16–18; radio drama in Argentina, 555–7 “audiovisual democracy,” 367 aura of work of art, 37–53, 180, authenticity: and reproduction of art, 39, 49n; see also simulation and simulacra authoritarianism in Disney comics, 113 authority and public sphere, 76, 77 automagic properties of Disney, 115

automation and jobs, 101 Avneri, Uri, 572 Bagdikian, Ben, 206, 223, 226 Baker, Houston, Jr, 575 Bakhtin, Mikhail, 574 Banton, Michael, 345 Baran, P. T., 187 barbarism of culture industries, 57, 58, 59, 62 Barber, R. R., 513, 589 Barkley, Charles, 322 Barnouw, Erik, 190, 213 barrios, 544, 550 Barron, John, 216, 222 Barthes, Roland, 10, 89, 90, 93, 95–100, 126–7, 129, 130, 141; Hall on, 141, 144; Hebdige on, 126–7, 129, 130, 133; “white writing,” 418 base and superstructure, 27, 91, 115–24, 163; and Consciousness Industry, 186–7; political economy and mass communications, 168, Bateson, Gregory, 574 Baudrillard, Jean, 10, 184n, 383, 385, 388–407, 451, 513, 519, 564 Bauman, Z., 569 Baumol’s disease, 180 Baxandall, Michael, 253n BBC, 167, 170, 176, 182, 183 Beckett, Samuel, 419 Bedouin tribes, 104, 534–5 Belson, Dr, 167 Bemba people and “third world women,” 353 Benjamin, Walter, 94n, 428, 443, 451n; art in age of mechanical reproduction, 6, 37–53 Bergson, Henri, 62 Berlinguer, Enrico, 395 Bernhard, Sandra, 317–18 Berube, Michael, 575 Bhabha, Homi, 435, 574 biches, Les (film), 277, 279, 280 Birmingham School see British cultural studies Black athlete, 320, 321, 322, 329 black male body, 314, 315, 316, 320, 323, 325 black masculinity, 318–31, 333, 334 black music in Brazil, 557–9 black nationalism, 313, 314, 336 black women’s writing, 438 Blair, Tony, 6

Blair Witch Project, The (film), 469 Blank, David, 198–9 Bloch, Ernst, 8 blogs, 472, 478, 482, 483, 601, 606–9 Blomberg, Hector Pedro, 557 Blumler, Jay, 148 boards of directors: news media, 208 body: and historical materialism, 168; postmodern feminism, 385, 433–42; see black male body Body Heat (film), 416–17 Boetticher, Budd, 270–1 Bogarde, Dirk, 281 Bolivar, Simon, 546 Bollier, David, 444 Bonaventura Hotel, Los Angeles, 425–7 Bond, Doug, 423 “books, hooks and looks” approach to film, 455 Booth, Ken, 570 Booth, Wayne, 415 booty, 318–37 border cultures, 373, 374, 375, 376, 378 Border Patrol, 544 border zones, 571 Borges, Jorge Luis, 388 Bosch, Juan, 219 Boserup, Ester, 354 Bourdieu, Pierre, 176, 178, 184n, 249–59, 394 bourgeois public sphere, 7, 29, 76, 77, 79n bourgeois ruling class, 27, 32; in Latin America, 547; and myth, 96–8 boyd, dana, 491–504 Boys in the Band, The (film), 278, 280 Bracewell, Ted, 462 Braestrup, Peter, 218–19 Braidotti, Rosi, 437–8, 439 Bramsen, Michelle Bo, 354 Branch, Bob, 465 brands and audience power, 244 Brazil: black music in, 557–9; cultural cannibalism, 588; modernization and national identity, 548, 594; television in, 526, 531, 534, 589, 590, 592 Brecht, Bertolt, 28, 30n, 50n, 431 Breton, Andre, 52n bricolage, 535 Briggs, Asa, 183 Britain: immigration and national identity, 344–5


INDEX 621 British cultural studies, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 91, 92, 93, 94, 263; identity studies, 337–47; influences on, 11; and political economy, 163; structural Marxism, 9 broadband internet access, 605 broadcasting: advertising and news media, 204–5; audience as commodity, 185–204, 242–9; and corporate power, 8, 235; as culture industry, 54, 71; and developmentalism in Latin America, 561; information superhighway, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447; mass communications studies, 10, 186; ratings research as commodity, 244–5; state-controlled broadcasting, 8, 163, 173; see also advertising; audiences; film; news media; radio; television Brooker, Will, 459 Brown, Beverly, 358 Brown, Roger, 277 Brunsdon, Charlotte, 154–6, 440 B€ ucher, Karl, 77 “buddy movies,” 270 built-in obsolescence, 180–1 Bukharin, N., 35 Bunt, John, 465 Burke, Edmund, 423 Bush, George, Sr, 233 Bush, George W., Jr, 598, 599, 600, 602, 604, 606, 607, 608 Butler, Judith, 438–9, 441 Cabanis, Dr., 36n cable television: and commodity audience, 192, 194; and globalization, 232, 527; and ownership, 192 Cage, John, 408 camcorders and amateur filmmaking, 444, 449 Camus, Albert: L’Etranger, 418 Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 243 Canclini, see Garcıa Canclini capitalism: and access to media, 244; and culture industries, 58, 61, 63, 175; developmentalism in Latin America, 561–5, “disorganized capitalism,” 514; and globalization, 507; and ideology, 4; markets and world television, 509; and mass communications, 166–85; moral

view of, 394; organized capitalism, 8; and patriarchy, 15, 243, 247, 248, 249; and postmodernism, 18–19, 407–33; production and distribution of media culture, 18; and reality principle, 394; separation and spectacle, 90; state-monopoly capitalism, 12; and technology, 423–5; Watergate scandal as simulacra, 394–5; see also corporate power; monopoly capitalism Cardenas, Lazaro, 551 Carey, James, 242 Carothers, J. C., 104 cartography and cities, 431–2 cartoons: and culture industry, 61; Disney comic books in Chile, 91, 110–14 Castells, Manuel, 365 castration threat, 267, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274 caudillo regimes, 548, 551 Cavell, Stanley Fall, 538 cell phones and activism, 600–1, 604, 608, 611 censorship, 204, 255 Center for Media and Public Affairs, 218 Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Birmingham, see British cultural studies chance and culture industry, 65 chaos theory and fractal cultural forms, 521–2 Chaplin, Charlie, 45, 52, 61, 66 character construction and stereotyping, 275 Chase-Dunn, Christopher, 589n chatte sans pudeur, La (film), 279, 283n cheapness and culture industry, 69, 70 Chile: Disney comic books and US imperialism, 91, 110–14; effects of development, 559; mass press in, 559–61; protagonist role of state, 548 China: relations with US, 404; television markets, 527 “China” (poem), 421 Chomsky, Noam, 164, 204–31 Church: Barthes on, 89, 96; and public sphere, 76–7; see also religion cinema, see film circus: “creole circus” in Argentina, 555

cities: and cartography, 431–2; and cognitive mapping, 432; and culture industry, 53; see also urbanization civil society: and hegemony, 34; public sphere, 28, 75–9 “civilizations,” 591 Cixous, Helene, 360 Clarke, John, 132 Clarke, Richard, 605 Clarke, Simon, 272 class, see social class class struggle: and State Ideological Apparatus, 81 classical economic theory, 102 Clerks (film), 459, 468, 469 Client Audience Profile (CAP), 212 Clinton, Bill, 6, 444, 452–3 Cocks, Joan, 308 coded signs, 140 codes: violation of, 131; see also encoding/decoding messages cognitive mapping and postmodernism, 432, 433 Cohen, Stan, 133–5 Cold War, 402–6 collage, 422 collecting culture: decollecting, 369–72 collective action, 575, 576 collective identities, 264, 281, 282, 341, 367 Colombia, 512, 553, 562, 565n, 593 colonization: and cultural transactions, 568; production of third world woman, 347–65; see also cultural imperialism; postcolonialism comic strips: Disney and US imperialism, 11, 91, 110–14 commercial broadcasting and world television, 587 commodity/commodification: audience as commodity, 165, 185–204, 242–9; commodity as spectacle, 10, 107–10; in Marxist economic theory, 173; of Other, 264; of postmodern culture, 422; in Warhol’s art, 412; see also consumption common sense, 89, 96–8, 118, 126–8 communal identities, 341 communication, 472, 473, 476, 479; communication technologies, 473, 474, 477


622 INDEX communications, see mass communications communicative action theory, 436 community: cultural communities and television, 586; imagined communities, 341, 594; and mass communications, 445; politics of hybridity, 575–7; virtual communities, 385, 448–9, 457; of women, 438 competition and television, 14, 590; see also ratings computers: digital cinema, 452–71; games, 473; “hacktivism,” 604–6; and hybrid culture, 365; McLuhan presages, 90; and postmodernism, 424; see also internet; new technologies Comte, Auguste, 258 Concepcion, Bievenido, 463 conference games, 446 connotation, 126, 140, 141, 146, 152 Consciousness Industry, 186, 187, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200 conservative hegemony, 4, 93 conspicuous consumption, 197 Constantine, Learie, 345 constructed ethnicities, 512 consumption: consumer society, 9; critical theory as, 122–3; and culture industries, 28, 60; fetishism of the consumer, 519; free time as working time, 197, 198; internet gift economy, 605; of media message, 144n; and Third World, 232; see also advertising; commodity/ commodification Cook, Pam, 274 Cook, the Thief, His Wife and Her Lover, The (film), 316 Cooperative Analysis of Broadcasting (CAB), 249n Coppola, Francis Ford, 416, 452, 469, 470 copyright and cultural production, 180 corporate power: audience as commodity, 165, 185–204, 242–9; capitalism and patriarchy, 243, 247, 248, 249; control of media, 8, 164, 166, 170, 176, 177; and culture industry, 60; and fan culture, 458; global media firms, 530; and information superhighway, 445; internet corporations, 602; news media and propaganda, 164, 204,

206–11, 213–17; and transnational cultural domination, 232; and world television, 590; see also advertising; propaganda Corry, John, 218 Cosby, Bill, 327–9 cottage industries, 239 counterhegemony, 11 Cowie, Elizabeth, 353 Cox, Robert W., 568 creativity and fan culture, 454 “creole circus” in Argentina, 555, 556 creole class in Latin America, 537 Creole cultures, 573 creolization of global culture, 573, 588 crime: reality and simulation, 383 critical audience research, 149, 150, 151 critical theory, 434, 602 Croce, Benedetto, 35 crossover culture, 459, 573 Cubism, 52n, 103 cult value of art, 41, 42 cultural cannibalism, 588 cultural capital, 165, 176, 252, 253 cultural communities and television, 586 cultural difference in Latin America, 546, 548, 565 cultural elites, 113 cultural identity, 385 cultural imperialism, 231–42; and active audience, 233; Disney cartoons in Chile, 91, 113, 116; and globalization, 15, 231, 233, 234, 527, 530, 532, 534; international communications theory, 536, 583, 584; and language, 526; and Latin America, 265, 526; media effects, 232, 534; political imperialism, 234; and racism, 358; resistance to, 241, 526; reverse cultural imperialism, 526; television and globalization, 526, 527; trade barriers, 530–1 cultural linguistic markets, 555, 583, 588 cultural memory and new technologies, 564 cultural pluralism, 565 cultural politics: and deterritorialization, 576; and late capitalism, 430 cultural relativism, 436 cultural reproduction and globalization, 517, 520, 521

cultural studies: conflicting definitions of culture, 156n; critical research, 146; and identity, 263; and political economy, 13–16; postmodern pedagogy, 18–19, 22; postmodern turn, 18; of social life, 9–13, 20, 89, 90; transdisciplinary theory, 22; see also Birmingham School; Frankfurt School; media culture cultural syncretism, 574 cultural transactions and globalization, 511–24 culture: autonomy of, 481; differing concepts of, 578; ideology and hegemony, 4–9, 91; meaning of, 118; see also hybridization; media culture culture industries, 6, 7, 8, 53–75 culture jamming, 484–5, 605–6 Curran, James, 172, 184n, 205, 211, 212 Cutrufelli, Maria Rosa, 351, 352, 353 cyber-tales, 449 Dadaism, 46, 47, 52 Dagwood character, 105 Daix, Pierre, 220, 229n Daly, Mary, 362n dance: gestures of blacks in Brazil, 558 Davis, Hannah, 535 daytime television commodity, 246 de Certeau, Michel, 374, 565 De Man, Henri, 35, 36 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 59, 103, 104 Dean, Howard, 599, 607, 609 Dean, Jodi, 598 Deas, Malcolm, 547 death: and postmodern art, 412; and simulation, 396 “death of the subject” in postmodern stars, 414 Debord, Guy, 10, 107–10, 609 decoding/encoding messages, 137–45, 150, 156n; understanding art, 251 decollecting, 369–72 deconstruction of expression, 410–14 Deleuze, Gilles, 360, 396, 445 Delwit, Pascal, 220 demand management and audiences, 186, 187, 191, 195, 202 democracy: mass democracy and public sphere, 78 demuseumification, 392 denotation, 140


INDEX 623 dependency relationships in feminist discourse, 304, 351 dependency theory: and hybridization, 571; in Latin America, 265, 525, 546, 552 depthlessness of postmodern, 410 Deren, Maya, 462 Derrida, Jacques, 360 Dery, Mark, 605 Desco, 552 desire: and capital, 396; feminist theory and subjectivity, 437, 439; for Other, 308–18; psychoanalysis and film, 267–75 determinism, 97, 115, 147, 385 deterritorialization: of culture, 578; and global cultural flows, 517; and hybrid cultures, 369, 372–7 detribalization by literacy, 104 development theory, 569; communications and development, 595; developmentalism and media in Latin America, 561–5; see also Women in International Development deviance, 324; and stereotyping, 361; and subcultures, 131, 135 Dewaele, Jean-Michel, 220 Diamond Dust Shoes (Warhol), 411–12 dictatorships in Latin America, 551 Diebold corporation, 605, 607 difference, 121; audience research and gender, 246–7; desire and Other, 308–18; and identity, 264; in Latin America, 546, 547, 548; and postmodernism, 412; “third world difference,” 349, 360, 361; see also Other/otherness; sexual difference digital cinema, 452–71 digital divide, 475 directors of news media, 208, 209, 210 discontinuity and modernity in Latin America, 546, 552 discourse, 83; construction of “third world women,” 347–65; encoding/ decoding media messages, 138 Disney: cable audiences and gender, 247; comic books in Chile, 91, 110–14 Disney, Walt: cryogenization, 393 Disneyland, 238, 393–4, 427 “disorganized capitalism,” 514 dissimulation, 394 distribution of media culture, 13, 14, 15; capitalist control, 180

division of labor, 32, 181, 188; academic division of labor, 16; sexual division of labor and “third world women,” 271, 355, 357, 358, 362 “Do-It-Yourself” (DIY) movement, 457, 458, 459, 468, 469, 472, 479, 480, 481, 486 D€ oblin, Alfred, 68 Doctorow, E. L., 417 Dog Day Afternoon (film), 281 dominant cultural order, 141 dominant meanings, 141, 142 dominant-hegemonic position, 143 domination/subordination: British cultural studies, 22; and gay stereotyping in film, 277; and Marxist ideology, 5, 22, 118; obliqueness of power, 377–9; subaltern groups, 5, 34; “third world women” constructions, 347–65; see also cultural imperialism; hegemony; imperialism Dominican Republic, 187 Doob, Leonard, 107 Dorfman, Ariel, 110–15 Douglas, Mary, 131 Downing, John, 478 Dreier, Peter, 211 Dreyer, Carl Theodor, 50, 51 Drouet, Minou, 100n Duhamel, Georges, 47, 52 durable consumer goods, 188–9 Durham, Meenakshi Gigi, 1–24 Durkheim, E´mile, 513 Durtain, Luc, 51, 52 Dyer, Richard, 264, 266, 275–83 East Germany: sports sponsorship, 238 eating habits and taste, 251 “eating the Other,” 308–18 Eco, Umberto, 92, 114 economic capital, 165 economics: and audience as commodity, 186; production and spectacle, 108; and “third world women,” 350; see also capitalism; development theory; Marxism/ Marxist theory; political economy economism, 169, 172 Edison, Thomas, 52 education: and audience as commodity, 195; and cultural capital, 250; and cultural studies, 92; Ideological State Apparatus, 80, 81; and ideology, 127; spectacle, 11;

wikis, 608, 611; for working classes, 12–13, 92 educational capital, 252 ego and self-image, 270 Egypt: media effects on bedouin, 534–5 electricity and communication, 90, 102 Electronic Rental Group (ERG), 167 elevators, 424, 426, 427 Eliot, T. S., 125, 126 elites and culture, 143, 144, 165; cultural capital, 165, 176, 253 Elliott, Philip, 138 Ellison, N. B., 491–504 Elmer-Dewitt, Philip, 444 emergent cultures, 120 EMI Records, 135n Emmanuelle (film), 279 emotion: waning of affect, 384, 407, 412–13, 417, 418 empirical audience research, 145–59 encoding/decoding messages, 92, 94, 137–44; understanding art, 250 enculturation and globalization, 520, 570 Engels, Friedrich, 4, 5, 31–4, 115, 135n Enlightenment: mediascapes, 514, 515–19, 521, 551, 557; see also modernism entertainment and culture industry, 62–4 Enzensberger, Hans Magnus, 187, 443, 444, 451, 462 erotic pleasure in film, 268 escalators, 426 Escobedo, Helen, 368, 379, 380 ESPN cable channel, 247 essences: bourgeois ideology, 98 essentialism: female body and sexuality, 437–8; and hybridization, 576; and racism, 313 essentialist community, 448 Established Order: Barthes on, 95, 96 etherialization, 106 ethnicity see race ethnocentrism, 277, 345, 350, 360, 361 ethnography: audience research, 145, 146, 152; global media effects, 53–6; interpretative ethnography, 152–5 ethnology and simulation, 391, 392, 396


624 INDEX ethnoscapes, 514–16, 518, 521, 522, 571 European (Economic) Community, 531, 584, 596 European Union: supranationalism, 570, 576 Evan, William, 212, 226 everyday life, 90–1, 113, 125–7, 129, 150 Ewen, Elizabeth, 315 Ewen, Stuart, 197, 198, 203 exchange relations: and mass communications, 168, 177; women and kinship structures, 352 exhibition of art, 41 existentialism, 131 exoticism, 97 experts and news information, 216–17, 219, 220 expression and postmodernism, 407–33 Expressionism, 56 extremist websites, 604 Facebook, 497, 498, 499, 500 Fakesters, 498 family: cultural reproduction and globalization, 517, 520, 521 as Ideological State Apparatus, 80–6; ownership of news media, 208, 209; on reality TV, 401–2; representations of “third world women,” 353, 355 Family Television (Morley), 149, 152–5, 158 fans: participatory culture, 384, 452–71, 456–60 fascism: and art, 38; and culture industry, 71; and Frankfurt School, 27–8; and hegemony theory, 27; and reproduction of art, 48–9 fashion and punk subculture, 132–3 Faure, Elie, 252 FCC, 218, 224n, 225n, 226n Featherstone, Mike, 233, 235, 241 feminism: and commodity audience, 242, 243; and cultural studies, 93, 265, 288, 299, 302; feminist political economy, 247–8; and identity, 359; and ideology, 12; internet politics, 602; and postmodernism, 385; psychoanalysis and film, 267–75; representations of “third world women,” 265, 347–65; women as

category of analysis, 347–65; see also gender; patriarchy; women feminization of poverty, 357 Fenby, Jonathan, 223n Ferguson, M., 585, 587, 596 fetishism: of the consumer, 519; fetishistic scopophilia in film, 268–72; production fetishism, 519 feudalism and public sphere, 76–7 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 9 Feulner, Edwin, 216, 288n fianc e e du pirate, La (film), 277, 279 fille aux yeux d’or, La (film), 279, 280 film: and audiences, 7, 28, 39, 42–3; as culture industry, 42–3, 44–5, 46–7; digital cinema, 452–71; global media ownership, 206, 529; Indian film industry, 526; and mechanization, 103; and national cultures in Latin America, 531–2; nostalgia films, 416–17; and psychoanalysis, 45, 265–67; reproduction of art, 7, 38, 41, 42, 44; stereotyping, 275–83 financescapes, 514, 515, 516, 518 first media age: limitations, 443 First World: cultural domination, 231, 232; use of term, 225, 233, 237 Fishman, Mark, 214, 227 Fitz-Roy, Don, 463 “flak,” 164, 204, 217–20, 222 Flaubert, Gustave, 421 Flax, Jane, 439, 441 Focillon, Henri, 252 folk culture, 457, 458; alluvial folklore, 550 “folk devils,” 135, 136 Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 236, 237 food and taste, 250 football hooligans, 133 Ford, Gerald, 396, 398 Fordism, 8 Forster, E. M., 104 Foster, Hal, 309, 310, 3131 Foucault, Michel, 18, 146, 311, 316, 359–60, 363, 413, 437, 481, 489 Fowler, Mark, 224n fractal cultural forms, 521 France: critical theory, 9, 10 “franchise” system in media, 455, 456, 461, 465 Franco, Francisco, 396, 399 Franco, Jean, 370

Frankfurt School, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 19, 91, 92, 147; base/superstructure theory, 172, 173; and demand management, 187 free lunch for audiences, 194 free time as propaganda, 197–9 Freedom House, 218 freedom of information and internet, 602 freenets, 605 Freud, Sigmund, 35, 45, 267, 268–70, 337, 384, 387, 410, 413, 437, 467, 555 Friedman, J., 507, 509n, 510, 586, 594, 595, 596 Friendly, Fred, 224n, 231n Friendster, 494–6 Fulbright, J. W., 227n functional networks, 571 Futurism, 48, 52, 425 Fyvolent, Robert, 465, 471 Galbraith, J. K., 103, 186, 187, 203 Galeano, E., 548, 554, 566 Gance, Abel, 39, 42, 49, 50 garces, Les (film), 279, 283 Garcıa Canclini, Nestor, 265, 365–80 Garnham, Nicholas, 166–85, 200, 203, 243 gaucho literature, 558 gays and lesbians: stereotyping and film, 275–83 gaze: male gaze and film, 267–75 gender: audience research differences, 245–7; and commodity audience, 242–9; film and visual pleasure, 267–75; gendered violence in media, 521; and hegemony, 11; see also feminism; patriarchy; sexual difference; women Genet, Jean, 130 genital mutilation, 351, 356, 362, 364 genre, 472; themes, 480–4; theory, 479–80 geo-cultural media markets, 584, 591–2 George Lucas in Love (amateur film), 454, 460, 464, 470 Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 217 Geraghty, Christine, 280, 283 Gerbner, George, 139, 144n, 242 Germany: culture industry, 27, 33, 56, 59, 66; see also Frankfurt School gesture: black music in Brazil, 558


INDEX 625 Gibbon, Edward, 104 Giddens, Anthony, 509, 524, 525, 527, 537, 569; structuration theory, 583, 585, 586, 587 Gide, Andre, 254 Giesso, Osvaldo, 368 gift economy and internet, 605 Gilder, George, 444, 451n Gilroy, Paul, 265, 266, 337–46, 433 global capital, 515, 612 global capitalism, 18, 93, 507, 524, 531, 604 global memory, 572 global pluralism, 527 global products, 11 global sociology, 579 “global village,” 512 globalization, 13, 14, 16, 21, 22, 511–24; ambiguity of, 21; conceptualizations of, 507–9; and cultural imperialism, 526, 578, 583, 587, 595; and cultural reproduction, 520; fractal cultural forms, 521; global media flows, 508, 530–4; homogenization and heterogenization, 534, 578, 579–80; and hybridity, 567–82; and ideology, 2; and internet activism, 603–6; and local, 507, 508, 527, 528, 570, 604, 606; media effects, 527–30; of media forms, 527; melange effect, 568, 570, 571, 572–3; and modernity, 578, 583, 586; negative views of, 507; and postmodernism, 507; scapes of global cultural economy, 508, 513, 514–16, 571; of television, 509, 527; see also cultural imperialism; global cultural flows glocalization, 570, 583, 588–90, 595, 597 Gloucester, Duke of, 104 Godelier, M., 127 Golding, Peter, 163, 173, 185, 187, 229, 230 Gombrich, E. H., 103 G omez-Pe~ na, Guillermo, 376 Google, 602; Google Bombing, 606, 607 Gori, Paolo, 379n, 380 graffiti on monuments, 368 Gramsci, Antonio, 5, 8, 11, 34–7, 80, 118, 121, 129, 346; Williams on, 118–20

grassroots culture, see participatory culture gratifications research, 138, 146, 147, 148, 149 Great Dictator, The (film), 66 Greeks: production of art, 38, 40, 47 Greene, Graham, 96 Grimme, Hubert, 50 Groening, Matt, 468 Grossberg, Larry, 93n, 94, 146, 151, 152, 156n, 157n Guattari, Felix, 360, 364, 445 guest-workers, 514, 516, 592 Gunning, Tom, 462 Gurevitch, Michael, 148, 242 Gutierrez, Eduardo, 556 Gutierrez, L. H., 567 Gwertzman, Bernard, 221 Habermas, J€ urgen, 5, 7, 8, 36, 75–9, 84, 187, 435, 436, 441 habitus, 251, 253, 520 hackers/“hacktivism,” 598, 604–5, 612 Hafner, Katie, 606, 612 hailing, 84, 85, 86 Hairspray (film), 316 Hall, Stuart, 11, 12, 29, 131, 137–45; articulation theory, 166n; and audience research, 172, 173, 242; British national identity385; critique of, 172–3; encoding/decoding, 1, 94, 128, 129, 137–44; and “real me,” 434–5, 436–7, 438, 439 Hall, Thomas D., 581 Halon, Aaron, 466 Hammersley, M., 151 Hannerz, Ulf, 573, 578, 580 Hansberry, Lorraine, 311 Hanson, Duane, 423 Hardt, M., 508, 509, 612 Harvey, David, 240, 436, 569 Haskell, Molly, 270 Hayles, Katherine, 450 Heart Condition (film), 313 Hebdige, Dick, 92–4, 124–36 Hegel, G. W. F., 31, 33, 50–2, 429 hegemonic viewpoint, 143 hegemony, 2, 4–9, 14, 16, 21; in base and superstructure model, 81; in British cultural studies, 11; conservative hegemony, 5–6; and culture, 5–9; and stereotyping, 277 Heidegger, Martin, 411, 415, 422, 423, 426, 437, 486

Held, David, 570, 576 Hendrich, Jeff, 465 Henze, Paul, 230 Herder, Johann Gottfried, 125 Herman, Edward, 164, 204–30 hermeneutics, 384, 387 Herr, Michael, 428, 433n Herzog, Herta, 27, 31 heterogenization and homogenization in global cultures, 534, 578, 579–80 hieroglyphs, 42 high culture, 187 high modernism, 408, 409, 410, 412 Hill-Collins, Patricia, 264, 266n, 318–37 Hinduism and deterritorialization, 517 Hinkson, John, 522 hip-hop, 319, 320, 321, 322, 324, 335n historical materialism, 35, 168, 171, 173 historical novel, 293, 416–19 history: historical differences in Latin America, 546; historical memory and urbanization, 367–9; historicism and postmodern, 415–16; and hybridization, 578; privation of, 96–7; see also nostalgia; periodization; time/temporality Hitchcock, Alfred, 272–3 Hitler, Adolf, 66, 73, 74, 399, 466 Hoggart, Richard, 11, 12, 13, 91, 125, 126, 265, 307n, 344, 345, 346 home movies, 462, 463, 470 homoeroticism in film, 270 homogenization and heterogenization in global cultures, 349, 358, 507, 513–20, 534 homogenous packaged goods (HPG), 188 homologous structures, 116, 137 homosexuality: stereotyping and film, 275–83, 331, 334 hooks, bell, 264, 308–18 Horkheimer, Max, 6, 53–75, 172, 176, 184n, 187 Horowitz, David, 228n Hosken, Fran, 351, 354, 356, 364 Hoskins, C., 590 hotel architecture: Bonaventura Hotel, 425–7 housework/housewives: and consumption, 198, 199, 246, 264, 288, 290, 306; and “third world women,” 355, 356


626 INDEX Howard, Ron, 469 Huet, A., 182, 184, 185 Hughes, Langston, 313 human interest stories, 256 Hume, David, 102 Huntington, Samuel, 591, 596 hustler, 282, 325, 327 Huston, Perdita, 354 Huxley, Aldous, 51 hybridization: and Americanization, 532; and globalization, 582–97; globalization and national television, 582–7; hybrid cultures in Latin America, 365, 379; and modernization, 599; politics of hybridity, 575–7; structural hybridization, 570–2; theories of, 573–5 hyperreality, 18, 385, 398, 450 Ice Cube 324 iconic signs, 139, 140 iconography in film, 264, 277–8, 368 identification: and culture industry, 64; and mythologization, 97, 133 identity: geo-cultural markets, 591; and global media flows, 508, 509; and globalization, 598, 570; and hybrid cultures, 532, 591; politics of representation, 524; and postmodern discourse, 385, 434, 435, 442; and technological innovation, 442, 466, 488, 450, 497, 498, 500; see also national identity; self; subjectivity Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA), 80–6, 602 ideologism: Barthes on, 99, 100 ideology, 1, 2, 3, 17, 20; advertising and news media, 173; Althusser on, 9, 80–6; anticommunism and news media, 219–20, 222; British cultural studies, 11, 12, 93; and culture industries, 4–9; in Disney comic books, 11, 110–14; and gay stereotyping in film, 275–83; Gramsci on, 118; incorporation of subcultures, 131–2; political economy of mass communications, 168, 173; State Ideological Apparatuses, 80–6, 168; see also propaganda ideoscapes, 514–28 Illich, Ivan, 601 imaginaire: global cultures, 512–13

Imaginary, 415 imagined communities, 341, 365 imagined worlds, 514, 515, 541 immigration: guest-workers, 514, 516, 590, 592; and national identity, 544; see also migration imperialism: Barthes’ African soldier image, 10, 89, 126; decline of, 233–4; and Disney comic books, 11, 110–14; and globalization, 525, 534, 569, 576, 580n; and Western feminist discourse, 350; see also colonization; cultural imperialism imperialist nostalgia, 310, 312 impulse purchasing, 196 India: deterritorialization, 517; film industry, 517, 526; media and myths, 589; non-working housewives, 355; oriental and European culture, 104 India Cabaret (film), 517 indigenization of global culture, 531–2 individuality: and culture industry, 69; and gay stereotyping in film, 280, 281; and State Ideological Apparatuses, 82, 83–5; subjects and ideology, 83–5 industrialization of culture, 164, 172, 175, 179, 182–3; Latin America, 549; newspapers, 205; see also culture industries information: freedom of information and internet, 602; media sources, 213–17; new technologies and postmodernism, 443, 484, 485, 486; see also mass communications information and communication technologies (ICTs): and oppositional politics, 598; see also internet; new technologies information superhighway, 443–5, 446, 447 informational broadcasting, 173 initiation ceremonies, 353 Innis, Harold, 163, 203 inoculation, 89, 96 Institute for Social Research, Frankfurt, 27, 28 intellectual property: corporate control of media, 445, 455, 457, 458; and media convergence, 470; piracy, 530–1; rights and internet, 459 interactivity: virtual communities, 470, 476, 611; see also internet interculturalism, 574, 578

International Association for Mass Communication conference, 243 international communications, 508, 524–39 international relations theory, 576 International Style, 409, 426 internet, 443–5; blogs, 509, 601, 605, 606–9; digital cinema, 452–71; “hacktivism,” 604–6; narratives on, 384, 449–51; and oppositional politics, 510, 597–613; virtual communities, 385, 447, 448, 449 interpellation of subjects, 84–5 interpretation and audience research, 152, 153, 154, 557 interpretative ethnography, 142 intersubjectivity and audience research, 157 intertextuality, 413 intrinsic asynchrony, 571 IQ levels, 105 Iran, 530, 589, 607, 612–13 Iraq War and internet, 598, 599, 601, 607, 608 Irigary, Luce, 360 Irvine, Reed, 219 Islam: “third world women,” 351, 354, 357 Italy: politics and simulation, 395; sports sponsorship, 238 Iwabuchi, K., 588 Iyer, Pico, 512 James, C. L. R., 337 Jameson, Fredric, 18–19, 29, 383, 387n, 407–33, 512, 522n, 569 Janus, N., 537 Japanization, 507, 514 Japonisme, 577 Jarmusch, Jim, 316 jazz and culture industry, 58, 59, 60 Jeanne d’Arc (film), 50n Jeffery, Patricia, 351, 354 Jenkins, Henry, 384, 452–71, 476 Jesuits, 390 Johnson, Lyndon B., 248, 490, 500 Johnson, Richard, 94 Journal of Communication, 242 journalism: Bourdieu on, 255, 256; and public sphere, 78–9; see also press Judge, Mike, 428 Jung, C. G., 107 “justice bomb,” 607


INDEX 627 Kahn, Richard, 21, 597–613 Kaiserpanorama, 52n Kant, Immanuel, 59, 250 Kantian schematism, 55 Kapor, Mitchell, 444 Katz, Elihu, 145, 148, 231, 449 Katz, J., 266 Katzenberg, Jeffrey, 469 Keen, Sam, 311 Kellner, Douglas, 1–23, 597–613 Kellogg, Robert, 280 Kennedy, John F., 219, 396, 398 Kennedy, Robert, 396 Khalistan, 517 Killing of Sister George, The (film), 277 Kinder, Marsha, 455 king, death of, 396, 399 kinship structures: “third world women,” 350, 352, 353, 358 Kissinger, Henry, 216 Klapp, Orrin E., 276, 283n Klapper, Joseph, 195 Kofman, Sarah, 360 Kottak, Conrad Philip, 534 Kracauer, Siegfried, 8 Kraus, Karl, 258 Kriegel, Annie, 220 Kristeva, Julia, 360 Kronke, Clay, 464 Kuchar, George, 462 Kuznets, Lois Rostow, 467 labor: audience work, 165, 187, 195, 197; cultural production, 178; and identity, 350; non-working housewives in India, 355; sexual division of labor and “third world women,” 357; slave labor in Brazil, 557; see also division of labor; work labor movement in Latin America, 552 labor theory of value, 197 Labour Party and news media, 205 Lacan, Jacques, 168, 410, 419, 431, 432 lace makers in India, 355, 356, 363n Laclau, Ernest, 551 Lacouture, Jean, 228 Lam, Bernard, 106 Landi, O., 551 landscapes, see scapes language: abuse by subcultures, 131; of bourgeois mythologist, 133; and cultural imperialism, 583, 584; cultural linguistic markets, 584, 585, 390; and culture industry, 57, 73;

encoding/decoding, 137; in hybrid cultures, 375; ideoscapes, 518; and media flows, 586; and postmodern, 414, 415; see also semiology/ semiotics Language Poetry, 421 Lascaux caves, 392 Lasch, Christopher, 419 Lash, Scott, 514 late capitalism and postmodernism, 407–33, 450 Latin America: dependency theory, 372, 552; developmentalism and media, 561–5; difference in, 545; discontinuity and modernity, 546–9; globalization and mass media, 508, 526, 531, 532; as hybrid culture, 265, 365, 373; hybrid sites, 571; media and politics, 530, 531, 532; nationalism and transnationalism, 545–67; nations and states development, 545, 546–8; political role of media, 546; see also Argentina; Brazil; Chile; Mexico; Peru laughter and culture industry, 62 Lavie, Smadar, 574 Lazarsfeld, Paul, 28, 89 Lazreg, Marina, 354, 362n, 363n Le Corbusier, 408, 424, 426 Lechner, Norbert, 366 Ledeen, Michael, 219, 229n Lefebvre, Henri, 90, 129, 131, 415 legal ideology, 83; State Ideological Apparatus, 80 Lego films, 466 Leiken, Robert, 220, 228n leisure time, 197, 355 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 44, 81, 430 Leonardo da Vinci, 52n Lerner, Daniel, 525 lesbians: stereotyping and film, 275, 277, 279–280 Levi-Strauss, Claude, 10, 29, 131, 252 Levitt, T. N., 195 Levy, Bernard-Henri, 259n Levy, Joseph, 460 Levy, Mark, 242 Lewis, Sir George, 211 Lewis, Wyndham, 105 liberalism: and culture industries, 54, 58, 59, 67; liberal model of public sphere, 77–8; and petit-bourgeois, 70; and political hegemony, 6 libido, 270, 273

Lichter, Linda and Robert, 218 Liebes, Tamar, 145, 148 Liebling, A. J., 106, 194 Lievrouw, Leah, A., 471–91 Lifetime cable channel, 247 light art, 60 Linder, Staffen B., 196, 197 Lindsay, Beverley, 351, 352 liras populares, 560 literacy, 91, 104, 105, 598 literature: postmodern historical novel, 416; and society, 121 lithography, 38 Little, Kenneth, 345 Livant, Bill, 199, 200, 202, 243, 244 Llewellyn, Keri, 464 Llosa, Mario Vargas, 555 local and globalization: glocalization, 570, 583, 588, 589, 590; internet activism, 602; media culture, 524–39 look: women as image in film, 264, 267–74 Lorde, Audre, 362 Lott, Trent, 607 lotteries, 197 Loud family reality TV show, 400–1 Loudest Whisper, The (film), 281 Lovell, Terry, 176 Lowenthal, Leo, 27, 28 Lucas, George, 454, 455, 456, 458, 459, 460, 463, 464, 470 Lucasfilm and fan culture, 459 Luce, Henry, 527 Lukacs, Georg, 99, 117, 416, 431 Lull, James, 534 Lynch, Kevin, 431 Lyotard, Jean-Franc¸ois, 396, 434, 435, 449, 450, 513 MacLaine, Shirley, 281 macro-regionalism, 571 M€ adchen in Uniform (film), 281 Madonna, 468 mainstream audience research, 145, 146, 242; uses and gratifications research, 146, 147, 148 male gaze and film, 270–3 male sexual politics, 351 Mallarme, Stephane, 40 Mandel, Ernest, 169, 408–9, 423, 424, 432 Manet, Edouard, 254 Mann, Michael, 571 Mann, Thomas, 415


628 INDEX Mansfield, Harvey, 227n Manzoni, Alessandro, 35–6 Mao Zedong, 118, 399 maps: cartography and cities, 431; of meaning, 128; see also cognitive mapping Marcuse, Herbert, 6, 12, 181, 188, 429 margarine ad, 89, 96 marginalization, 205 Mariategui, Jose Carlos, 547 Marin, L., 393 Marinetti, Emilio Filippo Tommaso, 48, 424 market capitalism and world television, 587–8 Marnie (film), 272, 273 marriage and “third world women,” 353 Martı, J., 546 martial arts tradition, 518 Martın-Barbero, Jesus, 545–67 Marvin, Carolyn, 446 Marx, Karl, 3, 4, 5, 13, 19, 21, 31–3; Althusser on, 82, 85n; Benjamin on, 37; Garnham on, 168, 169, 170, 171, 174, 175; Gilroy on, 343; Gramsci on, 35; Hall on, 137; Hebdige on, 127, 129, 132; Jameson on, 409, 424, 429, 430; McRobbie on, 435; Smythe on, 199; Williams on, 116–17 Marxism/Marxist theory, 5, 29; and audience as commodity, 187, 202, 243; and global cultural economy, 514, 518; identity and cultural studies, 342; modernity and globalization, 568; political economy of mass communications, 243; and populism in Latin America, 552; pro-modernist critique of postmodernism, 435; State Ideological Apparatuses, 9, 80, 83, 85; structural Marxism, 9; see also base and superstructure; British cultural studies; capitalism; neoMarxist theory; ruling class mass communications, 10, 16; encoding/decoding messages, 137–44; and hybrid cultures, 365–80; Ideological State Apparatus, 80, 173; mass communication studies, 122, 156; nationalism and transnationalism in Latin America, 545–67; and new

technologies, 100–7; and political economy, 166–85; and postmodernism, 442–52; and subversion, 550; see also audiences; broadcasting; information; internet; media culture; new technologies; press; print culture; telephone mass culture, 12, 16, 200; culture industries, 7, 8, 27; Disney and cultural elite, 113; mechanical reproduction of art, 28, 37–53; and national cultures in Latin America, 549–52; see also popular culture mass democracy and public sphere, 29, 78–9 mass media, see mass communications; media culture mass movements and mechanical reproduction, 39, 48, 53 mass press in Latin America, 559–61 Massey, Doreen, 577 massification in Latin America, 373, 549–52 materialism, 167, 170; see also historical materialism Mather, Evan, 460, 465–6 Mattelart, Armand, 91, 110–14 McChesney, Robert, 455 McLennan, Gregor, 434, 435, 436, 438 McLuhan, Marshall, 10, 13, 20, 100–7, 384, 401, 443, 451n McRobbie, Angela, 18, 385, 433–41 mechanical reproduction of art, 7, 37–53; see also culture industries media culture: and corporate power, 8, 13–16; and developmentalism in Latin America, 562–6; global media flows, 508, 530–4; globalization and social movements, 21–2; ideology and hegemony, 4–9; local and globalization, 534; and national cultures in Latin America, 549–52; pace of change, 19; political economy, 13–16, 163; politics of representation, 16–18; postmodernism, 18–19; and social life, 9–13; and state control, 21–2; see also mass communications media effects and global media flows, 530–4 Media Institute, 218 media and message, 100–7 media ownership, 527–30 mediascapes, 514–18, 521

mediation, 109, 116, 123 Meehan, Eileen R., 15, 242–9 Mekas, Jonas, 462 melange effect of globalization, 570, 571, 572–3, 574 melodrama in Argentinian radio, 555, 556, 557 Melucci, Alberto, 576 members types and gay stereotyping, 275–6 memory: cultural memory, 564; global memory, 572; historical memory, 367–9; see also nostalgia mental production and political economy, 170, 172, 17881 Mepham, Joseph, 130 merchandising: media convergence, 456 merged evolution, 579 mergers in media industry, 14, 224n mestizaje culture, 508, 541, 546, 550, 573, 588 Mexico: interpreting monuments, 368–9; migration and hybrid cultures, 539–44; muralism, 548; state and development of nation, 548, 549 Meyers, Janet, 281 Miami Vice (TV series), 248n micro-regionalism, 571 Microsoft, 599 Middleton, Sue, 299n Midsummer Night’s Dream, A (film), 42 Mies, Maria, 355 migration: and cultural reproduction, 508, 514, 586; and globalization, 569, 570; and hybrid cultures, 373, 374, 549, 574, 578; massification and populism in Latin America, 549–52; see also deterritorialization; immigration Miliband, Ralph, 172, 177–8 mimesis and cognitive mapping, 431 mimicry and hybridity, 574 Min-ha, Trinh T., 524, 527 Minces, Juliette, 351, 353, 354, 359, 365n mirror image, 269, 333 Mirus, R., 590 mixed times, 571 Mnouchkine, Ariane, 572, 577 mobile phones and activism, 599–601, 604, 608, 611n Modares, Mina, 354


INDEX 629 modernism: architecture, 408; and globalization, 569; hybridization and modernization, 577; modernization in Latin America, 588; postmodernism as stage in, 408; transition to postmodernism, 408–9 modernization theory, 569 modes of production, 9, 13, 23; capitalism and mass communications, 174, 175, 176, 178–81; hybridization and globalization, 571; and mode of information, 385, 447 Mohammadi, Annabelle Sreberny, see Sreberny, Annabelle Mohanty, Chandra Talpade, 265, 347–64 monads, 413, 414 Monde, Le, 255, 257 monopoly capitalism, 6, 8; audience as commodity, 185–204; political economy and mass communications, 172, 175, 176 Monsivais, C., 554 monuments, 367–9 moral panics, 135 Morin, Edgar, 554 Morley, David, 145, 146, 147, 148, 152–6 Morocco: research on media effects, 535 Morocco (film), 272 mother in feminist discourse, 435, 438 Mottallebi, Sina, 607 movies, see film MUDs, 446, 448, 450, 498 multiculturalism, 265, 346; see also hybridization multinational capitalism, 409, 425 multiple identities, 572 Mulvey, Laura, 263–4, 267–74 Munch, Edvard: The Scream, 412–13, 414 muralism in Mexico, 548 Murdoch, Rupert, 527, 528, 529, 530 Murdock, Graham, 163, 187, 201, 202, 243–4; and Blindspot Debate, 243 music: black music in Brazil, 557–9; crossover culture, 314; internet downloading, 605; and sport, 321–2 Muslim societies and “third world women,” 353, 356, 357

MySpace, 496, 498, 500 myth/mythologies, 89, 96–100, 123, 126, 157n; Naipaul, V. S., 575 Nair, Mira, 517 Name-of-the-Father, 287 Nancy, Jean-Luc, 448–9 nanoaudiences, 609 Napoleon Bonaparte, 103 Napster, 470, 604, 605 narratives on the internet, 449–51 Nash Bridges (TV series), 248n nation-states: and deterritorialization, 517; and globalization, 519, 583, 584, 586; and internet, 586; national television and globalization, 585, 586 National Council of the Churches of Christ (NCC), 214 national identity, 265, 338, 344, 583, 595; and globalization, 509, 583; in Latin America, 548, 549–52; and local cultures, 554–5; mass communications and community, 552–60; and world television, 582–97 National Socialism and culture industry, 27, 28 National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), 530 national television and globalization, 582–97 “ Nationwide” Audience (Morley), 145–7, 152 Neale, Steve, 146 Nef, J. U., 106 negotiated code/meaning, 143, 144 Negri, J., 612 neither-norism, 89, 97 Nelson, Benjamin, 569 neo-Marxist theory, 514, 519, 587 neopatriarchal society, 573–4 network, 483, 486, 487; see social network sites new audience research, 92 New Criticism, 122, 123 new feminist theory, 440 new media, 471, 484, 486 new media culture, 90 new revisionism, 532 New Sentence poetry, 421

new technologies: capitalism and mass communications, 165, 183, 377; and hybrid cultures, 183; in Latin America, 563–5; medium and message, 90, 100–7; participatory culture, 454–70; and postmodernism, 385, 442–52; see also computers; internet; mass communications “New Times” politics, 434 New York Times, The, 605 Newman, Cardinal, 103 News Corporation, 528, 529, 530 news media and propaganda, 108, 204–31 newspapers, see press Nietzsche, F. W., 104, 340 Nightingale, Virginia, 156n 9/11 terror attacks, 580, 598, 602, 604, 607 Nixon, Richard, 201, 225 “no-name brands,” 196 Non-Aligned Movement, 235 “non-material production,” 179 Nordenstreng, K., 187, 592 normalcy: and gay stereotyping in film, 278 nostalgia: “imperialist nostalgia,” 310; nostalgia films, 416; “nostalgia for the present,” 512; of postmodernism, 417 nuclear deterrent and simulation, 388 Nussbaum, Joe, 464 Nye, Joseph, 237 objectification, 252 O’Brien, Sebastian, 466 obscene in art, 251 obsolescence, 180 Oedekerk, Steve, 467 Olalquiaga, Celeste, 383 Oliveira, Omar Souki, 237, 533 Olivia (film), 279 Omvedt, Gail, 359 open-source software, 607 oppositional code, 144 oppositional politics and internet, 489 oppression, 11, 12; women as category of analysis, 359, 363, 378 organized capitalism, 8 oriental culture and literacy, 104 orientalization of the world, 573 Ortiz, Fernando, 556


630 INDEX Ortiz, Renato, 373 Other/otherness, 97, 105, 134, 308–18; “third world women” constructions, 348, 349, 350; Woman as, 268 Ouderkirk, Herbert, 530 ownership of media, 204–31, 384, 455; and globalization, 527–30; limitations on, 206 PP file trading, 605 Pacino, Al, 281 Paik, Nam June, 422 painting and film, 44, 45, 46, 47 Panofsky, Erwin, 250 panopticanism, 400–2 Pareja, R., 553 Park Wars: The Little Menace (amateur film), 462 Parmar, Pratibha, 351, 361 parody: and modernism, 415; Star Wars film series, 452–71 participatory culture: digital film, 384, 452–71; see also internet participatory journalism, 486 particularity and globalization, 570 Pascal, Blaise, 100 pastiche, 385, 476; historical novels, 417; nostalgia films, 416 paternalism in Western feminism, 363n patriarchy: Arab neopatriarchal society, 573–4; and capitalism, 15, 243, 247, 249n, 313; psychoanalysis and film, 268; and romance, 268, 300, 308; and “third world women,” 349, 350 patronage and cultural production, 181, 182, 212 Pax, Salam, 607 Peasant Shoes (Van Gogh), 410–12 peer to peer file trading, 605 Peirce, C. S., 139 Pentagon: public information service, 214, 215 perception, 39, 40; selective perception, 142 Perelman, Bob: “China,” 421–2 periodization, 409, 410, 423, 424 Peron, Eva (Evita), 551, 557 Peron, Juan Domingo/Peronism, 551, 556 Perry, Steve, 314 Peru and national identity, 548 petit-bourgeois, 97, 98, 100, 133 phallocentrism and film, 267–8 Philippines and Americanization, 512

Philips Electronic, 167, 183, 233 photocopiers, 371, 456 photography, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 412 photorealism, 408 Pieterse, Jan Nederveen, 508, 567–82, 583, 584 piracy, 530–1 Pirandello, Luigi, 42, 43, 50 Pirzada women in purdah, 354 Pius XII, Pope, 106 Podesta Circus, 556 political economy, 13–16, 164, 165; and cultural studies, 156; and culture industry, 28, 85; and mass communications, 166–85; national development in Latin America, 545–67; State Ideological Apparatuses, 85; see also capitalism; globalization political public sphere, 76, 78 politics of hybridity, 574 politics and media: “audiovisual democracy,” 367; internet and oppositional politics, 5, 27, 36, 44, 65, 509, 597–613; in Latin America, 559–61; news media, 221–2 politics of representation, 16–18, 263–7 politics of signification, 144 polysemy, 92, 527 popular culture, 92, 200; aesthetic populism, 408–9; black music in Brazil, 557–9; and new technologies in Latin America, 562; see also mass culture; participatory culture; populism popular press in Latin America, 508, 559–60 populism: aesthetic populism, 408–9; media and national cultures in Latin America, 546, 559–61; and national development in Latin America, 562–3 pornography and simulation, 437 Portantiero, J. C., 552 Portman, John, 425–8 postcolonial, 434, 435, 436, 568, 572, 574, 588 Poster, Mark, 355, 386, 442–51 postindustrial society, 432 postmodern pedagogy, 23 postmodernism: and cultural domination, 234, 407–33; and feminism, 385, 433–41; globalization theories, 507, 602;

hybrid cultures, 377; hybridity theories, 507; in late capitalism, 407–33, 507; nostalgia mode, 416, 417; postmodern turn, 18–19, 384, 385; pro-modernist critiques, 434; videos, 370–1 poststructuralism: and globalization, 602; hybridity theories, 507 Potempkin, Harry, 462 poverty: feminization of poverty, 357; and news media propaganda, 229n Powell, Judge Lewis, 216 power: audience power, 187, 189, 191–2; obliqueness of power, 377–9; representations of “third world women,” 347–65; soft power, 234, 235; see also corporate power; patriarchy; state precession of simulacra, 388–407 preferred meanings, 141 press, 5, 27, 36, 44, 65; advertising and news media propaganda, 187; audience as commodity, 185, 186; built-in obsolescence, 180; Disney comic strips and US imperialism, 110–14; industrialization, 205; newspaper pricing, 190; political patronage, 181, 182; and public sphere, 78; radical working-class press, 206, 212, 559–61; see also journalism pricing for audience power, 190 prime-time television commodity, 247 primitive: Western fascination, 308–11 print culture, 253; medium and message, 107–16; “print capitalism,” 513; and reproduction of art, 45; threat from television, 256; see also press private sphere: and State Ideological Apparatuses, 80, 81; see also public sphere theory privation of history, 96 Probot Productions, 466 production: base and superstructure, 27; critical theory as consumption, 122–3; mental production and political economy, 170, 175, 178–81; national television, 531; production fetishism, 519; production system, 285, 286, 287, 355; productivity of text, 147; and spectacle, 108; see also labor; mass production; modes of production


INDEX 631 professional code, 143 professionalism and economic reality, 177 profit orientation, 164, 204, 205 propaganda: and public sphere, 77; see also Disney comic books; news media and propaganda proverbs, 98 pseudoindividuality, 69 psychiatry: detribalization by literacy, 104 psychoanalysis: critical theory as consumption, 122–3; and film, 45, 267–75 public information and news media, 214, 225 public opinion, 29, 36, 75–9; and Disney, 112 public service broadcasting, 163, 193 public sphere, 28–30, 75–9, 451 publishers, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 290, 293, 294, 296 Pudovkin, W., 51 Pulido, Gonzalez, 557 Pulp Fiction (film), 454, 467–8, 469 Pulp Phantom (amateur film), 469 punks as subculture, 130, 131, 132, 133 purdah system, 354, 356, 357 qualitative audience research, 158 quantification of quality, 98 questionnaire, 284, 285, 289, 301, 304 Qui-Gon Show, The (amateur film), 465 race: constructed ethnicities, 512; creolization of culture, 573; and cultural studies, 89, 92; and hegemony, 5; and identity, 265 racism, 12, 13, 16; cinematic treatment, 313, 314, 317; new racism, 320, 332–4 radicals: as news media source, 217; working-class press, 205, 211, 559 radio, 90; and developmentalism in Latin America, 547, 550; and national cultures in Latin America, 547, 550, 589 radionovela, 556 Radway, Janice, 264, 283–308 Ramses II mummy, 391–3

rap music, 264, 335n Raphael: Sistine Madonna, 50 Rather, Dan, 607 ratings: Bourdieu on morality of, 249n, 254, 255–7; and commodity audience, 190 rationalism: and impulse purchasing, 196; and print culture, 104 Read, Sir John, 134 Read, W. H., 590 reader, 284–308 Reagan, Ronald, 217, 218, 219, 220 real: and simulation, 391, 393, 400; see also authenticity “real labor process,” 174 “real me,” 384, 385, 433–41 Rear Window (film), 272 reception theory and global media, 534 recognition and ideology, 84 regionalism, 570, 571; see also local regulation of media, 13, 213, 227n Reinhardt, Max, 42, 50 relativism, 436, 439 religieuse, La (film), 279–80 religion: and hybridity, 579, 591; Ideological State Apparatus, 29, 30; and public sphere, 28, 29, 30, 31; and simulacra, 383, 385, 387; and “third world women,” 354 Remedy (activist), 608 representation: politics of, 263, 265, 266; and public sphere, 29; and simulation, 383, 385, 387; spectacle as, 90, 91, 94, 97 Repressive State Apparatus, 80, 81 reproduction: of art, 7, 38; cultural reproduction and globalization, 535, 536; see also culture industries; simulation and simulacra research: retrenchment in UK, 434; see also audiences/audience research residual cultures, 120, 122, 142 resistance, 54, 57, 61, 63, 67; oppositional politics and internet, 597–613; and racism, 308–18; to cultural imperialism, 589 reterritorialization, 372, 376, 377 reverse cultural imperialism, 526 Rheingold, Howard, 447, 448, 603 rhetoric: and mythologization, 90, 96, 98, 126; and propaganda, 164 Ribeiro, Darcy, 547

Richards, I. A., 123 Richeri, Giuseppe, 201, 203 Ricoeur, Paul, 384, 387 Riegl, Alois, 252 Riesman, David, 197, 203 ritual and art, 40 Robertson, Roland, 569, 570, 572, 582, 586, 588, 589, 590, 592, 594 Rock, Paul, 277 role and stereotypes, 275 romance, 284–308 romantic fantasy, 286, 291, 301, 304, 305, 311 Romero, Jose Luis, 545, 550, 564n Rosaldo, Michelle, 350, 352 Rosaldo, Renato, 310, 374 Rosenau, James N., 571 Rosengren, Karl Erik, 148 Rosmini, Antonio (Rosmini-Serbati), 35 Ross, Andrew, 313 Rostow, W. W., 102 Rouse, Roger, 374, 380 Rowse, A. L., 105, 106 Roy, Jules, 95 Rubio, Kevin, 454, 464, 471 ruling class, 4, 5, 31–3; bourgeois, 547, 548, 550; high culture, 187–200; ideology of, 27, 81; see also domination/subordination; elites and culture; social class Rushdie, Salman, 436, 437, 575 Saadawi, Nawal el, 361n sadism and film, 272 Sahlins, Marshall, 394 Said, Edward, 346, 575 St Paul, 84 Saint-Michel de Cuxa cloister, 392 sameness and identity, 341–3 Sansom, G. B., 105 Sarnoff, General David, 102 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 90, 97, 421, 423 satellite television, 585, 586 satellites, 403 Saudi Arabia: US in, 234, 235, 236 Saussure, Ferdinand de, 126, 130, 134, 136 scapes of global cultural economy, 508, 514–18, 521 Scarry, Elaine, 315 schematism and culture industries, 55 Schiller, Herbert I., 92, 95, 195, 231–41


632 INDEX schizophrenia and signifying chain, 419–22 Schlesinger, P., 591, 594, 594 Schmucler, H., 564, 566 Schoenberg, Artur, 415 Scholes, Robert, 280, 283 Schramm, Wilbur, 525 scientific management, 188 scopophilia in film, 268, 269, 270, 272 Scott, J. W., 441 Scream, The (Munch), 412–13, 414 Screen (journal), 147, 168, 264, 267 Seaton, Jean, 205, 211, 223n, 226n second media age, 386, 444, 445, 446, 447, 449 Second World: cultural domination, 225, 231 232, 240 second-wave feminism, 246 Seekins, Steven V., 218 selective perception, 142 self: “real me” in postmodern discourse, 385, 433–41; see also identity; subjectivity Selye, Hans, 102 semiology/semiotics, 10, 29, 126, 128; and subcultures; 12, 20, 128; see also Barthes, Roland; signs and signification semi-periphery, 571 sensationalism, 35 sensationalist press in Latin America, 560–1 sense perceptions, 48 sensibility, 91, 122, 123, 126, 149 separation and spectacle, 90, 107, 108 separatist movements, 517, 600 Severin-Mars, 42, 50 Sex Pistols, 130, 131, 134n, 136 sexism, 247, 248, 268, 315, 316; and commodity audiences, 243, 245, 248 sexual difference: “third world women” construction, 349, 350 sexual division of labor and “third world women,” 355 sexuality: and Other, 264; postmodern feminism, 434; psychoanalysis and film, 267–75; stereotyping and film, 275–83 Shadows of the Empire (amateur film), 465 Shakar, Tupac, 323, 324, 335n Sharabi, Hisham, 573

Shevchenko, Arkady, 217, 220, 228n Shohat, Ella, 574, 575 signs and signification: encoding/ decoding, 137–45; signifying chain and postmodern, 419–22; see also semiology/semiotics Simon, Julian L., 188, 191 simulation and simulacra, 18, 388–407; fetishism of the consumer, 519–20; and postmodernism, 388–407, 445; and virtual reality, 446 Sistine Madonna (Raphael), 50 Situationist International, 90, 481, 509, 609, 613n slave labor in Brazil, 557–8 slave mentality, 107 Smith, Adam, 3 Smith, Allen, 469 Smith, Anthony D., 572 Smith, Dana, 463 Smith, Kevin, 459, 468–9 Smythe, Dallas W., 163, 173, 185–204, 243, 244, 245, 248n Snow, C. P., 105 SNS, 496 soap operas, 27, 54, 55, 190, 246, 589, 595; from Brazil, 370, 373, 587, 589 social class: base and superstructure model, 31–3; in British cultural studies, 11; class struggle and State Ideological Apparatus, 81; creole class in Latin America, 547, 549; and cultural capital, 165, 176; identity and cultural studies, 355, 359; and mass communications, 164, 167; massification in Latin America, 549–52; national bourgeoisie in Latin America, 547; see also ruling class; working classes social movements: in Latin America, 549–52, 553; oppositional politics and internet, 597–613 social network sites, 492, 498; definition, 492–3; history, 493–4, 497; privacy, 499–500; structure, 498–9 social networking portals, 601, 608, 609 social self: feminism and postmodernism, 434 social software, 609 social transformation, 40 social types, 276

social welfare state and public sphere, 78, 79 socialism, 399, 430 society of the spectacle, 10, 90, 107–9 sociology: Bourdieu on, 250; global sociology, 579 soft power, 234–5, 238 solidarity and identity, 264, 281 Some of my Best Friends Are . . . (film), 281, 282 Sontag, Susan, 423 Sorel, Georges, 37 sources of information, 213 South America, see Latin America space: hybrid spaces, 571 “space race,” 403 Spain: political activism, 509, 600–1 special effects in amateur Star Wars films, 461, 463, 464, 465 spectacle, 10, 90, 107–9 spectators, see audiences; spectacle Spielberg, Steven, 463 Spinoza, Baruch, 85 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, 435, 438, 440 spontaneity and culture industry, 54, 56 spoof film trailers, 454, 469; see also parody sporting events: spectators, 7, 11; sponsorship, 181 Sprewell, Latrell, 320, 321, 323, 328 Squeff, E., 548 Sreberny(-Mohammadi), Annabelle, 508, 524–39 stage acting, 42, 43 stance 481–3 Star Wars film series: and media convergence, 454; participatory culture, 465–60, 468, 470 stars: “death of the subject,” 414; and gay stereotyping in film, 281 state: and nation, 546–9; national television, 586, 592–4; as news information source, 204, 213–14; patronage of cultural production, 181, 182; and propaganda in media, 216; and public sphere, 76; regulation of media, 13, 227; state-controlled broadcasting, 8, 173; subaltern groups, 34–5; see also nation-states


INDEX 633 State Apparatus (SA), 29, 80–3 State Ideological Apparatuses, 80–6, 172, 173 state-monopoly capitalism, 6, 8, 12 statements of fact, 90 Steedman, Carolyn, 435 Steeve, H. Leslie, 242 Stephenson, Marylee, 198 stereotyping and film, 264, 275–83 Sterling, Claire, 215, 216, 220, 222 Sternberg, Josef von, 272 Stone, A. R., 448 Straubhaar, Joseph, 509, 582–97 Stravinsky, Igor, 415 “stress” theory of disease, 102 structural hybridization, 570–2 structural Marxism, 9 structuralism, 9, 10, 29, 420, 435 structuration theory and world television, 583, 585–6, 587, 595 style/stylization: in culture industries, 57, 58; in subcultures, 127, 130, 131, 132, 133 subaltern groups, 5, 34–5, 440 subcultures, 12–13, 18, 92, 93, 129, 130–4; internet activism, 601, 602, 603, 610 subjectivity: and audience research, 152; feminist theory and postmodernism, 435, 438, 440; identity and cultural studies, 339–41; individuals and ideology, 29; and State Ideological Apparatuses, 29; Western feminism and “third world women,” 264 sublime in postmodernism, 410, 422–5, 430 subordination, see domination/ subordination Sunday Bloody Sunday (film), 281 Sunkel, Guillermo, 559, 560 superficiality of postmodern, 384 superstructures, 27; see also base and superstructure supervision and public sphere, 77 surplus value, 173, 179, 180 Surrealism, 135 surveillance: and internet, 598, 602, 604; and “verite” television, 401–2 Sweezy, P., 187

symbolic capital, 225 Symbolic order, 267, 268, 270, 271, 273, 392 syncopation, 68 syncretism, 574, 578, 588 synergy strategies, 455 Synge, J. M., 105 taboos, 131 Tarantino, Quentin, 452, 467, 468, 469 Tasaday people as simulacra, 391, 396 taste, 89, 122, 123, 135, 181, 195 tautology, 89, 97, 98, 112 technology, 28; anti-design, 565; and culture industries, 54; and globalization, 565, 568–70, 579; media convergence, 384, 584; media effects, 584, 585, 587; and postmodernism, 18, 385, 410; see also new technologies technopolitics, 599, 601, 602, 603, 604, 609, 610 technoscapes, 514, 515, 516, 518 Telefon Hirmond o, 447 telenovela, 526, 531, 532, 587, 589, 594 telephone, 54, 74, 442; see also cell phones television, 55, 72, 76; advertising and news media, 188–93; American model and globalization, 590; audience as commodity, 165, 176, 178, 249, 253; Bourdieu on, 253–9; and cultural imperialism, 231, 233, 234, 238, 241, 526, 534, 586, 587; as culture industry, 55; and developmentalism in Latin America, 562, 564; economic factors and technology, 562; encoding/ decoding of message, 138–9, 142; and globalization, 583, 587; multilevel approach to globalization, 583–5; national programming, 531–2; national television and globalization, 508, 534, 535, 562, 582, 583–97; national television production, 583, 594; news ownership, 201; politics of audience research, 145–59; programming quotas, 531; ratings, 213, 244–5; structural analysis of world television, 584–6, 595

temporality, see time/temporality Terni, P., 142 Terrero, Patricia, 556 territorial culture, 578 terrorism: experts on, 164; internet sites, 164, 598, 604; war on terror, 598, 599 Texas, 540, 541, 542, 543 text messaging and activism, 598, 600, 611n Thatcher, Margaret, 5 The Alamo, 541 theatre: bourgeoisie and myth, 98, 126, 127, 129 Theater of Cruelty, 405 Theobald, Robert, 102 theoria, 2 theory, 27, 28, 29; and audience research, 191; critical theory, 434, conspiracy theory, 425 Third World: cultural domination, 232; global and local in international communications, 524–39; “third world difference,” 349, 360; “third world women,” 265, 348, 350, 351, 360; use of term, 361 n; see also colonization; cultural imperialism; development theory; Latin America Thomas, Clive Y., 187 Thompson, E. P., 91, 92, 127, 169, 182, 265, 343 ThumbWars (film), 471 Tie-Tanic (amateur film), 465, 471 Tijuana, Mexico, 14, 375–7 Time Warner Inc., 527, 528, 529, 531 time/temporality: and globalization, 524; and hybridization, 525, 534; and postmodern, 415–19; and virtual reality, 608; see also nostalgia; periodization Tinker, Grant, 212 Tinker, Irene, 354 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 59, 103, 104 Tomlinson, John, 569, 576, 584, 586, 587, 590, 594, 595 Torgovnick, Marianna, 308, 314 Total Information Awareness project, 602 totality of social practices, 117 town-planning, 53 Toynbee, Arnold, 105, 106 toys: action figure films, 456, 461 Tracy, Destutt de, 36


634 INDEX trade barriers and global media flows, 530–1 tragedy and culture industry, 64, 67, 68 Trailervision.com, 462 transdisciplinary theory, 22 translocal culture, 577, 578 transnational corporate cultural domination, 233 transnationalization and developmentalism in Latin America, 561–5 tribal culture and literacy, 90 Trooperclerks (amateur film), 469 Tunstall, Jeremy, 532 Turkey: guest-workers, 516, 592; and news media propaganda, 220 Turkle, Sherry, 385, 386 Tweeds catalogue, 277, 312, 313, 314, 317 types and stereotyping in film, 275–8 Tyson, Mike, 321, 324, 330 Ukiyo school, 577 unions in Latin America, 551 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 236, 525, 529, 530, 532–3 United Nations International Conferences on Women, 266n United States: cultural domination, 231–41, 509, 562, 583, 590, 591; Disney comic strips and imperialism, 11, 91, 110–14; Disneyland as simulacra, 383, 393–4; global media firms, 526, 529, 530; political imperialism, 233, 234, 235, 599; presidents and simulation, 396, 398, 399; television model and globalization, 590; see also Americanization; cultural imperialism universalism: and globalization, 568; “third world women,” 356–8 Until the End of the World (film), 451 urbanization: and discontinuity in Latin America, 546, 571; and hybrid cultures, 365, 547; hybrid sites in Latin America, 571; massification and populism in Latin America, 373, 549–52; see also cities Urry, John, 514

uses and gratifications research, 146, 147, 149, 154 Utopian in art of Van Gogh, 411, 412 utterance and new technologies, 450 Valery, Paul, 37–8 Van Gogh, Vincent, 410, 411, 412; Peasant Shoes, 410–11 VandenBerghe, Jason, 466 Vargas, Getulio, 551 Vargas Llosa, Mario, 555 Varis, Tapio, 526, 531, 592 Vasconcelos, Jose, 565 Veblen, Thorstein, 197 veil in Muslim societies, 356, 357, 360, 361, 535 Venturi, Robert, 408 “verite” television, 401 Ver on, Eliseo, 367 Vertigo (film), 272 Victim (film), 281 victimization of women, 351–2 video store aesthetic, 468 videocassette recorders, 370; and amateur filmmaking, 468, 469 videos: games, 371; and hybrid cultures, 371–2; hyperreality, 385, 398; piracy, 531; video industry, 167 Vietnam war, 196, 404, 405, 428 violence: audience research, 155; gendered violence in media, 521; Repressive State Apparatus, 80, 81; and “third world women,” 351, 356 virtual reality, 445–6, 446, 447, 450, 451; virtual communities, 447, 448, 449, 598; see also internet Volosinov, V. N., 128, 129 voyeurism and film, 267–75 Walkerdine, Valerie, 155 Wallerstein, I., 538 war: medium and message, 106; Vietnam as postmodern war, 404, 405, 428 War on Terror, 598, 599 Warblogging, 607 wardriving, 605, 612n “warez,” 604 Warhol, Andy, 408; Diamond Dust Shoes, 411 Watchblogs, 608 Watergate scandal, 383, 394, 395, 396 Waters, John, 316 Watt, Ian, 280

Web, see World-Wide Web Welles, Orson, 57, 200 Wellner, Damon, 466 Weltanschauung and spectacle, 108 Wenders, Wim, 450 Werfel, Franz, 42 Western feminist discourse and “third world women,” 347–64 westernization: globalization and modernity, 507, 568–9; resistance to, 587; see also Americanization; cultural imperialism; ethnocentrism wetbacks, 544 white supremacy: desire and Other, 309–11, 314, 336n “white writing,” 418 Whitney, Phyllis, 297 wi-fi technology, 605 Wikipedia, 609 wikis, 601, 605, 606, 609 Williams, Raymond: 115–24, 175, 176; base and superstructure, 91, 92, 93, 115–24, 175, 176; culture and society, 125, 126, 127; and demand management, 187; identification, 343; political economy and mass communications, 253, 254,; Smythe on, 187, 202n; working-class culture, 91, 92, 125 Williamson, Kevin, 468 Willis, Paul, 155 Winant, Howard, 314 wire services, 189, 206 wireless technology and activism, 598–601, 609 Wishnow, Jason, 452, 454, 465 Without You I’m Nothing (film), 317–18 WNET (TV station), 212, 213 Wolf, Eric, 521 W€ olfflin, Heinrich, 252 women: as category of analysis, 347–64; and cultural reproduction, 601; and culture industry, 54, 55; internet politics, 598; psychoanalysis and film, 267, 268; representations, 311. 312; “third world women,” 347–65 “women of Africa” construction, 319 Women in International Development (WID) school, 352, 362 work: audience work, 186, 195, 197, 202; see also housework/ housewives; labor; production


INDEX 635 Workers’ Educational Association, 105 working classes: in Frankfurt School critical theory, 7; identity and cultural studies, 263, 344; and populism in Latin America, 549–53; radical press, 205, 211, 559; working-class culture and British cultural studies, 91, 125 World Bank, 515, 526, 576, 587, 603

World Health Organization (WHO), 236 world-system theory, 568, 581, 596 world television, 582–97 World Wide Web, 449, 483–4, 487n; extremist sites, 604; participatory culture, 452, 456–60; social networking, 386, 491–504; see also internet Wright Mills, C., 145

Yahoo, 602 youth subcultures, 12, 124–37 Zanuck, Darryl F., 57 Zed Press Women series, 350, 358, 360, 362n Zeldin, Theodore, 559 Zhdanovism, 99, 100, 431 Zimmerman, Patricia R., 462


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