1 Mindanao’s conflict geography legal resources—who had to carry the burden of meeting these expectations.”6 Meanwhile, the MILF—established in 1984 as a breakaway group from the MNLF—was gaining popularity as Moros became increasingly disappointed with the meager results of the peace agreement and the poor performance of the autonomous regional government. In the 1990s the MILF was the main Moro revolutionary force in Mindanao, with bases in many locations and sufficient military strength to sustain relatively large armed confrontations with government troops. In response, in April 2000 President Joseph Estrada declared an “all-out-war” policy with simultaneous attacks on various MILF camps, including its headquarters. After Estrada was ousted, the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo reversed the “all-out-war” policy and resumed peace-building efforts with the MILF. Another important milestone in the decades-long peace process was the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the government and Moro forces in July 2003. This paved the way for exploratory talks and a peace process between MILF and government peace panels. But negotiations for a peace agreement reached an impasse in 2006 and were later stalled by a court order in 2008 on the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains (MOA-AD). The MOA-AD was a draft document that acknowledged the Muslims of Mindanao (the “Bangsamoro”) and laid the groundwork for establishing a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity as their homeland. In 2008 opposition groups petitioned the Supreme Court to stop the signing of the draft MOA-AD. After the Supreme Court ruled that the agreement was unconstitutional, the government peace panel was abolished, peace talks were suspended, and military build-up in Mindanao resumed. The peace process between the government and the MILF leading up to the MOAAD had failed to rally two important social groups behind it: the Indigenous People and the Christian settlers. So perhaps it was inevitable that the peace talks would be opposed on many fronts and would be challenged in the courts. After July 2009, preparations for peace discussions appeared to be starting again after the President of the Philippines suspended military operations against the MILF. Despite recent setbacks,
government statements indicate an intention to resume the peace process. Until then, prospects for a positive settlement to address the concerns of the Moro people are uncertain, and the issues will take more than a few years to resolve.
Deep divisions, unresolved issues Set backs in the peace process between the government and the MILF point to the depth, complexity, and seriousness of divisions in Mindanao. One source of tension is majority– minority conflict, with settlers taking the lead in economic and political matters but facing resistance from other groups. There is also tension in the never-ending tug of war between property rights governing the majority and the new and inevitably controversial ancestral domain rights of minority groups. Moros and Indigenous People—both feeling displaced and dispossessed—continue to assert their rights to self-determination and to survive as distinct communities. Because the leaders of the Moro struggle have often failed to acknowledge Indigenous People’s own self-determination struggles, the regrettable result is mutual distrust and animosity between Indigenous Peoples and Moros. Any strategic plans to improve economic conditions for Moro and Indigenous People groups must address their territorial claims and strengthen the mechanisms to protect them from further dispossession and marginalization. Indigenous People have yet to feel the benefits of security from the IPRA. Until the boundaries of their ancestral domain lands are protected with formal titles, any effort to improve economic activities or living conditions in their areas would be viewed with mistrust. Descendants of settlers, who comprise the majority, are usually unable to appreciate the concerns of minority groups and do not see a role for themselves in the search for solutions. Christiandominated provinces opted to be excluded from the ARMM government through plebiscites in 1989, 1996 and 2001. Moreover, petitions by city councils, municipal councils, and provincial councils have unequivocally expressed strong opposition to expanding the coverage and powers of the autonomous regional government.
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