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November 2018 Vol. 40, No. 10

The OFFICIAL PUBLICATION OF THE WASHOE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION

WCBA ANNUAL ENTERTAINING ETHICS WHAT DRUG DEALERS AND CELEBRITIES TEACH LAWYERS ABOUT PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 3 Hours CLE including 2 Ethics & 1 Substance Abuse

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elieve it or not, but the problems faced by some of the most notorious drug dealers actually allow us to understand the requirement to eliminate the barriers to justice for all. Plus, the issues that celebrities face gives us a chance to talk about conflicts, inclusion, and substance abuse. Join the CLE Performer, Stuart Teicher, Esq., as he examines the intersection of several aspects of professional responsibility - access to justice, ethics, substance abuse, and diversity...all in a way that will keep you engaged! Stuart I. Teicher, Esq. is a professional legal educator who focuses on ethics law. A practicing attorney for over two decades, Stuart’s career is now dedicated to helping fellow attorneys survive the practice of law and thrive in the profession. Mr. Teicher is a Supreme Court appointee to the New Jersey District Ethics Commission where he investigates and prosecutes grievances filed against attorneys.

Register online www.wcbar.org/events Questions, please call 786-4494

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Random Thoughts PG 2

Conversations On Discovery PG 3

FAMILY LAW PG 6

MEDIATION MATTERS PG 7

appellate Briefs PG 8

LAW LIBRARY Pro Bono PG 10

ASK BAR COUNSEL PG 11

THE NOT MUSLIM BAN PG 12

PEOPLE PG 14


Random Thoughts Patricia Halstead President

IS YOUR CLIENT COMPETENT?

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ccording to the U.S. Census Bureau, within the next 20 years people aged 65 and older will outnumber children for the first time in U.S. history. As of 2019, Baby Boomers, the demographic spurning that projection, are expected to number 72 million. With an older population in such great number there is a good chance you are going to be faced with gauging the legal ability of a client to act in light of the deterioration of his or her cognitive ability brought on by age. The legal profession is wrought with such inquiries. Does a person have testamentary capacity? Is a criminal defendant competent to stand trial or to enter a plea knowingly and voluntarily? Does a plaintiff have capacity to bring suit? The answer to each question is particular to the circumstance but what the inquiries all have in common is that each applicable inquiry should be addressed by you from the beginning of your interaction with your client. Just because a person suffers cognitive impairment does not render him or her incompetent. The legal system values an individual’s legal rights and to infringe upon those rights requires substantial cause but, to play it safe, legal professionals should consider the following. How would you evaluate your client’s decision making

The The Writ is the official publication of the Washoe county Bar Association Articles appearing in The Writ express the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the WCBA. For Advertising call The Writ at 775-7864494. WCBA reserves the right to accept or deny any advertising.

capacity? Can your client articulate his or her reasoning? Does the client vacillate? Does your client understand the consequences of his or her decision? Does your client seem confused? Many times a client with questionable competency will meet with you with the assistance of friends or family who are, in most cases, hoping to help. However, if you have concerns about a client, meet with the client privately. Ask the client probing and relevant questions about the matter in plain terms and that require thoughtful responses. Encourage the client to ask questions and place the client at ease by assuring him or her that the purpose of the private meeting without his or her friends or family is to ensure that you can work to accomplish the client’s specific goals. Also, take good notes of the conversation and, when in doubt, refer the client to a medical professional who is better suited to evaluate a client’s cognitive functioning. If you have a client whose competence concerns you, here are some signs to look for: - Is the client alert and oriented; - Does the client hesitate, act confused, forget details, or have comprehension difficulties; - Does the client have trouble articulating and staying on JOHN MOORE, Editor GINA MACLELLAN, Managing editor Annual subscription rate for non-members of WCBA: $36 WCBA, P.O. Box 1548, Reno NV 89505 Tel: 775-786-4494 FAX: 775-324-6116 www.wcBar.org e-mail: GINA @wcbar.org

topic; Do you have to repeat answers to simple questions or is the client repetitive; - Does the client seem to be in emotional distress; - Does the client appear poorly groomed or display bad hygiene; and - Is the client acting rationally. Follow your instincts and keep in mind Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14, which provides, “[w]hen the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.” Reasonably necessary protective action also includes a report to law enforcement and elder protective services if you have reason to believe an elder client is being abused or exploited. -

PRESIDENT VICE PRESIDENt SECRETARY TREASURER SERGEANT-AT-ARMS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

PATRICIA HALSTEAD HOLLY PARKER CHANDENI SENDALL JACEY PRUPAS JOHN MOORE GINA MACLELLAN

Printed on recylable paper using vegetable-based ink.

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November 2018, Vol. 40, No. 10


CONVERSATIONS ON DISCOVERY By Wesley M. Ayres, Discovery Commissioner

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f an attorney or party fails to reasonably comply with any provision of NRCP 16.1, the court must impose “appropriate sanctions in regard to the failure(s) as are just,” which can include “[a]ny of the sanctions available pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2).” See NRCP 16.1(e)(3)(A); Freemon v. Fischer, No. 50543, 2009 WL 1490776, at *5 (Nev. Jan. 23, 2009) (unpublished). Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court has affirmed sanctions orders for a party’s unreasonable failure to make complete initial disclosures. See Wolverton v. On Demand Sedan Servs., Inc., Nos. 55556, 56277, 2011 WL 5146034, at *2 (Nev. Oct. 27, 2011) (unpublished) (affirming sanctions for violation of NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(B)); Walters v. Meeks, No. 53856, 2011 WL 4527714, at *1-2 (Nev. Sept. 29, 2011) (unpublished) (affirming sanctions for violation of NRCP 16.1(a)(1)(C)). In its latest decision on this subject, Valley Health Sys., LLC v. Peterson ex rel. Estate of Doe, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 76 (2018), our high court reaffirmed that sanctions may be imposed for a violation of the initial disclosure requirements, including the failure to disclose witnesses with relevant knowledge. The opinion also serves as a warning to attorneys who fail to appreciate the line separating argument and misrepresentation Valley Health arose out of two lawsuits in which plaintiffs alleged they were the victims of sexual assaults that were committed by a male nurse (“Farmer”) employed at the hospital (“Centennial”) where they were admitted as patients. In connection with a police investigation into one of the assaults, two other nurses reported that Farmer was overly attentive to female patients, was anxious to perform procedures where female breasts would be exposed and possibly touched, and was involved in an incident in which another patient

yelled, “Get outta here! I don’t want you by me!” After that assault was reported to the hospital, it retained a law firm to conduct an internal investigation. During that investigation, several of the hospital’s supervisory employees revealed that they had knowledge of the police reports and the nursing staff’s concerns about Farmer. See id. at 3-4. After the victims initiated their lawsuits and named Centennial as a defendant, the hospital retained the same law firm that conducted the internal investigation to represent it in one of those cases (the “Doe case”). See id. at 3-4. Prior to the early case conference in the Doe case, Centennial served its initial list of witnesses and documents pursuant to NRCP 16.1(a)(1). However, those disclosures did not identify the nurses who had raised concerns about Farmer, and did not disclose the existence of their police statements. Almost five years later, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on liability. Centennial filed an opposition, arguing that Farmer’s actions were not reasonably foreseeable and stating that “[i]n the instant situation, there were absolutely no known prior acts by Mr. Farmer that could potentially put Centennial Hills on notice that Mr. Farmer would assault a patient.” The district court ultimately denied plaintiff’s motion, but in doing so it also entered certain findings of fact and conclusions of law that Centennial opposed. In connection with an unsuccessful writ petition challenging that order, the hospital recounted the statement it previously made to the lower court that Centennial knew of no acts or circumstances that could have put it on notice that Farmer would assault plaintiff. See id. at 4-5. After plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment was denied, she resumed discovery. She then learned of the concerns voiced by other nurses

regarding Farmer, as well as the nurses’ police statements. As a result, plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions against Centennial. Ultimately, the district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing and informed the hospital and its counsel that it was considering whether case-terminating sanctions should be imposed against Centennial, whether the hospital intended to thwart the discovery process, and whether the hospital misled the court. Following that hearing, the district court found that Centennial violated its obligations under NRCP 16.1 by failing to timely (a) identify the nurses who had raised concerns about Farmer, evidence relating to the central issue in the case (i.e., whether Farmer’s assault was reasonably foreseeable by the hospital); and (b) disclose the nurses’ police statements. The court therefore entered an order striking Centennial’s answer, establishing its liability, allowing it to litigate the damages, and directing it to pay specified monetary sanctions. In its decision, the court also found that Centennial’s counsel violated Rule 3.3 of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct by incorrectly representing that the hospital had not withheld any relevant evidence. In connection with an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration, the district court clarified that while it took counsel’s conduct into consideration, it did not sanction counsel, and the sanction order was based on the hospital’s misconduct. Centennial appealed the sanctions order, and its counsel challenged the findings of professional rule violations through a petition for extraordinary relief. See id. at 5-7. The supreme court observed that when a party fails to make a disclosure under NRCP 16.1, a district court may make “[a]n order striking out pleadings or parts thereof . . . or dismissing the action or proceeding, or any part thereof, November 2018, Vol. 40, No. 10

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or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party.” See id. at 9 (quoting NRCP 37(b)(2)(C)); see also NRCP 16.1(e)(3)(A) (incorporating sanctions authorized by NRCP 37(b) (2)). Of course, case-concluding sanctions are subjected to a heightened standard of review, including mandatory consideration of the factors set forth in Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Bldg., Inc., 106 Nev. 88, 92, 787 P.2d 777, 779 (1990). See Valley Health, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 76, at 8; Bahena v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 126 Nev. 243, 254, 235 P.3d 592, 599 (2010). But the supreme court reaffirmed an earlier holding that the heightened standard of review does not apply when “the district court strikes a party’s answer thereby establishing liability, but allows the party to defend on the amount of damages.” See Valley Health, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 76, at 8; see also Bahena, 126 Nev. at 249, 235 P.3d at 596. Non-case-concluding sanctions of that sort will be upheld if the order is supported by substantial evidence. See Valley Health, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 76, at 9. Presumably because it had been asked to impose case-terminating sanctions, the district court presented its findings of fact and conclusions of law with reference to each of the Young factors. Accordingly, the supreme court reviewed the lower court’s analysis regarding each of those factors in determining whether its decision was supported by substantial evidence. The hospital’s primary argument was that a court cannot find a corporation acted willfully or intentionally unless at least one employee has a culpable mental state, and that the lower court did not identify any specific employee with a culpable state of mind. The supreme court noted that it had never previously adopted the hospital’s argument, and questioned whether that argument was even applicable under these circumstances. The district court’s sanctions order identified seventeen reasons supporting its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the hospital willfully withheld evidence (e.g., Centennial was aware of other nurses’ concerns and their police statements before Doe case was commenced, but failed to identify

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them in its initial disclosures). See id. at 10-12. With regard to the other Young factors, our high court rejected the argument that Centennial was being penalized for the conduct of its attorneys. The hospital knew about the concealed evidence, yet allowed its counsel to submit eight NRCP 16.1 disclosures that failed to mention it, and also provided verifications for all of those disclosures. See id. at 13. The sanctions also were not precluded by Nevada’s policy of deciding cases on the merits. The lower court determined that the only way to undo the prejudice created by Centennial was to strike its answer, but it still allowed the hospital to litigate the measure of damages. Further, the sanctions selected were needed to deter not only future misconduct by the hospital, but by other litigants as well. Perhaps most important, the district court found that any lesser sanction would not mitigate the prejudice caused by Centennial’s misconduct—the loss of evidence as a result of faded memories regarding a central issue in the case. Because the lower court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and it did not otherwise abuse its discretion, its sanctions against the hospital were upheld. See id. at 13-14. The district court did not impose any sanctions against Centennial’s counsel. Nevertheless, the law firm argued that it had been effectively sanctioned through the court’s finding that it violated NRPC 3.3, a finding that it maintained was improper. The supreme court held that a district court has inherent authority to cite rules of professional conduct as part of its authority to regulate attorney misconduct in the courtroom. See id. at 18-19; see also Emerson v. Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 672, 680, 263 P.3d 224, 229 (2011) (district courts have broad discretion to impose sanctions for professional misconduct at trial and to address litigation abuses not specifically proscribed by statute). Yet it also recognized that the district court’s finding that counsel twice violated NRPC 3.3 amounted to a reputational sanction that was properly presented through a petition for an extraordinary writ (since sanctioned attorneys are

nonparties and lack standing to appeal). In fact, while “mere judicial criticism” or “routine judicial commentary” would not suffice, “the vast majority of courts that have considered the issue have held that a finding that an attorney has violated a specific rule of professional misconduct is tantamount to a sanction.” See Valley Health, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 76, at 16-18 (citing cases). With regard to the merits of the district court’s findings, NRPC 3.3(a) (1) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . [m]ake a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.” Cf. Bahena, 126 Nev. at 257 n.9, 235 P.3d at 601 n.9 (NRPC 3.3 “sets forth the standards of candor that a lawyer has toward a court”). The district court found that the law firm had twice—once to the district court and once to the supreme court on its earlier writ petition—falsely represented that there were no known prior acts or other circumstances that could have put the hospital on notice that Farmer would assault a patient. The supreme court explained that the statement in Centennial’s earlier writ petition was only provided to explain what the law firm had previously argued to the district court. “Thus, it was an accurate statement in that it correctly represented the false statement Hall Prangle argued in the district court.” Valley Health, 134 Nev., Adv. Op. 76, at 20. But the court found that the firm’s earlier statement to the district court violated NRPC 3.3 because it falsely represented that Centennial had no notice of prior behavior indicating that Farmer might assault a patient in the future. See id. In that regard, the record supported the district court’s findings that both the hospital and its law firm had knowledge of Farmer’s prior behavior that would put them on notice that a sexual assault was foreseeable. See id. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court rejected the law firm’s contention that its representation to the district court could not have constituted a rule violation because it was not purely a factual statement, but was argument intertwined with opinion regarding the evidence relating to reasonable foreseeability. See id. at 19-20.


The law firm also argued that the district court failed to provide the required notice that it was considering attorney sanctions, thereby depriving it of due process. The supreme court stated that “[d]ue process principles require that an attorney accused of professional misconduct receive notice of the charges levied against him or her.” See id. at 21. In that regard, it agreed that the district court’s order informing the parties of the matters that would be considered at the evidentiary hearing on plaintiff’s motion for sanctions did not mention that it would include consideration of sanctions against counsel; indeed, it specifically indicated that the court would only be considering whether the hospital (and other defendants) misled the court. However, after the sanctions order was entered, the law firm filed a motion for reconsideration. In that motion, the firm extensively argued the same due process issues that it was asking the supreme court to consider, and maintained that it did not violate NRPC 3.3. The court concluded that this subsequent opportunity to fully brief the issue of imposition of attorney sanctions was sufficient to cure any initial due process violation. See id. at 21-22; see also Sherry v. Sherry, No. 62895, 2015 WL 1798857, at *1 n.1 (Nev. Apr. 16, 2015) (unpublished) (“there was no due process violation as appellant addressed the district court’s invocation of the first-to-file rule before the dismissal in his motion to reconsider the stay order”).

Wes Ayres is the Discovery Commissioner for the Second Judicial District Court. His columns are online and searchable at wcbar.org.

PARALEGAL STUDIES CERTIFICATE PROGRAM WITH EXTENDED STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, RENO February 9 - April 28, 2019 ~ www.extendedstudies.unr.edu The program, taught over eight select weekends, offers tools essential to career advancement, with training in: • Leading-edge legal skills • Substantive law and legal issues • Law research, Westlaw and LexisNexis • Applying the law to factual situations • Letter, research and document preparation Taught by attorney Kerry Doyle, and attorney and Sparks Municipal Court Judge James Spoo. Learn more about this program at the upcoming FREE information session on Wednesday, January 16, 2019 at 5:30 p.m., UNR, Redfield Campus.

November 2018, Vol. 40, No. 10

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FAMILY L AW By Alexander Morey, Silverman Kattelman Springgate, Chtd.

PLAN FOR INCAPACITY: A PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENT

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merica is graying. Nevada is graying. As of 2017, 29% of Nevada’s population was age 55 or older.1 Another quarter was age 35 to 54.2 As our population ages, more people come into contact with the courts at advanced ages. With advanced age comes an increased likelihood of mental or physical incapacity or impairment, which impact both the incapacitated or impaired person in the legal system. When incapacity or impairment intersect the legal system, the results can be muddled, increase costs, and leave judgments open to attack.3 Planning for potential incapacity is important. Why leave things that may affect how a court case concerning you, where you live, or how all your money is managed to chance? The law has mechanisms to try to address “incompetents”. For example, NRCP 17 together with NRS 12.050 provide for appointment of a guardian ad litem for an “infant” or “incompetent”. Neither the rule nor the statute provide any guidance on what a guardian ad litem is to, may, or may not do, and Nevada case law also provides no delineation of the duties of a guardian ad litem. So, does a guardian ad litem stand in the shoes of the incompetent? Make decisions on the scope, strategy, and settlement of litigation? Advise the incompetent? Advise the court? Deal with the incompetent’s lawyer or her own? There is no codified rule or reported case establishing the parameters for appointment of a guardian ad litem. Even the level of incapacity necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem is in flux. Is it the same as for a general guardianship? If not, how much lower is it? Further complicating matters is the gravity of disability laws pulling at the rights and accommodations required for certain individuals. Does the Americans with Disabilities Act require accommodations

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in every potential guardianship case? Some? Most? In cases of more permanent incapacity, Nevada provides for appointment of a guardian in chapter 159 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. Once appointed, a guardian has broad powers, subject to court oversight, to collect, manage, and dispose of the estate of a “protected person”. A guardian may also have broad powers to determine where a protected person will live, what a protected person will eat, and how a protected person will obtain medical care. At the same time, guardianships are rigid. There are default rules about investments, sales of assets, and accountings. There are rules about continuing the business of a protected person, including application for the power to reorganize the business. There are also mandatory court appearances. Appropriately, guardianship sacrifices flexibility for safety through procedural due process. There are alternatives to some guardianships. For example, a living trust with an incapacity provision can provide for financial management without a guardianship, and a power of attorney usually allows an agent to litigate on behalf of the principal. Planning for

potential incapacity is key. Having a judge make decisions about one’s life and finances due to incapacity is much like having an on-call pastor give one’s eulogy . . . despite the best of intentions, the result may not be what one or one’s family desired. https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/ distribution-by-age/?currentTimeframe=0& sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Locatio n%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). 2 Id. 3 See, e.g., Jeep Corp. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 98 Nev. 440, 445, 652 P.2d 1183, 1186 (1982) (discussing, in dicta, the availability of collateral attack on a judgment for an unadjudicated incompetent: “In any event, if evidence surfaces which would indicate that the stipulation was the product of deceit, or was entered into at the calculated detriment of an unadjudicated incompetent, relief could be afforded through an appropriate proceeding or action.”) 4 NRS 162A.560. 1

Alexander Morey served as the Honorable Judge Deborah Schumacher’s law clerk from 2008 through 2010 before entering private practice with Silverman, Kattelman, Springgate Chtd. where he practices family law.

10161 Park Run Dr., Ste. 150

SERVING NEVADA SINCE 1981


MEDIATION MAT TERS By Margaret M. Crowley, Crowley Mediation, L.L.C.

CONFIDENTIALLY SPEAKING

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onfidentiality in mediation is well. Thus, for a person’s own look when deciding how to best bolster essential. In addition to selfmediation communication to the statute. determination, the assurance be disclosed in a subsequent The Uniform Mediation Act (the of secrecy is a lynchpin of the process. hearing, that person must agree “UMA”) offers an excellent model. The Think about it: who would be eager to and so must the parties to the UMA was drafted in 2001 by the Uniform lay out all the strengths, weaknesses, mediation. Waiver of these Law Commission, which provides states strategy and emotions that go along privileges must be in a record or with non-partisan legislation in an effort with a dispute if all that information made orally during a proceeding could be used in a detrimental way “Confidentiality is the essence of being trusted.” to be effective. There is no waiver if the case doesn’t settle? The need Billy Graham by conduct. See, http://www. for confidentiality in mediation is uniformlaws.org. obvious. Statutory protection of that When it was first introduced, there to bring clarity and stability to critical confidentiality in Nevada, however, is was concern the UMA would lead to areas of law. The UMA has been not quite so clear cut. additional litigation over confidentiality. adopted by 12 states and introduced in Nevada does have a statute addressing That has not been the case, according to another two. The UMA’s prime concern the confidentiality of settlement James R. Coben, a Professor of Law at is keeping mediation communications discussions, NRS  48.109. Pursuant to Mitchell Hamline School of Law. In his confidential. The following is the that statute, mediation sessions “must research on the UMA, Professor Coben Uniform Law Commission’s synopsis of be regarded as settlement negotiations, found that there has been little dispute the act: and no admission, representation or about it since its drafting. Professor Parties engaged in mediation, as statement made during the session, not well as non-party participants, Continued on page 9 otherwise discoverable or obtainable, must be able to speak is admissible as evidence or subject to with full candor for a discovery.” The statute also declares mediation to be successful that mediators may not be subject to and for a settlement to be civil process requiring the disclosure voluntary. For this reason, of any matter discussed during the the central rule of the mediation proceedings. While NRS UMA is that a mediation 48.109 supports confidentiality, it leaves communication is much to be desired. For example, it only confidential, and if addresses what happens during a session. privileged, is not subject Many mediations require pre-mediation to discovery or admission conversations and/or settlement briefs. into evidence in a formal Would those fall under the statute? proceeding [see Sec. What about settlement discussions that 5(a)]. In proceedings take place after the mediation? Are following a mediation, there any circumstances under which a party may refuse to confidentiality can be waived? disclose, and prevent Most mediators recognize that NRS any other person from 48.109 does not address all possible disclosing, a mediation situations, so they choose to preserve communication. confidentiality by having all participants Mediators and nonsign a confidentiality agreement. party participants may While that is definitely helpful, a more refuse to disclose their thorough confidentiality statute would own statements made be a benefit to all mediation participants during mediation, and in Nevada. There are multiple examples may prevent others to which the Nevada Legislature could from disclosing them, as November 2018, Vol. 40, No. 10

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APPELLATE BRIEFS By Adam Hosmer-Henner, McDonald Carano

“YOU STILL HAVE TO FOLLOW THE RULES”

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ow does a plaintiff go from winning $6,000,000 after trial to having the entire case dismissed eight years later after an appeal? One way, as illustrated by the Nevada Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. Adv. Op. 78 (Oct. 4, 2018), is to have counsel of record withdraw, leaving the plaintiff to proceed pro se. Rodriguez stands for the principle in the NRCP 60(b) context that while “district courts should assist pro se litigants as much as reasonably possible,” there are limits and “a pro se litigant cannot use his alleged ignorance as a shield to protect him from the consequences of failing to comply with basic procedural requirements.” Appellant Rodriguez was injured in 2006 when an employee of the Fiesta Palms sportsbook threw merchandise into a crowd, causing another customer to dive into Rodriguez’s knee. After filing

suit in November 2006 and prevailing in a bench trial in 2010, Rodriguez obtained a $6,051,589 judgment against the Respondent, Fiesta Palms. Respondent appealed the judgment arguing that there were evidentiary errors and improperly excluded expert witnesses. The Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. FCH1, LLC v. Rodriguez, 130 Nev. 425, 435, 335 P.3d 183, 190 (2014). Remittitur was issued in November 2014 and Rodriguez’s trial counsel withdrew the next month. Thereafter, Rodriguez attempted to obtain new counsel, which he did, only to have new counsel also withdraw approximately one month before the new trial date in February 2016. The district court continued trial again but Rodriguez was unable to obtain counsel for a hearing on the sixteen motions in limine filed by Fiesta Palms or for a hearing on Fiesta Palm’s motion to dismiss. The district

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court denied Rodriguez’s request for further continuance and told him “while we are to accord some accommodations and deference to self-represented litigants, you still have to follow the rules.” (emphasis added). Thereafter, the district court granted Fiesta Palm’s motion to dismiss because it was unopposed and deemed meritorious. Rodriguez eventually obtained replacement counsel who filed an NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside the order of dismissal, five months and three weeks after the challenged order. The district court denied the NRCP 60(b) motion and Rodriguez appealed. NRCP 60(b)(1) provides that a district court “may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” on grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” In Yochum v. Davis, the Court identified


four factors relevant to whether NRCP 60(b)(1) relief is appropriate: “(1) a prompt application to remove the judgment; (2) the absence of an intent to delay the proceedings; (3) a lack of knowledge of procedural requirements; and (4) good faith.” 298 Nev. 484, 486, 653 P.2d 1215, 1216 (1982). First, the Court noted that even though Rodriguez’s motion to set aside the judgment was technically within the sixmonth mandatory time limit of NRCP 60(b), it was only an outer limit, and he still did not act promptly or within a reasonable time given the circumstances. Second, the Court found that the record supported a finding that Rodriguez intended to delay the proceedings due to his numerous requests for continuances. Interestingly, the Court found that Rodriguez “intended to delay trial until he secured new counsel, rather than proceeding without representation.” This conclusion seems somewhat harsh as it is certainly reasonable, as illustrated by the Rodriguez opinion itself, for a party to want to proceed with counsel rather than without. Third, the Court found that Rodriguez was aware of the procedural requirements imposed upon him. Fourth and finally, the Court declined to consider whether Rodriguez acted in good faith given the district court’s silence on this factor, but still held that it would affirm based on the first three factors. The Court’s opinion illustrates the difficulty in “balanc[ing] the preference for resolving cases on the merits with the importance of enforcing procedural requirements.” This balance is found within the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, which are replete with special dispensations to pro se parties. See NRAP 10(b)(1) (exempting pro se parties from the rule requiring the preparation of the record); NRAP 28(k) (permitting pro se parties to file informal briefs); and NRAP 30(i) (preventing pro se parties from filing an appendix). Contrastingly, there are other provisions that specifically

reaffirm their applicability for pro se parties. See NRAP 9(b) (“A pro se appellant in a civil appeal shall identify and request all necessary transcripts.”); NRAP 21(a)(4) (mandating that “pro se writ petitions shall be accompanied by an appendix”). Unlike these provisions though, NRCP 60(b) is not tailored one way or the other toward pro se parties. Lack of counsel typically does not constitute “excusable neglect” warranting relief from a judgment. See Bonnell v. Lawrence, 128 Nev. 394, 404, 282 P.3d 712, 718 (2012) (internal quotations omitted) (“Fundamental rules governing the finality of judgments cannot be applied differently merely because a party not learned in the law is acting pro se.”) The district court demonstrated significant flexibility toward Rodriguez, before entering judgment, by granting multiple continuances and providing repeated cautions about the consequences of failing to respond. Once the dismissal order was entered though, the approach shifted to something more along the lines of enough is enough. Rodriguez argued that his delay in filing the NRCP 60(b) motion was excusable because he was struggling to find counsel, he was living outside of Nevada, and he was in poor physical and mental health. Earlier in the action, these grounds warranted continuances of trial, but it seems that they do not outweigh “the need to swiftly administer justice” once judgment is entered.

Adam Hosmer-Henner is a partner at McDonald Carano and practices primarily in the areas of commercial litigation and appellate law. He regularly handles appeals and writ proceedings at the Nevada Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Mediation Continued from page 7 Coben focused on 2013 through 2015, finding that state or federal courts interpreted the UMA to resolve a dispute about confidentiality in mediation only 16 times nationwide. This accounts for only 8% of all state and federal cases addressing mediation confidentiality disputes in that three-year period. Professor Coben compared those results to California, which has not adopted the UMA. During that same time period, California state and federal courts issued nearly 50 opinions on mediation confidentiality – 6 times more than in all UMA jurisdictions combined. While it may not be the best idea to consult California statutes on mediation confidentiality when looking at how best to strengthen Nevada’s statute, there may be some elements worth examining. For example, the California Legislature has just passed a provision requiring informed consent for mediation. On January 1, 2019, Senate Bill 954 will take effect. The new bill requires attorneys to obtain their client's signature on a separate printed disclosure form confirming the client understands mediation confidentiality. The statute will actually contain a sample form attorneys can use to ensure they are complying with the new law. A form such as this is an excellent way to confirm that clients understand mediation communications cannot be used outside of the session. Without doubt, ensuring mediation confidentiality is crucial. Until Nevada augments the language contained in NRS 48.109, using a good, solid confidentiality agreement, perhaps modeling language from California’s Senate Bill 954, is a prudent measure. What happens in mediation should stay in mediation!

Margaret Crowley is an experienced mediator, Supreme Court Settlement Judge, EEOC Mediator, Second JD Custody & Dependency Mediation Panels, Pro Tem Family Court Master and mediation instructor.

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l AW LIBRARY/ PRO BONO CORNER Lawyer in the Library Volunteers Thank you to all our October Lawyer in the Library volunteers. Volunteers in bold have volunteered more than once this year. Cedric W. Anderson Elizabeth J. Bassett Elizabeth M. Bittner Richard F. Cornell Richard P. Davies Joe Gorman Erin N. Grieve Chelsea Latino Madelyn Shipman Gary R. Silverman Sandra A. Unsworth

Lawyer on the Line As our Lawyer in the Library program continues to grow with more and more patrons seeking legal assistance, we are excited to have the opportunity to expand our services to include Lawyer on the Line. We are seeking volunteers to provide assistance via telephone or video conference to those patrons who would normally be turned away due to space limitations in the Law Library Program. Please let us know if this option better accommodates your schedule and if you are interested in volunteering for our overflow services.  The program hours are 5:00 p.m. – 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday and Wednesday evenings.  Attorneys may participate as often as they want or as little as once a year.  Please contact Emily Reed at emily.reed@washoecourts. us or (775) 325-6625, if you would like to volunteer or for further information regarding the Lawyer on the Line program.

Thank you to the Washoe County Bar Association The Washoe County Law Library would like to express our gratitude to the Washoe County Bar Association for their generous donation to fund an additional Westlaw Next terminal with National Primary materials. This addition will enhance the services we

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offer and provide increased access to meet the research needs of our library users. Thank you again for supporting the Law Library and our community. Respectfully, The Law Library and Self Help Center Team

Book Review: Occupational and Safety and Health Law

This is a thorough, detailed but readable treatment of the subject. It is a softbound annual volume from Thomson-West. We have the 2018 edition. The author, Mark Rothstein, concentrates on legal doctrines and practical considerations, not the specifics of thousands of OSHA standards. The Occupational Health and Safety Act was passed in 1970. Statistics showed there was a continuing need for legislation. Annually, thousands of workers were killed and millions disabled. The number of injuries was rising. The Act seeks as far as possible to achieve safe and healthful working conditions for every employee in the United States.

The book is substantial. It is a comprehensive look at Occupational Safety and Health Law. It is divided into 5 parts: The Scope of the Act, Duties Under the Act, Enforcement, Adjudication, OSHA Related Litigation. The book has 21 chapters separated into these parts. Each chapter of the book discusses fully that aspect of occupational health and safety law. Examples are: Chapter 2, Coverage, Chapter 5, Compliance with Standards, Chapter 10, Investigations, Chapter 17, Adjudication and Chapter 20, Employment-Related Actions. Occupational Safety and Health Law has 7 appendices including a glossary and statutory index. The book has a Table of Laws and Rules, a Table of Cases, and Index. The book would be useful as introduction to the law as well as benefit a more experienced lawyer. By Brian Keefe, Law Librarian II

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ASK BAR COUNSEL By Kait Flocchini, Assistant Bar Counsel

D

ear Assistant Bar Counsel Bobby:

I got an email from the State Bar saying that I’ve been disciplined and I owe $2,565.45, which is due now. I have never been in trouble before. I had no idea about this and I am freaking out now. What do I do?1 Dear Squeaky Clean, I am glad that you wrote to confirm what is going on. It sounds like you may have been the victim of a scam email. If you keep your contact information current with the State Bar, then you will never receive your first notice via email at the end of disciplinary proceedings. The State Bar discipline process is governed by Supreme Court Rule 99 through 122 and the Disciplinary Rules of Procedure. These rules ensure due process. If the State Bar thinks that you might have violated a Rule of Professional Conduct, then you will receive a paper letter from the Office of Bar Counsel (“OBC”). It will ask you for a response in writing. This is your best opportunity to explain what happened in the underlying matter and avoid any discipline. Don’t offer documentary support “upon request” and don’t dismiss the grievant as a “crazy person.” Include objective information that will assist the OBC to determine that you maintain the standards established for the practice of law. If the OBC pursues a grievance, then first it will present that grievance to a Screening Panel comprised of three members of the Disciplinary Board in your district. The Panel decides whether the evidence supports discipline. Some more serious matters will require a formal hearing from a new Panel, but you will get another notice in the form of a formal Complaint. You will get an opportunity to respond to the Complaint.

Before the formal hearing, you will be invited to an initial case conference during which the parties will schedule a date for the formal hearing. You will receive notice of the hearing and an opportunity to present evidence in your favor. After the hearing, the Hearing Panel will issue and serve you with a formal decision. Depending on the Hearing Panel’s decision, there may be an automatic review by the Nevada Supreme Court. If so, you will be notified and provided with briefing deadlines. If there is not an automatic review, you will be able to file an appeal consistent with the Rules of Appellate Procedure. You will owe the State Bar money for a disciplinary proceeding only after this process is complete and only if you are disciplined. The amount due is governed by SCR 120 and the State Bar will provide you with a Memorandum of Costs. You will never receive a notice out of the blue that you owe money to the State

Bar for a disciplinary matter. Always feel free to contact the Ethics Hotline at 702382-2200 if something like this happens again. This “question” is not an actual question that we received at the State Bar because your inquiries on the Ethics Hotline are always confidential. Instead, it is a hypothetical “question” that is loosely based on multiple questions that the OBC has received over the years.

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Kait Flocchini has been with the State Bar of Nevada, Office of Bar Counsel, since 2014.

ATTENTION: FAMILY LAW & ESTATE PLANNING PRACTITIONERS Looking for the attorney that handled the will or trust for Andrew Scharps. Mr. Scharps passed away September 2018. Please contact his niece, Jeanne Griffith at (978) 727-3717 or email: beannebeanne@ gmail.com or Jeanne.Griffith@fmr.com

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November 2018, Vol. 40, No. 10

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THE “NOT-A-MUSLIM BAN” By Therese Shanks, Esq.

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n March, I wrote about the pending appeals of President Trump’s controversial executive order (“EO-4”), referred to in the media as the “Muslim Ban.” On June 26, 2018, the United States Supreme Court upheld EO-4 as constitutional in a 5-4 opinion. Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 201 L.Ed.2d 775 (2018). 1. EO-4 EO-4 is the fourth executive order issued by President Trump that seeks to improve immigration screening for nationals from specific countries which the President finds present a threat to public safety. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, § 1(a) (Sept. 24, 2017). Under EO-4, the entry of nationals from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen is restricted. Id. These countries were chosen after President Trump consulted with the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department, and several intelligence agencies, to determine (1) if the foreign country has processes in place to ensure that travel documents are “authentic” (i.e., how easy it is to leave under a false identity), (2) if the foreign country provides the United States with background criminal history and suspected terrorist links of its nationals, and (3) whether the country poses a terrorism risk or is a known supporter of terrorism. Id. at § 1(c) Initially, 16 countries were identified were identified by the Acting Secretary of State for inclusion in EO-4. Id. at § 1(d)-(f ). After the State Department undertook diplomatic efforts to get the security concerns cleared up, the Acting Secretary of State recommended that President Trump restrict entry to individuals from Chad, Iran, Libya,

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North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen and Somalia. Id. at § 1(g)-(h). EO-4’s restrictions vary by country and desired entry status of the national. Under EO-4, all nationals from Iran, North Korea and Syria are banned because those countries refuse to provide the United States with criminal backgrounds and/or suspected terrorism links. Id. at §§ 2(b)(ii), (d) (ii), (e)(ii). However, Iranians who seek nonimmigrant student and exchangevisitor visas are allowed entry. EO-4 only bans entry to nationals from Chad, Libya and Yemen who seek immigrant visas and nonimmigrant business or tourist visas, because these countries have information-sharing deficiencies but are actively engaged in counterterrorism efforts. Id. at §§ 2(a)(i), (c)(i), (g) (i). EO-4 bans entry to nationals from Somalia who seek immigrant visas and requires additional screening for individuals seeking nonimmigrant visas because Somalia satisfies the basic information sharing policies, but has a special risk given its particular political climate. Id. at § 2(h)(ii). Finally, entry of specific government officials and their family members on nonimmigrant business or tourist visas from Venezuela is limited. Venezuela refuses to cooperate with the United States in sharing information on its citizens, but the United States has other means available to identify Venezuelan security risks. Id. at § 2(f )(ii). EO-4 differs from the prior executive orders in its treatment of those foreign nationals who are already on American soil. It exempts lawful permanent residents, and those granted asylum. Id. at § 3(b). EO-4 also allows for a “waiver” of its provisions, if a foreign national can demonstrate “undue hardship,” and that

their entry will threaten public safety. These waivers are determined on a caseby-case basis. Id. at § 3(c)(i). 2. EO-4 Is Constitutional. The State of Hawaii, three individuals, and the Muslim Association of Hawaii challenged EO-4 in federal district court. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2406. Without reaching the plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause challenges, the district court entered a nationwide injunction barring enforcement of EO-4 because it found that EO-4 violates 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f ) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”), due to a lack of specific findings that entry of these nationals would be detrimental to national interest, and § 1152(a)(1)(A), for discriminating against visa applicants on the basis of nationality. Hawaii v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 115559 (Haw. 2017). The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Trump v. Hawaii, 878 F. 3d 662, 690 (2017). In a 5-4 opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, and joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch, the United States Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit and upheld EO-4. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. The Court noted that § 1182(f ) “exudes deference” to the President and grants him “ample power” to restrict entry of certain nationals. Id. at 2408. President Trump “undoubtedly fulfilled” EO-4’s sole requirement that he “find” that entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States” after including the specific findings from the agencies ordered to analyze whether entry from certain countries should be restricted. Id. This made EO-4 “more detailed than any prior order a President has issued under § 1182(f ).” Id. at 2409. Regarding § 1152(a)(1)(A), the Court


and that very few student visas have been issued to applicants from Iran, Libya, Yemen and Somalia (despite not being subject to EO-4) since its implementation. Id. at 2431-33. Justice Breyer believes that EO-4 may have been written to be constitutional, but it remains a “Muslim Ban.” Id. 3. President Trump’s “Muslim Ban” Comments to the Media. Chief Justice Roberts declined to comment on the propriety of President Trump’s prior “Muslim Ban” statements to the media in the opinion. Id. at 2418. However, Justice Sotomayer in her dissent (joined by Justice Ginsburg) argued that President Trump’s comments to media while on the campaign trail and during the early days of his time in office are clear evidence that EO-4 violates the Establishment Clause because it is driven by the President’s animus towards members of the Muslim religion. Id. at 2433-48. But the most powerful judicial commentary on the “Muslim Ban” came from Justice Kennedy in his

©2018 hutchison & steffen

held that this provision only applies if entry is not otherwise restricted under § 1182. To read the INA otherwise would never allow a President to restrict entry based on nationality to combat risks like an “epidemic” or known terrorist threats. Id. at 2414-15. Finally, the Court held that EO-4 does not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2421-23. Applying rational basis review, the Court found that EO-4 passes constitutional muster. Id. It does not facially discuss religion, it is based upon the legitimate concern of national safety, and it restricts entry only to countries with Muslim-majorities that were previously designated by Congress and/or prior Presidents as posing entry concerns. Id. In his dissent, Justice Breyer argued that although EO-4 as written passes constitutional muster, EO-4 as implemented does not. Id. at 2430. He commented on the evidence before the Court that refugees are not being admitted into the United States (despite the waiver and asylum provisions),

concurring opinion. Although he joined in the majority, he warned that freedom from judicial scrutiny does not allow government officials the right “to disregard the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects.” Id. at 2424. Indeed, “[a]n anxious world must know that our Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts.” Id.

Therese Shanks is with the law firm of Robison, Sharp,Sullivan & Brust and focuses primarily on appellate practice and civil litigation. Since joining the firm in 2013, Therese has successfully handled hundreds of legal issues for local business owners.

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CONGRATULATIONS NEW ADMITTEES! Washoe County Bar congratulates and welcomes the new admittees who passed the July 2018 Bar Exam. The new admittees were sworn in on October 17, 2018 by the Supreme Court. WCBA welcomes them to the practice of law in Washoe County and invites them to join the Washoe County Bar Association. Our thanks to the firms for their generous donations to help sponsor the reception following the swearing in. Reed N. Adlish Allan L. Amburn Vereonica Bath Kelci Binau Regina Bradley Kelly Brandon Kale Brock Kaya Bromley Sarah Byrnes Erica Cooper Moria Desmarais Diana Ekins Patrick Gallagher Stephanie Glantz Adam Harris Amanda Marincic Michelle Mowry William Nobriga Kathleen Norris Samuel Quast Debra Schroeder Lorin Taylor Alexander Velto Craig Weaver

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See wcbar.org/events for details and registration NOVEMBER

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ouglas-Carson Legal Professionals meet for lunch and CLE at noon at Red’s Old 395 Grill, Carson City. Speakers are announced on website www.douglascarsonlegalprof.org.

2018 Annual Entertaining Ethics What Drug Dealers and Celebrities Teach Lawyers About Professional Responsibility Thursday, November 15, 2018 ~ 1:30 to 4:45 p.m. 3 Hours CLE including 2 Ethics & 1 Substance Abuse

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NALS of Washoe County (legal secretaries & paralegals) Black Bear Diner, 12 noon. $18 for NALS members Featured speaker will be Susan DeBoer, the Washoe County Public Guardian. Please RSVP by November 12 to Tori Francis at 353-7620 or email vfrancis@washoecounty.us. Nonmembers are welcome to attend!

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WCBA Annual Entertaining Ethics, 1:30 to 4:45 p.m., 3 Hours CLE including 2 ethics and 1 substance abuse. Bruce Thompson Federal Courthouse. Register at www.wcbar.org/events.

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NNWLA. Supreme Court Justice Michael Cherry will be discussing attorney wellness and substance abuse matters. Washoe County D.A.’s Office, 1 South Sierra Street in the South Tower on the 3rd floor. Tickets are $20 for members, $25 non members, and $40 for a member plus one guest. Ticket including lunch from The Cheese Board. Please RSVP by November 9th at www.nnwla.com/events.

DECEMBER

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WCBA Luncheon Honoring our 40 year members, 12 noon, Harrah’s. Please RSVP by 12/10/18 online at www.wcbar. org/events

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WCBA The Resilient Lawyer CLE, 2 Hours Mental Health Credit, Register online at www.wcbar.org/events Looking for the attorney that handled the will or trust for Andrew Scharps. Mr. Scharps passed away September 2018. Please contact his niece, Jeanne Griffith at (978) 727-3717 or email: beannebeanne@ gmail.com or Jeanne.Griffith@fmr.com

Believe it or not, but the legal problems faced by some of the most notorious drug dealers actually allow us to understand the requirement to eliminate the barriers to justice for all. Plus, the issues that celebrities face gives us a chance to talk about conflicts, inclusion, and substance abuse. Join the CLE Performer, Stuart Teicher, Esq., as he examines the intersection of several aspects of professional responsibility - access to justice, ethics, substance abuse, and diversity...all in a way that will keep you engaged! To register, please visit www.wcbar.org/events.

The Resilient Lawyer: an Experiential CLE Friday, December 14, 2018 1:30 to 3:30 p.m. Presented by: Margaret Crowley, Esq. & Amy Tirre, Esq. • Join us for 2 hours of CLE satisfying the new “Substance Abuse, Addictions and Mental Health Affecting Professional Competence” (1 unit carries over to 2019) • This is an “Outside the Box” CLE • Come prepared: * Wear comfortable clothing * Bring an Open Mind * Cultivate Mindfulness * Learn Simple Techniques to Reduce Stress through Movement and Sensory Integration * Create your Own Customized Plan for Stress Reduction and Resilience To register, please visit www.wcbar.org/events November 2018, Vol. 40, No. 10

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PRsrt std U.S. POSTAGE P AI D RENO, NEVADA PERMIT NO. 418

The P o s t o ff i c e b o x 1 5 4 8 , r e n o , n e v a d a 8 9 5 0 5

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Classifieds Please visit www.wcbar.org/classifieds for full job descriptions & deadlines. EMPLOYMENT ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY Small AV-rated land use/real estate law firm in Lake Tahoe seeking attorney with 5+ years exp to assist with land use, business, real estate, and litigation matters. Excellent research and writing skills required. Please send resume to julie@fmttahoe.com. FULL TIME DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY I – The Criminal Division of the Reno City Attorney’s Office is looking for a Deputy City Attorney with two (2) years experience preferred who is capable of working in a busy legal office. Available Salary Range: $ 81,000.00 +benefits (Benefit package includes Vacation, Sick Leave, PERS, Deferred Compensation Plan with up to 5% match, Life Insurance and Health Coverage). Applicant must be licensed to practice law in the State of Nevada.  Please send resumes and City of Reno job application which is available at www.reno.gov to Penie Colter at colterp@reno.gov. Only fully completed applications will be considered. Please do not contact office as to application status. WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES (WLS) a nonprofit legal aid organization, is seeking a Pro Bono and Volunteer Coordinator to manage the recruitment, training and mentoring of private lawyers in the community who wish to represent vulnerable individuals in Washoe County such as abused and neglected children, seniors and disabled adults. WLS will consider both attorney and non-attorney applicants for this position. Please visit www.wcbar.org/classified-ads to view job description and application information. ASSOCIATE ATTORNEY NEEDED: Hutchison & Steffen,  one of Nevada’s largest and respected  AV-rated, full-service law firms,  is  seeking  an  experienced and hardworking  attorney  to serve their rapidly expanding Northern Nevada Office in

Reno, Nevada.  A successful candidate will be  a solutions-driven attorney with more than three years litigation experience who is committed to adding value to the clients and communities the firm serves by providing high quality legal services.   Hutchison & Steffen is a great place to work for an attorney who is looking to build a rewarding career at a firm that will provide opportunities to practice law at a high level for outstanding clients.   The firm provides resources and support for each attorney to grow and develop, while at the same time facilitating a healthy work-life balance in a family friendly and collaborative  work environment. Additionally, the firm encourages attorneys in their efforts to make a meaningful impact in our community through pro bono legal work and public service.   Although the law firm provides legal services in almost every law practice area, law practice areas  a candidate can expect to immediately work upon hire in the Reno Office include, Employment and Labor Law, Civil Litigation, Corporate Law, Construction and Property Law, Public Entity Law,  Human Resources Support, Worker’s Compensation, Public Entity Law, Public Interest & Nonprofit Organization Law, Administrative & Regulatory Law, and Election, Campaign & Political Law.   Excellent writing skills and academics preferred. Competitive salary and benefits. Send resume to jguinasso@hutchlegal.com.

UNITED STATE DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF NEVADA, The Judicial Conference of the United States has authorized the appointment of two full-time United States magistrate judge for the District of Nevada to be located in Las Vegas, Nevada. The current annual salary of the position is $191,360. The term of office is eight years. A full public notice for the magistrate judge position and an application form is available on  the Court’s website (www.nvd.uscourts. gov). Applications must be received by 4:00 p.m. on Friday, November 30, 2018. Questions can be directed to the Clerk of Court at 702-464-5456.

SMALL LAW FIRM looking for a Litigation and Transactions Attorney with a minimum of 3 years of experience and Nevada law license. Directions on how to apply can be found here. Please submit all materials to admin@jerrycarterlaw.com.

LAWYER PROFESSIONAL ERRORS AND OMISSIONS INSURANCE PROGRAM. Altus Insurance Agency, Division of Orgill-Singer & Associates, has exceptional value for your Law Office. Over 30 years of serving Nevada. Contact: John Maksimik CIC, CRM at 775-398-2525 or email jmaksimik@orgillsinger.com.

LAW FIRM in CARSON CITY, NV seeks a Nevada licensed attorney with 1-5 years of experience. Excellent writing skills, appellate work experience and strong academic record required. Areas of practice include natural

resource law and municipal law. Please email resume to Sonia@legaltnt.com.

VOLUNTEER ATTORNEYS FOR RURAL NEVADANS (VARN) is looking for: Immigration Staff Attorney Staff Attorney to represent victims of domestic violence in family law matters. Please visit www.wcbar.org/classified-ads for more information.

SERVICES LEGAL RESEARCH & WRITING 20+ years experience at the Nevada Supreme Court, now available on a freelance basis for research and writing projects.  Briefs, petitions, motions, etc. tlindeman@ appellatesolution.com 775-297-4877.

The publication of any advertisement should not be deemed as an endorsement by the Washoe County Bar Association nor should any previously published advertisement be considered as precedent for future publication of the same or similar content.

2018 November Writ  
2018 November Writ  
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