PERCEPTIONS Volume 4, Number 1 Fall 2017
FOUNDATIONS AND ASPIRATIONS
© 2018 Temple University Undergraduate History and Social Sciences Association, All rights reserved Cover photograph of Philadelphia City Hall taken by Editor-in-Chief, William Kowalik
Letter from the Editor _________________
Dear Reader: In this, our newest issue of Perceptions, we are delighted to share some of the best undergraduate work being done at Temple University. Perceptions is proud to continue to serve as Temple’s first undergraduate research journal--as a platform for exhibiting the finest undergraduate research in history and social sciences. The selected articles for this issue are unified by the idea of “Foundations and Aspirations,” our title for this issue. The individuals, groups, and ideas expressed by them seek to explore where and how institutions and ideas began and look forward to where we are headed. Concurrently, others address this idea by calling out and righting the mistakes of the past. Nonetheless, they are situated at the threshold of change and receptive to the ambitions and advancements ahead. They challenge and offer insight into the conventional established order of things. In February 2008 President Barack Obama, then a candidate for the Presidency said: “Change will not come if we wait for some other person or if we wait for some other time.” This collection of works remind me of that call to action. As Perceptions begins its fourth volume, I have to look back on my experience. This is the third issue that I am proud to have been a part of, and I am always so pleased to see the incredible array of papers that we receive. This issue continues in the same tradition as we begin our fourth volume with fourteen exceptional articles. With this new issue, there are some exciting changes to present. New for this issue is our publication format. We are proud to launch our new home for Perceptions online using Open Journal Systems (OJS) hosted by Temple University Libraries. We express our gratitude and thanks to Annie Johnson for her assistance in setting up this new format. It is our hope that Perceptions’ new home will allow TUHSSA to continue to publish and showcase this fantastic student work before an even broader audience. Enjoy! Sincerely,
William Kowalik Editor-in-Chief, Perceptions President, TUHSSA Fall 2017
Inside Vol. 4 No. 1 ___________ On Erasure and Misrepresentation Selena Baugh, Sophomore, Sociology/Africology and African American Studies Violence Against Women in Rwandan Genocide Cecilia D’Arville, Sophomore, Global Studies and Journalism Allen, Jones, Hall: Black Social Entrepreneurship During the Early Republic Donovan Forrest, Junior, Secondary Education/History The Spirit of the Samurai: The Kamakura Bafuku, the rise of the Bushido, and their role in Diplomacy Armon Fouladi, Senior, Actuarial Science The Intersections of Latino Identity: Religion, Group Consciousness, and Immigration Policy Rebecca Gonzalez, Senior, Political Science Inequality: American Exceptionalism or A Global Trend Andrew Knox, Senior, Political Science and Philosophy Martian or Mauritanian? The Lesser Known Human Security Crises in the Sahel Amanda Morrison, Sophomore, Global Studies and Strategic Communication Guys Like Gauguin: A Legacy of Colonialism Emma Pilker, Senior, Art History Philadelphia and the End of Slavery Michael Reardon, Senior, History The History and Future of Peru’s Fast Growing Economy Alessandra Restifo, Sophomore, Political Science and Global Studies Seventeenth through Nineteenth Century Philadelphia Quakers as the First Advocates for Insane, Imprisoned, and Impoverished Populations Joanna Riley, Senior, Secondary Education/Social Studies Reenacting Reality: An Exploration of Richard Nixon in Frost/Nixon Alexandra Rocca, Senior, History The Success of Sophisticated Formalism in Modern Pop Music Abby Swoboda, Sophomore, English and French A Historical and Contemporary Discussion of the Tourism Industry in the Appalachian Region of the United States, with an analysis on its economic and sociological effects Nick Tarpey, Junior, Geography and Urban Studies
Editorial Team __________
Editor-in-Chief William Kowalik Senior, American Studies Major, Art History Minor
Executive Editors Christopher Chau Junior, History & Political Science Major, French Minor Armon Fouladi Senior, Actuarial Science Major, History & International Business Minor Brandon Rummel Senior, History Major, Religious Minor
Associate Editors Eli Siegal Senior, History Major, Geography & Urban Studies Minor Sabrina Wallace Junior, History Major, Political Science Minor
Assistant Editors Nathalie Bessette Sophomore, Political Science Major, Communication Studies Minor Ronald Joseph Senior, Political Science Major Benjamin Slesinger Junior, Criminal Justice Major, Religion Minor
On Erasure and Misrepresentation Selena Baugh Sophomore, Sociology/Africology and African American Studies Representation is crucial concerning questions of justice and equity. The way a group is perceived by others dictates the way they will be positioned in society. This is a fact which has been modeled consistently throughout history. Those who are perceived as inherently criminal are more likely to be abused by the justice system, as in the case of Black people in the United States, while those who are viewed as inherently weak are less likely to access positions of power, as in the case of women around the world. This pattern illustrates the importance of perception and therefore representation. Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication on the Rights of Woman, the Revisionaries documentary, Herodotus’ Histories, and the U.S. Constitution all illustrate the ability of a few people to dictate the positioning of various groups in society based entirely on the way individuals represent or misrepresent said groups. Although representation ostensibly implies increased visibility, when the available images are limited, those with platforms can use representation as a means of erasing or subjugating hitherto underrepresented groups. Throughout history, the groups who have been most susceptible to damaging representation have been those who were unable to effectively represent themselves. This is the case most often with those who possess little social or economic capital and therefore must rely on a select few to speak on their
behalf. This lack of voices lends more credence to the few available, which gives those representatives inordinate power over a group’s narrative. As a result, a single text which is meant to portray a certain group can effectively set the framework for how those people will be perceived for millennia. Whether that text omits people or misrepresents them, the effects can be disastrous. One of the most infamous examples of this is Herodotus’s Histories, which inadvertently situates Herodotus, a single man, as a sole spokesperson for several civilizations, most of whom do not have the wherewithal to contradict his accounts. As a result, when Herodotus makes claims such as, “[Egypt] has very many remarkable features and has produced more monuments which beggar description than any other place in the world,” readers have little choice but to accept this as fact, regardless of the other civilizations around the world at the time which may have been superior (Herodotus 108.) Not only does this place Egypt in a state of superiority over other nations, it effectively erases all other cultures which go unmentioned, thus discrediting them and ignoring their achievements. Furthermore, Herodotus’ reference to Egyptian culture as “idiosyncratic” in relation to Greece established the precedent for using White civilizations as the standard when evaluating other traditions: “...we may draw on the familiar to understand the unknown” (108). Not only does this portrayal as ‘other’ preclude Egypt from ever being perceived as entirely valid by future readers, this system of White-based evaluation ultimately dooms all non-White nations to a perpetual state of exoticism. Ultimately, Herodotus’ biased representation of non-White traditions sets the stage for European
colonialism, justifying subjugation by virtue of inherent White superiority. While misrepresentation can have far-reaching effects, exclusion can be equally detrimental. As previously stated, the public’s perception of a group directly impacts how those people are able to function in society. When a group is perceived accurately and positively, they are more likely to be accounted for in political legislation and benefit fully from the privileges promised in their respective society. Conversely, misrepresentation causes the opposite effect. If a person claims to speak for a group, but fails to do so effectively, his false narrative may negatively impact that group’s social standing. A similar impact is caused if certain facets of a group are excluded from the discourse. The result is erasure, which effectively delegitimizes experiences and results in disenfranchisement from legislative actions and increased social vulnerability. If a group is not recognized, they cannot be protected from injustices. Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication on the Rights of Woman is guilty of erasure on a massive scale as she purports to speak on behalf of all women while effectively ignoring women of color generally and Black women in particular. Throughout the text, she repeatedly cites lack of education as the biggest hurdle between women and equality, claiming that the discriminatory treatment women receive from men is justified due to women’s alleged ignorance. She follows this with the assertion that educated women who are independent providers are more deserving of respect than other women: “The woman who owns her own bread by fulfilling some duty deserves more respect than the most accomplished beauty” (Wollstonecraft 88.) This argument directly equates a woman’s worth to her education
level, a claim which dehumanizes all women who have not received formal schooling, but especially impacts Black women. Presumably, Wollstonecraft does not intend to negatively affect any woman through her work; but, because she clearly writes this piece with only White women in mind, yet presents it as applying to all women, her claims about education simultaneously disregard and actively harm Black women. While White women are feasibly able to go to school as evidenced by Wollstonecraft’s own education, Black women remain socially and legally barred from doing so. Therefore, under Wollstonecraft’s framework of equating humanity to schooling, Black women at that time are doomed to remain sub-human and deserving of whatever mistreatment they receive. This type of rhetoric sets the groundwork for White feminism which has a pattern of excluding women of color from its advocacy. Although White feminists rarely present themselves as explicitly against women of color, the means by which the feminists erase other women has a similar effect. By framing exclusive discourse as inclusive, those who are not properly represented are instantly delegitimized as society focuses on those in the forefront. As a result, the underrepresented group’s issues are more easily disregarded when juxtaposed with the more visible topics. In this way, selective representation can be used to further erase an already overlooked people. The original United States Constitution, and as a result, the country itself, was founded on a similar type of mass erasure. As evidenced by the document’s iconic first line, “We the people…” the framers imply that their intention is to represent the entirety of the nation (U.S. Constitution). However, this is clearly untrue 2
for several reasons, not the least of which is the fact that the public never gave the framers consent to create this document. Although women and people of color are neither given nor denied rights explicitly in the text, their exclusion leaves them vulnerable to future discrimination and delegitimizes the injustices which they are experiencing at the time of the Constitution’s inception. A glaring example of this is the absence of the word “slavery” in the original document. Though the issue is implicitly addressed under the guise of importation rights and representation with vague statements such as “the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit…”, this omission has far-reaching impacts on the perception of the nation’s history by future readers (U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 9). Because the document appears to function as a snapshot of the desires and concerns of America at that time, slavery’s erasure from the text translates into its exclusion from historical discourse surrounding the nation’s founding. While the Constitution’s erasure of Black people may not be with malicious intent, the American education system follows the Constitution’s example by continuing to largely omit Black people from the curricula. The documentary, Revisionaries, depicts how American textbooks are created, showing the incredible nonchalance with which whole cultures and themes are edited or removed entirely. Arguably the most shocking scene in the film is when the school board votes to exclude all mentions of institutional racism from the social studies book, the book which once again is intended to function as a representation of American society. One of the board members addresses the insanity of this vote by scathingly saying, “We don’t want to
talk about discrimination” (Revisionaries.) The ramifications of such a decision are devastating. Not only does this sweeping erasure overlook centuries of continued suffering and hardship, it impacts how generations of students will perceive Black people. Representation and perception directly impact a group’s position in society. Therefore, when hundreds of thousands of students are never taught about systemic racism, yet are faced with daily images of police brutality against Blacks, urban centers full of minorities and under-education, and a host of other social issues that seem to be uniquely prevalent in Black and brown communities, these students are only able to understand society in a modern context or with the knowledge that America is the “land of the free,” rather than recognizing these realities in the context of systemic inequality. As a result, in the eyes of a generation, minorities are once again viewed as the people who simply cannot ‘get it together,’ their struggles are delegitimized, and they are significantly less likely to receive the appropriate legislative intervention. Furthermore, this perception, when combined with Herodotus’ Eurocentrism and Wollstonecraft’s ideas about education and self-worth, creates a toxic society which validates White supremacy while dehumanizing millions of minorities. Once again all of this is accomplished not through explicitly aggressive language, but the absence of language all together. Though literature and education are two important sources of representation, one of the largest sources of representation today in the U.S. is entertainment media. Regardless of the genre or plot, audiences view television and movies as reflections of the real world. 3
Therefore, when viewers watch a story unfold on screen there is a certain level of truth that is assumed. As such, television and film are highly influential platforms for representation. Because entertainment media functions as a massive mirror for audiences to peer into, those who cannot see themselves reflected are placed in a unique position. First, it is important to recognize the difference between erasure and absence. For example, if a show about the United States airs and only the U.S. is shown, Canadians will not complain about not appearing in the piece. Contrarily, if a show about North America airs and only the U.S. is shown, Canadians will then have been erased and will rightfully protest the piece. Erasure occurs when someone is omitted from their own narrative. Therefore, when entertainment media is framed as a mirror, but a consumer cannot find their reflection, there can be negative ramifications. Aside from the previously discussed societal harms of erasure, there are equally serious personal impacts as well. Speaking from my experience as a Black girl, I understand how it feels to grow up without representation on television or in movies. Many of the insecurities I developed as a child about my hair are a direct result of my constant exposure to Eurocentric beauty standards. However, because of the recent unprecedented influx of minority representation, the issue is now shifting from one of erasure to one of misrepresentation. Now that I am older and more socially conscious, whenever I see Black people in entertainment, I am hyper-aware of the messages they are communicating. The continued lack of representation results in each image carrying inordinate significance.
Because of the importance of images in the media, I often find myself battling with the question of what constitutes ‘good representation.’ Does representation have to be all-inclusive in order to be considered valid? Especially in the entertainment arena, are Black characters prohibited from being flawed for risk of being perceived as offensive or problematic to the Black community? Should Hollywood no longer hire Black actors to play criminals and single mothers because those roles might be seen as stereotypical? Ultimately, does the need for positive and accurate representation actually translate into unreasonably high and limiting expectations? Is it such that the more desperately a group needs representation, the more difficult it becomes to do so satisfactorily? Representation is a complicated and volatile endeavor. If done effectively, people can feel validated and emboldened. However, if done incorrectly, the results can be devastating. The only substantive solution to these harms is to increase the number of platforms available for underrepresented groups. This will lead to more diverse representation, highlight the countless realities within each community, and decrease the power each individual has to potentially devastate a people. It is impossible for anything to be perfectly inclusive, however the impact of erasure and misrepresentation will decrease substantially if opposing images are readily available.
References Metni, Jawad. The Revisionaries. Independent Lens, 2012.
Waterfield, Robin. Herodotus: the Histories. Translated by Carolyn Dewald, 1998th ed., N/A, Oxford University Press, 1998. Wollstonecraft, Mary. “Early Modern Texts.” A Vindication on the Rights of Woman with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects, 1792, p. 88.
Violence Against Women in the Rwandan Genocide Cecilia D’Arville Sophomore, Global Studies/Journalism
Throughout history, genocides have proven to be amongst the most violent atrocities committed by the human race. The Rwandan genocide was no different. In 1994, between April and July, approximately 800,000 Rwandans were killed.1 Occurring only a couple decades ago, the Rwandan genocide stands out as one of the most notable examples of genocide in recent history. Despite the eyes of the world watching and involvement by the United Nations and other groups, hundreds of thousands of people were killed and sexually assaulted. During the Rwandan genocide, women were sexually assaulted on a scale previously unrecorded in any past genocide (United Nations 2014).2 Women in the Rwandan genocide are unique in their roles both as victims and perpetrators. This paper will explore violence against Tutsi women during the Rwandan genocide from April through July, 1994. Specifically, I will analyze the methods of such violence, the perpetrators, and the long-term effects on the female population. Prior to discussing the violence against women, it is important to understand the pre-existing tensions in Rwanda which led to the genocide and the status of Tutsi women in Rwandan society. The two major groups involved in the genocide were the Hutus and the Tutsis; the Hutus accounted for 84 percent of the population and the Tutsi accounted for 15 percent.3 Although the groups are ethnically
different, the main tensions between the two stemmed from political and socioeconomic differences (Hoex & Smeulers 2010:438). The Tutsis were the elites of society, and the Hutus rebelled against them in the mid-1950s by taking over the government (Sharlach 1999:391). The Hutus controlled the government for the next few decades and implemented discriminatory policies against Tutsis, deepening the tensions between the groups (Hoex & Smeulers 2010:439). In 1990, a Tutsi rebel group invaded Rwanda in an attempt to regain control of the government (Sharlach 1999:391). Their attempt failed and led Hutu leaders to begin planning what would become the Rwandan genocide. Regardless of ethnicity, women in Rwanda held less power in society than men. The Family Code of 1992 designated husbands as the official heads of households, limiting the rights of women within their families (U.S. Department of State 1997). Moreover, no laws exist to guarantee a woman the right to inherit land and property if her husband dies (U.S. Department of State 1997). Before the genocide, women held very little political influence. In 1984, there were no women involved in the sexual assault from Hutu extremists and government supporters prior to the start of the genocide. For example, in the early 1980s, a campaign began against single urban women and women in relationships with European men (Taylor 1999:44). The majority of the women incarcerated during this campaign were Tutsi, many of whom were abused by their captors or raped (Taylor 1999:44). In the 1990s, being both Tutsi and female in Rwanda put these women at a higher risk for sexual violence compared to other female and ethnic populations.
Violence in genocides most clearly manifests itself in the methodologies used to destroy the intended group. According to the United Nations definition, genocidal acts include “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group [and] imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group” (1948:3). Some common tactics of genocide are public executions, mass killings, and starvation. Within the Rwandan genocide, the Hutu militia, also called the Interahamwe, used such methods to kill Tutsi men, women, and children. However, there was one method of genocide which existed within Rwanda that stood out: rape. Rape as a tool of genocide was present prior to the Rwandan genocide, such as in Armenia in the early twentieth century, but it was not used systematically and extensively until the Rwandan genocide (Mangassarian 2016:374). Within the Rwandan genocide, rape specifically targeted women. Rwanda’s patriarchal, militaristic society reinforces the notion that women are property and, therefore, are part of the plunder of war. The use of rape in Rwanda went deeper than just men satisfying their sexual needs “in a forceful demonstration of hyper masculinity,” which often underlies rape in a domestic setting (Mullins 2009:721). Instead, rape was used to dehumanize and terrorize Tutsi women, by both common Hutu men and members of the Hutu militia (Totten and Ubaldo 2011: 31, 111). René Degni-Segui, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Rwanda, stated, “rape was the rule and its absence was the exception,” emphasizing the fact that almost all Tutsi females were raped during the genocide (1996).4 By analyzing the transcripts of trials
against those involved in the Rwandan genocide, Christopher Mullins identified three specific types of rape: opportunistic rape, sexual enslavement, and genocidal rape (2009). Opportunistic rape is defined as “sexual assaults that arise out of the general chaos and confusion of military engagement” (Mullins 2009:726). This type of rape presents itself not just in instances of genocide, but also in many wartime conflicts. In the context of the Rwandan genocide, opportunistic rape occurred the least frequently. Opportunistic rape relates closely to the “pressure cooker” theory of rape during wartime. According to this theory, men’s instinctual sexual aggression mixed with the chaos of war and combat creates a “pressure cooker” which causes rape (Gottschall 2004:133). Sexual enslavement describes situations in which one woman would experience multiple sexual assaults over a brief period of time while being confined, usually in the house of an Interahamwe soldier (Mullins 2009:727). This confinement separates sexual enslavement from other forms of rape. Additionally, sexually enslaved women were threatened with intense violence unless they gave into the will and requests of the soldiers. For example, one woman was threatened with being pierced by a spear after initially refusing sex (Mullins 2009:727). Although cases of sexual enslavement most commonly occurred in Interahamwe houses, there are also cases which occurred in the homes of Hutus who were friends and neighbors of Tutsi families (Totten and Ubaldo 1999:111). During an interview, a man named Kwibuka recalled, “[Hutu neighbors and friends] often turned on [the girls and women]
and raped them,” and “demanded that women allow themselves to be raped as the price… for being hidden” (Totten and Ubaldo 1999:111). These instances show that raping Tutsi women became a fact of life for all Hutus, not just for militia members. Additionally, the quote referencing rape as the “price” for protection amongst friends and neighbors reveals the perceived entitlement of the Hutu men to the bodies of Tutsi women. Genocidal rape differs from the other two categories because it specifically attempts to eliminate a population through violent and systematic rape. Mullins defines it as an “organized military tactic… used to generate fear in a subdued population, humiliate a population, derogate women, and create a cohort of mixed-ethnic children” (2009:721). Rape became normalized by local leaders, with rapists consisting of men of all classes and professions including soldiers, peasants, teachers, and priests (Sharlach 1999:394). In one instance, after finding a group of Tutsis, the commanding military leader told his troops to follow his example. He proceeded to rape and then stab one of the women. The soldiers followed his command and began raping and stabbing the women while shooting the men (Mullins 2009:728). Not only does this reveal military commands to rape women, but also it displays the increased amount of sexual violence women faced compared to men. Rape was also used to accomplish the genocidal goal of preventing the birth of Tutsi babies. Initially, rape may not appear to prevent births, but, the violent nature of the rapes achieved this. Women were sometimes raped with spears and other sharp objects, resulting in their death or genital mutilation, which
typically results in an inability for the woman to get pregnant (Mullins 2009: 727-729; Sharlach, 1999:396). Even in situations where Tutsi women did become pregnant, their child would be considered Hutu, as the legal ethnicity of a child in Rwanda is based on the father’s ethnicity (Doná 2012:16). This further helped to prevent the birth of Tutsi children. Although rape was the most widespread form of sexual violence committed against women, other forms of violence existed as well. The Interahamwe had an obsession with “what they did to women’s bodies” (Sperling 2006:644). Hutu militiamen focused on mutilating women’s breasts and vaginas. They poured acid and boiling water on women’s vaginas, cut open pregnant women’s wombs, and cut off women’s breasts (Sperling 2006:645). In one instance, an Interahamwe soldier cut a mother’s breast off and attempted to feed her baby with it (Mullins 2009:727). Sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide encompassed debased actions of dehumanization that affected women more than men. One witness recalled four Interahamwe soldiers and an officer publicly raping a Tutsi woman repeatedly. The officer forced refugee women to watch the attack and told them they would later be killed (Mullins 2009:727). On multiple occasions, sons were forced to rape their mothers while their whole family would watch (Sperling 2006:644). The act of forcing a child to rape their mother shows barbarity on behalf of the soldiers and exposes the lack of acknowledgment of the Tutsi mother as human. In a survivor interview, Rose Marie Mukamwiza recounted being raped twice in front of her daughter Claire (Totten and Ubaldo 1999:31). Forcing other women, children, and
families to watch rapes was common and added to the dehumanization of the women being raped; it shamed them, changing the way their children and community members viewed them. As mentioned earlier, acts of genocide and sexual violence were committed by men of varied classes and professions. Rape became a hegemonic aspect of society; Hutu men used rape as a routine tool to dominate and destroy Tutsi women. The overwhelming majority of men who participated in the Rwandan genocide were ordinary men who did not have a history of violence or military involvement (Straus 2006:96). Many Hutu men joined militia groups out of fear of the punishment they could face for not getting involved (Straus 2006:96). However, this was not the only reason Hutu men became involved in attacks. Others chose to join the attacks to counter the advancement of Tutsi rebels, to steal goods from houses being ransacked, or due to deep loyalism to the Hutu ethnicity (Straus 2006:96). Although ordinary Hutu men made up the largest group of perpetrators of violence against women during the Rwandan genocide, Hutu women also played a key role as agents of violence against Tutsi women. Even before the genocide, Hutu women were hostile towards Tutsi women. Prior to 1994, marriages between Tutsi and Hutus were legal, however, a marriage between a Hutu man and a Tutsi woman was more common than a marriage between a Tutsi man and Hutu woman (Fielding 2014:18). This resulted in some Hutu women harboring feelings of jealousy towards Tutsi women who were marrying and starting families with Hutu men. Additionally, a piece of Hutu propaganda
entitled the “Hutu Ten Commandments” fostered Hutu women’s animosity of Tutsi women. The first three commandments read: 1.
Every Hutu male should know that Tutsi women, wherever they may be, are working in the pay of their Tutsi ethnic group. Consequently, shall be deemed a traitor: Any Hutu male who marries a Tutsi woman; Any Hutu male who keeps a Tutsi concubine; Any Hutu male who makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée. 2. Every Hutu male must know that our Hutu daughters are more dignified and conscientious in their role of woman, wife or mother. Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest! 3. Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to their senses. (“The ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’ 1990) The first two commandments imply that Tutsi women were dangerous to the morality and sensibility of Hutu men and that Hutu women are morally above Tutsi women. The third commandment directly calls upon Hutu women to take action to save their Hutu men. This document was initially published in 1959 and then republished in 1990 and spread throughout Rwanda (Brown 2014:455). This appeal for Hutu women to act against Tutsi women was revolutionary for Rwanda’s patriarchal society (Brown 2014:455). While this appeal for action was liberating for many Hutu women, it only further contributed to the violence against Tutsi women at the time. According to Sara Brown,
the genocidal crimes committed by Hutu women during the Rwandan genocide can be split into two groups: direct acts of violence and indirect acts of violence (2014:457). Direct violence is defined as acts which require physical force, such as killing, rape, and sexual assault (Brown 2014:455). For example, a mother was put in jail for murdering her son who had a Tutsi father (Brown 2014:458).5 Indirect violence, on the other hand, involved looting, inciting violence, theft, and ordering direct violence. The majority of Hutu women committed indirect acts of violence, but some were involved in direct acts of violence (Brown 2014:455). Much like with the male perpetrators, Hutu women across all classes and professions were involved in committing violence against Tutsi women. School girls killed their classmates, nuns turned in Tutsi refugees to the militia, and prostitutes killed Tutsi children (Sharlach 1999:392). Although there were few women involved in the government at the time, two women held immense power among the political elite during the genocide: Agathe Habyarimana, the wife of President Habyarimana, and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, the Minister of the Family and Women’s Affairs (Sharlach 1999:387). As part of the “little house,” the group involved in planning the Rwandan genocide, the two women encouraged Hutu females to take part in the massacre of Tutsi women (Sharlach 1999:387). Nyiramasuhuko played a particularly prominent role in inciting violence against Tutsi women. Throughout the genocide, she routinely drove around and spoke into a megaphone to encourage Hutus to rape and murder Tutsi women (Fielding 2014:28). In
one instance, she allegedly ordered the militia to burn 70 women who were being kept by the government (Sperling 2006:650). Prior to burning them, she directed the men to rape the women and to keep the younger Tutsi women alive for sex (Sperling 2006:650). Nyiramasuhuko was the only female accused in the International Criminal Tribunal for her involvement in the Rwandan Genocide (Drumbl 2013:562). Furthermore, she is the only woman to be convicted of genocide and rape as a crime against humanity by an international criminal tribunal (Drumbl 2013:562). Nyiramasuhuko serves as the most extreme case of a Hutu woman inciting sexual violence against Tutsi women, however, there were many ordinary women involved. The effects of this sexual violence are still seen in Rwandan society today. Approximately 80 percent of female survivors were raped or sexually assaulted during the genocide (de Beer and Snyman 2015:117).6 The topic of rape is considered “taboo” in Rwanda and is not commonly discussed (de Beer and Snyman 2015:117). Many women have been stigmatized by their community because of their status a rape survivor, making it difficult for them to find stability and security (Holmes 2014:31). Additionally, a portion of female rape survivors faced the problem of unwanted and unplanned pregnancy. These pregnancies sometimes put the lives of the mothers at risk and resulted in a large number of orphaned children (Totten and Ubaldo 1999:59). Female survivors must also deal with long-term medical conditions which resulted from the genocide, such as HIV/AIDS and psychological problems (Sharlach, 1999:393).
HIV/AIDS continues to impact the lives of thousands of women in Rwanda today. Infecting women with HIV/AIDS was often the goal of the rapist; men who knew they were HIV positive would deliberately not kill the women they raped (Sharlach 2000:99). Current Rwandan president Paul Kagame revealed that during the genocide, the previous government ordered hospitals to release AIDS patients to be used as agents of genocide (Sperling 2006:645). Mary Blewitt, a survivor of the genocide, recounted learning of many women who were raped and “spared so that they could die a slow death from HIV/AIDS” (Blewitt 2010:203). Over 67 percent of women raped during the genocide were infected with HIV and AIDS (Survivors Fund 2011). The Rwandan Widows’ Association estimates around 70 percent of its 25,000 members are HIV positive as a direct result of being raped during the genocide (Hilsum 2004:913). Survivors claim that little is being done in Rwanda to prevent women from dying of HIV/AIDS. It is estimated that untreated HIV/AIDS can lead to death within 7 to 15 years (Sharlach 2000:100). Esther Mujawayo, a survivor, said “if you have not protected somebody in 1994, at least stop her dying now…women are still dying and again the world is watching” (Hilsum 2004:913). Treatment programs in Rwanda for HIV and AIDS do exist, but most of them do not prioritize the treatment of victims of genocidal rape (Hilsum 2004:913). This serves as an example of structural violence that currently exists within Rwanda. The government of Rwanda continues to allow for Tutsi women to face injustice in policies and programs.
In addition to women facing medical problems due to HIV/AIDS infections, many Tutsi women are plagued with psychological and mental problems due to their traumatizing experiences during the genocide (Sharlach 1999:393). One woman recalled that after her rapist forced her to watch her son get killed, he spared her and said, “You alone may live, only so that you will die of sadness” (Blewitt 2010:198). This exemplifies the mental torture many women were subjected to during the genocide. There are many accounts of men forcing Tutsi women to watch their husbands and children die. Although men in the genocide were also exposed to traumatic episodes, a study conducted by BMJ Open found Rwandan women to be more severely impacted by mental health issues (Krantz et al. 2015:1). This study found that men were exposed to slightly more traumatic experiences, such as witnessing mass killings, rape, and fleeing one’s home, during the Rwandan genocide (Krantz et al. 2015:4). However, as of 2015, Rwandan women experience anxiety, PTSD, depression, and suicidal thoughts at rates double that of men (Krantz et al. 2015:10). Rose Marie Mukamwiza, the survivor who was raped in front of her daughter, has suffered nightmares and panic attacks directly tied to her experiences in the genocide (Totten and Ubaldo 1999:34). Her daughter goes into a state of intense depression and emotional instability every April (Totten and Ubaldo 1999:33). During this time, she spends weeks alone in her room and has sporadic outbursts of uncontrollable crying and screaming (Totten and Ubaldo 1999:34). Umulisa, another survivor, claims that the mental health of survivors is neglected (Totten and Ubaldo
1999:63). According to her, most of those who assist survivors struggling with mental health issues are only trained for a few weeks. Additionally, she claims there are under ten professional psychiatrists available for survivors in all of Rwanda (Totten and Ubaldo 1999:64). This limited access to mental health care contributes to the lasting impacts of the Rwandan genocide on women. In addition to these troubles, many rape survivors lived in poverty and experienced chronic hunger and insecure housing immediately following the genocide (Zraly, Rubin, & Mukamana 2013:414). However, Tutsi women did not allow the genocide to completely ruin their lives and keep them from working towards moving forward in their lives. Despite the immense burdens they faced post-genocide, Tutsi women remained resilient. Grassroots networks of female survivors began forming in the years after the genocide ended (Zraly, Rubin, & Mukamana 2013:413). Through 12 years of research, ethnographers found three concepts within Rwandan culture which contributed to the resilience of these women: kwihangana, kwongera kubabo, and gukomeza ubuzima. Kwihangana involves finding strength within oneself to endure suffering, kwongera kubabo revolves around affirming the necessary existential conditions for being, and gukomeza ubuzima focuses on accepting struggles, surviving, and moving forward in life (Zraly, Rubin, & Mukamana 2013:414). Of the three, kwihangana is the most common, as it is present in everyday Rwandan life. The Rwandan word “ihangane” stems from kwihangana and means “be patient, be strong, withstand” (Zraly, Rubin, & Mukamana
2013:414). This phrase is used to both calm people down in times of arguments and to console mourning family members, showing that the concept of kwihangana can be found in all aspects of one’s life (Zraly, Rubin, & Mukamana 2013:414). Because kwihangana is a form of resilience which is performed within oneself, it gives women the ability to regain a sense of confidence and emotional independence. This is vital to a woman’s ability to heal because it allows her to take back control of her body and mind. In addition to finding resilience in traditional concepts of Rwandan culture, Tutsi genocide and rape survivors also found resilience in motherhood (Zraly, Rubin, & Mukamana 2013:21). Alicia, a woman who was raped and lost her husband during the genocide, said, “now I say that God deserves thanks because… I still have my children, and this is enough to me” (Zraly, Rubin, & Mukamana 2013:421). Her words reveal a mentality that many other women share. They find strength through their children and their determination to provide them with as stable and healthy a life as possible. Their ability to find a place for love and kindness in their lives and hearts after facing such unfathomable violence is reveals their persistent resilience. The Rwandan genocide marked an incredibly dark time in history. Rwanda’s patriarchal society was manifest in the form of intense sexual violence throughout the genocide. This was seen in the prevalence of genocidal rape and the gruesome mutilation and dehumanization of Tutsi women. These attacks were orchestrated by both Hutu men and Hutu women. However, even Hutu women were given only limited freedom in to carry out
the genocidal plans of the government. Thousands of Tutsi women died as a result of violent rapes and attacks, and those that survived are afflicted with both physical and mental health problems today. Still, many of these women have been able to move forward in their lives. The entire country of Rwanda has been taking steps to rebuild their nation in the wake of the genocide. Each month, villages require able-bodied Rwandan citizens to participate in at least three hours of community service (Specia 2017). This program, instituted by president Kagame, is one of many exercises created to help foster reconciliation within the nation. Although Rwanda has been working toward rebuilding their nation and citizens since 1994, other parts of the world are still plagued with overwhelming amounts of sexual violence directed at women. Twenty years after the Rwandan genocide, formed UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reaffirmed the international community’s dedication to “never again” allow genocide and genocidal rape to occur (Tompson 2017). Unfortunately, such acts have occurred since Ki-moon’s speech, notably in Syria and Iraq with the rise of ISIS (Tompson 2017). Girls and women are reportedly being sold to ISIS members, sexually assaulted, raped, and forced into marriage in Iraq and Syria currently (Tompson 2017). International organizations, notably the United Nations, need to speak out against the sexual abuse women continue to face and take action against these attacks. Much of the world idly watched as thousands of Rwandan Tutsi females were raped, mutilated, and violated. The world has a chance to stop such actions from occurring to women and girls in Syria and
Iraq. However, they must act soon if they want to stop history from repeating itself. NOTES: 1
Background information including statistics on the number of people killed in and the time frame of the Rwandan genocide can be found in Hoex & Smeulers 2010; Straus 2006; and United Nations 2014. 2
It should be noted that the Rwandan genocide was not the first recorded instance of women facing sexual assault directly related to genocidal actions. Notably, the UN estimates around 60,000 women were raped during the Bosnian genocide (United Nations 2014). However, the number of women raped during the Rwandan genocide is estimated to be at least four times this number (United Nations 2014). 3
The remaining one percent of the Rwandan population was Batwa or Twa, an indigenous group in Rwanda (Hoex & Smeulers 2010:438). Although they were impacted by the genocide, they were generally not overtly involved in the conflict, and therefore will not be included in the analysis. 4
Although Tutsi women were the main targets of most rapes, it’s necessary to note that some Hutu women were also raped during the genocide. Most commonly, these rapes occurred if Hutu women were associated with Tutsis, remained complacent during attacks, or were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time (Sharlach 1999:388). 5
When studying direct acts of violence committed by women in the Rwandan genocide, it is vital to note that there are recorded, isolated instances of Hutu women taping Tutsi men and boys (Brown 2014:459). However, these should not be considered genocidal rape because it was not organized as a widespread tactic to kill and dehumanize Tutsi men.
Women who were not raped still faced problems in Rwandan society post genocide. For example, in 1992 21% of women in Rwanda were widowed; by 1994, 36% of women were widowed (Holmes 2014:31). Not all of these women were rape survivors, yet they still faced issues of stability due to the death of their husbands. However, most available research focuses on the effects of the survivors of sexual violence, so I will focus this section on these women.
References Blewitt, Mary K. You Alone May Live. London: Dialogue, 2010. Brown, Sara E. "Female Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide." International Feminist Journal of Politics 16 (2014): 448-69. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, comp. Rwanda Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996. U.S. Department of State, 1997. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Publication no. 1021. United Nations, 1948. de Beer, Anna-Marie, and Elisabeth Snyman. "Shadows of Life, Death and Survival in the Aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide." Tydskrif vir Letterkunde; Journal of Literature 52, no. 1 (2015): 113-30. Degni-Ségui, Rene, comp. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda. Report no. E/CN.4/1996/68. United Nations, 1996.
Doná, Giorgia. "Being Young and of Mixed Ethnicity in Rwanda." Forced Migration Review, no. 40 (August 2012): 16-17. Drumbl, Mark. "'She Makes Me Ashamed to Be a Woman': The Genocide Conviction of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 2011." Michigan Journal of International Law 34, no. 3 (Spring 2013): 559-603. Fielding, Leila. Female Genocidaires during the Rwandan Genocide: When Women Kill. Hamburg: Anchor Academic Publishing, 2014. Gottschall, Jonathan. "Explaining Wartime Rape." The Journal of Sex Research 41, no. 2 (May 2004): 129-36. Hilsum, Lindsey. "Rwandan Genocide Survivors Denied AIDS Treatment." British Medical Journal 328, no. 7445 (April 17, 2004): 913. Hoex, Lotte, and Alette Smeulers. "Studying the Microdynamics of the Rwandan Genocide." The British Journal of Criminology 50, no. 3 (May 2010): 435-54. Holmes, Georgina. Women and War in Rwanda: Gender, Media, and the Representation of Genocide. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014. "The ‘Hutu Ten Commandments’." Kangura, no. 6 (December 1990). Krantz, Gunilla, Ingrid Mogren, Joseph Ntaganira, and Lawrence Rugema. "Traumatic Episodes and Mental Health Effects in Young Men and Women in Rwanda, 17 Years after the Genocide." BMJ Open 5, no. 6 (2015).
Mangassarian, Selina L. "100 Years of Trauma: The Armenian Genocide and Intergenerational Cultural Trauma." Journal of Aggression, Maltreatment and Trauma, 25, no. 4 (2016): 371-81.
Survivors Fund. "Rwandan History: Statistics." Supporting Survivors of the Rwandan Genocide. Last modified 2011. http://survivors-fund.org.uk/resources/r wandan-history/statistics/.
Mullins, Christopher W. "'We Are Going to Rape You and Taste Tutsi Women': Rape during the 1994 Rwandan Genocide." The British Journal of Criminology 49, no. 6 (November 2009): 719-35.
Taylor, Christopher C. "A Gendered Genocide: Tutsi Women and Hutu Extremists in the 1994 Rwanda Genocide." Political and Legal Anthropology Review 22, no. 1 (May 1999): 42-54.
Sharlach, Lisa. "Gender and Genocide in Rwanda: Women as Agents and Objects of Genocide." Journal of Genocide Research 1, no. 3 (1999): 387-99. Sharlach, Lisa. "Rape as Genocide: Bangladesh, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda." New Political Science 22, no. 1 (2000): 89-102. Specia, Megan. "How a Nation Reconciles after Genocide Killed Nearly a Million People." New York Times, April 25, 2017, Africa. Accessed April 28, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/25/w orld/africa/rwandans-carry-on-side-by-s ide-two-decades-after-genocide.html. Sperling, Carrie. "Mother of Atrocities: Pauline Nyiramasuhuko's Role in the Rwandan Genocide." Fordham Urban Law Journal 33, no. 2 (January 2006): 637-64. Straus, Scott. "The Genocidaires." In The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda, 95-121. Cornell University Press, 2006.
Tompson, Alexandra. "After the Rwandan Genocide the UN Promised 'Never Again' - Now It's Time for Them to Take Action against ISIS." Forbes, April 20, 2017, Foreign Affairs. Accessed April 28, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2 017/04/20/after-the-rwandan-genocide-t he-un-promised-never-again-now-its-ti me-for-them-to-take-action-against-isis/ Totten, Samuel, and Rafiki Ubaldo, eds. We Cannot Forget: Interviews with Survivors of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011. United Nations. "The Justice and Reconciliation Process in Rwanda." Outreach Programme on the Rwanda Genocide. Last modified 2014. Accessed April 23, 2017. http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/r wanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml. Zraly, Maggie, Sarah E. Rubin, and Donatilla Mukamana. "Motherhood and Resilience among Rwandan Genocide-Rape Survivors." Ethos 41, no. 4 (December 2013): 411-39.
Allen, Jones and Hall: Black Social Entrepreneurship During the Early Republic Donovan Forrest Junior, Secondary Education/History In the years after the Revolutionary War, the cities of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and Boston, Massachusetts saw a dramatic increase in the social entrepreneurship of African- Americans. The prevalent disenfranchisement of African-Americans in the era of the early Republic, the signing of the Declaration of Independence while most Blacks were enslaved and denied their basic right to life, liberty, and their pursuit of happiness, created an American society filled with discrimination and injustice. In the midst of hypocrisy, Black men rose to the occasion and founded organizations that provided Blacks with a sense of identity, comfort, and support. In the years following the enactment of the Constitution, African Americans found themselves to be disenfranchised socially, religiously, economically, and politically. A success for African-Americans nationwide was the establishing of the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME) in 1817 by former slaves Richard Allen and Absalom Jones. This establishment of a Black religious institution by former slaves gave Blacks a spiritual oasis of hope in the midst of adversity and social discrimination. The founding of the Free African Society, The African Methodist Episcopal Church, and Black Freemasonry led the way for a stronger social identity amongst Blacks in the face of discrimination and adversity.
In the late 1700’s and into the nineteenth century, Black men and women were marginalized economically, socially, and religiously. Servitude was common even in the northern city of Philadelphia where Richard Allen lived for a majority of his adult life. Allen’s work as an activist was not entirely religious but in fact socially too. At the eve of the American Revolution, enslaved Africans made up nearly one-fifth of the population of the thirteen colonies.1 Mostly all Blacks living in the British Colonies were enslaved.2 In 1790, when Richard Allen was twenty-years old he was freed from his master’s plantation in Delaware. As a young child and into his teenage years, Allen attended prayer meetings and church services in the Methodist church on a regular basis with permission from his master. Richard Allen’s master, Stockley, was often criticized because of the religious freedom he allowed to his slaves. Allen often recalls his master saying to him and his brother; “Boys, if I am no good myself, I like to see you striving to be good.” 3 Historical accounts labeled Stockley as a “good” master who was gracious and kind to his slaves. In his 1833 autobiography, Allen referred to his former, and unconverted master as a tender and humane man which he later referred to as a father figure. However, slavery as it was known to many enslaved men, women, and children created a different picture, one of intense pain, heartache, and denial of life, liberty, and each enslaved person’s humanity. In Marcia M. Matthew’s book “Richard Allen,” she reflected on Allen’s experiences as an enslaved man in Delaware and his experience watching to a freeborn Methodist and abolitionist preach about the sin of slavery to an angry group of pro-slavery men.4 16
Rev. Richard Allen spent a majority of his free years as a freeman preaching as a circuit preacher in Pennsylvania and Maryland until he settled in Philadelphia to establish The Free African Society. In his autobiography entitled The Life, Experience and Gospel Labours of the Rt. Rev. Richard Allen, Allen wrote on the backlash that he as well as other blacks experienced as members of the American Methodist Church. In his account, Blacks were pulled off their knees while they prayed, which prompted leaders such as Absalom Jones, William White, and Dorus Ginnings to erect a place of worship for colored men and women. “The elder said, “let us pray.” We had not been long upon our knees before I heard considerable scuffling and low talking. I raised my head up and saw one of the trustees, H-M-, having hold of the Rev. Absalom Jones, pulling him up off his knees, and saying, “you must get up-you must not kneel here.” Mr. Jones replied. “Wait until the prayer is over.” Mr. H-M-said “No, you must get up now, or I will call for aid and force you away.”5 Allen was known to be modest but stubborn. During the late 1700s, Blacks free or enslaved had to concede and defer to white authority in order to survive in a society where they were largely disenfranchised. Allen established the Free African Society in 1787, which was largely criticized by whites in Philadelphia during the Yellow Fever Epidemic. “We have many unprovoked enemies, who begrudge us the liberty we enjoy,
and we are glad to hear of any complaint against our color, be it just or unjust; in consequence of which we are more earnestly endeavoring all in our power to warn, rebuke and exhort our African friends, to keep a conscience void of offense towards God and man; and, at the same time, would not be backward to interfere, when stigmas or oppression appear pointed at, or attempted against them, unjustly; and we are confident,we shall stand justified in the sight of the candid and judicious for such conduct.” 7 In essence, Richard Allen and Absalom Jones were on the forefront for change in Philadelphia through their heavy involvement in abolitionism and other forms of social activism. Both men as well as Prince Hall, the founder of Black Freemasonry were actively engaged in advocating for Black equality in the British Colonies. The struggle for liberty and racial equality were as common in the early republic as they were in the years leading up to the United States Civil War. As the first minister of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, Absalom Jones was largely recognized in the black community by his dedication to rehabilitating the sick and ministering to the dying during the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1793. Endeared by a large part of the Black population and because of his positive reputation among his fellow Philadelphians, Jones was pardoned by Episcopalian officials from having to meet the Greek and Latin requirement to be a minister. In the midst of the founding of the First African Church in Philadelphia, Jones wrote, “to arise out of the dust and shake ourselves, and throw off that servile fear, that the habit of oppression 17
and bondage trained us up in.” 8 Both Jones and Allen were instructed by Quaker teacher Anthony Benezet. Benezet challenged the doctrine that Blacks were inferior and that Africa had produced barbarism. Benezet believed that Africa had produced respectable cultures, and that it was the environment and condition of slavery that transformed Africans into degraded human beings. 9 These teachings inspired both Allen and Jones and other Philadelphia Blacks to increase their accomplishments following the Revolution. Throughout his tenure as a preacher, leader, and social activist, Allen opposed the slave trade and slavery. As a social entrepreneur, Allen published numerous articles on the “sin” of slavery and targeted many slaveholders for what many believed was a crime against humanity. Both Richard Allen and Absalom Jones verbally sued political leaders and liberty activists for their part in the slave trade. In 1790s, the news of the successful Haitian Slave Rebellion had reached the ears of nearly everyone in Philadelphia. Former masters of Haitian slaves sought amnesty in Philadelphia and the anti-slavery discussion was in full effect. In his address to Thomas Jefferson, the slaveholding founding father of the United States and avid revolutionary for freedom, Allen wrote: “If you love your children, if you love your country, if you love the God of love, clear your hands from slaves, burden not your children or country with them.”10 Jefferson wrote in his Notes on the State of Virginia, that there was an existing dilemma in the minds of some slave masters. The dilemma was that although the American Revolution created a sense of American pride that was centered around the prospect of liberty, white slave
owners feared the possibility of blacks becoming equal to them. There was much controversy over what total emancipation would mean for America. Allen also gave Jefferson a solution to Jefferson’s fear that freeing blacks would mean a race war would ensue. “Why not retain and incorporate the Blacks into the State?” Jefferson responded that “deep-rooted prejudices entertained by the whites,” and the “10,000 recollections by blacks of the injuries they have sustained.”11 In essence, Jefferson concluded that free Blacks would execute revenge on their former slave masters and destroy the early Republic. Allen also maintained that freed men and women would be grateful towards their liberators. 12 In his sermon on the Abolition of the International Slave Trade in 1808, Absalom Jones the first pastor and co-founder of the African Methodist Episcopal Church, preached a sermon celebrating the day. Jones hoped that the day the International Slave Trade was abolished would be remembered as a day for Blacks and abolitionists to celebrate for years to come. Jones also urged freed Blacks to never forget their humble beginnings. “Let us conduct ourselves in a manner as to furnish no cause of regret to the deliverers of our nation, for their kindness to us. Let us constantly remember the rock whence we were hewn, and the pit whence we were digged. Pride was not made for man, in any situation; and still less, for persons who have recently emerged from bondage. The Jews, after they entered the promised land, were commanded, when they offered sacrifices to the Lord, never forget their humble origin; and hence, part of the worship that 3
accompanied their sacrifices consisted in publicly and privately, to acknowledge, that an African slave, ready to perish, was our father or our grandfather.” 13 In essence, Jones preached to his congregants that freed Africans were not to seek vengeance but be grateful for their improved conditions. Allen also worked with the Pennsylvania Abolition Society in dealing with his attitudes towards the institution of slavery. A common belief among white abolitionists of the early republic was that free Blacks still needed to be under the supervision of whites as far as their moral well-being is concerned. PAS President Benjamin Franklin believed that Blacks had been freed from slavery as “machines” and “animals.” Also stating that: “freedom may often prove a misfortune to [the slave] himself and prejudicial to society”--- unless white reformers remained their moral overseers.” 14 Despite the efforts made by Allen to push the agenda of abolitionism throughout the American Republic, racist and discriminatory beliefs were still engrained in the American daily social milieu. Benjamin Rush, a United States founding father, physician, and prominent figure of the early republic spoke of dark pigmentation as a physical ailment. Rush urged that whites should pity their Black counterparts until they were liberated of their sickness. In the decades following the Revolutionary War, Philadelphia was seen as a city of increased economic opportunities for whites as well as free Blacks. The Delaware River was a hotspot for trade and lenders granted loans to eligible Blacks and Whites for housing and was free of the discrimination
in the housing market that later plagued the same city over one-hundred years later. Richard Allen and Absalom Jones both lived amongst whites in the city’s river district. Allen lived a few blocks from co-founder of the African Methodist Episcopal Church Absalom Jones. Allen and Jones then established their church Mother Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church a few blocks from Independence Hall where America’s founding fathers Jefferson, Washington, and Adams signed the Declaration of Independence a few decades before.15 Philadelphia during the late eighteenth century as Allen recalled was a city of large homogenous nature. Blacks from the revolutionary Island of Haiti as well as immigrants from the West Indies, Northern Europe and Africa found their home in the bustling center of international commerce in the City of Philadelphia. In 1793, the recent outbreak of Yellow Fever caused significant casualties in the City of Brotherly Love. Among those who were infected was Allen who was admitted to Bush Hill Hospital located north of what is today Center City, in late September and remained until late November of the same year.16 “Fifty-five residents were dead by the end of the year (out of 708)”17 in Allen’s Spruce Street Neighborhood. Black residents were highly susceptible to more health risks because they did not have the means to leave their quarantined area.18 With Blacks recovering at a slower rate than whites, Black aid workers under the supervision of Allen and Jones visited yellow-fever victims and their families. Allen and his team nursed sick victims of the epidemic back to health and
gave the deceased proper burials.19 Allen and Jones’ Free African Society led the way for mutual aid organizations for Blacks in the upcoming decades and following centuries. As an organization that provided health assistance to victims of the Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1793, The Free African Society gained the trust of the Black community and Philadelphia and encouraged more free Blacks to attend religious services led by Allen.
Philadelphia’s Free Black population began to increase with the abolition of slavery in northern part of the United States in 1804. Similar to many non-profits in Philadelphia in the twenty-first century, the Free African Society sought to improve urban conditions for free Blacks. In essence, the growth of the Free African Society can be attributed to Absalom Jones’ preaching and Allen’s aid to those in need at St. George’s Methodist Episcopal Church.20 Prior to the American Revolution, and the establishment of the Free African Society, Philadelphia’s free and enslaved Black population married, were baptized, and congregated at the city’s Anglican churches. Initially, the Black congregants of the Anglican Church sought after Anglican beliefs for religious instruction, however, by the 1780s, they began to flock to the recently established Methodist Episcopal Church.21 Shortly after their transferring of denominations, Black congregants of the Methodist Church felt welcome and accepted.22 One of the first historians of the African Episcopal Church wrote: “and being despised and persecuted as religious enthusiasts, their sympathies naturally turned towards the lowly, who like themselves, were of small estimate in the sight of worldly
greatness.”23 The anti-slavery views of Episcopal Church founder John Wesley contributed to the initial treatment of Blacks and the opposition against the slave trade, and slave holding. Slaveholders were also restricted from holding church offices.24 In 1794, the African Methodist Episcopal Church was founded 25 as an extension of the spiritual efforts of the Free Black Society in the early eighteenth century. Due to the discrimination that free Blacks faced in the Methodist Episcopal Church, members decided to transform their congregation of the Free African Society into a church that Blacks could feel safe and welcome in. Upon Allen’s arrival in Philadelphia, he sold dried goods, manufactured and sold shoes, and cleaned chimneys. Allen also served as an Assistant Minister at St. George’s Methodist Episcopal Church. After almost a year of worshiping in the Methodist Episcopal Church, Allen as well as other free Blacks were told to move to the balcony. 26 After countless forms of discrimination ensued, the African American congregation at St. George’s left and worked to found their own church free of discrimination. As a result Absalom Jones called on free Blacks in other Northern Cities to form their own denomination based off of the religious teachings of John Wesley. In essence, the success of the African Methodist Church ensued jealousy amongst white congregants of the Methodist Episcopal Church. In an attempt to control the new church’s congregation, the Methodist Episcopal Church attempted to sue Allen. The lawsuit was successful however, Allen and his congregants quickly raised the necessary funds and rebought their property.
Also in the late eighteenth century in Boston, Massachusetts, Black men rose to the occasion to found organizations that would provide Blacks with a sense of identity, belonging, and pride. One example of these men was Prince Hall, an avid advocate of abolition, Black empowerment, and education. Hall founded Black Freemasonry, a secret society in Boston, Massachusetts and made it possible for Blacks worldwide to enjoy the all of the privileges of freemasonry. 27 In an address to his fellow brothers of the African Lodge, Hall spoke: “Another thing which is the duty of a Mason is, that he pays a strict regard to the stated meetings of the Lodge, for masonry is of a progressive nature, and must be attended to if ever he intends to be a good Mason; for the man that thinks that because he hath been made a Mason, and is called so, and at the same time will wilfully neglect to attend his Lodge, he may be assured he will never make a good Mason, nor ought he to be looked upon as a good member of the craft. For if his example was followed, where would be the Lodge; and besides what a disgrace is it, when we are at our set meetings, to hear that one of our members is at a drinking house, or at a card table, or in some worse company, this brings disgrace on the Craft: Again there are some that attend the Lodge in such a manner that sometimes their absence would be better than their Company (I would not here be understood a brother in disguise, for such an one hath no business on a level floor) for if he hath been displeased abroad or at home, the least thing that is spoken that he thinks
not right, or in the least offends him, he will raise his temper to such a height as to destroy the harmony of the whole Lodge; but we have a remedy and every officer ought to see it put in execution.” 28 As the founder of Black Freemasonry, Prince Hall often addressed his lodge members on the acceptable behaviors of members of Freemasonry. From the founding of the African Lodge to the twenty-first Century, members of Freemasonry conduct themselves as men knowledgeable of the needs of their community and active in community service and activism. Hall also played a large role in abolitionism and other anti-slavery causes in the North. One example of Hall’s involvement in the anti-slave trade in the early republic was his interception of the kidnapping of three Blacks into slavery in the West Indies. In February 1788, Prince Hall along with twenty other of his Lodge members petitioned the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to intervene in the kidnapping of three free Black men. The news of the kidnapping circulated throughout the city and to white Masons. One of the three men that were kidnapped was a freemason.29 Jeremy Belknap, a historian during the early Republic praised Hall and his comrades for their camaraderie. “Really, my dear sir, I felt, and do still feel, from this circumstance, a pleasure which is a rich compensation for all the curses of the whole tribe of African traders, aided by the distillers, which have been liberally bestowed on the clergy of this town for their agency in the above petition.”30 In 1788, John Marant became Grand Master of the African Lodge of Freemasonry.31 In Marant’s address to a mixed group of Masons he
discussed the slave of imperialism and the enslavement of fellow men and women. “To colonize, invade, enslave, or abuse the “nations” of this “African Ethiopia,” even those scattered across the African diaspora, is to act against the order of Creation.”32 One success for the African American community was the founding of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in 1817 by former slaves Richard Allen and Absalom Jones. The establishment of a religious institution by former slaves gave Blacks a spiritual oasis of hope in the midst of adversity. In addition, the founding of the free African Society, the African Methodist Episcopal Church, and Black Freemasonry led the way for a stronger racial and cultural identity for Blacks in the face of
discrimination and adversity. In essence, the years after the Revolutionary War saw a significant increase in the social entrepreneurship of Black men. In the midst of a split nation over the issue of the equality and liberty for all men regardless of skin color, and the marginalization of Blacks in the early Republic, the enslavement of Blacks created an African society that was largely defined by injustice and discrimination. However, in the midst of this hypocrisy and untruth, three African American men named Richard Allen, Absalom Jones, and Prince Hall answered the call to found organizations that provided Blacks with a sense of identity, comfort, and support.
Ibid. Newman, Freedom’s Prophet (New York and London: New York University Press), 107. 11 Ibid, 109. 12 Ibid. 13 Absalom Jones, Sermon on the Abolition of the International Slave Trade (1808). 14 Newman, Freedom’s Prophet (New York and London: New York University Press), 110. 15 Ibid, 81. 16 Ibid, 85. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Richard Newman, Freedom’s Prophet (New York and London: New York University Press), 90. 20 Ibid. 21 Gary B. Nash, “Absalom Jones: Free Black Leader, “Struggle and Survival in Colonial America (1981):179. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 10
Warren Smith, John Wesley & Slavery (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1986), 28. 2 Ibid. 3 Marcia Matthews, Richard Allen (Baltimore– Dublin: Helicon, 1963), 24-25. 4 Ibid, 4. 5 Richard Allen, “The Life, Experience, and Gospel Labors of the Rt. Rev. Richard Allen…,” (Philadelphia: Martin & Boden, Printers, 1833), 5. 6 Richard Newman, Freedom’s Prophet (New York and London: New York University Press), 6. 7 Ibid, 79. 8 Gary B. Nash, “Absalom Jones: Free Black Leader, “Struggle and Survival in Colonial America (1981):184.
Ibid. Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Joanna Brooks, “Prince Hall, Freemasonry, and Genealogy,” African American Review (2000): 197. 30 Ibid. 31 “Prince Hall Freemasonry,” Wikipedia.org, accessed November 10, 2016, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prince_Hall_Free masonry. 32 Brooks, 197. 25
Newman, Richard. Freedom’s Prophet New York and London: New York University Press. (2008) Smith, Warren. John Wesley & Slavery Nashville: Abingdon Press. (1986) “Prince Hall Freemasonry,” Wikipedia.org, last modified December 5, 2016.https://en.wikipedia .org/wiki/Prince_Hall_Fr eemasonry
Bibliography Allen, Richard. The Life, Experience, and Gospel Labors of the Rt. Rev. Richard Allen”Philadelphia: Martin & Boden, Printers. (1833) Brooks, Joanna. Prince Hall, Freemasonry, and Genealogy Vol.34, No.2 . Indiana State University. (2000) Hall, Prince. A Charge Delivered to the Brethren of the African Lodge (1792) Jones, Absalom. Sermon on the Abolition of the International Slave Trade (1808) Matthews, Marcia. Richard Allen Baltimore—Dublin: Helicon. (1963) Nash, Gary B. Absalom Jones: Free Black Leader: Struggle and Survival in Colonial America. University of California Press. (1981)
The Spirit of the Samurai: The Kamakura Bafuku, the rise of the Bushido, and their role in diplomacy
how the bafuku help develop the Bushido, and what effects both the Kamakura Bafuku and the Bushido have had on Japanese international relations.
The Kamakura Bafuku first emerged during the Gempei War (1180-5), a “national civil war involving substantial intraclan fighting and also pitting local against central interests” (Cambridge, 47). The primary factions involved were the Minamoto clan (led by Minamoto Yoritomo) and the Taira clan (Cambridge, 48-9). The war broke out when Yoritomo started an armed rebellion against the Taira-backed imperial court in 1180, justifying it with the claim that a prince had been left out of the imperial succession (Cambridge, 52). It was during this war that the bafuku would be formed. Although Yoritomo had been acting as a governor in his territory since the beginning of the war (Cambridge, 53), the catalyst for its official establishment would come in 1183. That year, Minamoto forces led by Yorimoto’s deputies, Yoshinka and Yukiee, managed to occupy the capital of Kyoto, forcing the Taira leadership to flee (Cambridge, 55). However, Yoshinka pronounced himself the true leader of the Minamoto clan, and began to impose a dictatorship on Kyoto (Cambridge, 56). Rather than go to the capital and start a rivalry with Yoshinka, Yoritomo negotiated with the imperial court and got them to give a permanent status to his government in Kamakura (Cambridge, 56). With this, Kamakura became the preeminent peacemaker, which would carry for the next hundred and fifty years (Cambridge, 56). Following the war, Yoritomo would spend the next seven years consolidating his position, establishing the dual jito-shugo officer network in 1185 (Cambridge, 59) and being appointed the shogun in 1192
Senior, Actuarial Science Japan is undoubtedly a central component to understanding international order in Asia. Its actions from the late 1800s to the mid-1900s defined the region, and its consequences have had repercussions that have lasted into the present day (Shambaugh, 10). But where does one go to understand Japan? A place that many people would start is with the Bushido, “the code of conduct of the samurai” (Nitobe, x). In 1905, when noted writer Dr. Inazo Nitobe wanted to explain “why such and such ideas and customs prevail in Japan” (Nitobe, xii), he used the Bushido as his explanation. Introducing the Bushido as the Japan’s “Precepts of Knighthood” (Nitobe, 4), he then proceeded to lay out the various values and tenets that consist of its make-up. But how exactly was the Bushido formed? Nitobe doesn’t delve too deeply into that subject, saying that “It was an organic growth of decades and centuries of military career.” (Nitobe, 5). But when did that growth begin? A good place to begin is with the Kamakura Bafuku (1185-1333), Japan’s first military government (shogunate) which overtook from the previous Taira emperors in terms of governance (Cambridge, 46). It was during the formative years of this government that many of the Bushido’s key points would be developed (Kawakami, 72). What this paper intends is to accomplish three things: to explain how the Kamakura Bafuku established itself,
(Cambridge, 65), a title he would hold for three years before moving to the then more prestigious office of utaisho (commander of the inner palace guards) (Cambridge, 64). Yoritomo died in 1199, and his role in the bafuku would be slowly assumed by the Hojo clan, with their position being solidified by 1219 (Mass, 12). However, the events that made the Hojo the hegemony of the bafuku would also lead to another war between Kyoto and Kamakura in 12211 (Cambridge, 69). Known as the Jokyu Disturbance, the war was fought swiftly and lasted two weeks (Mass, 35). Following its victory, Kamakura scattered the ex-emperor and his allies, obtained the right to interfere with high level personnel decisions, including the naming of emperors (Cambridge, 77). Following the Jokyu disturbance, Kamakura had firmly established itself as the dominating force in the country, which would continue well into the 14th century (Cambridge, 88) It was during this time that what would become known as the Bushido started to form. The Kamakura Bafuku’s biggest contribution to this would be in the field of Justice. Nitobe calls justice “the most cogent precept in the code of the samurai” (Nitobe, 23), and the bafuku’s actions during its formative years would be a large reason why. The beginning of this was in 1183, when Kamakura gained official status from the retired emperor. With that, Kamakura established itself as the preeminent peacemaker (Cambridge, 56). Kamakura’s military policing was direly needed at the time, as the Gempei war had provided cover for warriors to carry out their own private lawlessness (Cambridge, 59). Yoritomo responded to increasing pressure for order by acquiring a monopoly of power to
appoint jito2 in 1185 (Cambridge, 62). There were two results from this change. The first was that Kamakura appointed deserving vassals to jito positions that would guarantee lawfulness. The second was that a lot of the unauthorized jito, which had been common throughout the pre-Kamakura period and often engaged in criminal activities, were disciplined and dismissed (Cambridge, 62). During Yoritomo’s reign, the Justice of the bafuku would develop and provide a basis for the system it would become. The basis of this system would be evidence: the bafuku’s decisions on lawsuits were based on evidence provided by investigation; if there was not enough information, the case would refer to an appointed local officer (Mass, 67). The justice of the Kamakura would expand and mature considerably following the Jokyu Disturbance 3 , as the 1220’s would lead to a judicial revival (Mass, 93). One of the biggest changes was that both sides of a suit would be given maximum latitude, meaning that accused and the accuser would face each other as equals and the imperial court would determine the settlement (Mass, 93-4). Another reform to be enacted during this period concerned the jito, which removed the statute of limitations concerning illegally obtained land; this meant that a suit could be brought against him at any time (Mass, 107). The bafuku also managed to ensure that it did not undermine its own position as mediator and law enforcer. This was done by ensuring that it was not brought into any disputes involving any of its vassals, thus insulating Kamakura and preventing them from bringing or answering charges themselves (Mass, 155). The Kamakura bafuku’s commitment to justice was not only in its
justice system, but it was also in its actions and legal code. The best example about this was how Yoritomo handled the case of Shigetada Hatakeyama. When a bailiff in a province in Shigetada’s fiefdom was found guilty of criminal activities, Yoritomo held Shigetada accountable for his actions and had him punished, despite Shigetada being unaware of the crimes himself (Kawakami, 76). This sort of accountability was codified in the Code of Joei, and the story itself left a deep impression on samurai in the generations that followed (Kawakami, 77). It was this sort of commitment that led justice to become an integral part of the Bushido; Nitobe says that justice is “…the bone that gives firmness and stature…without [justice] neither talent nor learning can make of a human frame a samurai” (23-4). The other big contribution that the Kamakura Bafuku made to the formation of the bushido was its position and actions concerning loyalty. Loyalty was a large part of the bafuku, mostly in part because it was a very important to Yoritomo. It can be seen through the stories that have been handed down that are about loyalty, ranging from Yoritomo executing a turncoat samurai who killed one of Yoritomo’s enemies as an offer of surrender (Kamikawa, 73) to a Taira vassal allowing the sons of a Minamoto vassal, who had been forced to serve the Taira, to fight for Yoritomo (Kamikawa, 74). The emphasis on loyalty was also borne out of necessity as well. During the Gempei war, loyalty was very loose; so much so that a clan could join the Minamoto cause in isolation to the actual fighting (Cambridge, 63). Yoritomo would determine the loyalty by declaring war on a clan that had remained aloof during the Gempei War, using it to consolidate his own power (Cambridge, 63). Yoritomo would also purge anyone who was even suspect
of being disloyal, even his own brother (Cambridge, 65). The result is that loyalty became a firmly ingrained part of the Bushido. According to Nitobe, samurai were taught that their life was the means by which they would serve their master (93). Both the Kamakura Bafuku and the Bushido have had an important impact on Japan’s international relationships throughout history. Kamakura’s involvement with diplomacy began in 1191, when the Sung Dynasty of China arrested two traders and declared that anyone travelling from Japan to China would be arrested. Japan was able to smooth over tensions concerning the issue of extradition, but the incident demonstrated that Japan had become a stronger force in East Asian history than it had before (Shoji, 400). Japan’s position in international affairs became more precarious during the Hojo regency with the rise of the wako, or pirate (Hurst, 397). The wako would first appear in 1223, when they attacked the Korean 4 city of Kumjo (Shoji, 405). Over the course of the next four years, the wako attacked Korea so often that the bafuku were worried that the Koryo dynasty would attack Japan (Shoji, 405). In response, Kamakura would appoint a new governor of Kyushu, who open a communique with Koryo and beheaded ninety pirates in front of a Koryo envoy (Shoji, 405-6). From there, Japan and Korea would progress to a full trading partnership (Shoji, 406). Japan would also resume trade with Sung China that would compromise of forty to fifty ships going back and forth between the two countries annually (Shoji, 408). However, Japan issued an ordinance in 1254 limiting foreign trade, as trade had started to have adverse effects on both parties: China 26
and Koryo were suffering from wako attacks and excessive outflow of coins, while Japan had to contend with a severe outflow of rice that were exacerbating ongoing famines (Shoji, 410). But these trade imbalances would soon become trivial as the Kamakura Bafuku would face its greatest test: the Mongol invasions. The lead up to the invasion began in 1266, when Kublai Khan sent a letter to Japan through Koryo that attempted to open diplomatic relations 5 (Susumu, 131). The imperial court (who were the ones in charge of diplomatic relations) chose to ignore the letter, while the bafuku sent out a directive throughout the provinces telling them to prepare for a Mongol invasion (Susumu, 134-5). Mongolia would try several more times to elicit a formal response from Japan, but eventually concluded that force would be the only way to achieve their diplomatic aims (Susumu, 136-7). The actual plans for invasion began in 1273, after Mongolia had managed to conquer Sung China6 and subdue rebel elements in Korea (Susumu, 138). The invasion itself began in 1274, with the Mongolian forces attacking Tsushima and winning the battle (Susumu, 138). The war between the two countries waged for twenty days, with both sides making retreats after fighting in Hakata in order to recuperate from losses; however, the Mongolians were caught up in a storm on their way back to Korea, and were unable to resume their mission (Susumu, 140). Following the invasion, Kamakura enacted several measures to strengthen their defenses and drew up plans to attack the Yuan bases in Korea 7 (Susumu, 142-3). The next invasion would occur in 1281, as Mongolia had consolidated its power on the mainland and made conquering Japan its top priority (Susumu, 145). This time Japan was better prepared for the invasion, and was able to
better repel the Yuan invaders (Susumu, 146-7). Another storm prevented the Mongols from launching another offensive, and the Yuan army lost somewhere between 60-90% of its army (Susumu, 147). A third invasion of Japan never materialized, as the Mongol empire became consumed by rebellions and inflation (Shoji, 420). The success of repelling the Mongol invasions would remain the Kamakura Bafuku’s biggest achievement in the realm of international relations, and solidified the Bushido’s place in Japan’s discourse of diplomacy. This can be seen by the fact that Bushido reemerges at times when Japan’s place in the international order has been uncertain. The first case of this was with Nitobe. Nitobe’s explanation of the Bushido (Bushido: The Soul of Japan) was published in 1905, a time when Japan was rising rapidly in the world order and confusing the West about where Japan stood (Mason, 72). Nitobe used the Bushido to explain why Japan had been able to assume such a position so quickly. According to him, “the spirit of Bushido permeated all social classes….furnishing a moral standard for the whole people” (Nitobe, 163). Nitobe then says that the Bushido is “the animating spirit, the motor force of our country” (Nitobe, 171), linking the Bushido to Japan’s speedy rise and military victories that were the highlights of the Meiji Era (Mason, 72-3). Thus, Nitobe takes the spirit of the samurai and makes it the Japanese equivalent of the knight’s code of chivalry (Nitobe, 4), using it to dismiss any idea that Japan was a “childlike” country and assert that Japan was on equal footing with America and the European nations (Mason, 77). It was this interpretation of the Bushido that would 27
become the “touchstone of loyalty to the state” and involved in nationalistic discourse (Turnbull, 231), and it helped establish the Bushido as the basis for calls for nationalism in times of uncertainty. This includes the present day, as Japan must deal with uneasy relations with China (Green, 204), chilly relations with South Korea (Green, 208-9), ambiguity concerning their alliance with the United States (Green, 212-3), a shrinking and aging population (Prestowitz, 36), and a stagnant economy (Prestowitz, 37-8). It is in this situation that Bushido has been used to call for a return to nationalism and militarization. In 2006, when arguing to send Japanese troops to assist the American occupation of Iraq, a member of the Diet called Japanese soldiers “[the] samurai of Japan, the nation of bushido” (quoted by Turnbull, 231). Another example is seen with the 2004 book New Bushido. In it, author Hyodo Nisohachi uses the imagery and tenements of the Bushido to create a path to national empowerment, one that is marked by Japanese possession of nuclear weapons (Mason, 83). This view of the Bushido is potent in the current international situation, as Japanese conservatives have recently been making more attempts to push for remilitarization and the abolition of Article 9 (Mason, 86). All of this harkens back to the age of Kamakura, which helped formed many of the ideals and tenets of the Bushido, which informs this current climate. The Kamakura Bafuku may be nearly a millennium removed from the current day, but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t have an impact that could be felt today. The actions of the bafuku, and its founder Minamoto Yoritomo, have had a definitive impact on the Bushido as we know it. With the Bushido such a vital
component of the Japanese mindset, it is important to understand the actions and influences that created it, so that we can understand the actions taken today that determine the future.
Endnotes 1. There is no known immediate cause for this war (Cambridge, 69). The incident that is usually cited as the direct cause is the ex-emperor “strongly requesting” that two appointments be cancelled; however, this incident occurred two years prior to the actual fighting (Mass, 14). 2. Jito were vassals of the shogun who were obliged to discharge administrative services on behalf of courtier or religious landlords (Mass, xiv) 3. This happened due to the circumstances of the time rather than ideology. Following the Jokyu Disturbance, the Kamakura Bafuku had to deal with a large number of lawsuits that complicated matters (Mass, 90). 4. It should be noted that from 918-1391, Korea was known as the Koryo dynasties (Hurst, 397). Both terms are used interchangeably by scholars writing about this time period. 5. Due to complications that prevented the messenger from entering Japan at the time, the letter did not reach Kamakura until 1268 (Susumu, 132) 6. With Kublai’s conquest of China, he ended the Sung dynasty and established the Yuan dynasty (Susumu, 138). 7. It’s unclear to what extent these plans were put into effect, but it is clear that they were never fully enacted (Susumu, 143).
Works Cited Green, Michael. "Japan's Role in Asia: Searching for Certainty." International Relations of Asia. 2nd ed. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 197-225. Print. Asia in World Politics. Hurst, G. Cameron, III. "Japan and East Asia." The Cambridge History of Japan. By Kawazoe Shoji. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990. 396-446. Print. Kawakami, Tasuke. "Bushido in Its Formative Period." The Annals of the Hitotsubashi Academy 3.1 (1952): 65-83. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 02 May 2017. Mason, Michele M. "Empowering the Would-be Warrior: Bushido and the Gendered Bodies of the Japanese Nation." Recreating Japanese Men. N.p.: U of California, 2011. N. pag. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 4 May 2017.
Prestowitz, Clyde V. Japan Restored: How Japan Can Reinvent Itself and Why This Is Important for America and the World. Tokyo: Tuttle, 2015. Print. Shambaugh, David. "International Relations in Asia." International Relations of Asis. 2nd ed. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014. 3-33. Print. Asia in World Politics. Susumu, Ishii. "The Decline of the Kamakura Bafuku." The Cambridge History of Japan. Trans. Jeffrey P. Mass and Hitomi Tonomura. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990. 128-75. Print. Turnbull, Stephen. "Review." Rev. of Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan, by Oleg Benesch. Japan Review 2016: 230-31. JSTOR [JSTOR]. Web. 4 May 2017.
Mass, Jeffery P. "The Kamakura Bafuku." The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990. 46-88. Print. Mass, Jeffrey P. The Development of Kamakura Rule, 1180-1250: A History with Documents. Vol. 3. Stanford, CA: Stanford U.P., 1979. Print. Nitobe, Inazo. Bushido: The Soul of Japan: An Exposition of Japanese Thought. Rutland, VT: C.E. Tuttle, 1969. Print. 29
The Intersections of Latino Identity: Religion, Group Consciousness, and Immigration Policy Rebecca Gonzalez Senior, Political Science Introduction Minority political participation becomes more salient as these populations become more intertwined in the socio-economic fabrications of society. Rhetoric highlighting the importance of obtaining the minority vote has also become more pronounced (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003; Chavez 2013; Garcia 2017; Kelly 2008) and can be observed by the most recent presidential elections of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. In both cases, the success of these candidates has been attributed to their ability to mobilize minority populations (Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003). Just as the tangible political implications of these growing populations increases, scholarship has also followed, asking questions of what and why these groups vote the way they do. The theory of group consciousness serves as an explanation for what and why certain racial groups engage in distinct political behavior. Group consciousness is defined as the recognition of common concerns and values among race groups that mobilize mutual political preferences (Dawson 1994;McClain et.al 2009). Though research on this subject is diversifying, it is still applied most within the context of African Americans. Pioneer discussions of Latino group consciousness have emerged recently, however given difference of pan ethnic relations between Latino subgroups, there are still pronounced questions related to Latino political participation. Considering the
youth of group consciousness theory overall, the dimensions of this study are also largely undiscovered as they are centrally applied to the context of race and ethnicity. This paper applies the theory of group consciousness to the context of religion, arguing that religious group consciousness influences political preference. By investigation Latino policy preferences on immigration, I find that religious group consciousness plays some role in mobilizing political opinion though the salience of this function is weak in comparison that of race. Specifically, this preliminary analysis finds that behavioral identity indicators of religious group consciousness are more salient indicators than those of affiliation when operationalizing religious group consciousness. By distinguishing better indicators of measuring religious group consciousness, I hope to provide a foundational knowledge that may be utilized in future research on the subject. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework Studies on the subject of religious affiliation and political preference have a robust presence in social science literature. Questions of how religion may impact political behavior are considered by scholars such as Vega (2014), McDaniel & Nooruddin & Shortle (2011), Jones-Correa (2001), and Layman (1997). The focus of current scholarship largely pertains to correlations between religiosity and conservative political behavior, specifically, in the context of Anglos and Blacks rather than Latinos. In the Latino context, Jones-Correa (2001), Kelly & Kelly (2005), and Kelly & Morgan (2008) begin to examine religious political behavior, yet the studies do not investigate religious policy 30
preferences with a focus on immigration. On the subject of immigration and Latino politics, Hood, Morris, & Shirkey (1997), de la Garza (1998), and Garcia (2017), provide key insights to conditions shaping Latino interests, both diverging and converging, on the issue. Further, on the subject of group consciousness Dawson (1994), Sanchez (2006), and Garcia (2017) provide a base conceptualization of this consciousness among Latinos as they consider how group identity mobilizes certain policy preferences. Seeking to interpret the salience of religious identity among racially linked Latinos, the subject of immigration is being chosen because of its intersectional significance. Since immigration is an issue that influences all Latinos (Garcia 2017), testing these policy preferences alongside religious affiliation provides a theory of political participation grounded in the concept of religious group consciousness. The current literature on religious affiliation and political behavior is being largely separated from scholarship on Latino policy preferences and immigration. It is my intent to analyze the literature on these three subjects; immigration, religious political behavior, and group consciousness in order to provide a working foundation for my argument on the salience of religious group consciousness in the context of Latinos. Religious Implications for Political Behavior The role of religion in shaping political preference is further asserted in modern literature by the findings of Verba, Schlozman, Brady & Nie (1993), and Geoffrey Layman (Layman 1997; Layman & Carmines 1997). Verba, Schlozman, Brady & Nie find that if a participant “joins a church and begins to attend services weekly and to devote an additional three hours a week to other church
activity, this person will perform approximately two more church skill-acts (including tithing or volunteering), which will produce an increase of political acts” (Verba & Schlozman & Brady 1993 pg. 285). Layman builds on previous findings as well and observes the role of churches in increasing political participation among Blacks (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993). He finds various differences in partisanship based on degrees of religious observance. Orthodox observers, favor a stricter adherence to Christian belief and also tend to lean in favor of the Republican Party, while more religiously liberal respondents support the Democratic Party (Verba et.al 1993). They examine the changes of church denominational affiliations over time, and interpret the influence of this change in dictating political partisanship, specifically by measuring presidential vote choices. Layman identifies the salience of religious affiliation in political participation, finding that “highly religious individuals have consistently been more likely than their less religious counterparts to identify with the GOP,” further asserting that American political alignments are increasingly being shaped by the orthodoxy of religious beliefs (Layman 1997 pg. 301). This seminal piece emphasizes the importance of cross denominational considerations when predicting the influence of religion in predicting political partisanship. Religious Implications for Political Behavior and Latinos Literature that focuses on political partisanship and religion still rarely apply these models to ethnic groups beyond Anglos and Blacks. “Overall we know little about the political implications of Latino religion,” (Kelly & Kelly 2005 pg 88) and thus Verba et.al (1993), Jones-Correa (2001), Kelly &
Kelly (2005), and Kelly & Morgan (2008) work towards applying questions of religious affiliation and partisanship to the Latino context. Verba et.al (1993) finds that religious affiliation and church attendance explain varying levels of participation among Latinos in particular, arguing that Catholic affiliated Latinos have lower levels of participation. Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) builds on this model and applies t hese findings to Protestant practicing Latinos, finding that Protestant Latinos are more likely than Catholics to participate. Similarly, Kelly & Kelly (2005) measure differences in Latino partisanship further building upon previous scholarship. They apply measures of religious behavior, emphasizing the psychological role of churches apart from just religious attendance that measures the contextual role of churches in disseminating political information. Further, work on partisanship within the Latino context supports the notion that Evangelical Protestant Latinos have a strong and positive partisanship identification with the Republican Party (Kelly & Morgan 2008). Together, these texts work to identify the salience of religious affiliation in the Latino context, supporting the notion that Latinos identifying as strong Catholics or Protestants also lean conservative in political behavior. This validates the base assumption of this paper, proposing that Latinos with strong religious observance in either religious sect may also have conservative views when it comes to immigration policy. Religious Implications for Immigration Policy Literature on the subject of immigration does not consider religious ideology in forming conservative or liberal policy preferences, specifically in the framework of Latinos. In the context of American Latinos, McDaniel, Nooruddin & Shortle (2011) still provide
evidence of religious affiliation and its effect on immigration policy preferences. They develop hypotheses arguing that attitudes of immigration are being affected by conservative perspectives of civil religion, termed as ‘Christian Nationalism’. They find that, “members of religious groups are more likely to oppose immigrants, this is particularly true of Evangelical Protestants, and the source of opposition to immigrants is rooted in symbolic politics, specifically a concern that immigrants threaten ‘American values’” (McDaniel, Nooruddin & Shortle 2011 pg. 223). Knoll (2009) examines religion and immigration policy as well finding that those who attend religious services more frequently are likely to support liberal immigration reform policy. Some of the more vocal protests of immigrant measures have recently come from the leaders of various religious organizations (Knoll 2009 pg. 313). Knoll’s findings present diverging results from that of McDaniel et.al, further illustrating undiscovered caveats for examination within the current discourses on religion and immigration policy. Though concepts of religious affiliation, immigration, and political behavior have been combined in these studies, still there is disconnect between applying these concepts in the Latino contexts. Latino Group Consciousness and Perspectives on Immigration The study of Latino group consciousness has a relatively new appearance in literature on group consciousness. Seminal pieces are largely attributed to the works of Gabriel Sanchez (2006; 2008), Atiya Stokes (2003), and Natalie Masuoka (2006). Though original studies of group consciousness, such as those by Miller, A. H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. (1981) and Dawson (1994) may be applied to the Latino context, since these
groups face different cultural, economic, and social dynamics. Therefore, I will focus on the studies done on Latinos specifically considering these contextual differences. Gabriel Sanchez (2006) explores Latino group consciousness across different modes of political participation and Latino-specific activities. He finds that group consciousness among Latinos has a positive effect on mobilizing political participation (Sanchez 2006). Though he does not explore whether Latino group consciousness impacts voter specific choices and decision of partisanship, his analysis provides a solid framework for further exploration of Latino policy preferences such as the topic of immigration (as is the aim of this study). Ativa Stokes specifically analyzes Latino political participation and group consciousness across various pan-ethnic Hispanic identities. She finds that different dimensions of group consciousness mobilize different subgroups of Latinos, specifically polarized power dynamics in government “increases Mexican political participation, systemic blame increases participation among Puerto Ricans, and systemic blame and group identification increase political participation among Cubans” (Stokes 2003). Additionally, Masuoka (2006) questions pan-ethnic group consciousness amongst Latinos and Asians, finding that “although both Asian Americans and Latinos share many similar experiences, such as immigration, language differences, and acculturation processes, these factors are found to play differential roles for perceptions of collective identity” (Masuoka 2006). This knowledge suggests that different factors within ethnic communities may impact one’s sense of group consciousness. I consider such a factor to be religious identity though it has not
been considered in prior studies of group consciousness. Working towards filling gaps in literature, Vargas, Sanchez, and Valdez (2017) analyze the influence of immigration policy on perspectives of linked fate among Latinos. They find that both punitive and beneficial immigration laws such as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Garcia 2017 pg. 187) increase indicators of linked fate. Further, John Garcia (2017) examines Latino immigration policy preferences in a discussion of Latino community perceptions. He begins the dialogue discussing the importance of Latino policy preferences as the population of Latino voters in America is increasing. Unsurprisingly, the Hispanic vote has gained momentum just as both direct and indirect implications of punitive immigration policies have negatively affected these populations, mobilizing them to action. Such policies include those that are actively creating a ‘militarization’ of the U.S – Mexico Border implicitly framing undocumented immigrants in criminal terms (Garcia 2017 pg. 175). Additional policies include the immigration reform legislations of the 1990’s under George H.W. Bush that increased funding to the Border Patrol, inherently increasing apprehensions of both undocumented and documented Latino immigrants. On a legislative dimension, these policies have mobilized the few however increasing minority representatives resulting in salient political organizations such as the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (Garcia 2017 pg. 171). De la Garza, offers a perspective of the nature of Mexican American identity 33
arguing that the large and continuous nature of Mexican immigration distinguishes or separates this subgroup perspective from that of other Latinos. He adds that the constant reminder of Mexican immigrants due to their steady influx, elicits a stronger sense of community within Mexican Americans when examining their politico-social perspective. He powerfully concludes on the subject of group identity that although shared empathy for immigrants is salient, “Mexican Americans can influence policies that concern Mexico, but this influence will be shaped not out of a loyalty to Mexico but instead out of their own interest in US policy” (De la Garza 1998). This suggests that on the subject of immigration, though Latinos vote based on their racial identity, there are still clear differences in preferences between individual ethnic subgroups. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Religious Group Consciousness Knowledge on the study of group consciousness is being largely attributed to the work of Michael C. Dawson (1994). In his book Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics, Dawson examines the salience of racial identity in political participation among African Americans. In his analysis, he finds that perceptions of group interest play a more significant role in shaping partisanship and political strategy than class interest. He finds evidence for the salience of race based group interests in predicting partisanship among Blacks which he coins as group consciousness. Building on this concept, McClain, Carew, Walton, and Watts (2009) define group consciousness as “in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs and group’s social standing” (McClain et.al 2009 pg. 476). The key separation of this meaning from that of group identity, which is
defined as an individual’s psychological awareness of belonging to a group (McClain et.al 2009), is the notion that group consciousness mobilizes certain political preferences. A multitude of studies have applied group consciousness to various races (McClain et.al 2009; McClain & Stewart 2013; Garcia 2017; Sanchez 2006; Junn 2008, Masuoka 2006) yet this concept has not been applied to religious identity. In this analysis, I work towards applying McClain’s definition of group consciousness to the case of religion, analyzing the salience of religion as an intersectional identity such as race and class are. I utilize Latino perceptions of immigration policy as a surrogate for this comparison. Given that immigration policy intersects both race and religious identities in the Latino context (McDaniel & Nooruddin & Shortle 2011; Garcia 2017; Vargas & Sanchez & Valdez 2017), I believe it is a justified case to examine the prospect of religious group consciousness. Latinos constitute a large immigrant population (Pew Research Center 2014) and regardless of citizenship status, this pan ethnic population faces stereotypes pertaining to the image of being “illegal aliens” (Chaves 2013). This provides positive and negative implications for the use of immigration policy as a measure for the salience of religious group consciousness. Though Latinos constitute a large population of immigrants and it is plausible that as a racial group they will benefit more from liberal immigration policies, those Latinos who do not have a shared sense of identity may interpret immigrants as an economic threat. Since linked fate, or the shared sense of sociopolitical connectedness via race, is being argued by Dawson (1994) to transcend economic threats and class differences, it is important to consider this variable in the measure of religious 34
identity. The logic is that Latinos who have a sense of linked fate may also have liberal perceptions of immigration given that Latinos benefit or suffer from this form of policy. Considering this shared sense of racial identity, if Latinos claim conservative perceptions of immigration reform, it can be assumed that other considerations, such as religious identity, may be of salient concern. Immigration is a subject greatly influenced by race and religious perceptions (McDaniel & Nooruddin & Shortle 2011; Garcia 2017; Vargas & Sanchez & Valdez 2017). Latinos are a group affected by the racial implications of immigration policy and also constitute a large majority of Catholic and Christian followers. 55% of the Latino population identifies as Roman Catholic and 22% identifies as Protestant in 2013 (Liu, Pew Research Center). This percentage constitutes the majority of the total Latino population that identifies with some denomination of religion. As previous studies have suggested, religious affiliation mobilizes common patterns of political behavior (Verba & Schlozman & Brady 1993; Layman 1997; Layman & Carmines 1997). This suggests that religion not only shapes perceptions of group identity but also produces a sense of group consciousness by which these groups mobilize towards political action in accordance to McClain’s definition. Religion is an intersectional identity often neglected in studies though it does reflects a shared sense of in-group identity (McDaniel & Nooruddin & Shortle 2011). Past research ignores the conceptualization of religion as a salient identity amongst its followers and views religion as a form of church affiliation. Though Jones Correa (2001) and Kelly & Kelly (2005) begin a framework of analyzing religion as a form of behavioral
identity rather than just an affiliation to a certain church, and they do so within the Latino context, they do not apply this influence specifically to the subject of immigration. Likewise, though Vega (2014) begins to analyze Latinos who ‘disrupt the tenet of ethnic solidarity’ on the subject of immigration, she does not factor in religion. As 1 Corinthians 12:13 suggests, once a member of the body of Christ, one is “baptized by one Spirit so as to form one body” (NIV) or one common identity in Christ. This group identity does not manifest itself by primarily physical mutual characteristics as race has been socially constructed to do. Rather religion forms group identity through the spiritual base of common moral beliefs. A common moral identity “provides a cultural framework that helps individuals understand what actions are acceptable and what are not and therefore plays a central role in shaping social and political attitudes” (McDaniel & Nooruddin & Shortle 2011). This is particularly demonstrated in the discourse on abortion by which Christian and Catholic followers have common moral standings that result in political preferences leaning traditionally conservative. For the case of abortion policy, religious observers share the ethical principle that “life is sacred,” and they abide by this notion in their everyday lives (Lopez 2012 pg. 513). This has affected their political attitudes towards Democrats as they find that the Republican Party stands on the pro-life side of the debate. Religious group consciousness is being conceptualized differently than race in that it does not necessarily mobilize political activity based on a shared sense of discrimination, but rather on a shared sense of group goals in terms of biblical and spiritual fulfillment. The common goal of the church as outlined by biblical text is to “go therefore and make disciples of all nations, 35
baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” (Mathew 28:19 NIV Bible). Within the political arena, this goal translates into support for conservative policies since these tend to align with traditional Christian/Catholic values. The Republican Party in general is attractive to Christian/Catholic identifying populations because of the Party’s vocal political expression of certain values fundamental to the faith. Given that the majority of Christians/Catholics align more with the Republican Party, and Republicans favor stricter border policies, I expect Latinos who identify as strong religious observers to have stricter perspectives of immigration policy. If these Christian Latinos who identify as also having a sense of linked fate with the Hispanic community, then it is being proposed that religion is a salient identity above race in this political discourse. Hypothesis Understanding the plausible influences of religious group consciousness on political behavior, I investigate the salience of Latino religious identity on perspectives of immigration policy. Based on current literature, it appears that when respondents attend church often, or identify as being a part of the Protestant or Catholic church, they are more likely to have conservative political preferences. I apply this conceptualization specifically to Latinos, analyzing those who identify as having a sense of linked fate, and interpreting the salience of religious observance by reviewing opinions on immigrant population levels. Observing preferences of immigration among Latinos who have a sense of linked fate, during a period of high deportations and tension within this community, the responses may reflect considerations of religious group
consciousness. If conservative policies are preferable despite negative racial consideration, then these policy preferences may be considered through a lens of religious identity, thereby demonstrating the salience of religious group consciousness. Thus, this analysis proposes that those who have strong indicators of religious observance will also prefer fewer immigrant populations entering the United States. Hypothesis: Those who identify as Protestant or Catholic, and/or attend corresponding religious services often, will favor immigration policy that advocates for a decrease in this population Conceptualization and Measurement Strategy For the purpose of this study, I will use the ANES 2012 Time Series Study. I choose the 2012 study rather than the more recent 2016 study to take the sociopolitical contexts of the time in account. The time of this study is important to consider because this was the year that there was a record number of deportations (Gonzalez-Barrera 2014) and the Latinos s ocial movement, the DREAMers, had been at the height of participation and activity. This context illustrates a time of forceful immigration debates that may provide stronger survey responses with regard to Hispanic identity and opinions on immigration. The field of respondents are taken from the population of U.S. citizens age 18 years and older. The unit of observation is United States voters and the sample size consists of 589 respondents when variables are subset to draw from Hispanics self-identifying as having a sense of linked fate. The ANES sampling mode consists of face-to-face interviews with in-person recruitment and interviews conducted from
respondents derived from stratified sample clusters based on address. The respondents for the internet questionnaire mode of samplings draw from address-based mail and internet recruitment survey techniques. Views of immigration policy are operationalized in this study by considering various perspectives related to the amount of immigrants being allowed into the United States. The dependent variable that I am choosing for this study is originally a factor measure recoded to numerical values that represent opinions to the question pertaining to the number of immigrants respondents believe should be entering the United States. The variable immigpo_level specifically, seeks to measure respondent opinion on immigration levels asking the question, “Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be ....”. The answers are coded from decreasing to increasing intervals as 1. DECREASED A LOT 2. DECREASED A LITTLE 3. LEFT THE SAME AS IT IS NOW 4. INCREASED A LITTLE 5. INCREASED A LOT. This variable is a relevant measure of immigration policy attitudes because it evaluates the respondents’ views on stricter immigration policy; lower populations of immigrants are preferable if they believe the presence of immigrants should decrease a lot, or looser immigration policy is preferable if they believe that immigrants should increase a lot. Hood, Morris, & Shirkey (1997) use the same measure for immigration policy in their evaluation of Latino preferences, further validating the use of this variable. The limitation of this measure pertain to its broad focus, meaning it does not gage respondent’s opinions on specific immigration legislation and policies by explicit policy name.
Additionally, the measure relates to a respondent’s view on immigrant population levels which does not directly reflect conservative or liberal thought. As past literature examines, however (Verba, et.al 1993; Layman 1997; Layman & Carmines 1997; Jones-Correa 2001), conservatives tend to favor stricter immigration regulations while liberals tend to favor looser policies. Therefore, by precedent, this variable acts as the measure for immigration policy preference. Figure 1 provides insight to the distribution of immigpo_level. This distribution is normal and has relatively low variance, presenting another limitation with the data. A majority of respondents have moderate perceptions of immigrant populations believing that the population size should be left the same as it is now. This suggests a level of indifference or apathy within this Latino population towards immigrant groups and towards considerations of group consciousness in general.
The independent variables of interest are seeking to interpret the intersectional dimensions of the question at hand. The first 37
independent variable operationalizes the measure of religious observance. The variable relig_churchoft measures the amount of times that a respondent attends religious services on a continuously increasing scale, coded as: 1. NEVER 2. A FEW TIMES A YEAR 3. ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH 4. ALMOST EVERY WEEK 5. EVERY WEEK. Verba, et.al (1993) also use a similar measure in their analysis of religion and political involvement. This measure serves as an account for religious observance given that levels of church involvement suggest varying degrees to which a respondent commits to the faith. Further, it serves to interpret the extent to which a respondent identifies with his/her religion and depends on this ideology in normative thinking. This variable serves to operationalize one dimension of religious group consciousness. There are limitations to this variable in which it does not directly account for spiritual commitment or the degree to which the respondent observes the religion apart from attending religious services. Though a respondent may attend church every week, he/she still may not be fully committed to the tenets of the faith. The second independent variable I observe is relig_group, to account for respondents who identify as Catholics and Protestants. Note that the variable originally contained a “Jewish” and “Other” category that is dropped since the implications of these two sects may vary in effect from that of Catholics and Protestants. This variable serves to measure the amount of respondents who identify with these churches specifically. Kelly & Kelly (2005) use a similar measure of only Protestants and Catholics in their study of religion and Latino partisanship, further validating the use of this variable. The limitation is that it does not account for specific
denominations within these sects and differences of political rhetoric disseminated between these churches. Since the focus of this study is to observe religious salience overall rather than among specific denominations, I choose this variable. Table 1 provides insight to the summary statistics of these independent variables in addition to the main dependent variable. Note that all of these variables are being subset to draw from a specific sample of respondents. The sample draws from those who identify as dem_hisp or Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish in addition to those who identify as having link_hisp or answer YES to the question “Do you think that what happens generally to Hispanic people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?” Varia Min Mean Media Max bles n Immig 1.00 3.098 3.00 5.00 pro_le vel Relig_ churc hoft Relig_ group
Table 1 This variable is coded as a dummy variable measuring the number of respondents who answer YES = 1 or NO = 0. This variable aims to interpret the extent to which respondents have shared sense of linked fate with other Hispanics, suggesting that they too would have a stake in immigration policy. The overall intent of the subset is to specifically distinguish the extent to which religious group consciousness may be salient since all members of the sample have a shared sense of linked 38
fate. Controlling for strong political affiliations to either party is necessary to understand the extent to which only religious observations influence perception of immigrant populations. The variable pid_x indicates the partisanship of the respondent and serves as a control variable. The variable is coded on a scale of 1 to 7; 1 being STRONG DEMOCRAT and 7 being STRONG REPUBLICAN. This variable is problematic in that it encompasses varying degrees of Democrat and Republican support including “liberal Democrats” and “liberal Republicans.” These variations leave much room for subjective interpretations of one’s party identification. Still, this control is necessary as prior literature has observed the influence of partisanship on immigration policy (Verba et.al ; Layman ; Layman & Carmines ). Controlling for partisanship on any scale is necessary for this analysis to accurately distinguish the salience of religious identity. Further, the variable dem_edu categorizes respondent’s highest level of educational achievement, serving as a second control. Accounting for different perceptions of immigrants based on education level is common in literature on the subject of political participation. Particularly on the subject of Hispanic policy preferences and immigration policy, the use of this variable is exemplified by Hood, Morris, & Shirkey (1997). Additionally, accounting for education in the study of group identity is necessary because perceptions of group consciousness are influenced by variations in educational attainment (Miller, A. H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. 1981)
This study’s main concern is with interpreting the extent to which the dependent variable, immigpo_level, changes in response to the two independent variables relig_churchoft, and relig_group. Together, these variables operationalize religious group consciousness in tandem to perceptions of immigration. By using these measures, I interpret religious identity on dimensions of behavior and affiliation. The model established evaluates the salience of religious group consciousness in the context of Latino immigration policy preferences. I run a linear regression analysis using the R-Studio coding software to configure the model below: Model = lm( immigpo_level ~ relig_churchoft + relig_group + pid_X + dem_edu) Though the variables included in this model are justified by literature, there are still clear limitations. When considering the model’s ability to fully configure religious group consciousness, the framework of “group consciousness clusters” as used by Gabriel Sanchez (2006) could be of better use. This framework may also account for religious salience across pan-ethnic Latino groups. However, for the purpose of this study which is a preliminary analysis of group consciousness, I choose a simple linear regression model. Additionally, the measure of relig_group does not account for cross denominational affiliations, revealing a caveat in the models ability to fully interpret religious observation. Likewise, the control variable indicating partisanship is slightly problematic in that it leaves room for respondent bias of party identification that may influence results. Further, the dependent variable, immigpro_level, could be better operationalized by reference to a specific policy measure in its
question. Nevertheless, similar variables are used amid literature on topics of religion, Latino group consciousness, and immigration, validating its use for the purpose of this study. Further, though there is research pertaining to the aforementioned political discourses, it is important to note that conversation on the subject of Latino religious group consciousness, and implications for immigration policy and political mobilization have been overlooked, further validating the preliminary use of these variables for this analysis.
<2e-1 6 ***
Church Attenda nce Christia n/Catho lic Party Identific ation Educati on Level
Results & Analysis The results of Table 2 illustrate an interesting dynamic between this combination of variables. As seen, the P-values for Latinos who attended church often (relig_churchoft) and those who affiliate with either Catholic or Protestant churches (relig_group), diverge greatly from the .05 threshold thereby disconfirming the proposed hypothesis. The salience of Latino religious group consciousness on political preference, specifically on the topic of immigration, is thus largely insignificant. As plausibly expected, the control variables, in particular that of education, employs significant statistical effect on perspectives of immigrants. Surprisingly, the direction of this effect, seen in the coefficient plot Figure 2, does not follow conventional thought. The probability estimate predicts opinions favoring a decrease in immigrants for every increase in educational attainment. For both dependents, the variable crosses over the 0.00 threshold for regression estimates. Adjuste Estim Std. t pr(>|t| 2 d R = ate Error value )
Table 2 Those who attend religious services often have an estimate of .002 in favor of less immigrants entering the country. Though this is rather insignificant, the negative sign supports the hypothesized influence for religion. According to these data, those who attend services more often, favor conservative immigration policies attuned to decreasing immigrant populaces in the US. Interestingly however, those who identify as being Christian/ Catholic have an estimate equal to .0808, revealing an insignificant however positive view in favor of more immigrants. If one identifies as Christian/ Protestant, then he/she is also more likely to support immigration policy that favors increasing the number of immigrants entering the country. The adjusted R2 value of about 4% reveals that the model explains for only some variation in perceptions of immigration policy.
From these data, we can draw some inferences about the salience of Latino religious group consciousness on the subject of immigration. It is plausible that attending church more often associates with increased religious group identity, serving as explanation for why they prefer less immigrants in the country. Active church attendance may provide a sense of community, and the political rhetoric expressed within these church communities overall have been historically conservative. This serves as an explanation for the results indicating a favor for less immigrants entering the United States. Identifying as either Protestant/ Catholic may result in opposite opinions because of the construction of the variable. Since the data only accounts for those who self-identify as Christian/Protestant and not for denominational associations within these Churches, there is room for subjective interpretations of religious affiliation. Some denominations may be more liberal or conservative than others, for example evangelical and mainline identifying Protestants have a greater sense of Republican partisanship than do Catholics (Kelly & Morgan 2005). If the sample analyzed represents more Catholics than Protestants, then these differences of partisanship between denominations may account for the liberal perspectives given about immigrants.
The difference in opinions between those who attend services often and those who identify as being affiliated with a church interestingly suggests that indicators of religious observance are more salient than indicators of religious affiliation when operationalizing religious group consciousness. Though past research has assumed religious affiliation (religious sect) to have the same effect as religious observance (church attendance), this analysis presents clear differences in political opinion between the two. Overall data and knowledge made available on the subjects of religion and Latino group consciousness are limited, thereby restricting this preliminary analysis on the salience of religious group consciousness. The results presented are not as expected nor hypothesized. Possible explanations for this variance can be attributed to faults in the model as well as limitations of available data as a whole. The findings do not support the hypothesis but rather reveal the malleable intersectional nature of religious identity. Further, I find that differences in opinion between the two independent variables, relig_groupâ€‹ and â€‹relig_churchoftâ€‹, imply that variables measuring religious behavior rather than religious church affiliation are better indicators for measuring religious group consciousness. This notion implies that those who have strong religious behavior have more salient sense of religious group consciousness than those who simply identify themselves as a part of a specific religious sect. Based on these observations, it can be concluded that the salience of religious group consciousness overall is rather weak given the large degrees of variance between the variables. This provides insights to the multidimensional 41
nature of intersectional identities. Between these identities of race and religion, many subjective contextual conditions may influence political preference. This includes controls such as education, denominational affiliation, income, and general diverging preferences among pan ethnic Latinos. Conclusion Insight on Latino policy preference and the role of religion in shaping these sentiments is important to consider as the influence of Latinos in the political sphere grows. This group forms the largest growing population of immigrants in the United States (Lopez, Bialik 2017). Simultaneously we witness growing rhetoric in the political sphere about attracting these minority votes (â€‹Alvarez & Bedolla, 2003)â€‹. Despite the influences of religion in forming political opinion, research on the topic of religious group consciousness is rather minimal if not completely unexplored. Even more so, within the framework of Latinos and discussions of immigration policy preferences, religious group consciousness is not applied. This analysis seeks to input knowledge on the relevance of religious identity in shaping political opinions. By observing immigration preference, and considering the intersectional nature of race and religious identity, I examine the salience of religion in forming political decisions. The conceptualization of religion within the theoretical framework of group consciousness has rarely been applied in the discourse examining Latinos and immigration policy. By applying this theory to Latinos, I hope to add to the narrative of intersectional identity, ultimately questioning the salience of religious observance indicators to predicting political behavior. The findings presented can only begin to uncover the role of religious behavior and
affiliation on Latino immigration preference. The analysis discovers that religious group consciousness is not salient in forming consistent political preferences on immigration. Though the hypothesis is half supported by the conservative preferences of Latinos who attend church often, those who identify as Catholic and Protestant still observe more liberal interpretations of immigrants. These data present race and religion as complex and multidimensional in the study of policy preference. Latinos who identify as having a sense of linked fate, and fall within a spectrum of religion observation, still vary in their interpretations of immigration. I find that between the indicators of religious observance, variables that measure religious behavior and variables measuring church affiliation, result in sizable differences of political preference. Particularly, religious behavior rather than affiliation is a better indicator and measurement of religious group consciousness. There are clear constraints with the data made available and used in the model to understand this relationship. Still, the results add to the discussion of religion and political participation by finding differences of preference among the types of religious observance measures. Though the salience of religious group consciousness is not supported by these observations, this analysis suggests that differences of measures of religious identity are important to consider as these definitions may provide different cues of religiosity, thereby resulting in different policy opinions between religious observers. Further research on the subject would perhaps provide more insight to the particular differences between religious observance indicators versus indicators related to religious affiliation. In addition, the exploration of religious group consciousness should be expanded and applied 13 42
to various contexts beyond Latinos and immigration policy to fully interpret the intersectional dimensions of identity and its influence on politics.
Appendix Model 1. Distribution of Errors
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Gonzalez-Barrera, A. (2014, January 24). Record number of deportations in 2012. Retrieved June 24, 2017, from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2 014/01/24/record-numberof-deportations-in-2012/ Hood, M. V., Morris, I. L., & Shirkey, K. A. (1997). "!Quedate o Vente!": Uncovering the Determinants of Hispanic Public Opinion toward Immigration. Political Research Quarterly,50(3), 627. Jones-Correa, M. A., & Leal, D. L. (2001). Political Participation: Does Religion Matter? Political Research Quarterly,54(4), 751. Kelly, N. J., & Kelly, J. M. (2005). Religion and Latino Partisanship in the United States. Political Research Quarterly,58(1), 87. Kelly, N. J., & Morgan, J. (2008). Religious Traditionalism and Latino Politics in the United States. American Politics Research,36(2), 236-263. Knoll, B. R. (2009). “And Who Is My Neighbor?” Religion and Immigration Policy Attitudes. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,48(2), 313-331. Layman, G. C. (1997). Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: The Impact of Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment From 1980 to
1994. Public Opinion Quarterly,61(2), 288. Layman, G. C., & Carmines, E. G. (1997). Cultural Conflict in American Politics: Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S. Political Behavior. The Journal of Politics,59(3), 751-777. Liu, J. (2014, May 07). The Shifting Religious Identity of Latinos in the United States. Retrieved June 24, 2017, from http://www.pewforum.org/2014/05/07/t he-shifting-religious-identity-of-latinosin-the-united-states/ Lopez, G., & Bialik, K. (2017, May 03). Key findings about U.S Immigrants. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2 017/05/03/key-findings-about-u-s-immi grants/ Lopez, R. (2012). Perspectives on Abortion: Pro-Choice, Pro-Life, and What Lies in between. European Journal of Social Science,27(4), 511-517 Masuoka, N. (2006). Together They Become One: Examining the Predictors of Panethnic Group Consciousness Among Asian Americans and Latinos. Social Science Quarterly,87(S1), 993-1011. Mcclain, P. D., Carew, J. D., Walton, E., & Watts, C. S. (2009). Group Membership, Group Identity, and Group Consciousness: Measures of Racial Identity in American Politics? Annual Review of Political Science,12(1), 471-485.
Mcdaniel, E. L., Nooruddin, I., & Shortle, A. F. (2011). Divine Boundaries: How Religion Shapes Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Immigrants. American Politics Research,39(1), 205-233. Miller, A. H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. (1981). Group consciousness and political participation. American Journal of Political Science, 25, 494-511. NIV Bible. (2007). London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd. Sanchez, G. R. (2006). The Role of Group Consciousness in Political Participation Among Latinos in the United States. American Politics Research,34(4), 427-450. Stokes, A. K. (2003). Latino Group Consciousness and Political Participation. American Politics Research,31(4), 361-378. Vargas, E. D., Sanchez, G. R., & Valdez, J. A. (2017). Immigration Policies and Group Identity: How Immigrant Laws Affect Linked Fate among U.S. Latino Populations. The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics,2(01), 35-62. Vega, I. (2014). Conservative Rationales, Racial Boundaries: A Case Study of Restrictionist Mexican Americans. American Behavioral Scientist,58(13), 1764-1783.
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Inequality: American Exceptionalism or Global Trend? Andrew Knox Senior, Political Science/Philosophy
Has the precipitous rise in inequality in the United States since the 1970s been a primarily American phenomenon, or is it simply the most extreme example of a larger international trend? The authors in this syllabus have emphasized the uniqueness of American inequality - in part to draw attention to the importance of national policy, in part as a rhetorical appeal that inequality is not a necessary fact of modern life, and in part to argue against explanations that attribute rising inequality to skills-based technological change (SBTC) or “globalization.” According to Hacker and Pierson, the rise of inequality “has been substantially more meteoric in the United States than in other rich nations… The hyperconcentration of income in the United States… sets the United States apart from other rich nations, calling into serious doubt the usual explanation for America’s winner-take-all economy, SBTC.”1 Therefore, American politics is to blame for rising inequality, not transnational economic or political trends. Increases in inequality in other nations, especially the Anglo-Saxon countries, they attribute to economic competition with, and interconnection to the U.S. Also, “these [English-speaking] nations have also generally emulated U.S. public policy more than other nations have.” But what is distinctly American about the policies that they refer to? Similar policies were pursued in Chile and the U.K.2 during or before the period Hacker and Pierson
emphasize, the late 1970s into the 1980s. David Harvey refers to Chile as “the exemplar of ‘pure’ neoliberal practices after 1975”.3 Following the 1973 coup d’état against the socialist government of Salvador Allende, Chile embarked on an extensive campaign of privatization, deregulation and cuts in overall state spending,4 which greatly increased inequality in an already very unequal country.5 While in a much more radical and dictatorial form, these policies were very similar to those described by Hacker, Pierson and Bartels. Does Hacker and Pierson’s explanation of American inequality hold? Is the United States the exception, or simply the most extreme case of a general economic trend? In this paper I will examine trends in inequality across five other countries: the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, Japan and Russia. I select these countries because of their political and economic similarities to the United States. With the exception of Sweden, they are all members of the G8.6 While Russia is somewhat of an outlier as the only country that is not a liberal democracy, I include it because of its economic similarity to the United States as an advanced industrial/post-industrial nation and its experience of “shock therapy” in the 1990s. During this period, the Russian economy was transformed virtually overnight from a Communist planned economy to a free market capitalist economy, resulting in a rapid increase in both inequality and poverty.7 Privatization of state assets, deregulation, and cuts in social spending proceeded at a pace to put “Reaganism at warp speed” to shame. As in Chile, the policies Hacker and Pierson identify as having created the American winner-take-all
economy were implemented much more quickly and fundamentally than in the U.S. Testing Hacker and Pierson’s thesis is important to understanding inequality because it allows us to understand the causes of rising inequality. If inequality is on the rise not just in the U.S., but also in my five case studies, then something other than the American political system is to blame. This would not necessarily mean that policy is irrelevant; if all of the case studies implemented “winner-take-all” economic policies, then I would have to conclude, with Hacker and Pierson, that rising inequality is driven by policy, and not by structural changes in the world economy. The major caveat, however, would be that policy-driven inequality is a global phenomenon not particular to the United States.
the Gini coefficient, global inequality ranks at around 70, or 0.700 – staggeringly high, given that actually existing societies have never exceeded the low 60s. Brazil, one of the most inegalitarian countries in the world, has a Gini coefficient of 57.11 From 2005 to 2011, global inequality fell slightly, although we should be wary of concluding that a centuries-long trend is ending on the basis of six years of data.12 According to Piketty’s data, global wealth inequality has risen slowly but steadily from 1987 to 2013.13
Background: Global inequality Before analyzing trends in inequality in specific countries, I want to first examine global inequality. While global inequality may tell us little about inequality in individual countries or even regions, it gives us some idea about inequality outside the United States. As of 2014, U.S. GDP was 16.14% of world GDP, slightly behind China (16.32%).8 While the U.S. may be an economic powerhouse, its share of the world’s GDP makes it unlikely that world inequality would be greatly skewed by even a highly unequal United States. The American portion of world GDP has been shrinking as the country has become more inegalitarian, as well.9 Aggregate world inequality Global inequality has been rising since the Industrial Revolution.10 Considered in terms of
Milanovic, on the other hand, is more optimistic, although he admits that a sustained decrease in global inequality would be an unprecedented reversal.14 Inequality Between Regions Not only is global inequality increasing, the gap between the poorest and the richest regions has increased dramatically in the past century. The 1999 United Nations Human Development Report compared the fifth of the world’s people living in the highest income countries to the fifth living in the lowest income countries: the income gap between these two regions was 3 to 1 in 1820, 11 to 1 in 1913, 30 to 1 in 1960, and 74 to 1 in 1997.15 In terms of GDP, the ratio was 86% of world GDP for the highest income fifth, compared to just
1% of world GDP for the lowest income fifth.16 Given these trends analyzed by Piketty, these inequalities are almost certainly larger than they were in the 1990s. While poverty has decreased in very poor regions like Sub-Saharan Africa or Southeast Asia,17 vast inequality between the poorest and richest regions still remains. The United Kingdom It would be difficult to imagine a better natural experiment to test the role of policy: another industrialized liberal democracy with deep cultural and political similarities to the United States, pursuing, sometimes even consciously, similar policies to United States, virtually at the same time. Of all the countries I examine, patterns of inequality in the United Kingdom have been most similar to those in the United States. Inequality in the U.K. actually increased at a higher rate from the 1980s to the 2010s than inequality in the U.S., thought U.S. inequality was higher to begin with.18 It is not coincidental that British politics and American politics mirrored each other as did British inequality and American inequality. The similarity between the policy agendas of Reagan/Thatcher and Clinton/Blair is striking. Under the banner of “rolling back the welfare state,” both Reagan and Thatcher successfully confronted organized labor, cut social spending, and cut taxes significantly for the very rich.19 Both of their successors from their respective center-left rival parties (Clinton/Blair) continued these policies.20 Clinton and Blair, like Reagan and Thatcher, quite consciously saw themselves as part of one international political project, the “Third Way”.21 And what were the results? As I cited before, a seven-point increase in the U.K.’s
Gini coefficient in three decades. While seven points may not sound like much, remember that the gap between the most unequal and the most equal societies to ever exist is only about 35 Gini points. Germany Because of its division into the Communist East and capitalist West until 1990, Germany is somewhat problematic as a case study. Because of this, I will focus on the post-reunification period – to the extent that I can, given that some datasets begin in the 1980s. As of 2011, Germany had a Gini coefficient of 30.1, about ten points lower than Britain or the United States.22 Its Gini score has increased by 4.5 points since the mid-1980s, with most of the increase occurring from the mid-1990s to late 2000s.23 What explains this relatively small increase in inequality? Public cash transfers are significantly more redistributive in Germany than the U.S.24 West Germany had a strong union tradition, which successfully resisted Reagan/Thatcher-style reforms in the 1980s.25 In the East, the transition from Communism to capitalism was significantly more gradual and less plagued by corruption than its Russian counterpart26 – more on this later. Sweden Of all European countries, Sweden had one of the strongest traditions of social democratic politics,27 and for much of the 20th century enjoyed low inequality.28 However, beginning in the 1980s, the Swedish social-democratic consensus began to erode. As in the United States, the banking system was deregulated and taxes cut for the very wealthy.29 Much like the American Democratic
Party, once they returned to power in 1994, the Social Democrats had shifted their economic policy to that of their nominal adversary, the Conservatives. Instead of full employment and “solidaristic” wage policy, they emphasized “deficit reduction, inflation control, and balanced budgets.”30 Inequality began to rise during the 1980s.31 The trends of wealth inequality in Britain and Sweden are remarkably similar: very high and gradually rising from 1810 to 1910, declining sharply from 1910 to 1970, then rising again from 1970 to 2010.32
Russia As measured by the Gini coefficient, the Russian Federation is slightly more unequal than the United States, with a Gini coefficient of 0.416 in 2012, compared to 0.411 for the United States in 2013.33 Despite the obviously unequal nature of the Soviet system, in which the nomenklatura enjoyed social privileges
unknown to the vast majority, inequality increased greatly since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.34 In 1980, the USSR’s Gini coefficient was 0.290; in 1990, 0.281.35 This is an incredible increase: 13.5 Gini points in less than twenty-five years. Indeed, Russian inequality is far more exceptional than American inequality, which increased by less than ten Gini points in the same time period (see footnote 19).36 What explains this? There was no correspondingly dramatic change in the Russian economy over this relatively brief time period – for example, a crash in world oil prices. Also, inequality fell or remained stable throughout the 1980s,37 making it implausible to attribute the post-1990 spike in inequality to a previously existing economic trend. The elephant in the room, of course, is the transition from a Communist planned economy to a market economy. Unlike in East Germany or some of the other ex-communist countries, the transition was rapid and extreme, referred to as “shock therapy” by its supporters and opponents alike. Reddaway and Glinski compare shock therapy to Bolshevism – both were “determined and ruthless attempts to implement one or another set of prescriptions deduced from abstract theories in Russia via revolution from above.”38 While in a radically dissimilar political context, the economic principles that inspired shock therapy were the same as those of Reagan and Thatcher.39 And as in the United States and the U.K., the primary economic beneficiaries of the rollback of the state were the very rich, not the average consumer or taxpayer, as the reformers claimed. Deregulation of prices, deep cuts in social spending, privatization of state-owned firms, and tax incentives for large corporations all contributed to the rise of the Russian
“oligarchs”, many of them former members of the nomenklatura itself.40
rise throughout the OECD, and the state’s ability or willingness to offset it declining.46
Japan Japan experienced a low level of inequality during the post-WWII period due to its reformed tax structure and occupational laws, high levels of growth, and the income-compressing effects of the war.41 This aligns with Piketty’s attribution of much of the low inequality of the 20th century to the economic and physical destruction of the World Wars, which obviously disrupted the accumulation of capital and individual wealth.42 Since the postwar period, levels of inequality in the country have remained stable.43 Why? Moriguchi and Saez argue that “the postwar reforms transformed the one-time measures into lasting ones, facilitating a structural change in the Japanese economy that likely prevented re-concentration of income in subsequent decades”.While the war led to major income compression in Germany, the U.K. and even the United States, none of these countries experienced the kind of socioeconomic reforms implemented under the Allied occupation. These included sweeping land reform, “eliminating virtually all largeand medium-sized landowners.”44 However, even this view has been challenged by some, including economist Toshiaki Tachibanaki, who argues that the perceived egalitarian Japan is simply a “myth,” and that income inequality is on the rise.45 Conclusions Plainly, inequality has increased substantially even outside the English-speaking nations. Looking beyond my five case studies, the same trend appears, with inequality on the
This conclusion is in line with Piketty, who against Simon Kuznets argues that “there is no natural, spontaneous process to prevent destabilizing, inegalitarian forces from prevailing permanently,”47 and advocates a global tax on capital to prevent inequality from reaching socially destabilizing levels.48 “The consequences for the long-term dynamics of the wealth distribution are potentially terrifying,” he concludes.49 However, this does not discount the importance of national policy – far from it. Rising inequality is better understood as an outcome of the global spread of neoliberal economic policies, rather than an American pathology, occasionally spilling over into the other English-speaking countries. Each of my case studies where inequality increased significantly adopted neoliberal economic policies similar to those adopted by the U.S. in the 1980s and ‘90s, and inequality increased more when they were implemented more vigorously, as in the United States, Russia or the United Kingdom. What do I mean by neoliberal? Harvey defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”50 Neoliberalism demands low taxation, low social spending, privatization of state assets, and deregulation. Since the 1970s, neoliberalism has become the political and economic orthodoxy of much of the world, “the most successful ideology in world history,” in Perry Anderson’s words.51 “Embedded liberalism” and social democracy, once the consensus in Europe and the United States, have all but disappeared from the mainstream, even from the historical parties of the center-left (the Democrats in the U.S., Labour in the U.K., the German SPD, etc.) This is the larger story Hacker and Pierson are missing: the rise of “winner-take-all politics” globally. Endnotes 1. Hacker and Pierson 38-40.
2. Wapshott 126-7. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sent Ronald Reagan a congratulatory letter on the day of his inauguration. Shortly after, she visited Washington, an opportunity Democrats took advantage of “to point to the industrial turmoil in Britain caused by Thatcher’s imposition of a strict monetarist economic policy, with its attendant redundancies and bankruptcies. They would use the British example as a stick with which to beat the new president’s low taxation, low public spending economic policies.” 3. Harvey 74. 4. Valdés 21-24. The “Chicago boys” who advised Pinochet’s economic program would go on to inspire much of Reagan and Thatcher’s policy agenda. 5. Klein 86. 6. Harvey 66. 7. Milanovic (2011) 10. “After the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, inequality in Russia increased at a speed never recorded before anywhere.” For poverty, see “Study Finds Poverty Deepening in Former Communist Countries,” New York Times, October 12 2000. 8. “GDP as Share of World GDP at PPP By Country” 9. Ibid. In 1989, U.S. GDP was 22.28% of world GDP; in 2004, 19.64%.
10. Milanovic (2011) 11. 11. Ibid 10. 12. Ibid 11. 13. Piketty 430-43. 14. Milanovic 11. 15. U.N. Human Development Report 1999, 3. 16. Ibid. 17. Simmons, “Sub-Saharan Africa makes progress against poverty but has long way to go,” Pew Research Center. 18. Milanovic 8. From the 1980s to 2011, “inequality in the United States increased from about 35 to 40 or more Gini points (see Chart 1), and in the United Kingdom, from 30 to about 37 Gini points.” 19. Harvey 58-61, Piketty 98. 20. Harvey 63. 21. Atkins, “The Third Way International,” Jacobin. 22. World Bank database. 23. OECD 45. 24. Ibid 36. 25. Harvey 89. 26. Wiesenthan 2-3. “Has shock therapy been introduced in East Germany? The answer is a definite no. Only two of the five substantial [shock therapy] measures, namely the unfreezing of prices and cutting of subsidies were introduced at the start of economic and monetary union on July 1, 1990.” 27. Erixon 3, Harvey 112. The Swedish Social Democrats governed continuously from 1932 to 1976, forming coalition governments during only nine of those years. 28. Piketty 344. 29. Harvey 114-5. 30. Ibid. 31. Piketty 344-5. “…inequality in Sweden has increased significantly since 1980-1990 (and in 2010 was just slightly lower than in France).” 32. Ibid. 33. World Bank database. 34. Reddaway & Glinski 302, Stiglitz 2. 35. Alexeev & Gaddy 29. Because these measures are based on legal income and ignore the underground economy, they probably underestimate inequality slightly. 36. Milanovic (1998) 40. In the ex-communist countries, inequality increased by “on average, 1½ Gini points per year, a rise that is almost three times as fast as the rise recorded in those Western countries where inequality rose most rapidly in the 1980s: United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and United States.” 37. Alexeev & Gaddy 29. By 1985, the Soviet Gini coefficient had fallen to 0.284, increasing slightly to 0.290 in 1988, then falling again to a low of 0.275 in 1989. 38. Reddaway & Glinski 10. 39. Ibid 269.
40. Klein 230-1. 41. Moriguchi and Saez 1-3. 42. Piketty 20. 43. Moriguchi and Saez 28. “While the top 1% wage income share in Japan has been nearly constant at around 5% from 1970 to 2000, the share in the United States has risen exponentially from 5% to 12% during the same period.” 44. Ibid 19. 45. Ibid 5. 46. OECD 22-3. “The latest trends in the 2000s showed a widening gap between rich and poor not only in some of the already high inequality countries like Israel and the United States, but also – for the first time – in traditionally low-inequality countries, such as Germany, Denmark, and Sweden (and other Nordic countries), where inequality grew more than anywhere else in the 2000s… Finally, income taxes and cash transfers became less effective in reducing high levels of market income inequality in half of OECD countries, particularly during the late 1990s and early 2000s.” The fact that, of all economically advanced countries, Israel has a similarly high level of inequality seems to substantially undermine Hacker and Pierson’s Anglo-Saxon hypothesis. 47. Piketty 21. 48. Ibid 515-27. 49. Ibid 571. 50. Harvey 2. 51. Anderson, “Renewals,” New Left Review.
Works Cited “Study Finds Poverty Deepening in Former Communist Countries,” New York Times, October 12, 2000, accessed April 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/12/world/stu dy-findspoverty-deepening- in-formercommunist-countries.html Alexeev, Michael V. and Clifford G. Gaddy. “Income Distribution in the U.S.S.R. in the 1980s,” Review of Income and Wealth Series 39, Number 1 (March 1993), accessed April 21, 2016, http://www.roiw.org/1993/23.pdf
Anderson, Perry. “Renewals.” New Left Review 1 (January/February 2000). Atkins, Curtis. “The Third Way International.” Jacobin 20 (Winter 2016). Erixson, Lennart. “A Swedish Economic Policy – The Theory, Application and Validity of the Rehn-Meidner Model,” in Gösta Rehn and the Swedish Model at Home and Abroad, ed. E. Wadensjö and H. Milner), Ashgate Ltd (Spring 2001). http://www2.ne.su.se/paper/wp00_13.pdf Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. Winner-Take- All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Penguin, 2008. Milanovic, Branko. “More or Less.” Finance and Development Volume 48, No. 3 (September 2011). https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/201 1/09/pdf/milanovi.pdf Ibid. Income, Inequality and Poverty during the Transition from Planned to Market Economy. Washington: The World Bank, 1998. Moriguchi, Chiaki and Emmanuel Saez. “The Evolution of Income Concentration in Japan, 1886-2002: Evidence from Income Tax Statistics.” NBER Working Paper No. 12558 (October 2006).
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). “An Overview of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD Countries: Main Findings,” in Divided We Stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising. OECD Publishing, 2011. http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/49499779.pdf
Piketty, Thomas. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014.
World Bank, Development Research Group. “GINI Index.” http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GI NI/countries/
Wiesenthal, Helmut. “East Germany as a Unique Case of Societal Transformation: Main Characteristics and Emergent Misconceptions” (paper presented at the annual meeting for the 16th IPSA World Congress, August 21-25, 1994).
Reddaway, Peter and Dmitri Glinski. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. Simmons, Kaitie. “Sub-Saharan Africa makes progress against poverty but has long way to go,” Pew Research Center, September 24, 2015, accessed April 25, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/ 24/sub- saharan-africa- makes-progressagainstpoverty-but- has-long- way-to- go/ Stiglitz, Joseph. “Development Based on Participation – A Strategy for Transforming Societies,” Transition 9, no. 6 (December 1998). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). “Human Development Report 1999.” Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/26 0/hdr_1999_en_nostats.pdf Valdés, Juan Gabriel. Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Wapshott, Nicholas. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A Political Marriage. New York:
Martian or Mauritanian? The Lesser-Known Human Security Crises in the Sahel Amanda Morrison Sophomore, Global Studies/Strategic Communication While humanitarian crises have plagued the continent of Africa for years, some of the world’s most severe and dire human security issues exist within the Sahel region. This geographic and geopolitical region in the middle of Africa is located between the Sahara and Savanna. The Sahel struggles with damaging security issues as well as economic and cultural problems. This region is representative of a security complex because Sahelian states’ security is so interlinked that national security problems will never be solved apart from other Sahelian nations. While African nations such as Mali, Nigeria, and Chad are included in the Sahel region, a lesser-known and rarely discussed country is Mauritania. For a time being, Mauritania was so publically unrecognizable that autocorrect on smart phones would change “Mauritania” to “Martian” (Nashashibi 2012). Mauritania is unique because although it is situated near the violent nation Mali, it holds a mainly cooperative relationship with Western allies against Islamist insurgencies. This position highlights the country’s importance and the need for stabilization. While numerous security problems pose a significant threat to Mauritanian stability, a concerted international effort to provide food, environmental, and political resources to the country can resolve these crises.
It is impossible to fully evaluate the security issues in Mauritania without first understanding the country’s complicated history and deep security issues. In 1904, France established Mauritania as one of its colonial territories. Mauritania was completely dependent on French rule for political, economic, and social support during this time. With reforms to the French colonial system after the Second World War, Mauritania gained its independence in 1960. Mauritania’s first president, Moktar Ould Daddah, ushered in an era of government corruption and authoritarian rule until he was overthrown by a coup in 1978. After the coup, Mauritanians were under military rule until 2007, when the nation held its first democratic election since its independence (Stewart 2008). Furthermore, its sub-Saharan and Sahelian location in the desert presents infrastructure challenges that complicate travel and development; not to mention the long-standing problems with human slavery. The French practiced slavery under their colonial rule, and even though the practice was banned in 1981, its use in independent Mauritania is still widespread (Stewart 2008). Mauritania faces humanitarian and domestic crises including, but not limited to, human slavery, environmental degradation, an influx of refugees, food insecurity, and development challenges. Since all of these concerns affect people in different ways, there are many potential ways to classify this security crisis. Although there are problems with labeling crises as “human security” issues, this is the best term to use for these overlapping crises. Human security allows all of the issues facing Mauritania to be grouped under one umbrella. Thus, human security is not merely a player in this crisis but it is the entire game. 55
The response to these crises, however, needs to be carefully calculated to ensure aid and resources are allocated towards individual security efforts to best address the wide array of security concerns. Although the international community should discuss the needed responses for these problems, it is first important to understand that there are unchangeable geographic factors that define the Sahel region, such as its desert landscape and hot climate. Countries in the Sahel will always have hardships because of their location, but Mauritania is distinct because of its numerous interconnected security issues. Furthermore, the end of French colonization in 1960 left Mauritania with little infrastructure to grow their government and establish a stable state, as ninety percent of their population was still nomadic at the time of independence. While it is twice as big in geographic size as the country of France, to this day it still only has around 500 miles of paved roads (Mauritania 2006). This is significant because Mauritania is “a territory of 398,000 square miles” and lacks critical infrastructure because of its desert setting (Sterling 1974). While the pervasive security issues in Mauritania span multiple problem areas, examining these problems individually is key to understanding the needed policy and humanitarian responses. More recent issues such as the influx of Malian refugees have brought proximate causes of instability to the surface, but one deep cause of insecurity is Mauritania’s long history of human slavery. Government corruption allowed the existence of slavery even after it was “banned” in the late twentieth century. Only one slave owner has successfully been tried and convicted to date. Mauritania has the highest percentage of an enslaved population in the world, and thus one
of the most crucial human security concerns, with around ten to twenty percent of its 4.46 million citizens enslaved (Nossiter 2013). Not only are they still striving to abolish slavery in their society, but they are also wrestling with environmental security problems. Mauritania joins the ranks of dozens of developing countries that emit little to no carbon dioxide or other harmful emissions, but are still experiencing drastic effects from the Earth’s warming. One such consequence is the flooding of its capital city, Nouakchott. So much rain fell in August and September of 2013 that 2,000 people were left homeless. Water was even up to seventy centimeters—or 2.3 feet—in some homes (Smith 2016). Other deep-seated issues such as urbanization and urban sprawl further this proximate cause of environmental insecurity. Urbanization is a deep cause of instability because the country’s growing population increasingly flocked to city centers since the state’s independence in the 1960s (Smith 2016). A recent census noted that the urban population grew from just four percent in 1962 to forty-eight percent—over one million people—in 2013 (Mauritania 2016). This drastic urban population increase means already scarce resources are now even scarcer in the city centers. Unfortunately, human slavery and environmental insecurity are not the only security issues plaguing this West African nation. The proliferation of refugee crises across the globe also found its way to Mauritania. Since Mauritania shares a border with Mali, it is locked in a human security complex with them. Mali is one of the world’s least developed countries, and colonialism and government corruption are deep causes of instability that stem from its similar independence from France in 1960. These 56
continued problems caused instability to run rampant in Mali since its independence (Guterres 2012). The issues of food insecurity and an Islamic insurgency in Mali caused 42,000 people to recently pour across the border and establish new lives in the Mbera refugee camp in Mauritania (Smith 2016). Thus, not only are Mauritanians dealing with their own human security crises, but they are also trying to deal with their problems alongside the crises of tens of thousands of others. This poses a significant challenge of how to address all of these different security issues, not to mention the lack of food stability in the region. An estimated 239 million people are suffering from hunger in sub-Saharan Africa (Sasson 2012). One important component of food insecurity is that while many people go hungry in countries such as Mauritania, the larger problem is malnutrition. Malnutrition threatens the human security of twelve percent of children in Mauritania because citizens are often not able to access the nutrients they need (Kristof 2011). For example, "when people die of hunger-related causes, the problem is often not so much a lack of calories as a lack of micronutrients like iron and zinc” (Kristof 2011). The food insecurity and malnutrition problem is furthered by a lack of development; the lack of critical infrastructure makes it hard to get food to the people who need it most (Mauritania 2006). The deep problem of urbanization, coupled with the desert atmosphere in the Sahel and food security concerns, makes it hard for the international community to resolve these problems. Many efforts, however, are already underway from a variety of actors to better the lives of Mauritanian citizens as well as refugees within the country. One such measure is the
increase in water sanitation projects to combat flooding in Mauritania’s capital city. This measure was introduced by the Mauritanian people themselves and is set to “be operational within three and a half years” as they put water pumps in place with double the capacity than before (Smith 2016). This Mauritanian-based environmental solution sets the example for how other countries should react to environmental security concerns in developing African nations. They turned to their own citizens to help create a sustainable solution to the flooding and this solution is already solving the problem. Another strong in-country response to insecurity comes from non-governmental organizations working at the Mbera refugee camp. Here, organizations spend ample time working with refugees in the 11,327 shelters in the camp to promote stability and discourage adherence to Islamic extremism in the region (Smith 2016). This political assistance could greatly improve security from terrorism in the region, and only time will tell how successful this refugee education becomes. Western aid also played a key role in stabilizing one aspect of food insecurity in Mauritania. A flour mill in the country began adding essential vitamins and minerals to their food production in order to combat malnutrition. The New York Times writer Kristof noted, "American foreign aid money helped pay the startup cost of fortification, and the mill will pay all continuing costs. We watched the machines add tiny quantities of the nutrients to sacks of flour — and realized that this mill might end up saving more lives than a hospital” (Kristof 2011). This aid project has the potential to create a sustainable, lasting impact on communities in Mauritania. Labor unions in the United States also encouraged the President to 57
cut off duty-free trade with Mauritania just two months ago due to its failure to combat the human slavery crisis. Since Mauritania received a poor ranking on human rights from the United Nations earlier this year, the U.S. labor unions suggested the government take a hardline policy approach to affect the Sahelian nation economically (Ratcliffe 2017). Time will determine whether or not the U.S. is able to influence this Sahelian nation’s policy with economic threats. The diverse security concerns in Mauritania culminate under the umbrella of human security. The deep causes of insecurity in this Sahelian nation stem from French colonialism, government corruption, its geographic location in the Sahel, urbanization, and human slavery. Proximate causes include environmental degradation, an influx of Malian refugees, food insecurity and malnutrition, and development challenges. Thankfully, Mauritanian citizens, non-governmental organizations, and Western nations have all stepped up to bring resources and needed change to this country. These entities must remember, however, that simply giving aid money is not a sufficient response to fix all of the individual problems. From humanitarian aid to economic policies, concerted responses in the areas of food, environmental, and political resources not only better the lives of Mauritanians, but also place the Sahelian country on a firmer foundation. It is imperative that the international community supports individualized development efforts to stabilize Mauritania because these efforts will benefit the security interests of the world as a whole.
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Ratcliffe, Rebecca. "US Warned Mauritania’s ‘Total Failure’ on Slavery Should Rule Out Trade Benefits." The Guardian. Aug. 25, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/global-developm ent/2017/aug/25/us-warnedmauritania-total-failure-slavery-trade-benefits (accessed Oct. 4, 2017). Sasson, Albert. "Food Security for Africa: An Urgent Global Challenge." BioMed Central. Apr. 19, 2012. https://agricultureandfoodsecurity.biomedcentr al.com/articles/10.1186/2048-7010-1-2 (accessed Oct. 28, 2017). Smith, Alex Duval. "Malian Refugees in Mauritania, and India's All-woman Newspaper." The Guardian. Aug. 23, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2016/aug/23/malian-refugeesin-mauritania-and-indias-all-womannewspaper (accessed Oct. 4, 2017). Smith, Alex Duval. "'The Best Solution? Move the Mauritanian Capital': Water on the Rise in Nouakchott." The Guardian. July 25, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/global-developm ent/2016/jul/25/the-best-solutionmove-the-mauritanian-capital-water-on-the-rise -in-nouakchott (accessed Oct. 4, 2017). Sterling, Claire. "The Making of the Sub-Saharan Wasteland." The Atlantic. May 1, 1974. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 1974/05/the-making-of-the-sub-saharan-wastel and/482175/ (accessed Oct. 4, 2017). Stewart, Elizabeth. “History of Mauritania.” The Guardian. Aug. 6, 2008.
Guys Like Gauguin: A Legacy of Colonialism Emma Pilker Senior, Art History Introduction Paul Gauguin’s body of work lives at the intersection of orientalist and primitivist myth. He had a conscious hand in creating the mythology surrounding his work; his imagination was the source for the fiction of both his own life events and depictions of nonWestern cultures. Separating who Gauguin is as an artist from who Gauguin was as a man proves a difficult task. A large body of work exists dedicated to documenting and understanding Gauguin’s biography, investigating evidence that may or may not shed light on the truest or most honest version of Paul Gauguin.1 Despite the unknowability of who any person truly is, presenting itself as an obstacle in this process, scholars throughout the years have scoured his biographical information, life events, and letters for clarity. While this may add to the discourse surrounding how Gauguin’s life affected his work, it is more illuminating to look at Gauguin’s work for evidence of how he conceptualized himself in relation to others. Self-image was a major component of Gauguin’s creative endeavor. His mythology or, to use a term coined by Roland Barthes, “mythic speech,” was self-conscious and manifested in his various creations—works of art, works of fiction, and letters.2 His final self1
Suzanne Greub, Gauguin: Polynesia (Munich: Hirmer Publishers, 2012), 346. 2 Abigail Solomon-Godeau, “Going Native: Paul Gauguin and the Invention of Primitivist Modernism,” in
portrait exposes the un-remarkability of the façade that he relied on for his acclaim. The way Gauguin objectified non-white and primarily female bodies in his paintings, which was a carefully crafted part of this façade, paired with his overwhelming fame and status in Western culture, contributes to a constant recolonization that occurs in the art world and permeates outward through academia, institutions, and cultural consumption. Preserving and honoring Gauguin, and artists similar to himself, while largely ignoring artists from areas that he appropriated contributes to the looming institution of French colonialism and creates an art world that privileges whiteness and Eurocentric narratives. The structure of such an art world is hostile to individuals who feel non-European narratives are worthy of inquiry and study. Gauguin: The Man Gauguin’s life is fascinating and enthralling to many scholars and audiences. The incongruences between Gauguin’s selfcrafted, outward facing image and facts that oppose his narrative are worth examination. When investigating these incongruences, one finds that study regarding the effects of Gauguin’s life on the individuals and groups he marginalized are overwhelmingly understudied.3 This points to a larger problem with Gauguin’s presence in the Western art historical narrative. The idolization of Gauguin serves as just one of several functions that keep art history a predominantly white field that prioritizes white, male, Eurocentric art. Gauguin: The Artist The Expanding Discourse: Feminism and Art History, ed. Norma Broude et al. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 315. 3 Greub, Gauguin, 324.
Gauguin’s formal qualities from his early work conformed to the traditional bounds of Impressionism.4 He was able to transform from below average into “The Father of Modernism” when he underwent a drastic change in subject matter.5 With this reorientation toward exoticism he drew widespread fascination with his work.6 It begs the question of if Gauguin achieved his fame through his revolution of form or more through the fascination he and his audience had with the subject matter. Perhaps his boldness with color and exploration with planar figures would have been received differently had Gauguin not chosen to create images of brown-skinned, dark-haired women in a paradisiacal landscape so starkly different from anything found on the continent of Europe. Exoticism helped him find success in his field regardless. Gauguin did not make any sales to major art world players until 1888, after his first trip to Martinique. The trip to Martinique led to Theo van Gogh, and probably his brother, visiting Gauguin to purchase the Martinique works.7 Amidst the same period is when Gauguin said that the best way to receive acclaim in the art world is to travel to and depict the “other.”8 As he did so, Gauguin embarked on his own quest to find himself in what he deemed “the savage.”9 His quest for a “savage” life may have been partly motivated by less offensive desires. 4
Richard Brettell et al., The Art of Paul Gauguin (Washington: National Gallery of Art, 1988), 11. 5 Solomon-Godeau, “Going Native,” 316. 6 Amy Dickson, “Gauguin: A Very British Reception,” in Gauguin: Maker of Myth, ed. Belinda Thomson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 314. 7 Brettell et al., Paul Gauguin, 12. 8 Daniel Wildenstein, Gauguin: A Savage in the Making, Catalogue Raisonné of the Paintings (1873-1888) (Torino: Skira Editore S.P.A, 2002), XIII. 9 Ibid, 23.
In escaping a rapidly industrializing France, Gauguin found a life that was well suited for many artists that included a low cost of living, close interaction with nature, and freedom from familial or financial duties.10 While there may have been authenticity in this part of his desire to migrate to Polynesia, his depictions of Polynesian subjects were entirely of his own mind—there are many documented cases of Gauguin depicting cultural and ecological inaccuracies.11 Some of these inaccuracies include that many of his Tahitian titles for his work are untranslatable, which is of no surprise when considering the many times Gauguin tried to learn the language and failed, and the well-documented lack of interactions Gauguin had with indigenous populations, despite living there for years.12 Self-Portrait Jean Dolent claimed there were two men in Gauguin who opposed each other: who he was as a man and who he was as an artist, possibly suggesting the artificiality behind Gauguin’s artist persona.13 Gauguin’s selfproclaimed “savagery” and his desire to fit in with various non-Western natives was his most precious aspect of his performative identity. He claimed multiple times to be of “mixed-race” descent and to have “Incan” blood.14 His attempt to connect with this part of himself can be seen in his many self-portraits, where he tried to paint himself in a grotesque, ghastly way; he portrayed his face as shockingly 10
James F. Knapp, “Primitivism and Empire: John Synge and Paul Gauguin,” Comparative Literature 41, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 56, doi: 10.2307/1770679. 11 Solomon-Godeau, “Going Native,” 320. 12 Brettell et al., Paul Gauguin, XXVI. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.
angular with what he called his “evil eye”—a cold, calculating stare; an impenetrable mask of insincerity. His claims to Incan heritage or any type of non-whiteness have been debunked by family historiographies.1516 Gauguin’s self-mythology is inextricably bound to a desire to offend—to be a cultural transgressor, to shock, and to disgust. The key to Gauguin’s originality lay in his need to create a visual extreme, to a degree of hostility.17 This is why his self-portraits, for a long time, were so angry, provocative, and almost defiantly confrontational.18 One of the only exceptions to this rule can be found in his final self-portrait, which is evidential of a Gauguin who both evolved and descended into a final authenticity. This last self-portrait, painted in his final year, is a plea before death—the honest qualities here reveal the shallow, theatrical, over-exaggerated artificiality of his other works. This veneer hinged not on location but on an opportunist, colonial willingness to equate a non-white group as outside the realm of palatability and for the edgy consumption of Europeans who lacked an indigenous cultural heritage.19 This final self-portrait was made in 1903. Painted on Atuono in French Polynesia, this portrait was finished before he died in May of the same year, in the same place. Here, he is depicted from a straightforward angle. His clothes and hair have been called austere; he 15
Ibid. Ibid. 17 Ibid, XXIII. 18 Ibid. 19 Jean-François Staszak. “L'exote, l'oviri, l'exilé: Les singulières identités géographiques de Paul Gauguin / The Exote, the Oviri and the Exiled: Gauguin's Singular Geographical Identities,” Annales De Géographie, 113 no. 638/639 (2004): 370, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23456689. 16
wears a small pair of spectacles that connote a thoughtful, docile old man. It is as if “there is no one left to convince and only death to confront.”20,21 The noise of Gauguin’s mythic speech falls silent. Provocation and vanity evaporate from their shallow depths. The portrait is devoid of theatre.22 He wears white—in what possibly could be a hospital gown—looking studious with an intense gaze. Gauguin was fabricating his memoirs during this same period—the portrait could be the visual manifestation of a final, personal encounter with his real self.23 The absence of fantasy and primitivism looms large, considering that Gauguin built his mythology, his career, and his acclaim, on the fantastic and the primitive. One cannot help but notice that even his nose is smaller. It is no longer jutting out his face like it is in his Self Portrait dedicated to Carrière, Bonjour Monsieur Gauguin, Christ in the Garden of Olives, or his Self Portrait from 1889. Gauguin did not create any self-portraits during his first trip to Tahiti in 1891-3.24 Perhaps he realized how profitable this truly “primitive” subject matter could be. After this first trip, his self-portraits evolved, as if interactions amongst the “savages” further elevated his own self-image. His self-portraits display Gauguin, confident man of the world, and Gauguin, the world traveler, in portraits such as his 1893 Self Portrait With Palette and Self-Portrait with Manao tupapau. He even goes on to set his own features aside a wooden 20
Brettell et al., Paul Gauguin, XXVI. Ibid. 22 Belinda Thomson, “Identity and Self Mythology” in Gauguin: Maker of Myth, ed. Belinda Thomson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 73. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 21
idol with a form that he stole from Oceania in Portrait of the Artist with Idol.25 Later in his progression through self-portraiture, Gauguin shows a propensity for the image of the devil— a horned figure that surfaces repeatedly and which Gauguin, no doubt, related to his own self, or at least, how others saw him.26 Gauguin reveled in his status as an outsider, which manifested, visually, in many different forms, sometimes otherworldly and sometimes of this world. For Gauguin, Tahiti might as well have been a land designed for and like the devil—a motif he referenced frequently. Though Tahiti is real and the devil is a manifestation of religion, both were blank canvases for Gauguin on which to project his own carefully constructed identity; both were just as real and as human to him. How Self Portraits Fit into the Dichotomy Between Man and Artist There have been meticulous efforts in the West to create a boundary between Gauguin the artist and Gauguin the man. A belief in the inherent value of Gauguin’s work and his status as the, or a, Father of Modernism gives Westerners the urge to celebrate his work while halting the conversation about the questionable aspects of Gauguin’s legacy. In the major 1988 exhibition, The Art of Paul Gauguin, the curators lend a Freudian hand to the discussion of his self-portraits, noting that he cleverly treated even his own personal appearance as a disguise.27 Séguin said that Gauguin invented everything, from his method of canvas preparation to his way of dressing. Each of these aspects, Séguin said, was part of his disguise, which made up his persona. This
persona allowed Gauguin to distance himself from Impressionism. 28 Gauguin often called his own face the face of a “savage.”29 His self-portraits were very much a part of his mythology. These are inextricably intertwined: his mythology and his identity as “savage.” These two constructs evolve as Gauguin moves through life and further refines his own definition of “savage.” After painting in Brittany, which was Gauguin’s first artistic encounter with the “other,” Gauguin painted Les Misérables, wherein he wears the mark of a Breton fisherman—a blue jersey—which Gauguin associated with the primitive life in Brittany that he was so fascinated with.30,31 Cultural Appropriation The Western narrative is one that so critically hinges on the lone, unique, genius, white male trope—he who travels alone, who isolates himself for his art, and who brings a gift to society through his romantic and exhilarating journeys that border on martyrdom. Gauguin is a poster-child for this narrative. Both his ability to be successful doing what he did and his looming legacy were made possible by the structure of white supremacist colonialism, and he perpetuated white supremacy by appropriating, subjugating, and appropriating a society. The urge for white people in a world dominated by white supremacy to take from people and cultures they find savage, to chip away at their customs, and to take bits and pieces of cultural heritage where and when they please has been and is unavoidable. In his Atlantic article “The Case 28
Ibid, 74. Ibid. 27 Brettell et al., Paul Gauguin, VIII. 26
Ibid, XVIII. Wildenstein, Gauguin, XIV. 30 Knapp, “Primitivism and Empire,” 34. 31 Brettell et al., Paul Gauguin, XIX. 29
for Reparations,” Ta-Nehisi Coates reminds his readers: “When we think of white supremacy, we picture Colored Only signs, but we should picture pirate flags.”32 The very structure of the world today is based on the idea that white people may travel where they please and own whatever it is that they find, without regard for the others. It was and is organized in a sinister, deliberate way. It is part of what has been called the profound offense of cultural appropriation.33 Dr. James Young explores what, exactly, makes cultural appropriation wrong, and deduces that offending someone is morally wrong because it strikes at a person’s sense of self and personal philosophy.34 He outlines the three types of appropriation that are gross offenses: subject appropriation, when an outsider represents members or aspects of another culture, content appropriation, when an outsider uses another culture in the production of his or her own work, and object appropriation, when an outsider possesses a tangible object that is taken from insiders and transferred to the possession of outsiders.35 Gauguin was notorious for all three of these but especially for the first two kinds. In fact, he staked his career on the first type and relied heavily on the second one for content. For subject appropriation, which Gauguin did at a prolific rate, Young suggests that the depiction of a culture by an outsider “exposes the culture 32
Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Case for Reparations,” The Atlantic, June 2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/t he-case-for-reparations/361631/. 33 James O. Young, “Profound Offense and Cultural Appropriation,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 135, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3700467. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid, 136.
to ridicule” by perpetuating falsehoods about the culture.36 When examining this paradigm through an insider versus outsider lens, it becomes clear that Gauguin, who is on the outside, has created a similar situation in Polynesia by being the Pacific’s primary informant to the “West.” The outsider can say literally anything at all and the other outsiders would have only that outsider’s experiences to go off of—thus starting and perpetuating a cycle of inaccurate observations, offensive misrepresentations, and stereotypes, which combine to relegate the offended group to a vulnerable place of disenfranchisement that opens them up to more than just misrepresentations, and, in fact, subjects them to institutional violence, exploitation, militarization, oppressive economic systems, widespread dehumanization, and other effects of the calcified legacy of white supremacy. This is precisely what Gauguin does through his artworks, fiction, and letters. : he says literally anything at all. The tales the Gauguin spins somehow become the authority on Polynesian art. White or Western scholars can hardly discuss Polynesian art without relating it to the context of Gauguin. Colonization exploits people and ruins land. By the time Gauguin got to Tahiti, two thirds of their population had been wiped out.37 The greater context of being a French person visiting a French colony places Gauguin within the narrative of French imperialism. The legacy of white militarization of the Pacific Islands is lengthy and complex. It is one that is still playing out. Only as recently as the 1980’s, French nuclear testing in Mururoa and Fangataufa began, which culminated in riots in 36 37
Young, “Profound Offense,” 137. Greub, Gauguin, 260.
downtown Papeete in 1995.38 This gave way to a response piece called D’Apres Paul Gauguin by Tahitian artist Andre Marere.39 Marere is one of many Polynesian artists who relate Gauguin to French imperialism and hold him up to close scrutiny from a personal, moral standpoint. The militarization of Polynesia at the end of the 20th century and Gauguin are connected seamlessly through the philosophy of his work: “The land, seen by many as Papatuanuku, the Earth Mother, a nurturer and provider, is attached and devastated by French imperialism, just as the women of Tahiti have been exploited by centuries of Eurocentric eroticized and exoticized representations and sensibilities.”40 Integrating Reception Theory The reception of Gauguin by a number of Polynesian artists has been one that acknowledges his legacy and how he represents, in one person, the archetypal colonial Orientalist. He is every component of the colonialist; he is celebrated for his bohemian, traveler-adventure lifestyle, the romanticism of his quest for personal enlightenment, and, that his status as oppressor and sexual predator is often minimized, those parts of him are celebrated too.41 Samoan poet Selina Tusitala Marsh articulates this sentiment well: “thanks Bougainville for desiring ‘em young so guys like Gauguin could dream and dream then take his syphilitic body downstream to the tropics 38
Ibid, 348. Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 39
to test his artistic hypothesis bout how the uncivilised ripen like pawpaw and are best slightly raw delectably firm dangling like golden prepubescent buds seeding nymphomania for guys like Gauguin.”42 The responses across the Pacific run in a similar vein. Free Polynesia, an exhibition in Auckland featured a work made especially for the show by the Maori Samoan artist Lily Laita called Paragon of French Syphilization. Making a clear correlation between the legacy of Gauguin and nuclear testing as part of a continuum of French Pacific colonialism, this installation piece combined formal elements of the French flag and a woman’s torso painted in Gauguin’s signature style. The combination of island and body is palpable.43 Polynesian artist Tyla Vaeau’s works Tehamana Has Many Ancestors and When Will You Marry are Gauguin style paintings with photos of Vaeau’s friends and family members, who are Polynesian women, making exaggerated or silly faces superimposed onto them. They are, importantly, “a reminder that, for the most part, Gauguin’s Polynesian subjects were real girls who sat for him.” The images pose questions about the relationship of the various sitters and the artist.44 How might they have felt? What were the dynamics of these engagements? Unlike the vast majority of scholarly responses that do not pay any real attention to these women, for artists like Vaeau, it plays a crucial role in her critique of and response to Gauguin. 42
Selina Tusitala Marsh, “Guys Like Gauguin,” from Fast Talking PI (2009). 43 Greub, Gauguin, 348. 44 Ibid.
Why do contemporary responses matter? Because they offer another side to the narrative of Gauguin and, in effect, they undo some of his damage in giving people of Polynesia the agency to tell non-Polynesian people what it means to be Polynesian. In confronting Gauguin through their art, they are able to reclaim their culture, to which they and they alone are entitled. They fill in the gaps where scholarship falls short, because they, as artists and as insiders to the culture, are able to insert their feelings. They make connections that others cannot—connections that are important. By ignoring these responses, the Pacific is re-colonized. In the 1990’s a new wave of Polynesian contemporaries began to lift up their voices—only to be silenced. Every time Gauguin is spoken about without an utterance regarding his role in colonialism, every time the formal qualities of his works are discussed without any humanity given to his subjects, the shackles of colonialism in the Pacific are tightened. Feminist and Post-Colonial Interpretations Gauguin was a predator toward not only women, but a specific type of woman—women who were the racial “other.”45 Gauguin did not fetishize white women the way he fetishized non-white women, he did not violate them the way he violated and objected non-white bodies. Gauguin’s patriarchal and colonialist imagination was shaped by his time and continues to thrive in a time that still worships and admires that man who can be both patriarchal and a colonizer. The rape of Gauguin’s “vahines” is a subject that does not rival Gauguin’s value. It is this way even though he wrote in the margins 45
Solomon-Godeau, “Going Native,” 314.
of Noa Noa: “I saw plenty of calm-eyed women. I wanted them to be willing to be taken without a word, brutally. In a way [it was a] longing to rape.”46 Goodeau points out that while modernists were often proud to be sexual outlaws of a type, that this paradigm is built on historic contexts that allowed such violence to be perpetuated against women who are also primitive.47 This tendency can be directly linked to the fetish-driven violence inflicted onto women of color all around the world. Formally speaking, the feminist would look at Gauguin’s 1903 self-portrait and be suddenly aware that Gauguin was able to capture to the persona and the nuance of a person. It is present in this strikingly honest portrayal of himself, but also in all of his portrayals of himself and of his white male friends—they are dimensional, mysterious, enigmatic, sometimes bizarrely portrayed men. Why, then, for Polynesian women was Gauguin only able to portray zombie bodies? They are stoic and wooden, which calls to mind the mere fantasy they are meant to stand in for.48 His interactions with and depictions of the women of Tahiti were an attempt at misogynist and colonial self-indulgence, a projection born of patriarchy with white men at the top, which is a serious matter, as this is part of a pattern that actively oppresses women of color.49 Social Value There is often an overarching argument that offensive people can be excused because what they produce is of high social value; examples include Woody Allen, who married his partner’s adopted daughter, a woman of 46
Ibid, 324. Ibid. 48 Ibid, 328. 49 Ibid, 324. 47
color who was severely abused in her childhood to the point of brain damage. The social value of Gauguin’s work has been solidified. One could argue that this social value is apparent. He has codified a Western representation of the Pacific. His images are widespread, recognizable, and taught in nearly every Western art history survey. However, the social value of his legacy of also currency in the daily transaction between oppressor and oppressed; this social value does not diminish his role in colonialism. Perhaps the harm that Gauguin’s legacy inflicts onto others is worth considering further and more critically.
Bibliography Brettell, Richard, Françoise Cachin, Claire Frèches-Thory, Charles F. Stuckey, and Peter Zegers. The Art of Paul Gauguin. Washington: National Gallery of Art, 1988. Coates, Ta-Nehisi. “The Case for Reparations.” The Atlantic, June 2014. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/. Dagen, Philippe. “Gauguin’s Politics.” In Gauguin: Maker of Myth, edited by Belinda Thomson, 40-47. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Dickson, Amy. “Gauguin: A Very British Reception.” In Gauguin: Maker of Myth, edited by Belinda Thomson, 64-69. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Garb, Tamar. “Gauguin and the Opacity of the Other: The Case of Martinique.” In Gauguin: Maker of Myth, edited by Belinda Thomson, 24-31. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
Goddard, Linda. “‘Following the Moon’: Gauguin’s Writing and the Myth of the ‘Primitive’.” In Gauguin: Maker of Myth, edited by Belinda Thomson, 32-39. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Greub, Suzanne. Gauguin: Polynesia. Munich: Hirmer Publishers, 2012. Knapp, James F. “Primitivism and Empire: John Synge and Paul Gauguin.” Comparative Literature 41, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 53-68. doi: 10.2307/1770679. Solomon-Godeau, Abigail. “Going Native: Paul Gauguin and the Invention of Primitivist Modernism.” In The Expanding Discourse: Feminism and Art History, edited by Norma Broude and Mary D. Garrard, 314- 331. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. Staszak, Jean-François. “L'exote, l'oviri, l'exilé: Les singulières identités géographiques de Paul Gauguin / The Exote, the Oviri and the Exiled: Gauguin's Singular Geographical Identities.” Annales De Géographie, 113 no. 638/639 (2004): 363-384. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23456689. Thomson, Belinda. “Identity and Self Mythology.” In Gauguin: Maker of Myth, edited by Belinda Thomson, 70-92. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Thomson, Belinda. “Paul Gauguin: Navigating the Myth.” In Gauguin: Maker of Myth, edited by Belinda Thomson, 10-23. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Thomson, Belinda. “Teller of Tales.” In Gauguin: Maker of Myth, edited by Belinda Thomson, 190-203. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Tusitala, Selina. “Guys Like Gauguin.” In: Fast Talking PI. 2009.
Wildenstein, Daniel. Gauguin: A Savage in the Making, Catalogue Raisonné of the Paintings (1873-1888). Torino: Skira Editore S.P.A, 2002. Young, James O. “Profound Offense and Cultural Appropriation.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 135-146. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3700467.
Philadelphia and the End of Slavery Michael Reardon Senior, History Following the gradual emancipation of slavery in Pennsylvania in 1780, Philadelphia and its surrounding areas had a lasting impact on the practice in the United States. Being that Pennsylvania was bordered by multiple slave states, it was seen as a viable escape venue for many slaves that wanted to escape their bondage. Philadelphia had a long history in the United States’ ongoing slave debate and many abolitionists at the time based themselves out of the Philadelphia area. Over time many anti-slavery societies developed in the area and abolitionists began to surface. These abolitionists ranged from simple everyday people to men like Benjamin Franklin who remains a household name to this day. Along with abolitionists, the Underground Railroad became a popular option for slaves hoping to escape and many of the stops along the way were in the Philadelphia area. Fugitive slaves often escaped to Philadelphia and its suburbs and hid out from slave catchers that hoped to return them to the South. These Underground Railroad stops made Philadelphia integral in slave escapes and in their quest to obtain long-term freedom. It was through major cities in the early United States that the anti-slavery movement grew and the quest toward emancipation began. Initially, Northerners were content with the
North and South being split on the slave issue, but later cities like Philadelphia saw more unrest. In the end, Philadelphia played a vital role in the growing abolitionist movement in the United States. Without a movement like the one in Philadelphia, it was possible that the Civil War could have occurred significantly later and slaves would have been in bondage for decades longer. Just four years after the United States declared its independence from Britain, Pennsylvania passed a law which called for the slow abolition of slavery within its borders. This act permanently freed all African-Americans that had already been considered free. Essentially, under this law anybody who was not already a slave could no longer be sold as property within the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 1 The goal in enacting this was to not anger current slave owners, but to ensure that Pennsylvania’s slave trade did not grow. This law brought a new type of society to Pennsylvania. Philadelphia in particular was one of the most adaptive, as jobs, churches, and even schools were erected for the black population. Despite racial issues arising in the city, and as more African-Americans arrived, Philadelphia lived up to its name as the “City of Brotherly Love.” As antislavery societies and anti-slavery rhetoric grew within the city, Philadelphia quickly became one of the safest places for ex-slaves and fugitive slaves to go. 2 Despite the praise that Pennsylvania received from many of its citizens, the passage of this law did not please everybody. There were some who did not believe in the gradual abolition of slavery. In
1781, just one year after the law was put into action, there were attempts to repeal it. This would have meant that free AfricanAmericans living within Pennsylvania’s borders would once again be subjected to slavery. While the legislature voted against repealing the act, some of the letters and articles that followed show how former slaves coped with the possibility of their return to bondage. One such example of this comes from a former slave named Cato who wrote about how nothing would be worse than granting slaves freedom, letting them live a free life, and then returning them to their bondage. Cato said, “Our lots in slavery were hard enough to bear; but having tasted the sweets of freedom, we should now be miserable indeed.” 3 He then questions Christianity by saying, “Surely no Christian gentlemen can be so cruel!” 4 One of the main tactics in employing the change in laws at this time was to use freed blacks to reach out to the population. Ex-slaves’ words were powerful and valuable in the fight to abolish slavery throughout the state and country. Philadelphia was a popular destination for fugitive slaves because it was close to where Pennsylvania bordered slave states Delaware and Maryland. Slaves that lived in the northern parts of the South often recognized Philadelphia as part of their journey to freedom. In fact, former slave and abolitionist Frederick Douglass stated that he would pay attention to how steamboats got to Philadelphia. He would learn their routes so that we would have a better understanding of how to get to the city and where it was from a geographical
standpoint.5 Philadelphia quickly had the largest concentration of African-Americans within the state of Pennsylvania. 6 Its geographical location and growth in abolitionists within its borders made it an important city for the antislavery movement in the United States. One of the best ways for people to get the word of abolitionists to the public was through anti-slavery societies. One of the earliest and most famous anti-slavery society to form in Philadelphia was the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society. It was founded in 1775, but did most of its work following Pennsylvania’s gradual abolition law. The society was located on Walnut Street, which provided easy access for both its white and black members. Its overall goal was to better the African race. 7 This society worked tirelessly at emancipating slaves and growing the nation through its anti-slavery rhetoric. Many of their platforms stood on ideas like slavery being anti-Christian and slavery being harmful to the prosperity of the United States. The society called for the speedy abolition of slavery and they believed that this could be achieved peaceably and rather quickly. In other words, the society believed that slavery could be abolished nationwide if the United States government took a similar approach to the state of Pennsylvania. While they waited for the movement to grow, they put some of their efforts into improving conditions for free African-Americans living in Philadelphia.8 This made them a society for not only slaves, but a society for the improvement of race relations in the United States. Of course, this did not come easily as
even free African-Americans were treated poorly throughout Philadelphia and the rest of the country. The Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society was an extensive organization with a hierarchy of power and annual membership fees. Its Constitution laid out the chain of command as well as the steps that people needed to take if they wished to join. Some of the rules required to join included being twenty-one years old and being approved by the Board of Managers. Once they accepted somebody into the society, the person would be required to pay the annual fee of two dollars. Similar to the Constitution of the United States, the society’s Constitution required a two-thirds vote by the members of the society to amend the document. 9 This society essentially led Philadelphia through its role in the slave debate; its prominence was overwhelming throughout the city. The goal, to “never cease our endeavors, until slavery shall become entirely extinct, and our institutions, effectually purged from the gross impurities which they have acquired under its influence” brought people together in joining and played a part in Philadelphia’s importance during this critical time. 10 Another major anti-slavery society at this time was the Pennsylvania Abolition Society (PAS). It was also founded in 1775, and although the PAS was a statewide organization, it was prominent and grew throughout the city of Philadelphia. It quickly expanded to become the world’s leading anti-slavery organization during this time. Its main focus was obviously on abolishing the practice of slavery and emancipating every slave in the United
States, however it also had some other important aspects. In Pennsylvania, the organization took on smaller tasks like education for the black community and legally assisting African-Americans who were endangered by their opposition to slavery. While the institutions that developed were segregated, they were a start that very few other cities offered. Following Pennsylvania passing the gradual emancipation law in 1780, this became the PAS’s main goal for the rest of the country. They often approached these types of movements through legal action instead of mass organization. They are noted multiple times having petitioned congress, federal courts, and state government. As the abolitionist movement grew, antislavery societies began to appear more often and the PAS became less popular. Regardless, this society was huge in starting the fight toward abolition and the ultimate eradication of the institution.11 Following in the footsteps of societies like the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society and the Pennsylvania Abolition Society, the American Anti-Slavery Society was formed. This society was not simply an organization for the city of Philadelphia or the state of Pennsylvania, but a society designed for growing the abolitionist movement in the entire country. The other, smaller and local societies essentially morphed into this bigger, unified society in 1833. While the smaller societies in Philadelphia did not go away, the fact that the American Anti-Slavery Society was housed within Philadelphia’s borders made the organization more appealing to those
serious about advocating for the abolition of slavery.12 The American Anti-Slavery Society was formed in Philadelphia on December 4, 1833 and quickly became the largest of such societies in the United States. Its entire goal revolved around the complete emancipation of all slaves in the United States. Some of the other ideas that the society was founded on included elevating the character and condition in which African-Americans lived as well as improving race relations throughout the United States.13 The anti-slavery movement in Philadelphia brought notable abolitionists, one abolitionist of note during this time was Philadelphia native Benjamin Franklin. Despite having one time been a slave owner himself, Franklin became an advocate for the emancipation of slaves as he grew older. In fact, Franklin was even elected at one point to be the president of the Philadelphia Abolition Society.14 His change from slave owner to abolitionist was one that many cannot pinpoint, but as the United States moved past the revolution, it became clear that Franklin was willing to transfer his energy into the slave debate. Franklin frequently addressed public groups in the form of letters and speeches to speak out about his views on slavery. In 1789, Franklin gave an address on the atrocities of slavery where he mentioned how slaves did not have the ability to make choices and that everything they did was governed by fear. 15 The interesting things about Franklin as an abolitionist, was that he did not come out publicly as an abolitionist until around the time slavery was abolished in
Pennsylvania. The earliest signs of Franklin’s personal interest in the antislavery movement came in the late 1750s, but Franklin was careful to keep his abolitionist-agenda quiet. In 1729, Franklin was approached by a writer who wished to publish an antislavery manuscript. 16 At this point, Franklin was very wary on the slave debate and did not yet speak of it publicly. Franklin believed slavery to be a very complex issue and at the time it was highly contested; Franklin did not yet want to risk his reputation on a topic like slavery. 17 In this instance, Franklin did agree to publish the manuscript, but did not list his publishing company as the printer of the document.18 In the 1770s, Franklin decided to participate in both sides of the slave issue. In letters during this time, Franklin told antislavery advocates that he was with them, however, publicly he often supported the practice. Following the Revolution, Franklin became more open about his views on slavery. He felt that prior to the Revolution, the main focus should have been on developing and creating the basics of the country, but once that was complete he was ready to discuss other issues. By the time Franklin joined the Pennsylvania Abolition Society in 1787, he was prepared to make bold steps toward ending the practice. 19 It was at this time that he began regularly publishing and speaking out about the practice. As the society was growing, Franklin was noted saying, “I myself printed…[works] against keeping negroes in slavery.”20 He claimed that he had been publishing works of these abolitionists since as early as 1729.21 Some may find this rather
ironic, since Franklin did not publicly denounce the practice, however many of the publications that he sent to print were very valuable and contributed to the antislavery rhetoric in Philadelphia at his time. As the slave debate waged on throughout the 1800s, the north and south struggled to find even ground on the issue. One of the biggest laws agreed upon in regards to slavery in the United States was the “Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.” This act effectively required any slave caught escaping to the North be returned to their owner. This meant that whether or not a person supported the slave trade, they were required by law to bring slave back to their owners. Failure to comply with this law could have resulted in penalties, like fines. From this point, the effectiveness of the slave conversation in the city of Philadelphia began to disappear. 22 While legal action slowed for quite some time, the relevance of slave societies like the Philadelphia AntiSlavery Society and the Pennsylvania Abolition Society were only just beginning. Likewise, the illegal maneuvers by local people to break laws like the Fugitive Slave Act quickly became more popular and spread out not only in Philadelphia, but the entire northern region of the United States. The Fugitive Slave Act was opposed throughout the northern states, as many felt that it did not match with the principles written about in the Declaration of Independence. They questioned the ideals of the United States, especially the idea “that all men were created equal; that they were endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”23 The expectation brought on by the United States government to literally capture and send another human being into bondage, led to the formation of the Underground Railroad. The beginning of the actual, formal Underground Railroad began following a shooting in 1804 in Columbia, PA. During this shooting a fugitive slave was shot as he attempted to escape. It was here, that many mark the beginning of outraged free people (both white and black) coming together to help hide these escaped slaves. 24 Philadelphia became an important stop on the Underground Railroad due to its proximately to southern slave states. While early on, following the initiation of the law, the Underground Railroad remained quiet in the public realm, however, as tensions began to boil over and the Civil War was on the horizon, citizens began to congregate to amend and allow the non-compliance of this law. In one of these meetings, much was resolved, most importantly, the law was denounced in Philadelphia and primarily ignored.25 While this successful change in the law, was important, many slaves saw successful escape to the north prior to it being recognized by the city of Philadelphia. In fact, prior to 1860, almost 1,940 runaway slaves entered Philadelphia. Despite many of these slaves staying in Philadelphia, many others continued north on a trek that ultimately brought them to Canada, where they would be safest. 26 Some escaped slaves did not hope to end their venture in Canada, but were content to stay around the Philadelphia area and work. One such man, with the
pseudonym Henry Franklin was uninterested in going to Canada and instead worked carting coal between locations. In doing so, he would often help move slaves on their quest to freedom. He would do this by covering them with straw and carting them along with the coal from stop to stop. Henry Franklin worked for many years and moved between jobs in not only an attempt to live a comfortable free life, but to help fugitive slaves escape in any way he could. 27 One abolitionist who opened his doors to escaped slaves was Robert Purvis. Purvis was originally from South Carolina, but moved to Philadelphia in 1820. Following the move Purvis attended the Clarkson School, which was sponsored by the PAS. This is where Purvis grew to support the abolitionist movement and one of the biggest reasons that he devoted his life to the abolition of slavery and freeing escaped slaves through the Underground Railroad. Purvis lived at the cross of Ninth and Lombard streets in Philadelphia where his house had a secret door to hide runaway slaves. In 1837, Purvis developed a program for the purpose of assisting “colored persons in distress.” 28 While this program sent over 40 fugitives further north and worked on over three cases each week, the group collapsed in 1842 following an antiabolition riot. This society was later picked up by William Still, who worked at rebuilding the program to assist about 100 fugitives per year during the 1850s. Still was a former slave who hoped to help others escape to freedom. Still took the goal of Purvis’s society a little further as he worked with the slaves that he housed to find their
families and loved ones. 29 While it is unclear exactly how successful he was in doing this, his efforts and successes in simply housing fugitive slaves shows the importance of abolitionists living in Philadelphia during this time. Many place the relevance of antislavery rhetoric in Philadelphia from not only its proximity to slave states, but also its successes in establishing the first pro-Black organizations like anti-slavery societies and black churches. The African-American population grew dramatically between 1830 and 1860 not only because of the Underground Railroad, but because of the abolitionist societies formed in Philadelphia. By 1860 Philadelphia alone housed between 30 and 40 percent of Pennsylvania’s African-American population. While this made up only a measly four percent of the state’s population, this was a bigger free black population than any city in the United States at this time.30 This population became not only a major player in the ongoing quest to bring slaves to freedom, but was important because it even began an early Civil Rights movement. Philadelphia’s role at this time predominantly was focused on the freedom of slaves, but this did not prevent free blacks from beginning to start a movement for equal rights. In fact, Philadelphia housed the American Society of Free Persons of Coulour for four days in September of 1830. Here, AfricanAmericans met to discuss ways in which they could “devise and pursue all legal means for the speedy elevation of ourselves and brethren to the scale and standing of men.”31 Many of these early Civil Rights
movements were overshadowed by the slavery issue. Societies like the ones previously discussed were able to form and grow exponentially because of the Underground Railroad. As more slaves began to flee to Philadelphia, the city was able to grow both culturally and structurally. The Underground Railroad helped bring fugitive slaves to the city which continued to grow anti-slavery rhetoric in Philadelphia and further expanded the call to end slavery on a national scale. Philadelphia’s ability to grow in this way, was a massive success for the anti-slavery movement. The rhetoric and the ideas being spread from the city of Philadelphia further spread the message that slavery needed to be abolished and led the country closer to the Civil War. Philadelphia certainly played a huge role in the emancipation of slaves, but the surrounding suburbs often proved to be a better place to hide fugitive slaves. Due to their smaller population and smaller impact on the rest of the country, suburbs became an important place for escaped slaves to stop on their journey to freedom. One of the most notable Philadelphia suburbs to house slaves in the 1800s was Bucks County. While Bucks County was not among the most popular suburbs for fugitive slaves to run, it quickly became one of the most successful.32 Its small population and lack of standing out as an Underground Railroad “premier stop” made it valuable for high profile escapes and slaves wishing to find work. Slave catchers rarely came to Bucks County in search of their slaves, but if they did, they would knock on doors in hoping to
regain their “property.” It is for this reason, that many of the slaves who did not stay in the Bucks County area to work continued further north to Quakertown or the truly free land of Canada. Another reason for the limited success of slave catchers in Bucks County, was that the county was small enough to keep the secrets of where slaves were kept. Information rarely made its way into the wrong hands. When asked by slave catchers for information on the whereabouts of fugitive slaves, Bucks County residents often kept quiet and acted like there never were and never would be fugitive slaves hidden in the county. Simply put, the strategy in this area was simply to deny the Underground Railroad’s existence. 33 In many aspects, Chester and Lancaster Counties proved to be the best examples of thriving stops on the Underground Railroad. The close proximity of these counties to the events taking place in Philadelphia, made them excellent stops on the Underground Railroad because they were more protected and less searched. These counties were primarily Quaker, making it important because at the time, Quakers were one of the biggest advocates against slavery. Northern areas of these counties were far enough from the borders that they could house slaves until they could be transported further North. Unlike Bucks County, Chester and Lancaster Counties often proved to be primarily temporary destinations for fugitive slaves as slaves quickly turned over to the north and more slaves would enter. In terms of the routes used in these areas, they ultimately split into three separate northern routes. Fugitive
slaves would be strategically sent at different times on these routes to avoid traveling in large numbers. Slave catchers often followed their suspects through Columbia, PA (at the time located in Chester), and because of the strategic methods put into play in this area were seldom able to capture their slaves.34 This was one of the factors that led to further tension between the slave-owning South and the free North. The North’s failure to comply with the Fugitive Slave Act in addition to Philadelphia and its surrounding counties’ ability to allow fugitives to seek refuge in this area, were incredibly valuable as the United States geared up for the Civil War.35 In the late 1850s, as the Union was falling apart and the prospect of Civil War was becoming a reality, Philadelphia continued to play its part in the broken country. Philadelphia began to see struggles politically as they weighed whether they preferred Republicans (who they felt would tear the Union apart) or Democrats (who they felt would continue the practice of slavery). Until this time surprisingly, Philadelphia political figures did not speak out for or against the practice of slavery. This was mainly because people were so split on the issue and it was such a spirited issue for different people. Much of what happened in terms of political issues were handled at the federal level. More often than not Philadelphia’s leading political figures would not comment or act on things like the increased use of the Underground Railroad in their city. Rather, they would often turn a blind eye to the issue. 36
As the city and the country further approached secession and the Civil War, the city became more split. Despite its large African-American population, antiabolitionist sentiment began to increase. This was mainly the result of the fear that came with civil war being on the horizon. In fact, a certain sect of the Democratic Party was advocating for the state of Pennsylvania to secede if and when the slave states did. Despite some resistance prior to the fall of Fort Sumter, the majority of Philadelphians got on board with the United States’ government.37 By supporting the U.S. government, Philadelphia showed that it was ready to fight. While this would appear to perhaps have been an obvious endorsement by the people of Philadelphia because of its long history of anti-slavery rhetoric, it took until the fall of Fort Sumter for Philadelphians to officially support the U.S. government in the coming war. The oncoming war in the United States at this time, brought fear to many people and rightfully so. The coming slaughter of United States citizens at the hands of their own brethren is one that should have instilled fear in anybody. The United States at this time was very split and very different, and Philadelphia played a major part in this division and much later its ultimate reunification. Philadelphia represented one of the biggest cities in the country at this time, and its involvement in such a movement played an extensive part in what was about to come. Pennsylvania began a movement by enacting a law gradually abolishing slavery, and
Philadelphia acted on and expanded this law. Antislavery and abolitionist societies developed in the city of Philadelphia to bring awareness and help fight the horrors of slavery in the United States. Such societies played a major part in growing the abolitionist movement throughout the United States, it is through these societies that a movement was built and support was grown. Through these societies abolitionists were created. One of the most famous names at this time was Benjamin Franklin, whose open stance as an abolitionist began late in life, but who spent a lot of his life working behind the scenes toward a movement. Later, Philadelphia and its surrounding counties became major hubs in the Underground Railroad. Through this system, slaves were able to come through Philadelphia and gain their freedom. This did not come without controversy, but Philadelphians were ready to break the law to do what they felt was right for their fellow man. As the Civil War became imminent, Philadelphia, despite seeing a slight schism, held its ground and supported the United Statesâ€™ government in their upcoming challenges. The part played by Philadelphia from these points cannot be understated. All of these events took place within the city and some of its surrounding counties. The large Quaker population in Pennsylvania played a large part in this. It is through this population, that many slaves were freed, and it is through their ideology of peace and harmony that much of the antislavery sentiment in Philadelphia grew.
It later continued as more AfricanAmericans entered the city and worked to grow these practices. No one person created this movement, but it was one of big numbers and passionate Philadelphians. In the end, Philadelphia played a major role in the end of slavery in the United States. Without the cityâ€™s citizens push toward emancipating slaves in the United States, the oncoming Civil War could have been pushed back many years. By growing a community that pushed for the end of slavery, Philadelphia was able to help put an end to this horrible practice. The commitment of antislavery societies, abolitionists, and Underground Railroad supporters this movement could have taken a lot longer to accomplish. Philadelphia was able to become the heart of the antislavery movement as its location gave it the prime opportunity to do so. This movement could have taken much longer without the part Philadelphia played. Its role should not be forgotten but should be remembered as a bigger piece of history and the emancipation of all slaves within the United Statesâ€™ border.
Notes: 13 1
"State of Pennsylvania an Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery," The New Jersey Gazette (Trenton, NJ), May 17, 1780, accessed October 20, 2016, http://vv4kg5gr5v.search.serialssolutions.co m/? 2 Richard Newman and James Mueller, eds., Antislavery and Abolition in Philadelphia (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2011), 29-31. 3 Cato, "Having Tasted the Sweets of Freedom," Freeman's Journal, September 21, 1781. 4 Cato, "Having Tasted the Sweets of Freedom," Freeman's Journal, September 21, 1781. 5 Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, ed. David W. Blight (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin, 2003), 75. 6 Newman and Mueller, Antislavery and Abolition, 165-166. 7 Ibid, 177-178. 8 Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society, Constitution of the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society: Instituted fourth month 30th, 1834 (Philadelphia, PA: T. Town, 1834), 2-4, accessed November 1, 2016, http://vv4kg5gr5v.search.serialssolutions.co m/ 9 Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society, Constitution of the Philadelphia, 8. 10 Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Society, Constitution of the Philadelphia, 12. 11 Richard Newman, "Pennsylvania Abolition Society (PAS)," in Abolition and Antislavery, ed. Peter Hinks and John McKivigan (Santa Barbara, CA: ABCCLIO, 2015), 248-250 12 Newman, "Pennsylvania Abolition," in Abolition and Antislavery, 249.
The Constitution of the American AntiSlavery Society (New York, NY: American Anti-Slavery Society, 1838). 14 David Waldsteicher, Runaway America: Benjamin Franklin, Slavery, and the American Revolution (New York, NY: Hill and Wang, 2004), 229. 15 Memorandum by Benjamin Franklin, "An address to the public, from the Pennsylvania Society for promoting the abolition of slavery, and the relief of free negroes, unlawfully held in bondage," November 9, 1789, accessed October 6, 2016, https://www.loc.gov/resource/rbpe.1470100 0/. 16 Newman and Mueller, Antislavery and Abolition, 56. 17 David Waldsteicher, Runaway America,198-200. 18 Newman and Mueller, Antislavery and Abolition, 56. 19 David Waldsteicher, Runaway America,198-200. 20 Newman and Mueller, Antislavery and Abolition, 121. 21 Ibid 121. 22 Lawrence Goldstone, Dark Bargain: Slavery, Profits, and the Struggle for the Constitution (New York, NY: Walker & Company, 2005), 175. 23 Robert Clemens Smedley, M.D., History of the Underground Railroad in Chester and the Neighboring Counties of Pennsylvania (New York, NY: Negro Universities Press, 1968), 25. 24 Ibid 26 25 "Fugitive Slave Law in Philadelphia," The Sun (New York, NY), 1850, accessed November 1, 2016, http://search.proquest.com/docview/533291 270?accountid=14270. 26 Nilgun Anadolu Okur, "Underground Railroad in Philadelphia, 1830-
1860," Journal of Black Studies 25, no. 5 (May 1995): 537, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2784630. 27 Edward H. Magill, When Men Were Sold: The underground railroad in Bucks County, Pa. : an address delivered before the Bucks County Historical Society (n.p., 1898), 11, accessed November 1, 2016, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100554 543. 28 Okur, "Underground Railroad," 548. 29 Okur, "Underground Railroad," 548. 30 Ibid 554. 31 Richard Allen, "Address to the Free People of Coulour of These United States," speech, 1830, in Minutes of the Proceedings of the National Negro Conventions,18301864, ed. Howard Holman Bell (New York, NY: Arno, 1969). 32 Edward H. Magill, When Men Were Sold: The underground railroad in Bucks County, Pa. : an address delivered before the Bucks County Historical Society (n.p., 1898), 5, accessed November 1, 2016, https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/100554 543. 33 Magill, When Men Were, 10. 34 Ibid 5-6. 35 William Dusinberre, Civil War Issues Philadelphia 1856-1865 (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965), 29. 36 Ibid 36-38. 37 Ibid 96.
The History and Future of Peru’s Fast Growing Economy Alessandra Restifo Sophomore, Political Science/Global Studies
Abstract After the United States’ withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the world of free trade entered a free-for-all, as countries searched for a viable course of direction toward a new free trade agreement. Peru seems to be leading an organized effort for the development of free trade agreements both within Latin America and across the Pacific. This is not surprising, as an analysis of Peru’s economic history will demonstrate. Despite its social complications, free trade has usually led to prosperity for Peru. With it currently being one of Latin America’s fastest growing economies, the loss of the TPP grants Peru the opportunity to see if their endurance and success will continue as they become more internationally integrated. If Peru succeeds with its plans of expanding free trade, which is analyzed in this paper, the country may serve as a model for countries just embarking to participate in the world of free trade economic policy. Introduction The Peruvian economy experienced a boom at the end of the 20th century, which stimulated its remarkable economic growth throughout the 21st century. Furthermore, Peru avoided the crash phenomenon, as well as a recession, often associated with economic booms. In addition to Peruvian economic policies, Peru’s foreign investors and free trade agreements provided a strong base for its
continued prosperity. However, the loss of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) provides both a threat to Peru’s free trade-dependent economy and a chance for Peru to become a principal actor in a globalizing world economy. An analysis of Peru’s economic development, the TPP itself and its relation to Peru, and Peru’s “post-TPP” plans provides a substantial argument for Peru emerging as a pivotal member in the world of free trade. Development Since the 19th Century At the turn of the 19th century, a majority of the Peruvian population lived in the countryside, with Lima containing only 100,000 people in 1876 (Hudson & Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1993). Peruvians depended mostly on agriculture for their livelihood through subsistence farming and as their primary export. With foreign investment in Latin America on the rise during the dawn of the 20th century, Peru developed an almost laissez-faire approach to its economy and set few restrictions on foreign investments and imports. Peru maintained this economic system through the Great Depression, while many other countries adopted protectionist policies. During the end of the 1930s and World War II, protectionist policies allowed countries to stimulate their own economies and shape the new global economy that emerged as a result of World War II. While protectionist countries industrialized and prospered, Peru trailed behind. External economic pressure forced Peru to adopt extreme protectionist policies in the 1960s, which resulted in increased restrictions on foreign investment and more government interaction in the economy. However, these policies conflicted with the sharp population increase Peru experienced at 80
the beginning of the 20th century. The growth of employment in the manufacturing sector could not match the larger numbers of the growing population, especially with increased migration from rural areas to urban centers. This migration was caused by the decreasing ratio of arable land to the population that continued through the 1970s, severely damaging the agriculture industry. Resultantly, the manufacturing sector’s share of the labor force fell from 13% (1950) to 10% (1990) and unemployment increased overall (Hudson & Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1993). The few successes of Peru’s economy during this period occurred because of an increasing focus on primary product exports. During the 19th century, Peru’s main exports were gold, silver, and guano. Guano, Europe’s most important fertilizer at the time, made Peru the largest Latin American exporter to Europe (Hudson & Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1993). After the end of the guano boom, Peru’s economy recovered using two methods: the development of new primary products and increased industrial production. The initial replacements were silver (33% of export earnings ), sugar (28%), cotton, rubber, and wool (37% collectively) (Hudson & Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1993). Copper and petroleum gained importance at the beginning of the 20th century, as did fishmeal from anchovies in the post-World War II economy. Peru exported few manufactured goods – they accounted for 1% of Peru’s total exports in 1960 (Hudson & Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1993) – until 1970. Both the aforementioned high rates of growth and overfishing, which destroyed Peru’s successful fishmeal industry,
shifted Peru towards the industrial sector and a return to foreign investment. Prior to a shift back to foreign investment, Peru’s first experiences with free trade would set a preconception for all future investments. In 1901, the increased value of Peruvian copper attracted United States (U.S.) firms, who bought almost all of the copper mines. Similarly, the International Petroleum Company (IPC) created a monopoly over oil production in Peru in 1914. Augusto B. Leguía y Salcedo’s administration endorsed this foreign investment by enacting legislation that benefited foreign firms. In addition, Leguía y Salcedo’s presidency had repressive overtones. This eternally linked foreign investment to the control of few at the expense of the public in Peru. Furthermore, history repeated itself with the dictatorial government legislating the Mining Code of 1950, which provided favorable tax provisions to investors that adversely affected Peruvian citizens through higher taxes and lower wages (Hudson & Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1993). The Velasco government (1968-1975) provided an extreme alternative to the economic policies of these administrations. Beginning with the nationalization of IPC, the Peruvian government strictly limited foreign investment. Hostility toward foreign firms and a deteriorating economy caused foreign investors to withdraw. The Fujimori government (1990-2000), which is now classified as a dictatorship by political scholars, attempted to reverse Peru’s economic doctrine beginning in 1990. The government disavowed all restricting economic policies and re-created a welcoming environment for foreign firms. However, little foreign investment entered the country initially because of the unstable state of 81
the economy (Hudson & Library of Congress Federal Research Division, 1993). Nevertheless, Peru has become one of Latin America’s fastest growing economies in the years since the Fujimori government. The dean of the Faculty of Economics at El Universidad del Pacifico states, “In the last 23 years, a social market economy has been consolidated and there is a consensus to maintain it as the axis of development enshrined in the 1993 Political Constitution” (“La Década”, 2013). Therefore, Peru’s success can be attributed to the core values of the economic system began by the Fujimori office: stability in prices and the exchange rate, pursuit of sustainable growth, defense of free trade, the attraction of foreign capital, and legal security of investments. Recently, the following five countries were the largest investors in Peru: Spain (21.25%), the United States (13.29%), South Africa (7.67%), Chile (7.25%), and Brazil (5.89%) (Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Peru, 2013). A majority of the foreign investment in Peru is directed toward its major sectors of manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and mining. However, one of the largest sectors of Peru’s economy, trade, has contributed significant growth to Peru’s economy. Peru has major free trade agreements (FTAs) with the U.S., Canada, China, Japan, and the European Union (EU) (Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Peru, 2013). Peru also has tight trade agreements with other Latin American countries. The most important, especially with regard to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, is the Pacific Alliance, which is a trade bloc, comprised of the countries of Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. Evidently, business-friendly economic policies have fostered greater foreign
investments into Peru, which have had extremely positive effects. For example, the poverty rate in Peru decreased from 52% at the turn of the century to 22.7% in 2014 (Editorial Board, 2016). Although the poverty rate is still high in Peru, it is comparatively much better than that in other Latin American countries. Other beneficial economic factors have formed Peru into a force of economic progress in Latin America. For example, the Central Reserve Bank predicts a GDP growth rate of 3.5% for 2017, the second highest in Latin America. Despite setbacks from the devastation of El Niño, the Central Reserve Bank projects Peru will recover in 2018 with a growth rate of 4.1% (“Peru 2017”, 2017). An explicit example of Peru’s success is its survival of the 2008 world recession. From 2009 to 2012, Peru’s GDP experienced an average growth of 5.7%, with the GDP experiencing an increase of 6.3% in 2012 (Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Peru, 2013). Peru’s economic victory over the recession is a result of prior economic decisions. The 2000’s commodity price boom largely benefited Peru’s economy. The Peruvian government decided to save a majority of the money gained from the boom, and this allowed it to float while many other Latin American countries sank during the recession. Thus, Peru continued its economic growth on a fairly stable platform. For example, inflation is projected to drop to 2.4% in 2017, meaning Peru would have the second-lowest inflation rate in Latin America (“Peru 2017”, 2017). This stability has continued the cycle of attracting more foreign investors (Gillespie, 2016). Peru, in this time of relative prosperity, has developed economic goals for the future of its trade and investment. First of all, Peru hopes to form the aforementioned Pacific Alliance 82
into a European Union of Latin America. The leaders of Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru met in Santiago, Chile in 2017 to discuss combating global protectionism. The countries have begun developing plans to deepen financial ties across their countries, and eventually all of Latin America (De la Jara & Iturrieta, 2017). The Pacific Alliance can be viewed as the first step of Peru’s free trade plan. Professor Gonzalo Garland describes it as, “The declared intention of the country… to set up a logistics hub that integrates Latin America with Asia Pacific” (“La Década”, 2013). Peru’s economic development has led the country to become one that is prepared for a more globalized world and increased free trade. The recent benefits of increased foreign investments show that Peru understands the system and how it will benefit. The shift from primary product exports to industrialization and the relatively quick recovery from the 2008 recession demonstrate the adaptability of Peru’s economy. The largest source of evidence of Peru’s positive relation with free trade is the 2016 election of the current president, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, a Polish neoliberal who has strong beliefs in foreign investment and increasing exports. However, the citizens of Peru still have concerns. The association of repressive governments with free trade is still imprinted on the average Peruvian’s mind. These two mindsets clashed again with the introduction of the TPP. Trans-Pacific Partnership The Trans-Pacific Partnership was a regional trade agreement among twelve nations that border the Pacific Ocean: U.S., Peru, Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam. If ratified, this agreement would
have been the largest regional trade agreement in history, with the participating countries composing an annual GDP of $28 million and 40% of the global GDP (Granville, 2017). Furthermore, its broad language would allow for the introduction of more Asian countries. The TPP had five goals that the members wished to address: eliminating remaining tariffs; standardizing rigorous environmental, labor, and intellectual property standards; allowing free transfer of data across borders; increasing opportunities for service industries; and addressing partiality toward state-owned businesses. While a subvert goal of the U.S. was to pivot economic power away from China through the TPP, the ultimate purpose of the TPP was to create a Pacific free-trade zone. Peru, as mentioned before, was divided on the TPP. At the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2016, President Pablo Kuczynski stated, "In recent years, we have seen how companies go bankrupt and how people are left jobless due to falling trade…World trade has to grow and protectionism has to be defeated" (Villalobos, 2016). The Peruvian government’s current neoliberal economic policy agrees strongly with the TPP and many government officials supported its development. Alternatively, Peruvian citizens focused on the potential dangers of the TPP, holding many protests prior to the U.S.’s withdrawal. The main arguments were against policies that limited Peruvian sovereignty and pharmaceutical policies. Opponents of the TPP saw it as a threat to environmental issues, health care, Peruvian culture, and freedom on the Internet. In addition, trade provisions within the TPP enforced the use of genetically modified seeds and weakened workers’ and farmers’ rights. The TPP could have granted pharmaceutical 83
companies monopolies over certain medicines, resulting in higher prices that many Peruvians cannot afford (Mora, 2016). Both views were expressed in the revised TPP. First of all, Peru only had to enforce the partnershipâ€™s protections on medicines for five years during the decade following the ratification instead of eight years. Furthermore, the TPP would have eliminated 18,000 international trade taxes, but Peru was granted grace periods to phase out tariffs and total exemption of tax elimination in the following industries: some food and agriculture; clothing and textiles; light industrial product; and the entertainment industry (Post, 2015). The entertainment industry was included in various efforts to preserve Peru's cultural heritage in light of the TPP extending bidding on government contracts to foreign companies. These efforts included enforcing minimum requirements for Peruvian staff in media production and broadcast, preserving the right to pass laws that would protect indigenous cultures and Peruvian cultural staples, and defining the nationality of ownership if selling a state firm. The following industries were completely exempt from the bidding: clothing for the military, bedding for the El Salud healthcare system, accounting and arbitration services, food assistance programs, alpaca fibers, financial services, and products for Peruâ€™s embassies abroad. These sectors were considered to be essential to the Peruvian government and people, and critically important to the point where international intervention would not be welcomed (Post, 2015). The TPP, in terms of Peru, took into account basic principles of free trade. Also, the concerns of the Peruvians were addressed within the document, mainly the passages
about medicine protection and the preservation of cultural heritage. The Peruvian government would have triumphed, as they expected to export $2.25 billion in products and services to the five countries (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei) of the TPP with whom Peru does not have FTAs (Post, 2015). Nevertheless, the international concern over pharmaceutical companies, even with a reduced term of protection, is legitimate especially when many Peruvians would not be able to afford more expensive medicines. Other international concerns affect people of all socio-economic levels. For example, labor groups in developed countries are worried about jobs being exported to less-developed countries, while less-developed countries will have to abide by potentially nonviable international labor laws. Farmers in all of the TPP countries, especially food exporting countries (e.g. New Zealand, Australia) would have benefited largely from cuts in tariffs. Overall, the decreased tariffs and increased competition that would result from the legislation in the TPP would have benefited the countries on a macro level, but leave small farmers and small businesses in uncertainty (Naidu-Ghelani, 2015). However, the U.S. withdrew from the TPP in January 2017 and the eleven remaining countries have been forced to form alternative plans for an FTA. Peru has already moved into action and has received strong support. Peru found a natural conclusion in a pivot towards Asia, mainly China. Peru, with Latin Americaâ€™s fastest growing economy, has played a pivotal role in the struggle between the U.S. and China for control over Latin America. Over the last decade, Chinese companies have invested $18 million in infrastructure and mining in Peru as an attempt to lessen U.S. influence (Gillespie, 84
2016). When viewing Peru’s economic policy through this lens, Peru’s reasons for joining the TPP are as much about free trade as it is about increasing economic ties with Asia. As the future of the TPP grows dimmer, Peru has begun to strengthen its ties with Asian economies. While Peru and China already have a bilateral free trade deal, they have recently met to discuss updating its terms (Taj, 2016). Peru and its fellow members of the Pacific Alliance are strengthening their economies in order to create more FTAs with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Garland’s earlier assertion of Peruvian trade policy appears in the joint effort of the Pacific Alliance to improve their economies and their plans to enter into these FTAs as a trade bloc (“Peru ‘Prefers’”, 2017). Conclusion Free trade has produced amazing results for Peru macroeconomically. Peru has developed into one of the largest growing and most stable economies in Latin America, which placed the country in a crucial position in both the U.S. – China economic conflict and the production of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. In the “post-TPP” economic world, Peru has risen as a leader of FTA formation (i.e. the Pacific Alliance, FTAs with Asia). Outside of macroeconomics, the Peruvian people still maintain their suspicions about FTAs and foreign investments. Therefore, it can be concluded that Peru’s government is prepared to enter into a primary role in the globalized economy despite the resistance of the Peruvian people. As seen with Western countries in post-WWII economic development, countries that are principal actors in a changing global economy often benefit the most from it because they shape the economic sphere and increase their socio-economic influence. Peru now has
that opportunity as they lead Latin America in an increasingly global free-trade economy. Furthermore, its recent actions display a willingness to assume a leading position in the advancement and expansion of free trade. To ensure the participation of the Peruvian public, the government must listen to the concerns of the people, avoiding the authoritarianism of previous pro-free trade administrations as it moves forward in economic globalization. References Central Intelligence Agency. (2017, January 12). Peru [Fact sheet]. Retrieved March 27, 2017, from cia.gov website: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/t he-world-factbook/geos/pe.html De la Jara, A., & Iturrieta, F. (2017, March 10). Pacific Alliance trade bloc seeks to deepen financial ties. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-al ianza-idUSKBN16H2JO Editorial Board. (2016, June 12). Peru's rise. The Washington Post. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinion s/perus-rise/2016/06/12/6d7dd322-2f30-1 1e6-b5db-e9bc84a2c8e4_story.html?utm_ term=.3e9d6b2b05d1 Gillespie, P. (2016, November 17). Peru is shining amid Latin America woes. Retrieved March 27, 2017, from money.cnn.com website: http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/17/news/e conomy/peru-latin-america-apec/
Granville, K. (2017, January 23). What is TPP? Behind the trade deal that died. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/201 6/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pa cific-partnership.html?r=0 Hudson, R. A., & Library of Congress Federal Research Division. (1993). History of the economy. In Peru: A country study. Retrieved from https://www.loc.gov/item/93019676/ La década prodigiosa: Perú disfruta del mejor momento económico de su historia [The prodigious decade: Peru enjoys the best economic moment in its history]. (2013, June 23). La Republica. Retrieved from http://larepublica.pe/23-06-2013/la-decad a-prodigiosa-peru-disfruta-del-mejor-mo mento-economico-de-su-historia Mora, R. (2016, April 18). Peru: Activists prepare sixth march against the TPP. Retrieved March 27, 2017, from telesurtv.net website: http://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Per u-Activists-Prepare-4th-March-Against-th e-TPP-20160418-0036.html Naidu-Ghelani, R. (2015, October 6). TPP trade deal: Who are the winners and losers? Retrieved March 27, 2017, from bbc.com website: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-3445 1423 Peru 2017 GDP to be one of LatAm Highest at 3.5%. (2017, March 25). Andina. Retrieved from http://www.andina.com.pe/Ingles/noticia-
peru-2017-gdp-to-be-one-of-latam-highes t-at-35-659862.aspx Peru "prefers" FTA with Asia through Pacific Alliance. (2017, March 10). Latin American Herald Tribune. Retrieved from http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId =2432649&CategoryId=14095 Post, C. (2015, November 12). What did Peru get out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership? Retrieved March 27, 2017, from perureports.com website: http://perureports.com/2015/11/12/what-d id-peru-get-out-of-the-trans-pacific-partne rship/ Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Peru. (2013, June). Peru major business sectors. Switzerland Global Enterprise, 1-5. Retrieved from http://www.s-ge.com/sites/default/files/pr ivate_files/WZ_1307_E_Wirtschaftszwei ge-Peru_3.pdf Taj, M. (2016, November 22). Peru proposes talks to save TPP after Trump firms up opposition. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-peru-tp p-idUSKBN13H2CC?il=0 Villalobos, M. R. (2016, November 18). PPK: "El protecctionismo tiene que ser deterrotado" [PPK: Protectionism has to be defeated]. El Comercio. Retrieved from http://elcomercio.pe/apec/noticias/ppk-pr oteccionismo-tiene-que-derrotado-noticia1947509
Foundations and Aspirations, Fall 2017