Pilot Thesis: A Case for New Architectures of Political Engagement

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Pilot Thesis

Rebalancing Britain

Tom Ardron



Decentralising Central Government: A Case for New Architectures of Political Engagement



Essay 2: Pilot Thesis A pilot thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the M.Phil in Architecture and Urban Design, 2017/18

Tom Ardron St Edmund’s College

With thanks to: Mary Ann Steane, Ingrid SchrĂśder, Aram Mooradian, Ben Gardiner, Jack Sheldon, New Statesman, Roger Smith

This pilot thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text.



Preface

This research project has emerged through a critical reflection of the author’s experience of childhood and education in a postindustrial northern English town following a move to a city, and then the South of England for university. Revisiting one’s hometown throughout these periods forced new observations through the lens of both a city and that of a prosperous southern region. Questions arose of what it means to be Northern and the constructs contained therein; whether the North of England is a place with problems, or a problem in and of itself; and to what extent this is as much about London as it is about the North. These lines of enquiry were augmented

by the EU referendum outcome of 2016 in which the majority of the North of England voted to Leave - yet London unanimously voted to Remain. Although the vote regarded membership of the European Union, commentators have questioned whether this outcome was a retaliation against decades of social, cultural and economic disjuncture and an outof-touch political elite. This has ultimately led to an interest in devolution, decentralisation, the architectures of democracy, spaces of democratic engagement, and where one learns to be political; all of which has informed this project to date.



Contents

Introduction 1

What do we mean by ‘the North’? 5 The Problem of the North 7 Decentralising Government 19

Conclusion & Moving Forward 29


“… political connectivity is essential if we are to restore the link between people and government. The current yearning for a new kind of politics is symptomatic of a chronic lack of political connectivity at a local and national level. Support for devolution and self-determination on the part of the constituent nations of the UK is itself arguably an expression of a deeper demand to be heard and understood.” (Aldritt, 2015)

Fig.1 - Michael Heseltine giving a speech at the Northern Powerhouse Spotlight Conference, 27 February 2018


Introduction

In ‘From Problems in the North to the Problematic North’ (2018), Martin, et al. highlight the ‘… increasing gaps between the increasingly wealthy, connected and globalised space of the Core Cities and their regional hinterlands.’ This pilot thesis upholds that there is not simply an issue of an increasing social, political and economic divide between the North and South of England, but one also of Central-Local and Urban-Rural locations. This is typified by the votes cast in the EU Referendum; major economic and urban centres favoured a Remain vote, in contrast to a large Leave vote in peripheral towns and rural areas (Cox, 2017).

(Leeds Town Hall, 27th February 2018) that conscious efforts to help ‘rebalance’ the UK must now move beyond the space-neutral policy rhetoric (Gray, et al., 2018) and into a place-based, spatial discourse at various scales. Moreover, the outcome of the EU referendum underlines a political climate characterised by increased levels of disillusionment particularly in the North of England - where it could be argued that the populace used their voting power to express dissatisfaction with the current running of the United Kingdom (Jack, 2016; Goodwin & Heath 2016). The remainder of this pilot thesis, along with its corresponding design project, will question how the architectures of Parliament and its associated administrations could be reimagined and dispersed across the North of England to promote engagement within the UK democracy through considerations of space, place, and proximity in an age of globalised networks. It is posited that increased democratic engagement, through the reimagining of parliamentary architectures, could foster discourse on the creation of place-based solutions to regional disparities; putting into perspective the effectiveness of space-neutral economic agendas to date.

The first component of this pilot thesis will outline the genealogy of the North framed as a ‘problem’ and examine the initiatives focused on solving these problems which soon followed. In doing so, one can begin to locate the urban-rural and central-local divides as a result of the city/urban centre focus of past and current initiatives. By concluding that the Northern Powerhouse proposal, the most recent attempt to help the North, is in fact a ‘patchwork of territorial fixes’ focused on select core cities (Berry and Giovannini, 2018a: 9), this study locates a requirement for a pan-Northern spatial plan which could benefit the whole of the North. It has become increasingly evident throughout this study so far, and most recently in conversations held at the Northern Powerhouse Spotlight Conference

It is on the premise of spatial and political reconnection outlined above that I pose the following key research questions around which this pilot thesis will centre:

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Leave (%) 50 - 55 55 - 60 60 - 65 65 - 70 70 -75 75 - 75.6 Remain (%) 50 - 55 55 - 60 60 - 65 65 - 70 70 -75 75 - 78.6 Leave (%) 50 - 55 55 - 60 60 - 65 65 - 70 70 -75 75 - 75.6 Remain (%) 50 - 55 55 - 60 60 - 65 65 - 70 70 -75 75 - 78.6

European Union Referendum Vote Outcome

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Leave (%) 50 - 55 55 - 60 60 - 65 65 - 70 70 -75 75 - 75.6 Remain (%) 50 - 55 55 - 60 60 - 65 65 - 70 70 -75 75 - 78.6


of the country both spatially and politically. In an age of hot-desking and flexible work environments, what is the importance of space and place in today’s government? Could a nomadic Parliament respond to the significance of place in a globalised era?

1)Why has the North become a matter of increased political salience? How has the North of England acquired a meaning of subservience through government initiatives to date? This will examine the role previous governments have played in reinforcing the North of England as other through regional strategies and how these intended to benefit the area. A key focus will be on how The Northern Way, a scheme conceived by John Prescott under New Labour, has fed into the proposal for a Northern Powerhouse.

This section of the pilot thesis will apply the academic discourse around the theory of space and place (Massey, 1994; Harvey, 1996; Cresswell, 2015) with literature on the politics of space in current government architectures (Oldenberg, 2005; Goodsell, 1988; Rogers, 2004). Proximity plays a key role in this discussion, particularly in regard to the decisions made by policymakers being shaped through ‘the prism of their personal experience... for most of them it’s the experience of working, living and bringing their families up in the London region’. (Blomfield, 2018)

2)The Need for Place-Based Planning and Spatial Consideration? Here I pose that government initiatives positioned to benefit the North of England to date have failed due to an over reliance on a political rather than spatial plan. Until there is an understanding of local conditions and integration into existing architectures and institutions is considered, there is likely to be a continued lack of even-handedness through which city deals could create further inter-regional competition and disparities.

It is worth noting that the public policy and political science academic discourse surrounding these topics makes regular reference to the spatial characteristics of proposed devolution and decentralisation initiatives, yet due to their intended audience does not elaborate much further. The word 3)Towards a New Parliament? architecture appears regularly in these texts in reference to government hierarchies and Rethinking the architectures of Parliament structures as opposed to physical built forms. and its associated administrations. Where Acknowledging an opportunity to bridge the does one learn to be political? How do discussion between the policy-orientated we create spaces which foster democratic texts and the architectural and geographical engagement? Can we make a more public scholarship on the politics of space and place, Parliament? this pilot thesis aims to forge out a set of questions in which an architectural project The decanting of Parliament from the could begin to envision decentralisation Palace of Westminster during a significant proposals at a series of spatial scales, in order phase of restoration to reinforce these ideas Left: Fig.2 - Results of EU (Powell, 2018) would beyond the imaginaries in Referendum Vote showing present an opportunity which they currently sit. North - South differentiations to reconnect with the rest 3


North / South Divide Line

North / South Divide Line

Tees - Exe Line Tees - Exe Line Sheffield University SASI Group Sheffield University SASI Group Severn Trent Line Severn Trent Line Pronunciation of letter ‘A’ Pronunciation of letter ‘A’ Severn Wash Line Severn Wash Line Pronunciation of letter ‘U’ Pronunciation of letter ‘U’ Church Dioceses (Canterbury/York) Church Dioceses (Canterbury/York)

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What do we mean by ‘the North’?

The exact location of the North in England while the heavily industrial West Midlands is one which could be debated dependent may well have more in common with the on one’s origin, interests, favoured sporting North.’ (Martin, 2004) It Is therefore team, or political allegiance. It is of a important to note that, although this general understanding that most people in discussion is centred around the North of the UK can locate what is and what is not England, it would be ill-founded to suggest the North, but it is the boundary which that any disadvantages outlined are unique separates the North from the South of to this location; the North is not contained England which causes contention; as such in a political or economic vacuum. For the it has been the basis for research by many purpose of this pilot thesis, it is the way the academics (Martin, 1988; Dorling, 2010; North has been shaped and framed by its Kenny, 2016). Numerous differentiations wider contexts which is of interest. of the ‘North-South’ dividing line have been drawn; including those concerning the Contemporaneous academic discourse on location of rivers, washes, church dioceses, the North of England tends to uphold the and the pronunciation of the letters a and position that the North is composed of the u. Research by Danny Dorling (Dorling, North-East, North-West, and Yorkshire and 2010; 2011), Professor of Geography at Humberside regions. This position is one of the University of Oxford, has included which this pilot thesis also upholds. There Scotland, Wales and some parts of the is less agreement on the geography of the Midlands in determining his definition of Northern Powerhouse due to the political the dividing line due to the similarities in nature and ambiguity of the agenda, however outcomes in areas such as household income within this text, the term will be used in and life expectancy (Dorling, 2010). One reference to the proposed agglomeration of can acknowledge the justification for the the cities of: Manchester, Leeds, Sheffield, Midlands to be included in the scope of this Liverpool, Hull, and Newcastle. This research as ‘historically the East Midlands is founded on George Osbourne’s ‘on has had a more balanced and less industrial Delivering a Northern Powerhouse’ speech economy than the West given in Manchester in Midlands, and perhaps in 2015 (Osborne, 2015). Left: Fig.3 - Map of various Norththis respect has more in South dividing lines across the UK common with the South,

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The Problem of the North

Throughout the past 150 years, discussions begin to understand the shaping of ‘the spatial relating to the North of England have imaginary of the North as subordinated to understood it as ‘both a place with problems, the South’ (Berry & Giovannini, 2018a: 6). and as a problem in and of itself ’ (Martin et al., 2018). This is not only embedded within To ignore the history which has led to political rhetoric, but also within literature, the current proposal for a Northern arts and culture. In The Literary North (2012), Powerhouse would suggest that the issues Katharine Cockin states that ‘The North it intends to solve are of a contemporary is still often treated as a “strange country” nature, embedded only in the neoliberal and its rich literary and cultural heritage structuring and globalisation of today. are subjected to the short-term memory The current proposals around devolution of the South… The binary function of the and decentralisation stem from decades of North-South is strategic. The reiteration for government initiatives in which the North of all its ubiquity and apparent banality, is not England is framed through the narrative of trivial.’ (Cockin, 2012: a place which needs fixing 241) Albeit fictional, the (Gray, et al., 2018). It is landscape of Northern worth noting that these ‘The identification cities ‘as repositories of strategies to date focus of place usually social problems, and as on “helping” as involves an us/them heavily problematic places in opposed to “empowering” distinction in which the North, with very themselves’, portrayed in the other is devalued’ little ‘clear analysis as to novels such as Charles Dickens’ Hard Times why the North-South (1854), are images which divide exists’ (Berry & (Cresswell 2015: 42) have fixed within common Giovannini, 2018a: 6). perceptions of the North. The North-South divide (Cockin, 2012). The use of emotive and began to surface as a political issue following somewhat exaggerated imagery in these key policy changes made in the 1980s. It is fictional forms are what Baker and Billinge from this point onwards that we can trace (2004) refer to as the “representations of the initiatives intended to ‘fix’ the problems reality” (culture, literature) in the history of the North. of the North-South divide, in contrast to a “reality” (particularly in economic terms). Thatcher: Entrepreneurial Urbanism Whether or not a North-South divide is believed to exist, it is within this interplay of Following the election of the Conservative representations and reality in which one can government in 1979, there was a sincere 7


shift in focus from the post-war consensus of local authorities shaping their own futures, to one of an ‘entrepreneurial form of urbanism’ (Raco 2007). Ron Martin (2004) states that Margaret Thatcher’s aim was ‘to modernise the country by subjecting it to the full force of market competition and internationalisation, and to shift social interests and values away from the inherited culture of state support’, summarising that ‘regional and local disparities… during the three Thatcher governments was surely not coincidental.’

neglecting issues of decline in the North was conceived (Tomaney 2006). To suggest that only the North suffered significantly from deindustrialisation would be ill-founded as London equally felt the effects – the key point to reiterate is the lack of diversification in the North and its overreliance on industrial output in comparison to London. By the mid-1980s, ‘much of the debate surrounding the North-South divide focused on regional unemployment rates.’ (Martin, 2004: 24). As a result of the boost given to the financial sector following the deregulation of the City of London and lowering of taxes, employment in the service sector boomed whilst the older industrial areas declined at pace. It is from this point the North began to be positioned as the binary other in political discourse due to the widening of socio-economic inequalities.

Thatcher’s focus on building ‘a knowledge economy premised on the mobility of highly skilled labour’ (Martin, et al 2018: 224) naturally played to the strengths of the financial sector in London and its associated arms in other cities. Employment in industry was high in the North of England at the time, particularly in manufacturing and mining located in the peripheries. Although, since the 1970s, the manufacturing output of the United Kingdom has been fairly evenly spread, it became evident that the economies of some regions relied more heavily on this output than others (Berry 2018).

Through a combination of both a concerted effort to centralise control through the restriction of local government autonomy (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000) and policy approaches which were ‘unsympathetic to regional economic decline’ (Jones and Macleod, 2004) the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major paved the way for a Labour campaign soaked in regionalist rhetoric.

Contrary to claims by Thatcher’s critics, the origin of England’s regional inequalities can be found in the industrial specialisation of the North and the concentration of the financial sector (and therefore economic power) in London during the nineteenth century. The role Thatcher’s government played in the 1980s was one of accelerating the decline of mining, shipbuilding, steel, and thus deindustrialisation in the North (Lewis & Townsend, 1989). As a result of economic and political power being centred in London, the decision to close factories came from the South, therefore the perception of Thatcher’s government

The Northern Way: An Urban Renaissance The New Labour campaign for the general election of 1997 placed a significant emphasis on decentralising power, with promises for referendums in both Scotland and Wales eventually resulting in the creation of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1998. In due course, New Labour, under the leadership of Tony Blair, turned its focus towards the English regions as ‘the question of why the principles underpinning 8


devolution did not apply to the largest and most heavily populated territory of the United Kingdom hung in the political air’ (Kenny, 2016: 184).

regional inequality gaps than ‘making certain places (London as well as Northern cities) more wealthy and productive in a narrowly financial sense’ (Martin, et al., 2018). In the documents of The Northern Way, this is evident in proposals to ‘support growth where it occurs’ and to ‘retrench and withdraw elsewhere’; with troubling suggestions that some places are worthy of ‘demolition’ (Goodman & Hickman, 2006: 130-131).

Subsequent to the failed implementation of Regional Assemblies in 2004 (Willet & Giovannini, 2013), Labour’s plans for the northern regions were driven by The Northern Way proposal, spearheaded by Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott. The Northern Way epitomised the focus towards an ‘urban renaissance’ in the North, asserted in an earlier report by architect Richard Rogers’ Urban Task Force (1999). Running through the core of this plan was a focus on city and urban regeneration, aiming to boost endogenous growth in the regions. In contrast to the somewhat spaceneutral offerings of New Labour’s previous devolution efforts (Regional Assemblies, Regional Development Agencies), The Northern Way was possibly their most successful attempt to provide a ‘type of vision-based planning relatively rare in explicit government thinking’ (Goodchild & Hickman, 2006: 123).

In parallel to the plans for The Northern Way, architect Will Alsop developed and unveiled his SuperCity project; a critique of Labour’s urban competitiveness model, focussing on the interstitial areas located between the core cities. Alsop’s flamboyant proposals ‘reimagined Barnsley as a Tuscan hill town... in Bradford he suggested the flooding of a large area in front of its Victorian town hall [and] he envisaged a riverside complex in Middlesbrough with buildings in the shape of board games and toys’ (Martin, et al., 2018). This master plan, despite its unconventional makeup, explored alternatives to the core city focus based on the spatial qualities of each location, as opposed to their place-neutral economic output – how could their spatial qualities and existing architectures be utilised to introduce new infrastructure? Alsop’s scheme ultimately asked what if…? Despite the schemes’ extremity, discourse was forced out of policy and into a communication with space which subsequently fed into regeneration plans at smaller scales (Bradford Centre Regeneration, 2003). It is on this premise of forcing a spatial exploration out of the policy on which I critique the proposal for a Northern Powerhouse and through my own design research, propose a possible method in which to start to approach this.

The city focus in this proposal was grounded on the judgement that a ‘lack of growth in the north of England was not so much a problem, but an indication of under-used resources and an unrealized opportunity to raise national economic growth’, and that this could be achieved by ‘exploiting the untapped potential for economic growth along the existing transport corridors’ such as the M62 (Goodchild & Hickman, 2006). The focus on using the North to help boost ‘national economic growth’ is where one can begin to understand not only the focus on cities – the centres of the most economic activity – but also how these proposals are less concerned about bridging 9


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Su p e r City

Fig. 4,5,6 - Will Alsop’s Exhibition for his SuperCity project

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to not be tied down to specific plans, and that ‘vague-over simplifications’ and ‘sweeping statements’ could be part of a marketing strategy to source exogenous investment (2006). The genealogy of solving the problems of the North in government strategies shows a ‘constant toggling between solutions rooted in spatial planning … and those rooted in political power’ (Martin, et al., 2018:230). The Northern Powerhouse to date has failed to move beyond the latter.

The Northern Powerhouse: Spatial Planning vs Political Power When the Coalition government came into office in 2010, the Northern Way was scrapped, yet many of its key focus points – cities, urban centres and the use of transport networks to increase economic growth (now focused on High Speed Rail 2 as opposed to the M62) - can be found in George Osborne’s scheme for a Northern Powerhouse. Since its conception in 2014, very few of its proposals have left the imaginary in which it was conceived. The focus of the Northern Powerhouse, as outlined in George Osborne’s speech of 2014, is for the agglomeration of the core cities in the North to compete on the ‘global stage’, with very little mention as to where and how this is going to be achieved (Osborne, 2014a). In Place: An Introduction, Cresswell (2015) explains the vagueness of state commissioned globalisation strategies such as this;

It has become evident throughout this research so far that economics has underpinned most of the proposals. However, where this funding is spent and how this effects one locality to another is imperative. This was augmented by the outcome of a mapping exercise comparing the ONS (Office for National Statistics) data for health and education spending. Figures 8, 9, 10 & 11 show that an increased investment per head over a five-year period in both health and education spending did not ‘strategies of globalisation undertaken by the start to show a change in regional disparities state…all attempt to negotiate the production of in life expectancy and attainment 8 figures. locality in a non-place-based way that induces Additionally, the findings in a recent report increasingly delocalising effects...top-down by the Children’s Commissioner for England globalisation is insensitive to the specificity of explores this further. The report highlighted place.’ a disjuncture between the educational outcomes of those in the North compared to In reference to The Northern Way, Goodchild the South, with young people in the North & Hickman (2006) add to this by contesting feeling that ‘regeneration was about a few that the regional scale is ‘not the type of spatial shiny buildings, new shops and pavements, scale at which it is easily possible to present but not much more… regeneration was a “vision” that is tangible from the viewpoint something happening to their city, but not to of residents’. They argue that the regional them.’ (Pidd, 2018). This outlines not only scale too easily proposes ‘demolishing’ areas the local perception of top-down schemes, based on place-neutral statistics, with very but also that there is a lack of consideration little concern for how this will play out at for the opinions of these localities. This a 1:1 scale. It is possible to consider that the position is one in which vast scales undertaken Right: Fig. 7 - George Osbourne I ground the final section in these schemes could presenting his Northern Powerhouse of this pilot thesis. be a conscious decision proposal in Manchester, 2014 by government in order 12


‘They need to persuade us in the North they love us, so how do we go about it? That’s it, we create a Northern Powerhouse ‘cause that sounds like very Northern and it sounds like you’re serious about giving the locals some powers’ – Councillor, Yorkshire (Gray, et al. 2018)

‘Modern economists have spoken about the economic benefits when a critical mass of people, businesses and infrastructure are brought together in a large city. The whole is then greater than the sum of its parts. Our great northern cities represented here individually are quite small on the global stage - but combined they rival in size London or New York or Tokyo. It was this opportunity to create a Northern Powerhouse that I identified earlier this year.’ (Osborne 2014a)

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Average Spend per Head (£) 1719 - 1818 1818 - 1918 1918 - 2017 2017 - 2116 2116 - 2216 Average Spend per Head (£) 2216 - 2315 1719 - 18182315 - 2414 1818 - 19182414 - 2513 1918 - 2017 2017 - 2116 2116 - 2216 2216 - 2315 2315 - 2414 2414 - 2513

Fig.8 - Average Spend per Head on Health Services in English Regions , 2011-2016 Average Spend per Head on Health Services 14in English Regions, 2011 - 2016


Average Life Expectancy (Years) 78 - 78.5 78.5 - 79 79 - 79.5 79.5 - 80 80 - 80.5 Average Life Expectancy (Years) 78 - 78.5 78.5 - 79 79 - 79.5 79.5 - 80 80 - 80.5

Fig.9 - Average Life Expectancy for Births in 2012-14 per English Region Average Life Expectancy for Births in 2012 -2014 per English Region

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Average Spend per Head (£) 1178 - 1227 1227 - 1275 1275 - 1324 1324 - 1372 1372 - 1421 Average Spend per Head (£) 1421 - 1469 1178 - 12271469 - 1518 1227 - 12751518 - 1566 1275 - 1324 1324 - 1372 1372 - 1421 1421 - 1469 1469 - 1518 1518 - 1566

Fig.10 - Average Spend per Head on Education in English Regions , 2011-2016 Average Spend per Head on Education 16 in English Regions, 2011 - 2016


Average Attainment 8 Figure 44.00 - 44.60 44.60 - 45.40 45.40 - 46.20 46.20 - 47.40 47.40 - 48.90 Average Attainment 8 Figure 44.00 - 44.60 44.60 - 45.40 45.40 - 46.20 46.20 - 47.40 47.40 - 48.90

Fig.11 - Average Attainment 8 Figure per English Region, 2016/17 Average Attainment 8 Figure per English Region, 2016/17

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‘The need for face-to-face grass-roots participation in the political process is essential in a democracy’ (Oldenburg 2005: 70)


Decentralising Government

In this final section of the pilot thesis, I develop on the proposal of decentralising Parliament and the reimagining of government architectures to promote democratic engagement. By considering the importance of place, space, and proximity of government in an age of increased mobility and globalised networks, this section concludes through the generation of key questions around which a continuing design project will aim to explore.

influence on the measures of Government than the whole empire besides. This is a situation in which we never wish to see this country placed.’ (Benton 1857)

The identity and collective memory of place is important in relation to the location of Parliament. By removing Parliament from London, there would be an instant subversion of the history of its location. Simultaneously, this would raise questions around the importance of another location, and what perspective this places on its past locality. In the age of mobility, globalised networks and the movement of capital at the click of a button, the permanence of place and ‘mobility of capital are always in tension’ (Cresswell, 2015:93). Massey (1999) questions ‘in the face of all this movement and intermixing, can we retain any sense of a local place and its particularity?’ and suggests that the search for a coherence between place and community has ‘given rise to defensive and reactionary responses - certain forms of nationalism, sentimentalised recovering of sanitised “heritages”, and outright antagonism to newcomers and “outsiders”’ Massey’s argument here questions the perception of place as static and the desire to pause it in time. Harvey (1996) argues that ‘permanence’ of place is a form of investment in fixity and that ‘places do not come with some memories attached as if by nature but rather they are the “contested terrain of competing definitions” ‘(Cresswell, 2015). This understanding enables the questioning of the significance of those architectures of

Place When the United States were deliberating on the location for their seat of government, there was an air of concern around how the identity and current function of the location they decide on could influence proceedings. In reference to the UK Parliament being positioned at Westminster, some centuries after the City of London had established itself as an economic centre of trade, it was declared in the Debates of Congress (1857) that: ‘With respect to the uncentral [sic] situation of the seat of Government in other countries, this arose from the mere whims of the sovereigns of those kingdoms; but modern policy has obliged people of European countries (I refer particularly to Great Britain,) to fix the seat of Government near the centre of trade. It is the commercial importance of the city of London which makes it the seat of Government; and what is the consequence? London and Westminster, though they united send only six members to Parliament, have a greater

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Parliament requiring ‘fixity’, and those that do not. Through the need for the assembly of people, the debating chambers of the House of Commons and Lords, as well as the committee rooms require a fixity for a period of time. What would be the implication of these spaces becoming nomadic or relocating regularly? Could they utilise existing architectures and/or be the source of regeneration for buildings at risk? Would the collective memory, and therefore, negative connotations associated with the centrality of these spaces to one particular location be changed?

government offices within the regions is not an entirely new concept. In 1994, John Major introduced Government Offices for the regions (GOs) which were involved in implementing local policy and remained in place until 2011. To date, many offices have administrative locations throughout the country. The key point to make is that the policy is written and controlled by central government in Whitehall, with the regional arms used as ‘admin centres and a way to save money as office space and salaries are cheaper outside of London’ (HMRC Civil Servant. pers.comm., March 2018).

So far in my design research, I have approached the idea of place through the recognition of specific phenomena highlighted in the outcome of survey findings and news headlines (Fig.12). This was used as a tool to propose the relocation of government offices based on specific needs, as opposed to economic incentives such as cheap office space. One example is of the North East having the worst GCSE grades in the country. To research this further I would need to understand the details at a smaller scale to locate which areas of the North East (more likely Darlington or Sunderland as opposed to Newcastle and Durham) this represents. The possibility for these government offices to then move on to another location and in what form they could take is one which I intend to explore further.

Blomfield (2018) comments on the ‘prism of experience’ of policy makers being heavily influenced by their daily lives – for many, this is in the London region. This has been claimed as one of the factors for the success of the scheme to improve London schools (London School Challenge) in 2003 as many of the schools causing concerns were on the ‘patch’ of policy makers and parliamentarians (Cox, 2017). Allen & Cochrane (2010) add that despite technological advancements allowing for communications over a spatial divide, ‘little really happens at-a-distance… because the authority at the centre has already made its presence felt in its dealing with local bodies, public, private and third sectors, which, in turn, negotiate their own interests’. In proposing the relocation of Parliament and government offices across the region, the argument for the influence of proximity, despite our increase in communication Proximity technologies, is one which strongly supports this proposal. Although communication The argument for relocating Parliament technologies are now a significant part of is one located within contemporaneous our lives, there will always be moments discourse surrounding where telephone or video Right: Fig.12 - Locating Phenomena the extortionate costs of calls are not appropriate, as a Method for Relocationg restoring the Palace of therefore face-to-face Government Offices Westminster but locating conversations remain 20


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Redistribution of Governmental Departments Locating Phenomena


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Fig. 13,14,15 - HM Treasury and HMRC building

‘They’re usually for yearly reviews or serious matters, but they don’t have roofs on these pods so anything they say is not particularly private’

(HMRC Civil Servant pers.comm., March 2018) 23


important. The same argument also applies to debates being in person and why videocall interviews tend to precede one-to-one interviews. We are physical beings in physical spaces, and by being located in these spaces around other people, influence is applied.

or libraries? Figures 16, 17 & 18 began to try to imagine some of the architectures of government merged with everyday spaces of political expression as outlined in Oldenberg’s (2005) The Great Good Place. In arguing that there is increased disillusionment between the public and politics, it is interesting to perceive how the spaces of government are used and whether or not this ‘disconnection’ is also evident at the building scale. In Reinventing the Town Hall (2004) Ben Rogers identifies that these architectures used to be the centre of local democracy, yet they have grown increasingly ‘inaccessible, unwelcoming, and run down’. The lack of public space for democracy and political expression to naturally take place has been slowly removed, with many of these buildings morphing into the architecture of the everyday office building with fobbed-off zones restricting access. There is evidently a need for some privacy and security between those who govern and the populace, but this physical boundary between those who supposedly represent the opinions of the general public only exacerbates the disconnection. Rogers (2004) adds that this is also represented in the way that citizens wishing to attend a council meeting will be ‘ushered up a back staircase to an uncomfortable public gallery’ or at Westminster the public are placed in the ‘strangers’ gallery’. Goodsell (1988) concludes that ‘the impact of parliamentary architecture on political culture is essentially mediated by national elites. Mass behavioural involvement is limited to tourists who visit the capital city and watch from upstairs galleries’.

In a recent visit to Her Majesty’s Treasury and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ offices in Whitehall, many of these components in relation to proximity became evident. As the offices are increasingly moving towards a culture of ‘hot-desking’, I was informed that ‘people are travelling around a lot and therefore their desk may be unused most of the day which isn’t an efficient use of space’ (HMRC Civil Servant. pers.comm., March 2018). The regular movement of policy makers around the several departments throughout the City of London can only be perceived as increasing their sense of place and through this travel the opportunities for influence by lobbyists, think tank employees and the general public only becomes heightened. It is interesting also to notice that despite the increase in instant messaging and video call technologies, these offices also contain spaces which one-to-one meetings are intended to take place, ‘usually for yearly reviews or serious matters, but they don’t have roofs on these pods so anything they say is not particualry private’ (HMRC Civil Servant. pers.comm., March 2018). Space Though the offices of government aren’t easily differentiated from that of most other offices, questioning how these could be contained within other architectures or locations is one which my design research has tried to explore further. If the government is introducing flexible work environments, could the hot-desks be located within cafes 24


Public House / Library / Dining Room Furniture of Hybrid Types

Fig.16 - Furniture of Hybrid Types Drawing - Public House/Libary/ Dining Room

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Debating Chamber / Public House Furniture of Hybrid Types

Fig.17- Furniture of Hybrid Types Drawing - Debating Chamber/ Public House

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Public House / Debating Chamber / Corridor Furniture of Hybrid Types

Fig.18 - Furniture of Hybrid Types Drawing - Public House/Debating Chamber/Corridor

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Conclusion & Moving Forward

Some may argue that to relocate Parliament at a time of uncertainty following the outcome of the EU Referendum would only complicate and add expense to an already complex process. Notwithstanding, this pilot thesis has aimed to highlight that the current schemes through which the government is trying to solve regional disparities are not working. Moreover, this pilot thesis has shown that the narrative of a North-South divide and the city-centric agendas which aimed to close this gap have created a new disjuncture between the urban and rural localities in the UK. As the populations of the urban centres are getting younger and those of the ruralities getting

older, this divide is only likely to increase should the focus continue to favor economic growth of cities over trying to reconnect the peripheral towns and cities back into the conversation. The continuation of this project involves a significant period of fieldwork located in the North of England and London. Gaining a thorough understanding of the urban-rural disjuncture is pivotal within this period. Through an analysis of the role the architecture of local and national government plays in the lives of the everyday public, the reimagining and relocation of Parliament into the regions hopes to encourage an alternative view to addressing layers of disconnect within the UK.

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List of Figures

Figure 1 - Source: https://www.newstatesman. com/spotlight/devolution/2018/03/michaelheseltine-northern-powerhouse-glass-half-full Figure 2 - Author’s Own Figure 3 - Author’s Own Figure 4 - Source: https://urbismanchester. wordpress.com/exhibitions/supercity/ Figure 5 - Source: https://urbismanchester. wordpress.com/exhibitions/supercity/ Figure 6 - Source: https://urbismanchester. wordpress.com/exhibitions/supercity/ Figure 7 Source: https://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ georgeosborne/11941558/George-OsborneTax-credit-cuts-will-save-Britain-15bn-ayear-from-2016.html Figure 8 - Author’s Own Figure 9 - Author’s Own Figure 10 - Author’s Own Figure 11 - Author’s Own Figure 12 - Author’s Own Figure 13 - Author’s Own Figure 14 - Author’s Own Figure 15 - Author’s Own Figure 16 - Author’s Own Figure 17 - Author’s Own Figure 18 - Author’s Own

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