Prevention of Vivisection — now called Advocates for Animals) refused to participate in the drawing up of the bill which later became the 1986 Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act. This was a decision which excluded the animal rights movement from any influence on the key piece of legislation regulating the use of animals in laboratories. The Abolitionist Case
Even more worrying is the call by some (including the American animal rights philosopher Tom Regan) for the animal rights movement to distance itself from animal welfarism. This view is partly based on the argument that the compromises inherent in animal welfarism are morally wrong because to accept them is to give implicit acceptance to practices which are themselves immoral. More importantly, it is also claimed that the acceptance of welfare-based reforms is counter-productive strategically because to remove the worse excesses of factory farming or vivisection is to make these practices more acceptable, thereby diminishing the prospect of their eventual abolition. This is not quite an all or nothing position since its advocates are willing to accept that gradualism is acceptable as long as each step is, by itself, abolitionist (i.e. — the abolition of cosmetics testing or the LD50 test). Crucially, though, this position does not regard reforms to animal agriculture as acceptable because, whatever the methods used, killing animals for food continues. In my view, this fundamentalist abolitionist position is breathtakingly misguided. In the first place, the moral objection to animal welfarism is dubious to say the least. Should we really go along with a morality which states that the chance to alleviate some animal suffering now should be rejected in favour of a long-term abolitionist strategy which may or may not bear fruit sometime in the future? Surely not. Yes, animals will still continue to be killed for food but does not the quality of their lives matter? Secondly, there is little evidence that animal welfare reforms do hinder animal rights objectives. If only it was the case that reforms had significantly improved the lot of animals in general! Millions of animals are still tortured in British laboratories, factory farming is becoming, if anything, more pronounced and now we hear, with the tragedy of Lynx's demise, that fur may be making a comeback. This may be indicative of weaknesses in animal protection strate7 The Vegan. Summer 1993
gies but the last thing they tell us is that the next step along the road is the achievement of abolitionist animal rights objectives. Indeed, it is quite bizarre to claim that the best hope for animals is to just stand by and let their suffering continue on the grounds that this will produce a climate of such hostility that, say, the widespread adoption of veganism will bring an end to the meat industry. Why should it? After all, vegetarians, and vegans are still a tiny minority despite the existence and intensification of factory farming. Thirty years ago, only a small minority strongly opposed the wearing of fur or the use of animals for cosmetics testing
So the kindest thing that can be said about the "new fundamentalism" is that we have not reached the point at which it can be said that the pursuit of animal welfarism is holding back the achievement of abolitionist objectives and there is no reason to think that a gradualist reforming strategy cannot work. Indeed, other great reforming movements — such as the campaign to extend the franchise — did achieve their goals through a series of piecemeal changes. In the meantime, we can feel satisfaction when the slightest improvement in the lives of animals occurs. 'Unnecessary' Suffering
The most effective strategy for the animal protection movement, then, is an on-going attempt to re-define the public's perception of what constitutes unnecessary suffering. This has the advantage of working within a moral framework — that humans can exploit animals but any suffering inflicted must be warranted by the benefits produced — which the vast majority can accept. The term unnecessary suffering, of course, is vague and can justify almost anything. Nevertheless, it is this very imprecision which offers great hope for animal advocates. Thirty years ago, only a small minority strongly opposed the wearing of fur or the use of animals for cosmetics testing. Solid majorities now oppose these activities, and they are opposed not primarily because it is widely accepted that animals have moral status akin to humans, but because the perception of what constitutes unnecessary suffering has shifted. There is much further scope for cam-
paigning along these lines. What is necessary about using animals in circuses or keeping wild animals locked up in zoos? Is animal experimentation of much use given the differences between species and if there are doubts then how necessary is it? What is necessary about using animals to develop and test so-called "me-too" drugs which are produced merely to enable different pharmaceutical companies to market similar products? Furthermore, wouldn't it make more sense to divert money given for animal-based cancer and heart disease research into health education programmes which offer a much more meaningful way in which these largely preventable diseases can be eradicated? And could it be that the reason why governments will not follow this sensible course of action is that the drug companies have vetoed it because their economic interests are threatened? It should be pointed out that abolitionism is not ruled out by this approach. If a practice, such as hunting, is defined as unnecessary, then it should be prohibited. Likewise a case for vegetarianism can be made on these grounds. Eating meat is not necessary for health reasons (indeed, if anything, the opposite is the case) and a justification based upon a liking for the taste of meat is trivial and thereby illegitimate. At the very least, the most extreme forms of factory farming are not justified for the sake of cheaper meat or eggs. The questions raised above go to the heart of the institutional exploitation of animals in our society and they provide a radical agenda for many years to come. The animal rights movement does, of course, already pursue many of these lines of inquiry. Too often though there is an over-reliance on aniA vision is no substitute for an effective strategy
mal rights philosophy so that the empirical case for reform is neglected in favour of blanket statements that, whatever benefits humans gain from using animals, it is illegitimate because morally wrong. The so-called "new fundamentalism" is a restatement of such a position. There is nothing wrong with promoting animal rights ideas; indeed, every social movement must have a vision. But a vision is no substitute for an effective strategy. We must live in the real world and accept that, unless we can effectively challenge the necessity of animal exploitation, there is little chance at present of stopping any animal suffering.