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ISSN 2295-5895



ISSUE NO. 1/ Spring 2014



EUROPEAN Contributors Arno Metzler: Lawyer by profession, he is a member of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), where he sits as Vice President of Group III, as well as President of the EU-Turkey Joint Consultative Committee, which ensures the involvement of organized civil society in Turkey’s accession negotiation process. He is also General Manager of VBI, the German Association of Consulting Engineers. In Varietate Concordia Editor in Chief : Giovanni Collot

Editorial Board: Cécile Veillet; Rebecka Allen; Quentin Blommaert; Alexandra Lacroix; Fulya Özkul; Frida Göteskog; Lisa Jabroux; Mareike Trull; Mireia Reixach; Mariya Marinova. Creative Director: Valentina Calà Additional Design: Lucian Alexe

The New European is published bimonthly by UNITEE, the European-Turkish Business Confederation Meeûssquare 23 – 1000 Brussels, Belgium Phone: 0032 2 204 05 33 Fax: 0032 2 218 67 24 Responsible Editor: Dr. Adem Kumcu Meeûssquare 23 – 1000 Brussels, Belgium Follow us on and on Twitter, @unitee_europe Contact the Editor-in-Chief at Printed by Antilope Printing

Cover Picture by: Mark Abouzeid

Elizabeth Collett: Director of Migration Policy Institute Eu-

rope and Senior Advisor to MPI's Transatlantic Council on Migration. She is based in Brussels, and her work focuses in particular on European migration and immigrant integration policy.

Patrick Taran:

President of Global Migration Policy Associates, a multidisciplinary team of migration experts from all world regions engaged in research, policy development and advisory services. From 2000 to 2011, he was Senior Migration Specialist with the International Labour Office (ILO), working on discrimination and integration regarding migrant workers.

Rinus Penninx is emeritus professor of Ethnic Studies of the University of Amsterdam. He founded the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies at that university in 1993 and was its Director till 2005. Since 2004, he is Coordinator of the IMISCOE Research Network (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe). He has written for many years on migration, minority policies and ethnic studies.

Sir Graham Watson: He is a British Member of the Euro-

pean Parliament for ALDE, where he sits in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Since 2011, he has been the President of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party.

Maurice Crul: Professor at the Free University in Amsterdam and the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. In the last fifteen years, he mostly worked on the topics of education and children of immigrants, first within the Dutch context and in the last seven years in a comparative European and transatlantic context. He is the coordinator of the international TIES project (The Integration of the European Second generation). Sabine Laruelle: Belgian politician and a member of the li-

beral party ‘Mouvement Réformateur’, she has been her country’s Minister of the Self-employed, SME’s and Agriculture since 2011.

Caroline Essers: Assistant Professor of Strategic Human Resource Management at the Nijmegen School of Management (RU University), and Associate Professor of Business Administration at VU University Amsterdam. Her main research interests concern the identity constructions of entrepreneurs, particularly female (Muslim) migrant entrepreneurs. Colin Hann: Director of Communications at Supplier Diversity Europe, SDE.


In Varietate Concordia Giovanni Collot Editor in Chief

In Varietate Concordia. Harmony in diversity. It is the motto of the European Union, best celebrating its successes and setting its aspirations. Indeed, the European project has so far had the great merit of reuniting different countries and peoples under the same roof. This achievement shouldn’t be forgotten, and it has been rightly acknowledged by awarding the EU the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize. It is true, though, that also under another perspective is diversity a fundamental constituent of contemporary Europe: more than any other world region (except for the USA, where nevertheless it has been managed in a consistently different way), our continent’s history is one of migrations and exchanges. European identity has been forged by a constant interchange of languages and cultures: it was the diaspora of Florentine merchants in the Middle Ages who invented the modern financial system. And the Muslim Caliphate of Cordoba, Spain, before being conquered in the 15th Century by the Catholic Kings of Castile and Aragon, introduced new crops and advanced techniques that allowed Europe to eat, together with new ways of thinking that renovated its philosophy. Obviously, these migrations and exchanges didn’t happen smoothly: misunderstandings and clashes have always been a constant. Even today’s tirades against immigration are nothing new. But in the long term, they always, without exceptions, brought about more wealth and culture. An historical event is particularly interesting, for the resemblance it bears to today’s public discourse: in 1685 France, in the midst of Religion wars, King Louis XIV banned Protestantism. As a consequence, French Protestants – better known as Huguenots – were pushed to leave the country in huge numbers: between the end of 17th century and the beginning of 18th, from 200.000 to 500.00 people emigrated in bordering countries, such as England, the Netherlands, Switzerland and many German States. In most of their destinations, the newcomers were seen with suspicion, when not with open enmity. Some considered them spies for the French government, while others accused them of stealing jobs and resources from the natives. Prussia, on the other hand, welcomed them with open arms: there was a pressing need to repopulate lands devastated by decades of fighting and restart the country’s economy. But notwithstanding the different conditions they found, Huguenots soon became an essential asset. For the most part merchants and craftsmen, they introduced in their new homelands new products and industries. For instance, it is thanks to them that textile industries around London took off around the turn of the century, setting the basis for the First Industrial Revolution some decades later. The Huguenots case teaches us two things: first, migrants are not a novelty of our time. And second, they end up creating wealth, not destroying it. Which is why the anti-immigration wave currently growing in the European public discourse is not only wrong: it is dangerous, since it jeopardises our own future. It is necessary to change the mentality seeing diversity as dangerous and migrants as a threat to our civilization, and start looking at them as New Europeans and heralds of the new Europe. This is the vision behind the first issue of The New European. The title is not fortuitous. In the following pages we will try to answer, through high-level and original contributions, to some questions: who are the New Europeans? What role do they play in the European economy and society? What policies can be put into place to better benefit from their potential? The purpose of this is showing that diversity, if well managed, can lead to opportunities and wealth. Only by acknowledging this, Europe can successfully compete on the international stage. Only by clinging to its values and by knowing its past, will Europe be able to look at the future with optimism.


Letter from the president 4

In need of a new Renaissance for Europe Adem Kumcu President of UNITEE

In fifty years from now, where will the European Union be? Will our grandchildren remember it as an overly optimistic experiment, which started well but then collapsed under its multifold contradictions? Will it be a sleepwalking institution, distant and lacklustre, still existing but simply unable to improve people’s lives? Or, on the contrary, will it be a lively, prosperous and forward-looking place, an area of wealth and culture for its citizens? The answer does not look so obvious, today. Five years after the first sparks of a global crisis have engulfed the world, Europe still has not found a way out: indeed, from an economic crisis it has turned into a political one. All around Europe, anti-European and populist sentiments are growing, thus representing a major threat for the 2014 elections. More and more voices are calling for a lesser Europe. Examples are many, but increasingly worrying since they also come from traditional, moderate parties: in a recent speech, British Prime Minister David Cameron advocated for a reduction of citizens’ freedom of movement in the Schengen area. In Italy, not only has the Five Star Movement, the second force in the Italian Parliament, started a campaign for the European elections named “Crusade against Europe”, but Forza Italia, Berlusconi’s centre-right party and a former member of the coalition ruling the country, is declaring itself as opposed to the Euro and the European Union. Not to mention France, where the far-right party Front National is heading all polls. This, when around us the world is changing at the fastest pace ever: new countries in other regions of the world are emerging as leaders and imposing new rules of the game. A game that Europe, as it is today, simply does not look able to play anymore. More specifically, Europe is confronted to three challenges, which put into question its deeper values and the way it has tried to function so far.

The first of these challenges, and the most pressing one, concerns the economy. The 2008 crisis has underlined structural weaknesses that have not been sufficiently addressed by European policymakers, with a result: while other countries are going back to steady growth, Europe still struggles to get back on its feet, haunted by weak production and skyrocketing unemployment. Europe risks to be cut out of the globalised market if it does not reverse its course: as the 2010 Reflection Group put it, “Human capital is the key strategic instrument for ensuring success in the global economy. And yet Europe has lost considerable ground in the race to a knowledge economy». The economic challenge goes together with a demographic one, whose long term effects could be even more disruptive. An ageing population and low birth rates in all European countries are making existing social benefits increasingly unsustainable, weighing on national debts which are, in most cases, already stretched beyond their possibilities. Another consequence of the increase in the number of elderly persons is that it takes important resources away from investments, for example in education and research, further aggravating the deficit in competiveness against other younger countries. The third and last challenge embraces the other two, and is even more worrying for the survival of the EU itself: it is a challenge of identity. Or, more properly, of a deep lack thereof. European citizens seem to have lost any hope in a Europe to which they don’t feel they belong. The European process has focused too exclusively on building the institutions and the Common Market. But it has underestimated the power of another, fundamental aspect: its values and vision. In other words, the European Union and the Member States, at different levels, have built a bureaucratic behemoth without giving their people a reason to believe in it.

While Europe was growing in body, it lost its soul. And a body cannot properly function without a soul: that is why, once the economic construction began trembling, there was nothing under it to stop it from collapsing. In other words, the lack of a sense of commonality between Germans and Spaniards, for example, has worsened the crisis. In this rather gloomy situation, if Europe wants to successfully address the above mentioned challenges, a decisive action by everybody believing in it is required. The words of Albert Camus, the French existentialist writer and 1957 Nobel Prize for Literature, sound prescient of today’s moment: “Each generation doubtless feels called upon to change the world. Mine knows that it will not change it, but its task is perhaps even greater. It consists in preventing the world from destroying itself”. Should we fail, it will not only be a problem for us: it will be a theft to the coming generations. To prevent the European project from collapsing, I hold the strong belief that the EU must reinvent itself. Just as the phoenix, the bird of the myth, arising from its own ashes, Europe has to be reborn. But such a rebirth can be possible only if the values at the heart of the European construction, those that have inspired generations of thinkers and politicians, but also of common citizens, take again the centre stage: freedom of movement; sustainability; solidarity; rule of law; equality. These values should not only be more thoroughly taken into account in the EU’s governance, but they should also be more often communicated to its citizens. There is a need of what we may call a new European Renaissance: such as the Renaissance was revolutionary because it put the human being back at the centre after the Middle Ages, Europe needs to rediscover a system of values able to make its citizens free to develop themselves fully and to give them appropriate tools to address the challenges induced by globalisation. In the big task of unleashing a new Renaissance, I believe that UNITEE is in a privileged situation. In representing New Europeans, i.e. entrepreneurs and professionals with a migrant background, it has a clear certainty: New Europeans can offer immediate solutions to the economic and demographic challenges, as you will more extensively read in the following pages. But, even more importantly, New Europeans of-

fer a great opportunity in the formation of a truly effective European identity: they show with their everyday life the road that must be taken for a new, inclusive and democratic Europe. A Europe that is able to take advantage from its diversity and cultural richness. A Europe that doesn’t build walls against the external world, but instead builds bridges in all directions, thanks to its geographical position, appeal and diverse citizens. A Europe leader in innovation, where people from all around the world can come, move freely and exchange ideas. A Europe that does not have the ambition to homologate everyone under the same lifestyle, but that is able to make differences enrich one another. A Europe that is not obliged to follow the pace decided somewhere else, but that is able to impose its own agenda. A Europe that is sustainable, home to people wanting to build and not to destroy. A Europe that people are happy to join and are proud to be part of. And a Europe with less politics and more citizenship, less bureaucracy and more creativity. This is the vision that will inform this magazine. In our difficult times, there is no space for diplomacy and hesitations. What is required is to think bravely and to imagine the world we want to leave to the next generations. The New European wants to give its contribution: it has the ambition to create an opportunity to hold a fair and brave discourse about the challenges Europe is facing and what has to be done to successfully overcome them. Furthermore, it will not be limited to spread ideas, but it will also try to suggest practical solutions for action on a variety of fields we consider central to the future of Europe, such as innovation, green economy, citizenship and free market. Always keeping its founding values at the centre. Its content, issue by issue, will be focused on provocative, forward-looking thinking by Europeans coming from different backgrounds and experiences, but joined by two characteristics: an unwavering love for Europe and the will to fight for it. We will look for the new Europe where it already exists, we will help its birth and in doing that, we will show the way forward. A way in which the word ‘New Europeans’ will cease to define a specific demographic, and it will stand for a new breed of citizens, that will shape Europe and for whom Europe will be a reason of pride. Welcome to the New European Renaissance.


issue no.1 - january 2014


Contributors 2 // Editorial 3 // Letter from the President 4

8 Briefing Meet the New Europeans // Fulya Özkul & Alexandra Lacroix


11 Opinions Migration: preserving a viable Europe // Patrick Taran Making European diversity work // Elizabeth Collett


& Milica Petrovic


The two motors of integration: now it is the time for the New Europeans // Arno Metzler


18 Cover Story The EU’s Migration Paradox: a historical assesment // Rinus Penninx




25 Worldview Knowledge & diversity: The secret of the Silicon Valley Innovation Recipe// Cécile Veillet


28 Turkey Special Turkey has changed, but perceptions on us have not


// Interview to Selim Yenel


Turkey is extremely important for Europe, and there is nobody who says otherwise // Interview to Joost Korte


Draw me a bridge. And now a hub // Quentin Blommaert A green future for the EU -Turkey relationship?


// Graham Watson


BUV- Strengthening the German-Turkish partnership in the field of renewable energy // Anne-Christine Mainka


42 Solutions Education in Superdiverse cities // Maurice Crul New European female entrepreneurs in Europe


// Caroline Essers

44 46

If every vote counts // Giovanni Collot

49 Focus on country: Sweden The Swedish model: time to rethink integration // Maurice Crul


// Frida Gรถteskog


Swede seeking immigrant family!

54 Art The faces of the New Europe // Lisa Jabroux


58 Business Beyond Borders SMEs taking off // Sabine Laruelle Supplier Diversity Europe // Colin Hann

58 60

62 Euroviews Towards a new, industrial future for Europe // Interview with Antonio Tajani




(c) European Parliament

All the images: (c) Wikipedia

From left to right, in clockwise order: Eva Joly, Mario Balotelli, James Caan, Zaha Hadid, Ahmet Aboutaleb, Fatih Akin.


With special reporting by Alexandra Lacroix

“New Europeans”, as defined by the European Commission, are slowly changing our society and economy. But their innovative role still is not acknowledged enough. A short guide to the new Europe taking shape. The Frenchman with the local cheese shop. Your German butcher. The Italian coffee shop. The Turkish kebab place. Your neighbourhood is made of New Europeans. Europe is a hub of old and new. Acting upon this milieu, the establishment of the European Union has created an equal environment for all citizens of the EU member states. Due to necessity and opportunity, a large percentage of the European population now lives and has settled in countries other than their native country. Whether studying, working or for multiple other reasons, European citizens have the right to live in another European country without prejudice or discrimination. At the same time, in recent years Europe has also become a destination for many migrants, coming from the whole world in hope of


finding a better place to live and start a family. Both these groups, from inside and outside the EU, are already changing in depth the face of European cities, making them more diverse in colourful encounters of cultures.

Definition of New Europeans In this way, a new breed of European citizens has emerged. The official term to indicate them is New Europeans. The European Commission has a designated, detailed definition of the different attributes characterising this still largely unknown category, which encompasses more and more of the European population.

More specifically, the Commission identifies two different kinds of New Europeans in its 2011 Special Barometer: ‘New Europeans by ancestry’, as opposed to ‘New Europeans by openness”. People in the first group have a migrant background, that is, at least one parent or grandparent originates from a country other than their country of residence. On the other side, “New Europeans by openness” are people who developed strong ties to a country other than their country of residence. This may have happened for four different reasons: they have worked or studied in another country for some time, or have a partner from another country, or they may own property abroad. Both these groups are opposed to a third one: ‘Old Europeans’, i.e. people who have roots only in the country where their parents and grandparents were born. They are citizens of the European Union as a consequence of their country being or becoming a Member State of the EU. Furthermore, they have no links with other countries, in the sense that they have neither worked nor studied in another country, they have never lived with a partner from another country, and they do not own property abroad. So to clarify, according to this definition a New European is someone who associates with or lives in a European country other than that of their ancestry/origins. In the public discourse, the individuals who are part of this category are usually discredited, segregated and seen as “fo-

New Europeans as an engine of growth.

reigners”. As an example, just think about the Turkish population in Germany, the Algerians in France or the Asian population in the United Kingdom. These examples are specific to New Europeans with non-European ancestry, but the same cases are very often applicable more in general to nationals of EU countries. During the past fifty years, with the growth in migrations both from outside and within Europe and more crosscountry job opportunities, the amount of people living outside their country of origin has greatly increased: according to Eurostat, the European Union is today home to 33 million foreign-born people (i.e. individuals born in a country different from the 28 EU Member States). Furthermore, since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 and borders were removed between European countries, the member countries have only grown and expanded to include 28 EU member states, with Croatia being the most recent to join.

to their origins in one context or another: this makes them, on average, more adaptable and flexible to different environments. New Europeans, consequently, have a strong understanding of multiple countries and cultures, which makes them more effective in the common European market. All these preeminent characteristics have a significant effect on Europe’s growth. First of all, they are decisive in fostering a sense of entrepreneurship. According to the OECD 2011 International Migration Outlook, entrepreneurship tends to be slightly higher among immigrants than among natives in most OECD countries: around 12.7% of migrants of working age are self-employed, compared with 12.0% among natives. After all, the risk inherent in moving to a country with a different language and culture with the aim of reinventing yourself is similar to the risk of investing money and energy to transform an idea into a commercial product or service. The fear of failure and social pressure, both from the home and the source country, is another motivating factor.

The benefit of holding the European citizenship, even during the economic crisis, is access to a multitude of countries, languages, cultures and job markets. In a sense, it has always been like that: if we look at history, some of the most impactful individuals were New Europeans. In the industry of art alone, Vincent Van Gogh (from the Netherlands), Amedeo Modigliani (from Italy), and Pablo Picasso (from Spain) all relocated to France. Certain fields require relocation, both in the past and in today’s economy. Even Albert Einstein lived in multiple European countries prior to moving to the United States. But the list of impressive and successful New Europeans doesn’t stop with the great artists of yesteryear; today they can be found in all fields. Italian footballer Mario Balotelli, British entrepreneur James Caan, architects Zaha Hadid and Sefik Birkiye, Belgian Prime Minister Elio Di Rupo, French Green leader Eva Joly and German Director Fatih Akin are all New Europeans. And the list goes on and on. And so do the benefits that this specialized demographic can offer the EU. Whether they’re first, second or third generation and can understand and associate with the local cultural traditions, New Europeans also feel connected


(c) European Parliament


As a consequence, they are a powerful tool for job creation: according to the same study, immigrant entrepreneurs annually employ more than 750,000 individuals in Germany, around half a million in the United Kingdom and Spain, almost 400,000 in France and around 300,000 in Italy. On average, they thus employ 2.4% of the total employed population. That’s not all. There is growing evidence that New Europeans foster trade. Their language skills, cultural know-hows and connections provide them with the ability to create wide transnational networks, speeding the flow of information, providing contacts and fostering trust. In doing so, migrant entrepreneurs pave the way also for other firms that want to engage in trade with these targeted countries. More in general, New Europeans today have become the symbol of what the EU bases its foundations on: equality, diversity and opportunity. And it is these qualities themselves that can foster innovation and modernity. In “Cities in Civilization”, Peter Hall reminds us how “the creative cities were nearly all cosmopolitan; they drew talent from the four corners of their worlds, and from the very start of those worlds were often surprisingly far-flung. Probably, no city has ever been creative without continued renewal of the


creative bloodstream”. Today this is true more than ever. For instance, take any large European city and consider its demographic make-up. It could be Paris, London or Barcelona. For our purposes, though, we’ll take a closer look at Brussels. It indeed is a special case, as it is the European capital and the hub of the EU activity and evolution. Due to the amount of workers necessary to represent each of the 28 member states at the European level, it is the perfect example of all nationalities coming together for professional reasons or choices of life. With more than one in two residents not of Belgian origin, the amount of New Europeans in Brussels is at a higher percentage than in other European capitals, and that definitely makes the Belgian (and European) capital a truly New European city, its identity shaped by different cultures and traditions. Cities like Brussels, with their large population of New Europeans and their bursting innovation, are not a deviation from the European society; they should increasingly be the norm. With their colourful face, they represent the Europe of the future, economically strong and socially sustainable. It is time for Europe to acknowledge the potential of this diversity, and act consequently to foster it.



International migration is a characteristic of our globalised world. And it will become increasingly important for all developed economies. A new comprehensive framework for governance is thus necessary.


MIGRATION PRESERVING A VIABLE EUROPE International migration is here to stay; 90% of migration today has labour and employment related outcomes. Migration for Europe is about maintaining viable work forces and it is about sustaining productivity and development. International labour and skills mobility will likely increase significantly in coming decades. For Europe and elsewhere, this brings challenges. Future European economic performance and business competitiveness is at stake, so what is to be done? We offer a few notions.

Migration today According to the United Nations, there are an estimated 232 million people residing today in countries other than where they were born or are citizens. ILO calculated that 105 of the 214 million people living outside their countries of birth or citizenship in 2010 are economically active: employed, self-employed or otherwise engaged in remunerative activity. Given an estimated one accompanying dependent for each active adult, over 90 per cent of migration today is bound up in labour and employment outcomes. These figures do not register the millions more people around the world in short-term, temporary situations where they are not counted as residents. 49% of all migrants today are women and girls. Across Europe, women are a majority among migrants, comprising 51 to 55%. The feminization of migration is less about proportion; today the difference is that most adult women migrants are economically active.

Migration is about maintaining viable economies What is migration about? It is often said to be about development. However, migration today is even more about preserving development in industrialized countries. Foreign born workers comprise 10% to 15% of labour forces in Western European countries, and around 18% in Australia, Canada and the USA. As former mayor Ken Livingstone once said, London would not make it to breakfast without migrants. Including offspring of recent immigrants gives 20% or more of work forces “issue de l’immigration” in some Western European countries. It also represents growing portions in many countries across Asia, the Americas, the Caribbean, Eurasia and the Middle East, including Turkey. Evolution and diversification of technology, relocations of industrial processes and changes in the organization of work itself are constant characteristics of the world of work. This constant evolution requires accelerating complexity, diversity and specialization in the skills of work forces in every country.


No country today can train the entire range and number of evolving skills needed for the ever more complex work on its territory. This drives a constantly increasing, international mobility of labour at all skill levels. The skills crisis is critical. Today, employers in Europe and elsewhere around the world complain that they cannot fill one in three jobs on offer with the needed level of skills. However, a forecasting study by the McKenzie Global Institute reported that the global shortage of high skilled and trained technical skills is projected to reach 85 million by 2020. Among them, 40 million will lack tertiary education in developed countries. And 45 million more will have insufficient technical and vocational skills in developing countries. It is a huge mismatch in both numbers and quality. The needed skills largely do not exist; too few people are being prepared with appropriate skills for today’s or tomorrow’s needs. The global mismatch between needs and skills undermines the viability and competitiveness of enterprises and economies worldwide. It also leaves many youth unable to find employment. Paradoxically, migrants with acquired skills and working experience commonly face non-recognition of educational and experience qualifications in countries of employment. The result is a process of ‘deskilling’, where they obtain jobs far below their level of qualifications, often only in unskilled, precarious and poorly paid work.

Greater mobility coming Within 15 years, the majority of world’s countries and populations will experience a workforce decline. Germany is expected to lose 5 million workers in the next ten years, while the Russian Federation has lost 10 million since 2000. The Japanese labour force will shrink 37% over the next 25 years.And there’s the big one: China’s work force will decline by at least 126 million people in 20 years. According to recent estimates, 127 out of 224 countries and political territories are at or well below zero fertility rates. Over the next 15 years, all will face increasing departures from the workforce uncompensated by entrants. This means intensified global competition for the most crucial economic resource of all: labour and skills. Meanwhile, pressures for displacement and emigration from countries North and South remain intense. A key factor remains the absence of decent jobs in ‘developing’ countries with growing young populations: job creation has remained flat while population continue growing, adding millions of new workers each year to labour markets in which new jobs created only match numbers of jobs lost. Financial crises and austerity measures have devastated national economies in several European countries by producing youth unemployment rates ranging from 30% to 50% and, consequently, new waves of emigration of young skilled workers from Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

Exploitation structurally defined When people do move as they often must, they are often subject to abuse, exploitation and draconian repressive measures. Those who suffer most are the many persons simply obeying - often with little choice - the laws of supply and demand of the globalized capitalist market economy. In this situation, the basic dignity and rights of migrants as workers and human beings are undermined, especially those in irregular situations. Exploitative conditions commonly experienced by migrants are structurally driven. This is particularly the case for women. For many enterprises in many countries, for entire economic sectors, low cost foreign labour is the only ticket to survival. Agriculture would not be viable in Europe nor in North America - nor would a part of the population afford to eat - without cheap immigrant labour. Health, home care and schooling for children and care for increasing populations of ageing people depend on migrants. As do hotels, restaurants and the tourist sector in many countries. Global competition, free trade, and the race to the bottom push against the costs of labour and social services, challenging indeed the very social function of States. Keeping some migrants cheap, docile, flexible – and removable without social costs - becomes not just highly desirable. It becomes imperative to keep jobs at home and economies afloat. No matter what those jobs are and who is doing them. Despite rhetoric about controlling migration, migrant workers remain in irregular situations, tolerated because they provide that cheap, docile, flexible labour needed to sustain enterprises, employment and competitiveness. An excerpt from a recent report on the UK sums up features consistent with data from other EU countries: “Migrants, especially those from outside the EU15 who have limited access to social security provisions, face the paradoxical position of being welcomed by businesses and the state due to their high flexibility and minimal utilisation of the welfare state on the one hand, whilst facing increasing unease and hostility from anti-immigrant groups, the same state that welcomes them, and large numbers of the general public on the other. The highly unregulated and flexible economy has allowed many migrants to easily find work and businesses to remain competitive whilst simultaneously creating the conditions for widespread exploitation and producing divisions amongst workers, both between (native) born/migrant and between different groupings of labour migrants.”

A clear and present danger: xenophobia A burning concern is the recognized rise in discriminatory practices and of racist, xenophobic behaviour against migrants. Hostility towards migrants is evident worldwide. Numerous reported incidents in Europe indicate increasing intensity: shootings of migrant workers at workplaces, mob attacks on and killings of migrants, and sometimes police round-ups and detention of migrants in concentration camp-like facilities. The concern is aggravated by the dearth of vigorous responses by governments to anticipate, discourage, and prevent mani-

festations of hostility against foreigners, and to prosecute perpetrators. Social cohesion can only be maintained by deliberate legal, institutional and practical measures. Demonstrable proof is that in a few countries – such as Ireland - there have been almost no racist killings of migrants nor burnings of businesses, homes or places of worship of foreigners. Anti-immigrant politicians and political parties have gained no traction. Discrimination against foreigners may be manifested. But it is made unacceptable.

The governance framework There is indeed a comprehensive international framework for migration’s governance, comprising legal standards, global policy guidelines and supportive activity of a host of international bodies. The elaboration of governance - national and international - over the last century recognized that the economic processes of capitalist industrialization required normative regulation to provide decent conditions for persons engaged in work. Regulation was also essential to support employment, to ensure social protection, and to invoke social dialogue between the main economic actors: employers and workers. A range of instruments in international law provides the legal framework: Human Rights Conventions, International Labour Standards, the Convention and Protocol on refugees and Protocols on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants are the most relevant. Specific regional instruments on human rights, migrant workers, refugees, and trafficking have also been established by the Council of Europe and the European Union. Three complementary instruments focus on migration: ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment (of 1949), ILO Convention 143 on migrant workers (Supplementary Provisions) (of 1975), and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW). They contain norms for governance and administration of migration, for international cooperation, as well as for protecting migrant workers and their families. 87 countries have ratified at least one of these three instruments, including 12 in Europe. However, the governance structure for migration is changing in both old and new immigration countries. The locus of migration governance in many States over previous decades was in labour and employment ministries. This reflected the primacy of needs to regulate labour markets and protect workers as well as oversee employment relations and social dialogue. Security and control institutions of States now often predominate in managing and controlling migration and migrants. This appears to be coincident with a broad redefinition of conditions for labour. The treatment imposed on a substantial migrant component of workforces can and does influence treatment of the workforce more broadly. Administration of the foreign component of work forces by interior ministries has consequences in shifting emphasis of law enforcement at workplaces from labour standards to immigration enforcement.


Policy action agenda In view of contemporary and future challenges, obtaining good governance of migration and protection of migrants’ rights is critical. The main components of an agenda for action by governments in cooperation with employers and trade unions as well as civil society include: 1.

Campaigning for recognition and protection of migrants, by ratification and full implementation of legal standards protecting rights of all migrants


Obtaining disaggregated data on the characteristics, situations and conditions of migrants


Overcoming skills shortages; training youth for employment


Establishing national policy frameworks on migration, in consultation across government and with social partners and civil society


Upholding Decent Work for all migrants, particularly by vigorous enforcement of labour standards

Stopping xenophobia, racism and discrimination against migrants through public awareness campaigning, enforcing the law, and discouraging hostile discourse 7. Bringing health to migrants, ensuring full access by migrants to health prevention and care services and specific national public 6.


health policy covering migrants Ensuring access to and portability of Social Security for migrants


Enacting gender-specific migration legislation and policy

10. Ensuring policy and administrative responsibility and capacity on migration by labour institutions.




History tells that migration has been an essential ingredient of development and human welfare. However, unless regulated by appropriate laws and policies, migration entails high costs in violations of rights of persons, in social disruption, in reduced productivity, and in lost opportunities for development. Migration must be governed under the rule of law, with the involvement of key stakeholders across government, in parliaments, along with social partners, civil society and migrants themselves.

MAKING EUROPEAN DIVERSITY WORK Elizabeth Collett & Milica Petrovic, MPI Europe

Europe is losing the challenge of competitiveness. To get back to growth it must acknowledge the unfulfilled potential of its immigrant population.

One of the biggest challenges to future European competitiveness is the failure to acknowledge society as it is today: diverse and rich in unfulfilled potential. If Europe is to build a more advanced and sustainable economy, and attract skilled workers from abroad to fill specialized labour shortages, its governments need to promote the full use of talent already resident within Europe, and particularly young people with immigrant background. To achieve this, policy-makers will have to work with a broad range of actors, from city authorities to business leaders, and consider the impact of all employment and education policies on those with immigrant background. That Europe fails to make the most of its existing immigrant potential is clear. A number of European Member States have significant numbers of un- or underemployed people with immigrant background. According to 2012 OECD data the unemployment rate of foreign-born people is approximately 1.5 times higher than that of the native-born in many European

countries (Settling In: OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2012). In addition, young people have been particularly affected by the economic crisis: the rate of unemployment for young people (15 to 24 years old) is double that of the whole working-age population (15 to 64 years old), and immigrant youth experience disproportionately higher unemployment than native-born youth – on average 23% compared with 18% (Settling In: OECD Indicators of Immigrant Integration 2012). And the employment situation of the second-generation immigrant youth, those born in the host country to foreign-born parents, is particularly critical: compared to descendants of native-born parents, their unemployment rate is almost twice as high and long-term. This represents a lost generation of European citizens, which has not only economic but also social implications for the future success of European societies. Migration is and remains a highly politicized issue in most European countries, and many politicians and publics remain

reluctant to accept diversity as a permanent feature of contemporary society. This is discernible in policies to manage education or labour market access, which treat immigrants as a separate population for integration specialists, rather than part of mainstream policy. However, there are signs that these assumptions are changing, albeit slowly, with some policy-makers adapting their systems to serve increasingly diverse societies. This is particularly the case at local level, where failure to reach the entire population can have tangibly damaging, and long lasting, effects on the community. This requires balance. On the one hand, several countries are considering reform of, or have already reformed, the entire education system, recognizing that early selection or tracking systems harm those pupils from a more vulnerable background, including immigrant youth. On the other hand, targeted support is still necessary to improve education and labour market outcomes for immigrants; for example, national policy makers


need to continue investing not only in language support policies, but also in more structural support mechanisms such as anti-discrimination policy. National and European policy-makers have a crucial role to play in this, particularly those ministries and departments responsible for employment, education and business policies, but they can only implement such change with the open and public support of a whole range of actors, from integration specialists to local authorities, civil society and the private sector. All of these actors can set in place initiatives to support the sustainable employment of young people with immigrant background, from vocational training, bridging and apprenticeship programmes, to peer support and mentoring groups. But this issue is also about the public perception of immigrants and immigration; all of these actors are crucial in setting the agenda for changing both the debate on immigration, and the outcomes for immigrants. Policy makers need to engage more frequently and actively with employers and business leaders, and they, in turn, have a duty to speak up about their needs and challenges in realizing the full potential of a diverse society. Employers increasingly recognise the potential of linguistic, intercultural and specialised skills that foreign workers may bring, though smaller businesses may need


help in order to invest in them. Europe is no longer the default destination for many skilled people around the world. There may be many reasons for this, from administrative and legal complexity in obtaining work and residence permits, and difficulty in having qualifications recognised, to the high cost of living compared with locations in Asia and South America. But it is also linked to the perception that Europe is not a destination offering guaranteed success not just for immigrants, but also for their children and grandchildren. In order to build the case for attracting talented individuals to Europe, policy-makers must demonstrate successful employment and career outcomes for those with immigrant background already resident in Europe. The integration of immigrants is not just a societal public good, but also one that has implications for European economies. As such, it should not be an endeavour limited to integration policy specialists and immigrant organisations, but expand along two axes: whole-of government policy, incorporating immigrant needs within broader policy goals, and whole-of-society approaches, encouraging a broader range of actors to become active players in the future of young immigrants across Europe.

(c) Fouquier

The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit think tank in Washington, DC dedicated to analysis of the movement of people worldwide.


Politics is not enough. Civil society has a fundamental role in fostering inclusiveness. New Europeans are the best example.

At present, European integration is a topic linked to crisis: Euro and banking bailouts, youth unemployment, struggle about the EU budget and agricultural policy. The heads of state try to tackle these problems with summits and all-night negotiations – with more or less success. It seems like the common motor of integration, progress driven by the visions and commitments of European statesmen and – women is sputtering. Consequently, one should take a look at the other motor of European integration, being it a two-engine vehicle. Together with the top-down impulses, in European politics there has always been a bottom-up dynamic that filled political visions and decisions with life. It is the cross-border activities of individuals, companies and civil society organizations that matter. This is the other, even more effective motor of integration. It is the civil societies that bring in the dynamics of integration and are able to interlink regions, states, economies and cultures. Entrepreneurs doing business across borders build the internal market, artists like musicians, authors and actors build ties between different cultural backgrounds and many non-governmental organizations through their work strengthen the solidarity between nations and regions. There is one group that has to be highlighted in particular: youth. Mostly without too much interests in stereotypes, young people are open to new experiences and nowadays often take a Europe without borders as a matter of course. One of the first EU programs was the most effective: the student exchange program Erasmus. The personal experiences of students studying in other European countries build a crucial part of the mutual understanding and openness between European societies and lay the basis for joint business, cultural or social projects. There is even a term for those Europeans who have ties to other countries, be that EU member states or other states: it is the New Europeans. This term describes a large variety of people; an April 2011 Eurobarometer survey has identified many forms of connectedness, such as the family background, a partner

from another country, work experiences, retirement migration and some more. Thus, New Europeans have very multi-faceted links to other countries. Still, they share a very important societal function in demonstrating the intercultural reality through their own lives. These many personal, professional and societal examples of cross-border activities promote integration in the most effective way. This understanding gives a clue to another construction ground of European integration: the accession talks with Turkey. There are already very many New Europeans with close links to Turkey like the hundreds of thousands of people with Turkish background living and working in the EU. Viceversa, there are numerous individuals and organizations in Turkey with strong ties to EU member states. Obviously, there is a large potential of Turkish who could become New Europeans. Many of them may be among those who have demonstrated some months ago, and many will be also among those who conduct their everyday business. The diversity of societies in Turkey and in the EU member states would allow for many more personal, economic, cultural and social links. Once more, the sputtering motor of top-level political negotiations could be backed up by the bottom-up dynamics. With regards to the EU-Turkey accession negotiations, politicians should focus less on legal debates and further promote the exchange of students, employees and entrepreneurs instead. Facilitating access from Turkey to the EU would be a first step; a targeted support of exchange via student exchange programs and joint activities of civil society organizations has to be the second step. Political and legal integration will then follow the societal and economic realities. Here again, it is time to accelerate the second, even more effective motor of integration, taking its power from the people, the New Europeans who exemplify integration through their own lives.





Rinus Penninx

In the last decades, Europe has become a continent of immigration. The various national policies implemented have evolved along a clear, paradoxical path: more freedom of movement within the EU, together with increasing closure for immigrants from outside. A long-term analysis.

Introduction International migration and the position of migrants and their integration have become hot political topics in Europe, both in the public perception and in policies. How and why did this situation come about? We will try to explain two paradoxical trends: the first is the seeming contradiction that Europe has factually become a continent of immigration during the last half century, but that European countries define themselves consistently as non-immigration countries. The second is the paradoxical trend that the ever more restricted and controlled migration of Third Country Nationals goes together with an increasing internal free movement within a strongly enlarged European Union.

Europe has become a continent of immigration in the period 1950-2013 In the decade following the end of World War II, Europe was basically an emigration continent: during the Cold War, Central and Eastern European states lost many citizens as refugees to the West, and Western European states resumed pre-war emigration traditions to classical emigration destinations, like the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and some Latin American countries. This situation started to change radically at the end of the 1950s/ early 1960s. Emigration decreased and immigration gained importance, starting in the Western part of Europe. The United Nations estimated the number of ‘foreign-born residents’ in Europe already at 23 million in 1985, but they more than doubled to 56 million in 2000. They represented 7.7 per cent of the total population of Europe. When we narrow them down to the European Union (of the present 28 members), these figures are even higher: according to Eurostat, in 2011 nearly 49 million of the total 504 million inhabitants of the EU are

foreign-born. If more inclusive definitions are used, such as ‘allochtonous population’ or ‘population with a migration background’ that include children of migrants, then numbers and percentages grow significantly and for older immigration countries these will often double. In the Netherlands for example,’allochthonous population’ forms 21 % of the total population. In the German case, ‘persons having a migration background’ comprise 19,7 % of the total population in 2005 (Source: Eurostat). Europe has thus factually become an immigration continent. The importance of international migration is further underlined, if we look at its relative importance in the demography of Europe: in view of the low fertility rates in Europe, net migration (i.e. the number of immigrants in one year minus the number of emigrants in that same year) has become a more substantial contributor to population growth than natural growth in the member states of the European Union. For the near future, prognoses expect that net migration will prevent an absolute decrease of the EU-population until the year 2025. These are total figures and averages for Europe and the EU. However, the geographical distribution and impact of this sizeable immigration and of the settlement patterns of immigrants is basically uneven, both in time and in space. Some Western European countries, such as Belgium, France and Switzerland, have a long history of immigration before World War II. The Federal Republic of Germany also had some, but relatively smaller pre-war immigrations. Other countries in the Western part of Europe, such as the Netherlands and Sweden, only started to acquire their immigration experience in the decades following the Second World War. For a number of European countries that used to be emigration countries until the 1980s, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Norway and Finland, the current immigration experience spans only a period of about two decades.


Still other countries, among them most of the twelve EU member states that acceded since 2004, are experiencing emigration, transit migration and immigration at the same time. Obviously, such historical differences are reflected in the size and composition of immigrant populations in respective countries. The unevenness of the immigration experience in scale and in time is as much noticeable within the countries in question. More than in the past, new immigrants in recent decades have flocked to urban areas. Large cities have seen their composition rapidly changed. In the city of Amsterdam the percentage of inhabitants having a migration background recently surpassed 50 %, as revealed by the Amsterdam Statistical Bureau. Similar observations can be made about European cities like Berlin, Brussels, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Madrid, Rome, Stockholm and Stuttgart.

from China; refugees and asylum seekers from Africa, the Near East and Asia, from the Balkan and former Soviet Union countries, and undocumented workers from Africa, just to mention some of the major categories. The strong variation in origin of migrants has resulted in such heterogeneity that sociologist Steven Vertovec coined the new term ‘superdiversity’ to describe it, illustrating this with the case of the London Metropolis. Finally, while migration in the past tended to be viewed predominantly as a ‘one-off movement’ leading to permanent resettlement, recent migration has shifted to more fluid practices of international mobility – helped by greatly improved transport and communication facilities. Migrants today tend to have consecutive stays in different countries, to alternate their residence between countries, et cetera. This also leads to new practices of residence, integration and community formation. Researchers are exploring these phenomena under the notion of transnationalism. Policy-

Not only destinations of immigrants in Europe have changed in recent times, also the migrants’ origin did change. Up until the 1980s, immigrants in Europe were coming from a) (former) colonies of European countries (the United Kingdom, France, Portugal and the Netherlands mainly), b) labour sending countries’ in the Mediterranean Basin (“guest workers”) and c) refugee migration from Eastern to Western Europe. The geographical patterns of migration thus embraced at that time Europe and the Mediterranean countries, plus a limited number of (former) colonies. With the increase of international migration in recent times, a ‘new geography’ of migrations’ became visible. Nowadays immigrants come to Europe from all over the world in significant numbers and for more divergent reasons: there are expats working for multinational companies and international organisations; skilled workers, including nurses and doctors, from all over the world; students

makers are asking the uneasy question of what such practices mean for integration processes and policies.


...but states have reacted unwillingly towards immigration and immigrants How has all this been perceived by the societies of destination? How have these movements been labelled and how have societies reacted to these newcomers? A predominant characteristic of European states is that they have consistently defined themselves as non-immigration countries, exactly in the period Europe has factually become a continent of immigration. A rhetoric about being a ‘nation of immigrants’, as is usual in classic immigration countries like Canada, Australia and the United States, has been completely absent in Europe. This particular framing has had pervasive consequences, first of all for how

the factual immigration is perceived and labelled. Many newcomers received special labels that legitimised their arrival, but they were not called immigrants. In the Netherlands, for example, the sizeable group of immigrants from the former Dutch Indies after independence of Indonesia in 1949 came to the Netherlands under the label of `repatriates’, the workers from the Mediterranean area were defined as `guest workers’, expressing the intended temporary nature of their stay, and the migrants from Suriname (Dutch Guyana) and the Dutch Antillean islands in the West were (until 1975) `Overzeese Rijksgenoten’ (fellow overseas citizens, part of the Dutch Kingdom). In Germany, the inflows in the decades after WWII from the East were received under the labels of Űbersiedler (from the DDR to the BRD) or Aussiedler (in principle, Germans who had settled The ideology of not being an immigration country also had consequences for settlement and integration policies. North-Western European countries initially ‘solved’ the contra-

This growing contradiction did lead in some cases to early, strongly rights-based integration policies, covering not only the socio-economic, but also the political and cultural spheres of life, such as those of Sweden (since the mid-1970s) and the Netherlands (since the early 1980s). Remarkably, even in these cases this was done without revising the non-immigration-country-thesis. In the Dutch case, for example, a restrictive immigration policy was even defined as a condition for the success of a welcoming and integrating reception policy for those who actually already resided in the country. For most governments in Europe that had recruited guest workers, policies such as those proposed and practised by Sweden and The Netherlands went too far. They maintained the illusion of return and confined themselves to ad hoc adaptive measures, leaving the integration responsibility in practice to civil society, such as trade

diction - of not being countries of immigration, while receiving significant inflows at the same time - by defining these migrants either as a priori members of society, as in the case of the ‘repatriates’ in the Netherlands and Űbersiedler or Aussiedler in Germany, or defining them as ‘temporary guests’. In the former case, full citizenship was offered (in the Dutch case, it was even a condition for admission) and a full-fledged reception programme aiming at a speedy re-integrative assimilation was put in place. In the latter case of the guest workers, however, it meant limited facilities for accommodation in anticipation of their eventual return. For this sizeable group of ‘guests’, time created an increasing contradiction of expectations: in the course of time many guest workers factually stayed for good and formed communities that grew by using their rights to bring their families and spouses.

unions, churches and welfare organisations. Ultimately, such ‘policies of neglect’ resulted in migration and integration issues becoming contentious topics in European politics in the 1990s and 2000’s. In a politicised climate, immigration policies did not change – the norm of not being an immigration country remained. But the specific meaning of integration in policy discussions did change. Countries in Western Europe moved from earlier conceptions of rights-based integration policies, such as in Sweden and the Netherlands, to a conception of cultural integration policies that – in the name of social cohesion - primarily focuses on cultural and value-based commonalities that are supposedly crucial for such social cohesion.

21 enlarging European Union created free movement within... The preceding general description of the development of migration and migration policies in Europe is based on national states as basic units of analysis. But there have also been significant supra-national forces in Europe that have influenced migration and that even have created facilities for movement unheard of before. They stem from the economic and political integration process in Europe: the European Union and its predecessors have a story to tell on this. Regional economic cooperation started in Europe as early as 1951, when the Treaty of Paris instituted the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), an economic cooperation between six Western European states: The Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The treaty presented guidelines for free movement of (at that moment only skilled) workers in the economic sectors concerned. Although the principle was worked out in the course of time, it actually did not have a great impact in the period until 1968 in terms of migration flows. The 1957 Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community (EEC), not only established that cooperation would cover all domains of economic activity; it also confirmed that in the common market there was not only free circulation of capital and goods, but also of labour. Articles 48 and 49 of the Treaty of Rome

formulated the principles and Regulation 1812/68 concretely articulated that any national of a Member State was eligible for employment vacancies in the territory of another Member States with the same priority as nationals of that State. This principle of free circulation of labour was applicable to a growing area: the EEC grew from the initial six members of 1957 to nine in 1973, when the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined. Free movement of labour applied to these three countries from the date of accession. In 1981 Greece joined the EEC and Spain and Portugal followed in 1986. With Greece a ‘transition period’ until 1 January 1988 was negotiated. For Spain and Portugal the date of 1 January 1993 was chosen as the beginning of free circulation of labour. In all of these cases there was fears and predictions of significant new migrations after new members joined, but actually insignificant new migrations took place after accession. New accessions rather improved the position of migrants from these new joining countries already residing in established EEC-member states. The Single European Act of 1985 re-launched the idea of a complete internal market and introduced the next step: free movement of workers was widened to all citizens of Member States. The European Community (EC) should become “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”. The Single European Act foresaw the removal of all physical, technical and fiscal barriers to be implemented by December 31st, 1992. Such an opening up (actually, abolishment) of internal borders, however, meant that the Community would share henceforth a common external border. That in turn meant that visa policies, admission of Third Country Nationals and asylum policy should be coordinated. The decision to abolish internal borders made common policies for Third Country Nationals


necessary. However, Member States were hesitant to give up their sovereignty on this domain, although the upcoming “asylum crisis” and the pressures of supply driven migrations in general pushed some states towards common (restrictive) policies. In 1993 the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU) as the successor of the EC. The EU created European Union citizenship and granted full freedom of movement to all citizens of Member States. It completed the earlier developments towards free movement between Member States, in the sense that all obstacles for such movements were taken away and equal access to facilities was guaranteed. Moving between Member States within the borders of the EU, that used to be defined as international migration, had virtually become internal migration. Under this new regime the EU further expanded to 15 states through accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. But the complete freedom of movement and the factual abolition of borders within the EU had also increased the need to coordinate Member States’ policies relating to the admission of Third Country Nationals. The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 concretely stipulated that five years after its ratification (i.e. by May 2004), asylum and migrations should have become communitarian policy (being thus moved from the third pillar of intergovernmental collaboration to the first pillar of communitarian EU-governance) and that existing policies and practices needed to be harmonised. This goal was reaffirmed at the Tampere Summit of 1999, where also the explicit ambition was formulated that third country nationals who are long-term residents should be granted rights that

come as closely as possible to those of EU-citizens. Indeed, by May 2004 agreements of two kinds had been reached. The first amounted to a synchronization of restrictive policies aimed at combating illegal immigration and keeping at bay potential asylum seekers, and the harmonization of asylum policies. The Schengen Agreement and Dublin Convention at that stage had been made part of Community Law. These new policies – represented by the great majority of Directives developed between 1999 and 2004 - focus on the perceived problematic nature of (unsolicited) immigration of Third Country Nationals. They tended to develop restrictive immigration policies at the lowest common denominator between Member States. This regime was largely in place when the EU expanded from 15 members to 25 members in 2004 (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia acceded) and 27 in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania acceded). Although many old Member States delayed free access to the labour market for the citizens of these new members for some years, the total area of free movement in the EU at 27 counts in the end a total population of some 500 million. The effect of the accessions of 2004 and 2007 was twofold: on the one hand, a substantial (partly irregular) migration that had taken place from East to West since the fall of the iron curtain in 1989 was redefined as internal and legalised under the new regime, on the other hand it reinforced migration from some new Member States, particularly Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, to Member States in the Western part of the EU whose labour markets attracted workers. So migrant populations of these three countries grew significantly in all of the 15 old Member States until the financial and economic crisis of 2009 and following years.

that make European states competitive destinations. In short, particularly Western, Northern and Southern countries of Europe have factually become immigrant countries, but are still unwilling to recognize this in their policies. They also refuse to recognize the longer term needs for immigrants as a consequence of demographic decline and aging of their working population. Short term political interests and perceptions of threat– nowadays often culturally and religiously inspired – stand in the way of long-term, pro-active immigration and integration policies. The European Union has become a significant new political and policy unit which has created a new context for international mobility and migration in Europe since the late 1990s. On the one hand, EU Member States, particularly the early members in Western Europe, have transposed their national policies into common restrictive and defensive admission policies in relation to potential immigrants (economic migrants, family migrants and asylum seekers) from non-EU countries. Furthermore, they have made these policies the ‘standard’ for new members of the Union: the acquis requires new members to build legislation and institu

...finally, what can we learn and what to expect for the future? National governments in (Western) Europe have shown in recent decades a growing inclination to protect their labour markets and welfare states, by exerting their sovereign right to control the admission of non-citizens in general and restrict the immigration of those who are supposed not to contribute to their country’s interests (supply-driven migration). This expressed itself on the one hand in stricter immigration/admission policies, but in recent years increasingly also in requirements and demands on (potential) migrants in the framework of integration policies. On the other hand, demand for migrant workers leads to ambivalent policy reactions: unskilled, low-skilled and seasonal migrants should preferably be admitted temporarily and `circulate’, i.e. not settle permanently. High skilled migrants are welcome, but are not offered the simple procedures and attractive conditions


(c) CmdrFire

tions in conformity with established EU-policies in this domain. This strand of EU-policies has been named by critics as “Fortress Europe policies”. During the last decade, Western European countries have furthermore increasingly ‘uploaded’ their cultural integration requirements for new Third Country immigrants in EU-integration policies, thereby making these policies assimilative and selective in nature. On the other hand, the EU created a fundamental right to move and settle within the EU area for EU-citizens and for long-term Third Country residents of its Member States (and for specific categories, such as students in higher education, the EU has actively promoted mobility). The total area of free movement in the EU now counts 28 countries with a total population of more than half a billion inhabitants. bout 10 % of these half billion have been born outside their country of residence, and if we applied a broader definition, for instance ‘population with a migration background’, the percentage would probably be more than 15 %. An increasing part of these immigrants are “internal EU-migrants”. This increase is due on the one hand to the fact that individuals from new member states residing in other EU states change status at accession: from Third Country Citizens (TCNs) to citizens of a Member State. On the other hand, we see that in the last decade immigration by TCNs in the EU has decreased in a much stronger way than immigration by Member States’ citizens (Source: Eurostat, 2011). The recent financial and


economic crisis has reinforced the dominance of intra-EU migration. Germany is a strong case in this respect: while in 2004 the number of new immigrants in the BRD were approximately 50/50 coming from the 24 EU partners and Third Countries, this percentage shifted gradually to 63,4 % from the EU countries and 36,6 % from Third Countries in 2011. Recent immigration figures of other Member States also indicate such a trend towards stronger internal EU-migration. The strongly increased unemployment in the Southern EU-countries and Ireland may further contribute to this in the near future. The two different aspects of EU migration policies – the external and the internal one - amount thus to the paradoxical trend of full and increased free mobility for those within the EU, and increasing closure for those from outside. The financial and economic crisis that has hit many (but not all) EU Member States severely since 2009 reinforces these two trends and thus the paradox. In the short term (a few years) we should expect a decrease of international migration in the EU in general, with the persistence of present tendencies pointing at a replacement of TCN-migration with intra-EU migration. We will probably have to wait until the present high unemployment in many Member States of the EU decreases for the (temporarily covered) longer term demographic deficits and specific labour demands in the EU to revive and translate into sufficient political pressure for new migration policies.

(c) Trey Ratcliff



Silicon Valley is the most successful innovation hub in the world. What is its secret? And is such a model replicable at the European level? The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs, aiming at making the European Union (EU) “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world” by 2010, has utterly failed. Now, it has been replaced by another ten-year strategy, Europe 2020, even more ambitious, yet another illusion. In order to succeed in developing the “smart, sustainable, inclusive growth” dear to its heart, Europe needs to get

back to the worldwide competitive position it used to have. But thanks to the economic crisis Europe is currently facing and the dramatic increase of unemployment rates, the EU Member States as well as companies seem to finally grasp Europe’s dire need for competitiveness, and therefore to truly measure the importance of innovation. Well-known by entrepreneurs because related to risk-tak-

ing, innovation can be defined as the process of translating an idea into a good or service for which customers will pay. In other words, this idea must be replicable at an economical cost and must satisfy a specific need. Innovating is not an easy task. But maintaining the process over time is even harder. That is why everlasting innovation centres such as Silicon Valley concentrate so much atten-

tion and envy. According to Ms. Connie Martinez, managing director and CEO of 1st ACT Silicon Valley, the area is “one of the most diverse, well-educated and wealthy regions of the world”. And facts do corroborate her claim. There, 43% of the population had a bachelor’s degree or higher in 2007 (27% in the USA), while the percentage of white people within Santa Clara County is dramatically decreasing


over the years (70.9% in 1980 and expected 37.1% in 2020). As for the median household income, it was of $82,481 in 2005-2007. No place in the technology world is scrutinised as Silicon Valley is, attracts as many devotees as it does, and still manages to keep its recipe so secret. Many governments around the world indeed tried to import the concept in their countries believing a name and some technology-based companies could make it real. But the Eldorado of I.T. entrepreneurs appears impregnable! The area has expanded as any other industrial cluster, through an agglomeration process, with I.T. industry generating technological spillovers and attracting more and more skilled workers. This is no secret: success draws success. But how can we then explain the longevity of this virtuous circle? Silicon Valley indeed managed to reinvent itself with every new waves of technology. It started with the electronic industry and it is now surfing on the digital economy. So what makes Silicon Valley so special? What lessons could Europe learn from it?

Knowledge & ideas - new raw materials Mark Zuckerberg, founder and CEO of Facebook, gave part of the answer reminding that today’s economy is based primarily on knowledge and ideas. Such resources are available to everyone, therefore opening new horizons: people are better educated; companies are more productive; new jobs are created; and the average quality of living is improved. In his political statement published in The Washington Post on 11th April 2013, Zuckerberg underlined two key elements of Silicon Valley’s success that should be seriously taken into account by all public authorities: “In a knowledge economy, the most important resource are the talented people we educate and attract to our country. […] To lead the world in this new economy, we need […] to train and attract the best. We need those middle-school students to be tomorrow’s leaders.”

Political stakeholders, in Europe or the USA, must realise that they are shooting themselves in the foot when they decide to increase tuition fees. Knowledge must be available to the greatest number and opportunity to learn and be educated must be equally presented to all.

And retaining it Touching upon the aforementioned issue, Zuckerberg exposes a bigger one: in order to maintain its international leadership in innovation, the United States of America needs a new immigration policy. Although its impact on U.S economy is difficult to quantify, immigration definitely benefits the country. A study published in May 2011 by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) shows that several elements indicate immigrant workers do play an important role. Thus, foreign-born people represent 27% of the U.S. workforce with a doctoral degree. As well, one-quarter of all international patent applications from the U.S. have been made up by noncitizens and college-educated immigrants are twice more likely to register patents than their U.S.-born counterparts. And finally, immigrants are 30% more likely to be entrepreneurs and 18% of all U.S. businesses are immigrant owned. The USA is historically an immigrant nation. Nevertheless, outdated immigration policies run the risk to lose a key growth engine. In October 2012, a Kauffman Foundation study, America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Then and Now, confirmed this fear. It indeed showed a drop of immigrant-founded startups in Silicon Valley (from 52.4% in 2005 to 43.9% in 2012). But it also highlighted immigrants’ preference to establish businesses in traditional immigration gateway states such as California (31% of immigrant-founded firms). U.S. politicians seem to take the path towards a more comprehensive system. Europe however is not there, yet.

Producing knowledge... AnnaLee Saxenian, professor at Berkeley University, has given some very good insights of Silicon Valley’s complex functioning. In her 1994 book Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128, she insists on the impressive dynamism and interaction that exist among universities and research institutes in Santa Clara County innovation cluster. The role played by Stanford University in Silicon Valley’s development is indeed not to be proven anymore. But what makes Silicon Valley so special is its ability to exchange knowledge in a very open way. The high turnover between companies helps creating networks, hence fostering the flow rate of ideas. Knowledge is available to everyone, but education, training, and information exchange can dramatically increase the number of sparkling ideas. As well, Saxenian underlines that the greatest long-term threats faced by Silicon Valley do not only come from the outside (e.g.. competitiveness of high-tech or emerging countries); they come from the inside. Reductions in public funding for educational institutions jeopardise every efforts made to develop research and technical support to the regional economy. Reductions in public funding for educational institutions jeopardise every efforts made to develop research and technical support to the regional economy.


Connie Martinez

Although having a coherent immigration policy, flexible and adaptable to internal and external markets demand is an asset, EU Member States do not agree on a common position. In order to properly welcome immigrants, Europe however has to know what kind of workers and in which sectors it needs to boost its economy.

Workplace diversity consequence of an open society But knowledge – even though essential – is not the only ingredient needed. In order to generate innovation, one must indeed focus on ability as much as workplace diversity. Innovating requires thinking differently. Simon Kuper (The Financial Times, 10.05.2013) highlights that the French élite nowadays faces two big issues: self-reproduction and group thinking. No matter how smart people are and how severe the selection process is, like-minded people usually produce likeminded results. Add to this a lack of feedback or alternative views from fellow workers and the whole innovation process is slowed down. Diversity fosters innovation and Silicon Valley stakeholders understood this a long time ago. People with diverse skills collaborate in ways that other people do not: they join forces on a project, then circulate, and may gather again for other projects in the future.

Diversity fosters innovation... Diversity has two main dimensions: a more obvious demographic one (gender, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, and disability); and a learning one that might be more significant when it comes to improving innovation within a business (knowledge acquisitions, communication styles, personal skills, professional abilities, and functional expertise). Cross-functional teams are the way to break unilateral thinking. Besides bringing some fresh ideas and extending the knowledge pool of your team, it is a great source of creativity. As well, it improves the communication skills within a company as people learn how to get along with co-workers who think differently. They will then adapt more quickly to new working environments and be more tolerant. A diverse team can also lower the fighting over the same responsibilities: everyone has his/her own specialisation and all responsibilities are hence covered. And finally, from a pure marketing perspective, an organisation that welcomes multiculturalism is bet-

...but diversity must be embraced However, to fully exploit the innovation potential of diversity it is necessary to get rid of all forms of discrimination (explicit or implicit). A non-inclusive corporate culture otherwise stops individuals to communicate their ideas to others. Both management processes and practices within the company must encourage the development of creativity and innovation. And this reasoning is not only valid for companies but also for public organisations, especially in Europe. Europeans do have the capacity of technical innovation and concentration of high technology activities. They do have high-qualified and creative talents. But their cultures definitely lack openness and acceptance of diversity. One can be aware of this by looking at the number of women or minorities’ members in a senior position within companies. But this lack of tolerance can also be explained by the fact that immigration is not seen in Europe as an opportunity. Elisabeth Collett, director of think tank MPI Europe, argues that immigration in Europe is considered as an opportunity only if “it conveys significant economic benefits”, assuming that it would inevitably be socially costly for Europeans. That is where the shoe pinches. Although we can notice a general anxiety towards the topic of immigration in the USA, a pragmatic approach is preferred and an individual immigrant who arrives and works hard is celebrated. The recent debates on the immigration reform do not question the economic and social contribution of immigrants to the American society, but focus upon their accession’s conditions to permanent residence and citizenship. Persistent inequalities and discriminations substantially reduce immigration benefits to a country’s economy. Policy-makers have a great role to play in improving capitalisation on the value presented by immigrants. By dint of viewing immigration as a risk rather than an opportunity, it might become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Victor Hwang, co-founder of T2 Venture Capital, likes to compare Silicon Valley to a rainforest. The many nutrients that flow through the system (talents, ideas and capital) create some new and unexpected environments. However, some elements can damage the process (prejudices inherent to human nature) and should therefore be avoided. Culture should be transformed in order to build rainforests and maximise business innovation. “Silicon Valley has created a culture that encouraged people with diverse talents and backgrounds to meet, to trust each other and to take a chance together. […] Silicon Valley is a state of mind much more than a location.”

ter perceived on the market than others.



Selim Yenel: Turkey has changed, But perceptions on us have NOT Ambassador Selim Yenel explains how Turkey sees the challenges, opportunities and future developments of its relationship with Europe.

Ambassador Selim Yenel, the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the European Union, is a fierce and self-conscious man, used to navigate the perilous waves of life with an old style diplomatic savoir-faire. Qualities that he most certainly needs now, being on the forefront of the turbulent Turkey-Europe relationship, characterized by historical closeness and cooperation, but also by many lows and scepticism. Indeed, the recent months have been a particularly vivid example of this turbulence, with the European Union and Turkey declaring themselves in public discourse further away than their common history would tell. For this reason, The New European had the opportunity to interview Ambassador Yenel, to understand at what point the relationship among the two countries actually is and what we should expect from the future.



Why is Europe important for Turkey? And, conversely, why is Turkey important for Europe? The EU is important for Turkey because we have tried to take part for twenty years and we are a member of all the biggest European institutions, except for the European Union. We think that, with regards to the future, it is very important for us to become part of the EU, because we have our strengths, but we also have our limits. If we’re going to be part of the future, we need to be part of such an entity. And so, since we possess the same values, we need to be part of the EU. We think that we can offer the EU an added value: it’s a win-win situation for them as well, because, no matter what, the EU is an economic powerhouse, but not so relevant politically. It will be more relevant if Turkey joined and it could acquire an enhanced position in the world.

Ten years ago, Turkish Public support for the EU was much higher than it is now. What do you feel are the reasons behind this? And what do you feel can be done on the EU’s side to reverse this perception? It depends on how you ask the question: if you ask people if they want to become members, they will say ‘Yes’. But the belief is not there: they don’t believe it’s going to happen, because they’ve been hearing for a lot of years, especially when Mr Sarkozy was President of France, that Turkey doesn’t belong in Europe. Mrs Merkel is also not in favour. There are many signs that we are not wanted, in the European public debate. In the meantime, Turkey has become much more self-confident, thanks to the strong economic growth and our very active diplomacy. When you put all these things together, the result is the opinion that “if they don’t want us, we don’t want them”. On our part, we think that the accession process is a good thing, so we are trying to prepare ourselves for the eventuality that we are able to remove the political obstacles (above whom, of course, the Cyprus issue is the most pressing). We believe that these are political obstacles that are not relevant for our accession, and the population is fed up with this situation. But we are patient: we will continue to inform the public opinion in Europe about the benefits Turkey can bring. The Turkey of today is not the Turkey of yesterday: it is changing very quickly and for the better. But it is very difficult to change perceptions, and of course, in the grim economic situation of today’s Europe, perceptions are going down. Therefore, there is a lack of self-confidence in Europe as well. We have to wait a little bit longer.

Where do you see the EU in ten years’ time? And what kind of relationship do you foresee existing between the EU and Turkey a decade from now? To make any prediction, especially at this time, is very difficult, because things change a lot every year. Next year will be a decisive moment, because the Heads of all European institutions will change. So I do hope that, by the beginning of 2015, there will be new leaders and new Commissioners that will be able to move ahead and meet the new challenges. The EU has achieved much, but it doesn’t have to rest on its laurels: it has to move ahead and go beyond its limits. What we see now it’s not just nationalism; it is localism, parochialism, and that is dangerous for the European construction. As far as our relationship in ten years is concerned, we hope that we can be members by then, but we haven’t been in 50 years, so I can’t guarantee anything like that. Nevertheless, for us membership is not the key: our aim is to reach higher standards. That has been always our goal: if we can reach these higher standards through the EU, so much the better. If not, then, so be it.

Would you interpret Turkey’s talks with the Shanghai 5 Group as a shift away from Europe? Or are these more of a way to become more appealing to Europe, by opening up new economic relations? It’s neither. It’s not an alternative, because there is no alternative to the EU: you either become part of it or not, and we can stand by ourselves if necessary. But the Shanghai Organisation is on a totally different field. This is the new Turkey: we want to be part of all entities that are important for us, because the world has changed and we are now much more active in the world. The Shanghai Group is just one of these organizations: we want to be a member of the Danube Organisation and of the Arctic Council as well. This doesn’t mean that we are changing our orientation: we are just going out into a more active diplomacy. And on the other side, the EU doesn’t need Turkey to start a relation with the Shanghai group.


In what areas do you feel EU-Turkish relations are the strongest? Could you give us some specific examples of cooperation that is currently taking place between the EU and Turkey? Our strongest form of cooperation is on foreign policy. We are having a good cooperation with the EEAS (European External Action Service): Lady Ashton and Mr. Davutoğlu speak regularly, almost sometimes a few times a day. But it’s not just at the highest level: we have very good day-to-day cooperation on Syria and on the Balkans, in particular. So we concretely have good relations. Another successful area is that of education: thanks to Programs such as Erasmus and Leonardo, we have thousands of students coming from Europe to Turkey and from Turkey to Europe. Of course there are many good things happening, but they don’t make headlines. People are usually focused on the negative aspects.

It’s clear that Cyprus issue is a major stumbling block in EU-Turkey relations. Do you feel that there have been any positive developments in this regard? With new President Anastasiades, for the first time we have a person in power in Cyprus who in 2004 voted “Yes” on a planned referendum, and this gives us some reasons to hope. The problem is that as soon as he came to power, he found a disruptive economic crisis on his lap. This has weakened his position: we would have preferred him to be stronger, so he could deliver on the issue. Nevertheless, I do feel that we will start EU negotiations soon, because this issue cannot stay unresolved forever. The solution is out there, we all know that; what we lack is political will. By our side, we have all the incentives to do so. And as far as the Greek Cypriots are concerned, we believe that they have now understood that the EU card is not going to work. It never worked, but it took them 8 or 9 years to understand that. There is a good opportunity now in the field of energy, and I think that could be a way to recover for them. But more in general, having a good relationship with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would help them immensely. Then, there would be much more investments coming into the area, and we would be able to cooperate: in a word, it will be a win-win situation. So, I hope that they will have more than one incentive to solve the situation.

What is the Turkish position regarding the EU-US free trade deal currently being negotiated? Because of the Customs Union, we need to follow the commercial policy of the EU, so if the Union has new trade agreements we have to respect them. We have been following the US-EU trade and investment partnership very carefully, and we have told both sides that we want to be involved, because it has repercussions on us. The EU has a commitment with us, thanks to the Customs Union; the US doesn’t, but we have talked to them and a few weeks ago, when PM Erdogan went to talk with President Obama, they have created a working group on the issue. So we are not only following it closely, but we want to be involved as much as possible, because it will have long term effects on Turkish economy.


Joost Korte: “Turkey is extremely important for Europe, and there is nobody who says otherwise�

Joost Korte, former Deputy Director of the DG Enlargement, shares his thoughts on how the European Union looks at Turkey in the context of the accession process.


33 (c) Steve Calcott

According to the latest Transatlantic Trends Survey, released last September, both Turkish and European publics have lost enthusiasm for Turkish accession to the EU. Is the financial crisis a real reason for these mutual feelings, or are there further underlying causes? It is definitely true that the support in the public is declining, on both sides. And also, I think you are right in implying that the financial crisis has had a big role in it. Usually, what we see is a Europe that is more focused on itself and inward-looking, not only in relation to Turkey but also with other strategic partners. This undoubtedly affects the speed of the accession process. Furthermore, the fact that the Turkish economy has been booming in recent years and that people, becoming wealthier, now see no pressing needs to join the European Union is a very important factor. But we don’t have to forget that discussions in Turkey about the European accession are ongoing: depending on who talks, European integration can be seen as a priority or as much less than a priority. In the EU it’s the same: it is true that Turkey’s accession is quite a controversial subject.

Usually, when media in Europe and in Turkey talk about the accession process, there are misunderstandings: in Europe, fear dominates, while in Turkey there is more a sense of “being robbed of something that is deserved”, talking about the frequent stops in negotiations. Could you explain to our readers how the accession process works? First of all, I would like to remind that the fact that you are a candidate doesn’t necessarily mean you have an automatic right to enter the EU: you have to fulfil all the conditions. This is what we are trying to achieve, and this is also what is confirmed every year in the standard procedure: the European Commission presents to the Council a report on the development of relationships with all enlargement countries – not only Turkey - and every time all Member States of the EU, unanimously, have to confirm that Turkey is a candidate country and that the accession negotiations must continue. All processes of the negotiations are based on their own merits, so Turkey has to comply with the rules and the standards set by the EU. Which it is doing in certain areas, but not in all of them. Moreover, the unanimous support of all the EU Member States is required: with the consequence that one country is enough to block the whole process. It has once been calculated that if you look at how the process actually works, there are 35 chapters that must be completed; they must be opened unanimously and closed unanimously. And in between, there are different steps that have to be taken. For this reason, you can calculate that every single member of the European Union can stop the process 135 times. And of course, an unwavering support from the Turkish side is fundamental for the process to be successful. For us at the European Commission, the only thing that counts is that we have a very clear mandate, confirmed every year: we fulfil these negotiations with a clear mandate and the full support of all Member States. If the Member States tell us that we have to stop, I will personally regret that, but we will do it.

Is Turkey still important for the European Union? And do the advantages of a future accession outweigh the negative sides for both parties? Turkey is extremely important for the EU, and there is nobody around Europe who says the contrary. And I can’t see anyone in Turkey, either, believing that Europe is not important. We are, in that regard, extremely close, and we share a mutual interest. Take trade and investments: the Customs Union between the EU and Turkey is of vital importance. Companies can establish themselves in Turkey, because the goods that are produced there can enter the European market with no hindrance. In turn, this help Turkey attract many other forms of investments, which is one of the reasons why the economy is doing so well. Furthermore, looking beyond the economy, Turkey is an invaluable strategic player in the global geopolitical scenario, where Europe wants to play: not only for its role in the Middle East, but also with respect to countries as important as Russia and Iran. Nevertheless, things gets a bit more complicated as far as the accession process is concerned: Turkey is a very big country and in terms of population, it will soon be the biggest of all Member States, which may deeply change the dynamics inside the European Union. Together with that, we have to keep in mind that the EU is still preoccupied with itself and with the governance of the Euro: as a consequence, it is not focusing much on the external border, at this moment.


Many observers inside the EU, among whom Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Füle, have hailed the recent publication of the so-called “democracy package”. The recent opening of chapter 22 in the negotiation talks has been seen as a direct consequence of this. Will other chapters soon follow? Let me first say the opening of Chapter 22 is very good news, because it is the first chapter being opened in three and a half years. So, it breaks this terribly negative spiral in the accession negotiations where nothing happened. What’s even more, the political decision to continue with the negotiations was taken in June, in the middle of the riots in Taksim Square and Gezi Park. This is an extremely important aspect, because it shows that, in spite of those unrests, Member States were ready to continue negotiating. If somebody had been looking for an excuse to stop the talks, the riots were in fact a gift from heaven: you could have stopped them quite easily. Nobody wanted to do it. On the contrary, they were all looking for ways to continue. Now, it is true that it is just a chapter and Minister Egemen Bağış was right in saying that “it doesn’t make Spring”. But we are optimistic that other chapters will be opened soon: the Commission is having extensive talks with France, one of the strongest opponents of Turkey’s accession under its former President Nicolas Sarkozy, and it is possible that things may positively evolve very soon.

Cyprus is one of the major stumbling blocks in the normalization of relationships with the EU. Do you see some positive developments on that side? Progress in the settlement talks is of course very important for the overall negotiating process with Turkey. I see positive developments because the newly elected Cypriot President, Mr Anastasiades, has made it a main point of his agenda. There was a setback early in the year, when he was engulfed by the financial crisis affecting the country. But now the time has come for the two sides on the island to resume talks. We obviously support them very intensively and we hope they come to an end. The idea is, since negotiations are carried on by the United Nations and not by the European Union, that the UN facilitates reaching a solution, by having a strong intensive first round of discussions on the principal issues, and then to have an agreement for the spring of next year. That would be important because it will be election season in Turkey. After that, there will be a second, longer stage, where there may be an agreement on principles to be implemented. If we are able to overcome the division of the island, of course that can open the way for many more steps to be taken in the accession process.

The EU has been experiencing, for the last years, the worst crisis of its existence. Efforts have to be concentrated on re-defining the existent structures, without losing what we have achieved so far. In this rather gloomy environment, is it realistic to think about enlargement as a feasible policy? That is the debate between deepening and widening. But such a debate is as old as the EU itself. It has been there from the start; and every time, we decided to proceed with the deepening AND the widening together. I wouldn’t see why this should stop. If you look at today’s EU, there are many countries which have recently joined. This idea that it is possible to go back, to return to the original nucleus, is rather silly: it has never worked, I do not see why it would work now. Furthermore, all the 28 Heads of State are saying that we want to continue the enlargement process. Actually, as far as enlargement is concerned, it has very often been called ‘the most successful EU foreign policy’. This is definitely the case when you look at the central and Eastern European countries that entered the EU in 2004: the way the fall of the Soviet Union was absorbed was a fantastic success. One of the reasons there is still growth in the European Union is thanks to these new countries. This does not mean that enlargement has to take place at all costs. On average, the experience of former enlargements tells us that it will take seven-eight years for new countries to join the EU. Judging on the countries currently negotiating (i.e. Turkey, Montenegro and Serbia), we will not have a new enlargement before 2019, 2020, at the earliest. Not because we decided that we do not want to enlarge, but because none of the candidates is ready. So, we now have the time to look at the internal mechanism and reform. The EU is on a constant evolution: I have been working in Brussels since 1991, which is quite a long time, but I am still amazed and impressed by how quickly the EU has changed. I had never thought that we would have been where we are today. Even if in crisis, the EU is still an enormous success, looked at with envy by a lot of countries in the world who are admiring our ability to work together despite our differences. I personally think that we ourselves are far too gloomy about our own achievements. We are much better than we think we are.


Draw me a bridge. And now a hub. Quentin Blommaert

Turkey has always been seen as a bridge between East and West. Thanks to the sustained economic growth of the last years, though, it has become a new economic centre. Making it a first-choice destination for anyone looking for new trade opportunities.

The image of the bridge is typically used to depict the function Turkey occupies on maps. Indeed, for centuries Anatolia served as a passage for merchants, diplomats but also travellers and many more going from West to East and vice-versa for trade, political or personal purposes. The metaphor does not lose its pertinence today: modern Turkey continues undertaking a key role as a geostrategic link between Europe and Asia, to both of which it geographically belongs. Nevertheless, if we take the image of a bridge for granted, this given function requires the additional parameter of the hub in order to more precisely depict today’s Turkey. Bridges are used to link two separated realities and are accordingly crossed in order to move goods or people from a position A to B. In the case of Turkey, the bridge function is still valid, but it must be extended with that of a hub due to the rising role the country has acquired as a major production site, sales market and trade facilitator. Turkey represents a long-standing trade partner for the European Union: it has developed to such an extent that it has nearly become a part of the EU’s economic landscape through the multiple agreements signed between the two entities (e.g. the Customs Union signed in 1995). The intricacy of Turkey-EU trade relations is a giv-


en. Nevertheless, Turkey’s dual key asset, namely its bridge and hub function, is not acknowledged enough by its European partners. Taking the current economic situation in Europe into consideration, one comes to notice the need for the EU to broaden its current perspective in terms of foreign trade. In that respect, Turkey appears as a major partner and key player. With the end of bipolarity and the sudden absence of a clearly defined foe, embodied by the Soviet threat, Turkey started rediscovering one of its most central attributes: its geography. Step by step, Ankara has tremendously extended its trade relations with third countries, establishing itself as a first choice interlocutor for whomever is interested in dealing with Middle Eastern, Central Asian and even African countries. The speed at which Turkey has been building ties around its own geography and overseas is intricately linked with the long history of the Ottoman Empire and the established connections it used to have with many of the new trading partners. Turkey has tremendously expanded its room for manoeuvre in trade issues and has been reaping the fruits of its expansion efforts: the presence of Turkish companies in emerging economies (e.g. on the African continent, in Central Asia, the Middle East, etc.) is overwhelming. Turkey’s closeness

has undoubtedly favoured that, thanks to the natural ties Ankara possesses with direct neighbours (among whom culture and language). However, trade targets located far beyond Turkish borders are also reached with success. Considering the Turkish economy’s performance in the last decade and the numerous positive signs shown by its economy (not overseeing remaining problems such as a negative and growing current-account-deficit), the country appears to be a first-choice associate for any third country looking for new trade opportunities. It goes without saying that some EU Member States (such as Germany and the Netherlands) have already understood the potential Turkey represents in terms of geostrategic trade location (as a partner or interlocutor): German and Dutch companies are present by the thousands in Turkey, underscoring the definite key role the latter plays as a creation, production and trade hub to European and third markets. In addition, the trade bridge function is as topical as ever: the multiple gas and oil pipelines criss-crossing Turkey towards Europe are a very good point in case. Turkey and EU countries have developed relations that now go beyond the sole EU framework. The growing interest of European companies for the Turkish market (as a producer and selling country) is percep-

of trade opportunities, Turkey appears to be a suitable partner, opening up gates to a multitude of countries and regions. This role of a trade bridge and geostrategic hub, which could be imagined in the form of a passe-partout, would be of strong benefit for many EU countries at the moment.

Photo (c) Kıvanç Niş

Putting economic parameters aside for a second, it appears important to highlight that Turkey, next to its negative current-account-deficit, still needs to improve other shortcomings if it wants to keep up the pace with its economic successes. The persistent political turmoil the country has been lately experiencing brings instability, which in turn might frighten investors and discourage foreign entrepreneurs. With its dual key asset of a bridge and hub country, in addition to its demography and high-skilled labour force, Turkey has all the cards in its hands to play a pivotal role in its region, and beyond. The now old bridge between Europe and Asia has passed throughout centuries without getting a wrinkle. In the last decades, it has subtly strengthened itself and now has become an irreplaceable trade hub. The structure is solid: let’s use it!

View of Levent, Turkey

tible in the already mentioned growing number of foreign companies in Turkey. Nevertheless, not all European players take this opportunity for real. As an example, one notices the slim presence of French companies in Turkey (due to some extend to political reasons as well); at the same time the SME sector in France does not currently show healthy signs and could benefit from some backup. Taking the current crisis into consideration, it is through closer collaboration between the two countries that French companies could search for solutions outside of usual trade routes. French companies might alleviate the current pressure under which they work in their home country by expanding towards new and more receptive markets. In that respect, Turkey, as a geostrategic trade bridge and hub, could function as a passe-partout, opening up trade doors for French companies to its neighbouring markets and beyond. Both sides have much to win out of such cooperation: France could get fresh air by tackling new or less tapped markets. Turkey would continue enhancing relations with a EU key player, proving in turn commitment to one of its European partners. The EU’s current economic challenges will require solutions stemming from within but also from outside of its traditional scope. Concerning the latter, and in terms

Photo (c) Wikipedia


A green future for the EU -Turkey relationship? Sir Graham Watson, MEP

Turkey could become a regional leader in renewable energy sources. The EU should catch the opportunity – and play the long game.

Turkey is a country of massive geopolitical importance for Europe and the Middle East: its role as a secular state bridging Europe and Asia with Iraq, Iran, Syria and Israel-Palestine on its doorstep makes that inevitable. It also happens to be placed at the centre of two thirds of the world’s oil reserves and three quarters of the world’s natural gas reserves. Whether this is a blessing or a curse depends on your point of view. It is arguable that if you look at the big picture, fossil fuels are not the energy of the future - the world cannot sustainably continue to burn oil, gas and coal. Of course Turkey’s position at the centre of so many fossil fuel resources is a huge bargaining chip with respect to the EU and its energy security concerns, but it could well in the future become more of a resource curse as the country becomes dependent on these outdated energy sources. The elephant in the room of Turkish energy policy debate is renewables - the energy of the future. Turkey is a big hitter in the energy world. In 2009 Turkey consumed almost as much energy as Spain, despite per capita consumption only being half the EU average. Turkish demand for electricity is forecast to grow by 6% a year for the next ten years, which means it will double in 12 years - a rise second only to China. And Turkey is currently planning


on building 50 additional coal-fired power stations - the time to lock in energy efficient and green growth in the country is now. The new Enhanced EU-Turkey Energy Cooperation, which was signed in June 2012 between Commissioners Oettinger and Füle and Turkish EU Minister Egemen Bağış and Energy Minister Taner Yildiz, is very much to be welcomed. It is great that both sides intend to develop electricity infrastructure of common interest and smart grids. But the EU-Turkey energy relationship needs to be about more than just “regulatory matters” and “investment” - it needs to be about sharing our respective renewable sources, such as wind, solar and geothermal. It needs to be about high-capacity long-distance cross-border electricity transmission infrastructure. Turkey can be an “energy hub” not just for gas, as mentioned in the declaration, but also for renewables.But enhanced cooperation is only ever going to be a poor substitute for actually opening the Energy Chapter (Chapter 15) in Turkey’s accession negotiations on joining the EU. And it should not become a distraction from full EU membership, which I continue to fully support. The EU’s Enlargement Commissioner, Stefan Füle, reportedly said that the European Commission considers Turkey to be ready for the Energy Chapter to be opened - although he also added that not all EU governments share that view!

(c) Dave Clarke



Not to open the Energy Chapter would be a strategic mistake. It would be a lost opportunity for diversifying energy sources and reducing energy dependency on those who currently dictate the room temperatures and household expenses across Europe: Russia’s gas and coal exporters. It would allow the EU to be in charge of its own energy shopping list - and put green energy at the top of that list. Turkey is aiming to source 30% of its energy from clean sources by 2023. It is already looking seriously at the potential for generating renewable energy. Last April’s ICCI International Energy and Environment Fair and conference in Istanbul demonstrated the country’s potential and the breadth of interest of its entrepreneurs. And I have been impressed by the level of technological advance and the extent of investment by companies like Ortadogu Enerji and Afkel, who I visited recently. Turkey has huge solar potential - the country receives sunlight equivalent to 10,000 times the amount of electricity generated every year. There is great wind power in the Aegean and Marmara regions. The country has the eighth most geothermal potential in the world. And Turkey has the best hydro resources in the region - the capacity to become the battery of South East Europe, just like Norway could be for Northern Europe. Turkey is currently connected to the European grid network by two


very small lines to Bulgaria and one to Greece, each of 400 kV capacity. Commercial exchanges of power are currently being trialled. This should be massively ramped up - although we also have to make sure any new cross-border interconnections are not used just to import dirty coal-powered (and non ETS) electricity from Turkey into the EU. In the long term, if we were able to build an interconnected long-distance European ‘supergrid’, Turkey would be a big source of wind and solar power for the rest of Europe. And indeed, if we took that one step further in a ‘megagrid’ covering Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey could import (cheaper) solar power from North Africa and Saudi Arabia to meet its massive demand. Turkey has throughout history been a bridge between Europe and Asia. It could potentially play a pivotal role as a link to the Middle East and the Gulf in a Europe, Middle East and North Africa power system. The first step is to beef up the exchange of renewable electricity between Turkey and the EU. We can only hope that both sides will not be blinded by the lure of a quick buck in oil and gas, and play the (greener) long game instead.

BUV- Strengthening the German-Turkish partnership in the field of renewable energy Anne-Christine Mainka, BUV

Investments in renewable energies (RE) represent a promising opportunity for countries trying to grow their economy while also improving their CO² balance. For this reason, Turkey with its growing energy consumption has made a commitment to increase its share of electricity produced from renewable sources to 30% by 2023. The implementation of environmental goals, the government’s ambitious targets and a sustained policy effort to promote renewable forms of energy have made Turkey an important destination for investments in this field, especially for German businesses. Germany, with its extensive know-how and experience in the building of RE plants, but a stagnating domestic energy market has become an important economic partner for Turkey. Given the importance of an improved exchange of information on this issue, the Federation of Entrepreneurs´ Associations Germany (BUV) has already initiated two German-Turkish Energy Conferences, one in each country. The first German-Turkish Energy Forum was held in Stuttgart (Germany) in 2011 under the patronage of then-German Federal President Mr. Christian Wulff, President of Turkey Mr. Abdullah Gül and in cooperation with the Ministry of State Baden-Württemberg. Bringing together more than 600 participants, mainly Turkish and German CEOs, the Energy Forum was a huge success. Building on this success, we established a permanent Working Group for Renewable Energy in order to strengthen the strategic dialogue between Germany and Turkey. It meets regularly to promote the transfer of know-how and to help with the market development of renewable energies. Members of the Working Group include representatives of the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, the German Ministry for Environment, the German Energy Agency as well as various associations working in the field of solar, wind, biomass and geothermal energy. On behalf of the German Ministry for environment we organized the Second German-Turkish Energy Forum in December 2012, this time in Istanbul. Considering that the German and Turkish Energy Associations had never met before, we also initiated the first-ever German-Turkish Forum for Energy Associations, which took place

on the eve of the Second Energy Forum on 12th December 2012. Bringing together over 40 energy associations from various sectors - in particular from solar, wind, biomass and geothermal energy areas - the participants discussed possible joint projects that could be started in 2013. The following day, the Second German-Turkish Energy Forum with two rounds of parallel sessions focused mainly on the planning and construction of new power plants, green buildings, feed-in tariffs, as well as German-Turkish cooperation in research and development. Top-class speakers – including the Minister for Energy of the Republic of Turkey, Mr. Taner Yildiz; Dr. Helge Wendenburg, Director General of the Federal Ministry for Environment; and the German Ambassador Mr. Eberhard Pohl - along with the large turnout and active participation of over 350 participants made this event another success. The momentum created by our activities has led to the start of several promising joint projects in the field of biogas and geothermal energy since the beginning of this year. Further, BUV can proudly announce the upcoming opening of the German-Turkish Energy Association, with companies in the energy sector as members, in November 2013. Together with our partners in government, business and civil society, we are confident that we can continue to support and strengthen ongoing cooperation projects and help create many new partnerships for the future.

The “Bundesverband der Unternehmervereinigungen” (BUV), founded in 2009, represents at the present moment 21 business associations, having approximately 3 000 members, with and without a migrant background. For more information: www.buv-ev. de



Education in superdiverse cities Dr. Maurice Crul

European cities are increasingly multi-ethnic. In this situation, the key to successful integration lies in education opportunities. An overview of how different national experiences deal with the issue. Introduction Our large European cities are increasingly becoming super-diverse. In my book Superdiversity. A new vision on integration I describe how policy-makers can foster positive developments for of our cities’ future. The keys to an optimistic scenario are education opportunities. Indeed, all the challenges facing European cities point to one direction: the future of our cities (and socie-


ties) is increasingly tied to the social mobility of the children and grandchildren of immigrants.

Superdiversity In a period of two generations, the ethnic make-up of our big Western European cities has totally changed. This development is not new in the world. We have seen the same happen in places like New York, Los Angeles

or Toronto in North America. These conurbations have been best described by the term Majority-Minority Cities, i.e. cities in which all ethnic groups are minorities, and in which, by consequence, there no longer is a dominant ethnic majority group. Migration and aging are now bringing the same phenomenon to large European cities. Amsterdam, for instance, recently became the first majority-minority city of the Netherlands. According to the Amster-

dam Statistical Bureau, on 1st January 2011 only 49.7% of the city’s population was of Dutch descent. The second important development in big cities is that old migrant groups have settled. In cities like Brussels and Berlin, a third generation of Turkish descent is now growing up as true Bruxellois or Berliners. This is, in the words of the famous Dutch Sociologist Norbert Elias, an interesting reversal between newcomers and established groups.

The third important change in European cities is the increasing diversity within migrant groups themselves. While the first generation guest workers were almost all low-educated, the second and third generations are much more diverse. In some European cities, an increasing amount of second generation individuals is highly educated and start to have well-paid, specialised jobs. They usually marry with an equally educated partner and very often they recall the stereotype of the “yuppie”, the successful young urban professional. On the other side, among the same generation we see a considerable amount of dropouts, who also tend to be at the bottom of the social scale. They are often in precarious jobs and many of the women dropouts do not enter the job market, becoming full-time housewives instead. They more or less recreate the lives of their parents and sometimes they find themselves in an even worse financial position. Their children will grow up in poverty and will attend schools in typical ‘immigrant neighbourhoods’. All three of the above-mentioned developments taking place in European cities can be summarized under one heading: superdiversity.

Education is the Key Which conditions determine if superdiverse cities will evolve into successful global cities, or will instead become beacons of polarization and ghettoization? There is one short answer: education. In cities where education institutions provide opportunities to children and grandchildren of immigrants, we see a positive scenario develop. On the other side, where these opportunities are unavailable, the scenario can turn rather bleak. Results of the international TIES (The Integration of the European Second Generation), a research project among Turkish second generation individuals covering eight European countries, can show us the way. In all eight countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands), we interviewed children from classic guest worker families: when their parents arrived, they had a basic education and came to do low-skill jobs. However, the outcomes in the eight countries are very different. The situation for the Turkish second generation is the most favourable in Sweden, which has a stronger probability of higher education and the best opportunities for women to enter the labour market through extensive arrangements of pre- and afterschool childcare. Indeed, the Swedish childcare system works well both for children and for parents. On average, the children of Turkish descent are enrolled in pre-school facilities as early as they are two years old. They start to learn their second language in an educational environment and, as a result, they have a good proficiency in Swedish when they enrol in elementary school. After that, children are not required to choose their future path until after Grundskole, when they are fifteen. Because of the early start and late selection, many children make it into higher education. The pre- and after- school facilities also make it easier for second generation Turkish women to enter the labour market. Women

gaining employment provide their families with a double income, which can be necessary in larger cities, that tend to be more expensive. On the other hand, in Germany and Austria the numbers of highly educated people and of working women are lower. These two countries are characterized by a lack of pre- and after- school facilities. It is not unusual for immigrants’ children in Austria to start school at the age of six. At that age, they speak fluent Turkish, but almost no German. In elementary school, they only go to school for half of the day (Germany and Austria are the countries with the shortest school day at the elementary level) and the selection starts soon, at the age of ten. As a result, the majority of them chooses a lower vocational education. Compulsory school ends at fifteen and at this age many girls leave school. They start to be trained as housewives by their mothers until they marry and raise a family on their own. They often never enter the labour market and simply fulfil their mothers’ traditional role. This limits their family’s financial resources. Secondly, and even more importantly, they will not give their own daughters any example other than that of a housewife to take inspiration from. TIES research shows that each country harvests what it plants. The chances in each country are very different, which affects the ability of cities to become truly global players. The size of the immigrant population in European big cities is now so large that it affects their economic future: if too many fail to be socially mobile, it will directly affect the wealth of the whole society. So, how should European countries reform their education systems, so as to invest in their own future? Five major preconditions for success in education can be identified, all summarized under the heading of ‘school preparation’: an early start prepares children for elementary school; a full day elementary school (with longer hours) helps children to train well for important testing; late selection (e.g. at the age of fifteen instead of ten) gives second generation children time to close the gap with children of native descent; the possibility of doing internships while still at school helps to smooth the transition to the labour market; the possibility of paths towards higher education are especially important for children of immigr ants. The way we raise the children of immigrants through our educational systems is crucial in determining how our cities will develop in the future. The same applies to women’s opportunities to combine work and parenting: a system allowing women to easily achieve higher education and to combine work and home life creates households where both partners work. And this situation can help to create a new, integrated and superdiverse middle class. M. Crul, J. Schneider en F. Lelie (2013), Superdiversiteit. Een nieuwe visie op integratie. Amsterdam, VU Uitgeverij. http://www.


New European female entrepreneurs in Europe Dr. Caroline Essers

European cities are increasingly multi-ethnic. In this situation, the key to successful integration lies in education opportunities. An overview of how different national experiences deal with the issue. Labour market participation is considered key to the socio-economic integration of migrants in Western countries. The importance of ethnic minority entrepreneurship as a source of employment opportunities for migrant populations is considerable. However, most studies on ethnic minority entrepreneurship, implicitly or not, concentrate on male entrepreneurs or ignore the roles women play in these businesses. Moreover, the popular discourse on entrepreneurship, or the way the public, media and even traditional entrepreneurs ‘talk’ about entrepreneurship, seems to be in conflict with the discourse about women. Thus, being a woman AND an entrepreneur simultaneously seems hardly possible. Entrepreneurship and an origin from outside Europe, also seem a dichotomy. And so, being a woman entrepreneur is a big challenge for a particularly interesting category of women: Turkish female entrepreneurs in Western-Europe. This article will explore this issue by looking closer at originally Turkish female entrepreneurs and examining how this discourse affects these women in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom, where I did a pilot-study. Entrepreneurial rates among Turkish migrants in Europe are lower than that of the general population. Yet, evidence shows that the number of economically independent Turkish businesswomen is growing. In the Netherlands, only 4% of the population of Turkish origin are entrepreneurs, 18% of which are women (CBS, 2009),


while in the United Kingdom the self-employment rate is estimated to be 20% for Turks, 20% of which are estimated to be women. During the course of my research, I mostly gathered life-story interviews by originally Turkish businesswomen. I spoke with many Turkish female entrepreneurs in the Netherlands (more than 40), and a smaller number of Turkish female entrepreneurs in the United Kingdom (8), for a pilot-study meant to explore how these Turkish migrant businesswomen respond to, adjust to and alter the various political, institutional and societal opportunity structures. By comparing the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, we have been able to show how diverse structures may affect processes of entrepreneurial possibilities. During the course of this study, it was observed that the political opportunity structure in the Netherlands is experienced with more tension than in the United Kingdom. The businesswomen perceived their position as (young) women, of Turkish origin and entrepreneurs, as problematic, since these identities are perceived as incompatible. Or, sometimes, even shameful. Their families’ support may compensate and eventually strengthen these women’s entrepreneurial attitudes, and their position as Turkish individuals may be advantageous, particularly as they become more established. Networking is mostly seen as difficult, due to time commitments, and they often feel excluded due to their gender and ethnicity. In the United Kingdom, there is a greater reliance on Turkish bu-

siness networks and a greater sense of inclusion within mainstream networks. On the other hand, the institutional opportunity structure seems to be regarded more neutrally in both countries. They mostly do not feel the need to be coached formally, yet some successful female Turkish entrepreneurs seem to coach other minorities to contribute to society. Moreover, although entrepreneurialism is picked up ‘naturally’, paying more attention to this profession at school is regarded positively. Regarding finance, the businesswomen are more ambiguous. Having the right contacts at banks to obtain a loan seems to be essential, just like, in some cases, the right name or appearance. In the UK, the interviewees indicate they do not want business loans, as they do not see it as desirable to be burdened by repayments. Instead they choose to be much more reliant on informal sources of funding. Finally, the societal opportunity structure appears to be experienced more negatively in the Netherlands, as opposed to experiences of Turkish businesswomen in the United Kingdom. It is clear that the Dutch political climate has changed in a rather hostile manner against ethnic minorities, particularly those of Muslim faith. Islam is being used in public discourse to exclude this group, and the need for these allegedly non-adjusted citizens to integrate is constantly being stressed. This atmosphere makes it difficult for these businesswomen to deal with their suitability as entrepreneurs and Turkish women.

In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, women feel less different and discriminated and seem to be able to distance themselves more from negative pigeonholing in the media. The differences in these experiences might be explained by the fact that the political climate towards Turks/Muslims in the United Kingdom is less polarised than in the Netherlands. From their point of view, this negative climate affects the opinions and sentiments of the various stakeholders of the various opportunity structures they have to deal with. The differences might also be explained by different migration histories. Because of this, the interviewed Turks in the UK might feel less cultural disparities between their community and the British. Moreover, their experiences can also be contextualized within different economies: while the United Kingdom is a liberal market economy, the Netherlands is a coordinated market. Although one might expect the Dutch coordinated market to provide much more institutionalized support to entrepreneurship amongst this group than the UK’s liberal market economy, the reality is that a coordinated market entails too many obstructing rules. Of course these are only indications, and we cannot generalise on the whole population of migrant businesswomen. But we may also detect different behaviours when these women connect with their opportunity structures. They adjust to, deploy and alter the various opportunity structures in order to enhance their entrepreneurial

possibilities in various ways. Some women seem to distance themselves from the negative opinions regarding (Muslim) Turks within Western society, since this prejudice, together with the institutional opportunity structure, prevents their entrepreneurial activity. Their way of coping with the dominant discourse about foreigners and migrant entrepreneurs is to escape negative images. They, understandably, support this hegemonic discourse by focusing on the ‘different, other Muslim’. However, although seemingly adjusting to the various opportunity structures, their reaction eventually offers them more room to do entrepreneurship in their desired way. On the other hand, some simply refuse to engage with any formal institutions. This may be detrimental to their business, due to their reliance on bootstrapping. They exploit opportunity structures by conforming to a ‘Western’ way of doing business, making their own diversity invisible, both physically and through their entrepreneurial behaviour. Still other Turkish businesswomen react to these opportunity structures by altering them from within and with their own strength. Although Dutch people’s scepticism to their being entrepreneurs can be a problem for them, they patiently and pragmatically deal with these prejudices. While building on their growing experience, knowledge and professionalism, they subtly try to change the system from within. Some are also quite pragmatic in not letting their ethnic identity affect her

business practices, while at the same time capitalizing on the Turkish community wherever possible. But there are also examples of women who work more aggressively to alter these opportunity structures. Some set up a network for Turkish businesswomen; some others explicitly make use of their gender and ethnic identity as a unique selling point, helping society through their business and by initiating projects on entrepreneurship at schools. Such women actively fight to change the various opportunity structures that surround them, as well as in their own migrant community. Being involved in several organisations and using them to actively change the way business is done both within and outside their Turkish community, these female Turkish entrepreneurs can act as active ‘change agents’. Of course these are only some preliminary results: the number of interviews done in the United Kingdom is much lower than in the Netherlands. It would be very good if more systematic comparative research regarding the impact of national context on the possibilities and challenges of migrant female entrepreneurs in Europe could be done. For instance, a comparison between The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany would contribute to better policies (on a national and EU level) to stimulate and support these entrepreneurial change agents. This would not only bring more economic development, but also favour the emancipation of these New European women as well as their grassroots.


(c) European Parliament


The right to vote is usually seen as the central aspect of political participation. But in many European Countries, resident foreigners are left out of the democratic process. Losing a tool that could foster integration. «Anthropon Zoon Politikon». Man is a political animal. These words, written by the Greek philosopher Aristotle 2,500 years ago, have profoundly shaped the concept of modern democracy. All Western political systems, however diverse and imperfect they may appear, have one common founding belief: that individuals, to fully express themselves as human beings, have to participate to the well-being of their community. And conversely, every community that aims at being truly respectful of their members, should put them in the position to participate at the general wealth in the best way possible. This concept has informed the formation of democratic nation states in the last century, under the label of citizenship: being a citizen of a country brought with it dues, but also the right to participate at the political level – the biggest manifestation of this faculty being the right to vote.


In the meantime, many things have changed. Among all, Europe has become a continent of immigration and of increased internal movement. For this reason, citizenship and residency have increasingly been detached from one another: more and more people with political rights in one country live and work in another. Curbing this dichotomy and allowing them to participate at the public life of their new cities has been seen as necessary for one main reason: according to a wide array of thinkers and policy makers fostering participation among newcomers facilitates integration in their host community. The new conditions have been officially recognised by the European Union. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty states the right of all “European Citizens” (i.e. all citizens of one of the EU’s 28 Member States) residing in another European State to vote and be elected in local and European elections. Such a decision is connected

to the desire to create a new, supranational European identity, equally shared by all citizens. At the same time, parallel to the enfranchisement of other European citizens there have been growing concerns on giving political rights to another category of people: third country nationals residing legally in one Member State – or, as they are called by some, TCNs. In their case, the situation is much more diverse among European countries. If there are some virtuous cases, many others still have to address the problem. This shouldn’t surprise, given the heated arguments that burden every public debate concerning immigrants. Nevertheless, the issue of voting rights is an important one: permanent exclusion of a considerable part of the population from political participation can result in a deficit of stability for a country. And if it’s true that the right to vote is just one part of the more general political rights to which an individual is entitled, it is indeed the most symbolic one. So it is good to have a deeper look at the state of the debate in Europe and at how it might evolve in the future.

Voting rights in Europe: how do they work? The 1992 Council of Europe’s Convention on the participation of foreigners in public life at the local level is the only European legal standard relevant for the political participation of non-EU immigrants. It guarantees equal rights to media, some sort of consultative body elected by their own communities and the faculty to vote in local elections after maximum five years

of residence. Also the European Commission and the European Parliament have routinely supported voting rights for TCNs since the 90s. In particular, the Commission has suggested that “citizenship and political participation policies need to improve if integration ministers want to promote democratic participation, solidarity and sense of belonging”. The reality, though, hardly reaches up to the benchmark: electoral rules are an exclusive issue of national states, who have shown to be not so keen of enfranchising foreign citizens, even if just at the local level. Ratification of the Council’s Convention has been slow and limited over time, and the States doing so had already implemented laws meeting the convention’s minimum standards. But what are the numbers? At the time of writing, 16 of the 28 EU Member States allow some categories of resident non-nationals to participate in local elections. Among them, only two, Portugal and the United Kingdom, grant voting rights to TCNs at the national level, and only to specific categories of nationals: in the case of Portugal, Brazilian citizens, and in the case of the UK,

citizens of States members of Commonwealth. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that, even when voting rights are granted, in many States they are subject to certain conditions. Among them, the most common one is duration of residence, which can range from three to five years. But other countries require stricter measures, such as a registration procedure or a special legal status: e.g., Estonia, Slovenia and Lithuania, among others, grant voting rights only to third nationals who have a permanent residence permit or long-term resident status. The problem, according to Dr. Kees Groenendijk, Professor Emeritus of Sociology of Law at Radboud University Nijmegen (Netherlands), is that “these conditions have the effect of severely limiting the number of third-country nationals who can actually vote, since these countries’ governments grant the status infrequently or only to specific categories of immigrants”. It should not surprise, then, that Migrant Integration Policy Index, an important 2010 study, shows that on average, policies in EU countries are “less than favourable” for integration, with only a handful of countries scoring more than 60 points (on a 1-100 scale), the limit for satisfactory policies. And it is ironic that such measures are lacking especially in some of the

biggest and most influent countries in Europe, such as France, Italy and Germany.

The long struggle between enfranchisement and naturalisation The reasons behind this reticence to practice what one preaches are both politically motivated and more pro-

found. Indeed, the current political environment, generally hostile to migrants, doesn’t offer the necessary incentives for a more inclusive framework. In general, though, there is one big intellectual background to this sort of decisions: the way the State is perceived by people. Such a contraposition has been at the very heart of the development of European nation-states: on the one side, the liberal view, seeing State as something open to diversity and subject to variations. On the other, the communitarian perspective, according to which citizenship and membership go together and are determined by one’s culture and roots. In recent years, it is this second view that has been more successful around Europe. One of the most interesting consequences of this perception has been the stress on naturalisation instead of voting rights for resident TCNs. The German Constitutional Court expressly ruled on the issue in 1990, hinting that voting rights were unconstitutional, but suggesting that the government should instead make it easier for immigrants to naturalise. According to this mentality, there is a trade-off between voting


rights and naturalisation: if immigrants want to participate politically, why don’t they apply for citizenship? The reality, though, is slightly different. In the words of Dr. Groenendijk, “Naturalisation is not a viable alternative for many long-term immigrants either because it is difficult, expensive or extremely rare, or because there are other barriers for immigrants to apply. For example, emotional ties with the country of origin or automatic loss of nationality and concurrent loss of property rights or the right to inherit in that country”. For this reason, far from being a zero-sum choice, enfranchisement can be a first step in a process of integration leading to citizenship. The data seem to confirm this: in the Netherlands, for example, a large majority of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants have obtained the Dutch nationality in the 1990s, after they were first granted the right to vote in 1985.

Not all that glitters is gold One question still remains open: is it actually true that giving voting rights to resident TCNs fosters integration? It is difficult to calculate such data, due to a lack of relevant research on the field. Nevertheless, we can say that, in general, if integration means the level of participation of immigrants in their host society, then extending voting rights to TCNs enhances their integration. It is a two-way process: on the one side, as Stefanie André, MSc, PhD-researcher at Tilburg University, points out, “it gives migrants the opportunity to engage in their local community and to feel accepted”. On the other, it is also important to change the native population’s mentality: according to Professor Groenendijk, “granting voting rights sends a clear message to the majority of the population: most immigrants with three or five years of lawful residence are going to stay”. A recent Swiss study, comparing the political activity of migrants in Neuchâtel, where they have voting rights, and in Zurich, where they don’t, confirms this observation: having voting rights encourages immigrants to get more involved also in other activities at their community level. That doesn’t necessarily mean that all that glitters is gold: voting rights, though important they might be, cannot do it alone. This is shown by the marked differences in political participation among ethnic groups. Under the same conditions, in the same country granting them the right to vote, some migrants vote, and others simply don’t. According to Ms André’s research, one of the most important explanations of migrant electoral turnout is their


socio-economic background: income and education are important drivers for electoral participation for people in general. “Migrants who come from countries of origin having a higher social development (as represented by the Human Development Index) have a higher chance of voting in national elections”. This is the reason why granting voting rights cannot be enough: to really integrate newcomers into European societies, and actually make the conditions more equal for everyone, political rights must be joined by a comprehensive set of measures developing all different aspects of a person. And the best tool possible, embracing all the others and making them possible, is education. “Giving migrants and their children the possibility to fairly participate in the educational system is probably the most important way of including migrants in their host society”, remarks Ms André. With that in mind new far-reaching policies should be implemented: “To authorities, I would say that education and information are the key. Give people the opportunity to educate themselves, make literacy programs available to everybody who needs them and try to include migrants in the political process by approaching them during and between campaigns”. Some cases show that, if the ideal conditions are in place, there is some room for success: in the Netherlands, for example, there have been cases in which Turkish migrants have had a higher participation rate at local elections than native citizens. And it is widely acknowledged, as Dr. Groenendijk recalls, that the Social Democratic Party won the 2006 local elections in Amsterdam and Rotterdam mainly because immigrant voters, who turned out in large numbers to protest against the then centre-right government’s anti-immigration policies, tipped the balance in favour of the Social Democratic Party. Of course the examples mentioned above are partial and don’t necessarily tell a general truth. But there is one simple fact that doesn’t have to be forgotten: none of the 16 states that have so far granted voting rights to TCNs residents has abolished this right because it had bad consequences. And a growing number of groups and associations all around Europe, such as German Citizens For Europe and Italian L’Italia Sono Anch’io, are raising awareness on the subject. In the end, nevertheless, the decisions that European states will take on this issue will be based on a more fundamental vision for the future of Europe: will it be something close, exclusive, where people from outside can come and go but where they can never belong? Or will it be open, flexible and inclusive? It is time for Europe to choose between inclusion and exclusion. Let’s hope it makes the right choice.



When excellent policies are put to the test


Sweden is considered to be a role model for integration policies at the European level. Along with its Nordic neighbours, Sweden is applauded for its favourable conditions for immigrants to participate in society and find employment. The benchmarking Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which assesses governments’ commitment to integration, repeatedly puts Sweden well ahead of its European siblings. The riots that took place in Swedish suburbs last May, however, revealed a status quo that is far from perfect. As the Swedish case proves, well designed policies don’t suffice to assure their effective outcome, and even the most egalitarian of societies is affected by the rise of unemployment, social unrest, racism and xenophobia in Europe. In times of economic recession and high unemployment, the issue of integration is more pressing than ever. The Swedish government as well as the European Union (EU) leaders are starting to pay attention to entrepreneurship as a tool for integration. Could measures to support business activities among immigrants help tackle unemployment, stimulate growth, and increase trade in the EU as well as beyond its borders?

Swedish integration policy: when even the best do not measure up The secret to the success of the Swedish integration model is said to be a general openness to immigration combined with a strong labour market-oriented integration policy. Mr Mathias Wahlsten, responsible for integration issues at Arbetsförmedlingen (the Swedish employment service), states that the Swedish openness to the world is what makes its integration policies unique. “Migrants have enriched our country in many ways, and without this openness Sweden would have been a poorer country today”, Wahlsten commented to The New European. In Sweden, great attention is put to labour market support, in the form of language courses, civic orientation and job focused education. Swedish integration policy in fact corresponds to the high standards of Sweden’s social model, where each individual is legally entitled to support addressing their specific needs (e.g. labour market introduction, orientation programmes, and Swedish language courses). In the 2008 Government strategy, the central ambition was to increase the supply and demand of labour and to increase equality in schools. In spite of a certain fascination for the capacity of Nordic countries to welcome immigrants, in reality Swedish society remains marked by high unemployment among foreign born. The employment rate among foreign born is 15% lower than among Swedish natives, placing Sweden in the same class as most other EU Member States when it comes to this specific employment gap. According to the EU Labour Force Survey, in Sweden unemployment among citizens of a country outside the EU is over 20%, more than double the unemployment percentage of the native population. The riots in the suburbs of Stockholm, displaying torching of cars and buildings and attacks on police officers, testified of great social unrest and a generation that has stopped believing in a prosperous future. Not only did it shake the grounds of many clichés associated with the Swedish society; it also unfolded the question: if violent outbursts of this kind can hap-


pen here, what might unfold elsewhere? The truth is that Swedish society seems less Swedish than ever. Between 1985 and the late 2000s, according to OECD, Sweden saw the biggest growth in inequality of all the 31 most industrialised countries. The political drift rightwards in Swedish politics might be a convenient explanation, but fails to paint the whole picture. The problem is hardly lack of political will, and perhaps not even the policies themselves, but rather an absence of outcomes. The goals are well set, as are measures to achieve them, but outcomes do not seem to follow. In spite of top-ranked integration policies, immigrants to Sweden continue to flock to a few concentration areas, statistics show (Statistics Sweden, SCB). According to a 2009 report, the number of inhabitants with foreign backgrounds has escalated in all of the country’s most immigrant-dense suburbs over the past ten years – very much following the trends in other European capital cities.

Rethinking entrepreneurship as a tool for integration The fight against discrimination is, of course, a question of justice or human rights, but it is also a pressing economic question in times of financial crisis. Sweden, and Europe in general, can simply not afford to marginalise such an important part of their citizens. Recent studies, showing great entrepreneurial capacities among migrants, have pointed to neglected human capital in the EU and, raising the question: could entrepreneurship be enhanced as a tool for integration? Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, Italian-Swedish politician and MEP, firmly believes so. In an interview with The New European, she points to the economic recession creating great concerns, mistrust and prejudices. But to overcome the crisis, the EU has to benefit from the full potential of its citizens. “We need to recognise that we need migrants to sustain our economies. We have to start looking at New Europeans not as part of the problem but as part of the solution. Diversity is an asset, a strength”, she states. Her own personal history testifies of entrepreneurship as a way to achieve independence in a new country of residence. Originally from Italy, her experience as an immigrant in Sweden makes her particularly sensitive to the difficulties that entrepreneurs face when starting up or extending their business activities to other EU countries. Having started an e-commerce company in Sweden, Mrs Corazza Bildt says she understands the practical challenges of small business entrepreneurs. “When I came to Sweden I started my own company. This was for me a practical way to learn about Sweden, to meet people in practical life, to be a part of the Swedish society.” Today, Mrs Bildt is the owner of the internet company and the «hotel de charme» at The important asset that migrant-owned businesses represent for the EU economy is increasingly recognised by the European Institutions. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) clearly recommends that specific measures be taken at the EU, Member State and local level for the “creativity and innovation capacity” of migrant entrepreneurs to be reinforced. In its own-initiative opinion dating from 15 November, 2012, the EESC states that migrant entrepreneurship activities

Need for a european framework to promote entrepreneurship and trade The European Parliament has actively joined the campaign to promote ethnic entrepreneurship. In a March Resolution regarding the integration of migrants’ effects on the labour market it highlighted that migrant entrepreneurs contribute to more successful integration. Since red tape, failure to recognise qualifications and skills mismatch are more prevalent for immigrants than nationals, the resolution states that Member States should “provide more information for and raise awareness of these groups”. Particular importance is given to integration programmes that promote language learning, and familiarity with the country’s laws, political system and customs. Whether it is about cutting red tape or developing supportive measures for immigrant business start-ups, there is a need for a European Framework. The European Commission is working to develop support to entrepreneurs in their access to finance, training, networking and information in the EU. Providing training is particularly important for immigrants, who are more likely to lack human, financial and social resources. By improving the operational conditions of immigrant entrepreneurs, and particularly micro-entrepreneurs, these can be more successful in applying for micro-loans and dealing with bureaucracy, owners of business premises, suppliers, clients and banks. Recommendations of this kind are found in the Small Business Act (SBA), a package of policies launched by the Commission in 2008 to encourage entrepreneurial risk-taking and provide the best possible framework for SMEs. The document refers specifically to immigrants as “an unexploited potential for entrepreneurship”. In addition to measures to support entrepreneurship, it is equally important to remove existing obstacles. Engaged in policies related to the internal market and consumer protection, Corazza Bildt highlights the importance of having a

coherent European legislation when dealing with small businesses and trade within the EU. According to the Swedish politician, it is very much the success of European SMEs that is at stake. “The possibility for a business to grow and develop is bigger when you have a market of 500 million people instead of a market of 9 million people in Sweden.” Speaking from her own experience, Mrs Bildt says it is essential for entrepreneurs to know consumer rules in other EU countries. “A common harmonised system of rules gives enormous opportunities for businesses to grow – to invest, to establish and to sell in other European countries, both goods and services.”

Where public policy ends and civil society starts How can we sum up the relative success of Swedish integration policy? Unique introduction services, yes – but still high social instability among immigrant-concentrated areas, resulting in violent outbursts that shocked the European public. Unemployment is without a doubt the most important factor to social unrest that can be expressed in very violent forms. But integration, and a sense of belonging to a place, is not only about tackling unemployment rates or reducing disparities in income. It is also about building relationships. This in an aspect of integration that appears to have been forgotten in Sweden: for an integration model to be successful, it needs to make people feel at home.

(c) Natalie Hill

“contribute to economic growth and employment, often by rejuvenating neglected crafts and trades, and increasingly participate in the provision of value-added goods and services. They also form an important bridge to global markets and are valuable for the integration of migrants into employment, creating employment for themselves but also increasingly for immigrants and the native population.” This does certainly not mean that immigrants are in a favoured position to become entrepreneurs. If migrants are successful entrepreneurs in Europe, it is despite of the great difficulties they face, even in the most developed countries such as Sweden. According to the European Commission’s Network on Ethnic Minority Businesses, immigrant entrepreneurs face greater obstacles than native-born entrepreneurs. The most common obstacles are a lack of business development skills, heavy administrative and bureaucratic burdens and difficulties in obtaining financing. Swedish labour market introduction services may be of the highest standards, ranging from step-in jobs and try-out positions to educational and training initiatives by the Swedish employment service. However, measures to support business start-ups remain neglected, if not non-existent.

Anna Maria Corazza Bildt


Swede seeking immigrant family


Photo: (c) aussiegall

Frida Göteskog

How to make migrants feel at home? Swedish Paul Eneroth decided to take matters into his own hands. Living integration from a personal perspective.

Full integration of New Europeans is a pressing issue in many European countries, and the right recipe is not easily found. Rebecka Allen gives the example of the Swedish integration system, and ends her article by stating that “for an integration model to be successful, it needs to make people feel at home”. This does not necessarily always mean grand government solutions, but rather a single step from one dedicated individual. Swede Paul Eneroth is presenting one example of a personal approach to tackle some of the issues of exclusion and further integration in his home city. On a busy market square in Gothenburg, Sweden, in early October 2013, this man flagged a placard above the heads of the crowd. He was not shopping for fruit or vegetables, like his fellow market goers, but instead he was on the lookout for an immigrant family to introduce to his own family. «We live so separated.” he told the Swedish newspaper Göteborgs-Posten. “We live in a bubble. My children go to a school with almost only Swedish children and we live in an area where there are very few immigrants.» On a Friday afternoon, Paul Eneroth, 48, decided to take matters into his own hands. He went down to the basement and created a sign with a photo of his family underneath, and the next day he went to the busy Kviberg market, a popular weekend destination for many migrants and Swedes alike. Among fruit, electronics, clothes and international cuisine of all types, he flagged his placard at the market, among curious and interested on-lookers. This was an attempt by the father of three, Paul Eneroth, to in-

troduce to his children, something that he highly appreciated in his youth: the perspectives of people from a different background than his own. In the 90’s Paul was a volunteer, offering a helping hand for many newly arrived, and often alone, young immigrants. “It was incredibly fun and we used to, among other thing, go out dancing together.” Paul told Göteborgs-Posten. ”But now I have a family so therefore I want to meet a family instead, with similar aged children. I want to give this to my kids. I might be naive but perhaps you have to let the naive win over reasoning. It is important in precisely these questions”. His aim is to enrich the lives of his family, and especially his children. He believes that spending time together with a family of a migrant background, going for dinner, to the cinema, or having a coffee, would be beneficial and fun for both families. Many people at the market have already shared Paul’s enthusiasm for the initiative, and Paul and his family have received several phone numbers from interested and curious families. He has also given his own number to a couple of people. According to Paul Eneroth, the city of Gothenburg is too segregated. “A lot of it is because of how the city is built and there is a lot that could be done there. We live very close, but never meet anyways. What I am doing may be a small thing but I am still encouraging others to do something instead of going on about what the reason is for this segregation “


The Faces of the New Europe Art Lisa Jabroux

Photographer Mark Abouzeid, with his project to re-enact classic Renaissance paintings with modern immigrants, shows how New Europeans are making Europe wealthier.


Photo: (c) Mark Abouzeid


The Faces of the New Europe

Lorenzo de Medici and Dre Love as part of the exhibit The New New World, Mark Abouzeid, 2012. What do 21th century musician Dre Love, and Lorenzo de Medici, Italian patron born in 1449, have in common? According to renowned photo journalist Mark Abouzeid, they both represent versions of what Europe was, is and should aspire to be. Abouzeid has recently shone light on the theme of New Europeans’ integration with his exhibit The New New World, in Florence, Italy. The series of photos portrayed modern New Europeans posing as classical Renaissance paintings in a bid to expose the resemblance between old and new Europeans. According to the artist, the main point of this production was to negate the notion that there was room left for the myth of returning to the “original” country, which would have New Europeans settle back in their ancestor’s territory. “There is no logic in expecting them to move back to a place they have never lived in: They are Europeans” he says, adding that “We shouldn’t argue over Europe’s existence: there is a Europe. The true question now is: how do we make it work?”. The project also touches upon a sensible economic argument: Europe’s most glorious periods of growth were the result of open frontiers and open minds. Mentioning Italy’s economic golden age throughout the Renaissance, he insists that allowing fluxes of individuals within Europe – and increasing their integration - has always been an economic


booster. Abouzeid is not new to this kind of subjects: he had previously worked on a similar project entitled Without Us, focusing on the loss European economies would suffer without any form of immigration. Indeed, the photographer knows well what he’s talking about: he himself is a prime example of what a mixed background can inspire and produce. Born in Italy and educated in the United States, his family takes its roots in Lebanon: Abouzeid argues that it is this diversity that has shaped his art and entrepreneurial spirit. Author of prized works with, amongst others, The New York Times and Der Spiegel, the artist tries to use visuals to bypass the mental borders created by such words as “immigrants”. He also explains how his few years working in China have opened his eyes to the realities of how “the world is far bigger once you stop looking at it from a European perspective”. When asked why he chose to shoot such a project, he explained how artistic expression can be a source of understanding and better common living. He also admits he tries to provoke the viewer to open eyes to the current realities of Europe. Encouraging New Europeans to embrace both their past and their future potential, he adds “Roots are important, but they should not fix you; they should not make you static.”

Photo: (c) Mark Abouzeid



SMEs taking off Sabine Laruelle

Internationalisation is an important step for SMEs who want to grow. But it is not so easy: some suggestions from the perspective of Belgium.

Belgium is one of the most open and globalised economies in the world. For this reason, Belgian enterprises’ performances with regards to exports play a leading role in the country. These performances are though closely dependent on a limited number of big companies. According to recent studies, only a quarter of SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) is internationally active; as far as micro-enterprises are concerned, only 20% have export activities or production activities abroad. However, internationalisation of SMEs does offer undeniable advantages, for the involved partners as well as for the Belgian economy as a whole. Internationally active enterprises grow quicker in terms of turnover and job creation; they show a higher degree of innovation and productivity; their chance of survival is higher than those of enterprises limiting their activity solely to the Belgian market. Unfortunately, the risks at stake are numerous: the entrepreneur must skilfully gauge the risks in order to protect him-/herself and well estimate if the benefits acquired via internationalisation can compete with all the constraints. An SME willing to expand its activity abroad must also take care not to hurry too quickly: a thorough preparation and a good grasp of what is at stake should be at hand. A hasty move might bring the risk of underestimating the consequences internationalisation represents on one’s management system. In that regard, human resources are of tremendous importance. Entrepreneurs and partners stemming from a migrant background possess considerable comparative advantages in international development processes thanks to their acute understanding of social and economic realities, but also to their linguistic and cultural knowledge of targeted countries. Additionally, they possess networks both in Belgium and in the country of origin. Notwithstanding, SMEs that internationalise are faced with new financial needs, which tend to be more consequent than at the national level. This is due to the extension of the exploitation cycle


and the rise of new costs. To answer these challenges and ensure the survival and expansion of their international activities as well as domestic ones, it is crucial for SMEs to properly estimate and plan the generated revenues and expenses and to analyse their financing ability. This is the reason why I asked CeFiP (Centre de Connaissances du Financement des PME) to write the book Internationalisation of SMEs: How to succeed abroad?, which provides the reader with an overview of the main financial tools proposed by banks in order to internationalise. Indeed, different studies show the extent to which access to finance plays a central role in foreign trade development. Year after year, payment techniques developed in order to constantly respond more effectively to the needs of enterprises. It is all the same for the tools of protection against non-payment risks, of transport or exchange rate. Today, numerous financial tools exist that protect against the risks of clients’ default in payment. Credit insurance is one example among many others. To be protected against that kind of risks, it remains crucial to put an efficient credit management policy into place, to be well informed about foreign markets, to ask for first instalments and to maintain a diverse clients base. Eventually, numerous SMEs are not sufficiently aware of the different kinds of public aid that exist in order to internationalise. Yet, who knows how many of them would take the plunge if they knew they could be supported? To fill in this lack of information, CeFiP’s book unfolds an exhaustive list of support measures proposed at the regional, federal and European level, and additionally offers a glimpse on many parameters such as the principle of public aid, the eligibility criteria, the conditions, the reach of public incentives and access procedure. In a very systematic way, the book takes care of bringing entrepreneurs in contact with the relevant support organisations.


(c) Wikipedia

Supplier diversity europe Colin Hann Migration Policy Group

Making European companies more open and innovative Supplier diversity is an increasingly important part of every business’ daily life across Europe. Originally an American concept, it is concerned with companies ensuring that, when tendering or outsourcing their work, they effectively target SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) and, within these, under-represented and diverse businesses. This includes for example ethnic minority and women-owned businesses. By broadening the diversity of their supply base, companies can gain access to new ideas, increase competition, and widen their candidate pool. It also helps them align supply chains, products and services with an increasingly diverse market of customers and clients. There are also social benefits for company programmes supporting corporate social responsibility (CSR). Supplier diversity, for example, can help regenerate communities and encourage new entrepreneurs. Also relevant is the context of European and national legislation, regarding tendering opportunities with the public sector in particular. Increasingly, institutions are looking to see if companies have fair systems in the way they practice their procurement approach. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are also seen, by Governments across Europe, as a tool to help countries get out of recession and grow the economy. In the UK, for example, the Government has set a target of 25% of public sector spending going to SMEs.

Supplier diversity Europe Supplier Diversity Europe (SDE) is a groundbreaking project that is concerned with encouraging supplier diversity and fostering co-operation among multinationals, large companies, public organisations, SMEs and diverse and under-represented businesses, in order to develop dynamic and effective procurement programs in Europe. SDE currently operates in the UK and France and is expanding into Germany, the Netherlands and other parts Europe. SDE is a program of Migration Policy Group (MPG), an independent, not for profit ‘think and do tank’ based in Brussels with a track record in developing and implementing diversity and related activities. Recently, building on an expertise acquired over several years, SDE has launched an accreditation system called ‘The Accessible Supply Chain Benchmark’. This has been developed by leading experts on procurement, diversity and sustainability, based on established best practices and comprehensive evidence-based research. This accreditation provides a focus, and a structure, to assist organisations in making quick and tangible progress in developing their approach to supplier diversity. It is relatively straightforward,

it is not time consuming, and companies are assisted with advice and the sharing of best practices, which helps them quickly and efficiently get to where they want to be. This accreditation system is flexible and can accommodate companies of different size, kind and geographical location. The accreditation can either cover just one country in which a company operates, or it can take into account progress being made across several territories. It centres on SMEs as its foundation, looking at the economic impact at the local level, along with under-represented businesses. All diversity groups are included here, but companies will define their own priorities within this usually ethnic minority and women-owned businesses. An important part of any supplier diversity approach is the business case for developing supplier diversity as part of a sustainable procurement approach. It is important that companies develop their own rationale for developing a personal approach consistent with their employees, customers and other stakeholders. SDE have now completed the accreditation with several companies and others are in the pipeline. The accreditation system has so far proved successful, with good feedback being given by the companies involved in the program. For example, Skanska, a Swedish multinational construction company, has been the first large organisation of its kind to achieve the accreditation. This reflects the company’s priority of opening up opportunities for SMEs, which forms an integral part of its well-established approach to sustainability. Skanska has also developed a number of case studies reflecting its innovative approach based on encouraging the SME sector, and potentially diverse businesses within this. Also Fujitsu, the Japanese global IT company, has successfully achieved the accreditation. It has developed a strategic approach to supplier diversity covering all aspects of business, with buyin from across the company, and a programme to involve and encourage diverse businesses to bid for contracts. So far, the results have been remarkable. In the words of one CEO, ‘We are really impressed with the SDE accreditation system as it helps us systematically review progress we are making with SMEs and opening up opportunities for them to bid for contracts. What we especially like is the way supplier diversity has been highlighted as an increasingly integral part of the priority given by our company to sustainable procurement and the factors behind this. We see this as a win-win situation for a company like ours, as we gain all the benefits of working with an innovative and flexible SME sector, while at the same time making a positive impact on local economies.’

SDE is a program by Migration Policy Group (MPG), an independent non-profit European organisation dedicated to strategic thinking and acting on equality and mobility, two areas that are inextricabily linked. For more information on the project, or write to the author:



(c) Pink Sherbet Photography


Antonio Tajani: Towards a new, industrial future For Europe A Conversation with Commissioner Antonio Tajani on the Role of Industry for a New Europe.


Antonio Tajani is Vice-President of the European Commission, responsible for Industry and Entrepreneurship. The New European met him to discuss about the future of European industry and the steps the Commission is taking to make the European economy more competitive.

You have often advocated for a “new industrial future for Europe”. Indeed, until the crisis Europe was still a world leader in manufacturing. Today, it has lost its primate. Is it possible for Europe to overcome the crisis and return growing, or should we learn to live with a poorer and weaker Europe? There is still space for growth in Europe, and the key to it is the European industry itself. My main goal is to revamp sustainable growth and employment in Europe by focusing on the promotion and support of our industrial basis. The European Commission has the institutional responsibility to improve the context in which the industry operates, but the main role lies on the business world. Our industry is certainly able to achieve this task: don’t forget that Europe is still a world leader in many strategic sectors, such as automotive, aeronautics, engineering, space, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. If we want to be more competitive in the world economy, we certainly must keep our primacy in these sectors and, at the same time, be able to fully catch the new opportunities that innovation and technological developments offer us. To do so, Europe must invert its industry’s tendency to decline. Just in this way we could achieve a sustainable growth, create new high-value jobs and be more competitive. Our “New Strategy on industrial policy”, adopted in October 2012, aims exactly at that: before 2020 we want to increase the contribution of industry to the total European GDP from the 16% to the 20%. In these perspective, it will be fundamental to concentrate investments and innovation on the six lines of actions at the centre of our industrial policy: advanced production technologies, bio products, sustainable buildings, sustainable raw materials, clean transports and intelligent networks.

One of the main problems of European enterprises, especially SMEs, is that often, if they don’t lack ideas, they are suffocated by an excessive bureaucracy, which is non-homogeneous in the different member States. Which are according to you the solutions to make Europe more competitive at its heart? The reduction of bureaucracy is one of the top priorities of the European policy towards SMEs. This point has been stressed in the 2011 Small Business Act (SBA) for Europe and in a March 2013 Communication on Smart Regulation responding to the needs of SMEs. The SBA is based on the principle “Think Small First”: new policies and regulations must be implemented by focusing on SMEs’ characteristics and needs. Specifically, the “SME test” is the tool that must be used to evaluate the impact of a proposed measure on small businesses. The European Commission already uses it for its new proposals and is promoting its adoption by the member states as well. Furthermore, last year the Commission ran a public consultation to determine the “top ten most burdensome EU legislative acts for the SMEs”. The results of this consultation help us to simplify existing measures and to increase awareness on the need to implement the ‘Think Small First’ principle in all business-relevant legislation. Another goal of our industrial policy is to improve the internal market for goods, which consists of 75% of all within-EU trade and has an enormous potential as an incentive to competitiveness and innovation. For this reason we have set ourselves the goal of developing the amount of the exchange of goods in the internal market to constitute the 25 % of GDP before 2020. To achieve this, it is fundamental for laws and regulations concerning the single market to keep up with the evolution of products and technologies. We’re also working to tear down the barriers to the market of services, which constitute a more and more central issue, since the line separating goods and services is ever less definite. Services to enterprises, in particular, are crucial for industrial competitiveness and innovation and are of special importance for SMEs, who, more than their bigger counterparts, resort to purchasing services on the market. On the front of the safeguard of intellectual property rights, the introduction of a single European patent in February 2013 will allow us to reduce costs deriving from market fragmentation. It is moreover essential that the efforts of innovation and R&D be coordinated in the Union to guarantee the fast circulation and commercialization of technologies.



Speaking of SMEs: a solution indicated by pean added value? many for their survival is internationalisation. But if many companies have already When Europe plays at the international level, the rules must be the been successful in that, the majority still same for everyone because global competition is getting worse and worse. We need to improve our competitiveness, reducing taxes on struggles: 65% of international trade hap- labour and lowering useless costs for enterprises. At the level of our pens within the EU. What are the Commis- trade policy, we have lowered tariffs and technical barriers without sion’s projects to help and educate European taking into consideration the important divergences of costs with SMEs in the process of internationalization? some third countries, due to environmental and social standards The Commission has already put in place some initiatives with this aim: in particular, the Enterprise Europe Network carries out an important role in keeping enterprises constantly informed on issues concerning the European Union vital for their daily activities. Furthermore, it helps them find international partners and offering them other high-value, personalized services. The network also helps us involve European SMEs in giving shape to legislation, thanks to the collection of direct feedbacks. As far as the access to finance is concerned, COSME, our new project for the SMEs’ competitiveness with a budget of 2,5 billion € for the period 2014-2020, includes a specific chapter concerning the support to SMEs for internationalization. EU also supports cross-border cooperation between clusters and networks since, to grow and innovate, SMEs need strategic cooperation. Enterprises part of industrial clusters can take advantages from contacts, business relations and formal and informal knowledge present in their networks, as well as from personalized services. For this reason, the Directorate General for Entrepreneurship and Industry has carried out a complete mapping of all support services to enterprises, made available both by the EU and its member States, having as focus 25 third countries. Last but not least, the European Commission is reinforcing bilateral relations with third countries in the so-called “missions for growth”. I’ve been organizing these missions since 2011, usually in Latin America, USA and Northern Africa, and they have all been extremely successful. Usually, in this missions I travel with groups of around 50 enterprises, and we organize political high-level discussions and business-to-business meetings. I also very often sign political agreements to deepen our bilateral relations.

Let’s stay abroad: European enterprises have to compete at a global level with fierce companies coming from developing countries, who are very often advantaged by propitious legislations at the levels of environment, taxation and labour. Is it utopic to think of fairly competing with them without renouncing to our values? What is the Euro64

very different from ours. It was a mistake: we created a situation that is very often unsustainable in an open global market. In all this, I think the following: in the fight against climate change it is worthy to have severe rules on emissions. But we have to carry on intelligent policies: continuing on a lonely run, imposing further burdens on industry, means going against our own purpose of stopping the global warming itself. By having the highest energy cost in the world, we are pushing our businesses to delocalize towards countries that feed on carbon and don’t have any rules on pollution. And that surely doesn’t help the climate. And we don’t even help ourselves: without manufacturing, it is not possible to innovate, to export and to create jobs. 80% of innovation and 2/3 of export come from industry and, for every job in manufacturing one to two are created in services. Data show that the EU Member States that have better complied with the crisis are the ones with a more robust industrial base. Europe is the biggest economic power in the world: we need to talk with one voice.

The statistics on youth unemployment in Europe are alarming: 22,8% of young Europeans between 15 and 24 is jobless, so much that many define it as the “lost generation”. Which solutions do you think should be taken to allow young people to have a worthy future? First of all, it is necessary for the economy to recover, and to do this we need an explosion of entrepreneurial spirit. The Action Plan “Entrepreneurship 2020” adopted in January 2013 goes in this direction, proposing a series of measures to revamp it. Young people are at the centre of this project: it puts at the first place education and the support to young entrepreneurship, with the aim of creating a new generation of entrepreneurs. It is a paradox to think that, notwithstanding the high level of unemployment particularly among young people, the propensity of Europeans for self-employment is at its lowest degree since 2001, when the Commission began examining the entrepreneurial spirit in Europe. According to our Eurobarometer, today only 37% of all Europeans

would rather be self-employed or own a business than being employed. In comparison, the same data is of 51% in the US and 63% in Brasil. For this reason, it is necessary to realize some measures supporting young entrepreneurship that target specifically young unemployed. Entrepreneurship 2020 is not just a plan for the Commission, but a push to action for all levels of government in Europe.

Is it possible that the crisis has highlighted some limits of education in certain European countries? In other words, don’t you think that for too much time there has been an insufficient focus on the concepts of “entrepreneurial culture” and innovation? Undoubtedly, entrepreneurial education has a very important role: entrepreneurship is one of the key competencies recognized at the European level. It does not limit itself to specialist expertise in creating and managing a business. On the contrary, it includes a series of attitudes and cross-discipline abilities (ranging from the inclination to initiative to the ability to organize a project) that are essential today in all fields of work and who are more and more required by enterprises. Some researchers have shown that between 15 and 20% of all students who participated at a “mini-entrepreneur” program while at high school later actually started their own business. And creating a new generation of entrepreneurs is actually what we need. There are many excellent programs in Europe successfully promoting entrepreneurial learning in schools and universities. The challenge we face today is to make this kind of training a basic presence in all our educational systems. According to another survey, so far six European countries have launched a specific strategy concerning entrepreneurial culture, while other 13 include the issue in the range of their strategies for permanent learning, youth and economic growth. Our Action Plan invites member States to incorporate the key competency “entrepreneurship” in school programs before the end of 2015. It is indeed a very ambitious goal, but we hope we can at least get close to it.


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